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Embedded Archaeology, Cultural Heritage, and the Iraq War

Alexis Jordan

Abstract: The response of the archaeological community to the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq was focused largely on the rescue and protection of Iraq's cultural heritage, specifically looted artifacts, archaeological sites, and museums. Many of these efforts to return and safeguard Iraqi antiquities involved archaeological interaction with various allied military forces occupying the area (Hamilakis 2003, 2009; Teijgeler 2008). The preservation and protection of antiquities amidst military occupation has raised growing concerns within the archaeological community regarding the ethical and political aspects of "embedded archaeology," i.e. collaborating with military and occupation authorities in the service of rescuing antiquities. Some archaeologists cite the legitimization of invasions and civilian casualties as consequences of these collaborations (Hamilakis 2003; 2009:43; Teijgeler 2008). Others argue that collaborative efforts do not necessarily condone military actions. Engaging with military forces to protect cultural heritage is the primary responsibility of archaeologists and the reality of archaeology in the midst of conflict (Lawler 2008; Stone 2009a, b). What has become clear throughout these debates is the need to assess the experiences of archaeologists in the Iraq War for the purpose of establishing guidelines for the conduct of archaeologists in conflict situations (Pollock 2008; Perring and Linde 2009).

Key words: embedded archaeology, archaeology and the military, archaeology in war zones, archaeology and politics, cultural heritage, Iraq War, ethics, looting

A Brief History of Archaeology, Politics, and Military Interactions

Archaeology's entanglement with politics and military actions is not a new. The discipline never functioned independently of the societies in which it has been practiced; it has always been socially embedded. In the nineteenth century, the establishment of archaeology as a formal academic discipline in the western world was often tied to the field's usefulness in nation building and colonialist endeavors. In this period, European and American nations often used the past as a source of legitimization for control of the present.

Excavation opportunities for archaeologists blossomed in the nineteenth century when scholarly research was coupled with colonialist and nationalist exploitation of the archaeological record (Trigger 1984:355-357, 368-369; Kohl 1998:227-228; Arnold 2004:209; McFate 2005:25). Political and public interest in archaeology, in particular, stemmed from the physicality and visibility of material remains as a source of information about human history (Kohl 1998:236, 240). However, this interest in the past was selective, with research focusing on the particular needs of the parties involved. The exploitation of such research could range from entertainment and (self-aggrandizement, often at the expense of others) to the justification of genocide (Arnold 2002, 2004:192).

The expense of archaeological fieldwork and financial dependence on the state for research and employment continues to make archaeology vulnerable to political manipulation (Kohl 1998:240; Arnold 2004:191-192, 208-209). However, public and political interest in archaeology and, subsequently, state funding and authorization for research are always linked. Archaeology is viewed as a cultural luxury in most societies; if it is not seen as useful, it will not be a funding priority (Altekamp 2004:70; Arnold 2004:208-210). This places archaeologists in a precarious situation requiring them to balance scholarly objectivity with maintaining outside interest in archaeology to keep the discipline thriving, resulting in a “kind of sliding ethical scale” (Arnold 2004:191). In the early years of this relationship, archaeologists were often complicit in supporting the racist propaganda of the states supporting them (Kohl 1998; Trigger 1984). While the appropriation of archaeology by dictatorial regimes or violent colonial powers constitutes some of the most egregious examples of material culture misuse in state politics, not all relationships between archaeology and the state are so clearly inappropriate (Trigger 1984; Kohl 1998; Arnold 2002, 2004; Galaty and Watkinson 2004). The continually shifting relationship between archaeology and the state in the last two centuries has become a topic of continued debate for those wishing to examine the obligations archaeologists have to the societies in which they live and work. Questions such as determining the place of archaeology in politics, the extent to which archaeologists should be public intellectuals, and the ways in which fieldwork can be appropriated by governments appear frequently in these debates (Kohl 1998:241-243; Arnold 2002:111; 2004:207; Hamilakis and Duke 2007; Steele 2005).

