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Attitudinal Commitments and the Scope of Rational Requirements

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ATTITUDINAL COMMITMENTS AND THE SCOPE OF
RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

by

Anwar ul Haq

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ABSTRACT

ATTITUDINAL COMMITMENTS AND THE SCOPE OF RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

by

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The University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, 2016
Under the supervision of Professor Edward Hinchman

In this paper I propose an account of attitudinal commitments which flow from avowed beliefs and intentions. I distinguish my account from Thomas Scanlon’s account of attitudinal commitments on which our beliefs about normative reasons are the source of these commitments. In my view, attitudinal commitments result from avowal of certain attitudes and are best understood in terms of the attitudinal integrity of agents with respect to those attitudes. Rationality, I argue, is a matter of maintaining coherence among our attitudes in ways sensitive to the attitudinal commitments we undertake.

My account of attitudinal commitments makes room for progress on a question which is the ultimate focus of this paper, namely, the question of the scope of rational requirements. Concerning the conditional requirements of rationality, the question of scope arises, i.e., whether these requirements have a wide or narrow scope. Both wide and narrow scope rational requirements have their shortcomings. However, once we accept the correct account of attitudinal commitments, I argue that a theory of rationality can make progress beyond the shortcomings of wide and narrow scope requirements of rationality. I provide the outline of such a theory.
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1. Introduction

Consider the following case. Suppose Alex believes he ought to have salad for lunch everyday. Yet when he visits a restaurant, Alex cannot bring himself to intend to order a salad. He ends up having steak for lunch. Intuitively, Alex seems to have done something wrong. Moreover, suppose we are told that, unknown to Alex, an accident happened in the kitchen and the salad ingredients got contaminated. Despite this additional information, our intuition that Alex has gone wrong in failing to intend to order salad does not go away. The persistence of our intuition is best explained by distinguishing two kinds of normative relations. First, there is a relation of being a reason for. This is a relation between facts and a person’s attitudes. Secondly, there are relations specified by the requirements of rationality. These are relations among a person’s attitudes in abstraction from actual reasons for them. By failing to intend to order salad, Alex has accidentally responded to reasons correctly. Regardless, Alex appears to have done something wrong because he has fallen prey to irrationality.

The purported relationship between normative reasons and rationality has rightly received much attention. One proposal is offered by Scanlon (2007) and Kolodny (2005): that rationality is a matter of bringing our attitudes in line with our beliefs about (normative) reasons. This view presupposes an attractive conception of reasons: that reasons are independent of the present attitudes or activities of individual agents. Call this view the ‘reasons-first view’ of normative reasons. Contra Scanlon’s and Kolodny’s understanding of rationality, I propose that we can revise our understanding of what a view of rationality might look like, without thereby giving up the core commitments of the reasons-first view. The proposal is made possible after we notice a particular kind of normativity which underlies some of our beliefs and intentions.

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1 The reasons-first view captures a common thread which runs through the relevant views of Dancy (2000), Kolodny (2005), Parfit (2011), Raz (1999), and Scanlon (2014).
I propose an account of attitudinal commitments which flow from our avowed beliefs and intentions. When you avow an attitude you thereby undertake attitudinal commitments to have certain other attitudes or perform certain actions. I call these attitudinal commitments, ‘consequential commitments.’ Consequential commitments are best understood in terms of the attitudinal integrity of agents with respect to particular attitudes. If an agent follows through on consequential commitments, she thereby preserves her attitudinal integrity with respect to the corresponding attitudes. Against the background of consequential commitments, I argue that rationality is a matter of maintaining coherence among our attitudes in ways sensitive to the consequential commitments we undertake. Contra Scanlon’s and Kolodny’s account of rationality, the view which emerges from the following discussion shows that forming beliefs about reasons, and acting in light of them, is not the only species of responsiveness to reasons. What is distinctive about reason-responsive agents is their capability to avow their attitudes and undertake consequential commitments.

My alternative proposal, then, introduces the normative element of consequential commitments, and departs from Scanlon’s and Kolodny’s understanding of rationality. The proposal makes room for progress on a question which is the ultimate focus of this paper, namely, the question of the scope of rational requirements. A theory of rationality includes, among other requirements, several conditional requirements of rationality. Concerning the conditional requirements, the question of scope arises, i.e., whether these requirements have a wide or narrow scope. Both wide and narrow scope rational requirements have their shortcomings. Wide scope requirements fall short of capturing the force of the wrong of irrationality. For instance, they charge Alex of mere incoherence of attitudes.

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2 I borrow the terminology of ‘avowal’ from Moran (2001). My use of it is similar to Moran’s except that I am neutral about the issue whether avowal and self-knowledge are as closely connected as Moran suggests. Moreover, my account of consequential commitments is a departure from Moran. Moran does not formulate his view in terms of attitudinal commitments. Brandom (2003:191), however, gives an account of consequential commitments in the case of making assertions. My account of consequential commitments is roughly modeled on his account. Nevertheless, my account is not on all fours with Brandom’s for my account does not go all the way to accepting expressivism.
Whereas, intuitively, Alex has gone wrong in a more forceful way: having formed the belief that he ought to F, he has failed to direct his behavior in light of this belief. Secondly, wide scope rational requirements are symmetrical in objectionable ways. They draw no distinction between different ways of satisfying them. Narrow scope requirements do not have these shortcomings. However, if we accept our well-entrenched intuition that rationality is normative, narrow scope requirements lead to illicit bootstrapping of normative reasons. Moreover, narrow scope requirements may require us to do what we ought not to do. I argue that, given my alternative proposal, a *theory* of rationality can make progress beyond the shortcomings of wide and narrow scope *requirements* of rationality. My alternative proposal makes possible a hybrid theory of rationality which overcomes the respective shortcomings of wide and narrow scope requirements. The hybrid theory includes (a) wide scope requirements in conjunction with the basing prohibitions of rationality, and (b) additional narrow scope evaluative principles of rationality. The hybrid theory is not proposed as a radically new theory of rationality. Rather it is an attempt at improving on the existing narrow scope and wide scope theories, especially Broome (2013), in light of their respective shortcomings.

The paper is structured as follows. In §2, I start with contrasting the wide and narrow scope rational requirements. I outline what is at stake when we face the choice between wide and narrow scope requirements. In §3, I propose my account of consequential commitments which flow from avowed attitudes. In §4, against the background of consequential commitments, and in contrast to Scanlon’s and Kolodny’s view of rationality, I outline a hybrid theory of rationality which overcomes the shortcomings of wide and narrow scope rational requirements.
2. Wide versus Narrow Scope: What is at Stake?

