Identifying with “The Native” in Anglo-american Environmental Writing: A Rhetorical Study

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IDENTIFYING WITH “THE NATIVE”
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL WRITING:
A RHETORICAL STUDY

by
Alexis F. Piper

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ABSTRACT

IDENTIFYING WITH “THE NATIVE” IN ANGLO-AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL WRITING: A RHETORICAL STUDY

by

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The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016
Under the Supervision of Professor Anne Wysocki

In an effort to contribute to rhetorical theories of “identification” this dissertation examines Anglo nature writing written for Anglo audiences in the United States over several centuries. In my conclusion, I suggest approaches current nature writers might use to offer audiences ways of engaging with Indigenous peoples and Native conceptions of environment that are more ethical, appropriate, and effective than approaches used in previous centuries. I maintain that such approaches could potentially open possibilities for less destructive conceptions of and relationships with the “natural” world than are currently in use. I rely on the rhetorical concept “identification” (as developed and complicated by theorists over the last century) in my analysis of Anglo-American environmental writing for whites in three different time periods, focusing on how influential and widely read nature writers encouraged their white readers to conceive of Native peoples and Native relationships with environment. First, I argue that Anglo-American writers of the mid-nineteenth century encouraged their audiences to feel nothing in common—to disidentify—with Natives and nature, an approach which reinforces the long-standing Western tradition of “othering” Natives and the natural world as adversaries to be conquered or as resources to be exploited. Then, in my
analysis of Anglo-American nature writing of the second half of the twentieth century, I argue that writers of the time encouraged audiences to seek to become like—to consubstantially identify with—Native peoples and the natural world, an approach which ultimately suggests to audiences that Native peoples can be dissipated into sameness and are resources that can be known and owned. Finally, I argue that influential Anglo nature writers at the end of the twentieth century encourage their audiences to experience relationships with Native peoples that are marked by exploring both similarities and differences—a non-identification. However, although such non-identifications should open possibilities for white audiences and writers to listen to and learn from Indigenous eco-orientations, I also demonstrate how influential twenty-first century non-Native nature writers continue to write for white readers primarily about “the Native,” without letting Indigenous peoples speak and be heard on their own terms and in their own words. Therefore, although non-identification is theorized as a first step towards genuine engagement and rhetorical listening, twenty-first century non-Native nature writing has not achieved this important objective of rhetorical listening in its construction of Native peoples. Through my analysis of each period, I illustrate how the kind of identification predominantly used in that period made sense given the political and cultural context of the time. However, in each era I analyze, authors also sow seeds for different kinds of identifications (for example, although Anglo writers of the mid-nineteenth century encouraged their white readers to construct disidentifications with Native peoples, there are seeds of consubstantial identifications). This dissertation thus ends with a consideration of how non-Native environmental writers can encourage their audiences to listen rhetorically to and construct more active non-identifications with Native writers.
and with Native writing on the environment in the hope that such an approach can encourage a wider range of possible relationships with and conceptions of our environment.
For a place once called Byron Center and all who were touched by it.

For Robert and Finnegan. Paragons of patience and perseverance.

And in gratitude to Dr. Anne Wysocki, without whose patience, insight, and foresight this project would not have been possible.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Chapter One: Introduction to the Project and Definitions of Key Terms**  
1  
Structure of Dissertation and Justification of Selected Texts  
11  
Definitions of Key Terms and Terminology  
16  
Defining and Tracing Identification: Identification, Consubstantial Identification, Disidentification, and Non-Identification  
26

**Chapter Two: Analysis of Nineteenth-Century Nature Writing: Disidentification with “the Native” in the Work of Thoreau and Muir**  
39  
Cultural and Political Context: Native-White Relations in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century  
43  
Differences Between Thoreau and Muir’s Time  
55  
Disidentification with “The Native” in Thoreau’s *Walden*  
60  
The Potential for Consubstantiality in *Walden*  
76  
Disidentifications with Native Bodies in Muir’s *The Mountains of California*  
80  
The Potential for Consubstantiality in Muir’s Work  
95  
Chapter Conclusions  
98

**Chapter Three: Analysis of Nature Writing of the 1960s: Consubstantial Identifications with “the Native” in the Work of John Hay and Gary Snyder**  
101  
Cultural and Political Context: Native-White Relations in the 1960s and 1970s  
103  
Consubstantial Identifications in John Hay’s *In Defense of Nature*  
116  
Possibilities for Non-Identification in Hay  
131  
Consubstantial Identifications in Gary Snyder’s *Turtle Island*  
137  
Possibilities for Non-Identification in Snyder  
153  
Chapter Conclusions  
157

**Chapter Four: Analysis of Nature Writing of the 1980s: Non-Identifications with Native Eco-Orientations in the Work of Gary Paul Nabhan and Barry Lopez**  
161  
Cultural and Political Context: Affairs in Native Communities in the 1980s  
164  
Non-Identification in Gary Paul Nabhan’s *The Desert Smells Like Rain*  
175  
Possibilities for Active Non-Identification in Nabhan  
194  
Non-Identification in Barry Lopez’s *Arctic Dreams*  
196  
Possibilities for Active Non-Identification in Lopez  
213  
Chapter Conclusions  
216

**Chapter Five: Towards Ethically Engaging Native Writing on the Environment: Opening Possibilities for Active Non-Identification and Rhetorical Listening**  
221  
Why Ethically Engage? To What?  
222  
Towards an Understanding of Rhetorical Listening  
227  
Evidence Suggesting Rhetorical Listening is Not Occurring in Twenty-First Century Anglo-American Environmental Writing  
232  
Possibilities for Encouraging Active Non-Identifications and Rhetorical Listening  
237  
Works Cited  
250  
Curriculum Vitae  
269
Chapter One

Introduction to the Project and Definitions of Key Terms

Scientists agree that global climate change, human overpopulation, resource depletion, loss of biodiversity, and recent mass extinctions have made our current state on this planet one of ecological crisis.\textsuperscript{1} While those who write on the environment often work to help readers formulate different relations with the natural world that might help mitigate the effects of the looming crisis, many rhetoricians agree that past writing has not succeeded and that environmental writers need to do a better job of advocating for new relations with the natural world.\textsuperscript{2} From its inception, Anglo nature writing in the United States written predominantly for white readers has considered Native Americans as possessing conceptions of nature that differ from Anglo relations, and that those conceptions therefore might help Anglo readers develop more appropriate relationships with our environment. While this is an overly simplistic romanticization and essentialization of a wide array of Indigenous peoples and environmental

\textsuperscript{1} For example, Dr. James Hansen, one of the nation’s leading scientists on climate issues maintains that, due to human-caused climate change, the “planet Earth, creation, the world on which civilization developed is in imminent peril... The continued exploitation of all fossil fuels on Earth threatens not only the other millions of species on the planet but also the survival of humanity itself” (IX). In addition, scientists have concluded that the Earth is in the midst of a sixth mass extinction. According to Berkeley paleobiologist Anthony Barnosky the mass extinction we are currently witnessing differs from previous extinctions— when three-quarters of the world’s species vanished— in that this one is primarily human caused (Gibbons). Additionally, as Sessions points out, “Human-caused species extinction has accelerated from approximately 1,000 species per year in the 1970s to more than 10,000 species per year at present” (xiv). According to most biologists, including Pulitzer Prize winning Harvard biologist E.O. Wilson, the loss of biodiversity since the Industrial Revolution is astounding, and will continue to worsen dramatically in the coming decades (12). Thus, the course we are currently on is one of continued global environmental degradation and ecological crisis.

\textsuperscript{2} For example, numerous environmental historians, eco-philosophers, eco-rhetoricians, eco-compositionists, and environmental writers have demonstrated that despite burgeoning environmental awareness and the prevalence of environmental language within mainstream discourse over the last forty years, environmentalism has generally failed to incite audiences to action on behalf of the environment (for instance, see Oelschlaeger 3, Cantrill and Oravec 1, Bruner and Oelschlaeger xviii and 210, Killingsworth and Palmer 26, Brick 196, Pellow and Brulle 3, and Dobrin and Weiss 2). In other words, increasingly widespread concern and awareness on environmental issues have not been translated into large-scale action on behalf of the environment, or into more helpful and appropriate conceptions of and relationships to place.
attitudes I don’t want to perpetuate, I do think examining possible alternatives to the mainstream and long-established Western tradition of considering the “natural” world as a resource that exists for exploitation by humans need to be challenged. Given the state of our environment in the twenty-first century, alternatives need to be explored. However, using the rhetorical concept of identification to analyze environmental writing at three time periods important to Native-White relations in the United States, shows us that current practices of identification—and hence of Anglo readers’ relations with Native Americans and the environment—have, by and large, not helped readers develop different relations with the natural world. Instead, a reconception of the rhetorical notion of "non-identification" might potentially open possibilities for readers to develop more helpful relations with our environment.

Opening such possibilities is needed now because, as scholars have repeatedly demonstrated, despite burgeoning environmental awareness and the prevalence of environmental language within mainstream discourses, environmental writing has in large part failed to incite audiences to action on behalf of the environment (for example, Oelschlaeger 3, Cantrill and Oravec 1, Bruner and Oelschlaeger xviii and 210, Killingsworth and Palmer 26, Brick 196). In essence, even though environmental writing has "produced a substantial body of literature, it has not to this date effected consequential social changes” (Bruner and Oelschlaeger xviii). Further, despite a continued proliferation of nature writing and environmental texts, important findings in the field of environmental science, increasing involvement in environmental issues by the scientific community, the advancement of ecophilosophical positions such as deep ecology and eco-feminism, and developments in the application of rhetorical theory to environmental texts, as yet environmental concern has not been transformed into large-scale action on behalf of the natural world (Sessions xiv). Therefore, it would help if new possibilities could be opened for
how we conceive of, communicate on, and relate to the natural world—which is what I will strive to do in this dissertation through a re-imagining of the rhetorical concept of non-identification and an analysis of how Anglo-American environmental writers have constructed various kinds of identifications with Native peoples and Indigenous environmental attitudes for their largely white audiences.

Although I want to avoid romanticizing and essentializing Native conceptions of environment and perpetuating the erroneous conception that there is one “Native” view of environment when there are as many perspectives on the natural world as there are individual people, I do think alternatives to mainstream, Western understandings of the natural world should be explored given our state of ecological crisis. In short, the long-held depiction (by white, male “environmental” writers) of Native peoples and their attitudes toward the natural world as understood by white people have long served as a corrective or a counterpoint to white, Western, Anglo-European conceptions of and relationships to environment does a disservice to

3 As Reginald Horsman points out in his book Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism, I realize that the concept of a distinct, superior Anglo-Saxon race is not only problematic (to say the very least), but also largely a myth without basis in historical or “racial” actuality, a myth that has its origins in the sixteenth and seventeenth century (Horsman 1). However, for reasons of practicality and expediency I find it necessary to distinguish between white and Indigenous peoples, so I use the term “Anglo” throughout this dissertation to refer to predominantly white, male, English-speaking Americans with European heritage. Therefore, rather than a “racial” category (which is erroneous because—despite how the term “Anglo” has been used particularly since the first decades of the nineteenth century in the United States and Europe (Horsman 25)—there is no such thing as an “Anglo-Saxon” or “Anglo” race) I use the term “Anglo” throughout this project to refer to English-speaking, non-Native, Americans of European ancestry. In other words, I use it mostly to distinguish English-speaking, white, American Europeans from Native peoples who have ancestral origins on the North American continent; however, I realize that “Anglo” and “Native” are not parallel or binary terms. Out of necessity, to make my argument, and to undertake the project I’ve envisioned, I necessarily have to delineate between non-Native or “Anglo”-European peoples and Indigenous peoples; I necessarily have to get into tricky territory. However, I realize there are infinite grey areas and gradations in between the often dichotomous (mis)nomers and over-generalized categorizations of “Anglo” and “Native.” I will explain my use of particular terminology further later in this chapter in the sections “Definitions of Key Terms.”

4 In fact, as Robert Berkhofer, Jr. points out in The White Man’s Indian, not only is there no such thing as any one “Native” environmental outlook or attitude, there is really no such thing as any one collective “Indian” or “Native” due to the fact that “The original inhabitants of the Western Hemisphere neither called themselves by a single term nor understood themselves as a collectivity” (1); therefore, even though Native Americans were and certainly are real, “the Indian was white invention and still remains largely a White image, if not stereotype” (1).
the diversity of Indigenous cultures, peoples, and orientations. However, failing to engage with the potential diversity of alternatives to Anthropocentric or humankind-centered conceptions of environment often—although not always—offered by some Native writers is also a disservice, and perhaps equally unhelpful. Therefore, I argue that one possibility for helping audiences develop more appropriate relations with and conceptions of the environment could be a more “genuine,” non-proprietary, non-appropriative, and less dismissive engagement with Native writing on the natural world and with different Indigenous eco-orientations as articulated by a wide array of different Native people.

Writing for white audiences, since the time of Thoreau and the inception of American environmental writing on this continent white, male, “environmental” writers have turned to their own oversimplified understanding of Native peoples to describe a supposed awareness of environment and a relationship with particular landscapes that differs from Western, Anthropocentric (or human-centered) relationships with and conceptions of the natural world. For example, Thoreau writes in The Main Woods, “The Indian begins where we leave off… so much the more divine; and anything that fairly excites our admiration expands us. Not only for strength, but for beauty, the poet must travel the logger’s path and the Indian’s trail, to drink at some new and more bracing fountain of the Muses, far in the recesses of the wilderness” (114). Thoreau’s evocation of “the Native” here is representative of a larger, fundamentally essentializing trend evident in nature writing for at least the last 160 years—and is still apparent today. For example, the work of numerous contemporary environmental writers such as Lopez (411), Williams (154), Annie Dillard (114), Charles Wohlforth (107) Scott Russell Sanders (361), and Wendell Berry (50, 84-85) consistently evokes and depicts Native conceptions of

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5 Thoreau is often credited as the first American nature writer. For example, Max Oelschlaeger remarks that “It is no exaggeration to say that today all thought of the wilderness flows in Walden’s wake” (171) and Scott Lyon who credits Thoreau with founding the genre of American nature writing [xi].
environment. However, given our current state of ecological crisis and given the general shortcomings of environmental writing, these longstanding, essentializing, and stereotypical evocations of Native peoples and Indigenous conceptions of environment have—by and large—not proven helpful and productive in helping audiences forge less destructive relationships with the natural world. Therefore, in order to challenge the not-so-useful employment of Native peoples as a corrective or a dichotomous alternative to mainstream, white, Western conceptions of environment, and, moreover, in an effort to contribute to the rhetorical concept of identification, in this project I complicate how white, male writers have constructed different kinds of relationships or identifications with their own perceptions of Native peoples and Indigenous understandings of the natural world largely for white readers.

I point out in this dissertation that Anglo nature writers in the United States writing largely for white readers have, by and large and at different times in history, constructed three primary kinds of identifications in three different time periods important to Native American status in this country. However, these identifications—these relationships Anglo nature writers have depicted between Native peoples and the environment, as well as the relationships Anglo writers have constructed between themselves as white environmental writers and Native people—have, in general and all too often, been dismissive, proprietary, or have failed to engage with the actual words of Native Americans. As a result, as I will argue after offering extended explanations of the rhetorical concept of “identification,” the kinds of identifications non-Native environmental writers in the United States have constructed with Native peoples and Native conceptions of the natural world have, in large part, not helped readers develop new relations with environment. Yet, there remains the possibility that a further theorization of the specific type of identification termed non-identification by rhetorician Krista Ratcliffe may potentially
help audiences develop less ecologically pernicious and human-centered, and more appropriate, ethical, and sustainable relations with the natural world.

Identification as a rhetorical concept pertains to the ways we see ourselves as having important characteristics, experiences, values, beliefs, ideologies, and personal investments (in short, the building blocks of identity) in common with others. In fact, the general concept of identification means the seeking of common ground for purposes of persuasion. As numerous rhetoricians have pointed out (Biesecker, Brock and Chesebro, for example), beginning with the writings of Kenneth Burke in the mid-twentieth century who first developed the term, identification becomes a key concept essential for understanding persuasion, rhetorical exchanges, the construction of the Social, and the human condition. In short, since Burke, identification has developed into a concept that is of the utmost importance to Rhetoric as a discipline (Steinmann 47). Following Burke’s naming of “identification,” identification has been critiqued, complicated, and further theorized by a number of theorists and rhetoricians so that scholars have teased out different kinds of identifications, including the three specific kinds of identifications I analyze in the following chapters: disidentification, consubstantial identification, and non-identification. Rather than contributing to Native history or scholarship, this dissertation is meant to contribute to this tradition: to the critique and complication of the rhetorical concept of identification.

As I hope to make clear in the body of this dissertation (in chapters two, three and four), I contend that American environmental writers writing for white readers have primarily relied on three different relationships with Native peoples at different points in history: a disavowal of Native people that sees them as “other” and as completely dissimilar (a disidentification), which was prevalent in the middle of the nineteenth century; a relationship that views Native peoples as
completely like “us,” as similar and essentially indistinguishable from Anglo-Americans (a consubstantial identification), which was the predominant relationship constructed by Anglo nature writers in the middle of the twentieth century; and a relationship that allows for differences and similarities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples (a non-identification), an approach that became prevalent in Anglo environmental writing at the end of the twentieth century, and now into the twenty-first century. Further, even though there is a predominant iteration of identification that marks the particular era and that makes sense given the political and cultural context of that era, the environmental authors I analyze are planting seeds of the next iteration of identification. (So, for example, as the nineteenth century authors Thoreau and Muir rely primarily on disidentification with Native peoples, these authors are also planting seeds for their readers to consubstantially identify with Native peoples and Indigenous attitudes toward environment.) Therefore, in analyzing how Anglo-American nature writers encourage their audiences to construct different kinds of identifications with Native peoples, we see that there has been a movement towards identificatory practices that are increasingly more respective and tolerant of difference and potential similarities. This movement shows us that identifications with Native Americans by Anglo-American environmental writers and thus by their still predominantly white readership—although all too often an essentializing oversimplification—is not static; it evolves and challenges readers to engage perspectives that may be other than what mainstream culture and the political and cultural context of the time dictates. However, this development seems to be stalled in the twenty-first century. More specifically, even though Krista Ratcliffe theorizes non-identification (the primary kind of identification Anglo nature writers are constructing for readers at the end of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century) as a necessary first step towards “genuine,” ethical and appropriate
engagement or rhetorical listening, Anglo-American environmental writers have not yet taken this step and reached this potentially helpful objective of rhetorical listening with Native peoples and the often alternative environmental ethics they frequently—although not always—articulate. So, by critiquing and complicating the concept of non-identification and thereby contributing to rhetorical theory and conceptions of identification, I hope to point out in this dissertation how active non-identifications followed potentially by rhetorical listening may (again, potentially) help readers challenge pernicious Western ecological paradigms. Additionally, active non-identifications followed by what Ratcliffe terms “rhetorical listening” may also help readers challenge the stereotype of the “ecological Indian”—or the perception (most often by non-Native white people) of all Indigenous people's supposedly innate, deep seated knowledge of their environments—as well as helping us challenge the misconception that Native peoples as a romanticized, essentialized monolith. In short, although my main focus is on how a reconceptualization of non-identification can contribute to rhetorical theory and to the ways we communicate about our environments, there are other possibilities for theorizing more active non-identifications that I hope become apparent throughout the course of this project.

In her book-length project on rhetorical listening, *Rhetorical Listening: Identification, Gender, Whiteness*, rhetorician Krista Ratcliffe theorizes “rhetorical listening” as “a code of cross-cultural conduct” that “signifies a stance of openness that a person may choose to assume in relation to any person, text, or culture” (17). Essentially, according to Ratcliffe, rhetorical listening can help subjects “negotiate troubled identifications in order to facilitate cross-cultural communication about any topic” (17), and it is particularly useful for negotiating troubled, intersecting identifications between gender and race. The purpose of rhetorical listening is to “cultivate conscious identifications in ways that promote productive communication, especially
but not exclusively cross-culturally” (25). Principally, what rhetorical listening involves is listening beyond your own self-interests, listening not only for what you can agree or disagree with, listening not only for what you can identify with or disidentify with, but listening with empathy to the cultural logics enmeshed with different claims, arguments, and positions (28). Rhetorically listening can help people hear, engage, and communicate across cultures ethically and appropriately. Further, rhetorical listening enabled and preceded by a conscious position of non-identification may potentially offer individuals a way to “genuinely” communicate, understand, engage in productive discourse, and listen to one another across cultures without fear of disavowal, dismissal, diminishment, appropriation, or exploitation.

As I find in my rhetorical analysis, despite the different kinds of identifications across time, Anglo-American environmental writers are not yet listening rhetorically to Native peoples. In fact, throughout American nature writing’s long tradition of turning to Indigenous peoples, the kinds of identifications nature writers have historically constructed with their conceptions of Native peoples have too often proven inappropriate, unethical, as well as rhetorically ineffective in that they have frequently failed to help Anglo readers develop more egalitarian conceptions of and relationships to the environment. In addition, the identifications Anglo writers have constructed with Native peoples have also failed to challenge the ecologically pernicious paradigms of Anthropocentrism and developmentalism, schemas that many Anglo-Western readers work from and understand the world from (and that I will define shortly). Further, by and large, the identifications Anglo nature writers have constructed with Native peoples have too often proven ineffective because, similar to the ways American wilderness or “Nature” itself has long been (mis)used within the Western, Imperial tradition, Native eco-orientations are either known and owned (in the case of consubstantial identifications) or they are completely “othered”
and depicted the enemy to be subdued (as is the case with disidentifications). In short, the trend of consubstantial identification is exploitative and the trend of disidentification is dismissive—and both of these identificatory trends reinforce Anthropocentric orientations while often truncating potentially productive discourse. By comparison, as I will make clear in my final chapter, a further theorization of non-identification, and in particular a theorization of more active non-identification, may possibly offer opportunities for rhetorical listening and cross-cultural communication with a wide array of Native eco-orientations, thereby potentially opening possibilities for less Anthropocentric and more ethical, egalitarian, and productive environmental discourse.

**Structure of Dissertation and Justification of Selected Texts**

My rhetorical analysis begins in the 1850s with work of Thoreau, which environmental historians consider to be the dawn of a uniquely American form of nature writing (Lyon xi). From there, I take cross-sections at two other places in American nature writing history (the middle of the twentieth century, and the closing decades of the twentieth century) so that I am able to demonstrate how identification strategies have changed over time to become more respective of cultural difference and similarities, and how the three periods I examine roughly correspond to three types of identification. I chose these time periods because they are some important periods in Native-White relations, and they are periods that correspond with important

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6 In *This Incomparable Land* environmental literature scholar Thomas Lyons demonstrates the long, rich tradition of writing and communicating about the “natural” world that has shaped American literature. Although a significant number of eco-critics and nature writing scholars point to Thoreau as the originator of the genre, Lyons reminds his readers that the roots of the tradition of writing on behalf of “nature” run at least as deep as the founding of our nation, and can be traced back to the natural history writing that was popularized in America throughout the second half of the eighteenth-century (Lyon xi). In fact, as American literary scholar and nature writer Edward Hoagland notes: “Thoreau, though far from being the first ‘nature writer,’ has come to stand for the whole genre” (xvi). Although not the first (Hoagland, for example, traces the environmental writing tradition back to the Bible, in particular the book of Job) by contemporary consensus, he certainly remains one of the most influential.
changes in Native affairs (as I will describe in each rhetorical analysis chapter before I analyze the texts from each respective period). Although by no means am I an expert on Native history or Native scholarship and by no means is the focus of this dissertation a contribution to Native history or scholarship (rather, my focus is contributing to how we think about the rhetorical concept of “identification” and how different identifications play out), I hope that I provide enough historical context to show how Native-white relations were changing and how each iteration of identification made sense given the socio-political-historical context of the time. In essence, I hope my research in each period provides enough context for Native-white relations to show how the dominant form of identification used at that particular time made sense given the particular political and historical milieu. And yet, while the predominant kinds of identification are historical context dependent, analyzing specific kinds of identifications in these historical eras also shows us that environmental writers were striving to plant seeds of a different kind of identification, one that is potentially more open to cultural differences and similarities. In short, although I am not a historian and this is not a historical dissertation that aims to contribute to historical or Indigenous scholarship, I hope it is apparent that I have done enough research in the historical-political context sections of each chapter to bolster my argument about each iteration of identification and to assuage concerns about my knowledge. And I also hope that readers will be generous towards my treatment of Native history and scholarship. The chapter that follows this one—a chapter in which I analyze the nineteenth century works by Thoreau and Muir—offers the most historical context and points out the differences between the context in which each author was writing primarily because such a large gulf in years separates the publication of Thoreau’s *Walden* and Muir’s *The Mountains of California*, specifically forty years.
The primary texts I chose for my rhetorical analysis include *On Walden Pond* by Henry David Thoreau, *The Mountains of California* by John Muir (both from the second half of the nineteenth century), *Turtle Island* by Gary Snyder, *In Defense of Nature* by John Hay (both published in 1969), *Arctic Dreams* by Barry Lopez, and *The Desert Smells Like Rain* by Gary Paul Nabhan (both originally published in the late 1980s). These texts were chosen because of their influence and the general importance of their authors to the genre of American nature writing. For example, all of the authors I chose are highlighted by the contributors and editors of nature anthologies such as *The Norton Book of Nature Writing* (Robert Finch and John Elder, editors), *This Incomperable Land* (Thomas Lyon) and *What’s Nature Worth?* (Terre Satterfield and Scott Slovic). As further evidence of their influence and continued relevance, the authors I analyze are often studied by environmental rhetoricians (for example, Opie and Elliot 22; Clark, Halloran, and Woodford 265, 274; Slovic 89). In addition, throughout my own reading of American nature writing, Thoreau, Muir, Snyder, Hay, Lopez and Nabhan are often mentioned by other nature writers as being particularly influential to their own work and thinking. Finally, these particular authors and texts were also chosen because their original publication dates correspond with several important periods of change in Native communities, as I hope to make clear in the upcoming analysis chapters in my political and cultural context sections.

Before the analysis of each author’s text I offer a brief account of that particular author’s influence on the genre and their significance to ecological thought and environmental writing. It is my hope that these introductions to each author establish the particular author’s influence, why that particular author was chosen, and how they may be representative of larger trends taking place throughout environmental writing, particularly of the trends involving disidentifications, consubstantial identification, and non-identifications by Anglo writers and their white readers.
with Native peoples. In chapter four, in which I analyze environmental writing of the late twentieth century, focusing on Gary Paul Nabhan and Barry Lopez’s writing, I also briefly provide examples of non-identification from other Anglo environmental authors of the period. I offer this additional “evidence” of non-identification with Native peoples because of the increasing volume of environmental texts published during the late twentieth century.

By analyzing environmental authors who have been particularly impactful I hope to establish that, indeed, disidentification, consubstantial identifications, and non-identifications were taking place, they were a significant trend, and they were the primary way Anglo, non-Native environmental writers were relating to Native peoples at that time. Yet, as I will also point out in each chapter, Anglo nature writers are also planting seeds of the next identificatory practice that is potentially more receptive to cultural differences in relationships with environment. Thus, as I will point out in my concluding chapter, rhetorical listening makes sense as a next step. However, as I will also illustrate in my final chapter, twenty-first century environmental writers are not yet taking this important step, one that could potentially help readers develop more egalitarian, ethical, and appropriate relationships with the natural world.

Each of the following chapters begins with a brief explanation of what that chapter hopes to accomplish, and then I provide the cultural and political context for the period, focusing on what is occurring in Native communities and on Native-White relations of the era. Again, these historical-political context sections are included to show how a particular kind of identification makes sense at a given period, and I hope that I have provide enough research in these sections to bolster my argument about identification and changing identifications with Native peoples. In short, I include these sections—despite the fact that this project aims to contribute to rhetorical theory and the ways we think of identification, and does not seek to contribute to Native history
or Native scholarship— because the kinds of identifications forged by the Anglo authors of each period are related to Native-White affairs and interactions, and the status of Native peoples. Therefore, the kinds of identifications white audiences are encouraged to make made sense given the concurrent political and cultural context. Essentially, I hope this historical context will demonstrate how Anglo nature writers drew from the kind of identification with Native peoples that was prevalent in mainstream white culture at that time. Yet, the Anglo authors I analyze are also challenging their white readers towards attitudes that may be more amenable to cultural differences and similarities in environmental attitude by planting seeds of the next kind of identification. Yet, this progression is not yet occurring given that twenty-first century Anglo environmental writers are not yet rhetorically listening to Native peoples and Indigenous environmental outlooks (which is a claim I will provide evidence for in my concluding chapter).

Then, after the cultural and political context is established, in chapters two, three, and four, I offer my rhetorical analysis of the chosen authors and texts from each period. These rhetorical analyses, I believe, demonstrate that each historical era is marked by a certain kind of identification, and then I include a section that analyzes how each author is also planting seeds of a different kind of identification, one that may potentially be more respectful of cultural similarities and differences. Throughout my rhetorical analysis in places I turn to the work of environmental rhetoricians, wilderness philosophers, and Native scholars to help my readers better understand certain stereotypes, as well as conceptions of wilderness and different Native peoples that are occurring at a given time. Each chapter concludes with the implications of my analysis and its importance for my overall argument.
Definitions of Key Terms and Terminology

Here it will help if I define important terms I rely on throughout my dissertation. Toward this end, in this section I define the terms “Anthropocentrism,” “ecocentrism,” and “developmentalism,” which I use throughout this project as a kind of shorthand for different ecological paradigms. Finally in this section, I clarify why I use other terminology, including “eco-orientations,” “Anglo,” “Native,” “Indigenous,” “‘natural’ world,” landscape,” and “environment.” All of the terms I define in this section are used throughout the dissertation, from my second to my final chapter.

Essentially the characterizations “Anthropocentrism,” “ecocentrism,” and “developmentalism” are terms used to denote different ways of thinking about humankind’s place or orientation within the vast project of Life on this planet. Put differently, they are different environmental attitudes and schemas constructed and reinforced by cultural norms. First, “Anthropocentrists,” according to the wilderness philosopher Max Oelschaleager, “see the human species as the most significant fact of existence, and accordingly evaluate all else from a human standpoint” (293). Within Anthropocentric orientations, the natural world has no inherent rights and is valuable only in how it serves the wants and needs of humankind. Anthropocentrists envision, reason, and argue almost exclusively from a human-centered perspective. Under Anthropocentrism, other species and the planet are given little to no ethical, moral, or empathetic consideration beyond their usefulness to humankind. In The Death of Nature environmental historian Carolyn Merchant contends that Anthropocentric, domination-and-manipulation-of-nature orientations have held sway since the eighteenth-century Enlightenment (11). Scholars, eco-historians, and environmental philosophers from Max Oelschlaeger, to Paul Shepard, to Martin Luther Calvin, to Lynn White have traced this Anthropocentric mentality back even
further to the turn from a hunter-gathering existence to agriculture and the subsequent foundation of monotheistic, Abrahamic religious traditions. Throughout this dissertation I work from the assumption (as outlined by numerous environmental thinkers such as Oelschlaeger, Merchant, and White) that Anthropocentrism is the ecologically pernicious current status quo that writing on the environment has the potential to help audiences challenge and possibly move beyond. Further, as I will come back to in my concluding chapter, certain Native writers may potentially open possibilities for audiences to engage with alternatives to Anthropocentrism as an environmentally destructive paradigm.

In contrast to Anthropocentrism, ecocentrism is “an egalitarian attitude on the part of humans toward all members of the ecosphere” (Ulman 68). Ecocentrists, in general, view all life as possessing rights, intrinsic worth, and ethical consideration. The human species is part of the larger picture of life on this planet, and the interdependence of all beings—including human beings—is acknowledged and esteemed within an ecocentric ethic. Merchant contends that, “An ecocentric ethic is grounded in the cosmos. The whole environment is assigned intrinsic value” (57). Within an ecocentric ethic, humanity is not the pinnacle of creation, not the only life form that matters. For example, in their book *Deep Ecology: Living as If Nature Mattered*, Bill Devall and George Sessions write, an ecocentric movement “is committed to the principles that the well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman Life on Earth have value in and of themselves… these values are independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes,” and “the richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves” (70). Therefore, theoretically, within an ecocentric orientation, all life forms are valued and all life forms should have the right to develop towards their full potential. Along these lines, environmental rhetorician H. Lewis Ulman defines
ecocentrism as, “an egalitarian attitude on the part of humans not only toward all members of the ecosphere, but even toward all identifiable entities or forms in the ecosphere” (68). These definitions of ecocentrism have in common an understanding of the natural world—the world beyond the human species and its culture—as possessing rights, moral consideration, and intrinsic worth, or worth outside and beyond human confines. Ecocentrism maintains that all species and landscapes possess inherent value, that humans are not superior to other species in a moral or ethical sense, and that, therefore, human needs and wants should not supersede those of other species or landscapes. In short, within ecocentrism, man is not the arbiter of rights or value. In addition, everything—including whole ecosystems and their “nonliving” members—are encompassed within an ecocentric ethic. Throughout this project, I will work from the assumption (again, as a number of wilderness philosophers and other scholars do, including Oelschlaeger, Merchant, Louis Owens, and Paul Shepard) that moving towards more ecocentric thought would be beneficial for mainstream culture and humankind in general. Eventually I will point out how more active non-identifications with specific Native writing on the environment may potentially open possibilities for readers of Anglo-American environmental literature to move more in this direction, towards more ecocentric orientations.

And the last ecological orientation I define here because I use the concept throughout this project is “developmentalism,” which varies significantly from ecocentrism, and has a number of underlying similarities with Anthropocentrism. “Developmentalist” was coined by Jimmie Killingsworth and Jacqueline Palmer in Ecospeak: Rhetoric and Environmental Politics in America. Killingsworth and Palmer contend that “environmentalist” and “developmentalist” camps are in deeply entrenched, static, incommunicative gridlock. Defining “developmentalism” and speaking to this “oversimplified dichotomy,” they write: “On one side are the
environmentalists, who seek long-term protection of endangered environments regardless of short-term economic costs. On the other side are the developmentalists who seek short-term economic gain regardless of the long-term environmental costs” (9). Within developmentalism “progress” has become a “total ideology” (23) or a god term that trumps all other concerns for other species and ecosystems.7 Within a developmentalist orientation, all “progress” is good and goes unquestioned. In addition, humankind’s total, unchallenged right to progress and development takes precedence over all other species and other ethical concerns. In concurrence with the authors I cited to define developmentalism, throughout this project I also work from the assumption that developmentalism is the status quo ideology that currently holds sway in mainstream, Western culture. I will also work from the understanding articulated by Killingsworth and Palmer that developmentalism is an ultimately unsustainable and destructive paradigm, and thus it would be helpful if we could challenge and explore alternatives to this deeply entrenched yet pernicious paradigm. As I lay out in the following chapters, approaches of disidentification and consubstantial identification with Native peoples and Indigenous conceptions of environment are ultimately not helpful in opening alternatives to developmentalism and Anthropocentrism; whereas a further theorization of non-identification may potentially offer one possibility for moving beyond the status quo ideologies of Anthropocentrism and developmentalism.

Other terms I want to briefly clarify and justify here include “eco-orientation,” “Anglo,” “Native” and “Indigenous,” as well as references to “the ‘natural’ world,” “landscape,” and

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7 In The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics Roderick Frazier Nash finds that it was not until the counterculture movements of the 1960s and 70s that Americans truly began to challenge traditional American definitions of “progress” (85); therefore, it was not until the latter half of the twentieth century that the public began to seriously question developmentalism.
“environment.” In short, I would like to take the opportunity here to offer a brief explanation of the specific language and terminology I use throughout this dissertation.

Firstly, by “eco-orientation” I am referring to the determination of position within the vast scheme of Life on this planet. Eco-orientation, in other words, refers to an individual or a culture’s relationship to other beings, and an individual or a culture’s estimation of their position within their “natural” surroundings. In short, eco-orientation means ones’ conception of the natural world and where one fits in within the context of the environment, within the totality of Life. Of course, eco-orientations are culturally and linguistically constructed and reinforced modus operandi. Essentially, “eco-orientation” is my own shorthand for culturally constructed and reinforced estimations of where an individual sees themselves in relations to other beings and life forms, and in relation to the natural world.

I have to use the admittedly problematic and ambiguous “Anglo” throughout this project to refer to English speaking, white or non-Native males of European ancestry. I realize that “Anglo” and “Native” are not parallel terms, primarily because there are an infinite number of gradations and infinitely complex identities and cultural identifications in between the two ultimately not dichotomous terminologies. However, in order to undertake the project of exploring how essentially non-Native, English-speaking white males whose ancestors came from Western Europe rather than the North American continent shape identifications with the various Indigenous peoples of this continent for their English-speaking, predominantly “white,” non-Native readers, I find it necessary to use the term “Anglo.” And yet, I am aware of and I think it’s important to acknowledge the fact that, as Reginald Horsman points out throughout Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism, there is no such thing as “a distinct, superior Anglo-Saxon race, with innate endowments enabling it to achieve a perfection
of governmental institutions and world dominance” (1). In fact, “Anglo-Saxonism” is a myth whose roots can be traced back at least to the sixteenth century, a myth that was revived and reinvigorated in the first decades of the nineteenth century as a way for first German Romantics and then English-speaking peoples in Great Britain and the United States to supposedly explain their—of course erroneous—cultural and racial superiority (Horsman 25) and perhaps their colonial enterprises of Imperialism, along with all the injustices therein. So, there is no such thing as an “Anglo” race, and the term is incredibly problematic for the reasons I have just described. However, despite the ambiguity and past (and present) nefarious connotations of the term, I find it necessary to employ “Anglo” as a kind of shorthand for “white,” non-Native, English-speaking peoples of Western European ancestry. Although this a dubious and frankly fuzzy categorization at best that perhaps perpetuates Imperial and dichotomous thinking, for reasons of expediency I find it necessary to use the shorthand “Anglo” throughout this dissertation to refer to English-speaking, non-Indigenous peoples of Western European ancestry.

I use the terms “Native” and “Indigenous” as interchangeable references to the wide and diversified array of pre-European-contact inhabitants of North America, to those peoples who are members of or can trace some of their ancestry back to—both federally recognized and unrecognized—sovereign nations in the United States.8 There are a number of terms I could have

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8 A note on the use of “tribal” and on capitalization: On May 5, 2016 the Anishinaabe critic, poet, author, and storyteller Gerald Vizenor gave the plenary address at “Landbody: Indigeneity’s Radical Commitments” conference, held at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. In this address Vizenor noted two important caveats regarding how we refer to the Indigenous peoples of this nation: 1) “tribal” is most often used as a pejorative in other contexts, with the exception of Indigenous peoples, and 2) the words “Native” and “Indigenous” should not be capitalized because this gives the impression that they may be considered as a static monolith that is set in stone. I will avoid “tribal” as often as possible, although I try to refer to specific tribes when appropriate. In addition, while I understand and respect Vizenor’s concerns and I certainly want to resist the pernicious stereotype of long vanished Indians who exist as an unchanging, romanticized monolith, I have capitalized “Native” and “Indigenous” throughout this dissertation. I have done this primarily for two reasons. Firstly, as an essentially non-Native outsider, I feel the need to extend respect towards these “original” cultures of the Americas. (I would be less than thrilled if an “outsider” referred to my heritage as a Polish-American without the capitalization, not only because “polish” could be confused with the verb, and “pollack” without the capitalization could be confused with the fish.)
chosen, including “First Peoples” or “First Nations,” “Indians,” or “American Indians”; however, all of these terms are equally oversimplified and all-encompassing, and it seems to me that “Native peoples” or “Indigenous peoples” are the most recognizable and most widely accepted terms by many Indigenous peoples themselves. In short, in this project I will follow historian Colin G. Calloway’s lead; explaining his terminology, in his survey of American Indian history, *First Peoples*, he writes, “Both Indian and Native American serve as collective terms in the absence of any more suitable designation that does not require explanation or create confusion… My preference is to use the term Indian people, with Indian as an adjective for people, rather than on its own as a category” [emphasis original] (10).

When possible, I refer to a community by their specific name because I believe this is the most accurate and respectful terminology, and this is also what I see modeled by Native peoples themselves (for example, in anthologies of Native American literature compiled by Indigenous peoples such as *Nothing But the Truth*). I also use the name of a specific sovereign nation or Indigenous community when possible because I want to steer clear of the misconception that Indigenous peoples are a monolithic, homogenous entity or that there is anything such as one “Native” culture, when, of course, there are many. In fact, as Berkhofer points out, “The original inhabitants of the Western Hemisphere neither called themselves by a single term nor understood themselves as a collectivity” (1). Further, it is also important to keep in mind that “The first residents of the Americas were by modern estimates divided into at least two thousand cultures and more societies, practiced a multiplicity of customs and lifestyles, held an enormous variety

And secondly—and much more importantly than my own comfortability—the capitalization of “Indigenous” and “Native” is what I see modeled by many important and influential Native writers. For example, in the anthology of Native American literature *Nothing But the Truth*, the editors John L. Purdy and James Ruppert use “Native” and capitalize it in their general introduction and in their introduction to individual sections. The many significant and influential authors anthologized in Purdy and Ruppert’s text also most frequently use the term “Native” or “Native American” while capitalizing it. For these reasons “Native” and “Indigenous” are capitalized throughout.
of values and beliefs, spoke numerous languages mutually unintelligible to the many speakers, and did not conceive of themselves as a single people” (Berkhofer 1). I will certainly strive to use the most accurate, preferred name for a specific Indigenous people when possible to avoid erasing the cultural diversity of the original inhabitants of North and South America, to avoid reinforcing “the Native” as a monolithic white invention, and to avoid lapsing into the stereotypes and oversimplifications about which Berkhofer warns.

Native peoples have long resisted being understood by non-Natives as a monolith. Contemporary Indigenous writers continue to insist that the complexity contained within one Native individual cannot easily be explained, let alone that contained within the hundreds of different tribes and cultures of “Native” America. For example, as Anishinaabe poet and scholar Kimberly Blaeser makes clear in her article “Cannons and Cannonization,” Native Americans are always working within multiple traditions, consciousnesses, and worldviews. Similarly, David Moore insists that, just as language, story, and culture are context-dependent, fragmented, always shifting, and inhabit multiple orbits of meaning, so too are tribal identities, which Moore describes as “not as archaic survival but as an ongoing process, politically contested and historically unfinished” (96). Further, according to Vizenor, acknowledging this “ongoing process” is essential for “survivance” and for fending off stereotypes of the “vanishing Indian.” I want to honor this tradition of resistance, and I realize that to reduce the great complexity and diversity of Native peoples and Native consciousness to one knowable entity is at best inaccurate, and often unethical and inappropriate. Yet, when I articulate my argument for this dissertation in a general way, for practical reasons and reasons of expediency, I am forced to most often use the more comprehensive terms “Native peoples” or “Indigenous peoples” even while knowing how diverse these peoples are.
I also use the terms “natural world,” “environment,” and sometimes “landscape” or “wilderness,” in short, to refer to the world that has not been constructed by humankind. As environmental scholars such as Max Oelschlaeger and William Cronon have demonstrated, of course there is no such thing as “pristine,” “untouched” wilderness, including pre-Columbian contact New England and North American “wilderness” (Cronon, *Changes in the Land* 12). Yet these various terms including “wilderness,” nonetheless and of necessity, must be used throughout this project to denote that on which the artificial world and culture of mankind has been built upon, the original material of this planet, or in Max Oelschlaeger’s word’s the “Magna Mater” or “mother earth.” Numerous scholars (including Neil Evernden [50], Killingsworth and Palmer [Ecospeak 32], Sidney Dobrin and Christian Weisser [Natural Discourse: Toward Ecocomposition 2], Donal Carbaugh [39]) as well as Oelschlaeger (“Wilderness, Civilization, and Language” 227]) have pointed out that even designating a different term for “nature” reinforces the nature/culture binary or nature/culture dualism—an ecologically pernicious and dualistic mode of thinking reinforced by and apparent in our language.\(^9\) However, for practical

\(^9\) In fact, Cronon writes in *Changes in the Land*, “It is tempting to believe that when the Europeans arrived in the New World they confronted Virgin Land, the Forest Primeval, a wilderness which had existed for eons uninfluenced by human hands. Nothing could be further from the truth... Indians had lived on the continent for thousands of years, and had to a significant extent modified its environment to their purposes. The destruction of Indian communities in fact brought some of the most important ecological changes which followed the European’s arrival in America... Such a view would describe precolonial New England not as a virgin landscape of natural harmony but as a landscape whose essential characteristics were kept in equilibrium by the cultural practices of its human community” (12). This suggests that Native peoples (which, as discussed earlier in this chapter, should not be considered a monolith) did in fact possess an array of environmental ethics that differed from Anglo-Europeans, ethics reinforced by culture at least prior to European contact. I will come back to this contention in my final chapter.

\(^10\) Environmental historian and scholar Neil Evernden contends that nature/culture dualism “constitutes the most momentous phase in the history of human thought” (95). In his examination of how Modern, agrarian, industrialized culture created the concept of nature, of how nature is actually a social construction, Evernden writes, “In order to help discriminate between the ‘actual’ and the ‘cultural,’ I have adopted the convention of speaking of ‘nature’ when referring to the great amorphous mass of otherness that encloaks the planet” (xi). This is also how and why I using the term “nature” throughout this dissertation. Towards further definition of the binary, Evernden argues that human history can be read as the continual taking of steps towards “that banishing of man from the great world of nature... Indeed that is what Nature is: a world devoid of the properties we associate with humans” (50). Therefore, by its very definition, nature is other than human, other than culture, everything that is
reasons and to best articulate my findings, throughout this dissertation I must make use of the terms “nature,” “the natural world,” and “environment.” In addition, I sometimes use the word “landscape” in the same way as the other terms just discussed because this is the term a number of Native writers (including Linda Hogan and Lesley Marmon Silko, for example) use to refer to the inanimate and animate project of Life on this planet. In short, although I acknowledge that designating a separate term for “nature,” “the natural world” or “wilderness” essentially “others” the Magna Mater from which we sprung, and on which we continue to depend and thus reinforces the nature/culture binary, for reasons of necessity and to articulate my findings, I find it essential to refer to the world beyond and before what humankind has created, and I do so by using the aforementioned terms. There is no difference between the terms “natural world,”

not us. However, Evernden also points out the fact that, “Strictly speaking, there can be nothing that is not ‘nature’— it has no opposite” (20). Because we are still a part of nature and evolved— and continue to evolve—organically from “nature” (despite our increasing and separation as a result of our natural tendency towards tool making and technological innovation), the dualism between nature and human culture does not exist except as a product of human thought and culture. “Nature” as the collective, organic, living dynamism on this planet is all there is, a position that numerous Native peoples, including Louis Owens and Luther Standing Bear have articulated. And yet, as Evernden illustrates, it often becomes necessary to articulate and analyze the encompassing and sustaining “other” that has become “nature” (especially in its defense, as is the case in environmental or ecocentric rhetoric), even though doing so relegates nature to the status of “other”, the “not us” while also perpetuating a false dichotomy. As I allude to above, the fact that we even have a word for “nature” reinforces the problem of dualistic thought; our very language exemplifies and reifies the nature/culture binary. In other words, this is a dichotomy reified and perpetuated by our language. Sidney Dobrin and Christian Weisser highlight this fact when they write: “Nature is not simply ‘out there’ but rather a construct of human invention, human behavior, human language... the natural environment is a world constructed and defined by human discourse” (2). Oelschlaeger has even gone so far as to suggest that, “There is an essential role for language studies of the environment, for they are fundamental to exposing and then overcoming the presuppositions which entrench the distinction between nature and culture” (“Wilderness, Civilization, and Language” 227). However the nature/culture binary as reinforced and perpetuated by language seems not to be the case in many tribal societies, as illustrated by Killingsworth and Palmer in the following: “Cultures that sustain a memory of their hunter-gather origins have no word for wilderness. As the Lakota chief Standing Bear wrote, ‘Only to the white man was nature a wilderness.’ For nomadic peoples like the Lakota, ‘it made no sense to distinguish wilderness from civilization or wild animals from tame ones: civilization created wilderness’” (Ecospeak 32). Therefore, before sedentary, agrarian, Anthropocentric Western civilization began to dominate the globe, the nature/culture dichotomy theoretically did not exist. At any rate, I am well aware of the implications and the dualistic thought inherent in referring to the Magna Mater of this planet as “nature” or “wilderness”; yet I remain caught in the linguistic/schema thought and am without another term to use, which is why I rely on the terms I cite above.
“nature,” “wilderness,” and “landscape” in this project; I alternate terminology for linguistic variety and diversity, and for reasons of practicality and expediency.

Similarly, in this dissertation, because it is not necessary for my argument, I do not distinguish between the terms “nature writer” or “nature writing” and “environmental writer” or “environmental writing.” It is not necessary that I get into the tricky taxonomy of writing on the natural world, and they are all unavoidably ambiguous and imprecise terms that refer here to writing with environmental subjects and objectives.\textsuperscript{11} I use the terms “nature writing” and “environmental writing” interchangeably and alternate between terms, again, for linguistic variety. In general, throughout this dissertation the terms “nature writing” and “environmental writing” will be used to cover the “literature of nature” that possesses the following three subject matters, taken from Thomas Lyon’s Book of American Nature Writing: “natural history information, personal responses to nature, and philosophical interpretation of nature” (i). Broadly speaking, these are the subject matters that American nature writing has taken for the last two hundred years (Finch and Elder 3).

**Defining and Tracing Identification: Identification, Consubstantial Identification, Disidentification, and Non-Identification**

In addition to the terminology just defined, throughout this project I also rely on the general concept of “identification,” as well as the different iterations of identification teased out of Kenneth Burke’s original conception of identification, including disidentifications, consubstantial identifications, and non-identifications. Because I refer to identification in general

\textsuperscript{11} I say they are imprecise because the “nature writing” genre is notoriously hard to pin down. As always, there are overlaps in genre, and a text that may be classified as “nature writing” in one instance may be classified as “travel literature,” for example, in another instance. In fact, in his introduction to This Incomperable Lande: A Book of American Nature Writing editor Thomas Lyon insists that “nature writing is not in truth a neat and orderly field” (i).
and to the various kinds of identifications in subsequent chapters and throughout this dissertation, it will help if in this section I more completely define first “identification” in general, and then “consubstantial identification,” “disidentification,” and finally “non-identification.” Essentially, in this section I define identification—and its divisions into consubstantiality, disidentification, and non-identification—so that in later chapters I can show how Anglo-American nature writers have, in three different time periods, encouraged their white audiences to make these kinds of identifications with “the Native.”