In addition to the appropriation of archaeological knowledge in service of the state, archaeologists themselves were often entangled in the military actions of the imperial conquests and world wars during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Governments recognized the value of individuals who spoke foreign languages, understood the inner workings of different cultures, and possessed the ability to maneuver through them despite being outsiders. Archaeologists, like cultural anthropologists, often have first-hand knowledge of local cultures within the regions they excavate. A number of archaeologists acted as spies for their governments whilst conducting their excavations abroad, particularly in the Middle East during both World Wars. The reverse has also been true, with espionage agents posing as archaeologists (Emberling 2008:446; Lawler 2008:518). This is not to say acts of espionage were supported by the discipline or went un-criticized. Franz Boas was one of the first to speak out about the damage to scholarly integrity and credibility should anthropologists and archaeologists continue to act as government agents (Boas 1919:797). The ability of anthropologists and archaeologists to conduct field research in countries other than their own would become increasingly difficult and dangerous because of the spread of mistrust and suspicion among local populations as a result of espionage activities (McFate 2005; Emberling 2008:446-447).

During the two World Wars, however, ethical concerns regarding scholarly involvement with government and military agencies often took a back seat to concerns for the protection of one’s country. Archaeologists such as Glyn Daniel, Stuart Piggott, and Terence Powell joined the British Royal Air Force Army Photographic Intelligence team and transformed their skills in interpreting aerial photos from archaeological sites to examining images from enemy territories (Daniel 1986:94-178). Others, such as Sir Mortimer Wheeler, did not necessarily employ their archaeological skills in the military but enlisted in the armed forces (Wheeler 1956:121-178).

During this period, anthropologists and archaeologists began working in various capacities with Allied governments and military forces to protect cultural heritage. Lists of objects looted by German forces and monuments in need of protection in the event of an invasion were created. A group of archaeologists, art historians, and museum curators were gathered into the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives branch of the U.S. Civil Affairs Division (Mead 1979; Mabee 1987). Cultural anthropologists, such as Margaret Mead, advised the US government and military during the war, but the lack of positive results from these efforts often soured scholars on continuing the relationship. Mead was one of the first to note that a greater impact could be made in advising policy makers rather than those who carry out their mandates (Mead 1979; Mabee 1987; McFate 2005; Kurtz 2006; Emberling 2008). Despite the best intentions of archaeologists (and other scholars) their military activities set a precedent for the use of academic research in warfare that would become increasingly dangerous for scholars and the local communities with whom they interacted.

Military consultations with knowledgeable scholars took another negative turn during the Vietnam War. The US military, faced with guerilla tactics blurring distinctions between combatants and civilians, consulted anthropologists and archaeologists to devise counterinsurgency strategies in a program known as Project Camelot. The knowledge scholars gained during their fieldwork was then used to defeat or kill their informants. By this time, the discipline had established basic ethical principals regarding fieldwork practices involving the protection of informants and transparency about the purposes of any fieldwork (Horowitz 1967:47-49). The blatant misuse of anthropological knowledge by the military led to the active avoidance of any public anthropological or archaeological collaboration with the military in the years that followed. Anthropology and its subdisciplines became more reflexive and self-critical, particularly with regard to the history of the discipline's ties to colonialism (McFate 2005:25; Emberling 2008:447). The military's interest in using cultural knowledge to develop better counterinsurgency tactics has grown with the recognition that social organizations and customs inform battle tactics and diplomatic interactions (McFate 2005:25-26; Emberling 2008:447-448). Consequently, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have raised many of the same issues regarding collaboration with government and military agencies and clear answers regarding the conduct of archaeologists in conflict situations have not been forthcoming (McFate 2005; Emberling 2008).

