

5-2001

## A Burning Issue: The Consolidation of the North Shore Fire Department, 1991-1995

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**A Burning Issue:**  
**The Consolidation of the North Shore Fire Department,**  
**1991-1995**

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May 10, 2001  
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This thesis is dedicated to my husband,  
Gregory W. Golden.  
His dedication to fire fighting ignited my first spark of interest in fire protection  
services.

### **Acknowledgements**

I would like to thank Louise Whitaker for her time and help while I chose the North Shore Fire Department for my thesis project. I would also like to thank the Chief of the North Shore Fire Department, David Berousek for his support and his time he generously donated again and again. Without the advice and encouragement from my advisor, Assistant Professor Amanda Seligman, this project would never have been completed; I am in her debt. Thank you to all my professors at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee who challenged and enlightened me during my education here. Lastly, I want to thank my husband whose unending support and praise for my work makes it all worthwhile.

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## Part I: Introduction

It was a bitterly cold Christmas day when families gathered to celebrate the holidays in Shorewood, a small suburb of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 1985. All was calm before the page went out, calling fire fighters into duty to fight a fire raging in an eight-unit Shorewood apartment building. Fire fighters were also called in from the other North Shore suburbs surrounding the city of Milwaukee. Many fire fighters were not on duty at the fire station that day, but were called into active service to help control the blaze that eventually destroyed the building.

Most of the residents of the apartment building had been out of town for the holidays; only one occupant was home, and he made it safely out of the burning building. The fire had started in Apartment 1 on the first floor, rose up the walls and through crawl spaces to fan out to the other apartments and the attic. By the time firefighters from three North Shore fire departments, Shorewood, Whitefish Bay and Glendale, arrived at the scene, the fire was already blazing. Only five feet separated the apartment building from other buildings, and although the fire fighters were unable to save the apartment building, they were able to contain the fire to that building<sup>1</sup>.

After they had the fire out, fire fighters found that many of their hoses had frozen fast to the icy ground. The temperature that night was almost ten degrees below zero. Water from the hoses sprayed on the building also had frozen, glazing the gutted apartment building in icy jewels.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> "8-Unit Shorewood building just an icy shell after fire," *The Milwaukee Journal*, 26 December 1985, Metro Section, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

After dealing with this fire, questions and accusations arose regarding how the Shorewood fire department, the fire department in command at the scene, had handled the fire. Questions were raised regarding the abilities and professionalism of some of the North Shore fire departments.<sup>3</sup> Community leaders as well as fire fighters in the North Shore communities were seriously looking at ways for the relatively small North Shore communities to promote a more professional response to fires while permitting the communities maintain their autonomy and individual independence. Talks began, but it would take many more years for a solution to be reached.

The ultimate solution that these North Shore communities eventually came to was to consolidate their individual fire departments into one department, the North Shore Fire Department. By forming the North Shore Fire Department, community members, leaders and fire fighters hoped to alleviate many of the problems that they had been experiencing as separate departments.

There were problems with command control, the direction and authority held by the Fire Chief or Department in command at the scene of a fire, as witnessed by some in the Christmas day fire in Shorewood in 1985. Due to the expense of fire fighting, some departments had difficulty maintaining adequate apparatus and staff. Many department members were forced to spend much of their time handling administrative tasks, instead of developing their skills. The Mutual Aid system that existed among the individual North Shore fire

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<sup>3</sup> Clipping, Box 26: Municipal Departments of Whitefish Bay, Whitefish Bay Library, "4 Communities Consider Uniting Fire Departments," *The Milwaukee Journal*, 24 February 1986.



departments was stretched to the limits, and some community members thought it might become overextended.

Many of these concerns paralleled those experienced by larger cities at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Since the first spark of fire, much of mankind's efforts have been consumed with controlling and containing the blaze. Fire itself can be a useful tool; it is used by mankind to prepare food, to generate heat and energy, and it can even be used in warfare. Fire can also be devastatingly destructive, obliterating homes and other buildings, crops and landscape, and even lives.<sup>4</sup>

Historically, fire fighting has been a community effort, aimed predominantly at containing the fire and preventing it from destroying other buildings and homes. Eventually, residents of cities formed small fire fighting companies, or fire departments. These departments were most often unregulated by the state or federal government, or even the local communities which they sought to protect. Fire departments were strictly volunteer, private organizations. Many soon fell into problems of corruptness, rowdyism, and competition.<sup>5</sup> Communities sought to alleviate these problems by regulating the fire departments, turning them into career departments staffed by full-time professionals, where the city had regulatory control over the department's budget, membership, and actions.

Historically, larger American cities have looked for the most economical way to solve municipal problems, solving the needs of the greatest number of people using the least amount of money and regulations. Larger city fire

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<sup>4</sup>See Stephen J. Pyne, *World Fire: The Culture of Fire on Earth* (New York: Holt, 1995).

departments usually have several stations from which they respond as needed; yet there is one central command station, one administrative office. The North Shore communities' reaction to their fire protection needs mirrored those seen in many larger American cities. How the North Shore municipalities cooperated to join municipal forces demonstrated their ability to adapt big-city responses to municipal needs, while still maintaining their suburban communities' character.

The differences among the individual North Shore communities both helped and hindered their cooperation efforts. Although each municipality brought unique strengths and weaknesses to the table, they also were wary of maintaining their individuality. On occasion, the desire for autonomy stalled the effort to consolidate the fire departments.

The North Shore communities felt strongly about maintaining their individual identities,<sup>6</sup> but had on occasion in the past worked together to upgrade municipal services in their joint communities. A notable example of this is seen in the North Shore Water Commission, where the communities of Fox Point, Whitefish Bay, Glendale and Shorewood cooperated to provide water services to their communities in 1959.<sup>7</sup>

Prior successes in their joint efforts encouraged the North Shore communities to work together again, which in part prompted the discussion to join the individual fire departments in the North Shore to form one North Shore Fire Department that would serve all seven of the North Shore communities. The

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<sup>5</sup> Amy S. Greenberg, *Cause for Alarm: The Volunteer Fire Department in the Nineteenth-Century City* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968) 80-106.

<sup>6</sup> Clipping, Box 26: Municipal Departments of Whitefish Bay, Whitefish Bay Library, "4 Communities Consider Uniting Fire Departments," *The Milwaukee Journal*, 24 February 1986.

idea to consolidate the fire departments was not a new one in 1991. It had repeatedly been offered as a solution to inefficiencies in years past, but it had never been approved by the community members or leaders. Yet the idea never completely left the idea pool, resurfacing periodically. Finally in 1991, consolidation seemed a plausible and realistic approach to solving the problems faced by the individual departments.

Consolidation required a great deal of cooperation and sacrifice, but supporters argued that the end result would provide fire protection services that were well worth the costs. One community, the Village of Bayside, felt that the costs were just too great, and dropped out of the consolidation discussions for months before finally rejoining the effort.

The consolidation of the North Shore fire departments into one North Shore Fire Department was a long and difficult process, but one that illustrates how the North Shore communities worked together to ensure that their municipal needs were met. It is a clear example of how they were able to respond to municipal needs as a "big city," yet maintain their individual characteristics.

The North Shore area located to the north of the city of Milwaukee is comprised of the communities of Shorewood, Whitefish Bay, Glendale, Fox Point, Brown Deer, River Hills and Bayside. Around the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the citizens of urban Milwaukee began to move outward to the North Shore suburbs. Today, although the North Shore area is no longer rural, there still exists some open land available for new residential and commercial development

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<sup>7</sup> *Fox Point – A Planned Village: Its Heritage and Development, 1843-1976* (np, Bicentennial Committee and the Village Board of Fox Point, 1978), unpaginated.

and growth. Each community shared similarities with the other North Shore suburbs, yet each was unique in its own way. These differing characteristics are important to understand when contemplating the efforts to consolidate the fire departments in the North Shore area. Each community desired to maintain their individual attributes, yet they sought to work together in order to apply a "big city" approach to their fire protection services.

Once called "Cementville," due to a handful of plants that made cement from limestone located there, the community we now know as Shorewood has undergone a number of changes. Its physical composition has changed, and it has had a series of different names.<sup>8</sup> In 1900, the community started its own government, calling itself East Milwaukee. Residents of the City of Milwaukee traversed the short distance to the small community of East Milwaukee and frequented the amusement park located on the picturesque shoreline. In 1875, the amusement park was known as "Luddenmann's-on-the-River Amusement Park." Later the name was changed to "Coney Island," and then to "Wonderland Park." As the village's population grew, local residents began to complain about the noise and problems generated by the amusement park, so it was eventually closed.<sup>9</sup> Today, Hubbard Park is a serene reminder of the amusement parks of yesteryear.

According to the census information used during the consolidation, Shorewood was a densely populated community, with a population of 14,128 and

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<sup>8</sup> The T.A.G. Kids, *Shorewood Now and Then: 1987-1917, In celebration of Shorewood's 70<sup>th</sup> Anniversary*, (n.p.: Shorewood School District, 1987), unpaginated.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

a total area of 1.6 miles.<sup>10</sup> The combination of compactness and large numbers of people make it the most densely populated of all the North Shore communities. The majority of the structures in Shorewood are residential, although many churches, businesses, and schools serve the community. The high population, coupled with the relatively small area, has raised the physical fire risk for Shorewood. This meant that the congestion of the community had an increased risk of a fire starting, and further, that any fire might be difficult to contain in the compact neighborhood. There is also a preponderance of duplexes and apartment buildings in Shorewood, increasing the compactness. In fact, fire fighters and analysts considered the physical fire risk to be comparable to the City of Milwaukee,<sup>11</sup> although it should be noted that Shorewood's much lower occurrence of fires balanced the risk.<sup>12</sup> One reason for this variance is the importance that Shorewood, and other North Shore communities, placed on fire prevention education. At the time of consolidation, the Shorewood fire department was fully staffed by career personnel, 21 fire fighters in all.<sup>13</sup>

In 1892, when state law required that an area have at least 300 residents in order to incorporate, a local census reported that there were 314 people living on farms in the Whitefish Bay area.<sup>14</sup> The incorporation of Whitefish Bay evolved out of a conflict over local school location. Before incorporation, children had to walk two and a half miles to the nearest school. All attempts to rectify this

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<sup>10</sup>TriData, "Final Report North Shore Communities Fire Services Planning Project," January 7, 1994, 3-3.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 2-1.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> For a list, and status, of the apparatus held by Shorewood as well as the remaining North Shore communities at the time of consolidation, see Table II.

