From Mosques and Coffeehouses to Squares and Cafés: the Production and Transformation of Political Public Spaces and Social Life in Modern Tehran

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ABSTRACT

FROM MOSQUES AND COFFEEHOUSES TO SQUARES AND CAFÉS: THE PRODUCTION AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PUBLIC SPACES AND SOCIAL LIFE IN MODERN TEHRAN

by

Ashkan Rezvani-Naraghi

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016
Under the Supervision of Professor Jennifer A. Jordan

Why did the spaces of protest in Tehran, the capital of Iran, shift from sacred spaces of the city, two mosques and a holy shrine during the 1905 and 1906 Constitutional Revolution, to the streets and squares of the northern city in the 1940s and the early 1950s? Through extensive archival research in Iran, including examination of old Iranian periodicals, memoirs, travelogues, maps, and the like, I found that this spatial transformation was the tip of an iceberg; it was closely related to the transformations of urban society, social life, and social spaces in Tehran that had been brewing for decades. Nineteenth-century Iranian urban society was largely a classless society; it consisted of numerous smaller communities. Social life and the social spaces of Tehran –takīyyih, zūrkhānihs, mosques, bathhouses, and coffeehouses –were highly shaped by communal identities. In this context, the main sacred spaces of the city were the only sites that could transcend communal diversities and brought people together for a common political cause. However, Iranian urban society underwent massive transformations during the first half of the twentieth century. Two new urban classes, the modern middle and the urban working classes, developed in Iranian cities, particularly Tehran, which were free from the bonds of communal
life. The city’s social spaces and social life transformed alongside urban society. A new spatial
discourse that was incubated in Iranian society for a century became the main force transforming
Iranian cities, particularly Tehran. Moreover, new types of social spaces after European models –
cinemas, theaters, cafés, restaurants, and sport clubs – became the centers of social life for the
modern middle class. This class became the main political social force in the city. It rejected
traditional and religious spaces and defined a new way of life for itself. In this context, the
newly built network of streets and squares of the northern section of Tehran substituted the
sacred spaces of the city as the primary political public spaces.

Alongside the main historical element of the dissertation, there is also a theoretical
deliberation. Through the examination of various instances of social movements and their social
forces, I investigate the relationship between the public sphere and political public spaces in a
context beyond the conventional geographic scope of western urban and political theories. My
research suggests that the current models of the public sphere, including Habermas’s bourgeois
public sphere, do not map onto Iranian society. Instead, my research suggests a new model based
on the particularities of Iranian urban society during the nineteenth and the early twentieth
centuries, but potentially applicable to cases far beyond Tehran as well. In this model, I introduce
the communal sphere as the main construct of segmented Iranian urban society in the nineteenth
century, mediated between the private and public spheres. In this context, the public sphere
formed as the outcome of coming together of various communal spheres through the binding
force of religion and political activities of a new urban bourgeoisie, the propertied middle class,
at the turn of the twentieth century. Also, I found that the public sphere and political public
spaces are deeply interconnected; they share certain commonalities that can be investigated
through the socio-historical analysis.
To

all the people who think differently

and dare to act differently
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Introduction

The Public Sphere and Political Public Space: Contextuality and Universality

In 1905 and 1906 thousands of Iranians rose up against the Qajar monarchy (1796-1925), the ruling dynasty of the time. Months of protests and uprising resulted in the establishment of the first parliament in the modern history of Iran. The events of 1905 and 1906 are known as the Constitutional Revolution. During the revolutionary months in Tehran, people used the main sacred spaces of the city, two mosques and a holy shrine, as their primary stages of protest. Around forty years later, a brief era of democracy and relative political freedom in Iran brought a lively political atmosphere to Iranian cities, particularly Tehran, once again. The highlight of this era was the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement towards the end of the 1940s and the early 1950s. During these episodes of contention, people used the network of streets and squares in the northern section of Tehran as their spaces of protest.

Comparing these episodes of contention, a simple question initiated this research project: why did people of Tehran used the city’s two main mosques and a holy shrine as their primary places of protest during the 1905 and 1906 Constitutional Revolution, but in the turbulent years of the 1940s and the early 1950s, they repeatedly used the streets and squares of the northern section of Tehran for the same purpose of protesting? At the surface, I address the transformation of Tehran’s geographies of social movements in the first half of the twentieth century. However, as the story unfolds, the readers will find three other crucial narratives developing alongside the major story. This research situates the transformation of the spatiality of social movements in the
context of the transformation of Iranian urban society, the transformation of social life and
spaces of this society, and the role of local and global forces in these changes.

My point of departure for this research is the relationship between the public sphere and political public spaces. In this dissertation, I suggest that the public sphere and political public spaces are two different but deeply interconnected entities. Drawing in part Jürgen Habermas’s discussion in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, here I understand the public sphere as a medium between society and the state that enables the former to exert influence on the latter.¹ Political public spaces provide the spatial manifestations of the public sphere.² It is possible to investigate material manifestations of the public sphere in other media, such as newspapers and books;³ however, political public spaces provide unique platforms for people’s collective political activities, and in ways that intersect with other aspects of urban change.