Let me mention two provisos at the outset. First, I presuppose the reasons-first view about normative reasons. By contrast, some Humeans like Schroeder (2007) and Kantians like Korsgaard (1996) deny the reasons-first view. I do not commit myself to the truth of either side of the divide. The thesis I argue for is a conditional: if the reasons-first view is correct, then we have good reason to accept the proposed hybrid theory of rationality. However, if the reasons-first view is incorrect, the following discussion is still useful. It clarifies the dispute over the scope of rational requirements. Secondly, I focus on a particular requirement of rationality, namely, the enkratic requirement. The conclusions I draw, however, are supposed to generalize mutatis mutandis to all conditional requirements of rationality. I now introduce the wide scope enkratic requirement.3

\[ E_w: \text{Necessarily, rationality requires of you that (if you believe you ought to F, then you intend to F.)} \]

It is a wide scope requirement because the requirement takes as its scope the entire conditional (if you believe you ought to F, then you intend to F.) The requirement requires that you satisfy the conditional. There are two ways to satisfy it: by giving up your normative belief (i.e. the belief that you ought to F) or by forming the enkratic intention (i.e. the intention to F). Consequently, if you in fact believe that you ought to F, \( E_w \) does not require that you intend to F. \( E_w \) does not allow detachment of the consequent of the conditional. This feature of the wide scope requirements blocks the modus ponens inference to the normative conclusion that rationality requires of you that you intend to F.5

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4 Broome (2013:170) formulates the requirement in more detail as a synchronic requirement. The rough formulation will suffice for our purposes. Moreover, in this paper I do not discuss the distinction between synchronic and diachronic versions of rational requirements, mainly because both versions meet the four desiderata (outlined below) I suggest a theory of rationality must attempt to meet. We must introduce additional desiderata to resolve this matter, the task I leave for another paper.

5 Another way to block the inference is to maintain that ‘if’ in the conditional is expressing something other than a material conditional. Price (2008) considers this possibility.
other hand, if the enkratic requirement were a narrow scope requirement, it would take as its scope (intend to F.) The narrow scope requirement reads as:

\[ E_N: \text{Necessarily, if you believe you ought to F, rationality requires of you that you intend to F.} \]

There is only one way to satisfy this requirement: by forming the enkratic intention. \( E_N \), therefore, allows detachment of normative conclusions by allowing the modus ponens inference to go through.

Both wide and narrow scope requirements (I argue) have their limitations. Wide scope requirements fall short of capturing the force of the wrong of irrationality. Secondly, they are symmetrical in objectionable ways. Narrow scope requirements do not have these two shortcomings. However, if we assume that rationality is normative, narrow scope requirements lead to illicit bootstrapping of normative reasons. Let’s start with the shortcomings of wide scope requirements first.

### 2.1 The Wrong of Irrationality

Recall the case of Alex, the akratic person.\(^6\) He fails to intend enkratically according to his normative belief. Alex’s irrational behavior exemplifies akrasia.\(^7\) Most wide and narrow scope theorists of rationality accept that a theory of rationality must evaluate an akratic person as going wrong in some sense.\(^8\) But in what sense is akrasia a wrong? On the wide scope view, the wrong of akrasia amounts to violating the relevant wide scope rational requirement. Recall that to violate \( E_w \) is to either fail to form the enkratic intention or to fail to drop the normative belief. The wide scope wrong of akrasia effectively amounts to the claim that it is wrong of you to be in an incoherent state of mind. However, the wide scope charge of incoherence appears to be implausibly weak. For instance, in case

\(^6\) To make the examples more vivid, the first character of the names involved matches with the kind of behavior those persons exhibit.

\(^7\) Alex’s behavior is one kind of akratic behavior. Rorty (1980:333) identifies five kinds of akrasia.

\(^8\) For instance, both Broome (2013:31) and Schroeder (2004, 2009) make this assumption.
of Alex we expect Alex’s belief that he ought to F to influence the direction of his behavior. His normative belief must make a difference to what else it is now appropriate to do or think from his point of view. Alex has gone wrong in failing to appropriately direct his behavior in light of his normative belief. The wide scope charge of mere incoherence overlooks this failing. The narrow scope view, on the other hand, captures the force of this failing. The violation of $E_N$ charges Alex of failing to intend in accordance with his normative belief.

You might wonder whether the wide scope charge of incoherence, at bottom, is the same as the narrow scope charge of failing to direct behavior in light of the relevant belief. It is not. To bring out the contrast from the point of view of enkratic rationality, imagine the following scenario. You believe that you ought to F, and having conscientiously deliberated, you are confident that the belief is true. Now suppose you fail to intend to F. The narrow scope charge holds that you are going wrong unless you follow through in light of your normative belief. After all, you are confident that your belief is true. And in failing to follow through, you are being inappropriately evasive. The wide scope charge, on the other hand, is different. It holds that you are going wrong unless you either follow through on your normative belief or somehow rid yourself of the relevant belief. Either way, you will achieve coherence among your attitudes, and by rationality’s lights you'll have done alright. The wide scope-charge, therefore, is not the same as, and is weaker than, the narrow scope charge. I have argued that the narrow scope charge is more plausible.  

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9 A further complication: you might think that my characterization of the wide scope charge is lacking. For even if the wide scope enkratic requirement allows that you somehow rid yourself of the normative belief in order to become more coherent, it is possible that in doing so you are violating the requirement of epistemic rationality. So, one the wide-scope view, you might still count as going wrong from the point of view of epistemic rationality. In response, note that the relevant requirement of epistemic rationality is a wide scope requirement, too. That requirement reads as: Necessarily, rationality requires of you that (if you judge that you ought to F, then believe that you ought to F.) So in order to rid yourself of the relevant belief in order to satisfy the enkratic requirement, from the point of view of epistemic rationality you can either revise your judgment or somehow rid yourself of the judgment too. The charge of going wrong, from the point of view of epistemic rationality, would still be a charge of incoherence. The worry I’m pressing, therefore, won’t go away but only reemerge at the epistemic level.
Given the preceding discussion, it appears to be an important desideratum for a theory of rationality that, $D_1$, it must capture the force of the wrong of irrationality. The wide scope view fails to meet this desideratum. The narrow scope view meets it successfully.

2.2 The Symmetry Problem

The wide scope view is problematic for a second reason. It faces the now famous symmetry problem. Suppose Robin believes she ought to finalize her paper tonight and send it out for review. However, she gives in to procrastination and no longer plans to finish the task. Moreover, Robin rationalizes her behavior. On the basis of her failure to intend to finish her paper, Robin drops her belief that she ought to finish it tonight. This is a paradigmatic case of self-deception; rationalization is irrational behavior. Recall that $E_w$ requires Robin to satisfy a conditional. $E_w$ is symmetrical in that it draws no normative distinction between the two ways to satisfy the conditional: denying the antecedent—i.e. giving up the normative belief—and affirming the consequent—i.e. forming the enkratic intention. The objection is that Robin’s normative situation is not symmetrical in this way. For we think Robin must not drop her normative belief on the basis of failing to intend enkratically.

We can make the point in another way. We need a theory of rationality to explain the following data: rationalizing behavior is always irrational; and enkratic behavior is always rational. $E_w$ fails to

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11 Not all behavior which involves dropping the normative belief on the basis of one’s failure to intend accordingly amounts to rationalization. Cases of ‘rational’ akrasia (e.g. the famous Huck Finn case), or cases where one discovers that the object of intention cannot be realized, and so on, are not cases of rationalization. Moreover, rationalization is structurally different from akrasia. In case of akrasia a person retains their normative belief and nonetheless fails to intend enkratically. Whereas rationalization is an irrational resolution of akrasia.
register this asymmetry. It treats both kinds of behavior on a par. The narrow scope enkratic requirement, however, is not symmetrical in this way for there is only one way to satisfy it: by forming the enkratic intention.12

This brings us to the second desideratum a theory of rational requirements must attempt to meet, namely, D2: rational requirements must not be symmetrical in objectionable ways. The wide scope requirements fail to meet D2 (and D1) whereas the narrow scope requirements meet D2 (and D1) successfully.