<sup>14</sup> *Whitefish Bay 1892-1967, 75<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Booklet*, (Milwaukee: Village of Whitefish Bay, 1967), unpaginated.

situation by changing the school location or the boundaries of the school district failed.<sup>15</sup> G. A. Rodgers, the editor of the weekly publication, the *Whitefish Bay Pioneer*, led a force of opposition to correct the situation. Ultimately, the voters decided to incorporate their own village rather than continue to send their children to school in another town. In June of 1892, by a vote of 72 to 14, the Village of Whitefish Bay was incorporated. The newly organized village made setting up a school its first item of business.<sup>16</sup> Since its incorporation, Whitefish Bay has enjoyed considerable growth, seeing its largest population boom between 1940 and 1950, when the population rose from 9,651 to 14,625.<sup>17</sup> Whitefish Bay is still fairly densely populated, coming in second after Shorewood in the North Shore area, with a population of 14,272 and an area of 2.1 miles.<sup>18</sup>

The majority of the buildings in Whitefish Bay are single family residential homes, and these homes tend to be very large with a high value: This factor raised the fire risk in Whitefish Bay because of the potential for expensive property loss. The business buildings in Whitefish Bay tend to be smaller than those found in the City of Milwaukee, and they are well maintained. As in Shorewood, fire prevention efforts secured a lower fire risk than would be expected in the City of Milwaukee. Before the consolidation, the Whitefish Bay fire department was fully staffed with career personnel, a total of 19 fire fighters.

The City of Glendale came into existence when it incorporated in 1950. During this time, many communities felt pressure to incorporate under the fear

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<sup>15</sup>League of Women Voters of Whitefish Bay, *Whitefish Bay Then and Now* (n.p.: Education Foundation of the League of Women Voters of Milwaukee, 1960), 4.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 5.

that nearby cities would annex their community to provide, or maintain, a larger tax base.<sup>19</sup> The incorporation of the City of Glendale followed this pattern. The City of Milwaukee fought aggressively to annex Glendale, which it found attractive due to its valuable industrial area. Milwaukee challenged Glendale's intention to incorporate by declaring that Glendale was not suited for urban development. Undeterred, Glendale residents continued on their journey towards incorporation. They formed a campaign to incorporate and completed a special census and prepared a map outlining the boundaries for the proposed new City of Glendale boundaries. The City of Milwaukee responded by taking the issue to court. The court case was decided in favor of Glendale; on December 28, 1950, the City of Glendale was officially incorporated.<sup>20</sup> From its tumultuous birth, Glendale has enjoyed middle to upper class residential areas, typical to the North Shore area, while maintaining a balanced industrial and commercial sector.<sup>21</sup>

Today, the City of Glendale is located in the geographic heart of the North Shore communities. The population at the time of consolidation was among the highest of the North Shore communities at 14,102, but the area is larger than Shorewood or Whitefish Bay (with comparable populations), at 5.8 miles.<sup>22</sup> The buildings in Glendale are more widely dispersed, but are also more widely differentiated. Glendale is home to a wider variety of commercial and business properties than the other North Shore villages, which increases the physical fire

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<sup>18</sup> TriData, "Final Report North Shore Communities Fire Services Planning Project", January 7, 1994, 3-3.

<sup>19</sup> See John Gurda, *The Making of Milwaukee*, (Milwaukee, WI. : Milwaukee County Historical Society, 1999)

<sup>20</sup> League of Women Voters of the North Shore, *Glendale: A Citizen's Guide to the Community* (Milwaukee Co., WI: League of Women Voters Education Fund, 1980), 6.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>22</sup> "Final Report North Shore Communities Fire Services Planning Project", January 7, 1994, TriData, 3-3.

risk as well as the potential for high property loss. In fact, because of the large commercial and industrial base located in Glendale, the city has the highest risk of industrial or commercial fires in all of the North Shore communities.<sup>23</sup>

Glendale's response to its fire risk was to assemble the largest fire department in the North Shore, with a staff of 38 career and 2 paid-on-call fire fighters.<sup>24</sup>

The Village of Fox Point was incorporated on December 29, 1925. Among 190 qualified voters, 150 votes were cast, with 125 for and 25 against incorporation.<sup>25</sup> Fox Point enjoyed independence and small growth during the next 25 years, but annexation reared its head again in 1950.

As observed in the incorporation of the city of Glendale, Milwaukee began to seek new revenues by acquiring the tax base generated in the outlying towns. The residents of Fox Point had fears of their own; they did not wish to be annexed into Milwaukee and have their neighborhood developed into an industrial economic foundation for a large urban area. Although Fox Point had not annexed territory in the past, residents now saw defensive annexation as essential to maintaining their status as an independent community. The annexation of 1950 created the present boundaries of the Fox Point. Fox Point boasts a population of 7,235 with an area of 2.8 miles.<sup>26</sup> In contrast to Glendale, the Village of Fox Point is almost entirely residential. The homes located in Fox Point are wealthier middle and upper class homes, especially along the lake shore. These homes tend to be on large lots. Because of the large lots, and

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 2-3.

<sup>24</sup> Part-time, paid-on-call fire fighters are volunteer fire fighters who are paid a wage per hour while they are responding to fire calls. These fire fighters have primary employment elsewhere.



their location on the bluff, it was also difficult for the fire department to access these homes, and that fact, coupled with the high property value, increased the fire risk for Fox Point. The Fox Point fire protection service was staffed with a combination of 12 career and 18 paid-on-call fire fighters.

The Village of Brown Deer was incorporated on January 20, 1955, and, like other communities that sought incorporation during this time, Brown Deer met with opposition from both the Town of Granville and the City of Milwaukee. Brown Deer bordered on the Town of Granville, which the City of Milwaukee wanted to annex for its potential as an industrial area.<sup>27</sup> Local Brown Deer businessmen, who wanted to avoid annexation by the City of Milwaukee, led efforts to consolidate. The plans to incorporate Brown Deer also involved annexations of local areas, including the Town of Granville. This would have increased the area of Brown Deer to 22 square miles. Court action in 1956 limited the area of Brown Deer to 9 square miles, yet still over half of that remained in question.<sup>28</sup> In 1962 the fate of Brown Deer was decided by the State Supreme Court, which limited Brown Deer to 4.4 square miles. The decision also ended the question regarding the Granville territory, which the municipality sought to annex; annexation of Granville was denied to Brown Deer.

Brown Deer had been predominantly rural, and in 1963 approximately one-third of its land remained vacant. During the assessment of fire department consolidation, the community of Brown Deer was the only North Shore

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<sup>25</sup> *Fox Point – A Planned Village, Its Heritage and Development 1843-1976* (n.p.: Bicentennial Committee and the Village Board of Fox Point, 1978), unpaginated.

<sup>26</sup> TriData, "Final Report North Shore Communities Fire Services Planning Project", January 7, 1994, 3-3.

community that was still considered a growing community. Much of the undeveloped land was commercially zoned, which played a role in raising its fire risk assessment.<sup>29</sup> Brown Deer's population of 12,484 with an area of 4.4 square miles is close to an average for the seven communities. It also had a large commercial and business population, with a large amount of commercial and business properties. A handful of large apartment buildings, which were constructed before current restrictive building codes came into effect, raised the fire risk for the community.<sup>30</sup> Yet, as with the other North Shore communities, the buildings were well maintained and the fire prevention education efforts of the community helped to keep the overall fire risk lower than might have been otherwise expected. Brown Deer's fire department was a combination of 17 career and 18 paid-on-call fire fighters.

The Village of River Hills stands unique amongst the seven North Shore communities. River Hills is located along the Milwaukee River and was once called Riverdale. River Hills is strictly a residential community and contains no commercial or business establishments. The homes located in River Hills are single family homes; many are described as "sprawling estates."<sup>31</sup> In keeping with the wealthy character of River Hills, the incorporation of this posh community began at the annual meeting of the stockholders of the Milwaukee Country Club

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<sup>27</sup> Frances Beverstock and Robert P. Stuck eds., *Metropolitan Milwaukee Fact Book: 1970* (Milwaukee: Milwaukee Urban Observatory, 1972), 295.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> TriData, "Final Report North Shore Communities Fire Services Planning Project", January 7, 1994, 2-3.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 2-4.