The development of the military program known as Human Terrain Systems (HTS) has been particularly worrisome for scholars as it involves the deployment of cultural anthropologists or individuals having in-depth cultural knowledge to military units in order to assist with tactical operations. The anthropological community has, on the whole, recognized this as a blatant subversion of the discipline and misuse of the trust between anthropologists and local communities. The military has not addressed the concerns of the anthropological community and anthropologists have chosen to avoid the military in general (Kilcullen 2006; Emberling 2008).

Unfortunately, the lack of cooperation by professional anthropologists has not stopped the military from incorporating cultural training into their programs, sometimes without regard for the reliability of those individuals providing the information. Inaccuracies and incomplete information have led to ineffective and sometimes very damaging cultural and combat policies,

but the need for some form of counterinsurgency tactics means they continue to appear (McFate 2005; Kilcullen 2006; Emberling 2008:448). Today, the concerns cultural anthropologists face regarding HTS and the use of cultural knowledge as part of military tactics are similar to but not exactly the same as those facing archaeologists. In conflict situations, the concerns of the archaeological community encompass living peoples and their ancient cultural heritage (Teijgeler 2011:16-17). A general lack of communication and understanding between military forces and archaeologists laid the foundation for a variety of responses to the Iraq War by the archaeological community. These ranged from total avoidance of any engagement with military institutions (often coupled with an outspokenness against the war) to working selectively with the military and policymakers in specific contexts. Both approaches seek to actively mitigate the harm of warfare on local peoples and their heritage although each side sees this goal accomplished in very different ways (Emberling 2008:447- 448; Lawler 2008).

Archaeological Responses in the Iraq War

Archaeological concerns for the preservation of Iraqi cultural heritage have been voiced since the Persian Gulf War. During preparations for both the Persian Gulf War and the Iraq invasion in early 2003, there was a great deal of anxiety in the archaeological community concerning the military protection of archaeological sites and museums. Heritage protection should not have been a late addition to military plans, particularly in 2003, but this was not the case (McC. Adams 2001; Gibson 2009). Institutions such as the Archaeological Institute of America (AIA) and prominent scholars made public statements and questioned politicians to draw attention to the imminent threat to unprotected cultural heritage within the conflict zone (Stone 2005:933). Some military offices and archaeologists in the U.S. and Britain began informal discussions with each other to assess the risks and mitigate the potential damage to archaeological sites and museums. Specialists on Middle Eastern archaeology visited the Pentagon to identify the major problems facing sites and museums. Coordinates for some 5000 sites were given in the hope that they would be spared from the initial stages of bombing (Hamilakis 2003, 2009; Emberling 2008; Rothfield 2008). Of particular note is British archaeologist Dr. Peter Stone, who was, at the time, the honorary Chief Executive Officer of the World Archaeological Congress. As the only archaeologist approached by the UK Ministry of Defense, Stone provided information and advice on the identification and protection of archaeological museums and major sites in Iraq (BBC News 2003; Stone 2005, 2009b).

Despite these preparatory dialogues, no substantial immediate actions were implemented during the initial invasion in 2003. Cultural heritage concerns were not considered beyond the initial invasion and the U.S. military was unprepared to deal with long-term museum and site protection and the onslaught of indigenous looting. Consequently, there continues to be an inadequate number of forces available to protect Iraqi cultural resources. While some sites and museums eventually came under U.S. Coalition Forces control, the Iraq Museum was overrun and pillaged (Bogdanos and Patrick 2005; Gibson 2009). Site looting continues to be rampant throughout the country (Rothfield 2008; Gibson 2009). As the war progressed and the extent of looting and the destruction of antiquities became known, the archaeological community expressed sorrow and outrage at the loss (Hamilakis 2003:105-106; Rothfield 2008). Additionally, major archaeological organizations and individual archaeologists, in the U.S. and

Britain in particular, released statements to the media and sent letters to various government agencies expressing concern over the situation and making offers of assistance for damage assessment and destruction or looting prevention efforts. Numerous committees were founded, including the American Co-Ordinating Committee for Iraq Cultural Heritage created by the combined efforts of Society for American Archaeology (SAA), The Archaeological Institute of America (AIA), and the American Anthropological Association (AAA). In their public appeals for heritage protection, archaeologists noted the significant archaeological and scientific value of Iraqi antiquities and their importance to the cultural heritage of the world (Hamilakis 2003:105, 111).