(Before I move on, I should mention that the wide scope theorists have tried to solve the symmetry problem. One solution is offered by John Broome (2013). In §4.2 I argue that Broome’s solution is on the right track—though it has a shortcoming which I’ll point out. However, the difficulty Broome faces is that his view itself does not have the resources to offer his solution. The reason for this is that in response to Scanlon’s view of attitudinal commitments, which Broome finds too strong, and which leads to a narrow scope view of rational requirements, Broome (2013:100) wishes to remain noncommittal about the normative commitments which underlie our attitudes. The account of attitudinal commitments I offer below carves out a middle grounds between Broome’s evasiveness and Scanlon’s view of attitudinal commitments. My account provides the resources to offer a solution to the symmetry problem which is similar to Broome’s.)

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12 A clarification is in order. The symmetry problem comes to the fore when you hold the belief that you ought to F and you seek guidance from the enkratic requirement about to what to do. En gives you only one option: to form the corresponding intention. Ew, on the other hand, gives you two options: either form the enkratic intention or drop the normative belief. The symmetry objection is that Ew draws no normative distinction between the two ways of satisfying it. Now there is another problem in the neighborhood. Suppose you have dropped the belief that you ought to F. Now, as it happens, you have escaped En and satisfied Ew. You have escaped En because the antecedent of En is now false, hence the requirement no longer applies to you. You have satisfied Ew because you have satisfied the conditional embedded in the requirement. Intuitively, the distinction between escaping a requirement and satisfying it is normatively significant. This shows another difference between the wide and narrow scope theories of rationality.
2.3 The Bootstrapping of Reasons and the Normativity of Rationality

So far the narrow scope view appears to be the preferable view. However, its alleged victory is pyrrhic for two reasons. The narrow scope view leads to illicit bootstrapping of normative reasons and it conflicts with our intuition that rationality is normative.

Consider a rather extreme example. Suppose Bert ridiculously believes he ought to axe his mother. Despite the oddity of his belief the narrow scope view requires Bert to intend to axe his mother. (For there is only one way to satisfy \(E_N\); by forming the enkratic intention.) But one may worry, how could rationality require Bert to do what he ought not to?

Moreover, suppose that rationality is normative. That is, suppose there is a normative reason for you (either pro toto or pro tanto) to satisfy all requirements of rationality. Now if we accept the narrow scope view it follows that: necessarily, if you believe you ought to F, you have a reason to intend to F. But this is odd. For Bert arguably has no reason to intend to axe his mother. It is implausible to hold that, by forming the belief that he ought to F, Bert can bootstrap into existence an illicit reason to intend to F. The wide scope view does not involve this oddity. The wide scope view, together with the normativity of rationality, at most entails that Bert has a reason to (either intend to F or drop the belief that he ought to F.) We do not get the odd result that Bert has a reason to intend to axe his mother.

This brings us to two more desiderata I suggest a theory of rationality must attempt to meet. The third desideratum, \(D_3\), is to avoid illicit bootstrapping of normative reasons. Moreover, I suggest contra Kolodny (2005) that we must preserve our well-entrenched intuition that rationality is normative. This is the final desideratum I offer; call it \(D_4\). This desideratum is not uncontroversial, of course,

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13 Broome (2013) and Kolodny (2005) agree. However, Schroeder (2007), given his non-reasons-first view, thinks that Bert has a normative reason (of negligible weight) to intend to axe his mother.
but if a theory of rationality respects it I find this to be a welcome result. We must relinquish $D_4$ only as a last resort.

We are now in an uncomfortable position. Neither the wide scope requirements nor the narrow scope requirements meet all four desiderata. However, I think we can make progress. In §4 I outline a hybrid theory of rationality which attempts to meet all four desiderata. The hybrid theory is made possible only after we notice a particular kind of normativity which underlies some of our beliefs and intentions. I give an account of it in the next section. Furthermore, throughout this paper I give no direct argument to accept $D_2$ (rational requirements must not be symmetrical in objectionable ways), $D_3$ (avoid illicit bootstrapping of reasons), and $D_4$ (preserve the normativity of rationality). But I do find these desiderata fairly plausible. As for $D_1$ (capture the force of the wrong of irrationality) I find it equally important. But it is also the most controversial. The argument of the next section (specifically, §3.3) indirectly defends $D_1$.

3. Consequential Commitments

3.1 Avowal and Consequential Commitments

We hold many attitudes. Some of those attitudes are distinctive in that we avow them from the first person point of view. To avow an attitude is to deem it *answerable* to justificatory reasons for it (even when we do not have a full grasp of those reasons.) We can contrast avowed attitudes with alienated attitudes. Alienated attitudes are those attitudes we find impervious to justificatory reasons for them. At best we attribute them to ourselves on the basis of behavioral evidence.\textsuperscript{14} Two prime examples of attitudes that we typically avow are beliefs and intentions. We often recognize, from the

\textsuperscript{14} Repressed racist beliefs are an example. Gendler’s (2008) ‘aliefs’ may also qualify as alienated attitudes.
first person point of view, that some of our beliefs and intentions are answerable to justificatory reasons for them. (Now onward, I limit my discussion to beliefs and intention; I use the term ‘attitudes’ to refer only to them.)

A clarification is on order. I do not mean to suggest that avowed attitudes result from explicit deliberation. Nor do I mean to propose that avowed attitudes are the current focus of our attention. But I do think that, if we choose to focus on them, we ourselves see that these attitudes are answerable to justificatory reasons for them. As Moran (1997:143) helpfully puts it, alienated attitudes are discoveries whereas avowed attitudes are declarations (at times, potential) from the first person point of view.

This is not all. Moran (2001:95) suggests that avowing an attitude involves “the binding of oneself to a certain course of action (or proposition).”\(^\text{15}\) What does ‘binding oneself’ mean here? I propose the following answer: to avow an attitude is to thereby undertake consequential commitments. We cannot fully recognize even understand an avowed attitude if, having acquired it, we are thereby not committed to having other attitudes. To avow an attitude must make a difference to, and must have consequences for, what else it is now appropriate to do and think from our point of view. In case of Alex, for instance, it is plausible to hold that his avowed belief that he ought to order salad thereby commits him to intend to order it. Without this assumption I do not see how we could understand what his avowed belief amounts to. Indeed, I do not see why we must call it an avowed belief in the first place.

\(^{15}\) To be sure, Moran make this claim about the aim of deliberation. However, he also holds that deliberation, implicit or explicit, results in attitudes that we typically avow. I take him to further hold, implicitly, that avowing an attitude, among other things, shares the aim of deliberation.
By avowing his normative belief, then, Alex by his own lights is committed to intend accordingly.\(^{16}\) To generalize, when you avow an attitude you *thereby* undertake consequential commitments to have certain other attitudes or perform certain actions. Attributing an avowed attitude to an agent, therefore, goes together with attributing to her the undertaking of consequential commitments which flow from the avowed attitude.

The undertaking of consequential commitment, in my view, is a matter of objective, not subjective, commitment. Though it is up to you to form a particular belief that you ought to F, it is not up to you what consequential commitments flow from your normative belief. For instance, despite holding the normative belief to order salad, Alex might explicitly deny undertaking of the corresponding consequential commitment. Yet, regardless of what Alex thinks, Alex *has* undertaken the consequential commitment to form the enkratic intention, whether he likes it or not. For otherwise, it is hard to grasp what his avowal of belief would amount to. The undertaking of consequential commitments, then, is hardly a matter of meeting your own standard about what commitments flow from the avowed attitude.