<sup>31</sup> Frances Beverstock and Robert P. Stuck eds., *Metropolitan Milwaukee Fact Book: 1970* (Milwaukee: Milwaukee Urban Observatory, 1972), 367.

held at the Pfister Hotel in 1929. On April 12, 1930, the incorporation referendum held at the Milwaukee Country Club was passed by a vote of 141 to 15.<sup>32</sup>

In both population and size, River Hills is unlike any other of the six North Shore communities. With a population of only 1,612, it is the least populated of all the North Shore communities, but River Hills occupies 5.5 square miles, making it the second largest North Shore community in terms of area.<sup>33</sup> This is due to the fact that the vast majority of buildings in River Hills are large residential homes located on large lots that are widely separated from one another. Zoning laws prohibited building homes on lots smaller than five acres on 85% of the area of River Hills.<sup>34</sup>

The fire frequency in River Hills was low, yet if a fire occurred, the River Hills Fire Department had to deal with a complex problem: its reliance on water tankers. River Hills had no public water supply; all the homes had private wells. This meant that when a fire occurred, the fire department was responsible for transporting the water in to fight the fire. For this task, they relied on water tankers. The River Hills fire department had 17 paid-on-call fire fighters, and also had 13 Public Safety officers. The Public Safety officers were police officers who responded to fire calls while on duty as a police officer. When there was a fire call, the Public Safety officers had to cease action as a police officer and report to the fire station. This transition slowed down response time to fire calls.

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> TriData, "Final Report North Shore Communities Fire Services Planning Project", January 7, 1994, 3-3.

<sup>34</sup> Frances Beverstock and Robert P. Stuck eds., *Metropolitan Milwaukee Fact Book: 1970* (Milwaukee: Milwaukee Urban Observatory, 1972), 367, 13% of the area of River Hills had zoning laws requiring a minimum of 2 acres lot size, and 2% of the area of River Hills had zoning laws requiring a lot size to be a minimum of 1 acre.

The heated annexation and incorporation period of the early 1950s also prompted the incorporation of the Village of Bayside. Fears of being annexed by either the City of Milwaukee or the City of Glendale guided residents towards incorporation. As in other North Shore incorporations, Milwaukee's interest in gaining an industrial tax base added pressure to consolidation efforts. Bayside's population also feared a shift away from residential growth towards commercial and industrial growth under the guidance of Milwaukee.

After annexation, the Village of Bayside continued to grow as a largely residential neighborhood. Bayside's population was higher than River Hills, with a population of 4,820 living in an area of 2.3 square miles, making it second to the bottom amongst the seven North Shore communities by population.<sup>35</sup> Like River Hills, Bayside residents get their water from private wells. The village lacked a hydrant system and was completely dependent on water tankers to bring the water to the scene of the fire. Bayside was more compact than River Hills, but the spacing between homes was enough that fire spreading was not a significant factor in the area's physical fire risk. As in Fox Point, some of the homes located along the lake shore were a little difficult to reach, which increased the fire risk of the community. The single-family homes of Bayside did not prove a large fire risk, but considering Bayside's reliance on tanker support for water, a large fire in a commercial building would be a considerable danger. The fire protection services offered by the Bayside Fire Department was a combination of paid-on-call fire fighters along with Public Safety officers, as in River Hills.

## Part II: Historical Background

The North Shore communities had a Mutual Aid agreement which bound them together to support each other if necessary during a fire call. Mutual Aid agreements are used by similar communities across the U.S. as a way to enhance fire protection services for smaller communities while still maintaining a low financial overhead. In addition to Mutual Aid, the importance that the North Shore communities placed on fire prevention education and other fire prevention efforts helped to minimize the fire risk in those communities, keeping them lower than those in Milwaukee. Yet, there were distinct challenges to each community that the combined efforts of consolidation would be able to deal with effectively and efficiently.

The North Shore communities have a long history of independence. On some occasions, before the consolidation of fire services, however, they united for mutual benefits. Most notably, they cooperated to form the North Shore Library, the North Shore Water Commission, and the North Shore Paramedic Unit.

The North Shore Library was formed to serve the communities of the North Shore. It is a relatively small library located next to Cardinal Stritch College in Brown Deer. One of the most interesting things to note about the library is that North Shore communities continue to maintain libraries of their own. The North Shore library was built to supplement the individual libraries, and to add to the growing sense of a community identity to the North Shore.

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<sup>35</sup> TriData, "Final Report North Shore Communities Fire Services Planning Project", January 7, 1994, 3-3.

One of the most significant examples of the North Shore communities working together is the North Shore Water Commission. Fox Point had purchased its water from the City of Milwaukee, but as populations in both Fox Point and Milwaukee grew, Fox Point began to look elsewhere for their water supply. In 1933, a citizen's advisory board recommended a joint Fox Point, Whitefish Bay, and Shorewood water plant. During the Great Depression, however, the cost for such a plant was determined to be too high. In the fall of 1957, Whitefish Bay and Fox Point cooperated to petition the Public Service Commission for permission to build their own water plant. Shortly thereafter, Glendale indicated that it would also be interested in a joint water plant, as their water system consisted of private wells. The City of Milwaukee protested the water plant on the grounds that if the North Shore communities provided their own water, it would prove a significant loss of revenue for the City of Milwaukee. On the other hand, the City of Milwaukee did not want to provide water service to Glendale. City officials feared that if Glendale's water service was upgraded, that would encourage the development of industry in Glendale, rather than Milwaukee.<sup>36</sup>

Amid considerable controversy, the Public Service Commission authorized the North Shore Water Commission in January of 1959. The water is pumped from Lake Michigan, purified, chemically treated, and then pumped out to serve the North Shore communities of Fox Point, Whitefish Bay, Glendale and Shorewood. In a booklet published for the celebration of Fox Point's

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<sup>36</sup> *Fox Point – A Planned Village, Its Heritage and Development, 1843-1976* (n.p.; Bicentennial Committee and the Village Board of Fox Point, 1978), unpaginated.

bicentennial, the North Shore Water Commission was hailed as “one of the first examples of cooperation between often fiercely independent suburbs.”<sup>37</sup>

The North Shore communities also demonstrated cooperation with the formation of the North Shore Paramedic Unit. This rescue team was formed in 1978. Milwaukee County provided fifty percent of the necessary operating budget.<sup>38</sup> The North Shore Paramedic Unit served zone A, which was all of the seven of the North Shore communities. The North Shore Paramedic Unit operated separately from the individual community fire departments. Since the consolidation of the North Shore Fire Department, both the rescue and paramedic needs have been met by the North Shore Fire Department.

In the United States, consolidation of fire and rescue services, as currently exists under the newly formed North Shore Fire Department, has largely been completed during the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In fact, “rescue squads developed relatively recently in American life.”<sup>39</sup> Before rescue squads, injured people were personally responsible for their transportation to a doctor or hospital; there was no municipal help. Jack Kelly describes an incident where a young boy fell off a ladder and broke his leg in the winter of 1914.

Because his father was away, his mother had to carry him through the snow to a neighbor’s house. Lacking a phone, the neighbor rode a horse six miles to town. The doctor came out at noon the next day, confirmed that the bone was fractured, and advised Johnson’s mother to get him to the hospital in Easton, Pennsylvania, about fifteen miles away. Johnson recalled making the trip to town on an iron bed mounted on a buckboard, “I hollered

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<sup>37</sup> *Fox Point – A Planned Village, Its Heritage and Development, 1843-1976* (n.p.: Bicentennial Committee and the Village Board of Fox Point, 1978), unpaginated.

<sup>38</sup> Interview with North Shore Fire Department Chief, David Berousek, November 3, 2000.

<sup>39</sup> Jack Kelly, “Rescue Squad,” *American Heritage*, (1996), vol.47, no. 3, p. 92.

all the way as the bumps sent pain shooting into my leg.” After a twenty-minute wait the bed was placed on the baggage car of a southbound train to the city. A horsedrawn ambulance carried the boy to Easton Hospital, where his leg was finally set.<sup>40</sup>

All in all, it took well over a full day for this young boy to receive the medical attention he needed back in 1914. To help with incidents like this, the first independent rescue squad unit in the U.S. was formed in Roanoke, Virginia in 1928. The Roanoke Life Saving and First Aid Crew was formed by Julian Stanley Wise, who had witnessed two canoeists drown when he was nine years old. The memory of their deaths, and the inability of others to save them, remained with him to adulthood. He later said, “Right then I resolved that I was going to become a lifesaver. Never again would I watch a man die when he could be saved.”<sup>41</sup> The first Rescue Squad had modest beginnings compared to today’s lifesaving equipment. Wise’s 1928 crew was armed with a tackle box loaded with bandages and other supplies such as poison ivy wash, ammonia inhalant, and tannic acid compound.

In 1931, Wise’s squad responded to a drowning call. That day they saved a nine year old boy, and the rescue squad received national attention. Interest in the rescue squad program was growing, and Wise traveled over the country to help promote his cause.

Globally, first aid and rescue grew out of military practices. Dominique-Jean Lattrey, also known as the “father of ambulance service,” was the surgeon-in-chief of Napoleon’s army. As a precaution against further injuries to wounded

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<sup>40</sup> Jack Kelly, “Rescue Squad,” *American Heritage*, (1996), vol. 47, no. 3, p. 92.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 91.



soldiers, field hospitals were located miles to the rear of the advancing army; transporting the wounded was a long and difficult task. Because “most of the wounded died from want of assistance,”<sup>42</sup> Lattrey invented the *ambulance volante*, a two-wheeled, light carriage that carried a medical officer and assistant into the battle zone to treat the wounded where they fell, and transport others back to the hospital.<sup>43</sup>

Jean-Henri Dunant, a Swiss tourist, witnessed the horrendous bloodbath of the Battle of Solferino, which left 38,000 people dead or dying.<sup>44</sup> Shocked and horrified by what he had seen, he attempted to establish more humane rules of warfare, and also set up a group to organize civilian aid to wounded soldiers.<sup>45</sup> To honor Dunant, the organization, the Red Cross, adopted the Swiss flag with its colors reversed: a red cross on a white field.