A letter from all major American archaeological and heritage organizations (headed by the AAA) was sent to President Bush in April 2003, less than a week after the invasion began. This letter asked the president to use all means available to stop looting and destruction at archaeological sites and institutions, protect Iraqi professionals and scholars while they worked in these places, and adopt detailed plans to recover stolen artifacts. The letter also offered the assistance of numerous archaeological organizations and praised the coalition military forces for avoiding cultural sites and for conducting inspections. The letter concluded by noting the benevolence of the U.S. and its commitment to freedom, democracy, and the protection of American historical legacy- benefits “we hope...will be provided to the people of Iraq, and by extension to all the citizens of our country and the world who can claim the ancestral treasures of Iraq as partly our own” (American Anthropological Association 2003; Hamilakis 2003:106, 109-110). The drafting of this letter remains a point of contention within the anthropological community and a significant moment that highlighted the need for formal guidelines when dealing with conflict situations.

In the last eight years archaeologists have worked in a variety of capacities with the military in their efforts to protect Iraqi cultural heritage. Not long after these initial responses, *National Geographic* magazine funded an expedition of Mesopotamian experts in collaboration with U.S. forces to travel throughout the country and document the growing looting problem (Hamilakis 2003:105-106). Archaeologists John Russell and Zainab Bahrani held advisory positions to the Iraqi Minister of Culture in an effort to better protect sites and stop the spread of looting. Corine Wegener, a museum curator who served as a Civil Affairs officer, worked to establish a U.S. Committee branch of the Blue Shield- an organization formed by the Hague Convention to protect cultural property in wartime. Native Iraqi archaeologist Donny George Youkhanna, Director General of Baghdad’s National Museum and president of the State Board of Antiquities and Heritage, worked with Iraq’s Ministry of Culture to develop a 1400 person cultural heritage police force and was instrumental in recovering a great deal of the artifacts looted from the National Museum through his work with coalition forces (Emberling 2008; Rothfield 2008; Wegener 2008). Others, including Geoff Emberling, (Then associated with the Oriental Institute) and Brian Rose, current President of the Archaeological Institute of America, have worked to inform soldiers in the Marine and National Guard units across the country about the importance of history, its physical record, and its relevance to the soldiers’ mission. Laurie Rush, an archaeologist in training who now works in cultural resource management for the military, created a deck of cards to remind soldiers about the historical importance of particular sites (Schlesinger 2007; Rose 2007; Emberling 2008:450-453; Rothfield 2008).

The results of these cooperative endeavors have been mixed. Looting is still a widespread and dangerous problem and looted antiquities are sometimes used to fund insurgent actions. Funds and security forces are often in short supply not only for sites and museums but also for the archaeologists themselves. Dr. Youkhanna was forced to flee Iraq with his family after death threats were made against them; the funding for the cultural heritage guard has run out; and military forces are still stationed on top of some archaeological sites (Rothfield 2008). Despite these discouraging factors, training in cultural protection is increasingly frequent for military officers, troops have been moved from a number of major archaeological sites and the National Museum has reopened (Emberling 2008; Rothfield 2008; Stone 2009b). Archaeologists remain divided on how they should proceed in the future.