In this section, after I define “identification” as a general concept important to rhetorical theory, I then trace the implicit history of identification as the seeking of common ground. The tracing of identification first as common ground and then its development into different kinds of identifications is important to show how theorists, particularly since the modern and postmodern eras, have theorized the comprehensive identification process as an increasingly conscious endeavor, one that individual subjects have agency and responsibility in. This bringing into the light of identifications or making subjects more conscious of their identifications will be important particularly in my final chapter in which I argue that Anglo environmental writers should encourage their readers to be continually conscious of their position of non-identification with Native writing on the environment. In addition, the tracing of identification as common ground and then the different kinds of identifications that have developed out of the long history of understanding identification as the finding of common ground for persuasive purposes will give us an idea of how and why identification evolves and develops, which will also be important in my final chapter in which I argue that it would be beneficial if non-identification could develop and be further theorized to include more active forms of non-identification.

Essentially, a brief history of identification as the seeking of common ground for persuasive
purposes and then several of its “spin off” iterations will help us better understand how and why
identification needs to continue being critiqued, complicated, and theorized to include more
active non-identifications in which readers can forge their own relationships with Native eco-
orientations. Additionally, tracing identification can help us better understand why these
iterations are not yet a “good,” optimal fit for how Anglo environmental writers approach Native
eco-orientations for their white readers.

“Identification” as a general concept pertains to the ways we see ourselves as having
important attributes, experiences, emotions, orientations, cultural artifacts, understandings,
values, beliefs, and personal investments in common with others. Essentially, again as a general
concept of rhetorical theory, identification involves the individual building blocks of identity in
which disparate individuals may be able to find common ground. For Burke, (who named the
phenomenon of “identification” in Rhetoric of Motives, in 1950) identification is a key term for
describing human motivation, rhetoric, and the construction of the Social. Burke points out in
Rhetoric of Motives that whenever someone attempts to persuade someone else identification
occurs because for persuasion to occur, one party must "identify" with another (36). In other
words, according to Burke’s theorization of identification, persuasion occurs when one
individual sees themselves as like another in some way—as having common ground with
another. So, beginning with Burke in the mid-twentieth century, identification becomes a key
concept essential for understanding human communication, the way language acts on
individuals, the construction of the culture and the collective Social, and the human condition.
The other forms of identification— including consubstantial identification, disidentification, and
non-identification—take off from Burke’s theorization and definition of identification.
Therefore, when I use the term “identification” throughout this project, I am referring to
identification in the general sense; otherwise, I will name the specific kind of identification (disidentification, consubstantial identification, or non-identification) I am discussing.

Identification has a long, implicit history in rhetorical theory. In fact, stretching back to Aristotle, identification has been implicitly, primarily conceived of as a way for rhetors to purposefully present similar, identifiable characteristics to an audience for the purposes of persuasion (*The Art of Rhetoric* 74). More specifically, although he did not explicitly name it identification, the concept of identification was implied at least as far back as Aristotle’s concept of ethos, in which “the strongest proof of all” was contained in “the speaker’s reasonable image” and the audience’s ability to recognize and identify with that image” (75). So, since Classical antiquity identification has been understood as the locating of common ground and the minimization of difference.

In addition, from a contemporary vantage point, we can also see the implied understanding of identification in the Roman rhetorical tradition. For example, Cicero believed that there was common ground and potentially shared substance between all audiences, universal themes under which audiences and rhetors could find unification. For example, much like Aristotle, Cicero “praised the pursuit of truth as the worthiest aim of mankind and the source of real happiness” (Grant 15). In addition, also similar to Aristotle, Cicero believed these truths, as

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12 Put another way, according to Aristotle, a rhetor’s power of persuasion most often depends on their ability to establish an ethos that their audiences share and are able to identify with, thereby convincing the audience of their mutual consubstantiality with the rhetor, or of the common ground shared by both rhetor and audience. Illustrating this point, Edward Corbett explains that, “Aristotle recognized that the ethical appeal could be the most potent of the three modes of persuasion. All of an orator’s skill in convincing the intellect and moving the will of an audience could prove futile if the audience did not esteem, could not trust, the speaker” (24). Thus, within Aristotle’s theorization of ethos as the first proof or appeal of Rhetoric, identification with the rhetor was crucial. Or, as Gary Woodward points out, “There is simply no way to dismiss the powerful impulse of audiences to interpret messages through the filter of a source’s ethos” (6). In Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* then, it is imperative that the audience see themselves in the persona presented by the rhetor because this transference and projection of the internal to the external (and then potentially back to the internal of the audience) is essential for forging identifications. Thus, the notion of identification and its importance to the process of persuasion reaches as far back as Aristotle’s classic treatise on rhetoric, *The Art of Rhetoric*. 

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well as “happiness,” are universal common ground, and essentially collective substance
audiences could be united under.\textsuperscript{13} Although he didn’t term it such, Cicero also understood the
need and power of identification. Thus, identification as the seeking of common ground and the
erasure of difference is also implicitly understood by rhetoricians and used by rhetors in the
Roman era.

Additionally, as modern scholarship has pointed out, medieval rhetors and rhetoricians
also understood identification as the seeking and exploiting of common ground or shared
substance. For example, rhetorician Georgiana Donavin argues that the Western medieval
rhetorical tradition shared a number of important similarities with Burkean rhetorical theory,
including identification as the seeking of common ground.\textsuperscript{14} Along similar lines, Gary
Woodward points out how the medieval scholar and religious icon St. Augustine also understood
identification; Kristie Fleckenstein explores how the medieval saint Catherine of Siena also
employed and understood identification as the locating collective substance between rhetor and
disparate audience members; and Mary Carruthers explores the ways that images and visual
rhetoric were used during the middle ages to construct identifications and to locate common
ground between individuals. Therefore, from antiquity into the medieval period, identification
was long understood as the ways rhetors can locate and articulate common ground between
themselves and their audiences for persuasive purposes—at the expense of potentially productive
difference. However, this seeking of common ground or shared substance that we see from

\textsuperscript{13} In addition, Cicero believed in a universal spirit of cooperation, a universal spirit of do no harm, individual
freedom from tyranny, and a universal human condition that entails unification in our affection for one another
(Selected Works 28). Because these are threads woven throughout the majority of his speeches and letters,
because there is an essential reliance on absolutes, on foundational substances found throughout Cicero’s work
used to persuade audiences, it is apparent that Cicero understood the importance and power of identification.
\textsuperscript{14} In fact, Donavin points out, “The form and formal patterns adhered to throughout the middle ages were taken as
absolutes or as shared substance, and teaching adherence to them would have been a way to promote ubiquitous
identification” (61).
Classical antiquity and into the medieval rhetorical tradition, in general, does not allow for differences to accede to power and potentially become productive, and it does not allow for ethical cross-cultural communication. Therefore, identification as the exclusive seeking of common ground is not ethical, appropriate, nor complex enough when it comes to describing the ways Anglo-American nature writers encourage their readers to engage with Native peoples and Indigenous writing on the natural world.

Then, in the mid-twentieth century with the work of Kenneth Burke, identification, rather than persuasion becomes the “key concept” for understanding human motivation and rhetorical endeavors—and thus the central term for rhetorical theory. With Burke, the phenomenon of identification is named, complicated, critiqued, and further theorized; yet it continues to be predominantly understood, for the most part, as the seeking of common ground for purposes of persuasion and the erasure of difference, differences which are, in general, not considered potentially productive or persuasive in Burkean thought.

Consubstantiality and consubstantial identifications are different and need here to be distinguished from original, more general conceptions of identification. While Burke allowed in Rhetoric of Motives that identification as a general concept allows for one subject to share

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15 Janice Odom sums up this shift in terminology and focus when she reminds us that, “Until the mid-point of the twentieth century, Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric as ‘the discovery of the available means of persuasion,’ and persuasion as our master term, stood without challenge... In 1950, [Burke] accomplished, with the publication of A Rhetoric of Motives, what no one else had: he revised the master term of rhetoric from Aristotle’s persuasion to his own term, identification” (242). Similarly, Bernard Brock and James Chesebro describe identification as a “‘key term’ instrumental to understanding rhetorical discourses and events” (41). Also describing this major shift in terminology and focus, James Kinneavy writes: “Burke changed the notion of ‘persuasion’ in rhetoric to that of ‘identification’. Burke’s motivation seems basically to be a valid one: he realizes that rhetoric always is better described in terms of an attempt at identification of encoder and decoder than merely in terms of the encoder’s trying to ‘persuade’ the decoder” (218). As a result of this shift in terminology from “persuasion” to “identification,” a number of rhetoricians and scholars, including Erika Lindemann, for example, insist that Burke’s theory of identification and its importance to human communication and motivation is the most significant movement in rhetorical theory of the twentieth century (121). Thus, while we can find traces of identification back to the Classical and medieval rhetorical traditions, Burke incites a paradigm shift by naming identification and making it the “key term” or the major objective and impetus of human motivation, language, and socialization.
similar ground or to have some overlap in substance with another, consubstantial identification does not allow for both different and similar substance (20). Consubstantial identification is a kind of identification that involves a more totalizing merging of substance, of essence, of being. Put differently, consubstantiality—as most rhetoricians, including Burke, use the term—is something deeper and more totalizing than my original definition of identification above suggests because consubstantiality and consubstantial identification involve more than the seeking of common ground such as common beliefs or values.

As Burke also explains in Grammar of Motives, you can identify with another individual, yet still retain your original substance (47). However, when an individual is “consubstantial” with another or when rhetors work to incite consubstantiality, they are seeking a merging of being, a more totalizing merging of essence, of substance. Essentially, while identifying with another, you may have similar values, beliefs, ideas or attributes in common; however, when consubstantial identifications are forged, you are essentially merged with another, the same, without differences or differentiated substance. As a number of theorists have pointed out, including Krista Ratcliffe and Judith Butler, consubstantial identifications do not allow for difference. Consequently, the drive toward consubstantiality often proves problematic and unethical its insistence that all differences be erased, as I will point out in chapter three in which I analyze Anglo nature writing of the 1960s, a period when Anglo authors strove to persuade audiences of their consubstantiality with Native peoples.

The next kind of “spin off” identification I define here is disidentification—which, as I illustrate in the following chapter, is the primary approach Anglo nature writers of the nineteenth century took towards Native peoples. As a number of scholars including Butler and Minh-ha have demonstrated, disidentifications are part of, and inseparable from, the process of
identification. Or, as Paul Lynch writes, “Identification is a product of disidentification, and
disidentification a product of identification” (235). In short, every disidentification leads to an
identification, and vice versa. Consequently, the theorization of identification necessitates the
definition and theorization of disidentifications, which involves the disavowal of a potential
identification. Put differently, essentially, disidentification is the pushing away of or the
disavowal of any potential common ground. Because of our fragmented, alienated existence in
the postmodern world and because we are constantly bombarded by identity-constructing
artifacts and by potential identifications with different groups and with different individuals,
postmodern theorists felt a need for the theorization of disidentification to describe socialization,
the way rhetoric works, and the way persuasion and identity construction works in the
postmodern world. Therefore, postmodern theorists critiqued and complicated Burke’s original
concept of identification by demonstrating the absolute necessity of disidentification (Minh-ha
215). For example, Minh-ha points out that an understanding of identity necessarily involves the
process of claiming “not I,” of disavowing, of disidentifying when she writes, “Identity supposes
that a clear dividing line can be made between I and not-I, he and she; between depth and
surface… between us here and them over there… The search for an identity is, therefore, usually
a search for that lost, pure, true, real, genuine, original, authentic self, often situated within a
process of elimination of all that is considered other, superfluous, fake, corrupted” [emphasis
mine] (215). In short, the internal “elimination” of potential identifications (or areas of common
ground) that is perceived as “other” is what disidentification is: the disavowal of beliefs, values,
ideas, attributes, affinities, orientations, and objectives that are perceived as “other,” that are
foreign to and pushed away from an individual subject, and therefore (as Judith Butler points
out) made abject.
With the rise of postmodernism in the late twentieth century and the subsequent theorization of the postmodern condition, the concept of identification becomes further complicated and critiqued to the point that identification as the search for common ground through certain similarities or shared substance is no longer enough to explain human communication, identity construction, action, or motivation. Therefore, identification needed to be critiqued and complicated to include disidentification. Because of the fragmented postmodern condition and the complexities of postmodern existence, including an increasing sense of isolation, fragmented psyches, and an exposure to an increasing number of potential identifications, there is a need for the further theorization of different kinds of identification, including disidentification. Essentially, identification understood as the seeking and finding of common ground is no longer enough to explain how individuals communicate, construct their identities, and navigate the complexities of a postmodern world. Thus, “disidentifications,” as the ways we disavow or push away possibilities for common ground and shared substance, are theorized by postmodern and feminist theorists such as bell hooks and Judith Butler.

Consequently, the identification process is complicated and critiqued to address contemporary

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16 Jean-Francois Lyotard characterized the postmodern condition as characterized by a “Widespread apprehension that the ‘old’ forms of collectivity are disappearing or have already disappeared, that impersonality, anonymity, and solitude are the lot of a modern humanity crowded into ever-expanding urban conglomerates, that the very bonds of social interaction are sundered by the multifarious dislocations, disruptions and disappropriations that characterize life in postindustrial societies” (qtd. in Biesecker 74). In this context, in the postmodern condition, identifications as the binds of the Social are now increasingly difficult and complex, at best. Brummett explains the strained relationship between identification and postmodern thought as follows: “Because of this abundance of group identifications, many people today feel that their lives are fragmented. Some social observers have called this fragmentation the postmodern condition... We stand within a complex structure of ways of life, identifying with many different groups that may have very little in common with each other” (29). In other words, people living in the postmodern world have found themselves confronted with a difficult paradox: in a reality in which the possibilities for identifications are so many, identifications are much more difficult to forge and navigate. Therefore, previous Burkean theories of identification, and even those theories that came after and complicated Burke’s theory of identification, were no longer enough to explain how people navigated the postmodern world of endless potential identifications.
rhetorical needs, and the process of identification becomes more complex, and potentially more tolerant and respective of difference.

Also responding to the need for a further critique and complication of the identification process and the need for differences to be acknowledged, respected, and potentially made productive, “non-identifications” are named and theorized by Krista Ratcliffe in the twenty-first century. Ratcliffe theorizes non-identification as a place\(^\text{17}\) of pause and conscious reflection before gravitating toward the extremes of consubstantial identifications in which two subjects are of one essence, and disidentifications in which subjects disavow one another and see themselves as having absolutely nothing in common.\(^\text{18}\) I think one way we can think about non-identification, then, is to imagine it as a wedge that interrupts the often polarizing and unproductively entrenched process of consubstantial identification and disidentification. The wedge is inserted into discourse and the wedge of non-identification then opens up space and possibilities for “genuine” engagement, or rhetorical listening. So, according to Ratcliffe, just as identification precedes persuasion, non-identification precedes rhetorical listening—and eventually, possibly, cross-cultural communication (\textit{Rhetorical Listening} 128). Therefore, according to Ratcliffe, the concept of non-identification is integral to productive, effective, and ethical cross-cultural communication because it maps a place, a possibility, for consciously asserting agency to engage in cross-cultural rhetorical exchanges across both commonalities \textit{and} differences (as opposed to relying on consubstantial identifications or disidentifications, which

\(^{17}\) Butler reminds us that “Identification always invokes an assumption of place” (\textit{Bodies That Matter} 99) and Burke constantly metaphorically depicts consubstantiality as the finding of common ground—of space. Or, as further evidence of the identification process as taking physical place, as Rosalyn Eves points out, “Rhetorical persuasion (the move toward concord) cannot take place without some sort of shared material space” (265). In this tradition, Ratcliffe continually uses “space” and “place” and “margin between” to theorize non-identification.

\(^{18}\) Although Ratcliffe coins the term “non-identification” and perhaps does the most to articulate the need for this particular stance and kind of identification, feminist theorists such as Luce Irigaray, Gloria Anzuldua, Trihn Minh-ha, and Cheris Kramarae have also articulated the need for non-identification, as Ratcliffe is careful to point out in her book length project on non-identifications’ importance for rhetorical listening, \textit{Rhetorical Listening: Gender, Identification, and Whiteness}. 
allow one or the other to accede to power). Non-identification essentially means: this is not me; it is not mine and I cannot claim it, but I will make space for this other and I will let them be and be heard without trying to ingest or disavow their substance. With the theorization of non-identification, we start to see iterations of identification that are increasingly more respective of difference and that potentially allow differences to become productive possibilities in cross-cultural exchanges. In essence, in an effort to address cultural concerns about how different people live together and communicate across cultures, Krista Ratcliffe developed the theory of non-identification, which she argues is a necessary first step toward rhetorical listening, a stance rhetors and audiences must consciously assume if difference is to be acknowledged, respected, and made productive. As I point out in chapter four, non-identification is helpful and a better fit for the ways Anglo nature writers should encourage audiences to engage with Native peoples and their writing on the natural world. However, non-identification is not as helpful as it could be if it does not lead to rhetorical listening and cross-cultural communication—which, as I will also illustrate in chapter four in my analysis of late twentieth and twenty-first century Anglo-American writing on the environment, is—by and large—not yet occurring.

As I hope to have given my readers a sense of in this section, identification as a concept has a long history stretching back to the Classical Greek rhetorical tradition, and identification has been critiqued and complicated particularly in the last half century to include different kinds of identifications. However, as I will illustrate in the following chapters in which I analyze writing by Anglo nature writers corresponding to different iterations of identification, what has been theorized so far is still not ethical, appropriate, or complex enough, nor is it yet a “good fit” for the ways Anglo-American nature writers encourage their white audiences to construct different kinds of relationships with Native peoples, Native environmental writing, and
Indigenous eco-orientations. Therefore, as I contend more specifically in my final chapter, non-identification needs to be theorized, critiqued, and complicated to include ways that white readers can make space for their own engagement with Native environmental writing, with the actual words of Native peoples. This could potentially help challenge conceptions of the stereotypical eco-Indian as inherently more “in tune” with Nature, and this could also help challenge Anthropocentrism and developmentalism. I will eventually argue that Anglo-American environmental writers have most recently written to persuade white audiences toward a stance of non-identification, but they have not yet moved audience into a position of rhetorical listening, which requires engagement with writing by Native peoples.

But first, we need to understand where we have been so that we can better determine where we should go. Essentially, it is my hope that understanding the missteps of the past and why they have been missteps can potentially help us avoid those missteps in the future. As I will illustrate in the next two chapters, disidentifications and consubstantial identifications with Native people and their imagined (by both white readers and writers) eco-orientations within the context of Anglo writing on the environment have, by and large, been missteps. Yet, the authors I analyze in each chapter are striving to move audiences towards identifications with Native peoples and towards imagined-by-whites Indigenous eco-orientations that are more respective of cultural difference, which shows us that identification with Native peoples by white environmental writers is an ongoing process that needs to continue evolving towards more ethical and appropriate relations. However, even today, we are not yet there. It is my hope that better understanding identificatory missteps will prove useful as we work towards active non-identification with Native eco-orientations as articulated by Native peoples in writing. It is my hope that actively non-identifying with Native writing may potentially open possibilities for
assuaging oversimplifications of the multitude of differing eco-orientations articulated by a wide array of Indigenous authors, as well as potentially lessening the now all too apparent effects of our current state of planetary eco-crisis by potentially helping readers develop less Anthropocentric and developmentalist, and therefore potentially more responsible, appropriate, and egalitarian relationships with and conceptions of the natural world.
This chapter examines how two of the most prominent nature writers of the nineteenth-century—John Muir and Henry David Thoreau—most often constructed disidentifications with Native peoples in their writing. Through an analysis of Muir’s *The Mountains of California* and Thoreau’s *On Walden Pond* I demonstrate how both authors predominantly wrote about Native bodies, artifacts, and presence as if they were part of the landscape, as part of nature, as “other” than Anglo-European culture. Put differently, from Thoreau and Muir’s vantage point, the wild, savage, part-of-nature Indian was “not I”; therefore, their primary approach is one of disidentification.

More specifically, often Thoreau and Muir draw on prevalent stereotypes of the age to construct disidentifications, and both authors also use disidentifications with Native peoples to strengthen identifications amongst their predominantly white, Anglo-European audience. American nature writing has a long-standing tradition of being written for and by whites. Several nature writing scholars, eco-rhetoricians, and environmental historians, have pointed this out. For example, the premise and exigency for the *Colors of Nature* series edited by Alison Deming and Lauret Savoy is that the production and reception of writing on the environment is too monochromatic: in other words, it is too singularly white. They contend people of color are too often excluded from the genre. In addition, Michael Branch argues that nature writing in this country has been written by and for white Americans from its origins. He points out that the

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19 As post-colonial theorists from Said to Bhabha have asserted, there is a long tradition of white, Euro-American audiences defining themselves against native peoples, thereby re-affirming their own Western cultural superiority (Owens, *I Hear the Train* 102). Thoreau and Muir are part of this long tradition of “othering.”
earliest nature writers, including Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Washington Irving, and James Fennimore Cooper were “white writers whose success often depended upon romanticizing the Indian for the benefit of exclusively white audiences” (353). Even more specifically, and as we will see in my rhetorical analysis in this chapter, the “blood thirsty warrior” and “vanishing Indian” stereotypes and disidentification with these typecasts are used to bring together predominantly white readers.

Additionally, as I will demonstrate in the second part of this chapter, while relying on a primary approach of disidentification, both of these authors also work to introduce their white audiences to potential consubstantiality, to shared substance between readers and Native peoples. Therefore, although the predominant approach is one of disidentification with Native Americans (which made sense given the political and cultural context of the time), both Thoreau and Muir also strive to work against cultural and political expectations to plant seeds of potential consubstantial identifications between their white readers and Indigenous peoples. Put differently, although the primary approach is one of disidentification, which is to be expected, mid-nineteenth century authors also plant seeds of consubstantial identifications that are potentially more tolerant of differences that can be overcome as readers are persuaded by commonalities. This shows us that identification with Native peoples within the context of Anglo-American writing on the environment can develop to attend to and make space for similarities and differences and to encourage readers towards alternatives to the political and cultural expectations of a given period.

Yet, as I will point out throughout this chapter, because Thoreau and Muir primarily rely on an approach of disidentification with Native peoples, at this point in history possibilities for rhetorical listening and effective, ethical cross-cultural communication are foreclosed. In
addition, the hegemonic paradigms of Anthropocentrism and developmentalism remain dominant and unchallenged because Native peoples and their eco-orientations are predominantly disidentified with, or disavowed and not engaged with, and because possibilities for rhetorical listening are foreclosed, by and large. Further, the practice of “othering” Native peoples and constructing them as a monolithic enemy or as part of subservient nature reinforces the ecologically destructive, Anthropocentric norm in which humankind and Western, Anglo-European in particular is dominant. Consequently, disidentifications do not help readers forge relationships with the environment that could potentially be more helpful, respectful, and appropriate. As I argue in the conclusion of this chapter, for all of these reasons and primarily because disidentifications with Native peoples and Native eco-orientations foreclose possibilities to move audiences toward more ecologically egalitarian and ecocentric relationships with environment, disidentification is a misstep in identificatory practices with Native peoples, one that should be avoided in an effort towards genuine engagement with and rhetorically listening to Native eco-orientations.

To illustrate that disidentification is indeed the primary relationship Thoreau and Muir constructed with Native peoples for their readers, this chapter offers sections analyzing both Thoreau’s Walden and Muir’s The Mountains of California. Before the actual analysis of these two influential texts, I offer several paragraphs on each author’s individual contributions and influence on environmental writing in the United States to establish that the works I analyze are representative of larger trends taking place within environmental thought and writing—and specifically the trend of disidentification with Native peoples. Because it was written first, I begin with my analysis of Walden; then I will briefly turn to other works by Thoreau such as The Main Woods to illustrate how Thoreau, by and large, encouraged his readers to disidentify with
Native peoples. Then I provide examples of how Thoreau also encourages audiences towards potential consubstantial identifications. This demonstrates that Anglo environmental writers can encourage readers towards identificatory practices other than those dictated by the political and cultural norms of the period.

Next, I offer a section analyzing Muir’s disidentifications with Native bodies, focusing on *The Mountains of California* but also briefly turning to other texts by Muir to better illustrate how disidentification with Native bodies was the predominant relationship constructed for Muir’s readers. After I make the case for the dominant approach of disidentification, I then examine how Muir is also helping his readers overcome cultural differences by planting the seeds of consubstantiality. Finally, this chapter then concludes with the results of my analysis.

But first, to better understand the predominant rhetorical approach of disidentification employed by Thoreau and Muir, I outline the political and cultural context in which they lived and wrote. This will help us better understand how and why disidentification was the norm of the time, and why it made sense given the political and cultural context of the mid-nineteenth century. To illustrate this point, this chapter begins by offering a brief contextual background regarding Native-White relations in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It is my hope that this historical context will show the correlation between the disidentifications constructed and what is occurring in Native-white affairs during the second half of the nineteenth century. This historic context will also help us better understand how Thoreau and Muir were working against cultural and political norms of the nineteenth century to offer readers possibilities for consubstantiality. The following section, in addition, will also explain stereotypes of Native peoples that I come back to in this chapter and throughout the rest of the dissertation.
Cultural and Political Context: Native-White Relations in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century

The publication of Henry David Thoreau’s *Walden* in 1854 and the publication of John Muir’s *The Mountains of California* in 1894 span the second half of the nineteenth century, which was both a particularly formative period for American nature writing, and also a pivotal and tragic era for Native-White relations. The age in which Muir and Thoreau lived and wrote was a period when Native and Euro-American relations were characterized by efforts at reform, forced removal to reservations, military campaigns, systematized abuse, fraudulent treaty forging, as well as cultural, linguistic, and physical genocide. These historic realities enabled and further perpetuated largely negative rhetorical constructions of Native peoples, deleterious stereotypes, and Progressive era manifest destiny cultural myths. Essentially, disidentifications prevalent throughout Anglo-European culture in the United States and exhibited in nineteenth century nature writing, may have, at least in part, made the mistreatment of Native peoples possible. At the very least, the disidentifications we see in Thoreau and Muir’s work would have made sense at the time and it would have been what audiences expected, given the concurrent treatment of Native peoples.

Three rhetorical constructions of Native Americans were built upon, reified, and firmly entrenched by the middle of the nineteenth-century: the “vanishing” Indian, the noble savage, and the violent warrior (Owens, *Mixedblood Messages* 13). These stereotypes, and particularly the “noble savage” stretch back centuries, if not millennia, and are interwoven with the mythology of Western culture, often used (along with the American Indian in general) to criticize existing American and European social institutions (Berkhofer 73-77). However, these three stereotypical depictions of Indigenous peoples reached their apex in the nineteenth century.
and were common cultural tropes, certainly in the West by Muir’s time (Wilson xxii).

Essentially, the widespread stereotypes of the nineteenth century dictated that either the Native is noble and will die a gallant death, or he is fierce and furious and will die a violent death; but either way the Native is static, incapable of change—and his death is inevitable (Owens, Mixedblood Messages 117). In addition, the prevalent typecasts of Native peoples that were so prevalent in the nineteenth century perpetuated the “vanishing Indian” mythology and reinforced government policies of removal and eradication.20 Explaining the vanishing Native stereotype and its grounding in historical reality, Owens tells his readers in Mixedblood Messages:

> For five centuries the invader has imagined that the ‘Indian’ was vanishing. In poems, plays, novels, and films the noble savage and murdering savage alike were depicted as being at trail’s end, wistfully in the twilight of existence. Given the incredible efforts expended to destroy the Indian, the Euramerican imagination should not be faulted for believing that the Vanishing American would be an inevitable result. The fact that out of an estimated six million indigenous inhabitants of what would become the continental United States, only 237,000 remained by 1900 attests to the effectiveness of this war of extermination. (127)

Thus, for the reasons described by Owens, an abiding belief in the “vanishing” or already vanished Indian was firmly ensconced in the popular opinion of the white American populace by the conclusion of the nineteenth-century (Velie 6). In fact, “The belief that the Indian belongs to a doomed race,” the Indian policy reformer Herbert Welsh wrote in 1890, “incapable of civilization, is so prevalent and so firmly entrenched in the minds of our people as to make them

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20 It is important to note here that Owens makes it clear that these “damaging and deadening stereotypes” (18) remain with us today, as evidenced in popular culture, and particularly in movies. In fact, Owens writes, “Indians in movies have always had two roles: bloodthirsty savage or noble companion. In both of these roles, the unchanging obligation of the Indian is to die by the movie’s end” (117).
palliate national injustice as the inevitable adjunct of a conclusion that is unavoidable” (quoted in Wilson xxii). While it is true that many Native peoples actively resisted the “vanishing Indian” stereotype from colonial times until the present day, Welsh points to the possibility that the stereotype was so well-circulated by the end of the nineteenth century that—in some although certainly far from all instances—Native Americans and Euro-Americans either accepted the vanishing Indian stereotype.\footnote{However, the second half of the nineteenth century did not give birth to these caricatures and simulations of “Indianess” (Owens 13), and this is not the era in which the inevitably vanishing and doomed association with Native people of the Americas originated. In fact, in his Guide to American Nature Writing Thomas J. Lyon suggests that both the pristine landscape and the “primitive”, untouched-by-time-and-Western,-industrialized-culture people of the Americas were frequently regarded throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as territory destined to be conquered and therefore already moribund by the time of the first European contact. Nevertheless, “The nineteenth century was the apogee of the Indian as the vanishing American stereotype” (Wilson xxii ).}

In short, by the second half of the nineteenth century, a progressive era marked by industrialization, manifest destiny, Westward expansion and a frontier mentality (Hoxie, Mancall, and Merrell 2), in the white imagination, the Indian had to physically and psychically make way. During this period, evidence of Americans’ ability to develop, progress, and conquer was ubiquitous (Hoxie, Mancall, and Merrell 2). In addition, because Native American societies were often conceived of as being incapable of change, they must necessarily vanish—either literally or culturally. Given this prevalent attitude by whites, it made sense that Thoreau and Muir would have worked from and played to their readers’ default setting of disidentification. Essentially, disidentification with Native peoples made sense and was the dominant cultural norm, given the political and historical realities of the nineteenth century.

In addition, the frontier, manifest destiny mentality that conceptualized the “natural” world and Native Americans as adversaries to be conquered also played an important role in the Anglo perception and rhetorical construction of Native peoples as necessarily vanishing, which
became part of the national narrative. As Hoxie, Mancall and Merrell make clear, the second half of the nineteenth century is most often mythologized in the contemporary American psyche as the period when the “West was won,” when a doomed Native population was subjugated and civilized (xi). Speaking in a very general way, the following often justified, for many whites, policies of conquest, removal, and the theft of Native lands through deceptive treaties: conceiving of the American landscape as “empty” or as misused because it was not dominated by industry or agriculture, and regarding Native peoples as “doomed” to conquest, enculturation, and even extinction. While it is true that the 1840s were a decade of “intense reforming spirit in America” (Prucha 100), a period “when zealous reformers saw no limit to the possibilities for ameliorating and perfecting the human condition” (Prucha 102), in general, the second half of the nineteenth century brought great change, war, forced removal and reservation life, and disintegration to many Native communities west of the Mississippi. In his collection *Mixedblood Messages*, Louis Owens remarks on how conceiving of the American continent as “vast and empty” was the first step in appropriation and depopulation (8). Other Native authors—including Owens, Linda Hogan, and Leslie Marmon Silko, for example—have contrasted how white, Euro-Americans view of wilderness as alien and empty, while Native peoples tend to view it as “intimate and always fully inhabited” by fellow plant and animal beings (Owens 8). Calloway and other historians have now traced this misconception of a “vacant, unused land” ripe and ready for European exploitation and expansion back to the fact that, from 1492 onward, disease and other biological disasters decimated the vast majority of Native communities even prior to European contact (Calloway 4). It is possible that disidentifications made much of this treatment possible. Thus, disidentifications not only made sense, they may have even been essential in some instances for the removal and manifest destiny agendas of the day.
In fact, the master narrative of the era, including the triumph of Western civilization over both primitive, “savage” people and landscape, has played an integral role in forging the American national identity, and consequently the forging of consubstantial identifications among white, Anglo-European Americans. According to Hoxie, this master narrative or cultural mythology gained strength in the nineteenth century and is still prevalent today, as it continues to,

Cast the United States as an agent of advancement, moving westward to develop the continent’s resources through industrialization and commercial agriculture and in the process displacing the prehistoric peoples already there. In this narrative… Americans are builders. Americans are teachers who bring democracy, Christianity, and literacy. In essence Americans are tamers of a wild land. If the Indians’ defeat and displacement is regrettable, as it is to some, it was also inevitable and necessary for the greater good of the American nation. (Hoxie xi)

In short, this pervasive tale of inevitable conquest and decline of Indigenous peoples was an article of national faith in the second half of the nineteenth century, one that strengthened much needed consubstantial identifications amongst disparate groups of mainly white, European immigrants. This need for consubstantiality (which disidentifications with Indigenous peoples strengthened) was largely a result of the fact that the second half of the nineteenth century was an exceptional period of ethnic, cultural, political, and linguistic diversity, primarily as a result of mass immigration. For example, between 1815 and 1865, during the second wave of immigration in this country following the colonial period, nearly ten million Irish and German immigrants came to the United States; and between 1860 and 1900 fifteen million immigrants, mostly from western European countries, flooded United States cities so that by 1900 three-quarters of New
York and Chicago’s populations were immigrants or first generation immigrants (Library of Congress). Thus, it makes sense that Thoreau and Muir would have relied on disidentifications with Native peoples to play to their readers expectations and to strengthen consubstantial and in-group identifications among their Anglo audiences. However, as I will further explore in my concluding remarks to this chapter, the approach of disidentification with Native Americans forecloses possibilities for rhetorically listening and productive cross-cultural communication, and potentially for helping readers develop more egalitarian and less ecologically destructive conceptions of and relationships with the natural world.

As a result of the pervasive narrative of conquest and the nearly ubiquitous frontier mentality, in 1851 (when he realized that the United States was rapidly running out of land to which Native people could be permanently exiled to) the Secretary of the Interior stated, “If the

23 Recent scholarship in communication has explored the “echo chamber effect,” often referring to it as “in-group communication.” For example, Morin and Flynn’s 2014 article in Communication Quarterly which explores how Tea Party groups construct and preserve in-group identities in an online environment. Morin and Flynn point out that the “echo chamber effect,” or the ways groups who have found consubstantiality reinforce that consubstantiality, serve to “stifle open debate” (128). In addition, these communication scholars find that a result of the echo chamber effect is that groups are “hesitant to expose themselves to information that may challenge their already held views” (128). Stroud also writes about this phenomenon from a communications perspective in his article “Polarization and Partisan Selective Exposure,” published in the Journal of Communication in 2010. Additionally, Psychology has also explored the phenomenon of in-group identification for decades. For example, Irving Janice published Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes in 1982. Janice describes this “groupthink” phenomenon as: “lapses in judgment of ordinary citizens who become more concerned with retaining the approval of the fellow members of their work group than with coming up with good solutions to the task at hand” (vii). In addition, in Janice’s description of “groupthink” as “concurrence-seeking behavior,” that incites “we-feelings of solidarity” and which brings “deviants” back in line with the group we see the similarities between “groupthink” and in-group identifications. In fact, in-group identifications are the building blocks of group think, making this phenomenon possible. Stalder also writes about what I am describing as “in-group identification” or the “echo chamber effect” from a psychological perspective in his 2009 article “Political Orientation, Hostile Media Perception, and Group Centrism,” published in the American Journal of Psychology. More recently, Cass Sunstein and Reid Hastie have published Wiser: Getting Beyond Groupthink to Make Groups Smarter in 2015. Sunstein and Hastie describe “groupthink,” the echo chamber effect, or in-group identifications as: amplifying, rather than correcting, individual errors in judgment, the tendency of individuals to follow what others say or do without critical thought; the tendency of members to become more polarized, adopting more extreme positions than the ones they began with; and the phenomenon of emphasizing “what everybody knows instead of focusing on critical information that only a few people know” (2). Thus, whatever moniker it goes by (“groupthink,” “the echo chamber effect,” or “in-group identification”) the scholarly, multi-disciplinary consensus is that this tendency to reinforce the status quo and to stamp out challenges to the status quo is dangerous and a human tendency that should be pointed out and resisted.
policy of removal must necessarily be abandoned, the only alternatives left are, to civilize or exterminate [Native peoples]” (Wilson 289). Or, as Prucha writes, “When Indian removal was over the federal government returned to a concentrated effort at civilization and Christianization… new efforts were made to move them [Indians] rapidly into the white man’s ways” (99). So, frequently the first approach to the “Native problem”—to the fact that the Americas had been inhabited for millennia—employed throughout the nineteenth century was forced removal to reservations, often quickly followed by assimilation and acculturation. For example, as a direct result of President Andrew Jackson’s24 Indian Removal Act of 1830, approximately 125,000 Native Americans were forcibly relocated to (largely resource-poor and agriculturally unproductive) tracks of land set aside for them during the nineteenth century.25 Additionally, between 1830 and 1837 over 46,000 Native Americans from southeastern tribes were corralled and marched westward to Oklahoma (“Indian Removal”). Essentially, during the Jacksonian era and throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, the policy of removal would reign.26 This policy of conquest and removal was only possible after Native peoples were disidentified, dehumanized, and completely “othered.” In fact, disidentifications may have even

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24 Jackson was well known for his animosity towards Native peoples. Among a plethora of other offenses, he repeatedly refused to honor federal treaty obligations, allowing for the abuse and displacement of numerous tribes (Nabokov 148).

25 In 1865 General William T. Sherman defined an Indian reservation as, “a parcel of land set aside for Indians, surrounded by thieves” (Nabokov 189).

26 In the 1830s the Creek, Cherokee, and Choctaw of the southeastern United States began their “giant exodus”. As a result, “Nearly half of these nations died either en route or during their first years in the harsh, unfamiliar climate of Oklahoma” (Nabokov 149). In 1863 the United States military forced 8,000 Navajos to undertake a “Long Walk” from their homeland to Fort Sumner, 350 miles away (Hoxie, Mancall, and Merrell xv). Nearly a quarter of them perished in the journey (Nabokov 150). During the 1860s and 70s the Nez Perce, Northern Cheyenne, Modoc, Comanche, Navajo, Chiracahua Apache, Ponca, and Pawnee were rounded up in droves and herded to “Indian Territory” (Nabokov 146). Historians estimate that over thirty thousand Native Americans perished either on these journeys or shortly thereafter. By the conclusion of the nineteenth century the surviving members of more than sixty tribes had been herded up and moved to reservations in Oklahoma where they were confined exiles in their own land. And oftentimes reservation life was filled with its own sorrows and terrors. Many Native Americans faced starvation, abuse and corruption at the hands of Indian agents and soldiers, pernicious paternalism, and theft by dubious treaties of the land initially allotted to them on the reservation (Nabokov 120).
perpetuated negative cultural myths, pernicious policies, and violence against Native peoples. Put differently, it would have been very difficult to mistreat Natives in the ways that were prevalent throughout the nineteenth century if Indigenous peoples were not effectively dehumanized and disidentified with so thoroughly in many facets of Anglo-European culture, including but certainly not limited to Anglo nature writing of the period.

Yet, many tribes refused to serve as passive subjects to the government’s plans of removal or denial of land rights through treaties. Consequently, the second half of the nineteenth century was also a time of intensified conflict between Native Americans and European settlers, particularly in the Western territories. Throughout the nineteenth century Euro-American contact in the West meant conflicts over land and resources, as many areas of the West were inundated with white settlers as a result of the discovery and exploitation of natural resources (for example, copper in the Great Lakes region, gold in the Black Hills of South Dakota and parts of California, and timber in the Midwest) (Spencer xvii, Waldman 90). Even though “four centuries of bitter warfare between red man and white took place in overlapping phases from the East Coast to the West between 1500 and 1900,” (Nabokov 90) this battle of conquest and resistance peaked between the mid and late nineteenth century. White encroachment and exploitation of land given to Native Americans in treaties ratified by the United States Senate resulted in decades of sieges, skirmishes, and massacres collectively termed the “Indian Wars”—

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27 Although I am well aware of the fact that “American” as an adjective technically refers to peoples (both Native and non-Native) living from the tip of North America to the bottom of South America and does not technically refer to people living exclusively in the United States, in places throughout this dissertation I find it necessary to use the moniker “American” to refer to the inhabitants of the United States. This serves as a kind of shorthand that I find myself compelled to use for reasons of expediency. However, I will try to avoid doing so as much as possible because I realize it is actually a misnomer in the way I’m forced to use it in several instances throughout this project. In addition, for the same reasons, in several places I use the term “Euro-American” or “Anglo-American” to refer to white people of European ancestry who are living in the United States.

28 Nabokov claims that these centuries of European inundation, invasion, and contact resulting in the permanent presence of the white man constitute “the most cataclysmic event in more than ten thousand years of cultural development” (xxiii).
which occurred throughout the second half of the nineteenth century and which “add up to the longest war in American history” (Nabokov 95). These wars encouraged Anglo-European Americans to further disidentify with Native Americans as the “violent warrior” and an enemy, stereotypes we will see in the writing of both Thoreau and Muir.

And yet, as destructive as military campaigns were to many tribes, the coerced signing of dubious treaties that was standard operating procedure by the mid-eighteenth century was perhaps ultimately more pernicious than massacres, skirmishes, or lengthy military campaigns. “Native Americans lost far more of their land and independence by the bloodless process of signing treaties than they ever did on the battlefield,” Nabokov writes. “Indeed, most of the violence between Indians and whites flared up because Native Americans were being deprived of the very land promised them in earlier treaties” (117). For example, between 1800 and 1812 William Henry Harrison, then superintendent of the Northwest Indians and governor of Indiana territory, negotiated and rapidly signed fifteen treaties with tribes who thereby yielded all of present day Indiana, Illinois, a significant portion of Ohio, as well as sizable portions of Michigan and Wisconsin—all at the price of about a penny an acre (Spencer, et al. 442). In addition, farther west, Congress ratified fifty-two treaties by which tribes living in Idaho, Oregon, and Washington lost 157 million acres between 1853 and 1857 (Nabokov 119). These treaties, which essentially duped and confiscated land from Native peoples, also encouraged white people to further disidentify with Native peoples by reinforcing supposed racial

29 For example, between 1849 and 1887 the United States military campaigned across Arizona, New Mexico, and northern Mexico to vanquish the Navajo and Apache, and between 1849-1892 the military engaged in a series of desperate clashes from Texas north to the Canadian border and westward to the Pacific Ocean ("The Great Indian Wars: 1540-1890"). Additionally, throughout the 1860s settlers and U.S. soldiers fought the tribes of the Sioux who were suffering the effects of white expansion (Waldman 353). In the Sioux Wars of the 1860s the Sioux achieved a few short lived successes, including a surprise attack on settlers in Minnesota led by Little Crow, Red Cloud’s victory in 1868 over use of the Bozeman Trail, which ran through Indian territory (93). However, by the latter half of the nineteenth century repeating rifles, constant troop replacements, and the contribution of Indian scouts tipped the balance in favor of the U.S. military soldiers (93).
superiority: essentially, the duping-via-treaty gave credence to the scientific racism of the day that dictated the superiority and the ability to govern that was supposedly accessible only to the Anglo “race.”

Disidentifications with Native peoples, stereotypes, removal, as well as physical and cultural eradication of Native peoples by mainstream Anglo-American culture were part of the cultural context and political milieu in which both Thoreau and Muir lived and wrote. Thus, disidentifications made sense as an approach to Native peoples in the mid-nineteenth century, and it was an approach that would have been familiar to and resonated with Anglo readers. Essentially, in the context I’ve described for Native-White relations in the latter half of the nineteenth century, disidentifications may not only have been recognized by both Thoreau and Muir’s predominantly white, Anglo-American audiences, they would have been expected. In fact, the larger context of Native-White relations in the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century, including the prevalence of the kinds of racism perpetuated by science as I’ve discussed, greatly influenced and often necessitated the construction of disidentifications. In other words, in order for the large-scale eradication and removal that characterized white treatment of Native peoples in the United States throughout the nineteenth century to be

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30 In addition to disidentifications felt by whites of the time, during the nineteenth century, whites also wanted Native peoples to disidentify with their own culture. Particularly in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Native children were psychologically and culturally displaced by Indian boarding schools designed to eradicate Native language, culture, and ways of life. The objective of these schools was to teach military-like discipline, practical skills (such as mechanics, agriculture, and housework for girls), and “white habits” of hygiene, diet, and clothing while completely eradicating “paganism, savagery, poverty, and dependency” (Nabokov 215). At the white-run re-education centers that opened and operated steadily throughout the 1830s into the 1890s students entered a completely foreign, highly regimented environment (Waldman 322). Often, children were given a new, white name, their long hair was unceremoniously clipped to the skull, and they were forbidden from speaking their native language, often under threat of physical abuse (Waldman 322). The goal was to force students to renounce their Indian origins, their ancient cultural practices and orientations. As one Navajo headman put it, “When we put our children in school it is like giving our hearts up” (Nabokov 217). These efforts at cultural extermination and systematized attempts at total disidentification with all of the building blocks of Native identity continued throughout the nineteenth century, reaching their peak in the 1880s and 1890s. Thus, these re-education and cultural-eradication practices may have encouraged internal disidentifications within Native peoples themselves.
psychically and emotionally tenable for Anglo-Americans—or in order for this kind of treatment to be perpetuated by one group of human beings against another—at some level, disidentifications must be incited and continually reinforced in mainstream culture and discourse, including literature and Anglo environmental writing.

And the “science” (or, perhaps more aptly named, the scientific racism) of the latter half of the nineteenth century, by lending credence to the supposed superiority of “Anglo” races, supported and even justified the domination and attempted eradication of Indigenous peoples across the Americas and the globe. In short, new “sciences” of the first half of the nineteenth century (including physiogonomy, craniology, phrenology, and anthropometry, which are all studies of the features of the skull and head) “made possible a variety of supposedly empirically based generalizations about differences between various Caucasian races as well as between the white and colored races of the world” (Horsman 54), thereby working to “prove” the inherent, biological superiority of the Caucasian or Anglo-Saxon “race.” Or, as Reginald Horsman writes, The flowering of the new science of man in the first half of the nineteenth century was ultimately decisive in giving a racial cast to Anglo-Saxonism. Scientists, by mid-century, had provided an abundance of ‘proofs’ by which English and American Anglo-Saxons could explain their power, progress, governmental stability, and freedom… the [latter half of the nineteenth century] began a feverish interest in distinctly endowed human races—races with innately unequal abilities, which could lead either to success and world power or to total subordination and extinction. In western Europe and America the Caucasian race became generally recognized as the race clearly superior to all others. (43)
So, both Thoreau and Muir were living and writing in a time when science and scientists were working to lend empirical evidence and scientific “proof” to the tendencies of disidentification and the racist, nationalistic, Imperialistic propaganda and assumptions of white superiority of the time. While much science of the eighteenth century tended to focus on proving the underlying unity of humankind, by comparison, the science of the first half of the nineteenth century “widened the gap that separated Europeans from the newly discovered peoples in the rest of the world” (Horsman 45), thereby potentially inciting attitudes of disidentification.

In fact, at the end of the 1830s George Combe, the most influential and widely-read phrenologists of the time, believed that, “existing races of native American Indians show skulls inferior in their moral and intellectual development to those of the Anglo-Saxon race” (quoted in Horsman 58). It is no coincidence that this attitude espoused by Combe coincided with the Jacksonian era of harsh, inhuman removal in the U.S., removal that was tantamount to a kind of genocide particularly for the Cherokee people (Prucha 68-69). Then, “By the 1840s it was common for writers on race to emphasize wide gulfs between different peoples, and many argued that these gulfs were unbridgeable” (Horsman 59). This makes a strong case for disidentification. And finally, “by the 1850s there were very few scientists prepared to defend the inherent equality of the different races of the world” (Horsman 60). This shows us that less than twenty years after the Age of the Enlightenment approximately drew to a close, science and scientists were far from immune to or removed from the racist and nationalistic assumptions of the age. In fact, at least from the 1820s to the 1860s scientists seemed to become increasingly susceptible to scientific racism and misguided assumptions of Anglo superiority, thereby steadily and more stridently confirming popular racist assumptions and providing “evidence” and justification for “Anglo” conquest of the globe.
While the majority of scientists of the mid to late nineteenth century were not immune to the new scientific racism just described, neither were Thoreau and Muir immune to the misconceptions about Anglo-Saxon superiority, as we shall see as we take a closer look at their writing. Thus, it made sense that—given the ways science and white, Western culture at large was demarcating supposedly “unbridgeable” differences between whites and those of different ancestry throughout the nineteenth century as a result of the “science” of the first half of the century—Thoreau and Muir would have also constructed disidentifications with Native peoples for their white readers.

Differences Between Thoreau and Muir’s Time
While some generalizations can be made about Native-white relations in the nineteenth century as I have just done in the previous section, the periods in which Thoreau and Muir lived and wrote are also markedly different and need to be differentiated from one another. Two of the most important developments that separate Thoreau and Muir are the Darwinian Revolution and the outbreak of the American Civil War. Therefore, I will briefly outline these developments so that we can better understand how they may have impacted Thoreau and Muir’s writing, and specifically the disidentifications with Native peoples Thoreau and Muir construct for their white readers.

Charles Darwin published his treatise on evolutionary biology, *The Origin of Species* in 1859. Thus, the Darwinian Revolution took place between and separates Thoreau and Muir’s publications analyzed in this chapter (Thoreau publishing *Walden* in 1854 and Muir publishing *The Mountains of California* in 1894). Referring to both the “discovery” of “deep” or geologic time and the Darwinian Revolution, nature writing scholar Paul Brooks writes of the nineteenth
century: “This was the century during which fundamental beliefs about the origin of the earth and of man’s place in it were shattered beyond repair” (xv). Along similar lines as Brooks, Sigmund Freud noted that the Darwinian revolution was one of the major reconstructions of human thought that occurred in the nineteenth century (Gould 2). Freud also remarked that Darwin’s biological research “Robbed man of his particular privilege of having been specially created and relegated him to a descent from the animal world” (quoted in Gould 1). In accordance with an exponentially more expansive conception of the earth’s age, Darwin’s theory of evolution further contributed to a more holistic perspective in which humankind’s relative insignificance and diminishment as a species was undeniable. Also as a result of the Darwinian Revolution, and in direct contrast to the theories of race as completely separate and as the “Anglo” race as superior circulating from the 1820s to the 1830s, under Darwin’s theories there was (hypothetically, at least) a single humankind encompassing all races, and in which all races belong to the same species. Thus, after 1859 it became harder for intellectuals, scientists, and Anglo-supremacist thinkers in general to contend that humankind was so very racially different when Darwinian Theory seemed to be proving evidence for our shared origins, only separated by time and different geographical locals. Thus, we see that Thoreau31 refers to the “Red race of man” (34) repeatedly throughout Walden, thereby maintaining some separation, whereas Muir very begrudgingly admits that he belongs to the same species as the Monos he meets in the Sierra (The Mountains of California 73). So, even though there is evidence suggesting that Thoreau may have been an outlier and ahead of his time (as he often was in a number of ways) in his early acceptance of evolution (Brooks 14, Oelschlaeger 219), it is important to note that the

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31 Who reportedly read Darwin’s *Origin of Species* and kept the book on his bookshelf for a brief time at Walden’s pond and was not at all surprised by Darwin’s findings or his theory of evolution (Brooks 14, Oelschlaeger 219).
two texts analyzed in this chapter for the disidentifications they encourage white readers to make with Native peoples are separated by the Darwinian Revolution.