### 3.2 Consequential Commitments and Attitudinal Integrity

Our capacity to hold avowed attitudes is a typical (albeit not the only) manifestation of our agency.\(^{17}\) We are the kind of agents who are believers and intenders. Moreover, we avow our attitudes

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\(^{16}\) Admittedly, I have reached the conclusion rather swiftly. For you might think that even if it is granted that avowing an attitude must make a difference to a person’s forthcoming behavior, does this justify the conclusion that the person has undertaken a *commitment* to modify his behavior in the relevant way? This is my view, indeed. To allay your suspicion, I should mention that my use of the term ‘commitment’ is meant to capture the normative weight that avowal adds to the equation. I do not mean to use the term in any stronger sense than that.

\(^{17}\) It might also be a central *feature* of our agency. However, the stronger claim is not needed for my argument.
in that we take our attitudes to be answerable to justificatory reasons for them. It is particularly problematic, then, if we ourselves cut our avowed attitudes off at their knees (now onwards, let’s call avowed attitudes, simply ‘attitudes.’) Self-undermining of attitudes occurs when an agent violates the consequential commitments that flow from her attitudes. And when an agent does not undermine her particular attitudes in this way, she exhibits what I call ‘attitudinal integrity’ (of the agent) with respect to those attitudes.\textsuperscript{18}

To clarify, note that an agent might undermine her attitudes in at least two ways. The two ways of undermining attitudes correspond to the two kinds of consequential commitments that flow from attitudes; let’s call them A-type and B-type consequential commitments respectively. The first way of undermining attitudes relates to how an agent modulates her network of attitudes. An agent may (a) enmesh her attitudes in a self-impairing network of attitudes, or (b) fail to extend her network of attitudes in appropriate ways, such that some particular attitudes are not afforded the possibility of success as the attitudes they are. The notion of success of attitudes may be understood in terms of the roles those attitudes are expected to play within the attitudinal network.\textsuperscript{19} In case of (a), for example,

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\textsuperscript{18} I should emphasize that attitudinal integrity of an agent is a local, not a global, matter because it is measured with respect to individual attitudes or particular sets of attitudes an agent holds. Moreover, note that alienated attitudes also involve consequential commitments. But the violation of consequential commitments which flows from avowed attitudes additionally threatens the attitudinal integrity of an agent. No analogous threat arises in the case of alienated attitudes.
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\textsuperscript{19} Importantly, when the attitudes fail to play the expected roles, we rightly attribute the responsibility for this failure to the agent. The reason is that we expect the agent to ensure, when possible, that her attitudes play the expected roles in her attitudinal network. Now, what expectations we hold, or ought to hold, about the roles particular attitudes must play in the attitudinal network of a particular agent may depart from that agents’ own opinion about the matter. For the appropriate expectations correspond to what in fact preserves the attitudinal integrity of the agent. In \S3.1, I made a parallel claim about consequential commitments when I said that it is not up to a particular agent to decide what consequential commitments flow from her avowed attitudes. In defense of this claim, I argued that otherwise it would be difficult to understand what the avowed attitude amounts to. Why would it be difficult? Admittedly, my argument in the paper provides no deep answer to this question. However, I have now gestured at the beginnings of at least one possible answer: avowing an attitude stakes the attitudinal integrity of the agents with respect to that attitude. For if that were not the case, then it is hard to understand what if anything is special about avowal. Indeed, it would remain difficult to understand how avowal introduces any normativity into the equation. Also see n.16.
\end{flushright}
the belief that P is expected to eliminate obviously contradictory beliefs from the attitudinal network. So if an agent holds obviously contradictory attitudes, the attitudes appear to work against each other such that the possibility of their success gets undermined. Similarly, consider the case of (b). If an agent falls prey to akrasia or some other kind of rational break down—say, she intends to F but fails to intend the necessary means obviously implied by F, or she believes that P but fails to bring herself to believe its obvious implication, and so on—then that agent has failed to extend her existing network of attitudes in a way that would afford the possibility of success to her original attitudes. For instance, Alex has failed to intend according to his corresponding belief, and as a result the possibility of success of Alex’s corresponding belief gets undermined.

To generalize, the A-type consequential commitments are those commitments an agent undertakes such that, if she follows through on them, her respective attitudes are afforded the possibility of success as the attitudes they are. Thereby, the agent preserves her attitudinal integrity with respect to those attitudes. And if the agent violates those consequential commitments, she thereby undermines her attitudinal integrity with respect to those attitudes.²⁰

²⁰ I am indebted here to Langlois (ms.) Especially, I borrow from him the helpful term ‘attitudinal integrity.’ However, my specification of the term is different from his. I should also make an additional point here with help of an example. Suppose you rightly believe that Peano axioms are true. At the same time, you do not believe a particular result about the natural numbers. Perhaps you tried to prove the result from the axioms but you were unsuccessful. Furthermore, suppose that the result you think is false is in fact true. In that case, you appear to hold contradictory beliefs: for the result would deductively follow from the axioms you believe to be true. Is it fair to say that, for holding contradictory beliefs in this case, your attitudinal integrity is undermined? Intuitively, your attitudinal integrity does remain intact and I'm inclined to agree. Can my view explain this datum? As the view stands, it cannot fully explain it, or at least not explain it easily. For that reason, we need a deeper understanding of what attitudinal integrity amounts to. I can only gesture at a possible answer. Attitudinal integrity, and the success of particular attitudes, appear to be degree concept which must be fleshed out in light of the context of a particular person. In the example being considered, your attitudinal integrity remains intact because the success of your belief about the truth of Peano axioms is not undermined like it would be undermined in the case of someone who might hold obviously contradictory beliefs. Very roughly, the “distance” between your contradictory beliefs is greater than the corresponding “distance” between the relevant beliefs of the other person. I admit this proposal is rather vague. But any attempt to sufficiently sharpen it here will take us too far afield.
There is a second way in which an agent may undermine her attitudes. She may undermine them by giving them up in objectionable ways. Robin’s behavior is a case in point. She gives up her belief that she ought to F by engaging in self-deception. Recall that when Robin avows her belief that she ought to F, she deems it answerable to justificatory reasons for it. However, by engaging in self-deception Robin drops this belief in a way which is not fully sensitive to her avowal. For she rationalizes her behavior by inappropriately taking her failure to intend enkratically to be a justificatory reason to drop her corresponding belief. For this reasons, her original belief that she ought to F gets undermined. We have arrived at the B-type consequential commitments that flow from avowed attitudes: they are the commitments not to drop the respective attitudes in objectionable ways. B-type consequential commitments involve retrospective sensitivity to the avowal of original attitudes. If an agent follows through on these commitments, she thereby preserves her attitudinal integrity with respect to those attitudes.

It is important to note that the dropping of attitudes in unobjectionable ways (i.e., ways sensitive to the avowal of respective attitudes) does not undermine the attitudinal integrity of an agent with respect to the respective attitudes. Rather, this preserves the attitudinal integrity of an agent. Had Alex or Robin dropped their respective normative beliefs say for doubting their truth, their beliefs would have simply dropped out of their respective networks of attitudes, along with both kinds of consequential commitments that flow from them. In that case, the respective attitudinal integrity of both Alex and Robin would remain intact.

