Date of Award

May 2013

Degree Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts

Department

Philosophy

First Advisor

Robert Schwartz

Abstract

The worldmaking thesis stands as a contentious view of reality. Its primary tenet, that we play a role in cognitively making objects, properties, facts, and thereby the world, is dismissed by many philosophers as an incoherent and misguided position. In this paper I critically discuss the thesis and defend it against several criticisms: that (1) it is cosmologically incoherent, (2) raises a problem of causation, (3) implies subjectivism, (4) commits a use-mention fallacy, and (5) it commits the problem of disagreement. I show that these criticisms are not ultimately deleterious to the thesis. Furthermore, I explore ways in which worldmaking constitutes a more satisfactory account of objects, properties, and facts over and against competing views, viz., metaphysical realism.

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