Civilian first aid and ambulance service first emerged in American cities, with Chicago being the one to boast the first motorized ambulance service in 1899. New York followed a year later. In smaller communities, undertakers served an additional role of transporter of the ill or injured, as their vehicles were well suited for transporting the supine. This act of goodwill also boosted their esteem in the eyes of the community, helping to maintain good business relations with their neighbors, if not their customers. Ironically, the manufacture of ambulances closely resembled that of the undertaker’s hearse, and the

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> The Battle of Solferino occurred on June 24, 1859. It was the last engagement in the second war for Italian Independence.

<sup>45</sup> Jack Kelly, “Rescue Squad,” *American Heritage*, (1996), 47(3), p. 93.

construction of the ambulance based on an "enlarged passenger car on a limousine frame remained constant."<sup>46</sup>

As late as the 1960s, undertakers continued to provide ambulance service. In fact, growth in the first aid and ambulance service during the beginning of the twentieth century left much to be desired. In many cities and states, ambulances were staffed only by a driver, while the patient rode unattended in the back.<sup>47</sup> The American Red Cross, along with the American physician's community, and the rescue squad volunteers, came into conflict over the role of ambulances. The medical professionals wanted to keep the laypeople out of their profession. So the medical professionals won initially, and the amount of first aid that the patient could receive from these volunteers was very limited.

That soon changed. As highways continued to sprawl and stretch out across the United States, President John F. Kennedy saw the increased injury and deaths on American highways as "the greatest of the nation's public health problems."<sup>48</sup> Emergency medicine was transformed with the Highway Safety Act of 1966, which "set federal standards for training, equipment, and procedures, which the states busied themselves implementing."<sup>49</sup> Congress allocated hundreds of millions of dollars for funding of communications, ambulances, training, and other equipment.

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 95.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

Today's rescue and paramedic units are trained extensively, receiving "anywhere from four hundred to fifteen hundred hours of instruction, plus additional hours of continuing education."<sup>50</sup> The increased requirements for training takes their toll on volunteers and career members alike. Increases in the budgets needed to sustain a rescue squad unit have resulted from inflation as well as the higher costs of advancing technology. The ambulances of today are costly, around ninety thousand dollars each, and the modern lifesaving technology, such as automated defibrillators, also have a heavy price tag.<sup>51</sup> In addition, the complicated technology of this sensitive equipment requires additional hours of training for the rescue squad members.

Because of these increased costs, it has become increasingly difficult, both economically and psychologically, for smaller communities to staff volunteer rescue squads. Budget and staffing needs continue to be a major concern to rescue squads in the United States and around the country rescue squads are increasingly consolidating with fire departments to help alleviate this problem. The North Shore Paramedic Unit consolidated with the North Shore Fire Department for many of these same reasons.

Members of the communities that depend on these services are becoming more aware of their necessity as well as their financial burden. New and innovative ideas are forming to deal with the increased cost and limited volunteers. The North Shore communities' actions are such an example. Following the trend across the country, they have combined their fire and rescue

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 97..

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

service to improve and maintain excellent fire and rescue service to their communities, and also to decrease those costs shared by the communities. Consolidating the fire and rescue squad services was one thing, the actual consolidation of several independent departments into a single unit, however, was a long and difficult process.

### Part III: The Consolidation

In the 1950s, there was an attempt to consolidate the fire departments of Whitefish Bay, Shorewood, and Glendale. The idea to consolidate was rejected. The rejection was due primarily to economic concerns of the time,<sup>52</sup> competition amongst community fire departments,<sup>53</sup> fears of loss of identity and the fear of the ripple effects of consolidation. The question of consolidation arose again in 1986. Problems with the command post, as well as other accusations of ineptitude of the Shorewood Fire Department, during a large devastating fire in an apartment building in Shorewood on Christmas Day in 1985 prompted another look at the idea of consolidation. It was again rejected due to a "sense of community identity of individual departments and possible difficulties with bargaining units."<sup>54</sup> An article published in the *Whitefish Bay Herald* outlined the communities' solution to the burgeoning problems. Shorewood, Whitefish Bay, and Glendale had agreed to a set of command procedures to improve the way their fire departments worked together on large mutual aid fires.<sup>55</sup> These rules included establishing a visible command post and adopting a tactical worksheet which listed command decisions, objectives, strategies, staffing patterns, and priorities. Although establishing these guidelines as routine procedure in all fires might have increased fire safety and decreased total fire damage, the Fire Chief in Shorewood hinted that he would only use them when in the presence of other

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<sup>52</sup> Interview with Diane Buck, February 2, 2001.

<sup>53</sup> See Kathleen Kiefer, "Flying Sparks and Hooves," *The Cincinnati Historical Society Bulletin*, vol. 28, no. 2, 1976, p 82-107, Jacob Judd, "Brooklyn's Volunteer Fire Department," *The Journal of Long Island History*, vol. 6, no. 3, 1966, p 29-34.

<sup>54</sup> Clipping, Box 26: Municipal Departments of Whitefish Bay, Whitefish Bay Library, "Four Communities Consider Uniting Fire Departments," *Milwaukee Journal*, 7/14/1989.

community fire departments. The Shorewood Fire and Police Chief Alvin Berndt commented that these new guidelines might be beneficial, but went on to state, "However, we're only talking about that very small percentage of fires that involves mutual aid responses."<sup>56</sup> The question of adequate fire fighting in the North Shore communities lingered in the minds of many people.

In 1991, an article appearing in the *Whitefish Bay Herald* set off a debate of the superiority of career fire fighters over volunteer, paid-on-call fire fighters. Whitefish Bay Chief Norman Wichman publicly criticized fire fighters from other North Shore communities for their actions at the scene of a fire at the Food Lane grocery store in Whitefish Bay. He accused the part-time, paid-on-call fire fighters of panicking and not knowing how to operate the equipment. He reported that he saw some fire fighters with their masks on wrong and that others were unable to perform specific tasks.<sup>57</sup> Captain Jeffrey Weigand of the Fox Point Fire Department rose to their defense, saying "A paid-on-call fire fighter is no less a professional than a full-time fire fighter. In fact, there are a lot of volunteer fire fighters who are more professional than ones getting paid (full-time) for it."<sup>58</sup> He also said that the paid-on-call fire fighters "lacked a union mentality."<sup>59</sup> The Shorewood Fire Chief Alvin Berndt took the side of the full-timers, claiming that full-time fire fighters quit less often, were more professional, and had better command control – that is they responded more effectively to the

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<sup>55</sup> Clipping, Box 26: Municipal Departments of Whitefish Bay, "Questions raised: Fire Command Gets Review," *The Whitefish Bay Herald*, 2/20/1986.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Clipping, Box 26: Municipal Departments of Whitefish Bay, "A Burning Issue: Are Full-Time Fire Fighters Better Than Volunteers?" *The Whitefish Bay Herald*, 8/8/1991.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

orders of the command post during a fire call. He also said that the full-time fire fighters “live the job,” in contrast to the paid-on-call fire fighters, who had primary jobs elsewhere.

After two larger fires in 1992, the North Shore communities again looked at the possibility of consolidating. The departments were still having difficulty working effectively together during Mutual Aid calls, and costs for fire service were escalating. An article in the *Milwaukee Journal* on May 26<sup>th</sup> 1992, claimed that no North Shore community could afford to continue to operate alone. It also reported that Fox Point did not have enough fire fighters available to fight fires.<sup>60</sup> Because of the increased costs, Milwaukee was withdrawing its Mutual Aid support, and there was a growing fear among residents that the communities would be left without adequate fire protection.<sup>61</sup>

The booming economy enjoyed in the early 1990s made people optimistic. This, coupled with the fact that the now scrambling fire departments in the North Shore made safety concerns obvious, made new efforts to consolidate more possible. Yet there were still major obstacles and opponents to the effort. The individual North Shore communities had long been aware of their separate, yet united existence among other communities in the metro Milwaukee area. They had all previously shown that they were willing and able to enact defensive measures to ensure continued fruitful independent existence. The separate communities were capable of and amenable to cooperating to achieve a solution

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid. The “union mentality” referred to the tendency for union fire fighters to place an emphasis on their own personal gains, rather than the safety and security of those they have vowed to protect.

<sup>60</sup> “Fox Point: ‘Report Calls for Merger of Fire Fighters: Study of Village’s Needs Says Personnel Should be Added to Departments,’” *Milwaukee Journal*, 5/26/1992.

to their municipal needs. Some community members feared that under consolidation, their community would lose its sense of identity. Fire departments have long been seen as a part of the community, "integrally involved in the community process."<sup>62</sup> This sense of community can also be seen in the display of mutual aid: "firemen are quite conscious of the exchange basis of social activity, to the point that they may be said to have a well-developed ideology of mutual aid."<sup>63</sup> Fire fighters are willing to put in extra time and effort to help out neighboring communities, recognizing that they will also receive help when they themselves are in need.

Community fire departments, such as those in North Shore, recognize that their public image begins with their appearance. The department's appearance is, in fact, "relevant to the public confidence and support, [because] the firemen generally consider the public unqualified to make technical judgments" about its performance.<sup>64</sup> The "appearance" of the fire department is not confined only to their fire fighting abilities, but includes the look of their apparatus, equipment, and tools. It also extends to the individual department members and their conduct, both on duty and off. Members are "cautioned against reckless driving, joy-riding with equipment, and even a generally sloppy demeanor."<sup>65</sup>

Maintenance of the equipment is considered a top priority, not only to maintain the working order of the equipment, but to maintain public support. The public makes its judgment of the departmental equipment primarily on sight, as

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<sup>61</sup> Interview with North Shore Fire Department Chief, David Berousek, November 3, 2000.