Here I should make an important point. My proposal—that our attitudes involve us in consequential commitments—runs the risk of being assimilated to apparently similar but ultimately different proposals. For example, Scanlon (2007:92) argues that intending to A “involves a commitment on one’s part to think about what to do in a way this is compatible with one’s doing A.” However, on Scanlon’s view (2014:57) the ultimate source of this commitment is one’s belief about reasons for and
against one’s attitude. Beliefs about reasons are beliefs with practical content. And these beliefs, according to Scanlon, commit us to going on in a certain way. My proposal of consequential commitments is different from Scanlon’s. Consequential commitments flow from avowed attitudes. Avowing an attitude does not require an agent to hold a belief about corresponding reasons. Rather, what is distinctive about avowing an attitude is that the agent finds her attitude answerable to justificatory reasons for it, and thereby the agent binds herself to going on in a certain way.

In sum, consequential commitments have two distinctive features. First, they flow from avowed attitudes whether or not the avowal involves a belief about reasons for and against those attitudes. Secondly, there are at least two kinds of consequential commitments, A-type and B-type consequential commitments. Consequential commitments of both kinds are those commitments an agent undertakes such that, if the agent follows though on them, she in fact preserves her attitudinal integrity with respect to the respective attitudes. In the next sub-section, I argue that my account of consequential commitments provides an insight into what the wrong of irrationality consists in.

3.3 The Wrong of Irrationality

To hold an avowed attitude is to thereby undertake consequential commitments. Note that there is a gap between undertaking of consequential commitments and following through on them.

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21 I am indebted here to Hinchman (2013). Furthermore, I should note that my account of rationality vis-a-vis attitudinal commitments (in §4) is “weaker” than Scanlon’s. Given Scanlon’s account of attitudinal commitments it seems reasonable to infer that one must follow-through on these commitments. Hence, Scanlon holds a narrow scope view of rational requirements. My account of consequential commitments—in terms of the A-type and B-type consequential commitments—does not require this inference. My departure from Scanlon will be important in §4.2 where I argue, contra Scanlon (2007) and Kolodny (2005), that rationality is not a matter of following through on attitudinal commitments. Rather, I will propose that rationality is a matter of maintaining coherence among our attitudes in ways sensitive to the consequential commitments we undertake. Instead of the narrow scope view, I will argue that a theory of rationality includes wide scope requirements in conjunction with the basing prohibitions of rationality.
This gap provides us with the resources to better understand irrational behavior. Let’s start with akrasia. An akratic agent holds an attitude, undertakes consequential commitments, but fails to follow through on the A-type consequential commitment.

Now recall that on the wide scope view, the wrong of enkratic akrasia consists in violating the wide scope enkratic requirement, \( E_W \). Violation of \( E_W \) entails:

**Wrong\(_W\)**: Necessarily, you are going wrong (if you believe you ought to F, but you do not intend to F.)\(^{22}\)

**Wrong\(_W\)** effectively charges Alex of being in an incoherent state of mind. Against the background of consequential commitments, we can see why **Wrong\(_W\)** is implausibly weak. Alex has not committed the wrong of merely falling prey to incoherence. The charge against Alex of having gone wrong is more forceful. The charge is that having undertaken a consequential commitment Alex has failed to direct his behavior in light of it. The violation of consequential commitment amounts to self-undermining of his original belief and thereby undermines his attitudinal integrity with respect to his belief. This is not to say, however, that **Wrong\(_W\)** is false. I think it is true. The claim is that it is implausibly weak. The stronger principle we are looking for is the following:

**Wrong\(_N\)**: Necessarily, if you believe you ought to F, you are going wrong (for failing to intend to F.)

**Wrong\(_N\)** is the narrow scope counterpart of **Wrong\(_W\)**. **Wrong\(_N\)** is entailed by the violation of the corresponding narrow scope rational requirement, \( E_N \). **Wrong\(_N\)** takes as its scope the failure to intend to F. On the view I have proposed so far, **Wrong\(_N\)** amounts to the charge that, by failing to intend enkratically, Alex has failed to follow through on the consequential commitment he had undertaken. **Wrong\(_N\)** fully captures the force of the wrong of enkratic akrasia.

\(^{22}\) Violation of the other requirements, e.g. the instrumental requirement, would entail the corresponding ‘Wrong’ principles.
Beside the wrong of akrasia, the gap between the undertaking of consequential commitments and following through on them also provides a deeper understanding of the wrong of rationalization. For instance, Robin has gone wrong because she violated the B-type consequential commitment she had undertaken, i.e., the commitment not to drop her normative belief on the basis of her failure to intend enkratically. Both akratic and rationalizing behavior lead to self-undermining of one’s attitudes and hence threaten one’s attitudinal integrity. That is why you go wrong in a forceful sense when you are irrational.

The wrong of irrationality, then, does not amount to incoherence for it is more forceful than that. It amounts to the violation of consequential commitments one had undertaken. When evaluating a person of being irrational, a theory of rationality must be sensitive to the force of the wrong of irrationality. This is the first desideratum, \( D_1 \). If not uncontroversial, I hope \( D_1 \) sounds plausible now. We must attempt to meet it together with meeting the other three desiderata. We now have the required background to outline a theory of rationality which meets all four desiderata. This is the task of the next section.

4. A Hybrid Theory of Rationality

To recap, our discussion so far has revealed four desiderata a theory of rationality must attempt to meet. I list them here again.

- \( D_1 \): Capture the force of the wrong of irrationality.
- \( D_2 \): Rational requirements must not be symmetrical in objectionable ways.
- \( D_3 \): Avoid illicit bootstrapping of normative reasons.
- \( D_4 \): Preserve the normativity of rationality.

\(^{23}\) I give a formal formulation of the wrong of rationalization in §4.3. I have already given two formal interpretations of the wrong of akrasia, namely, \( \text{Wrong}_w \) and \( \text{Wrong}_N \).
We have seen that narrow scope rational requirements meet $D_1$ and $D_2$, but they fail to meet $D_3$ and $D_4$. By contrast, wide scope rational requirements meet $D_3$ and $D_4$, but they fail to meet $D_1$ and $D_2$. It would be helpful progress if a theory of rationality could meet all four desiderata. This is the task of this section. Let’s start with desiderata $D_3$ and $D_4$. After that, we will move up the list, first to $D_2$ and finally $D_1$.

4.1 Desiderata $D_3$ and $D_4$: Illicit Bootstrapping and the Normativity of Rationality

Recall the case of Bert. He ridiculously believes that he ought to axe his mother. What must rationality require him to do? If we accept the narrow scope view together with the normativity of rationality, the implication is that Bert has bootstrapped into existence a normative reason to intend to axe his mother. This is illicit bootstrapping of normative reasons. If possible we must avoid it. Therefore, I think we must accept the wide scope rational requirements. In case of enkratic rationality, we must accept $E_w$ instead of $E_N$. Together with the assumption that rationality is normative, $E_w$ does not entail illicit bootstrapping of normative reasons. At most it entails that Bert has a reason to either form the enkratic intention or drop the normative belief. We do not get the odd result that Bert has a normative reason to intend to axe his mother. By accepting wide scope requirements, we satisfy both $D_3$ and $D_4$.

