Date of Award

May 2014

Degree Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts

Department

Philosophy

First Advisor

Julius Sensat

Committee Members

William Bristow, Andrea Westlund

Keywords

Hegel, Moral Luck, Responsibility, Resultant Luck

Abstract

The problem of resultant luck leaves us with a dilemma: Reject the intuition that agents should be blamed only to the extent that events depend on factors within their control, or reject the pre-theoretical intuition that agents should be blamed in cases of negligence. Although many potential solutions have been put forth, the problem remains unsolved. In this paper, I diagnose why the problem has been recalcitrant, and I describe what a genuine solution must explain. To illustrate what such a solution would look like, I defend an interpretation of Hegel's concept of action and moral responsibility, and I show how his view explains a deeper puzzle underlying the problem. Extrapolating from the Hegelian solution, I explain what's essential to solving the problem of resultant luck and the problem of moral luck more generally.

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