<sup>62</sup> John Lozier, "Volunteer Fire Departments and Community Mobilization," *Human Organization*, (1976), vol. 35, no. 4, 346.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 347.



they often know little of the mechanics of the apparatus. It is for this reason that “considerable effort is expended in cosmetic cleaning, painting, and polishing of equipment. . . A great deal of effort is directed at making the property of the (fire department) into an impressive display.”<sup>66</sup> The fire engines themselves have come to represent not only the fire department and fire service to the community; they are also a reflection of that community.

The fire engine is a potent symbol of community solidarity, and it should be as new, as large, and as shiny as possible. Within a locality, it symbolizes protection offered by the community, the most basic function of human society. Beyond the locality, the fire engine provides a basis for invidious comparison: “Our fire engine is better than your fire engine.”<sup>67</sup>

This image of the fire department held by the community is significant, because how the community views the department is what shapes their reaction and feelings towards the department. Most communities have grown to view fire departments not only as the protectors against fire, but a reflection of their community’s status. “It is clear that the role and purpose of the (fire department) may be broader than mere fire protection.”<sup>68</sup> This view of the fire department as a reflection of the community is essential to understanding how many residents and fire department members saw consolidation as threatening to their municipalities’ identity.

John Lozier, writing on fire departments and community mobilization, asserts that “a community may be said to exist wherever numerous parties

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 347-348.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 348.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

recognize shared or mutual interests ('community of interest'); by this criterion, it is clear that the relationships among local (fire departments) contribute to the maintenance of community at a supralocal level."<sup>69</sup> Lozier asserts that the fire departments themselves form a community; and these departments interact with each other at the supralocal level, forming a separate and unique community. Using this view, we can look at the fire departments of the North Shore as existing in a community of their own, a community of fire departments existing locally. They worked together on large fires in the form of mutual aid. As the fire departments in the individual communities evolved, their needs changed. At this supralocal level, the departments recognized that they belonged to a community of fire departments, and the problems they faced were faced by that community as a whole.

At this supralocal level, other municipal agencies felt threatened by the proposed consolidation of the North Shore fire departments.<sup>70</sup> Questions were raised. If the fire department was consolidated, would the police department be next? Would city services such as snow plowing, waste removal and recycling pick-up be consolidated? The consolidation of one of these municipal services, the fire department, threatened the sense of community identity. In retrospect, we can see that this threat was small. Members of the community, however, anticipated that the consolidation of the fire department, although beneficial, would lead to a domino effect of consolidation of other municipal services. The

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 352.

<sup>70</sup> Interview with North Shore Fire Department Chief David Berousek, November 3, 2001.

sense of identity that the local community attached to these services would be lost, and the independence enjoyed by the communities would be threatened.

Also important are those fears held by the members of the North Shore communities regarding a threatened loss of community identity. These fears were juxtaposed to the fears of lost identity held by the fire department members themselves. Each department feared a loss of control and identity with consolidation. Staff members worried about pay cuts, being laid off, and their respective rank in the new consolidated department. Fears of identity existed within the community on a local level, in the respective community itself, as well as on a supralocal level, in the community's fire department.

Understanding these fears, and their effects on the minds of the members of the local and supralocal communities is essential to understanding the consolidation of the North Shore fire departments. It was largely due to these fears that previous attempts at consolidation failed. These fears also played a large role in the difficulty in the eventual successful consolidation that began in 1991.

In 1991, the idea to consolidate the North Shore fire departments was reintroduced to residents of the seven communities, and discussions began anew. The municipalities hired a company, TriData, to analyze the fire protection services in the respective North Shore communities and to make recommendations about improving the current fire protection service situation. TriData is based in Arlington, Virginia and specializes in researching and analyzing fire protection and emergency medical services, along with an array of

other fire and emergency protection services used by municipalities across the country.<sup>71</sup> In recent years it had become clear that something had to be done regarding the fire fighting services of the communities of the North Shore. After analysis, TriData found that the fire departments in the North Shore were inadequate:

There have been one or two major fires each year in the North Shore area that appear to have exceeded the capabilities of the local fire suppression forces. The history of these incidents suggests that the initial attack force and early reinforcements were unable to control the fires. The information that is available from these incidents suggests that the operational capabilities of the existing mutual aid system are weak.<sup>72</sup>

Community leaders, including fire department officials as well as the local governments with voter support, debated the merits of several proposals to solve the problems of fire service protection inadequacy. These options included consolidation of all seven of the communities' fire protection services, and a partial consolidation of the fire protection services in some of the North Shore communities. Community leaders also looked into enhancing the existing Mutual Aid system. Another suggestion was to accept the offer from the City of Milwaukee to provide fire service protection. Finally, they could simply keep the status quo.

Civic leaders examined each of these options, as did TriData. It was very important to consider the effects that each alternative would have on the individual communities and fire departments. The North Shore communities themselves were distinct in their strengths and weaknesses, as well as in their

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<sup>71</sup> <http://www.sysplan.com/TriData>

<sup>72</sup> TriData, "Final Report: North Shore Communities Fire Services Planning Project", January 7, 1994, 1-5.

needs. In addition, each of the seven North Shore communities had structured its own fire department differently. The existing fire protection services in each of the seven communities were analyzed to determine how best to magnify the strengths, and minimize, or eliminate altogether, the weaknesses. These goals guided policy makers, local government officials and fire department officials as they reviewed the report submitted by TriData. They used the information from the report to determine how best to alleviate the growing problems that the communities were being forced to deal with.

The Shorewood, Whitefish Bay, and Glendale fire departments were staffed with a combined total of 81 career fire fighters. Fox Point and Brown Deer staffed a combination of career and paid-on-call fire fighters, with a combined total of 65 fire fighters.<sup>73</sup> The two communities of River Hills and Bayside operated as Public Safety departments, "using police officers as their primary firefighters, backed-up by a paid-on-call reserve force."<sup>74</sup> Below, Table I summarizes the staffing of the independent North Shore fire departments in 1994 as reviewed by TriData:

Table I: Fire Department Staffing

City	Population	Area (sq. mi.)	FF Career*	FF POC**	PSO***
Bayside	4,820	2.3	0	21	14

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., Fox Point had 12 career, and 18 active reserve members, Brown Deer had 17 career, and also had 18 active reserve members, or paid-on-call. The active reserve members were paged to respond as a back-up to the on-duty personnel. 3-1.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

Brown Deer	12,484	4.4	17	18	0
Fox Point	7,235	2.8	12	18	0
Glendale	14,102	5.8	38	2	0
River Hills	1,612	5.5	0	17	13
Shorewood	14,128	1.6	21	0	0
Whitefish Bay	14,272	2.1	19	0	0
<i>Total</i>	<i>68,653</i>	<i>24.5</i>	<i>107</i>	<i>76</i>	<i>27</i>

\*FF Career refers to career fire fighters,

\*\*FF POC refers to paid-on-call fire fighters

\*\*\*PSO refers to Public Safety Officers

Because each of these communities had a relatively low rate of large fires, the officers who would command at such a scene were relatively inexperienced in that role. The officer in command at one fire scene was not necessarily the officer who was in command at the last fire call, nor would he necessarily be the officer in command at the next call. Those who took command at the scene varied in experience and training, and all handled the command post differently. The lack of regular and experienced command officers in paid-on-call departments was one of the problems that led to the discussion of consolidation. Consolidation of the departments was expected to curb this problem, as the command officers would be specifically trained in command, and they would be in that position on a regular basis.

Because of the limitations placed on the individual departments, many of the officers had multiple roles. These additional duties included "management and supervision of fire prevention and public education programs, training,

maintenance of apparatus, equipment and facilities, administrative duties, and special projects within their individual departments."<sup>75</sup> Due to the numerous tasks set before the officers, they could give only limited attention to each individual problem or policy. A large part of the officers' time was bogged down in tedious administrative duties. Consequently, they had less time for training, educational purposes, and maintenance of equipment. Consolidation would streamline the administrative duties, delegating these roles to a few select individuals who focused on giving these tasks the attention they needed and deserved, without robbing the fire department of training, educational, or maintenance time.


Each of the seven communities had its own fire station, and response times were satisfactorily low. In Bayside and River Hills, however, no one was regularly staffed at the fire station ready to respond, so there was a built-in delay. These communities relied on police, or public safety, officers to go to the station and respond with the appropriate vehicle. In an emergency, the 911 dispatcher sent out a page notifying the fire fighters of the fire call. The public safety officers, as well as paid-on-call members, received a page on a beeper notifying them of the fire call, to which they then responded. Map I shows the communities and their fire station locations.

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 3-4.

Map I: Fire Station Locations Prior to Consolidation

### EXISTING FIRE STATION LOCATIONS



Source: "Final Report North Shore Communities Fire Services Project," January 7, 1994, TriData, 3-8.



Each of the seven communities had a variety of apparatus, some in good condition, others in poor. Looked at individually, some departments were better off than others; by combining all the apparatus, however, there would be enough apparatus in good working condition to effectively meet the needs of the North Shore communities. The newly consolidated department would have to upgrade a fairly weak reserve fleet with replacements in the relatively near future.<sup>76</sup> Table II details each department's apparatus, and its status.

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 3-9.