Arguments against archaeological involvement with military forces

The foundation of ethical and political concerns regarding archaeological involvement with the military in areas of conflict rests on the idea that by actively working with invading military forces, archaeologists are not only condoning warfare (and all its repercussions) but also embedding themselves within the military in a permanent fashion. Those in opposition of this stance suggest that archaeologists have overlooked the social and political context of the situation and projected an apolitical and abstract response, thereby compromising their autonomy as scholars by giving academic legitimacy to the invasion. Their concern is too narrowly focused on the material cultural heritage caught in a military conflict and their duty of stewardship to the archaeological record (Mourad 2007; Albarella 2009:106-108; Hamilakis 2009:39). In praising the military and political administration for any successes in the protection of cultural heritage during the invasion and declaring themselves willing to be recruited for cultural advisory positions (Hamilakis 2003:106-107; Mourad 2007), archaeologists in such positions are described as having laid the foundations for what Hamilakis terms “embedded archaeology” or a “military-archaeology complex” in which they have failed to question the broader political narrative in which they have placed themselves (Hamilakis 2009:39). They further argue archaeologists provided legitimacy to a conflict widely considered to be illegal, preemptive, and substantiated by fabricated evidence (Hamilakis 2003, 2009; Teijgeler 2008; Albarella 2009).

In written statements and discussions with government and military offices, such archaeologists are described as having, in their eagerness to protect cultural heritage, “uncritically adopted the rhetoric of the invading and subsequently occupying power” (Hamilakis 2009:42). Instead of condemning the war outright and actively aligning themselves with the oppositional movement (consisting of other academics, intellectuals, and cultural workers), Hamilakis and others argue that many archaeologists focused their attention predominantly on the loss of antiquities in their statements and only through the veiled platform of protests regarding looting were anti-war sentiments expressed (Hamilakis 2003; Albarella 2009). This position on the archaeological response to the war is not shared by the entire archaeological community (see Arguments For below).

Attempts at creating an umbrella organization in the U.S. to unify and coordinate the response of heritage professionals (including archaeologists) with international organizations

such as the International Committee of the Blue Shield, have also been problematic. One of the key aims of the committee is independence and neutrality (in that it is the cultural equivalent of the Red Cross) and yet the U.S. branch of the Blue Shield coordinates with the U.S. military and government during times of conflict as one of its primary goals (Hamilakis 2009:54).

While their expertise in the topic of cultural heritage is what made their opinions valued by news sources in the first place, it has been argued by archaeologists that in placing the antiquities at the focus of concerns regarding the invasion, archaeologists have consequently placed the living peoples affected by the war below that of artifacts (Hamilakis 2003:107). Those advocating Hamilakis's argument do not cite specific examples of this, but instead note that the impact of the war on humanitarian, cultural, and environmental aspects of Iraq constitute an even wider and more damaging destruction of heritage. Specifically, they argue that the thousands of civilian deaths and lack of basic human rights in the conflict zone need to be dealt with before cultural heritage should be addressed (Steele 2005:57; Hamilakis 2009:46; Albarella 2009:112;). While the codes of ethics for many Western archaeological associations emphasize advocacy for and stewardship of the archaeological record, this notion is construed by some to be problematic and self-serving (Wylie 2002). In this viewpoint the archaeological record is seen as being produced by archaeologists out of the material remains of past societies. Archaeologists then declare themselves the stewards of this record they created and of which they are often the primary users (Hamilakis 2003:107; Mourad 2007:157- 158). This view of material remains does not discuss the fact that any part of the archaeological record can be destroyed, regardless of whether or not archaeologists have ever excavated or interpreted it. The record still exists in the ground independent of the archaeologists (Stone 2009b).

Instead, Hamilakis argues that the ethical responsibilities of archaeologists should include the protection of all material traces of people in the past, not on the basis of the archaeological record selectively constructed through excavation, but on the basis of a responsibility towards the social memory of past peoples (Hamilakis 2003:108). In this argument, providing military forces with advice is viewed as preserving the past for armies and not local communities (Mourad 2007:166). The specifics of this argument or what constitutes "all material traces" have not yet been discussed in more detail. Additionally, Hamilakis and other argue ethics need to be re-politicized and archaeologists should "reject the role of the professional specialist who provides expertise in their narrow field but who fails to question the meta-narratives and practices of nationalism, neo-colonialism and imperialism, within which this knowledge is deployed" (Hamilakis 2003:108). Archaeologists should critically engage conflict situations in a manner that protects their autonomy as scholars, critiques the agendas of the involved parties, and avoid becoming the cultural branch of a war machine (McGuire 2007; Albarella 2009:108; Hamilakis 2009:39, 53, 57).