4.2 Desideratum $D_2$: Rational Requirements Must Not be Symmetrical in Objectionable Ways

Now we have the task cut out for us. We have seen that the problem with accepting wide scope rational requirements is that they fail to meet $D_2$ (and $D_1$). In case of enkratic rationality, recall

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$^{24}$ If we accept the reasons-first view of normative reasons, then to my knowledge there is no narrow scope theory of rationality which meets both $D_3$ and $D_4$. The most recent statement of the narrow scope view, to my knowledge, is Lord (2014). It fails to meet $D_3$ and $D_4$. Korsgaard (2008) meets $D_4$ but she finds $D_3$ implausible. However, as noted earlier, her view is not a reasons-first view.
that $E_w$ requires that you satisfy a conditional. In case of Robin who rationalizes here behavior, $E_w$ is symmetrical in that it makes no comparative judgments of rationality between Robin’s forming the enkratic intention and Robin’s dropping her normative belief on the basis of her failure to form the enkratic intention. However, we think that Robin’s normative situation is not symmetrical in this way. Robin must not drop her normative belief on the basis of her failure to intend enkratically. Rationality must not legitimize rationalization.

Broome (2013) offers a solution to the symmetry problem. His solution is not entirely satisfactory but it is on the right track. Let us focus on his solution and amend it for its shortcomings. Broome (2013:187) argues that we need not capture the relevant normative asymmetries within the enkratic requirement. A theory of rationality includes several requirements of rationality. We may introduce separate negative requirements of rationality within the theory to handle these difficult cases. He calls these negative requirements ‘basing prohibitions’. There are several basing prohibitions but the one relevant to enkrasia is:

$E_p$: Necessarily, rationality requires of you that you do not drop your belief that you ought to $F$ on the basis of your not intending to $F$.

$E_p$ rules out cases of rationalization. When Robin gives up her normative belief on the basis of her failure to intend enkratically, she violates $E_p$ despite satisfying $E_w$. Even though $E_w$ predicts objectionable normative symmetry, $E_p$ takes care of it. By rationality’s lights, Robin counts as irrational.

Broome’s solution to the symmetry problem has at least two shortcomings. First, note that the cases of symmetry are offered as counter-examples to the wide scope requirements. It seems artificial to introduce separate negative requirements of rationality just to accommodate the counter-examples. We would not be suspicious, however, were we offered a unified and satisfying account of the source of both positive and negative rational requirements. But Broome does not offer it. Broome
(2013:150) thinks he has no general method of identifying rational requirements and basing prohibitions: “I find myself forced to appeal largely to our intuitions.”

Secondly, note that Broome’s solution to the symmetry problem allows rationalizing behavior to satisfy the corresponding enkratic requirement. Despite violating $E_p$, Robin satisfies $E_w$. For one way to satisfy $E_w$ is to drop the normative belief, and Robin does precisely that albeit in an objectionable way. This is an odd result. For Broome (unpublished) himself remarks, “if you are to become more rational—if your degree of rationality is to increase—you must come to satisfy requirements of rationality that previously you did not satisfy.” Besides violating $E_p$, Robin’s irrational behavior does make her satisfy $E_w$ which she previously did not satisfy. It is an odd result of Broome’s view that Robin’s irrational behavior figures positively—even when its positive effect is offset by the violation of basing prohibition—in determining the extent of Robin’s rationality. By contrast, I think a satisfactory solution to the symmetry problem must have at least two features. First, it must ensure that rationalizing behavior merits the charge of irrationality. Broome’s solution has this feature. But secondly, the solution must ensure that rationalizing behavior does not satisfy the corresponding requirement of rationality. Broome’s solution does not have this feature. (In case of enkratic rationality, the corresponding requirement is the specific enkratic requirement which corresponds to the basing prohibition violated by rationalizing behavior. This is not to say, however, that irrational behavior must not satisfy any requirement of rationality. That claim would be implausibly strong.)

Note that the source of the oddity of Broome’s view is not the introduction of basing prohibitions in response to the symmetry problem. To see why, let’s retain his solution, $E_p$, but replace $E_w$ with $E_N$. Now Robin’s rationalizing behavior violates $E_p$ but neither satisfies nor violates $E_N$. By dropping her normative belief Robin escapes the narrow scope enkratic requirement. This is the case because rationalizing behavior denies the antecedent of $E_N$. Therefore, the requirement no longer applies.
Hence, the odd result of Broome’s view is avoided while retaining his solution to the symmetry problem. Now you might wonder whether a narrow scope theory needs to retain Broome’s solution in order to address the symmetry problem. After all, narrow scope requirements are not symmetrical like the wide scope requirements. I think even the narrow scope theories need the basing prohibitions. For the narrow scope requirement alone is not sufficient to capture the extent of normative asymmetry.\textsuperscript{25} Remember that the asymmetry we want to explain is this: rationalizing behavior is always irrational, and enkratic behavior is always rational. $E_N$ captures the second conjunct, for the only way to satisfy it is to intend enkratically. However, $E_N$ is silent over the first conjunct, for it does not prohibit rationalizing behavior.\textsuperscript{26} In order to capture the full extent of the relevant asymmetry, the enkratic requirement, wide or narrow, needs supplementing with help of a negative requirements. That requirement is the basing prohibition, $E_p$.

This observation has two upshots. First, contrary to the typical opinion, I think the foremost location of the battle over wide and narrow scope requirements is not the symmetry considerations; the location lies elsewhere. For in order to capture the full extent of the normative asymmetry, a theory of rationality needs the basing prohibitions regardless of whether the theory includes wide or a narrow scope rational requirements.\textsuperscript{27} However, I would like to focus on the second upshot of our observation, which is that the source of the oddity of Broome’s view, as argued above, is not the basing prohibitions. In my view, the source of the oddity is the way Broome’s theory brings together wide

\textsuperscript{25} Broome (2013:142) and Lord (2014) also make this observation.
\textsuperscript{26} This is true regardless of whether we specify the narrow scope requirement as a state requirement, or, following Kolodny (2007), as a process requirement.
\textsuperscript{27} Lord (2014) suggests that the symmetry considerations are the decisive battleground for the choice between wide and narrow scope requirements. In light of our observation above, the foremost location of the battle changes. What does it change to? In my view, it changes to the nature of normative reasons. For if we accept the reasons-first view, there is considerable pressure to accept the wide scope view. If we reject the reasons-first view, the pressure is relieved. For this reasons, it is no surprise then that both as Korsgaard and Schroeder, who deny the reasons-first view, hold the narrow scope view of rational requirements.
scope requirements and basing prohibitions. I suggest there is a better way to understand the relationship between the two kinds of requirements. Recall that we posed the cases of rationalization as counter-examples to wide scope requirements. We noted that, unless we have a satisfactory and unified account of the source of both positive and negative rational requirements, it appears artificial to introduce separate negative requirements (i.e. the basing prohibition) only to accommodate the counter-examples. Broome thinks he has no satisfying account to offer. We have the resources to offer a unified account of the source of both positive and negative requirements of rationality. This unified account sheds light on the relationship between the two kinds of requirements.