In addition to the publication of *Origin of Species* and the subsequent Darwinian revolution, the second major difference between Thoreau and Muir’s time, and one of the major historical events that divided their writing, their historical situatedness, and their understanding of Native peoples is the American Civil War, which lasted approximately from the spring of 1861 to the spring of 1865 (Calloway 268). Thoreau’s *Walden* was written and published prior to the Civil War (in 1854), and Muir’s *The Mountains of California* was written after the conflict (1894). Prior to the Civil War, from about 1815 right up until the outbreak of war in 1861, the spirit of the age was one of reform, a spirit in which “betterment for all mankind seemed with easy reach and concern for society’s unfortunates [a category that included Native Americans]… appeared everywhere” (Prucha 100). However, after the Civil War, after intense and bloody conflicts not only between North and South (conflicts that involved over 20,000 Native peoples, fighting on both sides [Calloway 268]), but also between Western tribes and white settlers, much of the reforming spirit was gone and there was little to no tolerance for Indigenous peoples who refused “to die” off or conform. Throughout the Civil War between North and South, “a series of other wars,” as Prucha phrases it (143), were taking place on a second, Western front—wars between the Sioux and Dakota in Minnesota, the Apaches and Navajos in Arizona, and the Cheyennes, Arapahos, Kiowas, and Comanches in Colorado and Kansas and the U.S. government under the Lincoln administration (Prucha 143-144). Because of these “Indian Wars” against Western tribes, the Anglo American populace had little appetite or tolerance for Indian reformation as the country tried to heal its wounds and rebuild during Reconstruction.
Perhaps one of the biggest impacts the Civil War had on Native peoples in the West is that the conflict between North and South “temporarily slowed migration westward and called troops away from frontiers” (Calloway 268). And yet, after the Civil War conflicts between white settlers invading Indian land and moving West in search of “precious metals and agricultural riches” (Prucha 136) only intensified. Essentially, the inundation of white settlers increased with renewed vigor and determination after the Civil War, further decimating Native populations and further encroaching on and engulfing Indian homelands (Calloway 268).

And there are other impacts of the Civil War on Indian-white relations before and after the war. For example, in the antebellum years in the United States, “one could speak of a plains Indian barrier of Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapahos, Kiowa, and Comanche resistance extending from the Canadian to the Mexican border” (Prucha 120). However, after the Civil War, this barrier crumbled and there was little to no resistance, which “completely opened the way for unharassed travel or settlement on the Great Plains” (Prucha 121). In fact, this ostensible breaking of Native resistance to white settlement became a source of national pride (Prucha 121). Or, as Calloway writes, “‘Winning the West’ was a national goal that many believed could help restore unity and heal the wounds from the Civil War” (269). The supposed “subjugation” of various Native people (including the Southern Cheyennes, the Oglala Sioux, the Arapaho, the Kiowas, Comanches, and Plains Apaches) by white, Anglo-Americans was pursued with renewed fury after the Civil War (Calloway 268-270). Additionally, the annihilation of the buffalo herds (long a primary food source for Plains cultures as well as a basis for Plains cultures) and the building of the transcontinental railroad (which was completed in 1869) in antebellum America

32 While the Civil War may have staid certain conflicts, the so called “Indian Wars” continued, primarily in Minnesota where the Dakota Sioux went to war with the U.S. after large land sell offs and after enduring years of starvation at the hands of the United States government (Calloway 268).
contributed to the attempted eradication of Native peoples and Native culture and removal to reservations of Native peoples.

As Berkhofer makes clear, in the decades following the Civil War (by the 1870s, and certainly by the Massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890) the Indigenous armed resistance to white encroachment and abuses had collapsed (166). Then, “With all Native Americans finally under the effective control of American sovereignty, the effort to acculturate and assimilate became more efficient” (Berkhofer 166). The decades after the Civil War—and more specifically the time between when Thoreau was writing and when Muir was writing—was a time of ruthless subjugation, assimilation, and acculturation, a time when Indigenous peoples were herded up and often forcefully held in reservations where they were frequently under the absolute control of Indian agents, denied religious freedom as well as self-government, taught to be docile farmers who were individually, rather than communally orientated (Berhofer 169, 170). Given his historical and geographical situatedness, Muir’s thinking was certainly shaped within this bigger picture of “Winning the West” and Indian subjugation in the post-Civil War period and all it entailed, including the encroachment upon and the colonization of Native peoples. Therefore, while it may have been easier for Thoreau to romanticize the remaining Indians he saw out East prior to the Civil War and the Native peoples he imagined before the Civil War and the “Indian Wars,” Muir, by contrast, was more likely to see a defeated or violent Native people and less likely to romanticize and idealize the Indians he saw out West given his post-War positionality.

**Disidentifications with “The Native” in Thoreau’s *Walden***

As one of the foremost originators of the personal, reflective, observation-oriented nature essay based on individual experience in the natural world, Henry David Thoreau’s influence is still
apparent today in Western nature writing. In fact, according to environmental historian and nature writing scholar Paul Brooks, Thoreau has had “an immeasurable influence on the way we think and write about the natural world” (xii). In addition, as a number of contemporary wilderness theorists, including Oelschlaeger, Brooks, and Nash have similarly pointed out, Thoreau’s “ideas are recognized as crucial to the birth of a distinctively American idea of wilderness” (Oelschlaeger 133). Through his forging of ecocentric philosophy, his invocation and strategic rhetorical construction of time as so expansive as to be beyond human fathoming, the articulation of a mythological consciousness, and the theorization of primary, felt, individual experience with nature, Thoreau is one of the first nature writers in the United States to work towards the development of an ecocentric understanding of natural surroundings, an objective of environmental writing that remains important today. A consistent assertion that is threaded throughout *Walden*, arguably Thoreau’s best known work, is that socio-economic categories, constraints, and enculturations “blind human beings, destroying not only living entities, which are reduced to use value only, but also the human soul” (Oelschlaeger 150). Thus, Thoreau continually challenges the tenets of Modernism, Consumerism, modern Industrialization, Anthropocentrism, and developmentalism while working towards ecocentrism. These are objectives that remain important to environmental writing in the United States today.

Thoreau was also a vanguard of environmental thinking and writing in his evocation of “the Native.” Throughout *Walden* he consistently turns to “the Native,” and the primary relationship he constructs for his readers with Native peoples is disidentification. For example, in his chapter “Economy” Thoreau writes the following:

> Though we are not so degenerate but that we might possibly live in a cave or a wigwam or wear skins today, it certainly is better to accept the advantages,
though so dearly bought, which the invention and industry of mankind
offer…With a little more wit we might use these materials so as to become richer
than the richest now are, and make our civilization a blessing. (64)

Here Native peoples as a monolithic whole are used to symbolize a brutish, uncouth,
“degenerate” past that modern, white, Euro-American, New Englanders have overcome.

Although Thoreau is consistently critical of the contemporary increasingly urbanized,
industrialized, and mechanized culture which surrounded him throughout **Walden**, in Thoreau’s
estimation the Western, Eurocentric culture and its members were superior to Native peoples,
who represented a distant, dissimilar culture stuck in time. From Thoreau’s vantage point, as
potentially treacherous and detrimental as nineteenth century civilization was if it was accepted
without critique and reflection, it was still an improvement over humankind’s “savage,”
“degenerate” past that the culture of Thoreau and his readers had supposedly vanquished and
were far removed from. Thus we see that the primary approach Thoreau uses is one of
disidentification, a depiction which reinforces readers’ faith in developmentalism, in unchecked
exploitation of the natural world in the name of human “progress.”

In fact, the Native peoples Thoreau depicts here are the “other” which his superior
Anglo-American, Western culture can gauge their own progress as a culture against—but only if
readers disidentify with Thoreau’s stereotype of the poor, doomed savage living in ignorance and
squalor. Essentially Thoreau encourages his readers to disidentify with a vanished, vanquished,
“other-ed” Indigenous culture to re-make and improve their own. Essentially, the “savages”
remind Thoreau’s audience of how far they have come; yet he is also encouraging his readers to
look how far they can go with “a little more wit” or with a little more critical reflection. Because
it relies on stereotypes and because “the Native” is considered only as a resource for white
readers to exploit for their own edification, Thoreau’s primary approach of disidentification—although it makes sense given the attitudes, political, and cultural context of the time—is unethical and inappropriate. In addition, because the Native stereotype Thoreau constructs for his readers here is disidentified with, exploited for the edification of white readers and Anglo-European culture, and remains a static, ignorant, and mute construct, there is no chance the silent savage stereotype seen here can be heard by Anglo readers, let alone rhetorically listened to.

In addition, firmly entrenched on the “nature” side of the nature/culture divide, Native peoples and other “savage” races “untouched by civilization” are static, eternal, unchanging. While modern man and his civilization are the dynamic mind, Indigenous Americans are the inert, unchanging matter, the purely physical, the body. While Thoreau did not always see this as a negative (in fact, he continually asserts that humankind should be more like matter, more elemental, and more present in the physical moment) it is true that this is certainly a specific kind of disidentification Thoreau encouraged his audience to construct against Native peoples. This type of disidentification against Native peoples reinforces Anglo audience’s cultural norms and expectations, which, in turn, does not challenge audiences to re-think their Anthropocentric and developmentalist mentalities.

We are also able to see the depiction of Native Americans as physical specimens in the following from *Walden*:

The Jesuits were quite balked by those Indians who, being burned at the stake, suggested new modes of torture to their tormentors. Being superior to physical suffering, it sometimes chanced that they were superior to any consolation which the missionaries could offer; and the law to do as you would be done by fell with less persuasiveness on the ears of those who, for their part, did not care how they
were done by, who loved their enemies after a new fashion, and came very near
freely forgiving them all they did. (98-99)

Firstly, the “Indians” depicted here are essentially unfathomable to Thoreau, his readers, and to
the Anglo-European missionaries. Thoreau and his white readers cannot understand burning at
the stake from a Native perspective, which indicated bravery at refraining from crying out and a
purity of cause.\textsuperscript{33} Being irrevocably unable to access the psyche, the reasoning, the mentality of
another—and unwilling to try to do so—is essentially a kind of disidentification. Thoreau and his
white, Anglo-European readers are unable to fathom these savages of the wilderness who—from
Thoreau and his white readers’ perspectives—were seemingly (and inhumanly) immune to
physical pain and, in fact, all human emotion, including empathy, suffering, retribution, and
“consolation.” Therefore, because they are essentially beyond and other than “human” for all of
the reasons I have just cited, the approach Thoreau encourages his readers to adopt is one of
disidentification.

By constructing this kind of disidentification, Thoreau is encouraging his audience to
examine their own corrupt, defunct morality and to take a close, uncomfortable look at their own
hypocrisy. In other words, he is saying: look at these “others,” these “savages” that are so unlike
us and with whom we disidentify and think ourselves superior to. These wholly others are
teaching us to be Christian. However, throughout this chapter Thoreau is careful to keep the
Native separate: they are not Christian, they are not converted— they are “other.” Here a
disidentification with Native peoples is used to question and critique a consubstantial
identification shared amongst Thoreau’s audience as Christians. Here also Thoreau is using
disidentifications his audience would have undoubtedly been familiar with in order to point out
their own false sense of moral and religious superiority. Again, he is using disidentifications with

\textsuperscript{33} My thanks to Professor Cary Miller (who is my source for this information) for pointing this out.
Native Americans to enlighten and re-make his audience, as a resource to be minded for white readers.

Although Thoreau’s critique of missionary, Christian, charity-oriented culture is poignant, it is important to note that this is an example of the “noble savage” stereotype being used to full effect. As Berkhofer points out in his description of the “noble savage” typecast,

The true Noble Savage… depended upon passion and impulse alone for a direct apprehension of nature in all its picturesqueness, sublimity, and fecundity… [in the Romantics version of the noble savage] life, like nature, was or ought to be poetic in inspiration and experience. Social rules and conventions, like a formalistic appreciation of nature, were seen as a hindrance to the spontaneous experience of nature and of life in a direct and immediate way, a denial of the primacy of feeling. (79)

The Indians described by Thoreau above are truly alive because they are free from conventions and rationality; therefore, they are able to feel and experience all, from pain to elation to “true” forgiveness. Western rationality would have encumbered such exceptional, purely emotional capacity to forgive, as Thoreau seems to imply. Therefore, the noble savage stereotype is used to full effect as it serves as a corrective to Western over-reliance (in Thoreau’s estimation) rationality.

As Owens argues, “Savagism, nobility, and death— these three expectations delineate neatly the role of the indigenous Native in the Euroamerican imagination, and they are expectations founded upon a metanarrative that insists upon the mythic and tragic ‘otherness’ of Native Americans” (Mixedblood Messages 117). We see all three at work in Thoreau’s depictions of and identifications with Native peoples. And, above all, the noble Natives suffering in this passage are “other,” the opposite of Thoreau’s audience. The other, simplistic, noble,
suffering, but ultimately doomed savage is evoked so that Thoreau’s primary audience of white Euro-Americans can be re-made by thinking critically about their faith in ostensibly charitable acts. Again, Native peoples are disidentified with, and again they are resources for the Anglo-American culture to exploit for their own edification and enlightenment.

As we see in this passage about Jesuit missionaries and throughout *Walden*, Thoreau constantly urges his audience to resist the hegemonic paradigms of Western culture by questioning, reflecting, and thinking critically. Although he frequently berates his reader’s tendency to accept their fate as a cog in the wheel of the agrarian-industrial machine, he believes his readers at least possess the potential to think critically and resist an un-self-actualized existence. However, as is evidenced in the above quotation, as an atrophied relic of the past, this intellectual potential is not extended to Native peoples. The monolithic “savage” evoked here is not capable of the same anti-establishment questioning, self-actualization, and critical thinking. In Thoreau’s depiction above, the “Indian’s” moral authority derives, instead, exclusively from their base, inherent, purely physical instincts. One of Thoreau’s points here is that these innate, even animalistic instincts (from Thoreau’s perspective) as they have evolved through nature are actually nobler and may serve humanity better than Judeo-Christian doctrine or organized religion—which, in Thoreau’s view, stymies true reflection and original thought. The tortured, suffering Indians in this passage serve as an artifact to help Thoreau’s readers think critically and improve their work-a-day condition. The Indians depicted here ostensibly, from Thoreau’s vantage, have much to offer his audience—if that audience can first realize how different they are from Native peoples. Put another way, again Native peoples hold a key to one contemporary culture’s regrettable conditions—that is, if Thoreau’s audience can first acknowledge and embrace his constructed disidentifications with Indians.
Throughout *Walden* and his other works such as *The Main Woods*, Thoreau consistently turns to the Native tribes of the Eastern United States as a way for his white, Euro-American, increasingly urban, developmentalist, industrialized, consumer-oriented audience to look backward toward a time when humankind was not separated from the natural world by the culture and the urban landscapes they constructed. In short, throughout *Walden*, Native Americans are elemental. In other words, they were an element of the earth—which means they can be reduced to their pure, essential physicality. For example, Thoreau writes in *Walden*, “Contrast the physical condition of the Irish with that of the North American Indian, or the South Sea Islander, or any other savage race before it was degraded by contact with the civilized man” [emphasis mine] (59). Here, Native peoples, or “other savage race[s]” should be envied because of their physical health and strength, because of the fact that they are “savage” and closer to the elements of the earth. From Thoreau’s romanticizing perspective here, the “North American Indian” is the other against which modern, civilized man can judge himself and realize his own lamentable condition of being far removed from the earth, from the elemental and from physicality. Consequently, the approach of disidentification with Indigenous peoples is used to potentially re-make Thoreau’s white readers. This is in the long, Western, imperialist tradition of conceiving of both Native peoples and the natural world as resources for white, Western culture.

In addition, in the above quote Thoreau points to the Native peoples of North America and the South Sea Islander as examples of how “savages” are most often stronger and in much better physical condition than white members of highly “civilized” European nations. In this context—and specifically in the nineteenth century context that dictated that Anglos were supposedly the superior, more intellectual and rational race with the ability to rationalize and govern—Thoreau’s readers are the enslaved mind and Native Americans are the body, the
physical that modern Americans have neglected, disassociated and disidentified with. In fact, on
the following page Thoreau writes, “It is a mistake to suppose that, in a country where the usual
evidences of civilization exist, the condition of a very large body of inhabitants may not be as
degraded as that of savages” (58). White, Euro-Americans are considered for the possibilities of
their mind, whereas minority Indigenous peoples are reduced to bodies. Therefore, Thoreau’s
readers are encouraged to disidentify with Native peoples, which further suggests that the
primary approach Thoreau constructs for his audience is one of disidentification.

Additionally, a significant disidentification occurs in the portrayal of Native peoples as
pre-civilization and Thoreau’s audience as post-civilization due to the fact that Native peoples
are on the opposite side of the nature/culture divide. As Oelschlaeger and other environmental
historians and eco-philosophers have pointed out, this conception of man as other than the rest of
nature is one of humankind’s most ancient of disidentifications. And again, it is essential for
Thoreau and his readers to make this disidentification with Indigenous peoples so that they are
able to re-envision and re-make themselves. Because this objective puts mankind at the center
while constructing Native peoples (like “nature”) as a resource that Thoreau’s Anglo-European
audience can draw from, it reinforces Anthropocentric orientations. Thus, we see that
disidentification with Native peoples is not an optimal approach for helping audiences envision
less ecological destructive ways of thinking and being, which has long been an integral objective
of American environmental writing.

Another conclusion drawn from an analysis of the above passage is that in the “poor
minority” (58) (namely Native peoples) constructed here are a monolithic, homogenous entity:
all tribes and indeed all individuals are rhetorically constructed for Thoreau’s white, Euro-
American audience as the same. They serve as a synecdoche not only for all Indigenous peoples,
but also for all “others”—for anyone who Thoreau’s primary audience disidentifies with. While the civilizations of the ancient East and contemporary Europe are carefully differentiated in this chapter of *Walden*, Native Americans are considered only as a monolith. In addition, the European and Eastern civilizations are differentiated throughout time: they grow, change, and evolve throughout history, whereas the Native peoples are seemingly frozen in time. In the middle of the nineteenth century, during a period when much “progress” was being made, when there was a progressive spirit that characterized the age, when advancements in nearly every scientific field from biology to philosophy were being made, and when the United States was rapidly expanding and pushing ever westward (in short, in a time when—very generally speaking—change, progress, and the advancement of the human race seemed apparent and omnipresent), Thoreau’s audience would have constructed consubstantial identifications with his portrayal of ancient Eastern and contemporary European civilizations—who evolved. And they would have constructed disidentifications with Indigenous peoples who did *not* apparently possess the ability to change, adapt, and evolve. Consequently, because Native peoples are so completely disidentified with and because they cannot be listened to, Western audiences are reinforced in their mindset of cultural superiority and in their removal from the natural world, rather than challenged to potentially cultivate more ecocentric and egalitarian attitudes, which suggests that disidentification with Native peoples is not helpful in changing the ways we think about and construct the natural world through language.

Unfortunately, this approach of disidentification means that Indigenous peoples are relegated to a vanished past. (As we shall see, when Thoreau finds “real,” living Indians in *The Maine Woods*, this idealized version of Native child-of-nature stereotype becomes problematic.) In general, throughout *Walden*, Native peoples are utilized through the construction of
disidentifications as a way for the dominant, hegemonic Western culture to re-envision their existence and their future. However, Native people as “other,” as the object of Thoreau and his audience’s disidentifications, exist in the present only as a disidentification, as a vanished, defeated, and diminished race, as reminders of what was, not as a viable presence in Thoreau’s present. Because they are depicted by Thoreau for his readers as something white culture can learn from, and because they remain a pernicious stereotype, the strategy of disidentification is not ethical or appropriate—nor does it open any possibilities for rhetorical listening and thus engagement with alternative eco-orientations that may be more egalitarian, ethical, and appropriate.

As we have seen, disidentification is the primary approach Thoreau uses throughout *Walden* regarding Native Americans. In addition, elsewhere in his body of work we continue to see this “othering” approach of Indigenous peoples used to engage, persuade, and transform Anglo audiences. For example, throughout *The Maine Woods* Thoreau constantly refers to the Indians he encounters on his trek through the wilderness of Maine as “primitive” and as “savages” (not unusual given the time and the cultural and historical context), while also constantly and carefully observing them from a physical and ontological distance. Natives are alternately depicted as oddities to be either idealized and romanticized, or pitied. As just one example of this tendency to describe the Indians’ lamentable condition, in the first chapter of *The Main Woods*, “Ktaadn,” Thoreau’s describes paddling past “Indian Island” as follows:

As we left the shore, I observed a short, shabby, washerwoman-looking Indian—they commonly have the woebegone look of the girl that cried for spilt milk…

This picture will do to put before the Indian’s history, that is, the history of his extinction. In 1837 there were three hundred and sixty-two souls left of this tribe.
The island seemed deserted today… These were once a powerful tribe. I even thought that a row of wigwams, with a dance of powwows, and a prisoner tortured at the stake, would be more respectable than this. (6)

Thoreau is disappointed that the Indigenous woman he views from a distance (he does not get out of the large canoe he is traveling in) on “Indian Island” does not live up to his idealized, romanticized imaginings. She is not the violent warrior or the paragon of “natural” living Thoreau expected, as conjured from his imagination. Yet, she is still certainly “other.” According to Thoreau as described in this chapter of *The Maine Woods*, the Native Americans who are left on the island are out of place (for example, the female Native he describes is mournful, pitiable, tamed, defeated and does not belong to the pristine, unconquered, wild, breathtakingly beautiful landscape Thoreau describes) and out of time (for example, the tribe who used to live on the island has actually vanished, and those who remain are like shadows, sad memories of the tribe’s former glory). Thoreau and his party are living in a thrilling, yet undetermined present and creating history in the moment, while the Native woman belongs to an already-established, departed, dead history. The “washerwoman-looking Indian” is a disruption and completely at odds with the purpose of Thoreau’s expedition, the adventuresome, profound-wild-beauty-of-nature-appreciating spirit of the trip, while also being at odds with Thoreau’s party of hearty, vigorous (male) explorers. Therefore, Thoreau disidentifies with her, and asks his audience to do the same, thereby reinforcing his audience’s predisposition toward the tenants of Western superiority and developmentalism. Again, the approach of disidentification Thoreau employs does not help readers construct different conceptions of and relationships with their environment.

In addition to the “washerwoman” Indian described at the beginning of Thoreau’s first chapter of *The Maine Woods*, we see a variation on the theme of the lamentable, defeated race
near the conclusion of this chapter. Thoreau and his party meet two (apparently very hungover) Native Americans on their paddle back from hiking Mount Ktaadn, whom Thoreau describes as follows:

Met face to face, these Indians in their native woods looked like the sinister and slouching fellows whom you meet picking up strings and paper in the streets of a city. There is, in fact, a remarkable and unexpected resemblance between the degraded savage and the lowest classes in a great city. The one is no more a child of nature than the other. (105)

While it is true that, at first, it seems as if Thoreau is working to construct consubstantial identifications between the “degraded,” impoverished, seemingly reprehensible, lost souls of both white, Euro-American and Native American cultures, the more significant and prevalent trend is still one of disidentification between Thoreau’s readers and the pitiful, destitute Native he describes. Thoreau and his readers are not of the same substance as the poor urban bottom-dwellers or the deplorable Indians; therefore, Thoreau’s readers are asked to disidentify with the poor of both races.

More specifically, before this point in *The Maine Woods*—and, indeed, throughout *Walden*—Thoreau works to establish himself as a “child of nature,” at home in the woods, and immune to and above the vicious, degrading, and imprisoning cycle of “civilization” and city life. In addition, Thoreau’s audience is also not part of the cruel city system that created such degradation and abject poverty, given that they have picked up Thoreau’s book, taken this excursion with Thoreau for over one-hundred pages, and identified with Thoreau’s exceptional appreciation of the natural world as well as his unique ecocentric orientation for the duration of those pages. It could even be theorized that Thoreau and his readers are consubstantial in their
Eco-Exceptionalism. However, the contemporaneous Indians are not part of Thoreau’s aesthetic and they do not belong to his wilderness philosophy, nor to his romanticized vision of the natural world apart from humankind’s civilization; therefore, the “real,” living Native peoples he views from a distance in Maine need to be dismissed and disidentified with, which reinforces Thoreau’s and his readers’ consubstantiality in their supposed shared Eco-Exceptionalism.

In the final quote we’ll look at from *The Maine Woods* we can see how Thoreau constructs a different kind of disidentification with an Indian he catches a glimpse of on the river. *This* Native man does indeed live up to Thoreau’s idealized, atavistic imaginings. Thoreau describes this solitary Native man in a canoe as follows:

> He lives three thousand years deep into time, an age not yet described by poets. Can you well go further back in history than this? For there turns up but now into the mouth of Millinocket stream a still more ancient and primitive man, whose history is not brought down even to the former… He is but dim and misty to me, obscured by the eons that lie between the bark canoe and the batteau. He builds no house of logs, but a wigwam of skins. He eats no hot bread and sweet cake, but musquash and moose meat and the fat of bears. He glides up the Millinocket and is lost to my sight, as a more distant and misty cloud is seen flitting by behind a nearer, and is lost in space. So he goes about his destiny, the red face of man.

(106)

This Indigenous man is distanced and separate from Thoreau in every possible way. He is separated by time, by space, by a supernatural mist, and by everything that he does and how he lives. He is part of the great mystery of the wilds that Thoreau has come to explore and fathom, and as such he is the great Other that is Nature, to which Thoreau, his party, and “civilized”
man—including Thoreau’s readers—do not really belong for they are voyeurs and voyagers, not permanent residents of the primal natural world. At the end of the trip, they will walk out of the woods and back into civilization. Thus, Thoreau uses disidentification with Natives to invoke the mystery, a sense of wonder, and a spiritual enchantment with the natural world.

And this approach of disidentification extends beyond Walden and The Maine Woods to one of Thoreau’s most famous and still widely read essays, “Walking.” In this essay Thoreau writes:

I went to see a panorama of the Mississippi, and as I worked my way up the river in the light of to-day, and saw the steamboats wooding up, counted the rising cities, gazed on the fresh ruins of Nauvoo, beheld the Indians moving west across the stream, and, as before I had looked up the Moselle, now looked up the Ohio and the Missouri, and heard the legends of Dubuque and of Wenona’s Cliff—still thinking more of the future than of the past or present—I saw that this was a Rhine stream of a different kind; that the foundations of castles were yet to be laid, and the famous bridges were yet to be thrown over the river; and I felt that this was the heroic age itself, though we know it not, for the hero is commonly the simplest and obscurest of men. [emphasis mine] (60)

In this passage, the America populated and invented by white European immigrants has her best, most exciting, and most worthwhile enterprises in front her. White, predominantly European immigrant residents of the United States have yet to make their most significant contributions to the cultural endeavors of mankind. In which case, Thoreau’s gaze is fixedly upon the future. However, Native peoples, represented by the Indian he watches moving across the stream, belong to a different, bygone age. They are not part of the “heroic age” of which Thoreau and his
readers are participants; rather, they are part of the “legends,” part of the “ruins.” As such they are “other,” to be disidentified with. As a consequence of the disidentifications with Natives incited here and as a result of Thoreau’s assumption of linear time and progress, white readers’ faith in the status quo of developmentalism is not challenged; rather, it is reinforced.

It is also important to note that the Indians in this passage are moving west, and making way for a new, exceptional civilization. Their time has come and gone, and they are not participating in the construction of this new exulted, Classical civilization—as Thoreau and his readers are. Therefore, a disidentification with these displaced Natives is required of Thoreau’s nineteenth century audience so that they are not obligated to feel guilty about this displacement, and so that they can fully participate—without compunction—in the construction of this new Eden-like Rome. Again, audiences are not challenged to develop more helpful relationships with and conceptions of the natural world; rather, Anthropocentrism and the mythology of Anglo-Western Imperialism and cultural superiority are perpetuated and reinforced. Therefore, disidentifications with Native peoples are not appropriate, nor are they helpful. In fact, given all that we have seen in Thoreau’s writing, disidentifications are a misstep in the long tradition of Anglo, non-Native nature writers in the United States evoking “the Native.”

In fact, in addition to all of the reasons I have already cited, disidentifications with “the Native” are also a misstep because they work at cross-purposes with many of Thoreau’s utmost purposes as a writer, wilderness philosopher, and influential thinker. Throughout *Walden* and other works, Thoreau attempts to remake his predominantly Anglo, Euro-American audience. He encourages his readers to re-envision their existence and their attitudes towards, conceptions of, and relationships with the natural world. One of the ways that Thoreau attempts to re-make his white audience is by moving them from Anthropocentric orientations to more ecocentric
orientations. As Oelschlaeger points out, Thoreau was on the vanguard of ecocentric thinking, and inciting this orientation in his audiences was an integral part of his larger project in *Walden* (49). One of Thoreau’s utmost objectives, throughout his body of work, is to introduce audiences to this more inclusive, counter-hegemonic way of perceiving and making meaning in the world. In other words, one of his primary purposes is to offer his white audience a more encompassing ecocentric orientation, one that considered the human species as part of and a product of the natural world. However, the disidentifications he constructs with Native peoples do not align with this larger objective. Instead, disidentifications reinforce the Anthropocentric and developmentalist norms that his audience was, by and large and more than likely, accustomed to, thereby also reinforcing the echo chamber effect of white authors speaking to white audience’s expectations and failing to challenge hegemonic paradigms. Unfortunately, Native peoples and the alternative environmental ethic they have vivified for centuries (Owens 220 and Callicott and Nelson) don’t play more of a constructive role within Thoreau’s writing in the endeavor of moving white audiences toward more helpful, ethical, and appropriate conceptions of environment.

**The Potential for Consubstantiality in *Walden***

Even though the primary relationship Thoreau encourages his white readers to construct with Native peoples throughout *Walden* and other works such as *The Maine Woods* is disidentification, he also plant seeds of another kind of relationship that allows for potential cultural similarities. In short, although disidentification made sense given the political and cultural context of the time and given Indian-White affairs of the latter nineteenth century, Thoreau plants seeds of potential consubstantiality and consubstantial identifications with Native
peoples in several places throughout *Walden*. Put differently, there are places where he offers his readers ways that they may see themselves as “like” Native Americans.

For instance, one example of Thoreau planting the seeds of consubstantiality can be found in “Economy,” the first chapter of *Walden* where Thoreau writes:

> Why should not our furniture be as simple as the Indian’s?… The very simplicity and nakedness of man’s life in the primitive ages imply this advantage, at least, that they left him still but a sojourner in nature. When he was refreshed with food and sleep he contemplated his journey again. He dwelt, as it were, in a tent in this world, and was either threading the valleys, or crossing the plains, or climbing the mountain tops. But lo! Men have become tools of their tools… We no longer camp as for a night, but have settled down on earth and forgotten heaven. (60-61)

In this passage Thoreau refers to “man” or humankind as a unified species, and he also uses the inclusive “we,” which suggests that he is planting possibilities for consubstantial identifications between his white, non-Native readers and Native peoples. In addition, in the above passage, consubstantiality can be found in Native Americans’ and contemporary Anglo-European cultures’ potential to be a “sojourner in nature.” More ecocentric orientations and the realization of our connection with the natural world is the substance in which Thoreau’s white readers can find consubstantiality with Indigenous peoples.

However, *time* is the key here: in Thoreau’s estimation, Native Americans are removed by time and distance for Thoreau and his white readers. According to Thoreau, they indeed belong to a “primitive” past. The implication is that at one time all humankind was alike; we all shared this primitive past. Thus, common substance or consubstantiality can be found in the fact once “we” all shared this past, and this connection to nature. Yet, again from Thoreau’s vantage
point, now modern, white, Western, Anglo-European culture is separated from this past and this connection by the artifice and illusion of contemporary culture and technology. However, in realizing our past, and in realizing that Native peoples are a reminder of that past, there is the potential for shared substance, for consubstantiality, and for readers to develop more enlightened and egalitarian conceptions of environment. Thus, in Thoreau’s planting the seeds of consubstantiality we see that there is potential for readers to be introduced to kinds of identifications that are different than those dictated by the cultural and political context of the time. Put differently, we see Thoreau planting the seeds of a different kind of identification—of a consubstantial identification—that may be more respective of similarities between cultures, a kind of identification that is other than what white readers could expect given the cultural and political context of the mid-nineteenth century, given the state of Indian-White relations almost one-hundred and fifty years ago.

As further evidence of Thoreau’s construction of Native Americans as belonging both to the past and the earth he writes in “Economy,” “If we would indeed restore mankind by truly Indian, botanic, magnetic, or natural means, let us first be as simple and well as Nature ourselves, dispel the clouds which hang over our own brows, and take up a little life into our pores” [emphasis mine] (102). Thoreau doggedly laments the anemic, stupefied condition of a society consumed with mindless, meaningless work only as a means of material consumption—a condition which he attributes to living lives cut off from the natural world in which humankind evolved. However, the human species can be re-vivified by communion with and direct experience in Nature and all its elemental forms, of which Native peoples are a part. This is the consubstantiality or the common substance on which Thoreau’s readers can stand and potentially be united or consubstantial with Native peoples. In this passage Thoreau plants the seeds of
consubstantiality with “the Native” so that his readers can potentially realize their current unaware and unconnected-with-nature condition. A realization of the potential consubstantiality between Thoreau’s white readers and Indigenous peoples (or Thoreau’s imaginations of the “Indian”) is the means by which readers can reconnect with a more “natural” and more “vivified” and ecocentric state.

However, as we see in this passage above, before such a re-connection can occur, a disidentification with Native peoples must also be made so that Thoreau’s white audience can recognize what they are not, the substance they can’t yet claim. Or, if this disidentification has already been made (as it must have been for much of Thoreau’s audience given the previously discussed historical context in which Thoreau was writing), it must be fully recognized because it is only through an original or long-standing condition of disidentification with Native peoples that nineteenth century, industrialized, white, Euro-Americans can be remade into more ecocentric more “connected-with-nature” versions of themselves. In short, Thoreau’s image of Native Americans is a resource that white, Euro-Americans can use to improve their own condition by attaining a consubstantiality with “nature”—but only if readers realize what they lost (their original, “primitive,” more ecocentric past) through disidentification with Indigenous peoples. Put another way, readers have to recognize how far modern, consumer-driven, work-a-day culture is from what all of humanity once was—and what Native peoples, as reminders of this removed, distant “primitive” past, still remain.

Therefore, although seeds of potential consubstantiality are planted, in the long run, Native peoples have to be “othered,” or disidentified with in order for Thoreau’s Anglo audience to be re-made. Put differently, despite the fact that some possibilities for collective substance are opened, disidentification with Native peoples still remains the dominant strategy encouraged by
Thoreau. And yet, consubstantiality—although ultimately inappropriate and unethical because it only considers Thoreau’s own imaginations of “the Native,” because we do not hear from Native peoples themselves, and because Thoreau relies on stereotypes of the time—remains a possibility for Thoreau’s white readers. In fact, the fact that Thoreau plants the seeds of consubstantiality for his audience, suggests that writers can open possibilities for kinds of identifications other than those dictated by Indian-white relations, and the political and historical context of the time. Essentially, Thoreau’s planting the seeds of consubstantiality suggests that Anglo nature writers can encourage readers to move beyond the status quo—potentially, as I will put forward in my concluding chapter, towards kinds of identifications that are more effective, ethical, and productive with regards to cross-cultural communication. This possibility for white, Anglo environmental authors to imagine for their readers other kinds of identifications outside the cultural norms and expectations of the time will prove important as we look to the future of American nature writing, as I do in my final chapter.

**Disidentifications with Native Bodies in Muir’s *The Mountains of California***

Chronologically, John Muir is the second major influencer of American ideas of wilderness, environmental discourse, and ecocentric perspectives from the nineteenth century. He is the founder of the Sierra Club and the father of the American preservation movement (Oelschlaeger 170). In addition to his many influential books and essays, his direct contributions in the form of publicizing preservation initiatives lead to the creation of at least six of America’s best known national parks (Oelschlaeger 172-173). For these reasons Oelschlaeger describes Muir was, “An American scholar who not only speculated about but also changed the world” (172). This
emphasis on action and practical advocacy on the part of the natural world is still seen in environmental writing and discourse today.

Along with acting as an effective public relations beacon for nineteenth century preservationism (Oravec 119), Muir’s philosophical contributions to the understanding of conceptions of the natural world, wilderness philosophy, and ecocentric perspectives are still influential today, particularly in environmental writing. Through direct experience with nature (first on his family’s farm in Wisconsin and then in the Sierra Madres of California) Muir was able to abandon the Anthropocentric theology of Calvinism instilled by his father and replace it with an ecocentric wilderness theology incited by direct spiritual experiences within nature, and subsequently rooted in an awareness of the sacredness of nature and a kind of nature-orientated pantheism (Oelschlaeger 212). As a consequence of these experiences and this sacred cognizance, as evidenced in his writing, Muir could no longer adhere to the Calvinist hierarchical, Anthropocentric belief that Homo sapiens were the ultimate climax of God’s work or that human purposes were more important than that of other inhabitants of nature. Thus, through his writing, Muir was instrumental in forwarding ecocentric orientations as well as a preservationist agenda in public policy, influences still seen today in nature writing of the United States.

However, despite these important contributions to environmental thought, Muir is, by and large and from a contemporary sensibility, often arrestingingly dismissive and disparaging of Native peoples. In this, Muir also seems to have been influential. In keeping with the times, the primary approach Muir encourages his readers to adopt regarding Native peoples is one of disidentification. For example, in the fifth chapter of *The Mountains of California*, after four chapters of careful descriptions of different geographical and topographical features such as “The
Glacial Lakes” and “The Snow” in the fifth chapter of *The Mountains of California*, titled “The Passes,” Muir writes the following:

> It is interesting to observe how surely the alp-crossing animals of every kind fall into the same trails. The more rugged and inaccessible the general character of the topography of any particular region, the more surely will the trails of men, Indians, bears, wild sheep, etc., be found converging into the best passes. The Indians of the western slope venture cautiously over the passes in settled weather to attend dances, and obtain loads of pine-nuts and the larvae of a small fly that breeds in Mono and Owen’s lakes, which, when dried, forms an important article of food; while the Pah Utes cross over from the east to hunt the deer and obtain supplies of acorns; and it is truly astonishing to see what immense loads the haggard old squaws [sic] make out to carry bare-footed through these rough passes, oftentimes for a distance of sixty or seventy miles. They are always accompanied by the men, who stride on, unburdened and erect, a little in advance, kindly stooping at different places to pile stepping-stones for their patient, pack-animal wives [sic], just as they would prepare the way for their ponies. (63)

*The Mountains of California* is full of Muir’s detailed observations on the topography of the Sierra Nevada landscape, its elements and its wildlife. Here we see that Muir’s audience is incited to consider the Native peoples who inhabit the mountains of California as part of the landscape. In fact, they are more akin to the animals of the mountains than they are to humans and to Muir himself and his readers. They are one of a series of “alp-crossing animals.” The exotic, quizzical Indigenous “creatures” depicted above are “other” than Muir and his cultivated, knowledgeable, sensitive, and scientifically-minded audience who possess culture and are
therefore removed in their cultural superiority. This suggests that Muir’s primary approach is one of disidentification with the Native inhabitants he observes from a safe distance.

In addition, by depicting the tribes he observes as part of the landscape to be studied—along with the topographical features, the geographical features, the natural processes of the mountains, and the wildlife—Muir is placing Native peoples firmly on the other side of the Nature/culture divide, which is perhaps Western civilization’s oldest disidentification. The Native peoples Muir describes in the above passage are part of observable nature, the great “Other” that humankind shares little to no substance with as the constructers of culture. Muir and his readers are on the “culture” side of the divide, and all the “rest” of the natural world—including Native peoples—is on the “nature” side. Thus, Muir encourages his audience to disidentify with Native peoples.

Further, we do not hear from the Indigenous peoples Muir observes; they remain silent, and it is doubtful—according to Muir—whether they have the capacity for language. From what is depicted in the text and assuming Muir probably would have described the exchange, apparently Muir does not engage in any kind of conversation with the Natives, as one would with other humans. There is no real chance for engagement with the Natives depicted, no real chance to hear from them, so the Western tradition of Anthropocentrism goes unchallenged and alternative possibilities are foreclosed, rather than opened. Consequently, though Muir’s ultimate objective may be to get readers to think more ecocentricly, his treatment of Native peoples does not help audiences get there because—in the great Anthropocentric, Western-Imperial tradition—Natives are depicted as a mute, inert part of nature. Therefore, this overarching disidentification possibly makes it easier and justifiable for readers to see Indigenous peoples as a resource to be exploited, or a hindrance to be eradicated.
As further evidence of the observable subject conception of Native peoples, after a rather extensive, scientifically-orientated description of how Indians gather pine nuts, Muir pens the following:

Then the beating begins right merrily, the burs fly in every direction, rolling down the slopes, lodging here and there against rocks and sage-bushes, chased and gathered by the women and children with fine natural gladness. Smoke-columns speedily mark the joyful scene of their labors as the roasting-fires are kindled, and, at night, assembled in gay circles garrulous as jays, they begin the first nut feast of the season. (163-164)

Firstly, in this passage the Mono peoples are depicted in a simple, contented, child-like state. They are delighted to be provided with the most basic of human needs: food for survival. Like the birds, they have no mind, no higher concerns than to survive. This denies the Native peoples Muir observed any kind of human complexity in the eyes of Muir’s audience. And, often, from an Anthropocentric perspective which many of Muir’s white reader may have been working from, being categorized as “non-human” is a powerful disidentification.

In addition, in the long-established American nature writing tradition, Muir draws from and interweaves an appreciation of nature as a profound emotion-inciting, sublime landscape and nature as a material to be observed and documented for his audience (Oravec 117, Oelschlaeger 54). Therefore, Muir’s white audience may identify with one another in the sharing of this sophisticated consciousness and purpose in their reading; however, they are encouraged to disidentify with the Natives in this scene because they do not share the same human complexity.

In addition, it is important to note that Muir is not a part of the scene he describes above. He is the observant, impartial, relater of events. Additionally, the Indians and their activities are
painstakingly described in the larger context of and in the same methodical, relatively detached manner as the pine nut. Therefore, their relevance and attraction for Muir’s white audience depends upon and is subsumed by the audience’s interest in this particular species of California conifer. And similar to this particular tree Muir so carefully describes, for Muir’s Anglo audience, the Mono Indians are another curious, exotic, inhabitant of a far-away, still wild land. For knowledge of both tree and tribe, the audience relies upon Muir’s ethos or trustworthiness as an impartial, reliable observer. All of this contributes to a sense of literary-ethnic tourism: Muir is the guide and his readers are along for the adventure as fellow observers. Although there is a long and still-prevalent tradition of this kind of literary-ethnic tourism in environmental writing in the United States, this tradition, nonetheless contributes to the construction of disidentifications with Native peoples on the part of Muir’s readers. Indigenous peoples are the other, the “out there” that it is entertaining and perhaps even enlightening to observe.

Later on in the same chapter Muir offers his audience an even more detailed, detached (and derogatory) description of the objects of his observation, again the Mono Indians, going so far as to refer to them as “specimens”:

> Occasionally a good countenance may be seen among the Mono Indians, but these, the first specimens I had seen, were mostly ugly, and some of them altogether hideous. The dirt on their faces was fairly stratified, and seemed so ancient and so undisturbed it might also possess a geological significance. The older faces were, moreover, strangely blurred and divided into sections by furrows that looked like the cleavage-joints of rocks, suggesting exposure on the mountains in a castaway condition for ages. Somehow they seemed to have no
right place in the landscape, and I was glad to see them fading out of sight down
the pass. (72)

By describing the countenances (humankind’s singular feature that often defines and expresses
our humanity) of the Mono Indians in topographical terms, and by depicting the faces of the
Monos as geographical, even geological features, Muir effectively dehumanizes them and
solidifies them as part of a static, timeless landscape. In fact, for Muir, similar to what we saw in
Thoreau’s writing, the Monos exist out of the writer and audience’s current time. They are not
part of the advancement of the Western project of bringing culture and civilization. Therefore,
developmentalist agendas may be reinforced in the minds of Muir’s contemporaneous white
readers.

Additionally, the Monos do not belong in the time or the physical landscape in which
they appear, particularly because they do not fit into Muir’s subliminally glorious aesthetic or
divinely inspired ontology. It is somewhat ironic that in Muir’s writing, he (a first generation
immigrant born in Scotland) belongs to the landscape because he can appreciate it both
scientifically and spiritually, because he is cognizant of the landscape’s sublime aesthetic.
Environmental rhetorician Christine Oravec points out how from a Western perspective, and in
the Western tradition, “The sublime convention acts as a screen, or a projection of human
preferences upon the natural scene” (59). In other words, “We view nature through the
conventions of sublimity” (59). Oravec argues that “Sublime discourse… is an integral part of
the way we perceive nature, act with reference to it, and construct its relationship to ourselves”
(58). Muir is certainly a part of and a contributor to this Western tradition of viewing nature
through the terministic screen of the sublime. In fact, in this instance, Muir is in tune with the
sublime nature of the Sierrras, and the Monos are not. Therefore, they are the ones who are out
of place, while Muir and his readers lend a kind of intelligence and spiritual sensitivity to the (apparently, and possibly from the perspective of Muir’s white readers) “wild,” yet-untouched-by-man mountains. Consequently, Anthropocentric orientations as well as the nature/culture dichotomy are reinforced for Muir’s readers’. Further, Muir’s audience—as appreciators of the sublime—are incited to construct consubstantial identifications between themselves and nature, while forging disidentifications with the Mono Indians who are not a part of this sublime tradition and not a part of the sublime landscape.

In fact, although Muir frequently describes the natural world as a supremely beautiful, divinely created totality, in this excerpt Native peoples are not included as part of this wondrous totality. Thus, Muir and his white, non-Native audience are able to disidentify with the Monos because they exist outside of the audience’s sphere of identification and empathetic concern. These kinds of disidentifications and this construction of the Native inhabitants of the Sierras may even have morally and psychically allowed for or contributed to the removal, as well as the cultural and physical eradication of Native Americans that had continually taken place throughout Muir’s lifetime. Because the original inhabitants of the mountains do not belong to either the landscape or to the time in which they live, the land is ostensibly empty, and therefore can be explored anew, conquered, and claimed by individuals who appreciated the aesthetic beauty and sublime significance of the exceptional landscape. As Prucha makes clear, “White society… had a fundamental belief that the land was there to be exploited and that the Indians were not making full use of its possibilities” (70). Therefore, as a relic and part of that landscape, Native peoples themselves were either a resource or an adversarial “other” to be conquered by the Anglo-Europeans who sat at the apex of civilization. As a result, although his larger objective may be ecocentric, Muir reinforces Anthropocentric tendencies in his portrayal of Native
peoples. Because of this counterproductive reinforcement, the approach of disidentification with Native peoples does not help audiences form more useful and beneficial relationships with landscape.

In addition, throughout *The Mountains of California*, Muir frequently constructs consubstantial identifications among his white, Anglo-European readers by depicting them all, together as bringers of the sublime and the spiritual to the “wilds,” or as bringers of the mind to the matter of nature. All of these factors combine to create a strong sense of disidentification with the Native peoples who have actually inhabited the Sierra Nevadas for centuries, and even millennia (Sierra Mono Museum: North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians). Despite or perhaps because of this reality, Muir depicts the Monos as impediments to the project of Western intelligence and civilization; therefore, they are the “other,” an adversary to be converted or conquered. In short, they are a substance that Muir and his white readers can readily disidentify with, disidentifications that actually strengthen the consubstantiality, or the shared substance, between Muir and his Anglo audience.

In addition, although they are dismissed as out of place and time, and even as more akin to animals than humans, Muir also recognizes the fascination that his audience would have had for people whose existence, beliefs, cultures, and appearances ostensibly differed so greatly from their own. Muir misses little opportunity to sensationalize these differences. For example, in *The Mountains of California* he begins his description of an Indian encounter as follows: “At length, as I entered the pass, the huge rocks began to close around in all their wild, mysterious impressiveness, when suddenly, as I was gazing eagerly about me, a drove of gray hairy beings came in sight, lumbering toward me with a kind of boneless, wallowing motion like bears” (72). The first thing that needs to be noted in this sentence is the continued comparison to animals that
Muir insists on throughout *The Mountains of California*. These “mysterious,” “gray hairy beings” are unlike Thoreau, and presumably his readers, in every way. They do not even share basic humanity with Thoreau and his audience—let alone civilization, culture, learning, literacy, and a cognizance and appreciation of the sublime (common ground Muir and his readers can share). Therefore, again we see that Muir’s primary approach is one of disidentification.

In addition, it is also important to notice that, in the above passage, the impending danger of an encounter with the terrifying “natives” is unmistakable. Thoreau plays to his nineteenth century readers’ fears and misconceptions about Native Americans of the West by sensationalizing his encounter. Muir lets the tension of the potential threat build for his white audience, until he realizes who (or from his vantage point “what”) he has encountered. He continues, and writes:

I never turned back, though often so inclined, and in this particular instance, amid such surroundings, everything seemed singularly unfavorable for the calm acceptance of so grim a company. Suppressing my fears, I soon discovered that although as hairy as bears and as crooked as summit pines, the strange creatures were sufficiently erect to belong to our own species. They proved to be nothing more formidable than Mono Indians dressed in the skins of sage-rabbits. Both men and women begged persistently for whisky and tobacco, and seemed accustomed to denials that I found it impossible to convince them that I had none to give. ExCEPTING the names of these two products of civilization, they seemed to understand not a word of English; but I afterward learned that they were on their way to Yosemite Valley to feast awhile on trout and procure a load of acorns to carry back through the pass to their huts on the shore of Mono Lake. (72)
Within the span of a paragraph, the Monos morph from frightening, unknown, half-beast, bear-men to pathetic, inarticulate and unintelligent beggars—both different kinds of disidentifications.