Collaboration should only be sought outside of military structures with archaeologists who are residents of occupied countries, inviting them to talk about the archaeology of their country as they see it and asking them to train students in western countries. Archaeologists should also campaign for the repatriation of cultural heritage displaced by conflict and clandestine excavations for profit (which, if acknowledged, imply acceptance of responsibility) (Hamilakis 2009:53-54). Hamilakis and Bernbeck then argue that when archaeologists have no option but to work in conjunction with military authorities, such activities should always occur

openly and publically and include the open critique of illegal military actions (Bernbeck 2008; Hamilakis 2009:54). Overall, these perspectives on the archaeological record and the manner in which archaeologists should actively engage conflict situations interpret the current conflict situation in a way fundamentally different from that of archaeologists in favor of building some form of relationship with the military.

Arguments in favor of archaeological involvement with military forces

Archaeologists advocating some forms of collaboration with military offices in times of conflict perceive their duties and responsibilities quite differently. They argue that the archaeologists have been expressing more concern for artifacts than people is false and overly simplistic (Price 2009:10; Rush 2009:17-18; Stone 2009a). The situation is not as binary as some have made it seem. Protecting the archaeological record because it is an important part of a country's infrastructure (just as schools and religious buildings are) does not mean archaeological sites are being prioritized above living peoples. Instead, it means adding the protection of antiquities to the considerations of military planners and to the training of soldiers "in order that the cultural heritage will still be there for the benefit of post-conflict society" (Stone 2009a:330). Additionally, actively engaging with military forces to mitigate damage to cultural heritage is not the same as being an active collaborator in destruction or legitimizing invasion. This engagement is instead dealing with the complicated on-the-ground reality of conflict situations and working from within the government and military system to better protect cultural heritage and reach out to Iraqi colleagues already on the ground (Teiggeler 2008:179; Lawler 2008; Perring and Linde 2009:201; Stone 2009a). Archaeological protection of antiquities in Iraq was hindered in this conflict due to a lack of time. Military requests for advice came long after academics began voicing concerns and the recommendations presented were never implemented within existing strategies (Price 2009; Stone 2009a:326-27).

While some scholars view the cultural training of soldiers by anthropologists from the various subfields as a betrayal of local populations affected by invasion, others like Emberling see it as a way, albeit a frustratingly incomplete one, to reduce the impact of a military presence on cultural property and peoples, since archaeologists will never have an impact on strategic decisions about military deployment (Emberling 2008:455; Rush 2009). Emberling's experience as a consultant teacher for the American military program known as LDESP- Leader Development and Education for Sustained Peace, has been in part frustrating, though he contends, still important. His encounters with other lecturers who presented prejudiced, inaccurate and racist notions about Middle Eastern cultures and history were disconcerting. Despite the valid concern that any information presented (however benign) could potentially be misused by the military, Emberling and his colleagues decided to continue teaching. For Emberling, a more disturbing notion was the thought that if he and other anthropologists and archaeologists were not there to present a more accurate and balanced view, misconceptions potentially harmful to soldiers and Iraqis would be the only information available since the program would continue with or without the involvement of anthropologists. To mitigate the concerns regarding information misuse, archaeologists in this program have limited the type of information they will provide and the context in which they will provide it. This generally excludes giving information which could be labeled as tactical knowledge and working only in

support of educational efforts directed at developing and maintaining peace and stability in Iraq. Systematic evaluations of these lectures have not yet been possible but Emberling and other teachers like him have received letters from soldiers requesting additional assistance and noting that their cultural training made non-combat interactions easier and more positive (Emberling 2008:451-456).