In my view, all rational requirements, positive and negative, are requirements of attitudinal integrity so that the neglect of them makes you out of order. The neglect makes you out of order in the sense that you undermine your attitudes by violating the corresponding consequential commitments. And thereby, you fail to preserve your attitudinal integrity with respect to the respective attitudes. Now recall from §3.2 that avowed attitudes involve two kinds of consequential commitments. In case of enkratic rationality, the avowed normative belief that you ought to F involves, first, the A-type consequential commitment to form the enkratic intention. Secondly, it involves the B-type consequential commitment not to drop the normative belief in an objectionable way. If you fail to follow through on either of these consequential commitments, you thereby undermine your attitudinal integrity with respect to your respective normative belief. Given this background, let’s see what the enkratic requirement amounts to. First, in order to preserve your attitudinal integrity you might (i) make your attitudes coherent by forming the enkratic intention, or (ii) you might give up your normative belief. This amounts to \( E_w \). Secondly, you might undermine your attitudinal integrity by giving up your normative belief in an objectionable way, say by rationalizing your behavior. That would result in achieving coherence among your attitudes in a way which is blind to the B-type consequential commitment. Enkratic rationality must not allow that. This prohibition amounts to \( E_p \). In order to preserve your
attitudinal integrity, then, enkratic rationality requires that you maintain coherence among your relevant attitudes in ways sensitive to the consequential commitments you have undertaken. $E_w$ guides you how to achieve coherence and $E_p$ rules out the objectionable way to achieve it. Both the positive and the negative requirement together ensure that, if you satisfy them, you thereby preserve your attitudinal integrity. Therefore, we have good reason to believe that the basing prohibition is part of the requirement of enkratic rationality. The modified enkratic requirement amounts to the conjunction $(E_w \text{ AND } E_p)$.

If we accept the modified requirement, rationalizing behavior no longer satisfies the corresponding requirement of rationality. When Robin rationalizes her behavior, she satisfies the first conjunct but she violates the second conjunct. She does not satisfy the overall requirement. We no longer face the odd result of Broome’s view. We have arrived at a satisfactory solution to the symmetry problem.

I should emphasize that our modification to the requirement is only made possible against the background of the additional normative element we have introduced, namely, the element of consequential commitments. Since Broome’s view lacks this normative element, Broome does not anticipate the proposed solution.

4.2.1 The Scanlon-Kolodny View of Rationality

You might find the modified requirement objectionable for the following reason. You might think that making the basing prohibition part of the rational requirement conflicts with the preferred view of rationality endorsed by some reasons-first theorists. For instance, Scanlon (2014) and Kolodny

\footnote{The requirement might include additional conjuncts in order to rule out additional objectionable ways to drop attitudes. At any rate, the requirement must at least include the basing prohibition.}

\footnote{My modified requirement also satisfies Schroeder’s (2004:346) demand that the solution to the symmetry problem must locate the irrationality of rationalizing behavior within the respective rational requirement.}
(2005) endorse the reasons-first view. Moreover, both of them think that rationality is a matter of bringing your attitudes in line with your beliefs about reasons. Kolodny (2005:524), for instance, offers the following two ‘core’ requirements of rationality from which all other requirements are supposed to derive.

**C+:** Rationality requires one to have \( A \) if one believes that one has conclusive reason to have \( A \).

**C-:** Rationality requires one not to have \( A \) if one believes that one lacks sufficient reason to have \( A \).\(^{30}\)

Call this view the ‘Scanlon-Kolodny view’ of rationality. Now note that the basing prohibitions do not appeal to normative beliefs of agents about their assessment of reasons. Therefore, the objection holds, the basing prohibitions cannot be part of rational requirements. At most, they must be treated as a special case.

There are two ways we might attempt to address this worry. The first way is to accept the Scanlon-Kolodny view of rationality and adjust the basing prohibitions accordingly. We can formulate the basing prohibitions as conditional requirements involving normative beliefs about assessment of reasons. We can interpret the conditional formulation of \( E_p \) as either a wide scope or a narrow scope prohibition in the following ways:

**\( E_{pw} \):** Necessarily, rationality requires of you that (if you believe you ought to \( F \), you do not drop your normative belief on the basis of your not intending to \( F \).)

and,

**\( E_{pn} \):** Necessarily, if you believe you ought to \( F \), rationality requires of you that (you do not drop your normative belief on the basis of your not intending to \( F \).)

This solution has already failed. Both \( E_{pw} \) and \( E_{pn} \) are unacceptable. \( E_{pw} \) is not acceptable because rationalizing behavior satisfies it. You can satisfy \( E_{pw} \) by dropping your normative belief that you

\(^{30}\) Also compare Parfit (2011:111).
ought to F. When Robin rationalizes her behavior, she does precisely that. Moreover, $E_{PN}$ is not acceptable either. Although it has the same satisfaction conditions as $E_p$ it has different violation conditions. When Robin rationalizes her behavior, she violates $E_p$ but she *escapes* $E_{PN}$. The reason is that her rationalizing behavior violates the antecedent of $E_{PN}$. Therefore, we have good reason to preserve $E_p$ in its original formulation.

In my view there is a better way to address the worry we started with. I have motivated in §3.2 that consequential commitments can be understood independently of an agent’s beliefs about reasons for and against her attitudes. Against this background, I moreover suggest that we have good reason to deny the Scanlon-Kolodny view of rationality without thereby giving up the reasons-first view of normative reasons. I suggest that forming beliefs about reasons, and acting in light of them, is not the only species of an agents’ attempt at responding to reasons. What is distinctive about reason-responsive agents is their capability to avow their attitudes and, as a result, undertake consequential commitments. Avowing attitude does not essentially involve forming beliefs about reasons. It is enough for avowal that an agent finds her attitudes answerable to justificatory reasons for them. In contrast to the Scanlon-Kolodny view of rationality, then, I propose that rationality is a matter of making one’s attitudes coherent in ways sensitive to the consequential commitments one undertakes.\(^{31}\)

If the above proposal is plausible then the fact that agents undertake consequential commitments must guide our understanding of the content of rational requirements. And I have argued that when we heed consequential commitments, we reach the modified requirement $(E_w \text{ AND } E_p)$. Now note that by bringing in the element of consequential commitments—an element which appears to be more amenable to non-reasons-first views—we have not given up on the central commitment of the reasons-first views. For nothing we have proposed undercuts the claim that normative reasons are

\(^{31}\) To be sure, rationality as attitudinal coherence in commitment-sensitive ways might entail responsiveness to beliefs about reasons. The point is that rationality is not *equivalent* to responsiveness to beliefs about reasons.
independent of the present attitudes and activities of individual agents. Rather, we have arrived at an alternative understanding of what a view of rationality vis-à-vis the reasons-first view of normative reasons might look like.

In sum, I conclude that we must accept the modified requirements of rationality. The modified requirements of rationality include wide scope requirements in conjunction with the corresponding basing prohibitions. We have successfully satisfied the second desideratum, D₂, that rational requirements must not be symmetrical in objectionable ways. Now we can move on to the only unmet desideratum, D₁, and attempt to satisfy it.

4.3 Desideratum D₁: Capture the Force of The Wrong of Irrationality

By accepting the modified enkratic requirement, (Eₚ AND Eₚ), we have successfully met three out of four desiderata, namely, D₂, D₃, and D₄. But now we face a further difficulty. What does the violation of the modified enkratic requirement amount to? We saw above that violation of Eₚ entails \text{Wrong}_w. Moreover, the violation of Eₚ entails:

\text{Wrong}_p: \text{Necessarily, you are going wrong when you drop your belief that you ought to } F \text{ on the basis of your not intending to } F.