Table II: Apparatus Roster

	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Capabilities</i>	<i>Condition</i>
yside	2154	1987 Pierce Pumper	1250gpm/1500 gal.	Very Good
	2153	1975 Ford CFI Pumper	1000gpm/1000 gal.	Fair
	2151	1990 Ford M/M	BLS Ambulance T-1	Very Good
	2157	1988 GMC Rescue	One Ton Utility	Very Good
	2155	1984 Ford Tanker	2500 gal.	Very Good
	2156	1976 Ford Tanker	1500 gal.	Good
own Deer	1355	1981 Mack MC Pumper	1500gpm/ 700 gal.	Good
	1352	1975 Ford Pumper	1250 gpm/ 500 gal.	Fair
	1351	1991 Simon LTI	100 ft/1250gpm	Excellent
	1359	1992 Ford	BLS Ambulance T-1	Excellent
c Point	1550	1987 Pierce Pumper	1250 gpm/750 gal.	Very Good
	1551	1970 Pirsch Pumper	1000gpm/300 gal.	Fair
	1552	1956 FWD Pumper	1000gpm/250 gal.	Very Poor
	1554	1990 Ford Horton	BLS Ambulance T-1	Excellent
	1555	1955 Metro	Rescue Van	Very Poor
ndale	1753	1992 Pierce Pumper	1750 gpm/700 gal.	Excellent
	1754	1978 Mack MB Pumper	1250 gpm/500 gal.	Very Good
	1758	1970 Mack CF Snorkel	85 ft. Pitman	Fair
	1755	1992 Ford M/M	BLS Ambulance T-1	Excellent
	1764	1985 GMC Suburban	Command Unit	Very Good
	MED8	1992 GMC	ALS AmbulanceT-1	Excellent
er Hills	1951	1981 Pierce Pumper	1250gpm/1250 gal.	Good
	1952	1957 Pirsch Pumper	1000gpm	Poor
	1955	1976 IHC Tanker	2000 gal.	Poor
	1954	1970 GMC Brush Unit	250 gal. skid	Fair
	1950	1986 Ford	BLS Ambulance T-1	Very Good
itefish	1153	1980 Mack MC Pumper	1250gpm/500 gal.	Good
	1158	1973 Seagrave Quint	85 ft/ 1250 gpm	Fair
	1155	1983 Ford	BLS Ambulance T-1	Good
rewood	957	1992 Pierce Pumper	1250gpm/500 gal.	Excellent
	956	1981 GMC Pumper	1000gpm/300 gal.	Fair
	958	1971 Pirsch Ladder	100 ft Rearmount	Fair
	909	1989 McCoy Miller	BLS Ambulance T-1	Good
	957	1965 Pirsch Pumper	1000gpm/ 300 gal.	Poor

Units in **Bold** are suitable for first line duty.

Units in *Italics* are suitable for reserve status.

Units in plain type are due for replacement or retirement.

A major part of consolidation was combining the communications system of each of the separate departments. Shorewood, Whitefish Bay and Glendale had already combined their communications systems, located in the basement of the Whitefish Bay police station. The Fox Point Police Station housed a dispatcher for Fox Point, Bayside and River Hills 911 calls.<sup>77</sup> Brown Deer provided its own communications through a dispatcher on duty at the police station. TriData's analysis determined that with a "modest expansion of the CAD, [Computer Aided Dispatch], system . . . in Whitefish Bay would allow that facility to provide fire and EMS [Emergency Medical Services] communications for all seven communities."<sup>78</sup>

Consolidation of the fire services in the North Shore communities also required adjusting the fire station locations. There were two ideas proposed by TriData, the first included four stations, and the other included five stations. See Maps II and III for station locations.

The proposal for four stations was based on the assumption that a four-minute response time to all areas was all that was needed. The five-station proposal, with a three-minute response time, included an additional station in the Whitefish Bay and Shorewood areas, where, due to high population and relatively small area, there were higher risk levels. See Maps IV and V for response time areas.


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<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 3-12.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 3-12.

Map II: Proposed 4-Station Locations


### PROPOSED FIRE STATION LOCATIONS



Source: "Final Report North Shore Communities Fire Services Project," January 7, 1994, TriData, 5-5.

Map III: Proposed 5-Station Locations

### ALTERNATE FIRE STATION PLAN (5 Stations)




	City Limit
	Street
	Highway
	Rail Road
	Fire Station

Source: "Final Report North Shore Communities Fire Services Project," January 1994, TriData, 5-8.




Map IV: Response Time for 4-Station Proposal

FOUR FIRE STATIONS  
4 Minute Response Areas



Source: "Final Report North Shore Communities Fire Services Project," January 7, 1994, TriData, 5-6.

Map V: Response Time for 5-Station Proposal



Source: "Final Report North Shore Communities Fire Services Project," January 1994, TriData, 5-9.

Under these proposals, each station would be staffed according to the specific necessities of its response area. Each company was to be staffed at a level which maximized efficiency while minimizing the number of workers. Because much of the administrative work was to be done in a central office, the amount of staff needed for administrative work was lower than the number of administrative workers needed at the independent stations. The number of fire fighters kept on staff was also kept to a minimum and was attractive because response times were also kept low, so if additional help was needed from another station, they were not far away. See attached tables for both four and five station proposals in the Appendix for suggested staffing. Notice that the total numbers of on-duty staff of 9 officers and 26 fire fighters was the same for both four and five-station proposals.

A major consideration in the proposal for consolidation was the "inherent weaknesses of many small fire departments . . . the lack of management and staff support."<sup>79</sup> With consolidation, the management could become much more effective. In a fire department, whether large or small, the personnel must be trained, in regular and structured sessions, equipment and facilities must be maintained, and inspections made. In career departments, "personnel must also be hired, promoted, reviewed, and disciplined."<sup>80</sup> With consolidation, these duties could be streamlined for maximum efficiency. Figure I shows the proposed administrative organization.


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<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 6-1.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.



**NORTH SHORE FIRE DEPARTMENT  
PROPOSED ORGANIZATION CHART**



Source: "Final Report North Shore Communities Fire Services Project," January 7, 1994, TriData, 6-2.

Although this organizational structure looks complex, it actually reduced the overall number of management and staff positions that had existed in the seven communities.

The model dictated that the Fire Chief would report to a Board of Directors, who would be either elected or appointed by all seven of the communities. It would be the Board's responsibility to ensure that the department was effectively and properly managed and budgeted. It would also act as a buffer between local political bodies, so that the fire department was not constantly preoccupied with political issues. According to Chief of the North Shore Fire Department, David Berousek, the Board has worked quite effectively in this respect. Berousek has formed and maintained a working relationship with the President of the Board, as well as the other members. Questions or concerns that the Board members have are directed towards Chief Berousek, and Berousek is not plagued with calls from the many members on the various North Shore community governments.<sup>81</sup>

Company officers would be responsible for the crews of the individual companies they command. (In the staffing tables, company officers are listed as lieutenants.) One option proposed was to "upgrade one lieutenant position at each station to the rank of captain."<sup>82</sup> The position of apparatus operator would be a position available by promotion, and fire fighters would compose the bulk of the staff of each fire station. Additional personnel, such as Training Officer, and

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<sup>81</sup> Interview with North Shore Fire Department Chief David Berousek, February 28, 2001.

<sup>82</sup> TriData, "Final Report: North Shore Communities Fire Services Planning Project, January 7, 1994, 6-5.

Support Services Officer, would be needed to perform duties such as training and maintenance.

A critical issue in the proposal for consolidation was cost. Three major factors played a role in the discussion of how costs would be allocated among the seven North Shore communities: population, equalized property valuation, (which was essentially a mathematical determination of the property values in each community); and lastly, participating jurisdictions would each pay an equal fee. (Tables III and IV break down the costs that TriData anticipated for each of the seven communities under consolidation.)

Table III and Table IV: Cost Assessment

*Using Two Part Formula (Population and Valuation)*

Bayside	7.51%	\$525,700
Brown Deer	16.70%	\$1,169,000
Fox Point	11.53%	\$807,100
Glendale	21.70%	\$1,519,000
River Hills	4.28%	\$299,600
Shorewood	17.96%	\$1,257,200
Whitefish Bay	<u>20.32%</u>	<u>\$1,422,400</u>
	100.00%	\$7,000,000

*Using Three Part Formula (Population, Valuation, and Seven Equal Shares)*

Bayside	9.77%	\$683,900
Brown Deer	15.90%	\$1,113,000
Fox Point	12.44%	\$870,800
Glendale	19.23%	\$1,346,100
River Hills	7.62%	\$533,400
Shorewood	16.73%	\$1,171,100
Whitefish Bay	<u>18.31%</u>	<u>\$1,281,700</u>
	100.00%	\$7,000,000

Source: "Final Report North Shore Communities Fire Services Project," January 7, 1994, TriData, 7-7.

The second proposal on the table was a consolidation among only a subset of the communities in the North Shore area. After review of the financial costs in connection with the expected gains in fire protection services, TriData recommended against that possibility. TriData reported that “the cost implications for these communities are relatively neutral if all seven communities participate, but higher if only the communities with career departments decide to join together. A consolidation of the five career departments would take about the same resources and cost about the same as a department to protect all seven communities.”<sup>83</sup> In essence, if there was only a partial consolidation, they financial costs would remain relatively the same, yet the fire protection services in the remaining communities would not be improved, so the consolidated departments would not benefit from the combined efforts of all the communities departments.

The North Shore communities rejected the idea of enhancing the existing Mutual Aid system. The Mutual Aid resources within the seven North Shore communities were already depleted. The communities would have to draw from outside their existing Mutual Aid zone to gain assistance. The City of Milwaukee had withdrawn from the Mutual Aid system, and would not provide assistance except for a major emergency under a County Emergency Operations Plan. Without cooperation of the City of Milwaukee, enhancing the Mutual Aid system seemed a futile effort.

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 7-11.

In addition, there were concerns regarding the existing Mutual Aid system. One major concern was “whether mutual aid should be provided to ‘low effort neighbors.’”<sup>84</sup> No community wanted to be physically or financially responsible for fighting other communities’ fires through the Mutual Aid system unless they would receive similar assistance in return. Municipalities across the nation were aware of the danger of one community abusing the Mutual Aid system, thereby forcing neighboring communities to subsidize their fire protection services.<sup>85</sup> Each of the communities in the North Shore area responded to Mutual Aid, and there was no evidence to suggest that any community was abusing the mutual aid system in the descriptions above. Yet, future abuse of the system remained a worry amongst the communities and departments. This concern influenced the ultimate decision not to attempt to enhance the existing mutual aid system.