The lack of public statements outright condemning or opposing the Iraq invasion by archaeologists and archaeological organizations, was a decision based on the implicit acknowledgment that anthropologists had no way to influence the decision to invade. In addition, their ability to protect cultural heritage there would be severely diminished if overtly oppositional political statements were made damaging the prospects for further discussion (Emberling 2008:456). This does not mean archaeologists have been silent when they disagree with decisions of the coalition administrations with whom they are attempting to work. Instead they have expressed their dissatisfaction with certain policies and failures, given advice only for non-combatative purposes, and reported their experiences to the archaeological community to better educate the discipline (Emberling 2008; Teijgeler 2008; Stone 2009a, b). Without military protection and assistance, the type and amount of work archaeologists are able to do inside the conflict zone to protect sites and museums is often greatly reduced (Curtis 2009:7). Insurgents and armed looters foster continued concerns in Iraq, and it is often impossible to examine archaeological sites without armed escorts. The alternative option of cooperating with tactical/advisory consultants (such as Blackwater USA) to facilitate access to archaeological sites within the conflict zone, on the other hand, is fraught with more significant ethical concerns, including a lack of professionalism and training when compared to the armed services of nations (Price 2009:10).

Though general humanitarian aid in times of war should be offered and supported, and statements opposing internationally unsanctioned invasions should be made, archaeologists should specifically engage world events from the perspective of their expertise- the material remains of cultural heritage (Lawler 2008:522; Stone 2009a:327, 330). The deliberate destruction of cultural heritage within regions of armed conflict is cultural genocide. As with humanitarian groups, where the State is incapable of preventing this form of genocide, the international heritage community has the responsibility to protect “the material and immaterial culture of those who have been silenced” (Teijgeler 2011:17-18). Archaeologists are obligated to this heritage because of the messages, stories, and opportunities contained within these material remains which communities will need to rebuild after the war (Rush 2009; Stone 2009b:37). In this sense archaeologists are politically engaged activists, helping people utilize their cultural heritage in the healing process in their war-ravaged countries. Therefore, preserving material culture, speaking out against looting and destruction, and providing educational and professional opportunities for displaced scholars contributes to the fulfillment of this obligation (Lawler 2008:522). Though it is an idealistic and lofty goal, Stone contends that archaeology has the ability to act as a weapon of peace, uniting humanity and reminding people of their similarities by illustrating that many societies have struggled with the same problems and overcome them in a myriad of ways (Stone 2009a:329). Archaeologists cannot stop wars but they can make a contribution to an atmosphere where conflict and war are increasingly unacceptable (Stone 2009b: 38). Stone and others who collaborate with military forces argue that active engagement is really only possible from within the conflict situation, interacting with

as many parties involved as possible (Stone 2009a:329-330). Decisions about where and when to talk to the military will remain contextually contingent on the specific situation (Perring and Linde 2009:206).

The Need for Guidelines

Ultimately, archaeology needs to create workable responses that engage conflict situations from inside and outside the conflict zone (Perring and Linde 2009:206). Because archaeologists are usually short on practical experience in bringing relief to cultural heritage situations during conflict, ethical codes need to be reexamined and general guidelines for archaeology in conflict situations need to be developed (Teijgeler 2011).

Conventions that protect cultural heritage internationally have been established throughout the last century. The Hague Convention of 1899 with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Roerich Pact 1935 were the first major international agreements designed to protect cultural property during war. The 1954 UNESCO Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict sought to ensure that cultural property was safeguarded as the common heritage of humanity. This convention was strengthened by the Additional Protocols of the Geneva Convention in 1977.