Therefore, the violation of the modified requirement \( (E_w \text{ AND } E_p) \) entails \( (\text{Wrong}_w \text{ OR } \text{Wrong}_p) \)

But I have criticized \text{Wrong}_w, in §3.3, for being implausibly weak. It does not capture the force of the wrong of irrationality. Note, however, that the second disjunct, \text{Wrong}_p, is not problematic. First, it is shared by both wide and narrow scope theories of rationality because it is entailed by the violation of a basing prohibition which I argued is shared by both theories. Secondly, \text{Wrong}_p is not implausibly weak because it does not level a charge of incoherence. On my view, \text{Wrong}_p amounts to the claim that you are going wrong when you give up your original attitude in a way which violates the B-type
consequential commitment. Therefore, the only problematic disjunct is \textbf{Wrong}_w. Against \textbf{Wrong}_w, I have argued that we must accept \textbf{Wrong}_N in order to capture the force of the wrong of irrationality.

One way to accept \textbf{Wrong}_N is to accept the narrow scope requirement: \((E_N \text{ AND } E_P)\). The violation of this requirement entails \((\textbf{Wrong}_N \text{ OR } \textbf{Wrong}_p)\). Consequently, we are able to meet \textbf{D}_1.

But recall that \(E_N\), together with the normativity of rationality, entails illicit bootstrapping of normative reasons. This is an unwelcome result. Moreover, \((E_N \text{ AND } E_P)\) allows detachment which leads to counterintuitive results. In case of Bert, it requires him to intend to axe his mother. Broome (2007:365) rightly points out, “we should expect rationality to require you to get out of your irrational state, not to get in deeper.” We must resist \((E_N \text{ AND } E_P)\).

We are now in an uncomfortable position. It appears that we must sacrifice at least one of the desiderata: either allow bootstrapping of normative reasons or remain insensitive to the force of the wrong of irrationality. However, I think we can make progress on this front too. We must draw a distinction between \textit{prescriptive} and \textit{evaluative} principles of rationality. Prescriptive principles tell us what to do or what to avoid in order to be rational. And evaluative principles assess whether a person is rational or irrational. \((E_w \text{ AND } E_P)\) is both a prescriptive and an evaluative principle of rationality. It is prescriptive because it tells us what to do or what to avoid in order to be rational. And it is an evaluative principle because its violation entails the evaluative principle \((\textbf{Wrong}_w \text{ OR } \textbf{Wrong}_p)\) which evaluates whether, by rationality’s lights, you are going wrong. Now note that following remark by Thomas Nagel (1970:20): “rationality can be defined only in terms of adherence to rational requirements.” Many theorists of rationality, including Broome and Kolodny, assume the truth of this claim and extrapolate that the wrong of irrationality wholly consists in the violation of rational requirements. I reject this extrapolation.

I have introduced an additional normative element above, the element of consequential commitment. And I have argued that, from the point of view of rationality, you are going wrong in a
forceful way when you violate consequential commitments. This violation must figure in evaluating the wrong of irrationality. In order to do that, we must accept $\text{Wrong}_N$. Since we must resist ($E_N$ AND $E_p$), as rationality cannot be a source of illicit bootstrapping of reasons, I propose that we introduce the narrow scope $\text{Wrong}_N$ as a separate, *purely* evaluative, principle of rationality. I call it ‘purely’ evaluative because it is not entailed by any prescriptive principle in our theory. (For we do not accept the narrow scope rational requirements.) Yet if you happen to satisfy $\text{Wrong}_N$ you are thereby evaluated as going wrong. Therefore, the wrong of irrationality does not wholly consist in violating the rational requirements. It additionally consists in violating consequential commitments you had undertaken (that is to say, it additionally consists in satisfying $\text{Wrong}_N$.)

My proposal should sound intuitive. Rationality requires that you maintain coherence among your attitudes in ways sensitive to the consequential commitments you undertake. In case of akraisa, when you fail at this task, rationality thereby evaluates you as going wrong for being incoherent. But this does not mean that rationality must charge you of incoherence *alone* and remain blind to the fact that you additionally violated a consequential commitment. Rather, rationality must additionally evaluate you for violating a consequential commitment, without thereby requiring you to follow through on consequential commitment. For the latter would amount to the narrow scope view which would legitimize bootstrapping of illicit reasons. Hence $\text{Wrong}_N$ must be introduced as a separate principle without accepting $E_N$.\footnote{Since we have accepted ($E_W$ AND $E_p$), I should emphasize that $E_W$ does not require you to follow through on consequential commitments. It requires you either to follow through or to give up your corresponding belief together with the consequential commitments that flows from it. $E_p$ ensures that you do not give up your belief in an objectionable way.} In sum, enkratic rationality requires ($E_W$ AND $E_p$); whereas when you’re enkratically *ir*rational, you are evaluated as going wrong as: ($\text{Wrong}_W$ OR $\text{Wrong}_p$ OR $\text{Wrong}_N$). As a consequence, our theory of enkratic rationality successfully satisfies $D_i$: it captures the force of the wrong of irrationality.
My account of enkratic rationality is now complete. We have managed to satisfy all four desiderata. We may generalize our account to all conditional requirements of rationality. In our theory of rationality, first, each wide scope conditional requirement of rationality is in conjunction with the corresponding basing prohibition. Secondly, for every requirement that involves a wide scope conjunct, there exists, in addition, a purely evaluative narrow scope principle of rationality. The proposed theory, then, is a hybrid theory of rationality.

5. Conclusion

In the preceding discussion we have seen that wide and narrow scope rational requirements each have their shortcomings. Wide scope requirements fail to capture the force of the wrong of irrationality and they are symmetrical in objectionable ways. Narrow scope requirements, on the other hand, do not face these difficulties. However, they lead to illicit bootstrapping of normative reasons and fail to preserve the normativity of rationality. In this paper I think we have made progress. I have proposed an account of consequential commitments which are normative commitments that flow from avowed attitudes. Moreover, contra the Scanlon-Kolodny view of rationality, I have argued that rationality is a matter of maintaining coherence among our attitudes in ways sensitive to the consequential commitments we undertake. This backgrounds makes possible a hybrid theory of rationality. The theory includes (a) wide scope rational requirements in conjunction with the corresponding basing prohibitions of rationality; and (b) purely evaluative narrow scope principles of rationality. The hybrid theory successfully meets the four desiderata above. This is a welcome result.

I conclude with emphasizing the proviso with which I commenced the discussion. We have arrived at a conditional conclusion. If the reasons-first view of normative reasons is correct, then the hybrid theory of rationality is the preferable theory. Given my list of four desiderata, a purely wide scope theory appears unacceptable. However, if it turns out that the antecedent of our conclusion is
false, then the list of desiderata I have laid out might change. For instance, if a version of the non-reasons-first view turns out to be correct, then we may tolerate bootstrapping of normative reasons. The resulting theory of rationality, then, might be a purely narrow scope theory. One thing we have learned from our discussion, then, is that the battle over the narrow scope versus hybrid theory of rationality is to be ultimately fought over the nature of normative reasons.
References