The City of Milwaukee had proposed providing its fire protection services to the North Shore communities. The proposal by Milwaukee did not appear desirable to the North Shore communities for several reasons. Policy makers agreed with the report from TriData which argued that “Milwaukee’s approach to providing fire protection leans heavily toward fire suppression, but places much less emphasis on fire prevention, public education and risk management.”<sup>86</sup> Another factor that weighed heavily on the minds of those considering the options available to the fire departments was that if Milwaukee took over the fire

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 7-13.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 7-14, Fire suppression focuses on putting an existing fire out, while fire prevention focuses on preventing fires from occurring.

protection services, the vast majority of the North Shore career fire fighters would be laid off. Those able to obtain jobs with the Milwaukee fire department would only be offered entry level positions, would lose their seniority, benefits, and take a pay cut. They would also be required to move into the City of Milwaukee within six months.<sup>87</sup> The fear of losing their jobs, or their seniority and benefits, was quite possibly the most important reason for refusing the offer of the City of Milwaukee by fire fighters in the North Shore area.

The final alternative to consolidation of all seven of the North Shore communities' fire departments was to keep the status quo. This last proposal was rejected by the North Shore communities because it offered no solution to the existing problems.

The talks within and amongst communities continued. Although the majority of the municipalities agreed that consolidation was the best route to take, the Village of Bayside remained a hold-out. Bayside argued that they would have a much higher financial responsibility, in exchange for less service under the consolidation plan. In both of the proposals, the Bayside fire station would be abandoned and the fire station located in Fox Point would be responsible for responding to calls in the Bayside area. Some members of the Bayside fire department, along with Village officials, disagreed that consolidation was the best alternative for them, and were interested in pursuing other avenues to update their fire protection services.

One such opponent, Kevin Gerard, sent out letters to the residents of Bayside, urging them to contact the Village President, Francine Press, along with

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

the Village Trustees, and pose a united front against consolidation.<sup>88</sup> Gerard pointed to the proposed closing of the Bayside fire station and the increase in fire service protection costs as reasons for opposing consolidation. He outlined the current fire protection services as adequate and not in need of adjustment.<sup>89</sup> He did acknowledge that the current fire protection services provided by Bayside could be improved upon, but he suggested that that could be done at a much lower cost than the consolidation would incur. The trustees, village officials, and residents of Bayside agreed with him, and dropped out of the consolidation plans.

The Fire Department of the Village of Bayside operated as a Public Safety department. This means that Bayside used police officers as their primary fire fighters and the rest of the members of the department were paid-on-call.<sup>90</sup> The Public Safety officers were the first to respond to fire calls, driving to the fire station and then taking an apparatus to the scene of the call. In contrast to River Hills, Bayside is relatively compact, so the delay that occurred when the Public Safety officer traveled to the fire station, and then to the scene, was fairly minimal, although it did exist.

Bayside's apparatus status at the time of negotiations of consolidation was considerably higher than other communities. This was largely because the vast majority of the fire department's budget could be allocated for equipment, as they did not have to pay salaries to career fire fighters. Also, the Public Safety officers

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<sup>88</sup> Kevin Gerard, Letter to Bayside residents, October 1, 1994, white binder, Box "N.S.F.D. Consolidation Records, 9/1/95, Chief Berousek's Collection.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.



who were the first line of defense for the Bayside Fire Department were on the payroll of the Police Department, not the Fire Department.

TriData had proposed that after consolidation of the North Shore fire departments, some of the fire stations would be closed and others renovated to better meet the needs of the new department. Although the Bayside fire station had been in good condition to serve the needs in Bayside, under the new consolidation plan, it would be inadequate. The Bayside fire station served largely as a storage facility for the apparatus and was unable to house the career fire fighters who would need to be staffed there under consolidation. The station did not have, nor was there room to add on, living quarters needed for career fire fighters. For these reasons, it was proposed that the Bayside station would be among those marked for abandonment. Gerard and others opposing consolidation in Bayside saw the elimination of their fire station as a personal attack on Bayside's autonomy, and were fearful that it would leave them vulnerable to future fires.<sup>91</sup> Also, the residents in Bayside would need a tax increase in order to pay for the new fire protection services they would receive under the consolidation plan. Many saw this as paying more money for fewer services.

Gerard claimed that Bayside's fire protection service fees would increase 1,000%.<sup>92</sup> He alleged that the current budget for fire and ambulance services was just under \$65,000. Under the consolidation plan, that budget would be

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<sup>90</sup> TriData, "Final Report, North Shore Communities Fire Services Planning Project," January 7, 1994, Bayside had 14 Public Safety officers and 21 paid-on-call fire fighters, bringing the total department to 35 members.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

increased to between \$500,000 and \$600,000.<sup>93</sup> However, it is important to note here that a large portion of the budget for fire protection services in Bayside was hidden in the budget of the Police Department. As the Public Safety officers were Police officers, a portion of their time was given to fighting fires, not acting as police officers. To truly understand the amount that the Bayside residents paid for fire protection services, one would have to analyze the amount of time each Public Safety officer spent fighting fires, and how much time they spent acting as police officers, and divide the Police Department budget accordingly. Because that was not done, there does not exist an accurate reflection of the actual costs of fire fighting in Bayside. Because there is no accurate budget, it cannot be determined exactly how much of an increase, if any, Bayside residents would be subjected to under the proposed consolidation plan.

In his letter, Gerard concluded by stating that the level of fire protection that residents of Bayside enjoyed was satisfactory. He pointed to the 24-hour availability of the public safety officers, who were rapidly followed to the scene of a fire by the many highly trained paid-on-call fire fighters.<sup>94</sup> He also asserted that if needed, Bayside could rely on Mutual Aid from neighboring communities. It is important to note here that if Bayside did not consolidate with the other six North Shore communities, Bayside would be forced to pay for continued Mutual Aid from the newly formed North Shore Fire Department, at a rate of \$10,000 an

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<sup>92</sup> Kevin Gerard, Letter to Bayside residents, October 1, 1994, white binder, Box "N.S.F.D. Consolidation Records, 9/1/95," Chief Berousek's Collection.

<sup>93</sup> TriData, "Final Report, North Shore Communities Fire Services Planning Project", January 7, 1994, 7-7.

<sup>94</sup> Kevin Gerard, Letter to Bayside residents, October 1, 1994, white binder, Box "N.S.F.D. Consolidation Records, 9/1/95," Chief Berousek's Collection.

hour.<sup>95</sup> Gerard conveniently forgot to mention this fact in his letter to his neighbors. The charge for such Mutual Aid services almost certainly would have increased the overall budget for fire services in Bayside.

Due to opposition efforts of Gerard and other Bayside residents, Village President Francine Press pulled Bayside out of consolidation negotiations in July 1994. Although no longer directly involved in the negotiation and consolidation process with the rest of the North Shore communities, Bayside village officials and residents continued to debate the question amongst themselves. The village manager, Scott Botcher, urged the Village Board to reconsider joining the consolidated North Shore Department. Even though the Board had voted to withdraw from consolidation negotiations, they had authorized Botcher to continue to look into the proposed consolidation. As Botcher watched, the realization settled in that the other six communities were continuing ahead with consolidation, with or without Bayside.

Village President Francine Press felt the heat regarding the consolidation efforts still underway without the cooperation of Bayside. Trustee William Richards even went so far as to accuse Press of negotiating with the other six communities behind the Village Board's back. Accusations and insults were hurled in both directions, as other Village Trustees rose to defend Press. Trustee David Fantle criticized Richards, accusing him of micromanaging Bayside. Another defender of the President, Myril Manhoff, called for Richard's resignation

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<sup>95</sup> "Final Draft of the North Shore Fire Services Agreement, 9/2/1994", Exhibit A, 2, white binder, Box "N.S.F.D. Consolidation Records," Chief Berousek's Collection.

and lashed out at him saying, "You are trying to run the village. You are trying to play your Clarence Darrow routine, and I'm sick of it."<sup>96</sup>

As negotiation talks continued without Bayside, the clock began to tick louder. Bayside was on the outside looking in a window, and Botcher recommended that they should "jump through before it's on the outside looking in for good."<sup>97</sup> If Bayside missed the boat on the consolidation, they would lose out on a more effective and efficient fire department, with better equipment, less individual responsibility, with ultimately a higher cost.

A final draft of the North Shore fire services agreement, written on September 2, 1994 did not include the village of Bayside. It did, however, include the other six North Shore municipalities, Brown Deer, Fox Point, Glendale, River Hills, Shorewood, and Whitefish Bay.<sup>98</sup>

Under considerable stress, Press stepped down as Bayside's Village President. The resulting power vacuum enabled David Fantle to assume the leadership, and he quickly contacted the other six North Shore communities about re-joining consolidation efforts. Bayside's late re-entry severely limited their ability to negotiate, and Bayside was required to accept the consolidation terms as they stood. The North Shore Fire Department would operate under the suggested five-station plan, and Bayside was given the promise that the first new station would be built in their municipal area.<sup>99</sup> Bayside signed the agreement on November 20, 1994 and was ensured membership in the North Shore Fire

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<sup>96</sup> Clipping; white binder, Box "N.S.F.D. Consolidation Records 9/1/95," Chief Berousek's Collection, "Fire Plan Talk Sparks Spat, Improper Negotiation Alleged".

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

Department. It was a long and difficult road, but one that led Bayside ultimately to make the decision of becoming a part of the future of fire protection services in the North Shore area.