Additionally, to Muir’s dismay, these Native peoples don’t even speak or understand English (their own language handily discounted). Because shared language is a great marker of identification or common ground, and because language in general is one of the greatest markers as humans, or, put differently, a substance in which all humankind can find substance, the fact that these Native peoples are essentially inarticulate and depicted as incapable of language is a prominent disidentification. Essentially, the Monos depicted by Muir above are not fully human because they are unable to speak Muir’s language. Thus, the predominant relationship Muir constructs for his Anglo-European, nineteenth century audience is one of disidentification with Native peoples.

In addition as the above passage continues, Muir as the protagonist develops from the brave, undeterred-by-fear-and-danger adventurer into the white, benevolent bringer of treasures. Both of Muir’s depictions of himself in this passage combine to contribute to his overall adventurer-explorer-conqueror ethos. Further, according to Muir, it seems to be a positive testament to his overall character and upstanding moral qualities that he does not possess on his person the supposed inciters of vice that the Indians seek—whiskey and tobacco (which Muir and his white readers probably assumed the Monos would abuse, despite the fact that tobacco was and is often used for ceremonial purposes by many Native peoples). By reducing the Mono to pathetic, parasitic pests Muir is certainly playing into his nineteenth century audience’s expectation of reading the Mono as tragic, as hapless victims to the advance of Progress. Therefore, instead of inciting his audience to question their missionary, do-good tendencies—as we saw in Thoreau—Muir reinforces the audience’s conception of the white man as the bringer
of material and spiritual wealth. This reinforces Anthropocentric orientations, feelings of cultural superiority, as well as consubstantial identifications among Muir’s readers—consubstantial identifications that are reinforced by disidentifications with the Mono Indians. Thus, because the audience’s expectations are met and negative stereotypes of Native people are perpetuated, it is apparent that the disidentifications Muir encourages his readers to construct with Native peoples are not helpful in achieving cross-cultural communication, thereby potentially formulating different conceptions of and relationships with the natural world.

In addition the tragic victim stereotype, Muir also consistently depicts this particular tribe of the Sierras according to the violent savage or stereotype, which taps into prevailing fears of the time and which incites powerful disidentifications. For example, after an extensive, scientific description of the pine nut tree, Muir writes, “This is undoubtedly the most important food-tree on the Sierra, and furnishes the Mono, Carson, and Walker River Indians with more and better nuts than all the other species taken together. It is the Indians’ own tree, and many a white man have they killed for cutting it down” (162). Here the threatening, blood-thirsty savage stereotype is evident in Muir’s description of the pine nut tree and the people who harvest its bounty. The violence and savage brutality here is not in the act of the “white man” for destroying the absolutely critical (by Muir’s own admission) food source for the Monos, but in the Mono’s supposed protection of their insurance against starvation. Implicit in this use of the violent, murderous, bloodthirsty typecast is the justification for retribution. If the Mono have killed—from the perspective of Muir’s white readers who may be all too familiar with the violence of the Civil War and possibly even the violence of the supposed “Indian Wars”—protection against them is essential, even if that protection entails enacting further violence. However, also from the perspective of Muir’s late-nineteenth century readers who might have been familiar with the

89
violence and warfare of the period, this might have even been a righteous, justified violence against the Mono, and perhaps more accurately against the Native “others” in general—again, given the time and context in which Muir was writing.

Essentially, we see Muir strengthening consubstantial identifications amongst his Anglo-European audience through the construction of disidentifications with the hostile, violent Native. As we see into the present day, the construction of a common enemy (a disidentification) is useful for uniting often disparate groups of people (for consubstantial identifications). This unification produces an echo chamber effect (or “in-group identification”) in which commonly held beliefs are strengthened in the articulation, rather than challenged, transformed, or added to. Thus again, the disidentifications Muir encourages readers to forge with Native peoples are not helpful in working towards cross-cultural communication, nor does an approach of disidentification help audiences form more useful, ethical, egalitarian, appropriate, and respectful conceptions of environment.

*The Mountains of California* is not the only text where Muir depicts the Native peoples he encounters on his travels, and consequently constructs disidentifications with them. In fact, there are numerous places where he uses this approach of disidentification in *My First Summer in the Sierra*. For example, in his June 16 (1869) entry he writes:

One of the Indians from Brown’s Flat got right into the middle of the camp this morning, unobserved. I was seated on a stone, looking over my notes and sketches, and happening to look up, was startled to see him standing grim and silent within a few steps of me, as motionless and weather-stained as an old tree-stump that had stood there for centuries. All Indians seem to have learned this wonderful way of walking unseen—making themselves invisible like certain
spiders I have been observing here, which, in case of alarm, caused, for example, by a bird alighting on the bush their webs are spread upon, immediately bounce themselves up and down on their elastic threads so rapidly that only a blur is visible. The wild Indian power of escaping observation, even where there is little or no cover to hide in, was probably slowly acquired in hard hunting and fighting lessons while trying to approach game, take enemies by surprise, or get safely away when compelled to retreat. And this experience transmitted through many generations seems at length to have become what is vaguely called instinct. (53)

This excerpt is worth quoting at length for several reasons. First, Muir fires off a number of comparisons to plants and animals, including comparing the Native American to an “old tree-stump,” and a spider. Again we see that Indigenous peoples are a feature of the landscape, and not part of Thoreau’s supposedly mobile, adaptable, intellectual, and highly intelligent human presence, which is the presence he consistently portrays for his white readers, the presence he (Thoreau) brings to the landscape. Therefore, readers should be fascinated by, but ultimately disidentify with the Native man Muir describes. This is again a disidentification which places Indigenous peoples on the opposite side of the Nature/culture divide, in opposition to Muir and his readers.

Secondly, Muir establishes the Native man as wholly “Other,” as completely out of place, and as an unsettling alien entity in the camp of white men. He is even other-worldly in that his silence and his sudden, unnoticed appearance combine to make him seem not of the world in which Muir remains grounded. In fact, Muir describes the presence of the Indian in the same way that he so often evokes elements of the natural world: with a sense of the sublime or mystical, with keen powers of observation, and with a focus on how the “natural” feature affects him as the
observer. Muir and his camp, his position, are the reference point that readers experience this scene from, and the Indian is a disconcerting intruder that does not share the same substance. Therefore, white readers are encouraged to disidentify with the Native conjured from Muir’s imagination.

In addition, in the above passage, the Native man, his behavior, and his motivations are observed with the same epistemological and ontological distance as the spider. In fact, we know and understand more of the spider’s motivations that govern his actions. By comparison, nowhere do we hear the Indigenous man speak, and we never know why he came into the camp. This information would have made him capable of human communication and of possessing human motivation, and consequently human; but in this passage, like the others we have seen from Muir, the Native man remains firmly entrenched on the nature side of the nature/culture divide. He is the other to be disidentified with.

Further, near the end of this particular excerpt Muir makes it apparent that, like other non-human species who call the natural world home, Native peoples are governed by instinct only, and not by the great intellect and appreciation of the divine through direct experience with nature that Muir so careful cultivates throughout his writings. In Muir’s estimation then, Native peoples are part of the body of nature, through which the human mind (of which Muir and his readers are a part) can commune with the divine. Muir continues this line of thought in the following:

On the smoothest of these open strips and patches deer tracks may be seen, and the great suggestive footprints of bears, which, with those of the many small animals, are scarce enough to answer as a kind of light ornamental stitching or embroidery. Along the main ridges and larger branches of the river Indian trails
may be traced, but they are not nearly as distinct as one would expect to find them. How many centuries Indians have roamed these woods nobody knows, probably a great many, extending far beyond the time that Columbus touched our shores, and it seems strange that heavier marks have not been made. Indians walk softly and hurt the landscape hardly more than the birds and squirrels, and their brush and bark huts last hardly longer than those of wood rats, while their more enduring monuments, excepting those wrought on the forests by the fires they made to improve their hunting grounds, vanish in a few centuries. (55)

Firstly, again Muir persists in likening the Indigenous tribes of the Sierra region to various animals. Animals and “the Native” are the “Other” to be observed, which encourages readers to disidentify with Native peoples as objects of observation.

Further, in this passage, Native peoples are distanced from the Anglo reader as both part of “nature” and the animal world, and they are also distanced from Muir’s readers by time. Muir and his companions, and the “white man” in general, are intrepid (and destructive) newcomers to the scene, while the Indian is removed by both the great, unknowable expanse of time and by their light, impermanent effect on the landscape. Nature and the Indigenous peoples as part of nature are “other,” part of the inferior world of nature and not of the white man’s long lasting, civilizing enterprise. In an era when the dominant American cultural myth included subduing and permanently altering the landscape, Muir’s white readers are encouraged to disidentify with Native peoples who failed to “tame the wilderness” and make it useful. Therefore, as I contend it is throughout Muir’s body of work, the primary approach Muir wants his white readers to take towards Native peoples is one of disidentification.
The Potential for Consubstantiality in Muir’s Work

However, the predominant approach of disidentification does not mean there is not the potential for consubstantial identifications between readers and Native peoples evident in Muir’s *The Mountains of California*. For example, in one instance Muir portrays Digger Indians as surprisingly capable of an appreciation of beauty (although it is an overly simplistic appreciation). More specifically, in his thirteenth chapter of *The Mountains of California* titled “The Water-Ouzel” Muir is taken aback by the aesthetic awareness and appreciation of “Digger” Indians, and writes:

Everyone loves flowers to some extent, at least in life’s fresh morning, attracted by them as instinctively as humming-birds and bees. Even the young Digger Indians have sufficient love for the brightest of those found growing on the mountains to gather them and braid them as decorations for the hair. And I was glad to discover, through the few Indians that could be induced to talk on the subject that they have names for the wild rose and the lily, and other conspicuous flowers, whether available as food or otherwise. Most men, however, whether savage or civilized, become apathetic toward all plants that have no other apparent use than the use of beauty. (219)

Given Muir’s consistent portrayal of Native Americans as animalistic, uncommonly ugly, and even grotesque in appearance and manner up until this point in the book, it is surprising to find that in the above passage Muir depicts Native peoples in such as human way, and as capable of appreciating natural beauty. In this passage the Digger Indians are humanized because of their attraction to flowers early in life, and then by the adult male’s apathy toward beautiful but practically useless plants, both of which Muir seems to conceive of as uniquely human traits.
Muir seems pleasantly surprised to find that the Digger Indians not only have actual words for plants he considers beautiful, but that they are also governed by some of the basic human instincts that Muir and his readers also possess. Therefore—even though this passage Muir’s ignorance of gender responsibilities in many Native cultures—in the above passage which is part of the conclusion of the book, Muir does draw a kind of connection between the “savage” Natives and his “civilized” Euro-American readers as able to appreciate the aesthetic.

However, he does not push his Anglo audience further. In fact, it could even be conjectured that nineteenth century white readers would have remained in their nineteenth century comfort zone. This is primarily because the Digger Indians observed and conjured here for primarily white, Euro-American audiences are still confined as barely articulate, infantile humans. In fact, a close reading of this passage reveals that Muir does not use the pronoun for people (“who”) to refer to the Digger Indians; rather he uses the pronoun “that,” which is used when referring to inanimate objects or animals. It is as if while drawing tentative connections between Native peoples and “civilized” Westerners by illustrating some of their same basic human tendencies, Muir has trouble even convincing himself of the Digger Indian’s humanity. Yet, he seems no longer able to deny the reality of what he witnesses: Digger Indians are at home in the landscape, and their language reflects this belonging. However, he subtly insists on denying the Indians their humanity because doing so may lend authority to such deeply ingrained cultural at-home-ness, and thus to the reality that the Indians belong to the mountains of California more than Muir himself (an immigrant who was born in Scotland) does. This kind of consubstantiality in humanity that Muir begins to intimate here—if pushed too far—could conceivable have challenged the consubstantial identifications Muir was constructing amongst his Anglo-European readers. Therefore, ultimately dismissive disidentifications with Native
peoples need to be the prevailing rhetorical approach. However, the above passage *does* indicate that there is at least the *potential* for another kind of identification—in particular a consubstantial identification—that may be more tolerant of similarities between Anglo readers and Native Americans.

It is also worth noting that throughout *The Mountains of California* Muir repeatedly refers to Native peoples as “specimens” and “creatures” while also constantly comparing them to and putting them in the same category as different animals. This is certainly an approach of disidentification. And yet, by the fourth chapter Muir grants the Mono Indians he encounters as at least possessing basic humanity. After being surprised by their “hideous” appearance and their intrusion into his musings on the sublimity of nature, Muir writes of the Monos, “the strange creatures were sufficiently erect to belong to our own species” (72). As basic and begrudging (and still incredibly derogatory as it may seem given a contemporary sensibility) as this kind of identification may seem, it is still the acknowledgment of common ground, which is a kind of identification.

Muir does not exhibit the romanticized, idealized longing for “lost” Indigenous “ways” and for Native peoples that we saw in Thoreau; however in several places throughout *The Mountains of California* there are at least the first seeds of potential identifications and consubstantiality with Native Americans. Therefore, even in Muir, readers get an inkling of identificatory practices that may be more tolerant of similarities, that are moving closer to productive and potentially more ethical cross-cultural communication, and that are other than what is dictated by the political and cultural context of the time.
Chapter Conclusions

Thoreau and Muir’s various rhetorical constructions of Indigenous peoples—as sub-human, as romantic ideals, as pure physicality, as reminders of a primitive Eden, as victims of Western expansion and progress, as pitiable beggars, for example—combine to create strong disidentifications with Native Americans. In the context of Muir’s work, Native peoples often fulfilled the important, self-affirming, unifying function of serving as a point of disidentification that reinforced consubstantial identifications among white, Anglo-European audiences. In other words, Muir’s audience is made more cohesive because they share the common knowledge of what they are not, namely the “bloodthirsty or violent warrior” and the “vanishing Indian.” In a time of intense immigrations from a diverse range of nations and cultural backgrounds, when a polyglot nascent nation was still solidifying its identity (Library of Congress), and when the original inhabitants of the continent refused to disappear and succumb to the established master narrative of conquest and expansion, this locating of consubstantiality would have been an incredibly important objective of the nation and of environmental writing of the period.

Disidentifications with Native peoples and prevalent stereotypes of Native peoples served this objective of locating and reifying an American consubstantiality. However, disidentifications with Native peoples also served to reinforce the Anthropocentric, Imperialist norm of man being superior to nature and man being on the other side of the nature/culture divide. Thus, the approach of disidentification is not ethical, appropriate, nor useful in encouraging readers to formulate less ecologically pernicious relationships to the environment. Consequently,

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34 The latter half of the nineteenth century was an exceptional period of ethnic and cultural diversity in United States history. As a result of a mass influx of immigrants mainly from western European countries, anti-immigration sentiments were prevalent, and the 1880s saw the first anti-immigration laws in United States history passed (Library of Congress). Thus, in the second half of the nineteenth century the country would have been in need of powerful, broad, encompassing consubstantial identifications.
disidentification was and continues to be a misstep in the kinds of relationships Anglo environmental writers encourage their white readers to undertake with respect to Native peoples.

In comparison to Muir—and given their different historical contexts as outlined near the beginning of this chapter, which could account for some of the differences—Thoreau constructs disidentifications with Native peoples so that he can potentially re-make his Anglo audience.\textsuperscript{35} This re-making involves disidentifying with and realizing what they are not so that they can be re-made into something better (in Thoreau’s estimation)—specifically into more ecocentric, more self-actualized versions of themselves who realize the profound connections between humankind and the rest of the natural world. Therefore, as I hoped to make clear throughout this chapter, Muir and Thoreau both consistently portray “the Native,” and the primary relationship with Native peoples that both Thoreau and Muir construct for their white, non-Native readers is a disidentification. However, as we have also seen, there are also opportunities for the locating of common ground and even of shared substance—a consubstantiality. This is important because it demonstrates that identification with Native peoples within the context of Anglo-American environmental writing has the potential to evolve and to challenge audiences to move towards more ethical and effective cross-cultural communication, beyond what is dictated by the kind of identification that may be expected given the political and cultural constraints of the time.

Despite the possibilities for common ground and even consubstantiality, in the case of both Thoreau and Muir, readers don’t hear from Native peoples themselves. Essentially, the approach of disidentification does not allow for the actual words or worldviews of Native peoples themselves. Essentially, the approach of disidentification does not allow for the actual words or worldviews of Native peoples themselves.

\textsuperscript{35} The difference between these two strategies of disidentification could possibly be that Thoreau was writing from and situated in the East where Native peoples were (by and large, and from the contemporaneous Anglo-American perspective) safely conquered and removed; therefore they were a relic of the past. From Muir’s decidedly Western perspective, and in the context of the great “Indian Wars” there was still a very real threat of violence and resistance from Native tribes. Consequently, Thoreau could incite disidentifications to challenge and potentially re-make his Anglo audience to a greater extent, whereas Muir may have, in part, incited disidentifications to bring his white readers together against the perceived threat of Native peoples.
peoples to be articulated, let alone rhetorically listened to. Consequently, essentially
disidentification forecloses possibilities for rhetorical listening and cross-cultural
communication, and thus for potentially moving audiences toward more ethical and appropriate
conceptions of the natural world that may be articulated by some (although certainly not all)
Native writers. But, in short, we just don’t know because Native peoples themselves remain
silent and are therefore unable to potentially challenge Western, Anthropocentric orientations
and long-held Western beliefs in the natural world as “other” and exploitable. For these reasons
the approach of disidentification is a misstep in Anglo nature writers’ long history of evoking
and constructing different kinds of identifications with Native peoples.
Chapter Three

Analysis of Nature Writing of the 1960s:
Consubstantial Identifications with “the Native”
in the Work of John Hay and Gary Snyder

This chapter analyzes writing of two of the most prominent, influential, and celebrated nature writers of the 1960s—John Hay and Gary Snyder—and finds that Hay and Snyder predominantly construct consubstantial identifications with Native worldviews and Native peoples. The results of my analysis indicate that Anglo-American nature writers of the 1960s, by and large, sought to illustrate similarities and merge substance between their readers and Native peoples—often silencing differences, including those that could potentially prove productive. In particular, in the drive to merge substance, in the drive to make Native peoples and Anglo, non-Native readers one in the same, too often potentially productive differences are hammered down and possibilities for rhetorical listening are foreclosed. In addition, as I come back to and more fully explain in the conclusion to this chapter, because potentially productive dissonance is erased in the drive toward consubstantiality and because opportunities for rhetorical listening and cross-cultural communication are foreclosed, the ecologically pernicious schemas of Anthropocentrism and developmentalism are not challenged.

More specifically, I illustrate in this chapter how Hay and Snyder tapped into the protest-spirit, pan-tribal, pan-American, drive toward consubstantiality that was prevalent in both Native communities and white communities in the 1960s to forge consubstantial identifications between their readers and Native peoples. Essentially, as we see in the analysis of both texts from 1969, Hay unites his readers by writing under an all-inclusive eco-centric orientation and an anti-
technology bent; whereas Snyder unites his readers under the protest, counter-cultural spirit of
the 1960s. Both authors use stereotypes of the romanticized, idealized “ecological Indian” to
unify their audience. Calloway evokes this stereotype when he writes (of the contemporary
romanticization of modern portrayals of Indians), “Indian people lived in harmony with nature
and with each other before Europeans arrived” (3). The overly simplistic typecast of the
ecological Indian is used by both Hay and Snyder to forge consubstantial identifications between
their white readers and Indigenous peoples. However, I argue that these consubstantial
identifications are essentially exploitative because they insist that complex Indigenous
relationship to particular landscapes and environmental ethics theorized and vivified for
millennia by Indigenous peoples can be easily known and therefore owned, without being heard
or engaged with in an ethical, appropriate way. So, as we saw in the previous chapter, the trend
of disidentification is dismissive and therefore not helpful, and the trend of overarching
consubstantial identification is exploitative and appropriative so is also not ethical or appropriate.
In addition, both kinds of identification do not help readers listen rhetorically and work towards
productive, ethical cross-cultural communication.

However, this chapter and its analysis of American nature writing of 1969 also
demonstrates how Hay and Snyder are preparing their readers for approaches of non-
identification with Indigenous eco-orientations and Native peoples. Similar to how Thoreau and
Muir planted the seeds of consubstantial identifications, Hay and Snyder also plant the seeds of
non-identification, an identificatory practice that is more amenable to and respectful of both
cultural similarities and differences. This shows how identifications with Native peoples and
Indigenous eco-orientations are developing within the context of Anglo environmental writing in
the United States to potentially move closer to the outcomes of rhetorical listening and effective,
ethically cross-cultural communication. Additionally, in planting the seeds of non-identification, Hay and Snyder also illustrate how Anglo nature writers are able to help readers identify with Native peoples in ways that may be outside the confines of the norm, given the cultural and political context of the 1960s.

Following the same structure as the preceding chapter, this chapter begins with a summary of Native-White relations and Native affairs in the United States in the 1960s because it is my hope that this historical context will help readers better understand why the drive toward consubstantiality was so strong during this time, and how that drive may have influenced Hay and Snyder’s writing. In short, this political and cultural context will help understand why consubstantial identifications were the norm expected by audiences, a status quo that Hay and Snyder both work with and against (work with by predominantly constructing consubstantial identifications for white readers, and against by introducing audiences to a stance of non-identification). Next—after a brief introduction to the contributions and the accomplishments of each author to establish Hay and Snyder’s influence and how they are representative of larger trends, including consubstantial identification with Native peoples—I offer my rhetorical analysis of Hay’s *In Defense of Nature* and Snyder’s *Turtle Mountain*. The chapter concludes with my thoughts on the broader implications of my analysis and how it ties into and supports my overall argument.

**Cultural and Political Context: Native-White Relations in the 1960s and 1970s**

The climate surrounding Indigenous communities in the United States in the 1960s can be best understood by briefly describing events in the 1950s, given that much of drive toward consubstantiality evident in the 1960s was a reaction to attacks on Native sovereignty in the
1950s. During the 1950s both state and federal governments primarily pursued two policies towards Native Americans: Termination and relocation. These approaches aimed at depriving tribal peoples of their treaty-guaranteed rights while re-appropriating their land, eradicating Indigenous cultures, and assimilating tribal peoples into the post-World War, homogenized “mainstream.”

Termination’s objective was to disintegrate tribal communities and deprive tribes of their land, their legal status as tribes, and their non-taxable status (Prucha 341, Wilson 363), a policy that went hand-in-hand with relocation. In fact, under a policy of Termination, Congress strove to break up Indian reservations and disperse Native peoples to urban areas, while abandoning development programs on reservations—often against the tribes’ will and without their cooperation (Prucha 344, Berkhofer 188). In the 1954 session of Congress, under the Eisenhower administration which was the high point of termination, six tribes were terminated, the Klamath Indians of Oregon and the Menominees of Wisconsin the most prominent and largest tribes leading the list (Prucha 346-347). Tribes targeted for Termination were wealthy tribes (such as the Klamath of Oregon and the Menominee of Wisconsin) who had a great abundance of land and natural resource wealth and were self-sustaining. Encouraging the successful management of their own affairs was the reason given for Termination. However, today and at the time the targeting of specific tribes for Termination is viewed as a ploy for corporations and the federal government to gain control of tribal land and resources (Prucha 354-355). For example, in the case of the termination of the Klamath, dishonest selling methods by the government and price gauging was so blatant an rampant that the Federal Trade Commission was forced to investigate the abuses in 1972 (Wilson 366). Numerous historians concur with James Wilson and have concluded, “The really big winnings from Termination went to the federal government” (366).
For example, after the Termination of the Klamath, the federal government earned $120 million from timber sales on reservation land; in addition, the United States earned an estimated $200 million from incorporating Klamath land into the Winnema National Forest (Wilson 366). Despite the land and money grab, the law of Termination passed in 1954 was not repealed until 1973, placing the Menominee once more under federal responsibility and reinstating the tribe’s status (Prucha 372). The Klamath, however, didn’t fare so well and their federally recognized status could not be feasibly reinstated; and yet, a number of smaller tribes that had been terminated in the 1950s were restored to federal status in 1973, the year that the Termination policy was effectively, officially abandoned (Prucha 373).

But not before, from 1954 to 1960 some fourteen federally recognized tribes with reservations and extensive land holdings were terminated, often without their consent (Wilson 362). Documented consequences of Termination include: the breaking up of Indian families as children were forcibly removed and placed into foster homes; dramatic increases in Native poverty rates on reservations and in urban areas; increased animosity amongst tribes and family members; increased discrimination of Native peoples by mainstream, dominant, white culture; the “sapping of economic vitality” of many Native American communities (Wilson 366, Prucha 364); and (similar to allotment policies of the previous century) “the rapid transfer of tribal lands to White hands and control” (Berkhofer 189). The post-Termination situation was so dire for the Klamath, for example, that a Senate Committee visiting the reservation in 1969 lamented: “The Termination of the Klamath reservation in Oregon has led to extreme social disorganization of that tribal group. Many of them can be found in state penal and mental institutions” (quoted in Wilson 367). By the early 1960s it was apparent to many that Termination was an unfortunate return to the historic norm of well-orchestrated, systematic policies designed to eradicate
Indigenous cultures while depriving them of their land (Wilson 360). It is possible that, at least in part because of these attacks aimed at the disintegration and termination of individual Native communities in the 1950s, the 1960s saw a drive towards unification and consubstantiality amongst Native peoples from various tribes.

At the same time as state and federal governments pursued Termination, these governments also worked to further disintegrate tribal communities by making concerted efforts to relocate large numbers of tribal members from reservations to urban areas. As described by Calloway: “There were no more than 5,000 Indians in Los Angeles County before World War II; by 1980, 50,000 lived there. In 1950, only 13.4 percent of Indians counted by the U.S. Census lived in urban areas; by 1970, the proportion had risen to 44 percent; by 1980 half of American Indians lived in cities” (409). Or, put differently, even though relocation programs were reduced in the 1970s, “By 1980, more Indians lived in urban areas than on reservation” (Calloway 415). Government policy encouraged relocation by abandoning almost all federal development initiatives on reservations, by “running down federal services,” and by removing restrictions from individual allotments so that Native land could be easily sold, most often to white people (Wilson 367). “The aim was,” as Wilson indicates, “to force tribespeople to leave reservations to look for work in non-Native towns, where, it was assumed, they would quickly be absorbed in the general population” (367). However, the reality was much different. Destruction of Indigenous communities, the increased tension and animosity within Native groups, incredibly high rates of unemployment, inability to cope “in a world of individual capitalist competition” (Calloway 410), abject poverty and deplorable conditions (or “slum living,” as Prucha describes it [356]) in urban areas to which Native peoples were relocated, rampant alcoholism and suicide
rates,\textsuperscript{36} and crushing alienation are just some of the document consequences of relocation (Wilson 369, Prucha 356, Calloway 409-411). As Wilson concludes, “The relocation policy was a blatant and heavy handed attempt to destroy Indian communities… Reservations were deliberately undermined, and migrants were often resettled as far away from home as possible in order to weaken their family and tribal ties” (368). Therefore, relocation can be seen in the same light as many governmental policies stretching back to the nineteenth century that were designed to assimilate and acculturate Indigenous Americans.

However, just like Termination, relocation did not work as its proponents hoped it would. More specifically, instead of the weakening of family ties, tribal identities, and the disintegration and acculturation of the culture of Native peoples, relocation backfired and had the opposite effect. In fact, as Prucha describes, more often Indians affected by relocation “kept their Indian identity and their place on tribal rolls, and many used cities as only temporary residence, still thinking of the reservations as their true home” (356). So, in many ways, Termination and relocation set the stage for the pan-tribal movement of the 1960s. Or, as Calloway puts it, “The government’s termination and relocation policies largely backfired, generating increased resistance and organization among many American Indian groups… Mass migrations of Indians fostered a growing pan-Indian identity and a determination to preserve Indian community and heritage” (414). In addition, many non-Natives also perceived Termination and relocation policies as harsh and cruel to the extent that “As termination moved into full gear… and became well known, the outcry against termination became too loud to ignore” (Prucha 350). This outcry from non-Natives and the empathy for Native people within mainstream culture as a result of harsh termination policies set the stage for consubstantial identifications between Native peoples.

\textsuperscript{36} In fact, the average age of death among Minneapolis (as the most popular urban center for relocations) Native Americans in 1955 was thirty-seven, in comparison with forty-six for all Minnesota Indians, and sixty-eight for all Minneapolis residents (Wilson 369).
and non-Natives. In fact, as the 1950s drew to a close and as the public became increasingly aware of the injustices and ineffectuality of pursuing policies of Termination, “Termination became a hated word” in Native cultures and by many non-Native people as well (Prucha 351). As Prucha makes clear, in the 1960s Anglo-Americans began to realize the injustice of 1950s Native policies to the extent that “The guilt felt by white Americans for past injustices [particularly Termination] to the Indians was a powerful stimulus to widespread support of Indian claims, both in Congress and among the general public” in the 1960s (357). This guilt or empathy evoked by the injustice of Termination possibly set the stage for Anglo-Americans to begin identifying or seeking common ground and similarities with Native Americans.

The harsh, unsympathetic, and unjust tactics of the 1950s also had other effects: speaking broadly, they mobilized Native peoples politically—as well as unifying them culturally. As Daniel M. Cobb points out, “Through the 1960s, the demand for the recognition of tribal sovereignty, the refusal to be forced into the cultural and economic mainstream on terms of someone else’s making [namely the impetus and sometimes the results of Termination], and the insistence that the federal government fulfill its obligations to indigenous people gained greater salience and filtered back into tribal, state, and national politics” (6). In effect, in the 1960s and early 1970s many diverse Native peoples were united across cultures in their increasing militant and protest-orientated drive towards sovereignty and self-determination (Cobb 6-7). While the 1950s can be characterized as an era of attack on Indigenous rights in this country, the 1960s can be characterized as a decade in which Native Americans were vivified by a pan-tribal movement, while accumulating rights through increasing political and judicial savvy. Throughout the 1960s well-educated Native peoples were returning to their tribes and developing the skills to potentially beat the dominant culture at their own game (Pritzker 418). In short, the injustices of
the 1950s brought many Native communities together in the 1960s in a spirit of pan-tribal consubstantiality.

For example, in 1961, in a letter penned “as a means of rallying support among tribal leaders” (Cobb 35) and writing of their “shared experiences” as Native Americans (experiences including an apathetic federal government and Termination), the National Congress of American Indian (NCAI) president Clarence Wesley wrote to some 800 individuals and organizations: “Regardless of whether all or part or none of our recommendations are accepted, we have our first real opportunity to go ‘on the offensive’—Take the initiative—*as Indians working together all over the nation*” [emphasis mine] (quoted in Cobb 35). Essentially, in the 1960s following the injustices of the 1950s, by and large, the climate surrounding Native peoples and Indigenous issues was one of consubstantiality and unity under the ethnic category of “Indian” for the purposes of collective action. During this period, a number of pan-tribal organizations—such as the American Indian Movement (AIM) and the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC)—were established, thereby unifying a wide array of diverse Indigenous peoples for purposes of political action (Cobb 49, 60). In addition, during the early 1960s a number of important documents were also drafted and ratified, including the “A Program for Indian Citizens” and the “Declaration of Indian Purpose” that sought to bring together different Native cultures (Cobb 49, 51).

Although the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) came together as early as 1944 for the purposes of “drawing together Native Americans from across the country in a truly national, pan-Indian body” (Wilson 373), the pan-tribal movement gained momentum at the American Indian Conference of 1961 (378). Although not without controversy due to internal struggles within tribes and tribal politicking and personality conflicts, the Chicago conference brought together an estimated 400 Indians and another 150 non-Natives from over 100 different
communities in “a spirit of pan-tribal unity” (Cobb 51). Because of its scale, the extent of its pan-tribal inclusion, and because of its explicit, practical objectives, “The Chicago Conference was, undoubtedly, a remarkable achievement—perhaps never before, and certainly not since the end of the ‘Indian Wars,’ had so many disparate groups come together on their own initiative and united behind a commons strategy” (Wilson 379). The Conference was also a success in that it resulted in the “Declaration of Indian Purpose” which called for the abandonment of Termination, the removal of obstacles that prevented Native peoples from making use of their own resources, a push for local control and increased self-governance, and sweeping educational progress (Prucha 358). The Declaration also urged economic assistance, and, broadly speaking, it addressed “problems of health, welfare, housing, education, and law and jurisdiction” (Prucha 358). Because of the nearly unprecedented pan-Indian nature of the conference and the number of participants and because of the concrete purposes articulated by conference participants, a number of Native scholars and historians view the conference as the start of a new era in which political mobilization proceeded via unification and a pan-tribal approach.

However, despite Wilson’s and other scholars’ optimism about the conference, and despite the numerous positive results of the Chicago Conference including the increased focus on urban Indians and federally unrecognized tribes (Cobb 56), the Conference also revealed intertribal differences and schisms between Indian youth and their older, more conservative counterparts. As one example of these tensions, historian Jon Lewis also describes the Chicago Conference as not only the beginning of and the impetus for the pan-tribal movement that characterized the 1960s, but also as the point at which generally younger, more radical groups (such as AIM and the NIYC) adopted a different strategy and broke away from quieter

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37 This sentiment and the importance of the Chicago conference is echoed almost exactly by historian Jon Lewis, who attests that, “the Conference was the largest and most united gathering of Native American nations since the end of the Indian Wars” (337).
legislative efforts to focus on urban activism and Indian militantism (399). Cobb also makes this same point about the differing strategies of young Native peoples becoming more apparent as a result of the conference (57).

On the whole, though, Cobb also points out how “Native people came away from it [the Chicago Conference] with a renewed sense of shared experience and common interest” (56). In fact, the growing sense of power that accumulated in Native communities after the American Indian Conference “led to the creation of a whole spate of local organizations with all-embracing names such as ‘American Indians-United’ and ‘United Native Americans’ that reflected the new ‘consolidated’ Indian perspective” (Wilson 394). This further suggests that, in general, the 1960s can today be categorized as an era of pan-tribalism, of Native peoples locating consubstantiality in their identity as “Native” or “Indian,” rather than a particular tribe. In turn, the consubstantiality of “all” Native peoples under the auspices of new “pan-Indianism” could have possibly also made it easier for Anglo-Americans to consubstantially identify with Native peoples as a collective group.

Although pan-tribal efforts had been made for centuries, 38 arguably the 1960s witnessed the first time in history pan-Indian efforts at unification achieved such a scale, reaped such significant material benefits for Indigenous peoples across the United States, and achieved such notable success. Essentially, in the move towards consubstantiality, towards speaking with one, comparatively unified voice, Native peoples achieved unprecedented political, legislative, and

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38 For example, the Shawnee leader Tecumseh united over thirty tribes in an American Indian Confederacy as far back as 1811 (Thom 10). In the first decades of the nineteenth century Tecumseh traveled the country, from present day Michigan to Florida, spreading his message of pan-Indian land tenure. At the same time a nativist, pan-Indian religious revival was led by Tecumseh’s brother, Tenskwatawa. Although the American Indian Confederacy was relatively short-lived, disintegrating after Tecumseh was killed in 1813 at the Battle of Thames in Canada, at the time it was a monumental, highly successful, and groundbreaking move toward pan tribalism (Thom 9). As Thom writes, it was “the broadest brotherhood of nations any chief had ever united for any cause” (10); and as Pritzker reminds his readers, it was Tecumseh’s vision to see united tribes of North America (xix).
judicial successes. For example, during the decade of the Civil Rights era, Indigenous peoples in the United States formed many national, pan-tribal Indian organizations that successfully demanded the rights guaranteed them by their treaties and by their American citizenship. Another instance of a legal victory can be found in a Washington State case in which a federal judge ruled that the state’s Native people had legitimate rights, guaranteed by treaty, to half of the state’s salmon and trout fisheries (441). Fish-ins staged throughout the 1960s—in which Native peoples, primarily in the Northwest, asserted their rights to fish, despite harassment from authorities and other non-Natives—were much publicized and often effective (Calloway 416). Wilson has written that the much-publicized campaign of civil disobedience and “fish-ins” led by the NIYC was “probably the most effective Indian campaign against enforced assimilation in the twentieth-century” (387). Thus, there were certainly various positive outcomes of the drive toward consubstantiality occurring in Native communities in the 1960s.

Yet, in addition to Native peoples who sought change at the judicial and legislative level (who sought change through socially sanctioned mediums), during the 1960s there was also a more radical pan-Indian movement taking place. During the 1960s young Native peoples established an alternative, more raucous, aggressive politics of protest that celebrated pan-tribal Indian traditions, staged mass media events, and used mainstream, non-Native understandings of Indigenous peoples to great effect (Cobb 198-199). The NIYC, for example, decided to shift their struggle for Indian autonomy from predominantly bureaucratic efforts, into the larger battleground of American culture and public opinion (Cobb 161). The later years of the 1960s and the early 1970s saw the growth and increasing power and influence of more radical pan-tribal groups, perhaps the most revolutionary and media-covered of the pan-tribal organizations that flourished in the 1960s and 70s. Although, as Cobb points out, the “tendency to fixate on
AIM has contributed to the notion that the era’s activism began with the occupation of Alcatraz Island” (2) when actually “Native people have always engaged in political activism” (2) and the concerted Native activism of the 1960s and 70s can be traced back to less militant efforts of Native Americans working in different ways for the preservation of homelands and the protection of communities and tribal languages in the post-World War II period. And yet, it was in the late 1960s and 1970s that militant Indigenous political activism captured the imagination of dominant, mainstream, white society. Examples of the protest spirit and actions of the age include: in 1968 an occupation of the Reflecting Pool by a contingent of Native Americans as part of the Poor Peoples’ Campaign (Cobb 189-192); in 1969 a group called “Indians of All Nations” formed from seventy-eight individuals from over fifty different tribes (Wilson 394) seized the deserted federal prison on Alcatraz Island; in 1970 AIM protesters staged demonstrations at Plymouth Rock, and in 1970 they staged protests at Mount Rushmore (Calloway 418); in 1972 a caravan called the “Trail of Broken Treaties” comprised of “an army of Native Americans from the most disparate backgrounds and cultures” (Wilson 400) drove to the Bureau of Indian Affairs headquarters in Washington in hopes of convincing the federal government to renew treaty relationships and respect treaty rights; and one year later, in 1973, activists from the AIM and local Oglala Lakota members seized the trading post and Catholic Church in Wounded Knee, South Dakota—the explicitly historic, highly symbolic, and emotionally charged site of the Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890 (Cobb 199). Thus, consubstantiality for Native peoples could also be found in the protest, militant, counter-cultural, anti-establishment spirit of the age. Furthermore, by practicing these radical politics and by embracing an anti-establishment, protest zeitgeist Native peoples could also find common substance with non-Native peoples in their counter-culture orientations. This may be one of the
reasons that an approach of consubstantial identification with Native peoples would have made sense, and would have resonated with audiences.

In addition to finding consubstantiality under the counter-cultural, protest spirit of the age, AIM and other national organizations with a more revolutionary agenda found strength, revivification, and cohesion under a growing interest in “traditional” culture (Wilson 398). For example, many organizations participated in Sun Dances as a way to achieve “the spiritual rebirth of our Indian nation” (399). AIM, in particular, “relied very heavily on the traditional leaders and the holy men of various tribes” for unification and direction as one strategy for forging consubstantial identifications amongst different tribes of Natives (399). In fact, often the Plains Indian culture stood in for all tribes (399)—thus forging an overarching consubstantial identification for political purposes. This also suggests that consubstantiality or pan-Indian-ness was the spirit of the age, and one way it could be found was in “traditional” or stereotypically “Indian” practices—practices and typecasts which Native peoples and counter-cultural leaning Anglo-Americans could find both common ground and even collective substance in.

This desire for consubstantial identifications with Native peoples by Anglo-Americans was realized and often taken full advantage of by some Native communities. From enacting traditional Sun Dances, to dressing in “traditional” Plains costumes, to staging mass media events, to the exploitation of the “ecological Indian” stereotype, the 1960s was a period in which Native peoples increasingly, and with increasing success and skill, uncovered ways to play off and best use to their advantage the stereotypes constructed about them by the dominant white culture—as well as the mainstream culture’s desire for consubstantiality. Thus, the compulsion

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39 However, this is certainly not to say that Native Americans were not politically and rhetorically employing (mis)conceptions and stereotypes prior to the middle of the twentieth century. For example, the Lakota writer, rhetor, composer and political activist Zitkala-Sa played off of, re-made, and manipulated nineteenth and early twentieth century Anglo conceptions of Indian-ness in a number of ways, including dressing in full costume for the
seems toward consubstantiality seems to be taking place within Native communities across the country, and it also extends outside of those communities, to include white, Anglo-American culture. Further, since consubstantiality was the spirit of the age, it would make sense that both Hay and Snyder would have been aware of this drive toward collective substance, and drew from it in their writing.

Native peoples also began to claim unification and to find a voice for their collective concerns and experiences in Native-written literature of the 1960s. As Crow Creek, Dakota author and critic Elizabeth Cook-Lynn claims, in the 1960s, Native literature began to “gain the interest of more mainstream readers” (25). Although the interest of mainstream readers would be tapped into by Native writers such as Louise Erdrich, James Welch, and Laguna writer Leslie Marmon Silko in subsequent decades (Cook-Lynn 25), Kiowa author and intellectual N. Scott Momaday was one of the first Native peoples to achieve widespread acclaim and popularity in mainstream circles in the late 1960s. In fact, Momaday’s *House Made of Dawn* won the Pulitzer Prize for fiction in 1969, and is widely credited with leading the way for Native American literature into the “mainstream” (Scarberry-Garcia 2). In addition, in 1969 Sioux author and scholar Vine Deloria Jr. published *Custer Died for your Sins*, and in 1970 Momaday published *The Way to Rainy Mountain*, both of which were highly influential as well as popular (Purdy and Ruppert 624). Also, in 1970 Dee Brown (a non-Native) published *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*, which addressed Native concerns and also had a notable impact on “mainstream,” popular culture (Purdy and Ruppert 624). Breakthroughs in literature of the period also reinforced a pan-tribal spirit, while simultaneously helping to induce empathy for Native concerns and vast majority of her speaking engagements (Rappaport 7). From Indians using the “noble savage” stereotype in the late nineteenth century, to Native Americans playing off of “child of nature” and “lost Eden” stereotypes in the Southwest in the 1920s and 30s (Calloway 398-399), there is a long history of Indigenous Americans actively practicing survivance and using different political and rhetorical strategies to survive, thrive amidst, and resist the dominant, white, Anglo-European culture.
introducing white audiences to Indigenous experiences and perspectives. The popularity and acclaim of Native literature could possibly provide further evidence that the desire for consubstantiality with Native peoples by white, Anglo-Americans was prevalent in the 1960s.

Thus, Hay and Snyder’s audiences might possibly have been receptive to, if not at least familiar with, the drive toward consubstantial identifications with Native Americans. This approach and this particular kind of identification made sense given the political and cultural context of the time. Therefore, in the following section I analyze how John Hay encouraged his readers to forge consubstantial identifications with his conception of Native eco-orientations. And yet, as I will also point out following my sections analyzing consubstantial identifications with Native peoples forged by both Hay and Snyder, each author also plants the seeds of non-identification—an approach that is more respectful of similarities as well as cultural differences.

**Consubstantial Identifications in John Hay’s *In Defense of Nature***

John Hay’s extensive body of environmental writing spans over half a century (from 1959 into 2004), and includes a number of writings that were influential in helping shape the American nature writing genre (Lyon 75). In addition, Hay’s many works are cited in the majority of nature writing anthologies (including John Elder’s *Norton Book of Nature Writing* [27] and Lyon’s *This Incomperable Lande: A Book of American Nature Writing* [4, 14, 75-77]), which suggest Hay’s influence on the genre. For example, Elder calls Hay “one of the most innovative and daring of contemporary writers in the genre” (48). More specifically, one of Hay’s contributions to environmental writing in the U.S. includes advocating for a settled life and thereby developing a profound relationship to a particular place, rather than just “the environment” in general. For example, Hay was deeply invested the place where he settled, the Stony Brook Valley located in
Cape Cod. He co-founded Cape Cod Museum of Natural History in 1954, was a founder of the Brewster Conservation Commission in 1961, and was instrumental in the purchase of hundreds of acres in his beloved Stony Brook Valley for conservation (Eldred). Hay was also one of the first and foremost Anglo-American advocates for living settled in one place (Lyon 76).

Essentially, he practiced what he preached, settling and writing about his land in the Stony Brook Valley where he lived with his wife and three children from 1945 until 2004 (Eldred).

In addition to exploring the profound interdependent connections between the construction of self and a particular landscape, Hay is also influential in his articulation of ecocentrism, a view that purports the common substance between all beings on the planet. According to Hay, the experience and acknowledgment of an ecocentric orientation are crucial to the spiritual and physical health, and the very survival of mankind (In Defense of Nature 34).

Essential to inciting such an ecocentric ethic, one in which all life shares some level of consubstantiality, for Hay, depends upon an expansive view of time. In Hay’s orientation expressed throughout In Defense of Nature, history is not limited exclusively to human history, but, rather, is concerned with the vast expanse of time in which the great Project of Life on this planet has flourished. This contributes to the overall project of ecocentrism. Throughout In

40 However, this is not to say that Hay was the first, foremost, or the only writer to articulate the profound relationship between an individual identity or an individual’s conception and creation of themselves and a specific place. N. Scott Momaday, for example, is perhaps the most well know Native author writing at the same time as Hay and Snyder to articulate the profound importance of “weaving of selfhood with landscape” (Blaeser 95). In fact, as Blaeser points out, this profound relationship between self and a particular landscape has always been a primary focus of Native American literature. This weaving of selfhood with landscape and the articulation of the profound connections between language, experience in, and a spiritual connection to a particular landscape is central to Momaday’s The Way to Rainy Mountain, which (along with Hay’s In Defense of Nature and Snyder’s Turtle Island) was also published in 1969. Although the suggestion is a highly controversial, sparking much academic debate, Momaday has gone as far as to suggest the existence of a “racial memory,” by which individual psyches and identities are rooted in a particular landscape. For certain, within Momaday’s writing, the ongoing act and creative endeavor of language (and thus, as Burke might point out, the network of identifications that comprises individual identities) is rooted in landscape. Therefore, Hay was certainly not the first or foremost author to articulate the profound connections between self and a particular landscape, as a number of Native authors have long articulated these complexities. However, Hay is one of the first and foremost Anglo authors to do so.
Defense of Nature, Hay constructs a condition of ecocentric and temporal consubstantiality—one in which we share substance with all living creatures no matter how ostensibly different from us through an expansive, inclusive conception of deep time.\textsuperscript{41} Thus, the substance Hay’s audience shares with Native Americans is perhaps inevitable: if we are consubstantial with all of life on this planet, white, non-Native readers cannot help but conclude that they are consubstantial with Native peoples.

In fact, from the beginning of Defense, Hay works to construct specific, poignant consubstantial identifications with Indigenous peoples. For example, in the first pages of his first chapter Hay forges connections and consubstantial identifications between the first Anglo-European inhabitants of the United States’ eastern seaboard and Native Americans when he writes, “Like the Indians, the local people used to believe in charms and countercharms” (9). Thus Hay works to incite consubstantial identifications between his readers (who, in all likelihood, possess and identify as having some European ancestry) and Native peoples. The implication is that if we go far back enough in time we are consubstantial with one another, we all have ancestors who turned to spirituality and superstitions to explain the mysteries of the world. In this we can find merged substance or consubstantiality. Throughout Defense Hay cultivates an expansive conception of time that makes all life on this planet consubstantial (if we go back far enough, in other words, all humankind and even all species are part of the same project of life on this planet). Therefore, in this context, if they go back far enough, Anglo-American readers can certainly find collective substance with Native peoples, common substance which, in this instance, is ancestors who turned to spirituality and superstition to explain the mysteries of the world.

\textsuperscript{41} For example, Hay suggests we share common ground with worms in our evolutionary drive to survive and thrive (118-120).
However, in the drive towards consubstantiality, potentially productive differences go unarticulated and unheard. Readers get no explanation of what these “charms and counter charms” may be. All white readers get is the very brief, easy to miss hint at Indigenous spirituality and spiritual explanations of the mysteries of the natural world. Therefore, an opportunity to listen rhetorically to and potentially explore the alternative, complex and profound relationship to a particular landscape that is articulated by many Native peoples and authors is missed. Consequently, the opportunity to potentially offer readers alternatives to the dominant narratives of Anthropocentrism and developmentalism is missed. Hay’s Anglo readers do not hear from Native peoples themselves; in fact, all we get is Hay’s own very brief, very cursory conception of Indigenous epistemologies. In addition, potential differences between early Native explanations of the natural world and early Anglo-European epistemologies and cosmologies are not pointed out, so the ecologically pernicious yet hegemonic paradigms of Anthropocentrism and developmentalism are not challenged.

Similarly, Hay also forges consubstantial identification with his understanding of Native peoples in his second chapter titled “Teach us to Care.” Here Hay insists that the early Anglo-European visitors to North America had similar understandings of and misconceptions about the “fish hawk”42 as Native peoples did. Hay writes, “The fishermen and explorers who reached primal America saw the fish hawk wherever they went, and the Indians had lived with this bird and presumably related themselves to it in many ways for thousands of years” (37). According to Hay, both the early Europeans and the Native Americans noted the importance and the prevalence of the fish hawk: both cultures seem to be enthralled with the bird, and both cultures also misunderstood it as subservient to and lesser than the bald eagle (38). Thus, both Anglo-European-American peoples and Native peoples can find consubstantiality in the lore

42 The “fish hawk” as it is sometimes called in common vernacular is also called the osprey.
surrounding the fish hawk, and both cultures can locate common ground in their conceptions of this bird. In fact, throughout this chapter there are no differences between early European settlers to the Americas and the Indigenous peoples of the Americas, according to Hay. They are repeatedly portrayed as undifferentiated, consubstantial in their eco-orientations and in their understandings of various animals (32-47). In addition, both cultures are also consubstantial in their removal from the contemporary reader in time. Therefore, Hay strives to forge consubstantial identifications between his white readers and Indigenous peoples through the portrayal of both their ancestral groups as completely undifferentiated, as consubstantial.

In addition, in the same chapter Hay draws from both a Native writer and an Anglo-European writer and their descriptions of the fish hawk to illustrate the supposedly long-held common ground between the two cultures. Hay notes that the Osage author J.J. Mathews writes of the osprey: “All this indicated the great importance of the osprey, but still he feared the bald eagle” (38); while Englishman William Bartram describes the osprey or “fish hawk” in 1791 as “contributing to the support of the bald eagle” (38). By pointing out how Native peoples and settlers to the “new world” are consubstantial in their conceptions of a particular bird, Hay is working to forge consubstantial identifications between his readers (who, again, could probably identify with and claim consubstantiality with European immigrants to the Americas) and Native Americans. By taking the long view of human history here, Hay is also illustrating how two disparate cultures can locate commonality and can even construct consubstantiality through their relationship with, as well as their understanding and observance of, the natural world.