Despite the existence of these conventions and their ratification by the majority of U.N. nations, dangers to cultural heritage persist. Museums and sites are still looted, bombed, or occupied by military forces. In Yugoslavia, the blue shield emblems marking sites for protection were specifically targeted in a deliberate cultural warfare. However, archaeologists have been able to successfully appeal to the Geneva Convention in convincing coalition troops to withdraw from archaeological sites and monuments in Iraq. Though the implementation of these conventions of heritage protection has met mixed success, they have become important tools for archaeologists in conflict situations (Teijgeler 2006:138-142; Gerstenblith 2008).

Currently the codes and guidelines of the major international archaeological associations- the World Archaeological Congress (WAC), Archaeological Institute of America (AIA), European Association of Archaeologists (EAA), and the Society for American Archaeology (SAA) do not explicitly discuss archaeology in conflict situations. Thus far, these institutions have only touched on topics such as awareness of the impact of one's work on colleagues and local populations; refusal to take part in or abet the trade of looted antiquities; the relationship to indigenous peoples; the importance of archaeological heritage to all peoples; and the necessity for archaeologists to preserve cultural heritage and act as advocates for the archaeological record. Continuous discussions at the archaeological conferences of these various associations have noted the need for some form of politically engaged archaeology. Additionally, participants in these conferences have noted that there will likely never be a uniform politico-ethical standard. Instead, archaeology should be approached as a continuing ethical engagement that accounts for the specific and changing realities of each political situation (Pollock 2008:358-359).

While any actions will likely continue to be fraught with disagreement, frameworks for key concerns in conflict archaeology can be developed; 1.) the establishment of international archaeology and conflict organizations, 2.) when (if ever) is excavation acceptable in a conflict zone, 3.) how heritage professionals should go about prioritizing the antiquities they care for in situations of crisis (for themselves even if not for the military), 4.) should archaeologists ever work with private security (mercenary) companies, 5.) how should archaeologists identify themselves in conflict situations (both in what they wear and how they are categorized as non-combatants), and 6.) should archaeologists only consider involving themselves in a conflict situation once international sanction has been given to the military action taken (Teijgeler 2008:180; 2009; 2011:25-28)

In addition, while the concerns and responsibilities of archaeologists in conflict situations should focus specifically on cultural heritage protection, some archaeologists, like Rene Teijgeler have noted the potential benefits of organizing archaeological endeavors beginning with humanitarian methods. Conflict situations can be broken down into three time frames with three archaeological responsibilities: 1.) pre-conflict and the prevention of damage to cultural property, 2.) peri-conflict and immediate reaction and intervention on the ground, and 3.) post-conflict and the reconstruction of heritage (Teijgeler 2008, 2011). Post-conflict reconstructions make up the majority of current plans designed by heritage preservation organizations, but the dilemmas faced by archaeologists before and during the Iraq War have made it clear that the archaeological community needs to establish protocols for all phases of conflict situations since some, like the Iraq War, stay fixed in the peri-conflict stage with alternating periods of relative peace and violence (Emberling 2008; Teijgeler 2011).

Conclusions

Ironically, both sides of this dilemma argue for more consideration of the role of archaeology on the world outside of academia (Emberling 2008; Hamilakis 2009; Teijgeler 2011). Continued awareness of the politically embedded nature of archaeology and archaeologists, and how they can be used or misused in ethically fraught situations, has grown in importance to the discipline (Arnold 2002:111; Teijgeler 2011). It is the manner and degree of this involvement that is the source of disagreement, something that will not be resolved without continuing evaluation of the role of archaeologists in conflict zones such as in the Iraq War. However, by shutting down communication and discussion among the parties actively engaging the local population and directly affecting their heritage (namely, the military), archaeologists will impair the positive impact they can have by drastically limiting their effectiveness in the post-conflict phase while the most damage is being done in the pre and peri-conflict situations.

Despite the unresolved nature of the discussion, archaeologists agree that consideration of cultural heritage must begin with policymakers, not those who execute orders delegated to them, be they academic or military personnel. Such anthropological perspectives must be presented in order to efficiently succeed in the field through planning and education (Emberling 2008:455; Rush 2009:16-17; Stone 2009a:330).

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