The agreement for the consolidation of the North Shore Fire Department included a Board of Directors,<sup>100</sup> who would oversee the operation of the North Shore Fire Department. The Board consisted of the mayors of the seven North Shore communities. Meetings of the Board of Directors would be held once a quarter, or at the request of the President, or by the written request of two or more members. The Board was required to vote on any purchase of \$50,000 or more, and an affirmative vote of six or more members was required. The Board was also required to vote on the expulsion of any member of the Board, and again, an affirmative vote of six or more members was required. To abandon or relocate the station in any one of the municipalities, the affirmative vote of the representative of that municipality was required. The Board chose its own officers, and no compensation was given to the members of the Board.

The Board's important powers included, although were not limited to approval of the budget of the North Shore Fire Department. It was also authorized to approve the "repair, maintenance and renewal of the physical assets which are owned by the North Shore Fire Department."<sup>101</sup> The Board's primary role was managing the finances of the fire department.

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<sup>98</sup> "Final Draft of the North Shore Fire Services Agreement, 9/2/1994", Exhibit A, 2, white binder, Box "N.S.F.D. Consolidation Records," Chief Berousek's Collection.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid. As of spring 2001, there are still no plans for a station in the Bayside area.

<sup>100</sup> Clipping, "North Shore Fire Services Agreement," white binder, Box "N.S.F.D. Consolidation Records, 9/1/95," 1-4.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

Each of the seven municipalities would have a representative, appointed by their respective Mayors and Village Presidents. The members of the commission would not receive compensation for their services, and they would be appointed for five year terms.<sup>102</sup> The Fire Commission would be required to meet at least once a year, or at the request of the Chair or the written request of at least two of the members. For all business decisions, a majority vote was required. The powers of the Fire Commission, included, but were not limited to, the "appointments, promotions, suspensions, removals, dismissals, reemployment, compensation, rest days, exemptions, organization and supervision of departments, contracts and audits, to the extent that the provisions apply to third class cities."<sup>103</sup> Employees of the North Shore Fire Department would be considered employees of the North Shore Fire Department, not of any one of the municipalities they served.<sup>104</sup>

The North Shore Fire Department became the owner of all the assets of the North Shore Fire Department, except for the real estate.<sup>105</sup> The real estate would not be owned by the North Shore Fire Department, "unless any of such property is conveyed to and titled in the name of the North Shore Fire Department."<sup>106</sup>

The financial formula for each village was based on three factors: population, assessed valuation, and usage. The usage was to be calculated "in

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid. Initially, the representatives of Brown Deer and Glendale would have 5-year terms, Shorewood would have a 4-year term, Whitefish Bay a 3-year term, Fox Point and Bayside a 2-year term, and River Hills a 1-year term. After that, all terms would be for five years.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 7-8.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 7.

proportion to each municipality's percentage share of usage."<sup>107</sup> The method of calculating usage, based on hourly use of each apparatus, averaged for the five year term from 1988 to 1992, would be reviewed after the first year. Initial costs of consolidation would vary from the ongoing costs that the individual communities would be responsible for. If a more efficient and effective way to deduct a usage percentage could be found, it would be implemented then.

It was agreed that the termination of the North Shore Fire Department agreement could be obtained at any time, with the written consent of all seven of the municipalities, or by with the withdrawal of all but one of the municipalities. Additional departments would be allowed to join the North Shore Fire Department with the "unanimous approval of the governing bodies of the participating municipalities."<sup>108</sup>

After a long and difficult struggle, the agreement was signed by all of the North Shore municipalities in December, 1994, and the implementation process began. The North Shore Fire Department officially became operational on January 1, 1995. The blueprints had become reality, and it was now up to the administrators to enact the plans they had made.

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., 11.

#### **Part IV: Conclusion**

The Brown Deer location was staffed with one engine, one ladder truck, one ambulance, and one tanker. Glendale was staffed with an engine, a ladder truck, a medic van, and ambulance, and a car. Shorewood housed an engine, a ladder truck and an ambulance. The Whitefish Bay station was staffed with an engine and an ambulance. The fifth and final station, the Fox Point station, was staffed with an engine, and ambulance and a tanker. The Bayside fire station was closed and torn down. The Village built a new Village Hall and Police Station on the site. The River Hills fire station was also closed down; it was remodeled for use as the Town Hall and Police Station as well.

The apparatus that is owned and operated by the North Shore Fire Department is a conglomerate of the apparatus that had been held by the individual fire companies before consolidation. The apparatus were re-distributed amongst the fire stations according the expected needs.

With the merger of the fire protection services for the various communities came adjustments. The newly formed North Shore Fire Department was now dependent on municipal services for each station in their respective communities. Trouble arose, for example, over was snow removal. Each station required snow removal after a large storm, and each municipality was responsible for the snow removal (or other municipal service) in that community. There was some difficulty in arranging these services, as some communities thought that the



services would be provided by another community, or by "North Shore."<sup>109</sup> There was, however, no "North Shore" government to provide these municipal functions.

Other municipalities felt that they had "lost control" over decisions made regarding the fire protection services they received.<sup>110</sup> The city governments no longer had authority over the day-to-day workings of the fire departments. It was now up to the North Shore Fire Department and their Board of Directors to make all fiscal and policy decisions. Ultimately, this was the most advantageous for everyone concerned, as it would be unreasonable to allow each city government to be involved in the daily workings of the North Shore Fire Department.

All the full-time fire fighters that were employed by the individual fire departments in the North Shore communities received jobs with the newly consolidated North Shore Fire Department. Of the 54 paid-on-call fire fighters, 28 applied for the remaining 20 available positions. Each applicant was judged on merit and the recommendations they received by their local commanders, and the Board made the decision on which ones to hire. Those who were not hired made a variety of decisions. Some joined other volunteer departments, others quit the fire service entirely, and still others applied to the North Shore paid-on-call staff. The North Shore Fire Department maintains a paid-on-call staff, which fluctuates between 15 and 20 members. The paid-on-call staff are back-up help

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<sup>109</sup> Interview with North Shore Fire Department Chief David Berousek, November 3, 2000.

<sup>110</sup> Interview with North Shore Fire Department Chief David Berousek, February 28, 2001.

for large fires, and are also seen as a hiring source for the North Shore Fire Department<sup>111</sup>

The effects of consolidation were bittersweet. Although the North Shore communities gained in a more organized and efficient fire protection service under the North Shore Fire Department, it was a bumpy road to get there. Local governments were forced to relinquish some control, some municipal services had to be adjusted, a handful of paid-on-call fire fighters left to volunteer, or to apply for jobs elsewhere. All things considered, the long-term effects of the consolidation are considerably promising. The seven North Shore communities now enjoy enhanced fire protection services with manageable costs.

The North Shore communities had responded to their municipal needs by cooperating to form a large consolidated fire department to provide fire protection services similarly enjoyed in larger American cities. They had previously worked together to form the North Shore Water Commission and the North Shore Paramedic Unit. The idea of smaller communities joining together in order to apply large city responses to municipal needs seems to be growing in popularity. The success of the North Shore Fire Department may have had an affect on other Wisconsin communities; municipalities to the south of the City of Milwaukee are now looking into consolidation of their fire protection services as well.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> <http://www.ci.cudahy.wi.us/firereport.htm>.

## Appendix I: Proposed Staffing for 4-Station Plan

*Table 5-1a. Potential Staffing Plan – 4 Stations, 35 Personnel On Duty*

	<i>Units</i>	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Firefighters</i>
Station 1 Glendale	Engine 11	Lieutenant	3
	Tower 1	Lieutenant	3
	Medic 8	Lieutenant (PM)	2
	Battalion 1	Battalion Chief	
	Squad 1		
	Ambulance 1		
	Engine 12 (R)		
Station 2 Whitefish Bay	Engine 21	Lieutenant	3
	Ladder 2	Lieutenant	3
	Ambulance 2		2
	Engine 22 (R)		
Station 3 Brown Deer	Engine 31	Lieutenant	3
	Ladder 3	Lieutenant	3
	Ambulance 3		
	Engine 32 (R)		
	Tanker 31		
Station 4 Fox Point	Engine 41	Lieutenant	3
	Tanker 41		1
	Tanker 42 (R)		
	Ladder 4 (R)		
	Ambulance 4		
<i>Total</i>		<u>9</u>	<u>26</u>

Source: "Final Report North Shore Communities Fire Services Project," January 1994, TriData, 5-14.

Appendix II: Proposed Staffing for 5-Station Plan

Table 5-1b. Alternate Staffing Plan -- 5 Stations, 35 Personnel on Duty

	<i>Units</i>	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Firefighters</i>
Station 1 Glendale	Engine 11	Lieutenant	3
	Tower 1	Lieutenant	3
	Medic 8	Lieutenant (PM)	1
	Battalion 1	Battalion Chief	
	Squad 1		
	Ambulance 1		
	Engine 12 (R)		
Station 2 Whitefish Bay	Engine 21	Lieutenant	2
	Ambulance 2		2
	Engine 22 (R)		
Station 3 Brown Deer	Engine 31	Lieutenant	3
	Ladder 3	Lieutenant	3
	Ambulance 3		
	Engine 32 (R)		
	Tanker 31		
Station 4 Fox Point	Engine 41	Lieutenant	3
	Tanker 41		1
	Tanker 42 (R)		
	Ladder 4 (R)		
	Ambulance 4		
Station 5 Shorewood	Quint 5	Lieutenant	2
	Pump 5		
	Ambulance 5		2
<i>Total</i>		9	26

Source: "Final Report North Shore Communities Fire Services Project," January 7, 1994, TriData, 5-16.

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