Consequently, according to Hay, if we reach far enough back in history, once time is constructed as a unifying factor, common ground or collective substance can be inhabited by both cultures. Thus, it is apparent that the primary kind of identification Hay encourages his readers to make
with Native peoples is a consubstantial identification, in which both cultures are of one substance.

Additionally, throughout the chapter “Teach Us to Care,” Native peoples of the past and present, European settlers, and Hay’s contemporary readers are united in space: they share the same geography, the same space; and they are able to witness the same occurrences in the natural world and draw the same conclusions (35-38). Here again Hay is working to illustrate common ground and even the same collective substance between readers and Native peoples through their consubstantial ancestors, who Hay repeatedly are one in the same (for example, 36) once we take the long view of time, as Hay also repeatedly does throughout In Defense. In addition, through the common habitation of a particular landscape as well as the observance of and relationship to that landscape, consubstantial identifications are constructed between peoples past and present.

However, it is important to note that we hear nothing from Native individuals and Indigenous eco-orientations are not presented. Therefore, Anthropocentric orientations cannot be challenged. In fact, by assuming a somewhat superficial, surface-level consubstantiality in the perceptions of consubstantial ancestors and by failing to articulate complexity or differences in eco-orientations, chances for productive dissonance are potentially lost. Consequently, because all of the peoples and disparate cultures involved (past and present) are depicted only as similar in their conceptions of place and the natural world, the eco-orientations of Hay’s Anglo-American readers (including predispositions towards Anthropocentrism and developmentalism) are reified, rather than challenged. Therefore, simplified consubstantial identifications with Native peoples is not ideal for helping readers develop more egalitarian and appropriate conceptions of landscape, and unmitigated consubstantiality is not ideal for cross-cultural communication.
Near the conclusion of “Teach Us to Care” Hay also turns to a long-gone, vanished Native people to help his white audience potentially think more ecocentrically. Making an explicit comparison between the osprey (a bird of prey) and Native Americans, Hay writes,

So when I looked at the wounded osprey, I saw a near ghost, an old Indian now living in a world it never made, a symbol of old wilderness in a new one, man-created. What could either do in a society based on indifference toward them? (49)

So, even though we see the “vanishing Indian” stereotype here I still think the kind of identification encourages his white readers to make is a consubstantial one given the fact that Hay, his readers, and the “old Indian” are all living in a “world [they] never made” because of Hay’s anti-technological leanings. In addition, here Hay wants his readers to empathize with the osprey and with Native peoples, which is a kind of consubstantial identification, a merging of substance. Hay assumes he can inhabit the consciousness, the perspective, the feelings and the orientation of a romanticized, stereotypically vanished Native, which is a kind of unethical consubstantial identification.

In addition, everything up to this point in Hay’s writing has made it clear that, along with the osprey and the “old Indian,” he is also a resident of an “old wilderness” “living in a world [he] never made.” Everything in Hay’s eco-orientation, his epistemology, his environmental ethics, and the world he has created for readers throughout In Defense of Nature insists that he is consubstantial with the both the osprey and the stereotypical “old Indian” he conjures from his own imagination in the above passage. The context surrounding the above passage indicates that Anglo readers, Native peoples, the osprey, and Hay are all consubstantial in their shared awareness of their not belonging. The consumer and technology inundated, man-made and therefore superficial world is not where Hay or his readers, or Native peoples belong because it
is essentially fake, fleeting, and hollow. This awareness can potentially make readers consubstantial with Native peoples. In fact, anti-technology leanings and the ecological Indian stereotype are used to unite readers throughout *In Defense of Nature*, which indicates that the dominant approach Hay encourages his white readers to adopt towards Indigenous peoples is to consubstantially identify with them, which is ultimately unethical, inappropriate, and ineffective for purposes of rhetorical listening and cross-cultural communication.

More specifically, although readers can find unification in the easily recognized stereotype, Hay’s simulation of the stereotypical “old Indian” is ultimately unethical and inappropriate because is appropriative and proprietary. According to Hay, he and his white readers are able to inhabit the feelings of Native peoples, and to therefore become consubstantial with Native Americans. Assuming you can easily know and therefore own someone else’s orientation in the natural world and their thoughts and feelings is appropriative, proprietary, and it is ultimately an unethical consubstantial identification. Hay claims to understand how the “old Indian,” and by extension, all (apparently long-gone, vanished, and vanquished) Native peoples must feel—an assumption that is ultimately not respectful of complex Indigenous eco-orientations or Native peoples. Therefore, this kind of consubstantial identification with “the Native” or the “ecological Indian” is unethical and inappropriate, and it does not allow for potentially productive cross-cultural differences to be heard.

And there are other instances in *Defense* where Hay unites his white audience and encourages them to construct consubstantial identifications with Native eco-orientations. For example, Hay opens the ninth chapter of *Defense*, “Meetings in the Field of Life,” with the following:
The field of life, and not the landscape, garden, or even wilderness, terms we use to define our relationship with nature, this cosmic field, is where the hunting is. How could an Indian or an Eskimo, following his prey without help from guns and machines, risking his life each time he went out to hunt, not know himself to belong to the same earth as his quarry? How, since he was so near in self and in spirit, could he not venerate the powers that give and take away, and even ask forgiveness of that animal he was about to kill? (125)

Here Hay’s Anglo audience is asked to disidentify with Western, Anglo conceptions of the natural world, conceptions that are plagued by the nature/culture binary in which “Nature” is an externalized “landscape,” “garden,” or “wilderness” that is outside, separate, other. Rather, Hay’s readers are encouraged to consubstantially identify with the Indigenous orientations that view the entire planet and beyond as a “cosmic field.”

In order to better understand the consubstantial identifications Hay encourages his white readers to make in the above passage, it will help if we better understand the larger context of the passage and one of Hay’s most important purposes for *In Defense of Nature*: uniting his readers under an ecocentric orientation through the understanding of deep time and through consubstantial identifications with Native peoples who embody and represent such an orientation. Throughout the book Hay points out ways that he and his white audience are consubstantial with Native peoples, given their shared understanding of how Western, Anglo-American culture has been misguided in their conceptions of and relationships to the rest of creation. Evidence of the disidentifications Hay constructs with Anthropocentrism and developmentalism can be found in the following: “We need the kind of dialogue with the earth which does not always put us in the position of standing over the cash register telling everything
else how much it is worth” (127). Throughout Defense Hay encourages his audience to disidentify with technology-driven, Western Anthropocentrism and developmentalism because they have been so misguided and because they have wreaked so much havoc on the planet. Instead, Hay’s Anglo readers are encouraged to consubstantially identify with the exceptional and exceptionally egalitarian environmental Native ethic and ecocentric eco-orientation Hay understands to be uniquely Indian. Hay’s readers are not asked to identify with their own dominant, Western, Anthropocentric orientations, but with the Native ethic described above. By constructing consubstantial identifications between his audience and Hay’s understanding of Native relationships with the natural world, Hay is showing how his white readers and Native peoples both realize they depend on the environment. This is an exceptional, anti-technology, counter-cultural understanding that Hay’s readers and Native peoples are presumably consubstantial in.

Therefore, in the above excerpt stereotyped Native peoples are employed as a way for Hay to vivify an all-inclusive, expansive ecocentric perspective for his Anglo readers. Hay and his white readers are able to find their own enlightened, exceptional, and exceptionally ecologically appropriate worldview in the beliefs and practices of Native peoples. Therefore, Hay constructs consubstantial identifications with Indigenous tribes as a way to strengthen master consubstantial identifications with their own, imagined perceptions of ecocentrism among his Anglo audience. Admittedly drawing from stereotypes, Hay imagines the more ecologically in-tune and just orientation of Native peoples as a way for his white audience to strengthen their own ecocentric identities. Put differently, for Hay and his readers, Native peoples are a means to an end of their own, perceived ecocentrism. Therefore, again, Native peoples are exploited as a
resource for Anglo readers, a rhetorical construction which is ultimately unethical and inappropriate, and does not encourage ethical, effective cross-cultural communication.

In addition, in the passage above describing Hay’s understanding of an “Eskimo” way of life, we see that such an exceptional eco-orientation is easily accessible for Hay’s white readers. They can, seemingly according to Hay, easily imagine it for themselves and appropriate it. Further, because all we get is a romanticized, simplified version of Indigenous environmental ethics and because we don’t hear from Native people who are living this ecocentrism, the complexities of actually living such an ethic in the modern world are left unarticulated and unexplored. Because Native peoples are constructed in the passage above as a means to an ends of ecocentrism, because their alternative eco-orientations are mined for white readers like a resource, and because consubstantiality with Native peoples is too easily won, Hay’s construction of Native peoples and the consubstantial identifications he is forging for readers with Native peoples are ultimately unethical and inappropriate. Additionally, because we don’t actually hear the complexities of Indigenous eco-orientations from Native peoples, we have no way to rhetorically listen to the actual words of Native peoples, and therefore this evocation of “the Native” is more than likely not as helpful as it could be in challenging non-Native audience’s assumptions of Anthropocentrism and developmentalism.

Two chapters later, as Hay works toward a conclusion of Defense, he again offers his white readers a kind of consubstantial identification with a particular Native people, the Eskimo (or Inuit). Hay, perhaps first and foremost, encourages his readers to realize the common ground between dovecies\(^{43}\) and “Eskimos.” After an extensive, personal experience, careful observation,

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\(^{43}\) Dovekies are small, stout, black and white birds that are the smallest members of the auk family. They spend most of their time in the open Atlantic Ocean, breeding in the Arctic, and wintering briefly in northern New England (Cornell Lab of Ornithology).
and scientific-fact-and-research-based description of dovekie behavior and existence, Hay constructs the following link between this small sea bird and Inuit peoples:

To the Eskimos these little birds are of primary importance. They net them with long-handles nets as they fly over their breeding cliffs and store them in the frozen ground for winter food. Eskimo women gather their eggs, where their nests are found between the rocks and stones, beginning in June. They also use their skins for a bird skin coat called a *tingmiaq*. For one such coat about fifty skins are needed… The Eskimos are living from hand to mouth. (156)

The dovekies and the Indigenous peoples are consubstantial because they’re interconnected in that the Inuit depend upon the dovekies for their survival. According to Hay, the Inuit and dovekies also share the same precarious quest for survival in an incredibly harsh Arctic landscape (154, 157), a landscape in which bird and man have both adapted and managed to survive. By realizing this interdependence, the Inuit are acknowledging their own consubstantiality with the natural world. Further, by depicting such consubstantial identifications between the dovekies and the Inuits for his white readers, Hay encourages his audience to explore their own interdependence and consubstantiality with other species. The implied questions for Hay’s Anglo readers are: what are we dependent upon and what are we consubstantial with? Hay’s purpose in this chapter is to convey that the Inuit people realize and are living closer to what dominant, modern, developmentalist, technology-inundated culture has too often forgot: their dependence and consubstantiality with Nature and the totality of Life. Given this purpose, Native peoples are again a resource for predominantly non-Native, Anglo readers to use and exploit.
The further implication is then that, by acknowledging the ecocentric reality that we are all interdependent and consubstantial, Hay’s Anglo readers can—and should—be more like the Inuit. Readers can be more like the Indigenous peoples depicted here; readers can be consubstantial with Indigenous Americans in their realization of their interdependence on the natural world. Therefore, in the passage quoted above, Hay relies primarily on constructing consubstantial identifications first between Inuits and dovekies, and then he implicitly constructs consubstantial identifications between Native peoples and his white readers. The underlying message is that we all rely on other species, and on the natural world. Stereotypical Native peoples as Hay imagines them, however, are more aware of this dependence and interdependence, which Hay insists throughout *Defense* that his Anglo readers should also come to realize. In the realization of dependence on other species and the natural world Hay’s white readers and Inuit peoples should find consubstantiality. Therefore, we again see that Hay’s primary approach to Native peoples is one of constructing consubstantial identifications for his readers, an approach that is ultimately unethical and inappropriate because it relies on stereotypes, does not engage with the actual words of Native peoples, and considers (imagined) Indigenous eco-orientations as a resource that can be mined by white readers.

Additionally, it is also important to note that it is a simple kind of subsistence or “hand to mouth” life that is described above, one that (in Hay’s estimation) can be understood easily, within the span of a paragraph. The complexities of Indigenous environmental ethics, Native eco-orientations, and Native relationships with a particular landscape complicated and vivified for millennia are reduced to a subsistence existence. In short, the Inuits’ environmental ethic and way of life can be known quickly, and therefore can be owned by Anglo readers quickly and
relatively easily. Consequently, the kind of consubstantial identification constructed here is proprietary and exploitative—and ultimately inappropriate and unethical.

In addition, there is no real possibility for rhetorical listening or cross-cultural communication because a complex environmental ethic that would be feasible in the modern world is not articulated. Anglo readers are penned in and cut off by the vision of a subsistence economy, which is impractical at best—if not, more than likely, impossible—for contemporary and contemporaneous readers. Consequently, rhetorical listening, cross-cultural communication, and possibilities for audiences to potentially develop more appropriate and ethical relationships with the environment they encounter and live in every day in the modern world are foreclosed.

In sum, almost immediately within *In Defense of Nature* (in fact, in the “Author’s Note” that precedes the first chapter), Hay establishes an ecocentric ethic, purpose, and context for the rest of the book. He also, early on, establishes his profound understanding of deep time, while repeatedly insisting that time need not separate us from one another, from other species, and from the almost unfathomably long history of Life on this planet. Within this context in which Hay’s audience participates in the ecocentric “everlasting drive for unity” (209) and in which we are connected with “others” through time, it is a rather straightforward—and perhaps necessary and even inevitable—process for Hay to encourage consubstantial identifications with Native peoples.

Further, Hay works to hold Indigenous Americans up as vivification of an alternative (countercultural, not-dependent-on-pernicious-technology, non-developmentalist and non-Anthropocentric) way of being. It is true that throughout *In Defense of Nature*, in an idealized, romanticized way, Native peoples embody the ecocentric ethic Hay’s white readers are encouraged to consubstantially identify with early on in the book. Hay turns to his conception of
Indigenous relationships with the natural world as a way to reinforce the common ground his readers find in ecocentrism.

However, because Hay’s portrayal of Native peoples is oversimplified, idealized, reductionary, and stereotypical, modern, Anglo audiences are ultimately unable to consubstantially identify with an eco-orientation that would be feasible in the modern world. Feasible possibilities for actually changing relationships towards, conceptions of, and actions towards the natural world are not offered. In the drive toward consubstantiality with Native peoples, by appropriating their imagined eco-orientations too easily, without exploring differences and complications, real, viable possibilities for more appropriate, ethical eco-orientations in the modern world are foreclosed, rather than opened. Therefore, in general, the wholesale, unmitigated seeking of common substance with Native peoples is a misstep in the long history of Anglo nature writers in the United States constructing different kinds of identifications with Native peoples.

Additionally, Hay doesn’t let Native people speak for themselves anywhere in In Defense of Nature. In fact, the Natives Hay describes are rendered mute; therefore they can’t expose differences between their complex eco-orientations and Hay’s imagined conceptions of a Native environmental ethic. Consequently, alternative eco-orientations that may challenge the dominant paradigms of Anthropocentrism and developmentalism cannot be heard, let along rhetorically listened to. Essentially Hay reifies Anglo-American simulations of Indian-ness and the stereotype of the ecological Indian, rather than opening possibilities for productive, inventive, cross-cultural communication and rhetorical listening that is respective of difference. In other words, because the Indians depicted by Hay are oversimplified, static, and mean exactly what he needs them to mean, they serve the purpose of affirmation for the already converted ecocentric
insiders, thereby those who “get it” may be further isolated in their exceptional, advanced ecological understanding. In essence, by relying exclusively on consubstantial identifications (and therefore by glossing over potentially productive differences, and by not hearing from Native American peoples themselves) Hay is reinforcing what he—and his predominantly white audience—presumably already know and are on board with. For these reasons, relying exclusively on consubstantial identifications forecloses possibilities and stymies potential for rhetorical listening and cross-cultural communication, and so is consequently a misstep in identifications with Native peoples.

**Possibilities for Non-Identification in Hay**

And yet, there are possibilities in *In Defense of Nature* for a different relationship with Native peoples and the alternative eco-orientations they have long articulated. Essentially, there are instances in which Hay models an approach of non-identification for Anglo readers. For example, in chapter two of *Defense*, “Teach Us to Care,” Hay offers his longest, most extensive articulation of his perception of Native peoples and an Indigenous land ethic when he writes,

> It seems astonishing that the old varied culture of the American Indian, which had an intimate, alive, spiritual connection with all nature on this continent should have almost completely vanished. Many Indians had the kind of knowledge of terrain, and the ability to find their way, which a modern urban man might call supernatural. Their ceremonial rounds were tied in with the giving and taking away of the seasons, the dearth and abundance of crops and game. They identified with what they depended on, which may make them limited in our terms, and at the same time all the life of earth was available to them in their worship and the
pride of worship. Each natural thing, whether an ant or an osprey, without any particular hierarchy among the animals, was considered to be a possible source of mystic power to any man, and they found celestial patrons in the stars. (39)

Here Hay is pointing out differences between contemporary Anglo-American eco-orientations and Indigenous understandings of and relationships with the natural world. He is starting to hold up differentiated substance that his readers are encouraged to make space for and potentially listen to, before they potentially consume it through a consubstantial identification or disavow it in a disidentification. There is substance that Hay’s white readers could potentially identify with (such the seeing oneself as a part of what you are dependent on and the non-hierarchical, non-Anthropocentric ways of thinking) and there is substance that Hay’s white readers cannot consume and that is inaccessible to them (such as a “supernatural” ability to orientate oneself in a particular landscape). Therefore, more so than in other passages we have looked at from Hay’s writing, Anglo readers are encouraged to listen to and make space for both possible differences and similarities, which suggests the beginnings of approach of non-identification.

In addition, this is Hay’s longest articulation of supposedly “American Indian” ways of thinking. It offers the greatest complexity of non-Anthropocentric and non-developmentalist thought, and it offers the most complex and complete alternative environmental ethic Hay articulates by turning to Native peoples. For these reasons, there are potentially more possibilities for a variety of identifications, ranging from consubstantial to disidentification. All of this suggests Hay is encouraging his readers more towards an approach of non-identification with Native peoples and Native eco-orientations than elsewhere in Defense. Although we certainly still see the ecological Indian stereotype, and although we still get Hay’s interpretation of this stereotype without Native words or evidence, in the above excerpt Hay’s interpretation is
beginning to become more complex with more substance for readers to pick and choose from, which is start to helping non-Native readers pause, listen to and potentially non-identify with similarities and differences.

However, it is important to note that Hay’s description in the above passage is still a highly idealized, romanticized, and simplified holistic conception of a diverse range of Native environmental ethics and orientations. We see both the ecological Indian and the vanished Indian stereotypes. In the passage above Hay evokes the “ecological Indian” or the “genetically predetermined environmentalist” (Owens, *Mixedblood Messages* 220) American Indian criticized by Cherokee-Choctaw critic and author Louis Owens, and he also evokes the simplified, romanticized “simulated Native ‘Indian’ as a Euroamerican invention” (13) described by Owens. Essentially, Native peoples are what Hay needs them to be, not what they themselves have articulated they are. We do not actually hear from a Native person, nor does Hay turn to writing of Native peoples describing their own eco-orientations, environmental ethic, or relationship with a particular landscape. So, we have the seeds of non-identification being planted, but there is still a long way to go in order for Anglo Americans to appropriately, ethically turn to and engage with Native peoples.

In addition, the above passage also smacks of the “vanishing Indian” stereotype articulated by Owens (13). The Native peoples Hay depicts here are indeed extinct; they have

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44 Environmental historian Peter Coates describes how contemporary Indigenous Americans are conflicted about the “ecological Indian” stereotype as follows: “Though some American Indians have assented to and sometimes collaborated in the construction of the ‘ecological Indian,’ others criticize the appropriation and commercialization of Indian spirituality through the sale of books and music. Another group advises Euro-Americans to look for role models in their own pre-Christian heritage. Others dismiss the ‘ecological Indian’ as yet another Eurocentric stereotype, ostensibly flattering but deeply offensive to the variety of Indian culture and experience in its presumption of an ‘Indian view’ [as Silko articulates in “An Old-Time Indian Attack”]. Some Native Americans also find the idea that Indians are children of nature who blend innocuously into the natural world profoundly racist and disempowering in that it denies both their identity as humans and also their history, defined as an ability to control and shape their lives by asserting themselves within their physical environments” (88). So, according to Coates, Native communities, tribes, and individuals remain conflicted about this particular “ecological Indian” typecast, a stereotype that gained strength and ubiquity as well as offered consubstantiality in the 1960s.
gone the way that the osprey and the bald eagle could potentially go, as these birds are also threatened with extinction (Hay 39). In short, Native Americans are not only considered as one holistic, homogenized group, they are also consistently depicted as belonging to a long gone past. They have vanished, and apparently no longer exist and hold the same beliefs and eco-orientations in the modern world. As James Wilson points out, “It is always perhaps easier and less threatening for white people to identify with Indians long dead and vanished, than with living Indians” (422). Hay could not so quickly and easily consubstantially identify with complex, living, viable, non-stereotypical Native people who may challenge his preconceived notions of what “the Native” might look and be like. Essentially, Hay’s Native peoples are not a viable, complex presence in the modern, contemporary world, so ostensibly they are not present to be engaged with, to listen to, or to challenge the deeply entrenched tenets of Anthropocentrism and developmentalism.

Further, it is a simplistic Native environmental ethic Hay articulates above, one that does not include actual, living Native people or the eco-orientations they espouse. These are silenced. Therefore, there remains a good possibility that the Anthropocentric and developmentalist outlooks Hay works so hard to dismantle elsewhere in Defense are not as seriously challenged as they potentially could be, if readers were to hear from and be encouraged to listen rhetorically to actual Native peoples. Hay also assumes his audience can lay easy claim to these simplistic, romanticized Indigenous eco-orientations, that they can be known and owned relatively easily, without hearing from Native peoples. This assumption can be classified in the long tradition of unethical appropriation of Native artifacts and spirituality, which is proprietary at best. So, although the seeds of non-identification are beginning to be sown, which I contend is a positive step, there are still numerous problems with Hay’s evocation of “the Native.”
Hay also plants the seeds of non-identification with Native peoples later on in the chapter “Teach Us to Care” when he writes,

Our range, our capability of action has vastly increased over the Indians’, and of course with the technology they had they could do no more damage than they did. They could make very little dent on their environment, and diseases were beyond their control. They set fires, but their effects were usually limited and not beyond restoration, which was the case of agricultural lands whose soil was impoverished through over-use. In short, conservation was not in the Indians’ world at all. (40)

Although he perpetuates misconceptions about Native people as not impacting and using the land for their own purposes, Hay *does* hold up differences between his conception of Native ways of living on the land and the modern, technology driven world, which suggests the first seeds of non-identification. However, there is also the implied possibility of consubstantiality in that Hay’s non-Native readers could also construct a culture that is not the bringer of destructive technology to the natural world and that has no need for the concept of conservation, which Hay sees as only necessary because our technology has gotten so destructive and beyond our control. Essentially, according to Hay as evidenced in the passage above, there are ways that modern culture has advanced and improved supposedly since the vanished Indian reigned on this continent, and there are things that we can certainly learn from Native peoples who supposedly (of course, in Hay’s estimation, even though this has been long been disproven) had no need for a conservation ethic.⁴⁵ Because differences and similarities are beginning to be held up for the

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⁴⁵ However, while Hay insists that Native Americans had no need of a “conservation ethic,” Native peoples and Native writers have purported that indeed conservation and environmental ethics were integral parts of Indigenous culture. For example, see Patty Loew’s book *Seventh Generation Earth Ethics*. This miscommunication is evidence, I believe, of the need for Anglo readers and nature writers to more genuinely engage with and rhetorically listen to contemporary, living Native peoples.
non-Native, Anglo audience to contemplate, the seeds of non-identification that may potentially be more respectful of differences are beginning to be planted.

However, again Hay’s own imagined construction of Native peoples proves problematic. In striving to show how his white audience could potentially consubstantially identify with Native peoples, Hay seems to inhabit and therefore claim the pre-contact Native world. He assumes that he can inhabit their consciousness and know how they lived and why in the above passage. By telling his readers exactly what an “Indian world” contains, Hay strives to offer his white readers viable substance to consubstantially identify with. However, in presuming to easily inhabit this world Hay—again—appropriates too easily, and therefore actually misinterprets. It is unethical to presume to inhabit the total “Native” “world,” including complex epistemologies, ontologies, and orientations that are essentially largely inaccessible to Hay from his Anglo-American vantage point. Further, we only get Hay’s conceptions of an “Indian world”; we don’t hear the actual words of Native people. Also, in the Imperialist tradition that smacks of cultural superiority, Hay assumes that Native peoples had no need for an environmental ethic because their technology was not as advanced as ours in modern times. However, in-depth studies on Indigenous relationships with environment by scholars such as Callicott and Nelson indicate that Native peoples do historically and into modern times possess an environmental ethic that includes respect for all living beings and conservation of resources. In short, Hay presumes to know for certain and in totality what an “Indian world” is without actually listening to any Native peoples, which is proprietary, unethical, and inappropriate. In addition, Hay also assumes that all Indigenous people have the same environmental ethic, which is incorrect. Thus, although we see seeds of non-identification in Hay, he does not, by and large, rely on an overarching

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strategy of non-identification for shaping how his readers consider Indigenous peoples. Instead, Hay predominantly encourages his readers to, in general, consubstantially identify with Native peoples and Native conceptions of environment.

**Consubstantial Identifications in Gary Snyder’s *Turtle Island***

Gary Snyder is an essayist, Pulitzer Prize winning poet, *poet laureate of the deep ecology movement* (Oelschlaeger 261), and author of nine books of poetry and five books of prose (Oelschlaeger 264). Along with other countercultural participants of the 1960s, Snyder warned against an “overdependence on science, reason, and technology and hoped for a renewal of the importance of magic, intuition, mystery, and awe” (Nash 252). The historical context in which Snyder grew up infused him with a profound skepticism regarding technology, the government, and hegemonic American culture in general. These are the influences he brings to American nature writing, and these are some of his most significant contributions to the genre. As we shall see, Snyder’s skepticism of mainstream culture and the government is apparent in his poetry, and it allows him to forge disidentifications with the mainstream culture, and consubstantial identifications with Native peoples.

In short, as a result of Snyder’s socio-historical milieu and his early affinity for the natural world, he developed a strong countercultural bent, characterized by a spirit of “seething creativity” and rebellion against the mainstream culture and the conservatism of the 1950s (Barbour 251). Snyder and his countercultural colleagues of the 1960s believed it was time for a change: specifically they hoped for the emergence of an ecologically sensitive “new” way of living based on a proximity to Nature (Nash 252). Thus, we see throughout Snyder’s work, readers are united in the protest, counter-cultural spirit of the age—and the stereotype of the

47 Although it was first copywrited in 1969, Snyder’s *Turtle Island* won the Pulitzer Prize for Poetry in 1975.
ecological Indian helps in this endeavor. Further, using his countercultural inclinations as a source of inspiration and invention, Snyder is situated to make a number of significant contributions to American writing on the environment.

For example, Snyder is on the vanguard of theorizing the implications of deep or geologic time for Anglo-American audiences. Similar to many Native authors—and in opposition to the Western Platonic, Judeo-Christian historical tradition—Snyder depicts time as non-linear or cyclical, thereby “abandoning any idea that the present time culminates a historic process” (Oelschlaeger 244) and challenging developmentalism. Snyder’s conception of time as so incredibly expansive to the point of unfathomability creates a sense of what Oelschlaeger terms the “eternal mythical present,” which essentially means that time is sacred, eternal, and constantly reuniting humankind and all creations with the moment of creation(249). One example of Snyder insisting on the eternal mythical present is in his poem “Toward Climax,” which condenses the history of the earth into a kind of creation that is always happening, and in which Snyder insists that there are “great dream-time tales to tell” (83). Or, in Oelschlaeger’s words, “Snyder obliterates the importance of human time through geological time beginning 300 million years ago—when there was no Turtle Island, but only a sea” (274). Similar to Hay then, in this expansive conception of time, a conception that is present throughout Turtle Island, Snyder also makes important contributions to American nature writing.

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48 Oelschlaeger offers his most concise definition of the “eternal mythical present” (a concept he elaborates on and draws from throughout his rather exhaustive study The Idea of Wilderness) while comparing a hunter-gatherer conception of temporality with a “modern” conception: “To the modern mind time is not sacred, repeating in itself the mystery of creation and the cycle of life and death, but rather a succession of moments leading ad seriatim to the future. But to Homo religiousus [to primeval, hunter-gathering humankind] time is sacred, and cave art and ritual celebrates an eternal mythical present, reuniting humankind with creation... Homo religiousus refuses to live solely in what, in modern terms, is called the historical present and instead attempts to regain a sacred time that, from one point of view, can be homologized to eternity” (24). Oelschlaeger argues that humankind, for most of our at least 200,000 year history living primarily as hunter-gatherers, was orientated in the “eternal mythical present”; it was only with the advent of the Hebrew cultural, historic, and biblical traditions that humankind’s understanding of temporality became a linearity (Oelschlaeger 33).
Snyder’s temporal scope is useful for constructing consubstantial identifications, and it is useful for encouraging ecocentric orientations in his Anglo, non-Native readers. By striving to comprehend this remarkable scale of time—a scale that is based on the universe’s existence, rather than the four to six thousand years of recorded human history—humans are no longer the center of the universe, they can no longer construct master, wholesale disidentifications with the rest of Nature as the exceptional species, and humankind is reincorporated into a consubstantiality with the rest of existence. Put differently, as we saw in Hay in a number of instances, by enlarging his audience’s understanding of time and by enhancing their temporal scope, Snyder dethrones humankind as the center of the universe, thereby potentially encouraging readers to adopt a less Anthropocentric and less developmentalist mindset, and a more ecocentric orientation.

In addition, Snyder also makes unique contributions to environmental writing by drawing from traditional knowledge, mythology, and eco-orientations of both Indigenous and Eastern philosophies (particularly Zen Buddhism). Snyder’s poetry and short essays insist that a faith in reason be replaced by a poetry that discloses an ancient wisdom. Or, as Oelschlaeger points out, throughout his body of work Snyder advances a premise that by exploring the ‘primitive’ we can identify primary human potentials thwarted by modern society and that by actualizing these potential we not only will cease burdening the earth’s living systems but will become more fully human… He is a thinking poet whose poetry calls into being an ancient wisdom that resonates with contemporary ecology. (262)

Snyder turns to alternative, other than the dominant paradigms of modern industrialized culture, to construct a kind of sacred ecology in which scientific fact, myth, visions, religious
experiences, and close observations of the natural world are fused. “Turtle Island,” Oelschlaeger contends, “is perhaps the best example of this fusion” because it provides “a new vision of old ways in both prose and poetry that points toward an alternative path for modern people” (265). By turning to other traditions and by looking back, past what we usually assume is all of human history, Snyder assumes a sort of pan-cultural prehistoric wisdom and imagines a different way of being, a different eco-orientation, a different relationship with the world for humankind. For example, he writes in his “Introductory Note” to Turtle Island: “The land, the planet itself, is also a living being—at another pace. Anglos, Black people, Chicanos, Indians, and others beached up on these shores all share such views at the deepest levels of their old cultural traditions—African, Asian, or European. Hark again to those roots, to see our ancient solidarity, and then to work of being together on Turtle Island” (1).49 In short, by going back in time, by imagining our collective and ubiquitous ancient, pre-historic, hunter-gatherer origins, Snyder finds common ground for humanity. Thereby he constructs consubstantial identifications with all peoples for his readers, including Native Americans.

After Snyder establishes a pan-cultural, ancient, consubstantiality for all peoples in his “Introductory Note” to Turtle Island, thereby establishing common ground for Anglo-Europeans, Africans, Asians, Indians, and Hispanic peoples, he then—in his very first poem—turns specifically to Native Americans, and even more specifically to the Anasazi. For instance, the first half of the poem, entitled “Anasazi,” reads as follows:

Anasazi,

49 In addition, in his poem “The Way West, Underground” Snyder also establishes a pan-cultural consubstantiality between the ancient, prehistoric cultures of China (yet, he Snyder makes it clear that he is talking about a time “long before China” existed as a country), Finland, France, Spain, and the prehistoric cultures of the Americas, specifically the Indigenous cultures that resided in pre-Columbian times in present day Oregon (4-5). In this poem included in Turtle Island these diverse, primal cultures are consubstantial in their spiritual reverence for the bear and for the Earth.
Anasazi,
tucked up in clefts in the cliffs
growing strict fields of corn and beans
sinking deeper and deeper in earth
up to your hips in Gods
your head all turned to eagle-down
& lightening for knees and elbows
your eyes full of pollen
the smell of bats.
the flavor of sandstone
grit on the tongue. (3)

Firstly, the position of this piece as the first poem of the book, included immediately after Snyder’s call for unity between all the races in his “Introductory Note” is significant here. According to the “Introductory Note,” everyone, every race, is included in this quest for ancient wisdom, yet it is the Indigenous peoples of the Americas who will lead the way, who we should turn to for our “right” orientation, our ethical, deeply democratic relationship with the Earth. Further, Snyder insists that this is a relationship white readers can easily know and become consubstantial with, and that they can emulate, which, as already mentioned in regard to Hay’s appropriation of imagined Indigenous eco-orientations, is ultimately proprietary and unethical. Additionally, in this excerpt above, the long-dead Anasazi have no secrets. Therefore, Snyder is ostensibly able to inhabit their consciousness, even though they “vanished” hundreds of years ago. Consequently, because knowing is a form of possession, the specter of exploitation and appropriation lurks in Snyder’s claimed consubstantiality with Indigenous spirituality in
“Anasazi,” which is not ideal for “genuine” rhetorical listening or ethical and effective cross-cultural communication.

I also think Snyder’s choice of the Anasazi tribe is significant and strategic. Even today the Anasazi remain a mysterious tribe that have long been mythologized in popular culture as having vanished rather inexplicably, as a result of either warfare, internal strife, invasion, religious upheaval, climate change, prolonged drought (Cordell). Therefore, because the Anasazi are essentially a mystery to modern readers, Snyder is better able to inhabit their consciousness, their mystery. Further, because they are largely perceived to be a vanished mystery, no one can contradict Snyder. The Anasazi are, in many ways, essentially unclaimed and therefore easy-to-inhabit artistic and intellectual territory.\(^5\) Therefore, Snyder’s primary approach of encouraging consubstantial identifications between white readers and Native peoples is ultimately unethical and not ideal for rhetorical listening across cultures.

In addition, another possible reason the Anasazi are chosen here in Snyder’s first poem to stand in for all Native cultures as inhabitants of Turtle Island, may be because they could be used to encourage readers to forge quick and easy consubstantial identifications with Anglo readers. Although what happened to the Anasazi remains a mystery, what is clear is that the Anasazi achieved a number of significant cultural, artistic, and engineering accomplishments, building a flourishing, complex civilization in the four corners region that reached its cultural zenith in the thirteenth century (Cordell). For example, their achievements include: the constructions of large-scale and complex road systems, architectural feats, advances in pottery, and basket weaving—among others (Cordell). In addition, the Anasazi cliff dwelling ruins are a part of southwestern

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\(^5\) Actually, the Anasazi are now believed to have dispersed and joined surrounding tribes, including the Aztecs in Mexico, and a number of modern tribes claim them as their ancestors (Cordell). However, this may make Snyder one more Anglo in the long tradition of refusing to acknowledging contemporary Native peoples claims to their ancestors’ artistic and cultural accomplishments. Therefore, the Anasazi may remain unclaimed artistic and intellectual territory for Snyder.
cultural mythology to this day (Cordell). Therefore, Anglo-American readers can also experience affinities, or consubstantial identifications, with this particular tribe because: their presence is still visible on the landscape and part of the mythology of this country; they developed a number of engineering and artistic achievements, which is also part of the American identity; and, finally, their story may contain an ecological and apocalyptic lesson for the people of the United States, given that, according to many, the collapse of the Anasazi’s civilization was due to large-scale deforestation and resultant water shortages (Cordell). It is possible that, for these reasons, Snyder turns to the Anasazi in his first poem to construct consubstantial identifications between his audience and Native peoples. In other words, it is possible that Snyder opens with a poem describing a tribe that his Anglo readers could readily construct consubstantial identifications with. I believe this suggests that the predominant approach is the construction of consubstantial identifications between Snyder’s readers and Native peoples.

In addition, a close reading of “Anasazi” reveals that, in the third line, the ancient ancestors are re-absorbed, back into the earth, where we will all presumably go. In this realization, there is consubstantiality. Despite their notable, ordered efforts of “growing strict fields of corn and beans” (an endeavor Snyder’s modern readers could have conceivably identified with) during life, and despite their religious faith, they are now, again, part of the earth. This is a fate that very well may, according to Snyder, happen to the great American enterprise (12). Despite the Anasazi’s cultural, artistic, and engineering achievements (which the American enterprise also takes pride in and sees as part of the American project) the Anasazi have vanished. In this eventuality, Snyder’s readers could find consubstantiality: we will all share the same fate. Therefore, the predominant kind of identification Snyder strives to construct
here is a consubstantial one in which potentially productive differences in culture and eco-
orientations are silenced and left unarticulated, unexplored.

In addition, in this poem, the Anasazi still seem to haunt their ancestral homeland. Their connection with and their presence in the landscape is depicted as eternal. The Anasazi have a continued physical and spiritual presence that visitors, including Snyder and his readers, can still experience and imagine, and thus become consubstantial with. In the instance of “Anasazi,” Snyder constructs a consubstantial identification between his readers, the Anasazi landscape, and the imagined, mythologized Anasazi people themselves so that his readers may better contemplate their own ethereal mortality. Thus, Snyder seems to be suggesting that what is really eternal is our vivified experience in, our impact on, and our living in a particular landscape, as the Anasazi have done. Yet, in order to reach this understanding, Snyder’s white, non-Native readers must first consubstantially identify with the Anasazi.

However, essentially Snyder’s appropriation of “a Native,” or Anasazi consciousness is unethical and inappropriate because the Anasazi are mythologized, romanticized, simplified, conjured for effect, long vanished, and unable to be heard in their own voice and on their own terms, let alone listened to rhetorically. This representation of “the Native” plays into the “vanished Indian” stereotype, thus reinforcing Anglo audiences’ expectations rather than challenging those expectations and cultural norms. In addition, because the Anasazi have been gone for so long, by Snyder’s reckoning, they are not present in the contemporary time and we can only construct our own interpretations—or adopt Snyder’s’—of what their lived experience and their relationship with the landscape was like. In short, the Anasazi are not present to seriously challenge the modern dominance of Anthropocentric and developmentalist orientations and they are not present to be relevant in the current time. We only get a vision of what it would
be like to fully inhabit and become part of a place, to live an ethical and appropriate life in a particular landscape from long dead ancients, literally and figuratively from under the ground. Essentially, the long-dead Anasazi can only be what Snyder and his audience imagine them to be, which is consubstantial with the earth and consubstantial with readers. Thus, the complexities and the differences between their eco-orientations and the audience’s go unarticulated—and as a result, possibilities for cross-cultural communication and rhetorical listening are foreclosed.

Snyder also encourages his readers to construct consubstantial identifications with Native Americans in the poem “Control Burn.” Because, like the majority of Snyder’s poems in *Turtle Island*, it is relatively brief, I will include “Control Burn” in its entirety here:

What the Indians
here
used to do, was,
to burn out the brush every year.
In the woods, up the gorges,
keeping the oak and the pine stands
tall and clear
with grasses
and kitkitdizze under them,
ever enough fuel there
that a fire could crown.

Now, manzanita,
(a fine bush in its right)
crowds up under the new trees
mixed up with logging slash
and a fire can wipe out all.

Fire is an old story.
I would like,
with a sense of helpful order,
with respect for laws
of nature,
to help my land
with a burn, a hot clean burn
  (manzanita seeds will only open
   after a fire passes over
   or once passed through a bear)

And then
it would be more
like,
when it belonged to the Indians

Before. (19)

Here we see that, firstly, Native peoples, Snyder, and his audience are consubstantial by place.
By grounding us in place in the second line, “here,” and by separating this word on its own line
Snyder is re-affirming a collective habitation and vivification of place, a common substance that the white readers and “Indians” share, through time. This grounding of Indians and contemporary readers in a common landscape continues throughout the first stanza. Thus, again, Snyder relies primarily on an approach of consubstantial identification.

Then, in the second and third stanzas, Anglo readers and the vanished, ancient Indians are consubstantial by fire, from Snyder’s perspective. In other words, they share common substance in their collective wisdom, knowledge, and use of fire. The implication by the penultimate stanza is that, in humankind’s capacity for fire, contemporary Anglo readers also—like Native peoples—possess the capacity to cleanse, to contribute to, to be a part of, and have a positive impact on the place they share. In this way, Snyder’s readers can be returned to, can be a part of again, the earth and a particular place. Therefore, in “Control Burn” Snyder constructs consubstantial identifications with vanished Indians to encourage his audience to imagine how they can once again be part of the land—as Native peoples presumably always were (past tense)—and to help his readers think about how they can dispel the nature/culture binary and once again “return” to the land through right, ethical action in regards to a particular place.51 In “Control Burn,” it is apparent that the primary kind of identification Snyder encourages his white, non-Native readers to construct with Native peoples is a consubstantial identification, a relationship that suggests Native peoples (in this case long vanished Native peoples) and Snyder’s non-Native, Anglo readers can become one through the merging of substance. While encouraging these kinds of consubstantial identifications may be productive in some instances

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51 Silko in “An Old-Time Indian Attack Conducted in Two Parts,” anthologized in Nothing but the Truth, specifically references “Control Burn” and points out how Snyder “intellectualizes his complicity in the land theft” (170) and how Snyder is essentially—although he is reverent about the land he is occupying—still “occupying stolen property” (171). Therefore, what Snyder is trying to do in “Control Burn,” which is constructing a consubstantiality across time, race, and culture, is politically and practically problematic given the fact that Native Americans “continue to fight bitterly to regain control of the occupancy and use of land that was taken” (Silko 170).
and even right-minded, there are still problems with the drive toward consubstantiality and the subsequent silencing of potentially productive cultural differences, which forecloses possibilities for genuine engagement and rhetorical listening.

For example, even in an ostensibly forward-thinking, ecocentrically minded poet and paragon of the mid-twentieth century, anti-establishment, environmental movement such as Snyder, Anthropocentric thought is reinforced in “Control Burn.” This is apparent in the penultimate line where Snyder uses the word “belonged.” This proprietary understanding of mankind’s relationship to a particular landscape is predominantly Western and Anthropocentric, and might be an indication of even Snyder’s implication in the Anthropocentric schema. Therefore, when he does not engage with actual Native peoples, his imaginations and Western paradigms are not interrupted and—despite his best intentions and his overarching project of inciting ecocentric orientations—Anthropocentrism is ultimately rearticulated, re-packaged, and reinforced. Consequently, instead of consubstantial identifications, an approach of non-identification possibly followed by rhetorical listening and more effective cross-cultural communication with alternative Native eco-orientations could have potentially been more effective in helping readers develop more ethical, egalitarian, and appropriate relationships with environment.

In addition, even though both apparently long-vanished Native peoples and modern Anglo-American readers are consubstantial in their use of fire, Snyder assumes that this one bit of knowledge of one element will make him consubstantial with and able to inhabit the consciousness of a Native person. Everything will be fine, Snyder seems to be insinuating, and we will return to a past in which mankind was more “in-tune with nature” if we can only use fire to burn away the centuries of ecological degradation by the “white man.” This is not only
appropriative and proprietary, it doesn’t offer viable solutions in the modern world—a possibility that may be opened if Anglo writers were to instead encourage an approach of non-identification followed by rhetoric listening to the actual words of living, not vanished Native peoples.

The next way that Snyder encourages readers to adopt an approach of consubstantial identification with Native Americans is by attempting to occupy the same spiritual traditions, mythologies, and intellectual property in “Prayer for the Great Family.” This poem, by Snyder’s own admission, is, “after a Mohawk prayer” (25), which explicitly admits appropriation immediately. Despite Snyder’s interpretation of this “poem” or prayer, what Snyder appropriates here is actually much more than one prayer but a Mohawk “Thanks Giving Address” or Ohenten Kariwatekwen, which is both a spiritual and political text (“Mohawk Council of Akwesasne”). According to Snyder’s interpretation, the address expresses gratitude to the elements of the earth, including the plants, air, “Wild Beings,” water, sun, and sky. In this instance it’s important to note that by “borrowing” a Mohawk “prayer,” Snyder is claiming that he and his white, non-Native readers can occupy the same spiritual and intellectual space as Mohawk people. The common ground between Mohawks, Mohawk cultural traditions, and Snyder’s contemporary readers is reverence and gratitude. As Snyder suggests, modern Anglo readers can inhabit the same orientation as Mohawk people quite easily by adopting this “grateful” state of mind. Thus, the poem “Prayer for the Great Family,” which is followed by Snyder’s postscript “after a Mohawk prayer,” reads in its entirety as follows:

Gratitude to Mother Earth, sailing through night and day—and to her soil: rich, rare, and sweet/in our minds so be it./Gratitude to Plants, the sun-facing light-changing leaf/and fine root-hairs; standing still through wind/and rain their dance is in the flowing spiral grain/in our minds so be it. Gratitude to Air, bearing the soaring Swift and the silent/Owl at dawn. Breath of our song/clear spirit breeze/in our minds so be it./Gratitude to Wild Beings, our brothers, teaching secrets,/freedoms, and ways; who share with us their milk;/self-complete, brave, and aware/in our minds so be it./Gratitude to Water: clouds, lakes rivers, glaciers;holding or releasing; streaming through all/our bodies salty seas/in our minds so be it./Gratitude to the Sun: blinding pulsing light through/ trunks of trees, through mists, warming caves where/bears and snakes sleep—he who wakes us—in our minds so be it./Gratitude to the Great Sky/who holds billions of stars—and goes yet beyond that—in our minds so be it./Beyond all powers, and thoughts/and yet is within us—/ Grandfather Space/The Mind is his Wife./so be it. Again, this is really a theft of a Mohawk Thanks Giving Address or Ohenten Kariwatekwen which is more than one prayer and serves as both a spiritual and political text (“Mohawk Council of Akwesasne”). My gratitude to Professor Margaret Noodin for pointing this out.
again we see that Snyder’s prevailing strategy of constructing consubstantial identification with Native eco-orientations for his non-Native readers is unethical and inappropriate.

Additionally, Lesley Marmon Silko attests in her essay “An Old-Time Indian Attack conducted in Two Parts,” there are significant problems with this particular kind of consubstantiality—with borrowing or “translating” traditional Indigenous prayers, songs, stories, chants, and myths (a practice that stretches back to early ethnographers such as Franz Boas, and which continues today). The assumption “that the white man, through some innate cultural or racial superiority, has the ability to perceive and master the essential beliefs, values and emotions of persons from Native American communities” (Silko166) is essentially a racist presumption because it does not work both ways: as Silko contends, “this notion that the writer has the ‘power’ to inhabit any soul, any consciousness, you will find this idea restricted to the white man: the concept of a ‘universal consciousness’ did not occur until sometime in the early eighteenth-century. Ask an older tribal person to attempt to recreate the thoughts and feelings of a white person, and they will tell you that they can’t” (167). This cognizance articulated by a hypothetical “older tribal person” seems like a position of non-identification, which, as we will see in the next chapter, would be more useful and appropriate in Snyder’s writing. However, in striving for consubstantiality, Snyder neglects the reality that cultures and individuals have their own specific beliefs, paradigms, emotions, ontologies, and orientations that are unique to and the property of that culture or individual. Essentially, in striving for unification while ignoring issues of appropriation, Snyder essentially dismisses the long tradition of cultural theft by Anglo-European peoples—even, one could argue, making the “racist assumption that… the prayers, chants, and stories weaseled out by the early white ethnographers… are public property” (167).
Here the issues of appropriation indicate that consubstantial identifications too easily won are a misstep in the long tradition on Anglo environmental writers identifying with Native peoples. Snyder also constructs consubstantial identifications with “the Native” and, similar to the previous example, appropriates Native ways of knowing and seeing the world in the essay “The Wilderness.” For example, appropriating Sioux (or, more accurately Dakota) language and epistemologies Snyder writes:

What we must find a way to do, then, is to incorporate the other people—what the Sioux Indians called the creeping people, and the standing people, and the flying people, and the swimming people—into the councils of government. This isn’t as difficult as you might think. If we don’t do it, they will revolt against us. They will submit non-negotiable demands about our stay on earth. (108)

Firstly, in addition to borrowing prayers, Snyder also borrows the *supposedly* Indigenous concept of ultimate democracy, in which all beings—from rivers to mountains to otters to sparrows—possess intrinsic rights, have a voice, have a vote (Grinde and Johansen), and moreover, have the right to fulfill their full potential. Snyder’s white audience can supposedly be consubstantial with Native peoples in this easily appropriated kind of ultimate democracy. It is apparent that consubstantial identification with Native eco-orientations is the primary relationship Snyder is encouraging his readers to adopt. However, in the too easy erasure of profound differences in orientations and eco-orientations in particular, in the neglect of the power of Western Anthropocentric orientations, in the failure to listen rhetorically or engage ethically, the common substance Snyder strives to unite his white readers and Native peoples under is unethical and inappropriate.

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53 As further evidence of this “borrowing” of Indigenous and specifically Native American conceptions of ultimate democracy, Snyder writes in the poem “Tomorrow’s Song”: “The USA slowly lost its mandate/in the middle and later twentieth century/it never gave the mountains and rivers,/trees and animals,/a vote” (77).
Secondly, Snyder takes his assumption that the dominant, developmentalist, mainstream, predominantly Anglo-European culture can adopt the complex beliefs and orientations of Native peoples wholesale one step further in this passage. He explicitly insists that it’s not even difficult. As we have already seen, and as a number of Indigenous authors have pointed out (for example, Owens, *Mixedblood Messages* and as Silko in “An Old-Time Indian Attack” 166) this kind of appropriation is overly-simplistic, unethical, and highly problematic. What Snyder is suggesting is that readers can simply substitute paradigms and thought schemas that have been part of Western, Anthropocentric culture for centuries, and probably much longer, in one fell swoop.\(^{54}\) This means we don’t even have to listen—let alone listen rhetorically—to Native peoples.

However, this wholesale, simple swap is ultimately not ethical or feasible. Essentially, in the case of the above poem, the consubstantiality goes too far, and is not careful and multifaceted enough. Therefore, in addition to issues of exploitation, we get an overly-simplistic version of the profound complexities of Indigenous eco-orientations, which may not help readers as much as Snyder might hope. Instead of wholesale, easily won consubstantiality, it would be more helpful if a wide variety of Native environmental ethics, relationships with landscape, and eco-orientations could be non-identified with so that differences and similarities could potentially be heard, respected, and rhetorically listened to.

We have seen that in Snyder’s *Turtle Island* consubstantial identification is the primary approach Snyder encourages his readers to adopt with respect towards Native Americans. Snyder repeatedly strives to merge the substance of his readers and Native peoples by claiming him and his non-Native, Anglo audience can easily inhabit Indigenous consciousness and cultural

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\(^{54}\) Oelschlaeger traces the Anthropocentric paradigm back to the ascension of monotheism, the events in the Old Testament, and rise of the Abrahamic religions, to approximately 4,500 B.C.E.
traditions—without really listening to what those complex cultural ways of knowing might be. However, in this erasure of difference, there are a number of significant problems, including appropriation and even cultural theft.

Unfortunately, the appropriation and co-option of supposedly (often from the perspective of white nature writers and white readers) Native eco-orientations and environmental ethics is not limited to Hay and Snyder, but is rather a larger trend that took place in nature writing of the late 1960s. For example, in Notes from the Century Before (1969) by Edward Hoagland, in The Inland Island (1969) by Josephine Johnson, and in Desert Solitaire: A Season in the Wilderness (1968) by Edward Abbey, all authors consubstantially identify with Native peoples and their own, imagined conception of Indigenous eco-orientations. All of these authors consistently appropriate and co-opt the imagined eco-orientations of Native peoples as a monolith. And yet, despite its prevalence, relying exclusively on consubstantial identifications, while erasing differences, is a misstep in the long history of Anglo-American authors turning to Native peoples, one that does not ultimately help readers engage in ethical, effective cross-cultural communication.

Possibilities for Non-Identification in Snyder

And yet, for all the problems with Snyder’s appropriation and predominant approach of encouraging consubstantial identification, he also plants seeds of potential non-identifications in Turtle Island. For example, Snyder concludes “The Wilderness” by describing “how a friend of [his] from Rio Grande pueblo hunts” (109). In the final paragraph of this penultimate essay, Snyder describes the cultural tradition of hunting amongst the “Pueblo Indians” as follows:
The Pueblo Indians, and I think probably most of the other Indians of the Southwest, begin their hunt, first, by purifying themselves. They take enmetics, a sweat bath, and perhaps avoid their wife for a few days. They also try not to think certain thoughts. They go out hunting in an attitude of humility. They make sure that they need to hunt, that they are not hunting without necessity. Then they improvise a song while they are in the mountains. They sing aloud or hum to themselves while they are walking along. It is a song to the deer, asking the deer to be willing to die for them. They usually still-hunt, taking a place alongside a trail. The feeling is that you are not hunting the deer, the deer is coming to you; you make yourself available for the deer that will present itself to you, that has given itself to you. Then you shoot it. After you shoot it, you cut the head off and place the head facing east. You sprinkle corn meal in front of the mouth of the deer, and you pray to the deer, asking it to forgive you for having killed it, to understand that we all need to eat, and to please make a good report to the other deer spirits that he has been treated well. One finds this way of handling things and animals in all primitive [sic] cultures. (109-110)

In this passage Snyder illustrates cultural differences so that they can perhaps be better understood by his readers. This paragraph is the longest, most in depth articulation of a Native custom in *Turtle Island*. Therefore, it offers perhaps the greatest possibility of exploring the complexities of a different cultural practice and eco-orientation; and it also offers the greatest potential for readers to pause and make space for cultural differences and potential similarities. In other words, there is potential for non-identification.
In addition, the above passage is the closest Snyder comes to engaging with the thoughts and words of an actual, living Indigenous person. Rather than relying exclusively on a stereotype or a romanticized imagination of “Indian-ness” not grounded in any kind of vivified reality, at least in the above instance Snyder supposedly heard the complexities of hunting rituals articulated by a Native “friend.” In making space for real, lived substance of Native peoples for his readers to pause and reflect on instead of immediately consuming that substance in a cultural stereotype, Snyder is planting the seeds of non-identification. It’s a start.

In addition, in the passage quoted above, there is room for differences to be articulated and for commonalities to also be realized by Snyder’s audience, which indicates the beginnings of non-identification. The specifics of the hunting practice and the treatment of the deer are certainly other than, different from the cultural practices of Snyder’s Anglo audience. However, commonalities can be found in the “Pueblo Indian’s” attitude of humility and in their refusal to take from the natural world without need. Thus, differences and similarities are potentially brought to light and identified with in different ways. This indicates the potential for an approach of non-identification on the part of Snyder’s readers. Again, it’s a start.

However, this passage, this attempt at non-identification in the above passage is also problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is important to note that midway through this passage the primary pronoun Snyder uses switches from “they” to “you.” At first “the Native” is other, the “they” to be held up and differentiated with; and then the use of the pronoun “you” indicates that Snyder’s overarching objective is to incite consubstantial identifications between his audience and Native peoples. “You” is inclusive; it includes readers and implies that the readers can inhabit the consciousness and the experiences of a Native person. Therefore, by using “you” Snyder is implying that his readers can understand—or literally “stand under,” share
the same substance, and therefore be consubstantial with—epistemologies and eco-orientations
that are incredibly complex and that are, more than likely, markedly different from their own.
Consequently, a complex cultural practice is again appropriated and easily known and therefore
owned, which is ultimately unethical and inappropriate.

In addition, this paragraph is worth quoting at such length because of the continued
appropriation of a minority culture’s complex practices, rituals, and orientations—without
hearing from any person belonging to a Native tribe. For example, Snyder assumes that he can
know not only the specific practices and rituals that a particular tribe undergoes, but also the
“feeling” that his “Indian friend” has while engaged in the hunting ritual. Again, we see the
(racist, according to Cook-Lynn) assumption that Snyder can relatively easily inhabit the
consciousness and the feelings of his Native friend. This feels arrogant at best, a bit like
dominant culture voyeurism. Owens contends that “crossing conceptual horizons can be, and in
fact must be, hard work”; yet the Cherokee-Choctaw critic and author insists that it is absolutely
critical to undertake this arduous work (Mixedblood Messages 4).55 In Snyder’s passage above
and throughout Turtle Island even where Snyder is planting the seeds of non-identification,
however, this work is made too simple, too easy. Therefore, although we see the very beginnings
of non-identification modeled for readers by both Hay and Snyder in certain places, in general
these mid-twentieth century nature writers rely predominantly on an approach of consubstantial
identification with Native peoples for their readers, which all too often proves appropriative,
proprietary, and ultimately unethical and inappropriate—and also forecloses possibilities for

55 Owens also makes the point in Mixedblood Messages that Native American writers, such as Gerald Vizenor and
Momaday “are beginning to demand that non-Indian readers acknowledge differing epistemologies, that they
venture across a new ‘conceptual horizon’ and learn to read in new ways” (4). However, Snyder does not
acknowledge the difference in epistemologies and he makes the venture into supposedly Indian consciousness far
too easy.
rhetorical listening or “genuine” engagement and effective, ethical cross-cultural communication.

Chapter Conclusions

As we have seen throughout this chapter, the predominant relationship Hay and Snyder construct with Native peoples for their audiences is one of finding shared substance, of overarching commonality. Therefore, they are employing the long-understood concept in rhetorical theory of consubstantial identification. More specifically, Hay uses an anti-technological bent and the stereotype of the ecological Indian to bring together his readers, whereas Snyder uses the counter-cultural, anti-establishment, protest spirit of the 1960s as well as the stereotype of the ecological Indian to bring together his readers. Thus, consubstantial identifications are the most prevalent relationship both Hay and Snyder encourage their readers to engage in with respect to “the Native.”

Yet, there are also seeds of non-identification being sown by both authors analyzed in this chapter. Consequently there is the possibility that Anglo-American environmental writers of the 1960s are working towards relationships with Native peoples that may potentially be more respectful of both similarities and differences, and that may be more conducive to rhetorical listening and ethical cross-cultural communication.

However, there are several problems with Hay and Snyder’s prevailing drive toward consubstantiality with Native beliefs and simulated Indigenous eco-orientations. For instance, in the drive toward consubstantiality with Native eco-orientations, relationship with the environment, and Indigenous ecological epistemologies, both Snyder and Hay foreclose possibilities for productive dissonances and differences. Additionally, insisting that incredibly
complex ecological mythology, environmental ethics, and relationship to place established by numerous Native tribes over millennia can be so easily known and therefore owned by Hay and Snyder’s Anglo, non-Native audiences is particularly problematic and exploitative.

Also, Hay and Snyder too often discount the long history of intellectual and cultural theft, of unethical appropriations of Native traditions, beliefs, artifacts, and profound mythical and spiritual complexities by the hegemonic white culture. In not being aware enough of this longstanding and unfortunate historical veracity, by failing to address it in their writing, and by too often ignoring differences in the compulsion towards consubstantiality, both Hay and Snyder are, in many ways, implicated in the longstanding tradition of appropriating anything Native that may be of use to Anglo audiences. In short, Hay and Snyder may be perpetuating the following trend identified by Susan Stewart: “If scholars constantly examine the relation between dominant and minority cultural forms as one of a colonizing appropriation and borrowing by the dominant, they end up, as nineteenth-century folklorists did, turning minority forms into something like nature—that is, a reservoir of spontaneity bereft of particularity and agency” (quoted in Owens, *Mixedblood Messages* 54). Most often in Hay and Snyder’s writing, in the Western-Imperial tradition, Native peoples are a resource the dominant white culture exploits—just as Nature has long been in said Western-Imperial tradition. In essence, by relying exclusively on the construction of consubstantial identifications, Hay and Snyder, as part of the dominant culture, are able to mine what they need; they view minority perspectives as a resource, and can pick and choose the views that either entertain (as in a kind of “ethno-nostalgia” [Owens 47] or multicultural “tourism” or even voyeurism), or that reaffirm collective, consubstantial identifications amongst their Anglo readers because they are part of the culture that has achieved dominance. This is problematic because if one is trying to encourage more appropriate, ethical,
and egalitarian relationships with and conceptions of the natural world, it is not prudent or ethical to use the same kind of strategies that Western culture has long used to exploit, diminish, and consume that world.

In short, rhetorical listening and “genuine” cross-cultural communication and developing more ethical, appropriate relationships to and conceptions of the natural world can’t—and shouldn’t—be as easy as Hay and Snyder make it. Essentially, by relying on an approach of overarching consubstantial identification, Anglo audiences aren’t challenged to question their own assumptions of Anthropocentrism and developmentalism. As Owens points out in his essay “Multicultural Tourism”:

> It is our responsibility, as writers and teachers, to make sure that our texts and our classrooms are not ‘safe’ spaces from which a reader or student may return unchanged or unthreatened… Some upsetting is necessary… It is our job as teachers and writers to make people listen well, to disrupt the discourse of dominance, to challenge and discomfit the reader, to ultimately startle that reader into real knowledge. (46-47)

Essentially, it is quite possible that rhetorical listening, “genuine” engagement, and effective cross-cultural communication will require some kind of “upsetting,” some “discomfiture,” which is not possible in consubstantial identifications that are too easily achieved, without the hearing of difference. For these reasons, consubstantial identifications without the first steps of (active) non-identification and potentially rhetorically listening—along with the dominant strategy of disidentification with Native peoples that characterized Anglo environmental writing of the mid-nineteenth century—is another misstep in the long history of constructing different kinds of identifications with “the Native” in Anglo nature writing in the United States, a misstep that
forecloses rather than opens possibilities rhetorical listening and effective cross-cultural communication, and for potentially more helpful, ethical, appropriate and egalitarian conceptions of and relationships with the natural world.

Therefore, although they are innovators for a number of different reasons and have contributed significantly to the genre of American nature writing and although they are planting seeds of non-identifications that may be more respectful of both similarities and differences, by mainly relying on an approach of consubstantial identification, Hay and Snyder are not startling their readers into “real knowledge.” Instead, by relying predominantly on an approach of consubstantial identification, Hay and Snyder reaffirm what their audiences already know and believe, and they are too often using their own understandings of Native eco-orientations and their own construction of Native peoples to reify consubstantial identifications. Thus, they are not disrupting the Anthropocentric and developmentalist discourses of dominance as much as one might initially think. By assuming consubstantiality that can be easily won—and by assuming that its even a “winner take all” game, which itself is a Western paradigm—Hay and Snyder fail to fully realize how ingrained, hegemonic, and pervasive the modern paradigms of Anthropocentrism and developmentalism remain. Consequently, these schemas aren’t challenged to the extent that they should be as a result of Hay and Snyder’s failure to listen rhetorically to Native people and their over-reliance on consubstantial identifications.
This chapter illustrates how environmental writers Barry Lopez and Gary Paul Nabhan predominantly encourage their readers to adopt an approach of non-identified with Native peoples. More specifically, my findings in this chapter suggest that environmental writing of the late 1980s modeled non-identification with Native peoples for their Anglo readers, without encouraging readers to actively forge their own non-identifications with the words or writing of Native peoples. My findings also suggest that Nabhan and Lopez employ different strategies to encourage readers to non-identify with Native peoples and eco-orientations. Therefore, in this chapter I elucidate how these authors use different strategies to encourage their audiences to pause before they gravitate towards the extremes of consubstantial identification or disidentification—essentially to non-identify with the increasingly complex articulations of Native eco-orientations we see in non-Native environmental writing of the 1980s.

In this chapter I also explain that, while the approach of non-identification is a step in the right direction because it is more respective of cultural differences and similarities, in modeling non-identification without encouraging readers to forge their own non-identifications with Native texts Nabhan and Lopez’s audiences can potentially remain passive observers of non-identification. As I will make more clear as the chapter progresses, this passivity is not ideal for the important objectives of rhetorical listening and cross-cultural communication, which Ratcliffe theorizes as an active, conscious process (Rhetorical Listening 11). Essentially, because
non-identification is modeled and therefore readers are not directly engaging with Native writing on the environment, we still get possible Native alternatives to Anthropocentrism and developmentalism through the filter of non-Native authors. For these reasons, as I explain further in my concluding chapter, active non-identifications in which audiences engage with the actual writing of specific—although certainly not all—Native peoples and in which white, non-Native readers are encouraged to construct their own non-identifications would be more helpful in encouraging audiences to potentially develop more appropriate and ethical conceptions of and relationships with the natural world.

This chapter is structured much the same way as the last two chapters. After a reminder of how Ratcliffe defines non-identification, I provide a brief summary of affairs in Native communities in the 1980s. It is my hope that his context will prove helpful in understanding why the move towards non-identification started to occur in the 1980s, why identification made sense at that time and how it was possible to non-identify with Native peoples given contemporaneous audience norms and expectations. Then, I offer my analysis of Nabhan’s *The Desert Smells Like Rain*, after a brief introduction to Nabhan and his influence on environmental writing, followed by a brief introduction to Lopez and an analysis of his book *Arctic Dreams*. In order to further illustrate the larger trend of non-identification with Native peoples in American nature writing of the 1980s, I also briefly analyze the work of the widely read and influential nature writers Anne Zwinger and Annie Dillard. The chapter concludes with the results of my analysis and my thoughts on the continuation of non-identification as an approach to Native peoples in environmental writing.

But first, it would help to remind my readers of what Krista Ratcliffe in particular (because she has done the most to theorize and offer an explicit, extended definition of the term)
means by “non-identification.” Ratcliffe’s figuration of non-identification is a metaphoric gap, a “space between” juxtaposed subjects or concepts (73) used for rhetorical listening and cross-cultural communicative conduct. Ratcliffe contends that it is important—albeit difficult—to “focus simultaneously on commonalities and differences” (“Rhetorical Listening” 198), which is what non-identification demands. Essentially then, according to Ratcliffe, non-identification is a tool for cross-cultural communication. It is a pause between the extremes of consubstantiality (the drive towards similarity) and disidentification (the compulsion towards difference). It is taking a conscious breath before occupying any space, anywhere between consubstantial and disidentifications; it is a conscious pause before moving towards any identifacotory space.

Essentially, Ratcliffe figures non-identification as a middle place between positions that may allow for a purposeful, conscious stance of non-identification proceeded by the act of rhetorical listening. An integral benefit, according to Ratcliffe, of rhetorical listening preceded by consciously undertaken non-identification is the ability to locate identifications across commonalities and differences (Rhetorical Listening 3). For Ratcliffe, there is a need for differences to be acknowledged, yet not made impossibilities or points of irreconcilable conflict, but rather to be transformed into productive possibilities. Therefore, she theorizes non-identification, which Ratcliffe contends fulfills this need.

However, it is important to note that Ratcliffe’s most often theorizes non-identification as taking place between people or groups of people. By Ratcliffe’s reckoning, identification is, most of the time, a tool for cross-cultural communication between people. Yet, as I will point out in the conclusion to this chapter in the final chapter of this dissertation, non-identification needs to be critiqued, complicated, and further theorized so that it can also be understood not only as taking place between two people, but also as taking place between an individual and a text—
which, in the case of non-Native readers engaging with Native environmental texts and Anglo writing on the environment, could potentially help readers construct more appropriate, ethical, and egalitarian conceptions of the natural world.

Drawing from Ratcliffe’s theorization of non-identification, this chapter analyzes how Nabhan and Lopez use different strategies to create spaces for Native peoples in their writing. These strategies include: the articulation of “traditional” or “ancient” as well as contemporary Native mythology, stories, and oral traditions and the living out of those traditions by contemporary Indigenous peoples; the incorporation of Native eco-orientations interwoven with scientific rhetoric and knowledge to create a hybrid form; the appreciating and allowance of the unknown; the incorporation of actual words, the voices, of Indigenous peoples; insisting that Native cultures are part of the landscape; refusing to idealize Native peoples; and an incorporation and esteem for Indigenous ecological knowledge. Essentially, these are the ways Nabhan and Lopez model non-identification with Native peoples for their readers. But first, my next section provides the cultural and political context of Native-white relations in the 1980s so my readers can better understand why non-identification made sense at the time, what factors contributed to the approach of non-identification with Native Americans, and how Nabhan and Lopez may have been challenging audiences to engage with Native peoples even more actively and ethically by planting the seeds of more active non-identifications.

Cultural and Political Context: Affairs in Native Communities in the 1980s

Throughout the later 1980s, as the nation moved towards the quincentennial of Columbus’ first voyage to the Americas (which would take place in 1992), many Indigenous and non-Native communities across the Americas reflected on five-hundred years of occupation, conquest,
assimilation, poverty and prosperity, resistance, survival, and coexistence. In the concluding decades of the twentieth century, Native peoples continued the tradition of winning legal victories yet, in general, moving away from the strategies of protest and civil disobedience that characterized the 1960s and toward victories in federal and state courtrooms. The 1980s saw the continued struggle for sovereignty, survival, and resistance as Native peoples with distinct cultural heritages vivified by thousands of years and hundreds of generations of ancestors living in the Americas.

Here statistics may provide a context for the lives of Native peoples and the state of Indian affairs in the later 1980s. Between the 1960s and the 1990s the population of the United States became consistently and universally more diverse, across a wide range of ancestries and ethnicities (Tienda and Morning 11746). By the year 1990, people who self-identified as “Native American” comprised approximately 3 percent of the total population of the U.S., rounding out the ten most frequently reported ancestries (Tienda and Morning 11748). By comparison, according to official tribal memberships from federally recognized tribes, in 1960 less than 0.3 percent of the total population of the U.S. consisted of Indigenous, tribal affiliated groups, then by 1990, this percentage jumped to 0.7 percent (Tienda and Morning 11747). And this trend of increasing Native populations continues into the present. As of August 1997, the official native population of the United States stood at 2.3 million, or .9 percent of the total population (Pritzker xii). In addition, according to the 2010 Census, “5.2 million people in the United States identified as American Indian and Alaska Native, either alone or in combination with one or more other races… The American Indian and Alaska Native in combination population experienced rapid growth, increasing by 39 percent since 2000” (Norris, et all 1). In addition to a viable, increasing demographic presence, today there are 557 federally recognized tribal groups
in the United States, and approximately another 150 are currently petitioning for federal recognition (Pritzker xii). Further, reservation land in the U.S. totals over 55 million acres (Pritzker xii). Thus, it would seem that the American Indian population in the United States continues to grow and assert their continued presence. Despite five centuries of physical and cultural genocide and frequently forceful and coercive assimilation by the dominant culture, and despite at least two centuries of the “vanishing Indian” stereotype, the Native American remains, and continues to be a rising cultural, political, and economic presence on the American stage. Or, as Josephy writes, “Despite almost five hundred years of a history marked generally by attempts to exterminate American Indians or force them, by one means or another, to adopt the cultures of their conquerors, they—and their attachment to their Indian heritage—are far from extinct” (346).

In addition to asserting their very real continued presence, in the 1980s Native communities frequently turned to the legislative process and the courtrooms to assert their rights to self-determination. The centuries-long fight for sovereignty included important legal victories in the 1980s. More specifically, in the 1980s, “Many tribes and Indian individuals, turning from militancy [of the 1960s] to litigation to fight for the preservation of tribal existence, sovereignty, treaty rights, and the protection of tribal natural resources and civil rights, were winning notable victories in Federal courts” (Joshephy 365). For instance, throughout the late 1970s several important laws were enacted that reestablished Native rights, including: the Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, the Indian Child Welfare act of 1978, and the Tribally Controlled Community College Assistance Act of 1978 (Joshephy 363). Then, in 1982 the Supreme Court ruled that tribes had the power of taxation, which opened the way for new revenue streams affording a degree of self-governance
for tribes (Josephy 366). In many ways such legislation set a precedent for upholding Indigenous people’s rights, which was a positive step towards self-determination, towards the ultimate goal of allowing Native peoples to decide for themselves how to best govern their own communities.

These important legal victories and steps toward greater degrees of sovereignty, self-governance, and autonomy may possibly have set the stage for approaches of non-identification on the part of Anglo, non-native readers of American nature writing. At least it makes sense to say that Native-lead struggles for recognition of sovereignty would have potentially made Anglo readers more receptive to and understanding of approaches of non-identification. In fact, history suggests that during the closing decades of the twentieth century, Native peoples were insisting on their difference, on their right to exist as different, as unassimilated. They were also insisting with increasing success that these differences be acknowledged and listened to by the mainstream, non-Native culture. This potentially set the stage for an approach of non-identification, an approach that makes sense given the legislative victories and the resistance to assimilation that was prevalent during the 1980s.

Two significant examples of legal victories for Native people include Congress passing the National Museum of the American Indian Act in 1989 and the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) in 1990 (Pritzker xvii). Both of these laws mandated the repatriation of millions of human remains and cultural artifacts from U.S. museums that receive federal support (Pritzker xviii). NAGPRA essentially increased the protection of Native grave sites on federal and tribal land, and outlawed trafficking in Native remains. “Under these laws,” according to Pritzker, “thousands of remains and artifacts have been returned to Indian groups” (xviii). These legislative victories indicate a continued, and possibly increasingly successful, resistance to assimilation, and they could indicate a resistance
to the merging of substance into the mainstream, or, in other words, a resistance to consubstantiality. This suggests that an approach of non-identification made sense in the closing decades of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{56}

In addition, the latter half of the 1970s and into the 1980s also saw the restoration of land and monetary settlements achieved via the legal system for a number of Midwestern and Eastern tribes (land that was taken illegally in the colonial era of American history) (Josephy 365). As an example of the push towards self-determination through the re-acquisition of ancestral lands, in 1989—in an effort to address the crisis of land tenure and the continued consumption and destruction of land by timber corporations and private absentee landlords—several key members of the Anishinaabeg people (a diaspora of many nations) founded the White Earth Land Recovery Project (WELRP), which, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, purchased over 1,500 acres of land now held in a conservation land trust (LaDuke 126). This is another example of Native rights and victories, another instance in which Native peoples demanded their viable, ancient presence on the land, and demanded to be heard. These initiative and victories further suggest that Native peoples were continuing to insist on their presence as a distinct, different culture; yet Native Americans were not so unlike contemporary Americans that they couldn’t use the hegemonic system to insist on their own rights. Thus, through these actions, through an insistence on both similarities and difference, non-Native peoples may have been primed for a stance of non-identification towards Native Americans.

In addition, fishing rights were restored to a number of Midwestern and Pacific Northwest tribes in the 1980s, rights that often had been previously guaranteed by nineteenth

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\textsuperscript{56} In addition, in 1988 Congress amended the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, which authorized twenty tribes to participate in their own governance, essentially empowering the tribes to directly control millions of dollars in federal funds (Pritzker xvii). Along with the other integral legal victories described here, this is another initial, yet essential step toward achieving the self-governance of sustainable Indigenous communities.
century treaties (Josephy 365, LaDuke 126). During this era, numerous cases were brought before federal courts on behalf of Native fishing, hunting, water, and civil rights. Tribes, Native lawyers, and other educated professionals used historic treaty rights to re-assert themselves, their rights, and their sovereignty in the 1980s. The legislative successes of the later 1970 and 1980s were hard won, and signified both a deviation from the historic norm of the Dawes era and Termination as well as landmark legal precedents for Native people across the United States. They also signified new public and governmental recognition of the inherent legal rights of Native peoples, rights that had long been both passively ignored and actively denied.57 Thus, again we see Native peoples demanding acknowledgement of their rights as a distinct culture with increasing success, which could mean that many non-Native peoples were ready to listen and to adopt stances of non-identification.

Yet, along with these newfound rights also came responsibility—particularly fiscal responsibility and an increased push towards “economic independence” under the Reagan administration. The Reagan administration’s Native policy involved “the severe curtailment of

57 However, legal decisions that restored Indigenous rights and reinforced tribal sovereignty often fanned anti-Indian sentiment (LaDuke 122). As LaDuke reminds her readers in All Our Relations: Native Struggles for Land and Life, “There has always been anti-Indian sentiment in America,” sentiments that, as LaDuke points out, surge when groups of Anglos feel threatened, when a measure of Native rights are restored, or where Native and non-Native communities must coexist in areas adjacent to and within Native communities (122). In fact, Josephy contends, “Anti-Indian hatred and violence, an old story to the tribal peoples, also became a target of militants,” beginning in the early 1970s (361). For example, during the latter 1970s and into the 1980s, “In California, a white man murdered one of the Indian leaders of the occupation of Alcatraz, and in Washington State, others shot the leader of Indians who were demonstrating for their fishing rights. Indians were also killed in Pennsylvania and Nebraska, and in other places Indians were subjected to racial prejudice, humiliations, and beatings” (Josephy 361). LaDuke argues that, by the 1980s, anti-Indian sentiments turned into a full-fledged movement with the rise of vigilante groups—a movement that continued with the popularity of white-supremacist and wise-use groups in the 1990s (122). In fact, following the 1987 Voigt decision in Wisconsin (which restored fishing rights to Anishinaabeg peoples), “the racial slurs, intimidation, and threats Native people experienced led the FBI to investigate the potential for violence” (123). Thus, while the 1980s saw some significant headway made in the area of Native cultural and religious sovereignty and several significant moves toward land restoration, unfortunately this progress too often incited anti-Indian backlash. Additionally, while the stage was beginning to be set for a stance of non-identification with Native peoples through a recognition of their sovereignty and cultural significance, and while possibilities for “real,” productive cross-cultural communication were beginning to coalesce, there were holdouts who clung to ignorance and a lamentable historic tradition of hate and bigotry.
Federal spending for Indians and the withdrawal or reduction of government financial support for such reservation activities as public education, health care, road maintenance, law enforcement, judicial services, and housing construction” (Josephy 367). In fact, President Reagan informed Native American tribes that they “should cease looking to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and other Federal sources to fund tribal affairs but should assume the responsibility for the well-being of their people and turn to the private sector for joint capitalist ventures that would provide funds for economic development of their reservations” (367). The Reagan administration insisted that reservations become more independent from the federal government, and the federal government wanted dealings with reservations to be more about relationships between governments. Yet, various tribes were in different stages of preparedness for their new (theoretically) independent status. Also, there is no getting around the fact that Reagan and his administration cut the annual budgets of tribal communities rapidly, drastically, and haphazardly in the 1980s (367).

In addition, in the words of Josephy, there should be no denial of the subsequent reality that,

The tribes were gravely affected by the elimination or reduction of funds for services that affected almost every phase of reservation life. The economic progress that reservations had been making stalled and reversed; unemployment rose dramatically to as high as 95 percent among the tribes; and poverty, ill health, and associated problems such as alcohol and drug abuse and reservation violence increased. (367)

Thus, numerous tribal leaders were torn between what many perceived as the recognition of their inherent sovereign powers—including the new tools they were ostensibly being given for self-
government and self-determination—and between the realities of the social upheaval that occurred in the wake of the U.S. government’s abandonment of many Native communities.

The response of many tribes to the social and economic crisis that followed the Reagan administration’s deep cuts to tribal communities was to establish tribally owned and operated high-stakes gaming enterprises that appealed to crowds of non-Natives. These gaming operations both increased the average income on impoverished reservations and slashed unemployment rates (Josephy 368). As Pritzker points out, “For a few tribes, gaming has provided an excellent source of employment and income” (31). In fact, only two years after Congress’ approval of the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which gave approval to gaming on reservations, “it was estimated that almost 130 tribes in more than 20 states were lifting themselves up economically with the help of bingo, roulette, black-jack, and other games of chance, which on some small reservations provided enough jobs to eliminate unemployment” (368). And the benefits of gaming that were beginning to be reaped in the 1980s by a few, select, and ideally positioned tribes with successful gaming operations have not stopped with employment opportunities: a number of tribes have used the profits to redistribute the gains to tribal members, provide loans for tribal businesses, diversify the reservation economy by investing or developing different businesses, reacquire land, fund a variety of health and human service programs, and offer scholarships to tribal youth (Pritzker 31, Calloway 485). In short, gaming has certainly created access to a considerable amount of wealth for some Indigenous communities. In fact, following Congress’ approval of the Indian Gaming Act and following a 1987 Supreme Court ruling which declared that California could not prohibit Indians from operating gaming facilities (Calloway 485), in 1988 Indian casinos grossed approximately $100 million a year; and ten years later they brought in more than $6 billion (Pritzker 31). Further, in 2002, almost three-hundred Indian
casinos operating nationwide reported revenues of nearly $13 billion (Calloway 486). In generating this kind of wealth, the growth of gaming on reservations in the late 1980s created opportunities for economic stability and diversification, as well as a degree of autonomy and self-governance for a relatively small percentage of tribes (Calloway 485). It would seem that, spurred by the Reagan administration’s steep decreases in funding, a few, select tribes—such as the Mashantucket Pequot, the Oneida, and the Shakopee Dakota (Pritzker 31)—found a certain degree of sovereignty, self-governance, and economic independence as a result of legalization of gaming on reservations in the late 1980s (Calloway 485).

There have been many benefits and a number of problems that accompanied the success of Indian gaming, including but not limited to the accumulation of wealth for a very select few (and a number of non-Natives), the fear it will undermine tribal communities and perpetuate negative stereotypes (Calloway 489). And it is certainly true that the success of gaming for some tribes “has generated a backlash among some non-Indians, renewed concern in some circles about the powers and the unique status of Indian nations within the United States, and brought heightened attention to questions of Indian identity” (Calloway 489). However, by and large, the visible economic success of gaming would have been apparent to non-Native communities and perhaps would have given some non-Natives viable substance to non-identify with. Put differently, for certain non-Natives gaming would have put Indian gaming and Native peoples front and center and made them visible to the mainstream, non-Native culture, thereby providing a collective Native identity and even tribal identities to non-identify with.

All in all, reactions to the dramatic de-funding of reservations—including the growth of gaming, the building of casinos, and the resultant influx of wealth to reservations that began in the late 1980s—brought with them new assaults on the cohesion and continuity of Native
cultures (Josephy 368, Pritzker 31). While pressures to assimilate had been strong for five centuries, the compulsion to assimilate was increasingly powerful and omnipresent in the 1980s. As Native communities across the country diversified their economies, business conducted with non-Natives increased—and as a result, exposure to outside influences and often the ensuing pressures to assimilate also increased.

Yet, as Native peoples acquired more rights and responsibilities while moving towards sovereignty and self-determination, they began to engage the dominant culture on their own terms. While much legislation in the late 1970s and 1980s protected Indigenous culture and traditions, the allure of economic opportunities and consumer culture was a constant presence for many Native peoples in the late 1980s. Thus, the threat of enculturation and assimilation remained strong and ever-present throughout the 1980s and into today for many Native Americans. As Pritzker asserts,

Readers should understand, that, in general, oppression and exploitation of Native Americans have not stopped. Not only is there still a great deal of anti-Indian prejudice among society at large, but the U.S. and Canadian governments continue in many ways to subvert legitimate treaty rights and to exert other pressures on native people to give up their culture, traditions, and resources (xx).

Thus, although the worst, most tragic, horrific, and lamentable injustices of the past were behind Native communities by the 1980s, Native languages, culture, traditional economies, spirituality and spiritual practices, orientations, mythologies, and oral traditions are constantly under threat from the dominant Anglo culture—and from state and federal governments. And, although Native communities had more tools to defend themselves in the 1980s than they had in previous centuries, the 1980s witnessed a growing realization of the threat of assimilation in Indigenous
and non-Native communities, which may have made audiences more receptive to a stance of non-identification. By insisting that differences be acknowledged and respected in the face of powerful pressures of assimilation (in the face of a totalizing, domination-inspired consubstantial identification) Native peoples perhaps primed non-Native audiences of environmental writing to adopt a stance of non-identification.

In sum, the centuries-long, constant struggle of Native peoples to defend their inherent right to live as Native people won a number of hard, long-time-in-the-making victories throughout the 1980s. The insistence of Native American tribal communities to preserve their cultures and to decide for themselves how best to live and govern, contributed to the dominant, Anglo culture’s ability to non-identify with various Indigenous peoples. By asserting their own, distinct culture, cultural and individual identities, tribes and tribal members create a viable substance for the dominant culture to non-identify with. Essentially, as Nabhan and Lopez were writing the texts I analyze in this chapter, their audiences may have potentially been receptive of an approach of non-identification, given Native-White relations and the political and cultural context of the time.

In short, many Indigenous-American people and individuals—in taking hard-won legislative steps toward self-determination throughout the 1980s, and in continuing to resist assimilation while maintaining their agency throughout the simultaneous process of accepting and remaking some aspects of the dominant, Anglo-European culture—have made significant strides through the practice of survivance. In fact, a look at the larger context Native affairs in the 1980s can be seen as a continued stance and strategy of survivance. In his introduction to Survivance: Narratives of Native Presence Gerald Vizenor, who coined the term, defines survivance as: “an active presence over absence, deracination, and oblivion; survivance is the
continuance of stories… survivance stories are renunciations of dominance, detractions, obtrusions, the unbearable sentiments of tragedy, and the legacy of victimry” (1). According to Vizenor, survivance is an “ongoing process” essential for fending off stereotypes of “vanishing Indians” (96). Survivance (a mashup or portmanteau of survival plus resistance) involves the constantly adapting assertion of presence, the vivification of cultural uniqueness and possibility, an ever-adaptive “trickster” mentality, the insistence on choosing the most optimal adaptive strategies from various cultures, and the disavowal of defeat and the “vanished Indian” stereotype. We see survivance throughout the 1980s in Native communities’ change of tactic to achieving legislative victories in the courtrooms of the dominant culture, in their adaptability and their commitment to economic success in the face of federal defunding, in their continued assertion of their existence as a distinct people with important cultural differences, and in their continued quest for sovereignty. This strategy of survivance, which resists both consubstantiality and disidentification, along with the events taking place in Indian country throughout the closing decades of the twentieth-century, are related to and have had an impact on the approach of non-identification used by American nature writers in more recent decades. Essentially, strategies of survivance and the affairs in Native communities that took place throughout the 1980s may have potentially made Anglo audiences more receptive to approaches of non-identification with Native peoples in the 1980s.

Non-Identification in Gary Paul Nabhan’s *The Desert Smells Like Rain*

Throughout his thirty plus years of publication, Gary Paul Nabhan has been much anthologized, and has had significant influence on the genre of American nature writing. For example, an excerpt of *The Desert Smells Like Rain* is anthologized in Finch and Elder’s *The Norton Book of
Nature Writing (899-903), and four of Nabhan’s books\textsuperscript{58} are cited by Thomas Lyon in his Guide to American Nature Writing for their “literary worth, cultural and historical significance, and intellectual challenge” (133). Finch and Elder sum up The Desert Smells Like Rain and Nabhan’s contributions to the field of American nature writing as a result of that work as follows:

Nabhan’s books show more than an ecologist’s interest in their desert-adaptive traditions and the potential value of little known plant varieties. He writes with great appreciation of the Indians’ sense of history and ritual interaction with the desert and convincingly of their seemingly paradoxical sense of desert as a place of great fertility and vitality. (899)

Thus, Nabhan’s major influence on American nature writing stems from his ability to interweave his ethnobiologist’s understanding of plant life with his humanity and his respect and interaction with Indigenous cultures. This interweaving of modern science and Traditional Ecological Knowledge can be seen in Gathering the Desert (1985), Enduring Seeds: Native American Agriculture and Wild Plant Conservation (1989), The Desert Smells Like Rain: A Naturalist in Papago Indian Country, and Cultures of Habitat: On Nature, Culture, and Story (1997). Nabhan won the John Burroughs Medal for Gathering the Desert (Finch and Elder 899). Also, as additional testament to his influence and wide-ranging readership, Nabhan’s work has also been a subject of study for environmental rhetoricians such as Scott Slovic (92).

In The Desert Smells Like Rain: A Naturalist in O’odham Country Nabhan establishes a stance of non-identification and encourages his readers to non-identify with Indigenous peoples almost immediately in his acknowledgements. Firstly, he refers to the Native people the book
centers around as Papago\textsuperscript{59} as a particular tribe, rather than the collective “Native Americans” or “Indians,” which contributes to affording them a specific identity—as well as a particular geographic locale, a home, and an orientation in the landscape. As a result, Nabhan’s readers are aware by the first page of the acknowledgements that the Papago are the people of the Sonoran desert, with a particular orientation and identity as a result of their specific home landscape. And as such, as more than a stereotype, they can lay claim to a particular, unique substance rather than a diffuse substance that could be easily claimed and consubstantially consumed or disidentified with. Thus, the stereotype of the natural world and Native peoples as resources to be mined or as enemies to be fought and conquered are potentially resisted.

After this initial establishment hint of encouraging non-identification with the Tohono O’odham people, Nabhan uses four main strategies to encourage readers towards non-identifications. These include: evoking mystery to create space for collective invention, understanding, and potential cross-cultural communication; creating a hybrid genre that uses contemporary research to better understand the Tohono O’odham and their alternative eco-orientations; allowing contemporary Tohono O’odham to speak, or including the voices and dialogue of tribal members; and articulating the traditional myths of the Tohono O’odham and interweaving them with the vivification of those myths in the lives and lived experiences of “actual” Tohono O’odham people. These are the four primary ways Nabhan encourages his readers to open a space for Indigenous peoples to be heard, and possibly better understood. Or, in

\textsuperscript{59} It should be noted, as the publishers have on the copyright page, that since \textit{The Desert Smells Like Rain} was published in 1982, “the Papago Indian Tribe officially changed its name to Tohono O’odham (Desert People). This change became effective with the adoption of the new constitution in January 1986 by members of the Tohono O’odham Nation” (copyright page). So, although Nabhan refers to them as Papago, they are now officially the Tohono O’odham. I will use the official moniker when possible, although for reasons of clarity, I also have to use Nabhan’s language.
other words, these are the ways that Nabhan models non-identification with the Tohono O’odham for his Anglo, non-Native readers.

Firstly, throughout *The Desert Smells Like Rain* Nabhan consistently incites a sense of the unknown and the ineffable with respect to the Tohono O’odham people, and with the natural world, which may potentially help readers better listen to and make space for alternative eco-orientations. For example, describing a response he received from a “Papago youngster” after asking him what the desert smells like, Nabhan writes in his first chapter, “An Overture”: “The boy’s response was a sort of Papago shorthand. Hearing Papago can be like tasting a delicious fruit, while sensing that the taste comes from a tree with roots *too deep to fathom*” [emphasis mine] (6). By insisting he cannot fully come to know the full, profound complexity of the boy’s response, Nabhan resists claiming consubstantiality with the boy’s eco-orientation, his way of being in and constructing his identity in response to the landscape. From Nabhan’s perspective, although he may be able to arrive at some kind of understanding regarding the boy’s response through his biological, scientific knowledge of how the creosote bush releases aromatic oils after rain and how the boy had made this association, neither Nabhan nor his readers can or should claim full consubstantiality with the Papago boy’s experiences and culturally and experientially vivified relationship with the desert. In addition, by insisting that better, although not ultimate, understanding *can* be achieved, Nabhan works against disidentification to construct a non-identification. In this way, a middle ground between disidentification and consubstantial identification—a non-identification—is modeled for Nabhan’s his Anglo readers. In other words, Nabhan is essentially showing non-Native readers: this is how to non-identify with Native people; this is how it’s done.

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60 The boy’s response, according to Nabhan was: “The desert smells like rain” (5)—thus, the title of the book.
By way of concluding his first chapter, which explores the Tohono O’odham conception of rain and how that conception is brought to life in their language, Nabhan tells his readers that the Tohono O’odham are able to “grow food in a desert too harsh for most kinds of agriculture, using cues that few of us would ever notice” (8). And he continues,

Their [the Tohono O’odham’s] sense of how the desert works comes from decades of day-to-day observations. These perceptions have been filtered through a cultural tradition that has been refined, honed, and handed down over centuries of living in arid places. If others wish to adapt to the Sonoran Desert’s peculiarities, this ancient knowledge can serve as a guide. Yet the best guide will tell you: there are certain things you must learn on your own. The desert is unpredictable, enigmatic. (9)

Here again, Nabhan uses his understanding of “mystery” or evoking the unknown to model non-identification with the Tohono O’odham for his white readers. It is apparent in the above passage that while Nabhan is able to begin to fathom the complexities of the Tohono O’odham relationship with the desert and he can respect and appreciate it, he cannot completely inhabit it. He cannot construct a full consubstantial identification with it, as so often Snyder purported to do. Although Nabhan and his white audience can learn from Indigenous eco-orientations (and as Nabhan, Lopez, and Owens, for example, have argued in different places and in different ways, it is absolutely integral that contemporary society do so), the Desert People’s way of living in the landscape and the culture that arose out of that relationship ultimately must remain a unknown to Nabhan and his Anglo readers. Therefore, Nabhan encourages his audience to listen and to make space for that unknown—a space that is essential if non-identifications are to take place. And
because of the space and the listening incited by the evocation of the unknown, possibilities for rhetorical listening and cross-cultural communication are potentially opened.

In concluding the following chapter Nabhan again evokes a sense of the unknown as a way for his readers to construct non-identifications with Native peoples. In the chapter “On the Trail of I’itoi” Nabhan visits a cave of the Tohono O’odham people. After offering his readers the “traditional” myths surrounding the cave, as well as contemporary Native and non-Native experiences associated with the cave, Nabhan concludes his experience in the cave as follows:

The cave was at least twenty feet long, but we couldn’t really tell how big it was—it didn’t matter. We were on the edge of a place, a being that was larger and deeper than we were. And that was it—recognizing that even though we had found the cave, it was still largely unknown to us. We were standing in the cool musky air of a sanctuary that was saying to us: ‘There is always something hidden in this world, that you can’t just realize from the outside. You need to make contact with it now and then, to nod your head in knowing, to receive its blessing.’ (21)

In Nabhan’s estimation and experience the cave is ultimately unknowable, especially by the Western compulsion to quantify—and this spiritual center should be respected as such; it should remain a unknowable, and should be valued as such. This allowance for the unknown, rather than ultimate, definitive knowledge and consubstantiality is essential to the strategy of non-identification as the finding the middle ground between consubstantiality and disidentification, between ownership and unmitigated dismissal. Essentially, in striving to better understand (which resists dismissal, a disidentification), but in realizing that definitive knowing and owning (which would be a consubstantial identification) is not the objective, the middle space of non-
identification can potentially be inhabited. Again we see non-identification modeled for Anglo readers.

Further, it is important to note that earlier in the chapter Nabhan takes care to describe how the cave is associated with unexplained occurrences, according to the Tohono O’odham (14-15). By the end of the chapter, as illustrated by the preceding excerpt, Nabhan makes it clear that he is able to identify with what he sees as the Native appreciation of and allowance for the inherent mysteries of the natural world. However, Nabhan does not claim to know exactly what the cave means to the Tohono O’odham. From what we read, it is apparent that this is an unknowable to Nabhan. Instead, he offers his readers his interpretation of “traditional” myths associated with the cave, contemporary Tohono O’odham experiences with the cave, and then finally what the cave has come to mean to Nabhan after his experience there. Therefore, Nabhan encourages an approach of non-identification with Native peoples and eco-orientations by allowing these eco-orientations to be voiced without completely claiming them as his own. Allowing for what cannot—from Nabhan’s perspective—be known, allowing for open-ended meaning and possibilities, is essential to an approach of non-identification principally because readers have to make a space to contemplate the “mystery,” without owning it. To know, in a way, is to own, to claim consubstantiality; however, in Nabhan’s insistence that the cave and Tohono O’odham conceptions of the cave must ultimately remain unknown to him and his non-Native readers (14-15), Nabhan is encouraging an approach of non-identification.

Nabhan also evokes a sense of the unknown and models non-identification for readers in his re-articulation of the modern “legend” of a missing Tohono O’odham boy, and in his re-articulation of traditional Coyote trickster myths. In the chapter “Changos del Desierto” Nabhan relates what has become contemporary Papago legend in his telling of the story of Manny, a then
two-year-old boy who was missing in the desert for three days with only his dog as protection and companion. As Nabhan writes, using the words of Papago officer Ed Noriego, “He was way off in the other direction from where he could have gotten water… How he stayed alive was a mystery, even with the dog protecting him” (56). Ultimately, Nabhan arrives at the following conclusion regarding this contemporary story: “Ask the dog about it. Or shout the question out across the desert flats, and listen until the earth issues up an answer” (57). And this is how Nabhan leaves the story. Thus, Manny’s story of survival remains a mystery—one shared by the dog, Manny, and the desert, the landscape. Readers cannot know the ultimate Truth—and in Nabhan’s re-telling of the story, readers are encouraged to let it stand as an unknown.

Essentially, readers must let this secret of the desert and the Papago people be: we can neither know absolutely what happened and therefore, in a way, possess the knowledge of what happened (a consubstantiality) nor can we discount it as completely false (a disidentification), given the details and fact Nabhan relates. Consequently, Nabhan’s Anglo audience is encouraged to non-identify with this contemporary Indigenous myth. Again we see that non-identification is the primary kind of identification Nabhan models for his readers, and that the evocation of the unknown is one way non-identifications can be encouraged.

Nabhan also draws from traditional Coyote mythology to evoke the unknown and to further construct non-identifications with Native orientations. For example, he opens his sixth chapter titled “Plants Which Coyote Steal, Spoils, and Shits On” with the following:

Coyote—he’s a hard one to write about and get away with it. I tried once before. One winter, I went around to the villages asking the Desert People about him. By the end of the cold season, I had a whole notebook full of stories… Yet nothing became of those stories I wrote down. It seemed I had misplaced the notebook.
For weeks, I searched without luck. The following summer, I was walking near the village they call Ban Dak, Where Coyote Sat Down, when I came upon a charco that had just filled up with floodwaters. There, floating in the pond, was a notebook that looked familiar to me, except it had pawprints smudging the pages, and whole sections ripped out by the teeth. You have to watch what you say about this one they call Coyote. [emphasis original] (77-78)

Here Nabhan brings to life Native mythology associated with the trickster, the ever-adaptive, impossible-to-pin-down-and-understand eternal prankster that is present in a great deal of Native mythology across many Native cultures, as articulated, for example, by Owens and Vizenor.61 In fact, Nabhan’s description of Coyote here aligns with Indigenous traditions in that his actions and his character are essentially unknown and impossible-to-pin-down. Despite his best efforts to come to know Coyote (he talked to numerous Papago, “spoke with trappers and zoologists, and memorized all the identifying features characteristic of ordinary coyotes” [78] in an effort to come to know Coyote), and despite all his Western scientific research and data collection, Nabhan is still unable to pin down coyote, or share any real consubstantiality with him.

Therefore, Nabhan and his Anglo or non-Native readers have to make space for Coyote, and wonder at him knowing full well that he cannot possess him intellectually or rationally—at least, from Nabhan’s perspective. As is the case with the various myths, stories, individuals, and natural features Nabhan encourages his audience to appreciate and respect for the unknown associated with them, the real value—from Nabhan’s vantage point and in his interpretation of what the Papago are relating to him—is in the endeavor to understand, not in possessing through definitive, static understanding in the form of monolithic and often hegemonic consubstantiality.

61 Indeed, Nabhan seems to be aware of and to have studied this long-standing tradition of Native peoples of the Southwest.
The value is in the means, not the end, in other words, and in this endeavor meaning is constantly made and re-made; it is never static. The constant positioning and re-positioning without ultimate knowing and owning may encourage readers towards an approach of non-identification. Therefore, again non-identification with Native peoples and their beliefs are modeled for white readers through the evocation of the unknown.

This use of mystery or the unknown aligns with Ratcliffe’s conception of non-identification as a constantly ongoing process (rather than an end, as Burke often depicted consubstantial identifications) that involves participation and agency from all parties (Rhetorical Listening 25). Nabhan embraces and models a tolerance and respect for the unknown, for open-ended meaning, to give his readers pause—to give them time and space for non-identification with Native stories, worldviews, and eco-orientations. In Nabhan’s writing the evocation of the unknown serves as the wedge of non-identification that interrupts the often polarizing and unproductively entrenched process of consubstantial identification and disidentification. According to Ratcliffe, the wedge is inserted into discourse, theoretically opening up space for rhetorical listening—and potentially cross-cultural communication (27). In modeling non-identification, Nabhan is essentially showing non-Native readers how this can be done.

A second strategy Nabhan uses to incite non-identifications with the Papago people and their eco-orientations is allowing tribal members to speak for themselves. Of course, ultimately it is Nabhan’s book and everything, in a way, is related by him; however, the inclusion of supposed dialogue from supposed Native people makes Nabhan’s writing different than the other authors we have looked at so far. Throughout The Desert Smells Like Rain we hear the voices of Tohono O’odham people through Nabhan’s inclusion of dialogue and, again, through Nabhan’s interpretation and understanding of what he is hearing. For example in the chapter “On the Trail
of I’itoi” contemporary experiences of Papago people visiting the cave are related *not* by Nabhan, but by a Papago woman named Mona (16-17). Again, of course the book is written by Nabhan so everything is filtered through him; yet, if Nabhan can be believed, he makes the effort to include Mona’s actual words. In fact, Nabhan offers three paragraphs of Mona’s speech telling Nabhan and his then wife Karen about recent mysterious occurrences at the cave, and about the proper rituals for entering and exploring the cave. Ostensibly, readers get the ancient and contemporary mythology surrounding the cave not from Nabhan (although, again, of course, he’s the ultimately the author and the book and words are his), but from a Tohono O’odham woman.

In addition, Nabhan makes it appear as if Mona has the last word in this section (17). Nabhan very purposefully makes it look like he isn’t offering his audience *his* interpretation or *his* iteration of the significance of Mona’s words. Instead, he lets what are apparently Mona’s words stand as viable substance for his audience to identify with in whatever iteration of the identification process they choose. Ultimately and ideally Anglo, non-Native readers can construct their own identifications, disidentifications, or non-identifications (or some combination thereof) with Mona and with Papago mythology and worldviews, as they choose. But first, Nabhan encourages his Anglo readers to pause and listen across similarities *and* differences—first, they are encouraged to non-identify. Put differently, by strategically not overtaking or subsuming Mona’s words with his own interpretation and his own words, Nabhan encourages his white readers to seek the middle ground between consubstantiality and disidentification in order to listen to alternatives to their Western environmental ethic.

In the next chapter Nabhan again offers his audience what Nabhan wants his Anglo readers to believe are the words of a Papago woman, and concludes the section with those words (27). In this instance as related by Nabhan, an elderly Papago woman named Marquita is
explaining to a Papago boy why he mustn’t throw rocks at saguaros to harvest their fruit. She exclaims with horror, “No!... The saguaros—they are Indians too. You don’t EVER throw ANYTHING at them. If you hit them in the head with rocks you could kill them. You don’t ever stick anything sharp into their skin either, or they will just dry up and die. You don’t do anything to hurt them. They are Indians” (27). Undoubtedly Nabhan’s interpretation of this succinct statement is fecund in ecological significance and contains tremendous implications for offering audiences an alternative eco-orientation and environmental ethic, alternatives to Anthropocentric and developmentalist paradigms. Yet, Nabhan lets these differences stand as is. Readers get no exposition from Nabhan on the implications of this Papago understanding of saguaros and the audience is not berated for their own potential differences with this orientation (as is often the case in the rhetoric used by Thoreau and Hay, for example).

Thus, by allowing for difference and not immediately consuming them as his own, Nabhan non-identifies with Mona and her expressed beliefs, and he encourages his Anglo audiences to do the same. Again we see in the example quoted above that, instead of relying exclusively on Nabhan’s summary and opinions of Papago beliefs and eco-orientations, the author includes what he wants his white readers to think are the words of his Native friend so that readers can ideally make up their own mind. Therefore, because Nabhan uses this strategy, audiences can choose to see differences or similarities—or both—but first they have to pause and pay attention, which ideally encourages Anglo readers to adopt an approach of non-identification.

And again, Nabhan lets these words stand to conclude the section. He does not subsume or consume the words of an Indigenous person, and does not offer what readers would see as his own interpretation, summary, or commentary. The white audience is encouraged to pause,
reflect, put the pieces together, and do this work for themselves, which first requires an approach of non-identification. Again, Nabhan models non-identification for his audience, and he intentionally makes it look as if he incorporates the actual words of Native peoples—without speaking for them—to do so.

However, it is important to note that readers could remain unaware of this pause. They could remain oblivious to their encouraged approach of non-identification. Although Nabhan encourages non-identifications with Native peoples in his modeling of non-identification, showing readers what it should look like and how it should be done, readers can remain unconscious of their own approach of non-identifications and of the non-identifications they are encouraged implicitly to construct with Indigenous peoples. Essentially, readers don’t have to constantly assume and re-assume a position of non-identification because they can watch Nabhan do it for them.

In an effort to further model approaches of non-identification for his readers, Nabhan makes sure that what he wants readers to see as two of the most profound and resonate truths of the book are articulated by Papago. The first example comes from chapter seven in which Remedio, a “humble Papago farmer” (95) relates the following:

I’ve been thinking over what you say about not so many birds living over there anymore. That’s because those birds, they come where the people are. When the people live and work in a place, and plant their seeds and water their trees, the birds go live with them. They like those places, there’s plenty to eat and that’s when we are friends to them. (96)

This interpretation of a supposed Papago environmental ethic gets at some of the most profound quandaries grappled with in the nature writing genre during the 1980s, in particular: are humans
really separate from nature and inherently destructive; are human culture and “nature” mutually exclusive; is “nature” really “Nature” if it is less than “pristine,” if it is “tainted” by human habitation (which, of course, as discussed earlier, is a myth); can humans habitation actually increase biological diversity; is the Anglo-American expectation of “pristine” as a prerequisite for “wilderness” really all that optimal or even realistic? Yet, Nabhan isn’t didactic about answering these questions. Instead, he purposefully makes it look as if the lives of particular Papago and the lives of the tribe—who have not only dwelt responsibly but contributed to the biological diversity of the Sonora desert for centuries—and the words of Remedio speak for themselves. In this way, a pause is potentially inserted, a non-identification is modeled, and an alternative to Anthropocentrism is also brought forward for Nabhan’s audience so that differences and similarities can both be heard. In this way, Anthropocentrism is not necessarily reinforced, as we saw was the ultimate outcome of totalizing consubstantial identifications and disidentifications. Rather it is challenged by way of inserting a pause so that Nabhan’s understanding of an alternative eco-orientation can be potentially heard and potentially engaged. Again, although readers aren’t encouraged to forge their own non-identifications with Native words, they can see how it is done as Nabhan models this approach.

Another time a profound ecological truth is held up for audience to non-identify with occurs in chapter eight, “Gathering.” In this chapter, a Papago man named as “lean old Casimiro Juan” describes his experience picking a specific kind of small wild onion as follows: “That’s when I knew I picked too many. So I just opened the bag and saved a bunch of big ones. Then I sat down and planted most of those onions I picked back in the sand so that they could grow again. When you take me there, I’ll show you. They still keep coming up there” (103). Nabhan’s interpretation of this insightful premise of environmental ethics that works against
Anthropocentrism concludes the section. Again, by avoiding commentary that focuses on either commonalities or differences, and by letting what Nabhan wants his white readers to believe are actual words from a Tohono O’odham tribal member stand at the end of a section, Nabhan creates both a metaphoric and physical space for the gap of non-identification.

In short, by offering his interpretation of the environmental ethic of a particular Tohono O’odham individual—rather than offering his interpretation of “the Native” environmental ethic—possible differences and potential similarities with this individual and their expressed eco-orientation are possibilities for further exploration by Nabhan’s audience. They are a starting point, rather than an end in and of itself, as we often find when the polarities of consubstantial identification or disidentification are the sole outcomes, the only identificatory possibilities offered to white readers. In modeling non-identification for Anglo readers, in other words, Nabhan is letting readers decide. Consequently, an approach of non-identification with Indigenous peoples and their alternative eco-orientations often opens rather than forecloses possibilities for cross-cultural communication. However, as I will explain further particularly in my concluding chapter that follows this one, in order for this to work, in order for rhetorical listening and effective and ethical cross-cultural communication to occur, readers need to actively construct their own non-identifications with Indigenous words, which they are not yet encouraged to do *The Desert Smells Like Rain* where we still gets words and succinct environmental adages selected by Nabhan and filtered through his consciousness, despite the fact that he presents those words as direct quotes from particular Papago individuals.

One more way that Nabhan opens possibilities for further conversation and continued meaning-making, one more way he creates a pause for non-identification in other words, is by juxtaposing modern, scientific research with contemporary Tohono O’odham lived-experience,
Indigenous stories, and oral traditions—thereby creating a hybrid work that enhances Nabhan’s ethos as a nature writer. Throughout *The Desert Smells Like Rain* Nabhan includes sections on Tohono O’odham traditional legend or the experiences of living Tohono O’odham peoples and then has a section break, butting these legends, tribal mythology, and contemporary lived experience up against modern scientific research and academic sources.

For example, chapter three, “What Do You Do When the Rain is Dying?,” begins with an epigraph “from the O’odham origin myth” (41) explaining the scarcity of rain; then Nabhan moves onto the tribulations of his Tohono O’odham friend Julian working the land and struggling to make his spring crops of peas, corn, and beans flourish, all the while watching the sky and praying and singing for rain (41-46). Next, Nabhan breaks for a section that offers his readers contemporary, scientific research by professionally trained “Anglo dwellers” (46) that explains the decrease in rainfall, the depletion of groundwater resources, as well as the effect this has on the bioregion, its botany and its agriculture (46-47). Again, as we saw with Nabhan’s inclusion of dialogue from Tohono O’odham people, he offers very minimal commentary after and during his juxtaposition of myth, lived experience, and modern research. Instead, he lets these varied epistemologies stand as is. He doesn’t make the connections between these ways of knowing overly explicit or didactic. Instead, he encourages the audience to work and participate in the meaning-making process. The result of this juxtaposition and the lack of interpretation is two-fold: firstly, it gives Nabhan a sense of objectivity, thereby building an ethos for Nabhan that is trustworthy and positive—the reliable relator of profound, interconnected truths; and secondly, because Nabhan doesn’t expound on the connections between these different epistemologies but rather creates both physical space on the page and metaphorical space in the reader’s understanding. Therefore, Nabhan’s audience must literally pause between Papago
stories, the recounted lived experience of Tohono O’odham people, and modern research. This space offers a pause for non-identification to potentially occur, a gap in which readers must make the connections for themselves. Essentially readers are encouraged to decide for themselves what the differences and commonalities between the three different ways of knowing are. Put differently, readers are encouraged to decide for themselves what the differences and commonalities are between their own positions and that expressed in Papago stories and legends, Papago lived experience, and research by experts. In this way, by inciting participation on the part of readers and by ostensibly avoiding the dichotomous traps of consubstantiality and disidentification, differences and commonalities may potentially open productive possibilities for further meaning-making.

However, readers are not encouraged to forge their own active, conscious non-identifications with Native writing on the environment, with actual words of Papago people unfiltered by Nabhan. Since the writings of Kenneth Burke in the mid-twentieth century, particularly in the postmodern tradition, and into the current era, scholars have worked to bring identifications into the light, to make subjects more aware of their subconscious and semi-conscious identifications and to the different kinds of identifications they make on their way to becoming enculturated and socialized. For example, for Burke, identifications are theorized primarily as subconsciously or semi-consciously undertaken, yet as a scholar and critic, particularly in Rhetoric of Motives, he strives to make subjects more aware of the identification process. Or, in Burke’s own words: “The major power of identification derives from situations that go unnoticed” (Rhetoric of Motives 22). Further, according to Burke, in processes “not wholly deliberate yet not unconscious,” a speaker or rhetorical agent uses language and other symbols specifically associated with wealth or class, or an audience member may identify with
such nuances of wealth without being fully aware of doing so (*Rhetoric of Motives* 122). Burke’s perspective suggests that subjects and audiences can indeed bring to light the impact of messages that may be semi-conscious, which we may not be fully cognizant of. In the Classical rhetorical and continuing through the Roman era and the Middle Ages, persuasion as the action of rhetoric happened externally to a collective audience and was incited by the “good man speaking well” (Quintilian 12). Burke, by comparison, expands the scope of rhetoric by exploring the ways we semi- or subconsciously forge identifications and persuade ourselves. Thus, Burke’s conception of rhetoric and identification offers a theorization of the possibilities for exploring identification as other than a direct and deliberate strategy used by a rhetor to persuade an audience. Drawing from Burke’s own words, Foss, Foss, and Trapp phrase it as follows:

> Often the most powerful... identifications are used to persuade at an unconscious level...
> Although classical definitions of rhetoric, then focus on ‘the speaker’s explicit designs with regard to the confronting of an audience,’ identification includes the possibility of unconscious persuasion, for individuals may not be consciously aware of the identifications they are making. (193)

In short, following Burke’s lead, scholars from Ratcliffe to Fuss agree that there is an unconscious and/or subconscious component to many of our perhaps most powerful identifications. Yet, while they agree that it is most often a positive thing if subjects can be made more aware of their identifications, and thus claim a greater degree of agency over their socialization and identities, the degree to which these subconscious identifications can be brought forward into consciousness offers a point of contention amongst scholars.

Ratcliffe’s theorization of non-identification is certainly in this rhetorical tradition of attempting to bring awareness on the part of subjects to their identificatory processes. In her
book length project on non-identification and the possibilities this stance offers for rhetorical 
listening and potentially for productive cross-cultural communication, non-identifications are 
theorized as consciously undertaken. However, in Nabhan’s writing, readers are not encouraged 
to take this next step, to make their non-identifications a consciously chosen stance. This is 
important because Ratcliffe insists that a stance of conscious non-identification is essential for 
rhetorical listening (Rhetorical Listening 13, 25). Therefore, because non-identifications are 
modeled for readers rather than encouraging readers to forge their own conscious, active non-
identifications, non-Native readers of Nabhan may still potentially be failing to listen rhetorically 
to Native peoples, despite Nabhan’s efforts to model non-identification.

While Nabhan shows his white readers how to non-identify with Indigenous peoples and 
eco-orientations, readers must intuit that the next step could potentially be to engage with Native 
writing on the environment and with the actual words of Native peoples unfiltered by Anglos 
(particularly male non-Native environmental writers who certainly have a specific agenda and 
positionality) in order to forge their own, more active, conscious non-identifications because this 
is left unarticulated in Nabhan’s work. I argue that it would prove helpful if readers were 
encouraged to actively participate in forging their own non-identifications with Native texts, 
rather than be relatively passive witnesses to non-identifications. In this way, if the next step 
could be taken, if readers were encouraged to adopt conscious approaches of non-identifications 
and if active non-identifications with Native writing on the environment could take place, then 
readers could potentially be better positioned to listen rhetorically to the actual body of writing 
and the alternatives to Anthropocentrism and developmentalism long articulated by some—
although certainly not all—Indigenous peoples. The findings of my analysis of The Desert 
Smells Like Rain indicate that this next step of rhetorical listening, of more “genuine”
engagement and effective cross-cultural communication, is not yet happening within Nabhan’s writing—or contemporary non-Native, Anglo writing on the environment in general (as I will show in my conclusion to this chapter and in my final chapter).

**Possibilities for Active Non-Identification in Nabhan**

As I will elaborate on more fully in my final, following chapter, I contend that pausing for more active, conscious non-identification, followed (potentially) by rhetorical listening and improved cross-cultural communication with living Native peoples and authors, could possibly open possibilities for more appropriate, ethical, and ecologically egalitarian relationships to and conceptions of the natural world through the exploration of possible alternatives to Anthropocentrism and developmentalism. Although his primary strategy is to model non-identification for Anglo readers, Nabhan does plant the seeds of this kind of more active, conscious, participatory kind of non-identification. For example, after his acknowledgements, before the actual text of *The Desert Smells Like Rain*, Nabhan offers the following disclaimer to his readers:

> The fictitious Papago in the chapters which follow are composites of several people—a character is not intended to represent a particular real-life person. I’ve used this poetic license for two reasons. Individuals deserve privacy, and the *O’odham Himdag*, the Papago Way, is more encompassing than any one person’s knowledge. My friends generally prefer not to be singled out as ‘native experts.’ Likewise, I can neither ‘possess’ the desert, nor the knowledge they have shared. And despite the help of many Papago, nothing here is meant to convey an ‘official’ Papago viewpoint. (ix-x)
Here, one person does not stand in for an entire culture, for an entire way of life. The “Papago way” is too complex and sacred to be claimed by any one individual. In this understanding of the Papago way, and by articulating this understanding for his readers, Nabhan works against easy, trite, reductive stereotypes—such as typecasts of the “ecological Indian,” which are static, which foreclose the continual construction and re-construction of meaning. Instead, Nabhan creates a space where meanings, orientations, and a way of life could potentially be constantly listened to because these orientations are not static. Instead, they are shifting and ever-morphing, particularly because they are continually collectively constructed, and not represented by any one individual. This potentially creates opportunities for non-identifications to become more active and conscious, to be engaged in and continually re-engaged in. Further, readers are encouraged to make a space and listen for the collective, collaborative creation of the Papago way—and they are even encouraged to participate in its construction through their own making space and listening. By more actively non-identifying in this way, Nabhan potentially creates a synergistic relationship between audience and the Tohono O’odham in which meaning is constructed collectively (rather than possessed by any one individual), and in which the substance of the tribe—their way of living and being in the world, the Papago way—is neither completely consumed by readers, nor completely disavowed. Even though readers are not reminded that a stance of resisting possession and the collective creation of meaning described above by Nabhan is a conscious, active, continually assumed and re-assumed position, I believe in the above passage we see the very first seeds of a more active kind of non-identification in which white readers can potentially be more aware of their own stance of non-identification with Indigenous words, peoples, and eco-orientations.
Non-Identification in Barry Lopez’s *Arctic Dreams*

Critics and nature writing scholars have frequently mentioned Barry Lopez as an author of significance and influence. For example, the *San Francisco Chronicle* described Lopez as “the nation’s premier nature writer” (Baker). Lopez has also been noted by environmental historians (for example, Evernden 133 and 174), studied by environmental rhetoricians (such as Slovic 84 and Bergman 285), and anthologized by scholars of nature writing (such as Finch and Elder 839-856, Lyon 120 and 187, and Stewart xviii). As I explore in my analysis of *Arctic Dreams*, a hallmark of Lopez’s work is his ability to make space for the knowledge of Indigenous peoples, which is one of the ways he has influenced the genre of environmental writing in the United States. In fact, Lopez has made important contributions to nature writing by interweaving research with explorations of the natural world and spirituality, thus helping to further develop the genre’s increasingly hybrid nature in the 1980s.62

One of the ways that Lopez contributes to the hybridity of environmental writing in the United States is by insisting that Native peoples be listened to and non-identified with. Throughout *Arctic Dreams* Lopez consistently models non-identification with Native peoples for his readers. In my analysis I’ve found that Lopez primarily models non-identifications with Native inhabitants of the Arctic and their eco-orientations in three ways. These different strategies for encouraging readers to non-identify include: carefully and continually pointing out

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62 The range of Lopez’s work and the wide range of disciplines he incorporates into his writing also make him, like Nabhan, an apt example of the nature writing’s increasing diversity and hybridity beginning in the 1980s. For example, Lopez has published in multiple literary genres. In addition to *Arctic Dreams*—for which he received the National Book Award—Lopez is also the author of the non-fiction *Of Wolves and Men*, a National Book Award finalist and winner of the John Burroughs and Christopher medals—as well as eight works of fiction, including *Light Action in the Caribbean, Field Notes*, and *Resistance*. He has also written numerous essays, which are collected in two books, *Crossing Open Ground* and *About This Life*. His work has appeared in dozens of diverse anthologies, including *Best American Essays*, *Best Spiritual Writing*, and collections ranging from *National Geographic*, *Outside*, *The Georgia Review*, *The Paris Review*, and other periodicals (“Barry Lopez”).
how Native Americans, and Eskimos in particular, are part of and present in the landscape, by refusing to depict Native peoples as static and idealized constructs, and, finally, through his insistence that Indigen-knowledge occupy a place in his narrative of the Arctic. In short, these are the three strategies Lopez works to model non-identification with Native peoples.

Firstly, Lopez maintains throughout *Arctic Dreams* that Indigenous peoples are present in and an integral part of the landscape. In *Mixedblood Messages* Owens remarks on how conceiving of the American continent as “vast and empty” was the first step in appropriation and the apparent depopulation of the new world (8). Other Native authors— including Owens, Linda Hogan, and Leslie Marmon Silko, for example— have contrasted how white, Euro-Americans view wilderness as alien and empty, while Native peoples tend to view it as “intimate and always fully inhabited” by fellow plant and animal beings (Owens 8). Taking the latter view, throughout *Arctic Dreams* Lopez insists that, even in the most unforgiving of deserts, “nowhere is the land empty or underdeveloped” (411). Therefore, one of the important undercurrents of *Arctic Dreams* is that, if we look closely at the apparently barren, alien and inhospitable landscape of the Arctic, we will see that it is rife with life, significance, and meaning. Not only does this conception of the Arctic landscape work against Anthropocentrism, it also may potentially help

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63 Throughout *Arctic Dreams* Lopez uses the term “Eskimo” to refer to the native inhabitants of the land and islands surrounding the Arctic Ocean, from Greenland to Alaska. However, the Alaskan Native Language Center at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks has the following to say about the use of the term “Eskimo”: “Although the name ‘Eskimo’ is commonly used in Alaska to refer to all Inuit and Yupik people of the world, this name is considered derogatory in many other places because it was given by non-Inuit people and was said to mean “eater of raw meat.” Linguists now believe that ‘Eskimo’ is derived from an Ojibwa word meaning ‘to net snowshoes’. However, the people of Canada and Greenland prefer other names. ‘Inuit,’ meaning ‘people,’ is used in most of Canada” (Kaplan). Therefore, for the remainder of my analysis I will use the—admittedly overly general and all-encompassing—term “Inuit” to refer to the wide, disparate variety of Native peoples of the Arctic rim.

64 While also giving Western science, modern research, and Western historical perspectives their space in *Arctic Dreams*. In short, like Nabhan, Lopez also creates a hybrid genre by drawing from various Western and Indigenous ontologies, epistemologies, and eco-orientations. Modern scientific research from various disciplines (from anthropology to zoology) and Western history in the Arctic are just as prevalent in Arctic Dreams as Indigenous history and mythology, yet this hybrid strategy we saw in Nabhan’s work isn’t one of Lopez’s foremost strategies for non-identification. Therefore, I chose to highlight and focus here on three other ways that Lopez incites non-identification with Native peoples.
readers non-identify with the Native people who inhabit the teeming-with-life Arctic.

Essentially, in making space for all of life and for Native peoples, and by insisting that Native peoples are present, Lopez models non-identifications for his readers. Put differently, one of the ways that Lopez models non-identifications with Indigenous peoples of the Arctic is by making them part of the abundant life, landscape, and story of the Arctic. They are neither an inarticulate part of inert “Nature,” (which would be a kind of consubstantial identification) nor are they completely separate from the landscape and on the other side of the Nature/culture binary (a disidentification). Instead, they are a viable presence that deserves a pause filled with readers’ careful consideration. By presenting Native peoples as such, Lopez models non-identification for his non-Native readers.

Further, rather than an empty, barren land, by the middle of the prologue readers are able to recognize that the Arctic is inhabited not only be a plethora of wondrous creatures, but also by a proud and complex people who possess a “particular knowledge… garnered from hundreds of years of patient interrogation of the landscape” (7). The complexity of flora, fauna, and human life in the Arctic must have their space to be heard and must be carefully listened to, according to Lopez. Therefore, Lopez’s own stance, and the approach he models for his readers is one of non-identification towards Native inhabitants of the Arctic. Consequently, because Lopez insists that Native relationships to and perspectives on the land must be heard in all their complexity, a possible alternative to Western, Anthropocentric schemas is opened for Anglo readers.

This disruption of traditional Anthropocentric views in which humankind is singular and not a part of the natural world is also apparent in the fifth chapter of *Arctic Dreams*, titled “Migration.” In this chapter Lopez offers detailed accounts of how species—including numerous birds (for example, the snow geese to Tule and Labrador ducks to Arctic terns to the American
robin), the Arctic fox, lemmings, bowhead and beluga whales, polar bears, muskoxen, different kinds of salmon and seals, and walruses—move across the Arctic. After twenty-six pages of in-depth exploration of these species, and others, migratory habits and histories, Lopez then describes the complex history of humankind’s movement across the Arctic landscape (178).

Lopez’s detailed account of our species’ history in the far north and the migration of various tribes across the Arctic and around the Arctic Circle stretches all the way back (40,000 years) to Cro-Magnon man, and extends into the present. Not only does Lopez describe the land’s distinct periods of glaciation and the glacier’s effects on the migrations of animals and people, but he also describes the prehistoric movements of the Pre-Dorset, Dorset, Thule, and Punuk peoples (182-185), while simultaneously articulating each culture’s technological innovations and their unique way of adapting to the different landscapes they encountered on their migrations. For example, Lopez notes that the Thule “developed the dog-drawn sled and made sophisticated refinements in the harpoon technology of the Dorset,” and they also invented the umiak, “an open, walrus-or bearded seal-skin boat, about 30 feet long, sometimes fitted with a square sail and a single, stepped mast” (185). In fact, over twenty-five pages of this particular chapter (178-209) are devoted to describing the remarkably long, complex, interconnected movement of Native peoples across the Arctic.

Thus, this chapter is an assertion that, along with the long story of animal migration across the frozen plains and mountains, Native people are also an undeniable part of the history (and present) of the Arctic and the landscape. The implication is that the story of the Arctic cannot and should not be told without the history of human people as part of the environment. In other words, both human and animal stories need to be held up, articulated, reflected upon, explored, contemplated, and potentially listened to in order for Lopez’s readers to formulate a
more complete understanding of the land. In this way, by insisting that a Native presence in and relationship to a particular place be listened to, that differences not be glossed over or ignored, Lopez models non-identification for his white readers.

In other places, including two chapters later in the chapter “The Country of the Mind,” Lopez is even more explicit about insisting that Native peoples are an inseparable part of the Arctic landscape. For example, he writes, “Studies have revealed a long and remarkably unbroken connection between various groups of indigenous people and the particular regions of the Arctic they inhabit. It is impossible to separate their culture from these landscapes. The land is like a kind of knowledge traveling in time through them” (264). Again, the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic are part of the landscape. In telling the “story” of the Arctic, in telling the long and complex history of an oft-overlooked landscape, Lopez repeatedly maintains that the story of Native Arctic people also needs to be told, not as the only story or way-of-knowing, but as an integral part of that landscape’s story. In making space for potential differences and similarities, again Lopez models an approach of non-identification for his readers.

In addition to the purpose of illustrating how our species can come to re-discover our “at-home-ness” in the most foreign and unforgiving of environments, another of Lopez’s purposes for *Arctic Dreams* is to tell the story of the Arctic, using multiple epistemologies, orientations, and disciplines. By consistently pointing out how Inuit tribes are part of that story, Lopez insists that his audience first listen to and acknowledge Native peoples’ knowledge, history, and experience with the landscape—rather than consuming Native eco-orientations as part of their own substance, or disavowing them as irrelevant and therefore not part of the Arctic’s story. In modeling an approach of non-identification for readers, Lopez insists that his Anglo audience must recognize that Inuit peoples are an inseparable part of the land—something that can only be
achieved through non-identification, by pausing to better understand the similarities and differences in Inuit eco-orientations.

Additionally, in summarizing an interview with an Inuit man, Lopez writes, “Their minds, [the Inuit man] thought, shaped as they were to the specific contours of the land, could imagine it well enough to know what to do… Like most Eskimos, he could not grasp the meaning of a life divorced from the landscape” (265). Here Lopez models non-identification for his readers by holding up differences in the Inuit experience and Inuit eco-orientations for his audience to consider. Lopez does not insist that this particular orientation is accessible or consumable to his readers (a consubstantial identification); and he does not point out how inaccessible to a modern readership this orientation has become (a disidentification). Instead, Lopez offers up an alternative eco-orientation as a non-identification that readers should be aware of, contemplate seriously, and then identify with in whichever way they choose. In seeking this middle ground between the extremes of consubstantiality and disidentification, between exploitation and dismissal, Lopez is modeling non-identification.

Further, while possibilities for consubstantially remain accessible to Lopez’s audience throughout *Arctic Dreams*, in his insistence that Inuit peoples are present in and an inseparable part of the Arctic landscape, Lopez refuses to gloss over differences in Indigenous eco-orientations and modern, Western, predominantly Anthropocentric orientations. In this way, possibilities are opened, rather than foreclosed. For instance, Lopez reminds readers that,

> A fundamental difference between our culture and Eskimo culture… is that we have irrevocable separated ourselves from the world that animals occupy. We have turned all animals and elements of the natural world into objects. We manipulate them to serve complicated ends of our destiny. Eskimos do not grasp
this separation easily, and have difficulty imagining themselves entirely removed from the world of animals and the land. For many of them, to make this separation is analogous to cutting oneself off from light or water, from life. It is hard to imagine how to do it. (200)

Although Lopez’s overall project of exploring and illustrating for his audience how humankind can better fit into and be at home in a particular landscape is one of hope and possibilities, and although non-identification with Indigenous peoples and eco-orientations are an integral part of the possibilities inherent in this project, Lopez does not hammer down significant differences in lived experience and perspective between the dominant Western culture and many Inuit cultures. These differences must not be bridged, Lopez maintains, without understanding, critical examination, and reflection, however. The differences in eco-orientation Lopez outlines in the above excerpt should, ideally, be non-identified with, carefully considered and honestly engaged with—rather than consumed or completely disavowed, which would foreclose possibilities for developing more helpful and appropriate conceptions of environment. Thus, by maintaining that Native peoples’ understanding of themselves as part of the landscape is worthwhile to both the story of the Arctic and to the future of humankind, and by reinforcing this perspective, Lopez models non-identification with Inuit peoples and the eco-orientations they espouse. In short, by modeling non-identification for his Anglo readers, possibilities are potentially opened rather than foreclosed (which is often the case when readers gravitate toward consubstantiality or disidentification).

However, in the above excerpt and throughout *Arctic Dreams*, white readers could remain unaware of the efficacy and ethical implications of opening up space for Native peoples and eco-orientations and engaging with these perspectives in a non-proprietary and non-
dismissive way. Readers could passively watch this approach of non-identification as Lopez undertakes it; but then the non-identifications could end as readers are not encouraged to carry this conscious making-of-space forward. And again, as we saw in Nabhan, everything is filtered through Lopez. Anglo readers are still at one remove and are subject to Lopez’s interpretation of what he sees as Indigenous knowledge of environment and Native eco-orientations.

In addition to pointing out how they are an inseparable part of the landscape, another strategy Lopez uses to model a stance of non-identification with Inuit tribes is often purposefully refusing to idealize the Native peoples of the Arctic. For instance, he describes his arrival at the following realization: “Lying there in the tent, I knew, as does everyone I think who spends some time hunting with Eskimos, that they are not idyllic people, errorless in the eyes of God. But they are a people, some of them, still close to the earth, maintaining the rudiments of an ancient philosophy of accommodation with it that we have abandoned” (40). By presenting the Inuit as neither a relic of time forgotten, nor as an idealization, as irrelevant, Lopez articulates instances in which his audience can both disidentify and potentially identify with Native peoples. The Natives Lopez describes here are not perfect; therefore, there are differences and opportunities for disidentification that should not be glossed over. However, the way many Inuit continue to live can offer Lopez’s readers possibilities for eco-orientations more reverent of, “in tune” with, and more accommodating to the natural world. Although white readers cannot claim the same ecocentric substance as the Inuit (and certainly cannot claim it as a totalizing, undifferentiated consubstantiality because modern, developmentalist, Anthropocentric culture has “abandoned” it) there are ways that non-Native readers can listen to Inuit conceptions of their environment (of course filtered through Lopez) across commonalities and differences, in order to potentially arrive at a more ethical, less psychologically and physically destructive way of being in the
world. Put another way, Lopez maintains here that there are aspects of Inuit culture non-Native readers can disidentify with: readers do not need to claim comprehensive consubstantiality in order for more appropriate and perhaps ethical eco-orientations to be considered. Lopez seems to be insisting that differences or disidentifications, as well as productive possibilities and opportunities for un-coercive consubstantiality, can potentially exist at the same time, as mutually interdependent conditions. Therefore, the most appropriate, ethical, and useful approach is one of non-identification, which Lopez models for his non-Native readers.

However, readers do not get the actual words of Native peoples, nor are they encouraged to engage with the actual words of Inuits who have long articulated an alternative, comparatively more ecocentric relationship with landscape. All is filtered through and interpreted by Lopez. Therefore, non-identifications can potentially remain passive on the part of readers. White readers may also remain unaware of their non-identifications with Native peoples. In other words, readers’ stance of non-identification could remain unconsciously undertaken because Lopez does not ask readers to bring their non-consuming and non-disavowing approach to Native peoples into the light of conscious consideration. Instead, by modeling non-identification, Anglo readers can semi-consciously understand non-identification and see the value in the approach; however, they do not have to actively, consciously assume a position of non-identification. Essentially, while non-identification is modeled, readers can remain relatively passive, oblivious observers and they can remain in their comfort zone—a space and a positionality which is not ideal for challenging readers to address and potentially move beyond the Anthropocentric and developmentalist status quo. Essentially, although modeling non-identification is an improvement over the disidentifications of the mid-nineteenth century and consubstantial identifications of the mid-twentieth century, the approach of modeling non-
identification for readers is still not ideal for truly “genuine” engagement or ethical, appropriate, effective, and potentially transformative cross-cultural communication.

Toward the conclusion of his chapter “Migration” Lopez offers another instance in which he refuses to idealize the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic. Here he cautions,

It is wrong to think of hunting cultures like the Eskimo’s as living in perfect harmony or balance with nature. Their regard for animals and their attentiveness to nuance in the landscape were not rigorous or complete enough to approach an idealized harmony. No one knew that much. No one would say they knew that much. They faced nature with fear, with ilira (nervous awe) and kappia (apprehension). And with enthusiasm. (201)

Again, we see that what understanding the complex affinity and relationship Inuit people have with their homeland offers audiences is not a perfect epitomization of the “ecological Indian” living in perfect harmony with a pristine Nature—which, of course, would be reductive and an unethical, inaccurate, and ultimately not useful over-simplification (one we often saw in Snyder, Hay, and sometimes Thoreau’s writings, for example). Instead, here Lopez offers his audience a middle ground between idealization (a kind of consubstantiality in which one wants to be like and consume the total substance of another) and dis-association (in which one finds nothing of value in another’s position, and therefore completely disidentifies with that individual’s perspective, with their substance, and with the individual themselves). It is only through an approach of non-identification—which Lopez models here in his refusing to idealize Native peoples—that both differences and commonalities can come to light, be reflected upon, and can potentially be developed into productive possibilities.
In fact, Lopez is often quite clear about his own ability to view both differences and commonalities between Inuit ways of life and his own more Western orientation toward the land and its animal inhabitants. In this way, he models inhabiting the middle ground of non-identification for his white, non-Native readers. For example, Lopez writes in his epilogue,

> When you travel with [the Inuit], their voluminous and accurate knowledge, their spiritual and technical confidence, expose what is insipid and groundless in your own culture. I brood often about hunting. It is the most spectacular and succinct expression of the Eskimo’s relationship with the land, yet one of the most perplexing and disturbing for the outsider to consider. With the compelling pressures of a cash-based economy to contend with, and the ready availability of modern weapons, hunting practices have changed. Many families still take much of their food from the land, but they do it differently now. (409)

In Lopez’s estimation, the Inuit’s subsistence, hunting-dependent way of life is both venerable and disturbing. In articulating the perspective above, Lopez is aware of his own positionality as a Westerner, as a non-Native outsider. From such a position, it is best to non-identify: to learn what one can across potential similarities (the venerable) and differences (the disturbing). In addition, constructing his positionality as an observer makes an approach of non-identification possible by inserting a pause between the extremes of consubstantiation and disidentification. Further, this approach and modeling of non-identification better affords Lopez the opportunity for agency in the identification process because he may be better able to consciously choose what to consubstantially identify with and what to potentially dis-identify with, as well as (hypothetically) a whole range of possibilities in between. White, non-Native readers are
implicitly encouraged to also non-identify; however, they are not encouraged to consciously, consistently forge their own active non-identifications.

Further, this approach of non-identification is available not only to Lopez and his Anglo readers as observers, however. At least theoretically, in a genuine condition of mutual interdependence and non-identification, the possibilities for agency throughout the identification process are also open to Native people. In a stance of non-identification, the potential for engagement and transformation as well as for generative, mutually-interdependent discourse exists from all positions. Therefore, in the excerpt quoted above, the acknowledgment of both similarities and differences may potentially better create opportunities for productive cross-cultural communication—and for the parties involved to engage their own agency throughout the identification process. Similarities and differences are both valuable. In fact, it is only by pointing out and acknowledging differences that shortcomings in one’s own orientation can be realized. Put another way, both prospective similarities and disturbing differences may offer readers a way to critique their own culture and positionality.

Additionally, in the final two sentences of the quote cited above, we again see Lopez’s refusal to depict the static, oversimplified, stereotypical, eco-Indian—an image that Anglo readers, especially of the environmentalist persuasion, can too easily consubstantially identify with in a wholesale fashion (and therefore inhabit easily and own). Instead, in depicting Inuit culture as adaptable and surviving in the modern world of “cash-based econom[ies]” Lopez is again insisting that possible similarities and differences, the venerable and disturbing, are both valuable. Consequently, by consistently refusing to idealize Native peoples as a romanticized, static icon of environmentalism of a bygone age (as we saw in Hay, for example), Lopez continues to cultivate an approach of non-identification so that readers can more accurately
examine their own implication in the dominant, ecologically destructive Anthropocentric paradigm—and thereby perhaps develop more useful and appropriate eco-orientations.

However, the need for non-identification is still left implicit in the passage quoted above. Lopez models this consideration of similarities and differences, but he does not make it explicit or actively call for this approach. Anglo, non-Native readers are not encouraged to forge their own relationships with the actual words of Native people, nor are they encouraged to make their approach of non-identification with the indigenous inhabitants of the Arctic conscious. Therefore, white readers can see how non-identification works; yet, their own non-identifications could remain passive and semi- or sub-conscious, which is problematic because it is then all too easy for readers to slip into “easy,” normative stereotypes and hence positions of consubstantiality or disavowal.

The final strategy I’ll examine in this section that Lopez uses to encourage stances of non-identification towards Native peoples is by constantly articulating and exhibiting a respect for Indigen-knowledge throughout *Arctic Dreams*. In fact, I believe one of Lopez’s more prominent purposes in *Arctic Dreams* is to demonstrate what his predominantly Anglo, non-Native audience can intimate from Native eco-orientations and from Traditional Ecological Knowledge, or TEK. In short, traditional ecological knowledge encompasses indigenous, aboriginal, and other forms of “traditional” epistemologies regarding sustainability, biodiversity, and resource management and conservation. TEK refers to "a cumulative body of knowledge, belief, and practice, evolving by accumulation of TEK and handed down through generations through traditional songs, stories and beliefs. [It concerns] the relationship of living beings (including human) with their traditional groups and with their environment" (Berkes, et all 1251). In recent decades, and since the publication of *Arctic Dreams*, the academic community
has largely come to terms with the fact that “Indigenous groups offer alternative knowledge and perspectives based on their own locally developed practices and resource use” (1251). In short—often, although certainly not always—Native peoples may possibly articulate alternatives to the ecologically destructive Anthropocentric and developmentalist contemporary norm. Because he continually asserts that Native peoples are integral to a particular landscape and their culture is so intertwined with and constructed by that landscape Lopez is one of the vanguards for valuing this kind of Indigen-knowledge or TEK. Throughout *Arctic Dreams* Lopez insists that, along with historical accounts from Anglo-Europeans as well as modern scientific research, Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) also needs to be listened to and non-identified with if the comprehensive, most accurate and valuable story of the Arctic is to be told, and if humankind is to truly understand and come to be more at home in this seemingly inhospitable environment.

In fact, quite frequently, Lopez is critical of Westerners who disparage Indigenous knowledge of place. For example, he criticizes the shortsightedness of nineteenth century whalers as follows:

The sophistication the whalers felt next to the Eskimo was a false sophistication, and presumptuous. The European didn’t value the Eskimo’s grasp of the world. And, however clever Eskimos might be with ivory implements and waterproof garments, he thought their techniques dated or simply quaint next to his own… They were people to be taken mild but harmless advantage of, to be chastised like children, but not to be taken seriously. (7)

Here Lopez laments the fact that the ancestors of contemporary Anglo-Europeans disparaged and disregarded the more physical and practical, as well as the more philosophical, value of TEK. By pointing out the error in this approach, Lopez is setting his Anglo audience up to make space for
his articulation of Indigenous knowledge and eco-orientations. Put another way, by pointing out the error of previous generations and by potentially creating a disruption in the dominant, Anthropocentric, heroic-Anglo-explorer narrative Lopez is simultaneously creating space for Indigenous knowledge and orientations to be non-identified with. It is only by creating this open space between ownership and dismissal, and by insisting on a reflective pause where listening can take place, that a stance of non-identification can potentially be assumed in which Native eco-orientations and epistemologies can be engaged with—thus potentially offering alternatives to the dominant Anthropocentric and developmentalist norm.

Five chapters and over one hundred pages later Lopez again critiques the West’s refusal to acknowledge the value of TEK. In the chapter “The Country of the Mind” he criticizes modern ecology, science, and the scientific research and publication process when he writes,

A belief in the authority of statistics and the dismissal of Eskimo narratives as only ‘anecdotal’ is a dichotomy one encounters frequently in arctic environmental assessment reports. Statistics, of course, may be manipulated… The Eskimo’s stories are politely dismissed… What the uninitiated scientist in the Arctic lacks is not ideas about how the land works, or a broad theoretical knowledge of how the larger pieces fit together, but time in the field, prolonged contact with the specific sources of an understanding. (270)

In short, modern Western man’s brief stays in the Arctic and his exclusive reliance on the methods, discourse, and rationality-based epistemologies of modern Science are not enough to understand and tell the story of the Arctic in any kind of complete way. By pointing these limitations out, Lopez is again making space for Indigen-wisdom. He is inserting a wedge in the traditional Western-scientific paradigm and the dominant narrative about the Arctic, which
potentially creates a space for differences, different narratives and epistemologies, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge to be non-identified with, and consequently potentially valued. Therefore, through making space for Indigenous conceptions of environment, by more honestly and openly engaging with alternatives to Anthropocentrism, and by resisting totalizing consubstantial identifications and dismissive disidentifications with Indigenous worldviews, audiences may potentially develop more useful and appropriate conceptions of and relationships with the natural world, conceptions that are other than Anthropocentric and developmentalist. Therefore, essentially what Lopez is doing in the above passage is navigating the space between consubstantiality (by refusing to claim that readers and Western scientists can be consubstantial with Inuit due to the fact that the Inuit have lived with the landscape for countless generations and tens of thousands of years) and an approach of disidentification (in pointing out how disidentifications or “polite dismissals” of Indigen-knowledge of TEK is not helpful) and modeling a stance of non-identification for readers.

However, in this passage and in the larger context of the chapter, readers do not get the actual words of Native peoples. In addition, the careful, conscious carving out of space for Indigenous eco-orientations that Lopez develops in this passage could leave white, non-Native readers unaware that they also need to consciously, purposefully, and critically carve out space for Indigenous conceptions of and relationships to a particular landscape. In short, readers could passively witness non-identification, yet their own stance of non-identification with Native words and peoples could remain dormant, inactive, and largely passive. And again, we get supposed Native eco-orientations and relationships with a particular landscape filtered through Lopez.
As we have seen, a consistent thread throughout *Arctic Dreams* is the esteem in which Lopez holds Native people, their wisdom, and the at-home-ness in the landscape they have culturally constructed and maintained through language and through TEK. In fact, Lopez contends that the knowledge of how to live well and how to live right in a particular landscape is a timeless wisdom that survives failed human economies. It survives war. It survives definition. It is a nameless wisdom esteemed by all people. It is understanding how to live a decent life, how to behave properly toward other people and toward the land. It is, further, a wisdom not owned by anyone, nor about which one culture is more insightful or articulate. (298)

In other words, the wisdom Native peoples have garnered through intelligence, patience, careful observation, and thoughtful communion with a particular landscape over millennia endures and should be acknowledged by the dominant culture. Additionally, Lopez’s insistence that this is not exclusive to one culture, to one people, creates possibilities for collective re-invention of new eco-orientations, and it opens the potential for his audience to engage with—rather than consume or completely disidentify with—more ethical and appropriate eco-orientations. By contending that the wisdom that comes with being “at home” in a particular landscape is not the property of any one cultural tradition, while simultaneously insisting that total consubstantiality with traditional Indigenous knowledge is not possible, Lopez opens up a middle ground and thereby models an approach of non-identification for his readers. However, even in this final example in which Lopez models non-identification, the actual words of Native peoples are not engaged with and readers are not asked to consciously adopt a stance that rejects the disavowal and the consuming of substance, in this case the substance of Indigenous eco-orientations. Essentially, as in all the passages thus far analyzed, Indigenous peoples of the Arctic remain silent on their own
eco-orientations, and Anglo, non-Native readers could watch the non-identification process without taking conscious part in it themselves.

Possibilities for Active Non-Identification in Lopez

As important as modeling non-identification is in that it is more respectful of cultural similarities as well as differences, I argue that it would be helpful if audiences were encouraged to form more active identifications with the actual words of Native peoples. It would also be more helpful if non-Native readers were encouraged to make their stances of non-identification with Native peoples and Indigenous eco-orientations more conscious endeavors, thereby assuming a greater degree of agency and responsibility in the identification process. Despite the fact that, by and large, Lopez models non-identifications with Native eco-orientations for his white readers which could leave non-identifications semi- or subconscious while also leaving readers passive subjects of the non-identification process, there are seeds of more active forms of non-identification being planted in *Arctic Dreams*. For instance, Lopez writes,

> We could help each other. [The Inuit’s] traditional philosophy is insistent on the issue of ethical behavior toward animals. Within the spirit of this tradition and within the European concept of compassionate regard may lie the threads of a modern realignment with animals. We need an attitude of enlightened respect which will make both races feel more ethically at ease with animals, more certain of following a dignified course in the years ahead, when the animals will still be without a defense against us. (53)

By respecting and non-identifying with Indigenous knowledge, Lopez offers his Anglo readers a middle ground in which they have the agency to choose what is most ethical and most in
accordance with the Natural world from each culture—from both Indigenous and Anglo orientations. By neither completely consubstantially identifying with one culture or one eco-orientation nor by completely disidentifying with Western or Indigenous perspectives—in other words, by undertaking a stance of non-identification—a middle ground can be explored. Put differently, through non-identification, Lopez implicitly maintains, his audience and humankind can choose a new way and create potentially more ethical and useful eco-orientations for the future by drawing from multiple cultural traditions. In this middle ground of non-identification, differences and similarities are not impossibilities, but rather opportunities for rhetorical listening and effective cross-cultural communication, for invention, for the creation of a new way.

Moreover, the “attitude of enlightened respect” (122) that Owens calls for could potentially point to more active non-identifications, non-appropriative and non-disavowing non-identifications that readers are cognizant of and consciously assume. It is important that this “attitude of enlightened respect” be undertaken consciously and with agency on the part of readers because it is an attitude, a stance, an active approach of non-identification that needs to be constantly re-established and re-assumed, rather than taken for granted.

However, while the seeds of a more active kind of non-identification are being planted, we still do not hear from Native peoples, nor are Anglo readers encouraged to seek out Indigenous words and texts. Readers must still rely exclusively on Lopez’s interpretation. Therefore, Indigenous eco-orientations still are not listened to rhetorically or engaged with in a respectful, honest, ethical, “genuine” way, and productive, effective, and ethical cross-cultural communication has yet to be achieved.
In the conclusion to the chapter “The Country of the Mind” Lopez again plants the seeds of a more active kind of non-identification. In fact, he goes so far as to theorize what seems like non-identification near the end of the book so that his audience better understands the active non-identificatory approach they are encouraged to adopt. As Lopez brings to a close his in-depth exploration of the animal and human life of the Arctic and what the landscape means to the past, present, and future of humankind, he offers his readers an implicit theorization of non-identification. He writes in the conclusion of his chapter, “The Country of the Mind,”

I thought about the great desire among friends and colleagues and travelers who meet on the road, to share what they know, what they have seen and imagined. Not to have a shared understanding [a consubstantial identification], but to share what one has come to understand. In such an atmosphere of mutual regard, in which each can roll out his or her maps with no fear of contradiction [a kind of disidentification], of suspicion, or theft, it is possible to imagine the long, graceful strides of human history. [emphasis mine] (300-301)

What Lopez articulates here is a frame of mind, a way of being, a rhetorical stance, and a way of communicating in which productive, illuminating differences are not erased in a hegemonic compulsion toward similarity, but voiced and respected by all participants and co-constructors of meaning. This is what non-identification essentially entails, and, I believe, what Ratcliffe envisions when she articulates the need for non-identification if rhetorical listening and cross-cultural communication are to be achieved. Here we see that Lopez believes that this approach, this stance of non-identification, is essential for “genuine” understanding of human history, as well as for understanding how we as a species have been shaped by landscape. Thus, Lopez implicitly (because, of course, he does not use the rhetorical theory term “non-identification”)
asserts that a stance of active non-identification is necessary for greater comprehension of our “right,” ethical place in the natural world. In turn, the stance of non-identification is necessary for re-making the alienating, ecologically destructive, and unethical, yet dominant eco-orientations of modern Anthropocentric and developmentalist culture. In the excerpt above Lopez is calling for his readers to actively assume a position of non-identification. By calling attention to this position of non-appropriative and non-disavowing pause for consideration and reflection, Lopez’s white readers may potentially be made more aware of their non-identifications with Native peoples and eco-orientations. And even though we still don’t hear from Native peoples and so must still rely on Lopez’s interpretation, this awareness, this process of bringing non-identification into the light, is a positive step on the way towards rhetorical listening and more effective, ethical, and appropriate cross-cultural communication.

Chapter Conclusions

As we have seen throughout the analysis in this chapter, the primary stance Nabhan and Lopez encourage their readers to adopt towards Native peoples and Indigenous eco-orientations is non-identification, a significant and prominent identificatory approach in the 1980s towards Native peoples within the context of environmental writing in the United States by Anglo, non-Natives. In fact, Nabhan and Lopez model non-identification for their readers with an increasingly complex Native—a trend that develops in the nature writing of the 1980s. A seeking of a middle ground, the effort to encourage audiences to listen across commonalities and differences, and the purposeful pause of non-identification with Native peoples that was taking place throughout American nature writing of the 1980s certainly extends beyond Nabhan and Lopez. For example, Anne Zwinger also uses this approach towards Indigenous peoples in her 1986 book *Wind in the*
In addition, Pulitzer Prize winning poet and narrative prose author Annie Dillard also forges non-identifications with Native peoples in *Teaching a Stone to Talk* (published in 1982). In her first chapter, “An Expedition to the Pole,” for instance, Dillard juxtaposes Inuit intelligence, ability to adapt, ingenuity, and adeptness with early Arctic explorers extremely inept, shortsighted, bungling, and plain misguided initial excursions into the frozen north (26-29). This shows us that the strategy of non-identification with Anglo perceptions of Native peoples and Indigenous eco-orientations extended beyond Nabhan and Lopez in the 1980s. Yet, it is clear that both Nabhan and Lopez rely on different strategies to model these non-identifications between their audiences and Native peoples. While Nabhan uses the unknown, hybridity, the supposed voices of the Papago, and the mythology and oral traditions of a particular tribe, Lopez employs a repeated insistence that the Inuit are present in and part of the landscape, a refusal to idealize the Inuit, and an esteem for Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) to model non-identifications for white readers.

These various strategies mean that the identification process itself is becoming increasingly complex in the 1980s as the genre also becomes more hybrid in nature, drawing from different epistemologies. The increasing complexity of the identification process and the increasing complexity of non-identification strategies in particular make sense at a time when the genre itself is becoming increasingly diversified, drawing from a wider array of authors, including more diverse voices, and drawing from an eclectic range of disciplines and epistemologies. In addition, the approach of non-identification in all its complexities also makes sense at a time when Native peoples themselves were asserting their rights of sovereignty, their rights to be understood as and to exist as Native peoples, neither completely assimilated and absorbed into the mainstream culture (a consubstantiality) nor as a relic of a bygone past,
irrelevant and non-existent in the present (a disidentification). In short, given the cultural and political context provided at the beginning of this chapter, by what was occurring in Native communities during the 1980s, the modeling of non-identification by Anglo-American authors of the late 1980s made sense and could have even been expected by readers. And yet, there are also instances when both Nabhan and Lopez move beyond modeling non-identification to planting the seeds of a more active and a more conscious approach of active non-identification that calls for cognizance, agency, and responsibility on the part of white readers.

Essentially, an approach that encourages readers to cultivate active, conscious non-identifications with Native peoples and Indigenous eco-orientations may potentially prove a productive strategy for challenging and moving beyond the Anthropocentric and developmentalist norms. However, as I will further illustrate in the following chapter, Anglo environmental authors continue to be stuck in a rut of modeling non-identification, which could all too often leave readers unawares of their own responsibility to engage in an approach of non-identification. While non-identification seems to be the most ethical with respect towards Native peoples and the alternative eco-orientations they have vivified and articulated for millennia (especially when compared to the other iterations of identifications examined in chapters two and three), and it is the kind of identification that has, thus far, proven the most respectful of cultural differences and similarities, there is still work to be done on the part of writers and readers of environmental literature. While I believe that an approach of non-identification with Indigenous peoples and eco-orientations should continue within the context of environmental writing in the United States, I argue it would be helpful if environmental writers could encourage Anglo, non-Native readers to become more aware of their non-identifications with Native peoples, rather than modeling non-identification, which could still leave readers passive and unaware.
This passivity and unconscious level of non-identification is problematic because if non-identifications are unconscious, readers could potentially slip back into less helpful, ethical, and appropriate forms of identification, including prevalent stereotypes as well as disidentifications and consubstantial identifications with Native peoples. Further, because Ratcliffe theorizes a stance of conscious, purposeful, assumed and constantly re-assumed non-identification as essential to rhetorical listening and eventually, potentially effective cross-cultural communication, this passive form of non-identification that is still occurring in Anglo environmental writing with regard to Native peoples is problematic. It is not ideal for rhetorical listening, which I contend is still not happening with regard to Native peoples and eco-orientations primarily because—while non-identifications are a more positive step in the history of Anglo nature writers turning to Native Americans—non-identifications still remain all too passive.

By comparison, a more active non-identification on the part of audiences could occur if readers were made more aware of their purposeful, conscious stance of non-identification. More active non-identifications could also be entered into if readers were encouraged to read, non-identify with, and engage with the actual words on Native people on their own terms, rather than through the filter of Anglo, non-Native environmental authors. Therefore, the next step in the non-identification process is for readers to actively forge their own conscious non-identifications with Native eco-orientations, Indigenous environmental ethics, and Indigenous conceptions of and relationships to place by turning to the words of Native peoples, by turning to Native authors. Nabhan and Lopez offer us a start to potentially developing more ethical and appropriate relationships with the natural world by modeling non-identification with Native peoples. However, it would be helpful if non-identification could be critiqued and complicated so that it
becomes a more conscious and active process, and one that could also take place between an individual and a text, rather than relying on particular interpretations. As identifications with Native peoples within the context of Anglo writing on the environment become more complex and increasingly more respective of cultural differences and similarities, this could be a productive, helpful next step.
As we have seen throughout this dissertation, Anglo-American environmental writers have constructed different kinds of identifications with Native peoples dependent on political and historical context for over a century and a half, since the inception of American nature writing. Although there have been missteps along the way, including unethical and inappropriate identifications, over time, this identification process with Indigenous Americans has developed to include different kinds of identifications that are potentially more respective of similarities and differences, and a wider range of possibilities in between, identifications that seem to be increasingly more conducive to cross-cultural communication. This shows us that Anglo-American nature writers have, in the past, encouraged readers to move beyond the current, historical status quo, towards kinds of identifications that are more effective and ethical with regards to cross-cultural communication, a trend that should continue into the future. However, as I pointed out in the previous chapter and as I hope to further illustrate in this concluding chapter, for approximately the last twenty years the process of identification with Indigenous peoples has been stalled in the strategy of modeling non-identification for readers. This status quo of modeling non-identification is problematic because white readers can remain unaware of their position of non-identification, which, in turn, is problematic because in order for rhetorical listening and effective cross-cultural communication to be achieved, according to Ratcliffe, readers need to be continually, consciously, ever-vigilant of their always-adaptive and dynamic position of non-identification. This is why I believe non-identification also has to be critiqued.
and complicated to the point where Anglo readers of American nature writing are more conscious of their own non-identifications with Native peoples. As we saw in the introductory chapter, theorists since the modern and postmodern traditions have worked to bring the identification process into the light, or to make subjects increasingly aware of their identifications—a step which it would be helpful if Anglo-American environmental writers could take regarding the kinds of relationships they are constructing for their readers with Native peoples.

To help towards this objective, to make my case more completely, and to give environmental writers some specific, concrete direction toward the objective of encouraging readers toward more appropriate and ethical identifications with Native Americans, this final chapter is organized into four sections. Together these sections that make the case for listening, suggest that listening is not yet occurring, and provide ways that more active non-identifications can be adopted, thus enabling better listening. In my first section, I draw from Indigenous scholars and authors who have made the case that the wide array of Indigenous conceptions of and relationships to the natural world need to be carefully and responsibly listened to and responsibly engaged. Essentially, this establishes why more careful, responsible, thoughtful listening needs to take place with the plethora of perspective often articulated by Native writers. Next, in the second section, I remind readers what rhetorical listening is and what it involves so we can better understand how to possibly get closer to this objective. Then, in the third section, I offer evidence suggesting that in too many instances rhetorical listening is not yet happening in twenty-first century Anglo-American environmental writing. Then, in this same section, I offer my critique of Ratcliffe’s theorization of rhetorical listening so that we can understand how and why non-identification needs to be critiqued and complicated to include the ways that individuals
can non-identify with texts from different cultures. And finally, in my fourth section, I offer three specific ways readers can be encouraged to develop more active stances of non-identification, which I contend could help Anglo, non-Native readers listen rhetorically to Native peoples, thereby potentially helping readers develop more appropriate relationships with the natural world.

In essence, my hope is that by the end of this final chapter my readers will have a better idea of what non-Native, Anglo environmental writers can do to help readers actively non-identify with and thus listen rhetorically to Indigenous peoples, thereby potentially opening possibilities for more effective, ethical cross-cultural communication and thereby potentially challenging the long tradition of problematic and too often unproductive identifications with “the Native” in Anglo-American nature writing. But before we define rhetorical listening and explore the specific possibilities for more active non-identifications, it would help to hear from Native writers, scholars, and researchers who have made the case for listening to Indigenous eco-orientations, environmental ethics, and Indigenous conceptions of and relationships with particular landscapes. In other words, it would help if we turned to the words of Native peoples to better understand what we are trying to better engage with and listen to and why.

**Why Ethically Engage and Listen? To What?**

As research has shown and as Native peoples have themselves insisted for centuries, some—although certainly not all—Indigenous Americans often articulate alternative environmental orientations and alternative relationships with landscape. For example, anthropologists Baird Callicott and Michael Nelson demonstrate that in many instances Indigenous peoples,\(^6\)

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\(^6\) In Callicott and Nelson’s study titled *American Indian Environmental Ethics: An Ojibwa Case Study*, specifically the Ojibwa people.
Indigenous mythologies, and oral traditions express an environmental ethic and a relationship with place that differs from Western, non-Native eco-orientations (136). In addition, as further evidence of this alternative Native conception of the natural world, natural resource scientists Berkes, Colding, and Folke point out that, in their study of Traditional Ecological Knowledge (or TEK), “Indigenous groups offer alternative knowledge and perspectives based on their own locally developed practices of resource use” (1251). And, as Native peoples themselves have insisted in various fiction and non-fiction genres for centuries, they often understand and exhibit an alternative, interconnected, interdependent, and egalitarian relationship to place, to particular landscapes and to the totality of life—animate and inanimate—found there (for example, as N. Scott Momaday does in his chapter “An American Land Ethic” [The Man Made of Words 42] and in The Way to Rainy Mountain [8], as Linda Hogan does in Dwellings [20], and as Winona LaDuke does throughout the section of The Winona LaDuke Reader entitled “Native Environmentalism” [12-130]). So essentially, what anthropologists, environmental scientists, and certain Native people themselves have shown is that many Indigenous cultures articulate alternatives to Anthropocentrism and developmentalism, alternatives that are frequently (although not always) more appropriate, ethical, and egalitarian conceptions of and relationships to the natural world—alternatives that I contend could prove helpful, if not essential, to non-Native peoples as our current state of ecological crisis becomes increasingly manifest. Therefore, it would help if we could open possibilities by listening to Native peoples and more effectively and ethically engage Native writing on the environment.

In fact, contemporary Native authors and scholars have often articulated the need for “mainstream” Western, Anglo culture to listen and engage with Indigenous conceptions of and
relationship to the natural world. For example, Louis Owens writes in his collection of essays *Mixedblood Messages*,

> Ultimately, we have to realize, along with Luther Standing Bear, that there is no emptiness in this world unless we create it, and that when that happens not only does our environment become more fragile, but we are forever cut off from a part of our inheritance as living beings in richly interconnected web of life… Such closeness of vision, reciprocity, and respect are powerful medicines, the only medicines that may, perhaps, save humanity from itself. *This is a lesson Native Americans and all indigenous peoples really do have to teach, and it is time the world began to listen carefully.* [emphasis mine] (236)

What Owens is insisting on is the necessity of listening to, engaging with on a profound and ethical level, and learning from the alternative eco-orientations of Native peoples—which Owens believes is not yet happening (a belief I agree with and will provide evidence for in this final chapter).

Along similar lines, Kiowa author N. Scott Momaday also articulates the need for Anglo, non-Native readers to listen to, better understand, and work towards developing a land ethic that is more in line with Native relationships with landscape. Momaday articulates the need for better listening and learning when, in his oft-quoted essay “An American Land Ethic,” he writes,

> It would seem on the surface of things that a land ethic is something that is alien to, or at least dormant in, most Americans. Most of us have developed an attitude of indifference toward the land… But in Ko-sahn [a Kiowa elder] and her people we have always had the example of a deep, ethical regard for the land. We had better learn from it. Surely that ethic is merely latent in ourselves. It must now be
activated, I believe. We Americans must come again to a moral comprehension of the earth and air. We must live according to the principle of a land ethic. The alternative is that we shall not live at all. (48-49)

What Owens and Momaday are both articulating is the need to learn from and listen to Native people, particularly where Indigenous relationship to landscape and to their alternative, non-Western eco-orientations are concerned. And, further, what both authors articulate is the need for “genuine,” ethical, and effective engagement, engagement that is non-consuming and non-appropriative and non-disavowing. In other words, from a rhetorical theory point of view, there is a need for non-Native Anglos to rhetorically listen to Native peoples’ alternative eco-orientations.

As we have seen in this dissertation, Anglo-American environmental writers have been engaging Native peoples in their writing in different ways for at least two centuries. More specifically, as we have also seen, white nature writers have encouraged their readers to construct different kinds of identifications with Native Americans, identifications that have grown increasingly more respective of both similarities and differences and the possibilities in between, to the point where non-Native nature writers reached the point of modeling non-identification for their readers in the late 1980s. Ratcliffe theorizes non-identification as a necessary step towards rhetorical listening and productive, ethical cross-cultural conduct and communication. However, despite taking the step of modeling non-identification for readers in the late 1980s, environmental writers are still not listening rhetorically or encouraging readers towards rhetorical listening. Or, in other words, Anglo-American writers are still not encouraging their audiences to engage in an ethical, open, “genuine” way with Native peoples or with the wide array of Indigenous conceptions of place and landscape.
The current state of our threatened environment seems to demand that possibilities need to be opened for listening to and engaging with many Native peoples’ eco-orientations, but given our problematic past and our troubled history of identifications with Native peoples as evidenced in this dissertation, how can we engage ethically, appropriately, and responsibly? The work of this dissertation suggests that, even though Anglo environmental writers have taken positive steps in identifying with Native peoples by developing identifications that are increasingly more respective of cultural differences and similarities over time, and while my analysis in the previous chapter suggests that encouraging a stance of non-identification is a positive step, we are not yet there.

Writing on the natural world has historically helped readers formulate more appropriate conceptions of environment. And yet, Anglo environmental writers are still failing to identify with Indigenous peoples in ethical and effective ways, and they are still failing to listen rhetorically to Indigenous peoples—which is ultimately counterproductive to the purposes of American nature writing of challenging Anthropocentric and developmentalist paradigms and of helping readers formulate more appropriate and ethical conceptions of environment. So, what is rhetorical listening, how can it help in this endeavor, and how can it help in the context of engaging with Native peoples in American nature writing?

Towards an Understanding of Rhetorical Listening

In her book *Rhetorical Listening: Identification, Gender, Whiteness* Krista Ratcliffe theorizes non-identification as a means to the objective of rhetorical listening, followed—ideally—by productive, ethical cross-cultural conduct and communication. Put differently, in Ratcliffe’s theorization, non-identification is the means to the ends of rhetorical listening, and rhetorical
listening is the means to effective, ethical cross-cultural communication. However, as I illustrate shortly, this effective, ethical cross-cultural communication is not yet happening in Anglo-American writing on the environment with respect to Native peoples because we are not yet listening rhetorically, in turn, because we are not yet actively non-identifying with the actual words of Native peoples.

So, what is rhetorical listening so that we can better understand how to get there? In *Rhetorical Listening* Ratcliffe presents “rhetorical listening” as a way to genuinely hear and engage across similarities and differences, a position of mutual respect, and possible solution to “dysfunctional listening” in which parties participate to determine who is right and who is wrong (26-34). Further, in her article “Rhetorical Listening: A Trope for Interpretive Invention and a ‘Code of Cross-Cultural Conduct’” Ratcliffe insists that by listening rhetorically or by “standing under the discourses of others and rhetorically listening to them, we may transpose desire for mastery into a self-conscious desire for receptivity; this process both invites the desires of others into our consciousness and accords these desires a place in which to be heard” (207). Hence, according to Ratcliffe’s theorization and definition, rhetorical listening means listening not only for what you can agree or disagree with, listening not only to potential consubstantialities or disidentifications, but to potentially productive dissonance as well as harmony (203). In addition, rhetorical listening means listening with the intent to genuinely hear and engage, listening—as much as possible—without a self-serving agenda, without consuming, appropriating, or dismissing the words and intents of others. It means listening intently, rather than listening with the intent to critique, master, or interject. Further, when engaged in the process of non-identification followed by rhetorical listening, cultural differences are not erased and
commonalities are not dismissed as naive, but rather both are, ideally, turned into productive possibilities.

In fact, speaking to this potential, Ratcliffe sums up the possibilities for rhetorical listening as follows: “Rhetorical listening broadens our possibilities for interpretive invention. When employed as a ‘code of cross-cultural conduct,’ rhetorical listening has the potential to generate more productive discourses about and across both commonalities and differences” (220). So rhetorical listening not only has potential possibilities for effective, ethical cross-cultural conduct across both similarities and differences and a whole range of options in between, rhetorical listening may also open possibilities for invention, for the making of the new, for inventing outside of norms, status quos and hegemonic paradigms. Making this connection between rhetorical listening and its possibilities for invention even more clear, Ratcliffe writes: “Rhetorical listening opens up possibilities, and responsibilities, for interpretive invention, for making meanings via language via others” (208). So, when listening rhetorically, audiences have the responsibility to work together to collaborate and invent together, to move thinking and cross-cultural dialogue forward collectively. I contend that because Anglo environmental writers are stuck in the position of modeling non-identifications for readers which could leave Anglo, non-Native readers unaware of their constant, dynamic position of non-identification, the collective, productive, creative possibilities of interpretive invention that are so integral to rhetorical listening are stymied.

Further, Ratcliffe also—briefly—specifies that there should be no end to conscious rhetorical listening, or to the means of non-identification, by implication. I use the qualifier “briefly” here because, even though she doesn’t spend much time at all on it, Ratcliffe makes the responsibility of a listener to constantly assume and then re-assume a positionality of non-
identification clear in her article “Rhetorical Listening” (209-210). However, this dynamic, ongoing nature of non-identification and rhetorical listening is largely glossed over and not explicitly articulated in Ratcliffe’s book-length project, *Rhetorical Listening: Identification, Gender, Whiteness*. And yet, both non-identification and rhetorical listening are theorized by Ratcliffe as ongoing, dynamic, conscious processes subjects should be constantly aware of so that they can be in the best positions to non-identify and then re-non-identify in order to listen rhetorically (209-210). In fact, Ratcliffe points out that, “Listening with the intent to receive, not master, discourses [rhetorical listening] is not a quick fix or a happy-ever-after solution; rather, it is an ongoing process… Rhetorical listening is another way of helping us continually negotiate our always evolving standpoints, our identities, with the always evolving standpoints of others” (209). Consequently, because rhetorical listening and non-identifications are ongoing and dynamic, modeling non-identification for readers is not enough. Readers should be encouraged to actively participate in the ongoing process of non-identification.

In addition, ideally, if ethical engagement, improved understanding, cross-cultural communication, and rhetorical listening are to occur, non-identifications should not go unnoticed, and they should not be unconsciously entered into. This is why the modeling of non-identifications we saw in the concluding decades of the twentieth century—an identification that allows white readers to often remain unaware of their potential stance of non-identification—is problematic: because readers could slip back into worn stereotypes of “the Native” or “the ecological Indian” as well as slipping into and unconsciously accepting “old,” irresponsible ways of identifying (such as disidentifying and consubstantially identifying). Essentially, if white readers are not on their guard to constantly assume and re-assume a position of non-identification, stereotypes and unproductive and even unethical identificatory practices are
perpetuated. Consequently, if non-identifications are not made more active and consciously conceived of as a dynamic, ongoing process, then listening rhetorically to Native writing and eco-orientations is difficult at best, and an impossibility at worst.

Further, throughout Ratcliffe’s work on rhetorical listening, rhetorical listening is theorized as potentially taking place between an individual and a text. For example, in an effort to define rhetorical listening, Ratcliffe writes, “rhetorical listening signifies a stance of openness that a person may choose to assume in relation to any person, text, or culture” [emphasis in original] (Rhetorical Listening 17). Therefore, rhetorical listening can, ideally, take place between an individual and a text. In addition, non-identification is understood, according to Ratcliffe, as a necessary, conscious step between the extremes of consubstantial and disidentifications, a step that must come before rhetorical listening (47). However, Ratcliffe does not address how readers can and should non-identify with a text. I hope the remainder of this chapter intimates the possibilities that could be opened if Anglo, non-Native readers could be encouraged to actively, consciously non-identify with a Native text, thereby potentially opening possibilities for rhetorical listening and effective, ethical cross-cultural communication. While I agree with Ratcliffe that in order for rhetorical listening to occur readers need to actively, consciously assume a position of non-identification, which they can do with a text from a different culture, I believe work needs to be done on how individual readers from one culture can actively non-identify with a text from another culture. This is, by and large, overlooked in Ratcliffe’s work on rhetorical listening, a gap in scholarship that I hope this last chapter begins to address. But first, I want to suggest through twenty-first century textual analysis that Anglo-American environmental writers are not yet listening rhetorically to Native voices and Native writing.
Evidence Suggesting Rhetorical Listening is Not Occurring in Twenty-First Century Anglo-American Environmental Writing

So, now that we better understand rhetorical listening and why there is a need for more active, conscious non-identifications, perhaps we can better see how this is not yet happening in contemporary, twenty-first century Anglo-American writing on the environment. It is my contention that Anglo environmental writing is not yet encouraging readers towards non-identifications that are active, conscious, and continually re-engaged in, which could potentially help environmental writers and readers get closer to the objective of rhetorical listening. Despite positive—although imperfect—steps taken towards non-identification and even increasingly active non-identification in the 1980s, Anglo environmental writers in the United States have continued to struggle with constructing active non-identifications and with listening rhetorically to Indigenous Americans and the wide array of eco-orientations they articulate. For example, Terry Tempest Williams writes in her 2008 book *Finding Beauty in a Broken World*,

In 1950, government agents proposed to get rid of prairie dogs on some parts of the Navajo Reservation in order to protect the roots of sparse desert grasses and thereby maintain some marginal grazing for sheep. The Navajo elders objected, insisting ‘If you kill all the prairie dogs, there will be no one to cry for the rain.’ The amused officials assured the Navajo that there was no correlation between rain and prairie dogs and carried out their plan. The outcome was surprising only to the federal officials. The desert became a virtual wasteland. Without the ground-turning process of the burrowing animals, the soil became solidly packed, unable to accept rain. Hard pan. The result: fierce runoff whenever it rained. What
little vegetation remained was carried away by flash floods and a legacy of erosion. (87)

Here Williams insists that the Navajo (or, perhaps more accurately, the Diné) possess an alternative understanding of and relationship to the natural world, one that takes into account the complexities and the interdependencies therein. In Williams’ depiction Native peoples certainly exhibit a profound, complex, and egalitarian understanding of their landscape and the intricate interdependencies that allow that landscape, and all of its flora and fauna as a totality, to flourish. In short, the Diné offer an alternative environmental ethic, one that differs from the Anthropocentric and developmentalist norm.

However, Williams does not engage with the actual words of Native peoples, with those complexities, intricacies, and interdependencies of an alternative eco-orientation as they appear in Diné writing. Instead of letting Native peoples speak for themselves, the words offered here come from Williams’ own interpretation and perspective. Engaging with the actual words and the writing of Native peoples is essential for ethical, appropriate interpretive invention, and therefore for rhetorical listening. However, that does not happen here, or throughout Finding Beauty in a Broken World—or any of the other texts by Williams that I’ve read.

In addition, the Navajo depicted here and simulated for Anglo readers are passive. They are the victims, even though they apparently “know better” as the stagnant stereotype of the “ecological Indian.” Although I respect Williams the egalitarian relationships with the natural world she constructs for her readers in much of her writing, Williams is still not listening rhetorically to Native peoples, which is counterproductive to those egalitarian purposes. Relying on stereotypes from Williams own perspective does not make readers pause, pay attention, and be more cognizant of their listening to and their identifications with Native peoples. Instead,
stereotypes can go unnoticed and can stand in for “common sense,” rather than being critically 
examined and reflected upon. This kind of construction of Native peoples, similar to the 
“ecological Indian,” the “vanishing Indian,” the “noble savage,” the “silent Indian,” and the 
“bloodthirsty/violent warrior” stereotypes we saw throughout this dissertation, can lull readers 
into a kind of unconscious, unthinking, unnoticed absorption, rather than conscious, purposeful, 
rhetorical listening. Reiterating stereotypes without pausing to hear from the individuals affected 
by those stereotypes might even be the antithesis of rhetorical listening.

And there are many other instances in which twenty-first century Anglo-American nature 
writers fail to listen rhetorically to the wide and differing array of Native eco-orientations they 
continue to consistently draw from, to the point where a failure to listen rhetorically, I believe, is 
still the norm. In addition to the other examples I’ve already cited, I would like to offer just one 
more instance in which a twenty-first century Anglo author does not achieve the potentially 
productive objective of rhetorical listening. In her book *Of Landscape and Longing* Carolyn 
Servid writes of her first encounter with a crew of Native Quileute rowing a seiner, or a painted, 
open canoe,

The seiner and her native crew became sheltered by all the Quileute seafaring years that 
went along with this place, all the experience passed from one generation to the next. Not 
invincible, but wise—to the ocean, to the weather, to the limits and capabilities of their 
boats and themselves. My fear backed down into respect. I imagined Quileute women, 
their years of faith and waiting, the wailing emptiness they must have known from time 
to time when a boat didn’t come home. (138-139)

It is apparent that Servid believes the Quileute offer an alternative relationship to a particular 
place, one that she respects and admires. However, because readers don’t hear from any Native
people anywhere in the book, all they are offered to potentially consubstantially identify with is Servid’s own imagined reconstructions of generally vanished, and greatly diminished (according to Servid [139-140]). Essentially, therefore, there is no viable Native voice or substance for Servid’s Anglo audience to listen rhetorically to. Cultural differences and similarities are not respected, held up, reflected upon, and genuinely engaged with. Rather possibilities for difference are subsumed under Servid’s romanticized, victimized, and vanished simulation of the ecological Indian.

Importantly and tellingly, Servid herself seems to be conflicted about her inability to listen to and engage ethically with the Quileute. While Servid claims she can imagine and inhabit the world of (presumably long gone) Quileute women wailing for their lost men, as powerless victims, she encounters an actual, living Quileute woman only two short pages before her imaginings who is working at the front desk of the hotel where Servid is staying (136). However, the not vanished and dead woman is given no voice in the book. Even when Servid is confronted by living Quileute people, she reverts to stereotypes of the “ecological Indian,” the “noble savage,” “the silent Indian,” and the “vanished Indian,” stereotypes which can easily be glossed over semi- or subconsciously. This makes it difficult for white readers to consciously, consistently assume a position of non-identification towards Native peoples, which, in turn, forecloses possibilities for rhetorical listening. Moreover, readers cannot hear the contemporary, living Quileute woman, let alone listen rhetorically to the complexities of place and landscape she may have articulated—or not.

Further, as evidence of Servid’s confliction and perhaps budding realization of her own inability to listen, when she comes across an ancient stump on Quileute land, she ruminates: “On our way back we wondered about a lone stump… that stood in the wash of the tide… Could it be
rooted there, a remnant of a forest that once edged an altered shore? Had it been placed there by the whims of natural forces? Could someone have planted it there deliberately? We wondered and should have asked” [emphasis mine] (141). But she doesn’t ask, and the Native people who Servid could have possibly engaged in a cross-cultural dialogue with are rendered mute. Cultural complexities, as well as potential cultural similarities and differences are left unexplored and unarticulated, which does not allow for readers to listen rhetorically to Native peoples and Indigenous eco-orientations.

And Williams and Servid are not alone in their problematic construction of Native eco-orientations and their inability to encourage readers to listen rhetorically. For example, twenty-first century Anglo influential environmental writers such as Annie Dillard (114), Charles Wohlforth (107), Scott Russell Sanders (361), and Wendell Berry (50, 84-85) continue to turn to Native peoples to depict their own interpretations of more ecocentric orientations. In all of these instances just cited, we do not hear from actual Native peoples, the writing of Native peoples is not presented or engaged with, the voices and the substance of Native peoples are not given space, and, consequently, Native relationships with environment are not engaged with in an appropriate or ethical way. In addition, these authors evoke “simulations of indian-ness,” in the words of Vizenor, by relying on the “ecological Indian” or the “vanished Indian” stereotypes. Therefore, these Anglo authors are still not listening rhetorically. To work towards the objective of rhetorical listening, I contend that it would be helpful if Anglo environmental writers could first encourage more active non-identifications—which could then, potentially, be followed by rhetorical listening, possibly followed then by more helpful, appropriate, less developmentalist and Anthropocentric conceptions of environment.
Possibilities for Encouraging Active Non-Identifications and Rhetorical Listening

Towards these ends, in this concluding chapter I outline three specific ways I believe non-identifications could become more active, more conscious endeavors. Put differently, here are three ways that I believe Anglo-American environmental writers can encourage more active identifications with Native peoples and eco-orientations (as opposed to the modeling of non-identification, as we saw in the previous chapter). Given that Ratcliffe theorizes non-identification as an essential step towards rhetorical listening, these more active non-identifications, I believe, may help readers listen rhetorically and achieve better, more effective, and more ethical cross-cultural communication. The three specific ways I believe Anglo-American environmental writers can forge more active identifications with Native peoples and Indigenous eco-orientations include: 1) engaging with the actual words and the writing of living, contemporary Native peoples, 2) pairing engagement with Native peoples and Indigenous eco-orientations with the Burkean Action/motion differential 3) encouraging readers to constantly keep in mind and put into play with their active non-identifications the Native articulated concepts of “survivance” and “rhetorical sovereignty.”

Firstly, as an example of how the non-identification process could become more active, I suggest that readers could be encouraged to forge their own active, conscious non-identifications with the actual words, with the writing of contemporary Native peoples. For example, non-Native environmental writers could move beyond modeling non-identifications (where I suggest they have been stuck for approximately the last thirty years, or since the late 1980s), to encouraging their readers to actively construct their own non-identifications with the writings of Native authors who have exhibited an alternative environmental ethic and conception of place. For instance, they could point the way toward active, conscious non-identifications with Native
writers such as Winona LaDuke, Linda Hogan, and Jeanette Armstrong, who often articulate in their work an alternative, more ethical, appropriate, egalitarian, and ecocentric environmental ethic—as well as a reciprocal, interdependent relationship with a particular landscape that differs from Western Anthropocentric and developmentalist conceptions of the natural world. In short, these authors offer an alternative environmental ethos and ethic, both grounded in communitarianism and social and environmental justice. I believe it would be helpful if readers were encouraged to actively, consciously forge their own non-identifications with the writings of Native Americans writing today—rather than more passively, unconsciously non-identifying with stereotypes of supposedly long vanished Native peoples, as we continue to see as non-identifications became more prominent in the Anglo-American environmental writing of the 1980s and as we also see in twenty-first century white nature writing. In short, relying on the specters of stereotypes, relying on Anglo interpretations of a single “Native” eco-orientation, while also continuing to omit the voices of Native peoples articulated in their own words and in their own terms does not encourage stances of active identification, nor consequently rhetorical listening.

However, it is important that the texts white audiences are encouraged to actively non-identify with are not thought of or used as a resource Anglo, non-Native audiences can exploit, can mine for what they might find of value. This approach would fall into the long tradition of appropriation and exploitation of Native people and their ways of life. Therefore, as I will explain shortly, it is important that active, conscious non-identification with Native texts be a constantly ongoing, dynamic process rather than a means to an end. To help avoid the kind of unethical appropriation and considering Native peoples and Indigenous writing as a resource to exploit, a position of conscious, active, dynamic non-identification followed by rhetorical
listening needs to be constantly assumed and re-assumed, which could help non-Native readers avoid slipping into traditions of appropriation, exploitation, and too easily gained consubstantiality. In addition, ideally texts and entire bodies of work by Native authors should be considered, actively non-identified with and (again, ideally) rhetorically listened to in their entirety. Snippets and supposedly pithy, poignant environmental adages are too easy to appropriate and do not do the complexities and wide array of Indigenous environmental thought justice. In addition, Native texts should be thought of and engaged with as interdependent voices that depend on and point the way towards other Native and non-Native voices.

In short, rhetorical listening cannot happen unless the actual words and writing of Native peoples are engaged in a thoughtful and ethical way. Encouraging white readers to more actively and consciously engage with or non-identify with Native environmental texts is essential for disrupting the echo chamber effect of Anglo writers writing to the norms and expectations of Anglo readers, which is still happening within the context of American environmental writing. Non-identifying with the words of Native authors can help disrupt this echo chamber effect, and thus potentially help to more effectively challenge the deeply ingrained tenets of Anthropocentrism and developmentalism. As Ratcliffe writes, “Imagination alone is not enough when attempting to understand a person from a different tradition. Imagination must be grounded in material reality via a kind of cultural/historical archaeological/ethnographic work that the subject doing the conscious identifying must be willing to perform” (Rhetorical Listening 62). This is why engaging with the actual words and the texts of living Native people is so important: it takes us beyond imagination and imagined stereotypes to a kind of more “genuine,” ethical, appropriate, and useful knowledge while opening possibilities for disrupting the echo chamber effect of white writers talking to the cultural norms and expectations of white readers.
Disrupting the echo chamber effect—an effect which is the antithesis of effective cross-cultural communication—and opening up possibilities for rhetorical listening are just two reasons readers should be encouraged to hear and engage with different Native peoples in their own words and on their own terms.

The second way that readers can be encouraged to more actively non-identify with Native peoples and eco-orientations within the context of Anglo-American writing on the environment is by pairing non-identification with Kenneth Burke’s concept of Action, with a capital “A.” In the tradition of complicating and critiquing identification over the last century and particularly since postmodern theorists, Burke’s theorization of “Action” will potentially help readers be more conscious of their own identifications with Native peoples and Indigenous eco-orientations and it will potentially help readers take more responsibility for an approach of constant, conscious, active non-identifications. Towards these ends I believe it would help if non-identification could be paired with and put into play with Kenneth Burke’s theorization of an Action/motion differential.

The constant and compelling struggle between individuation and the social—what is sometimes referred to as the Action/motion differential—is what Burke sees at the epicenter of the human condition as well as the driving force of human motivation. Motion, as defined by Burke is an act that is taken up only because of the “interaction of forces,” those “instincts, drives, or other sheerly compulsive properties” over which the agent has no control (Rhetoric of Motives 79). Action, on the other hand, as motion’s dialectical opposite, are those acts that entail “connotations of consciousness or purpose” that mark “a ‘doing’ rather than a being ‘done to’” (Grammar of Motives 15-16). Therefore, Action (with a capital “A”) is a conscious choice that involves agency, while motion is not conscious, but rather our default position. Burke theorizes
the Action/motion differential as a Mobius strip with all sorts of possibilities between the two extremes of Action and motion.

I am putting forward here that it would be helpful if non-identifications could move more toward the Action end of Burke’s Action/motion differential or Action/motion Mobius strip, which involves motion as the unconscious compulsions or instinctual drives over which humans have very limited control at one end, and Action on the other end, Action being consciously undertaken acts of reflection and critical consciousness. Action with a capital “A” denotes a greater degree of agency and awareness on the part of the individual involved in the identification process. It has been my observation that rhetorical theorists have, at least since the middle of the twentieth century, worked to elucidate ways that the identification process can be less motion and more Action. Further, I see my further theorization of active non-identification as the ways that individuals can non-identify with a text as contributing to and advancing this tradition of potentially making subjects more aware of their own identification process, of their responsibilities throughout this process, and of bringing the identification process into the light, of making the process more conscious and dynamic, essentially less motion and more Action.

In addition, pairing non-identification with Burke’s conception of Action could also help readers adopt an approach of engagement with Native peoples and Indigenous eco-orientations that is more dynamic and collaborative, an approach where readers can also contribute to the active construction of more helpful and appropriate conceptions of and relationships with the natural world. Pairing non-identification with Native peoples with Action in the Burkean sense could potentially help readers be participatory inventors of alternatives to the Western, Anthropocentric and developmentalist status quo. Thereby, theorizing how non-identifications with Native writing on the environment could be more Action could prove helpful to readers as
they strive to develop more appropriate relationships to the environment. These are some of the reasons why the second way I suggest that non-identifications become more active is by putting them into play with Burke’s theorization of the Action/motion differential, thereby potentially becoming a more dynamic and ongoing collaboratively inventive process.

The third way I believe non-identifications could become more active and therefore provide better opportunities for listening rhetorically to Native peoples is if non-identification was put into play with the Native-developed concepts of “survivance” and “rhetorical sovereignty.” Anglo engagement with Native writing on the environment should be considerate of ways that Native peoples themselves have articulated are important in cross-cultural exchanges. For example, Anishinaabe author and scholar Gerald Vizenor has articulated Native Americans’ insistence on “survivance” as part of their Indigenous orientation and as part of their way of being in the world, and Native scholar and rhetorician Scott Lyons has articulated the need for “rhetorical sovereignty” in cross-cultural communication with Native peoples. I suggest that these are two useful concepts that could be paired with and put into play with an approach of non-identification so that non-Native, Anglo readers could more ethically, appropriately, and effectively rhetorically listen to Native peoples and Indigenous eco-orientations.

In his introduction to Survivance: Narratives of Native Presence Gerald Vizenor, who coined the term, defines survivance as: “an active presence over absence, deracination, and oblivion; survivance is the continuance of stories… survivance stories are renunciations of dominance, detractions, obtrusions, the unbearable sentiments of tragedy, and the legacy of victimry” (1). Because we continue to see the specters of the tragic, victimized, and powerless Native even in twenty-first century Anglo nature writing in the United States, the essentials of survivance as the constant resisting of such ultimately unhelpful and harmful stereotypes could
prove important and helpful to non-Native readers as they strive to constantly reposition themselves in a stance of active non-identification. In fact, according to Vizenor, survivance (a mashup or portmanteau of “survival” plus “resistance”) is an “ongoing process” essential for fending off stereotypes of “vanishing Indians” (96). Because this specific stereotype continues to haunt Anglo-American environmental writing and works against the conscious approach of active non-identification (given that stereotypes often lull readers into a kind of unconscious, uncritical, complicit acceptance of the status quo) it would help if non-Native readers would be more aware of the premise and purposes of survivance as they strive to actively non-identify.

Survivance also involves the constantly adapting assertion of presence and the vivification of cultural uniqueness and possibility. Or, as Kimberly Blaeser writes in her book-length analysis of Vizenor’s work, “Survivors actively engage themselves in the ongoing process of discovering and creating their own lives. Those who survive are those who continuously evolve. If stasis characterizes the victims, vitality and adaptability characterize the survivors” (Gerald Vizenor: Writing in the Oral Tradition 14). This assertion of agency and relevance in the current time, along with insistence of a viable, ever-evolving presence, is important for contemporary non-Native readers and writers to keep in mind and it could potentially help readers and writers of environmental writing move beyond stereotypes of “the Native” and more actively non-identify and listen rhetorically.

In addition, because it is an essential psychological tool for resisting assimilation (which is essentially the drive towards consubstantiality) and for being seen as active presence in the modern world rather than a relic of the past (the resistance of disidentification) an understanding of survivance is important for Anglo, non-Native readers to understand as they strive to approach Native writing on the environment from an a position of active non-identification. I am putting
forward here that non-identifying with and listening to Native articulations of survivance may help Anglo readers, in turn, actively non-identify with Native conceptions of environment. As we saw in the theorization of disidentification by postmodern scholars, a disidentification can potentially lead to a larger consubstantial identification; and every identification is entangled with, and can potentially unravel another or a different kind of identification. Consequently, it may be possible that a non-identification could lead to another non-identification: in this case a non-identification with survivance may help contribute to active non-identifications with Native conceptions of the natural world. Essentially, because both concepts demand consciousness and dynamic, never static ways of being and thinking, it is possible that a non-identification with survivance could be intertwined with active non-identification with Native writing—and potentially vice versa.

Further, survivance, as an essential component of contemporary Native realities, is instilled and perpetuated in story. In his essay “Aesthetics of Survivance” Vizenor writes, “The nature of survivance is unmistakable in native stories… Native survivance is an active sense of presence over absence, deracination, and oblivion; survivance is the continuance of stories” (47). Survivance, therefore, is an essential component of Native ways of being, and also of Native language and story. Thus, ethical, appropriate engagement with wide and differing array of Native writing should take survivance into account. In addition, once survivance is paired with an active stance of non-identification, it will be difficult for various and differing Native voices to go unarticulated and unheard—which is, as we have seen, a problem that continues to beleaguer Anglo writing on the natural world with regard to Indigenous peoples.

Another concept that Native peoples have articulated is important to them and integral to cross-cultural exchanges is “rhetorical sovereignty.” It has since been taken up and applied by
other scholars, particularly working in the field of Composition and communication, but one of the first iterations of rhetorical sovereignty comes from Native scholar Scott Lyons. In his essay “Rhetorical Sovereignty: What do American Indians Want From Writing” Lyons writes,

Our highest hopes for literacy at this point rest upon a vision we might name rhetorical sovereignty… Our claims to sovereignty entail much more than arguments for tax exempt status or the right to build and operate casinos; they are nothing less than our attempt to survive and flourish as a people. Sovereignty is the guiding story in our pursuit of self-determination, the general strategy by which we aim to best recover out losses from the ravages of colonization… For indigenous peoples everywhere, sovereignty is an ideal principle, the beacon by which we seek the paths to agency and power and community renewal… the pursuit of sovereignty is an attempt to revive not our past, but our possibilities. Rhetorical sovereignty is the inherent right and ability of peoples to determine their own communicative needs and desires. (449)

Similar to survivance, rhetorical sovereignty is also a concept and a tool used by Native peoples to resist assimilation (a hegemonic consubstantiality) and the insistence of a viable presence in the modern world (a kind of the resistance of disavowal by the dominant culture). Therefore, understanding and keeping in mind the concept of Indigenous rhetorical sovereignty as we continue engaging Native conceptions of environment may prove helpful to audiences as they strive to enact their own active non-identifications with Native writing.

Furthermore, and similar to survivance, an approach of non-identification with rhetorical sovereignty (striving to empathize with and engage with the concept while neither consuming it nor disavowing it) may help readers better undertake an approach of active non-identification
when reading Native texts. Putting both survivance and rhetorical sovereignty into play with an approach of non-identification could potentially help readers proceed ethically and appropriately as they actively non-identify with Native texts.

These are three ways readers may potentially be encouraged to forge more active, ethical, and appropriate non-identifications with the wide and differing array of Native peoples and Indigenous writing on the environment. Of course, these suggestions are not exhaustive. However, it is my assertion that it is important to start the process of rhetorically listening to Native peoples, and these are three specific places to start.

Further, I contend that more consciously, actively non-identifying with Native texts in particular may potentially open possibilities for rhetorical listening. In turn, rhetorical listening to Native peoples and texts is an endeavor that may potentially help readers develop more appropriate, egalitarian, and helpful relationships with environment, conceptions of environment that are potentially less ecologically destructive, that move beyond the Anthropocentric and developmentalist Western status quo. These are possibilities that, given our current state of eco-crisis, need to be opened.

Essentially, it is my hope that encouraging non-Native readers to actively non-identify with Native texts as a place to start listening rhetorically may open important possibilities for less destructive relationships to and constructions of the natural world, rather than foreclosing possibilities for effective and ethical cross-cultural communication and more appropriate conceptions of the natural world, as all too often has been the case historically as Anglo environmental writers constructed and continue to construct various kinds of identifications with their own imaginings of “the Native.” As we have seen, Anglo-American environmental writers have long turned to “the Native” and “the ecological Indian” as a corrective for the dominant
culture’s misuse and abuse of the natural world. Throughout this process across time, as we have also seen in this dissertation, there have been missteps as well as the construction of identifications that are potentially more productive and more respective of cultural similarities and differences. However, the real work of constant, conscious rhetorically listening to living, contemporary Native peoples has, by and large, not yet truly begun. While rhetorically listening to Native Americans is not a panacea for our pressing and frankly daunting environmental ills, it may offer a productive place to start. Ultimately, more productive cross-cultural dialogue will involve collective collaboration and invention across cultures, humility, the recognition of our mutual and complex interdependencies, and the coming to terms with our own vulnerability as we strive to develop more appropriate, ethical and less destructive conceptions of the natural world. Exploring how to bring these conditions about are possibilities for future work.

Other possibilities for future work include examining how Native American writers are identifying with and constructing different kinds of identifications with their Anglo readers at different times. More specifically, I think it would be worthwhile to explore how Native authors are finding common ground in an expansive and cyclical conception of time. This “alternative,” non-Western understanding of temporality potentially enhances the scope of possibilities for rhetorical appeals, arguments, and solutions, while also opening possibilities for common ground and for moving forward together, cross-culturally as we strive to find ways to develop more ethical and appropriate conceptions of and relationships with the natural world. Looking at how Native peoples both disidentify and identify with the master narratives of Anthropocentrism, materialism, consumerism, and developmentalism would also be a worthwhile endeavor.

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66 In fact, considering Native peoples and perspectives as a panacea would reinforce the stereotype of the “ecological Indian,” which stymies rather than encourages “genuine,” rhetorical listening and productive, inventive cross-cultural communication.
In addition, I also think it would open possibilities for environmental discourse and would be a worthwhile endeavor to examine the differences in how Native American writers use language to construct their understanding of the natural world. Some of these differences, as I see them include: differences in pronoun use, including the Native use of pronouns that assign life to “inanimate” objects by Western standards; and allowances for open-ended meaning making in Native storytelling and the dynamic, collaborative, inventive relationship between story, audience, and storyteller as described by a significant number of Indigenous peoples including Thomas King and Kimberly Blaeser. Exploring these differences from the standpoint of rhetorical theory and environmental rhetoric or discourse analysis could potentially be productive possibilities for future work.

Finally, future work could also include examining the ways that Native peoples and Indigenous writers in particular are teaching Anglo audiences to non-identify with their worldviews and eco-orientations. For example, in her book *Whispering in Shadows* Okanagan author Jeannette Armstrong describes Indigenous people from a variety of tribes coming together to listen to and physically and psychically make space for the words of an Indigenous man from Bolivia (30-34). Thereby, it is possible that Armstrong is showing non-Native readers how she would like them to proceed as far as identification goes; it is possible that she is showing Anglo readers how to more actively, consciously non-identify. Essentially, exploring the question of how and why Native peoples are teaching their audiences to identify with them, and how are Native authors controlling and striving for agency in this identification process would be a possibility for future work. There is much work to be done, and I look forward to exploring other ways that language, writing, cross-cultural exchanges, and the application of rhetorical theory to
environmental texts may potentially help readers develop alternative, more ethical, appropriate, and ultimately less destructive conceptions of our shared environment.


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268
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PUBLICATIONS
“The ‘Native’ as not so Creative Commonplace within the Borderland of Environmental Rhetoric.”
Conference Proceedings from 2013 Writing Across the Peninsula Conference, published by Michigan State University Press
“The Possibilities and Pitfalls of Claiming the Personal: Invoking a Working Class Past when the Working Class is Under Attack.”
Review of the 2013 College Composition and Communication Conference published in Kairos, a journal of Rhetoric, Technology, and Pedagogy
Editor, Writing Consultant, and Contributor to An Architect’s Guide to Effective Self-Presentation (Andreas Luescher, editor)
“Harnessing the Powers of Classical Rhetoric and Invention in your Self-Presentation Campaign.”
Chapter Contributor to Colors of Nature: Culture, Identity, and the Natural World Online Teaching Guide (Alison Hawthorne Deming and Lauret E. Savoy, editors)
“The Significance of Identification within Rhetorical Theory and Writing on the Environment.”
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

Rhetoric Society of America 2016: Rhetoric and Change
May 27, 2016
“Keeping Productive Change Alive: How Burke’s Action/Motion Differential Can Contribute to the Transformative Potential of Environmental Rhetoric.”

Conference on Community Writing: Building Engaged Infrastructure
University of Colorado Boulder, October 16, 2015.
“Building Infrastructure for a More Environmentally Engaged Public: Five Specific Ways Eco-Rhetoricians Can Contribute.”

Tenth Annual Conference on the Teaching of Writing
University of Connecticut, March 27th, 2015.
“Imagination, Empathy, and Translation in the Writing Classroom: Re-conceiving Critical Thinking as an Act of Translation.”

Rhetoric Society of America Conference 2014: Border Rhetorics
May 24th, 2014.
“American Nature Writing as Borderland: Navigating the Border between Ecocentric and Anthropocentric Rhetorics.”

Transforming Access Composition Conference
University of Cincinnati, March 8th, 2014.
“How Anthropocentric Discourse Limits Access to Global Climate Change Discourse.”

Writing Across the Peninsula Conference
Michigan Technological University, October 25th, 2013.
“The Possibilities and Pitfalls of Claiming the Personal: Invoking a Working Class Past when the Working Class is Under Attack.”

College Composition and Communication Conference
Raleigh, March 2013.
“Environmental Issues in the Composition Classroom: A Look at Ethos and Identifications within Environmental and Anti-Environmental Groups.”

North Carolina Symposium on the Teaching of Writing
North Carolina State University, February 2013.
Pegram-Piper, Alexis, Reed Stranton, and Danielle Hartke.
“Recognizing an Ecology of Place and Time: Using Eco-Composition Theory to Explore Temporality-Constructing Events and to Enhance Social Sphere Literacy.”

College Composition and Communication Conference
St. Louis, April 2012. Pegram, Alexis, David Clanaugh, and Michael Lewis.
“(Mis)appropriating the Strategies of the Opposition: Burke’s ‘Selection of Means’ within Anti-Environmental Rhetoric.”

University of Michigan Language and Rhetoric Conference
University of Michigan, September 2011.
“The Rhetoric of the Wise Use Anti-Environmental Movement: Three Inappropriate Appeals to Pathos.”

Newberry Consortium in American Indian Studies (NCAIS) Conference
Newberry Library, Chicago, July 2011.
“Keeping the Sacred Fire Lit: The Re-Imagination of Memory and the Possibilities for Environmental Rhetoric within Linda Hogan’s Mean Spirit.”

UW Milwaukee Composition Forum
University of Wisconsin Milwaukee, April 2011.
“Moving From Rhetorical Analysis to Critical Inquiry: Using the Elements of a Rhetorical Situation to Help Students Engage with the 102 Outcomes.”

Red River Graduate Student Conference
North Dakota State University, March 2011.

“Presence, Performance, Tricksters, and Victims: The Pedagogical Implications of Survivance for Speakers of Marginalized Dialects in the Composition Classroom.”

First-Year Composition Conference
UW Milwaukee, May 2010.

“Experience as Knowledge: Using Personal Narrative to Bridge the Gap Between Interpretative and Reflective Essays.”

Marquette University Composition Instructor Conference
Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI, December 2009.

“This Who Wrote Moby Dick Anyway”? Graduate Teaching Assistants and Literature in the First Year Composition Classroom.”

HONORS AND AWARDS

Chancellor’s Award, UW Milwaukee English Department, 2012
Victor Hugo Award for Excellence in English, Marian University Arts and Humanities Department, one of two awarded annually university-wide
Suma Cum Laude Honored Graduate, cumulative GPA of 3.99/4.0, Marian University, December 2004
All American Scholar Athlete, Marian University, 2004

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

National Council of Teachers of English, August 2010- present
Rhetoric Society of America, September 2010- present