My research suggests that the transformation of the political public spaces of Tehran from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries should be investigated in the broader context of the transformation of the public sphere and Iranian urban society. The examination of the latter two provides the framework for the theorization of spatial changes. However, I do not take the main theoretical concepts, the public sphere and public spaces, at their face value. I do not adopt the Habermasian model of the public sphere without questioning its legitimacy for Iranian urban

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society. I demonstrate, in fact, that the Habermasian model cannot fully theorize the normative relationship between the state and society in Iran.

Nineteenth-century Iranian urban society was largely classless and segmented. Unlike European cities of the time, it is not possible to divide urban society into broad classes based on shared economic interests, such as working, lower, middle, and upper classes. Instead, the urban population consisted of many smaller communities. The members of each community shared a common social identity, such as ethnicity, language, dialect, sectarian affiliation, profession, or religion. These communities were semi-independent and socially enclosed entities with their specific social interactions and spaces. Social and spatial analysis of this segmented society is crucial to the investigation of the formation and transformation of the public sphere and political public spaces in Iranian cities, particularly Tehran, at the turn of the twentieth century. My analysis of this society posits a third sphere mediating between the public and private spheres: the communal sphere. The usage of the communal sphere in my research is different from the

---

4 In his valuable book, Ervand Abrahamian, uses the term fragmented society to describe Iranian society in the nineteenth century. However, here, I prefer to use segmented society, since fragmentation refers to break down of a whole into pieces. Nineteenth-century Iranian society was not a whole to become fragmented. It consisted of numerous smaller segments: Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 11, 35, 41, 58, and 161.


6 These communities were in great contrast to Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities.” Anderson defines nations as “cultural artefacts.” He argues that the nation “is imagined because the members of the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” As Chapter One discusses, in the nineteenth-century Tehran the members of these small scale communities knew each other; they had constant social interaction in their communal spaces: Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6.

7 Clearly the phrase “communal sphere” is a loaded term. It has been used in various disciplines with different connotations. For example, in the context of Soviet and post-Soviet era, the communal sphere is related to the communist party and its policies. In their analysis of Social Welfare in Post-Soviet Georgia, Stephen J. Collier and Lucan Way state that “The first two sectors of social welfare we consider –heat and water –are elements of what was referred to in the Soviet period (and still is today in many places) as the ‘communal sphere,’ which included the material basis of a city and the infrastructures that service it.” For the usage of the communal sphere in the Soviet and post-Soviet context see: Stephen J. Collier and Lucan Way, “Beyond the Deficit Model: Social Welfare in Post-Soviet Georgia,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 20, no. 3 (2004): 258-84; Rey Koslowski, “Market Institutions, East European Reform, and Economic Theory,” *Journal of Economic Issues* 26, no. 3 (Sep., 1992): 673-705; Ellen Comisso, “Property Rights, Liberalism, and the Transition from ‘Actually Existing’ Socialism,” *East European Politics &
above-mentioned cases. It is based on the specific socio-historical analysis of Iranian urban society in the nineteenth century. I deliberately chose the term communal sphere to insist on the communal identity of urban society. As I discuss in the first chapter, the small scale communities were unable to coalesce and form a broader public. There was a hostility and competition between them. As a result, I avoided using the term multiple public spheres since it does not reflect the segmented, communal context of society.8

The communal sphere in this sense was not based on economic interests; it consisted of rich and poor people that worked towards the general well-being of their community and provided social support for their members. People’s shared affiliations were the essential principle for the formation of communities; social affiliations had priority over economic interests. More importantly, there was not a single communal sphere; the segmented urban society of Tehran in this era consisted of various communal spheres living side by side. The most significant task of this sphere was the identification of individuals; each person was affiliated with at least one community. Through various social interactions in communal spaces, each community was able to reproduce its social identity. Moreover, there was hostility among

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8 Oren Barak uses more or less the same concept of the communal sphere in his study of communal conflicts in Lebanon. However, his scale of analysis is the nation-state and refers to various ethnic communities in the country. In this research, my scale of analysis is the city: Oren Barak, “Intra-Communal and Inter-Communal Dimensions of Conflict and Peace in Lebanon,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 34, no. 4 (Nov., 2002): 619-44.
different communities of the cities. These communities could not get along peacefully and they were in constant competition with each other. As a result, various communities were unable to coalesce and form the broader public.⁹

In nineteenth-century Iranian cities, communal spaces were extremely masculine. Women were absent from these spaces or, in the best case, they were silent, unrecognizable figures beneath their thick and dark veils. As a result, it is convenient to place women in the private sphere of conjugal families.¹⁰ While private houses were the spatial representation of the private sphere, the boundary between the private and communal realms was porous for women. My research suggests that the politics of gender relations in Iranian cities makes it hard to draw a bold line between the private realm of houses and the communal realm of the outside world for women; it demands a more dynamic description of the relationship between communal and private spaces and the role of men and women in their production. There were considerable interrelations between the two realms at the place of private houses, and the so-called private spaces could work as lively communal spaces for women.


¹⁰ It seems easy to dichotomize pre-modern societies based on gender into two different poles: public and private realms. This dichotomization is what Hannah Arendt does in the Greek polis, defining the private realms as the realm of women and slaves and the public realm as the political realms of property owners: “The distinction between a private and a public sphere of life corresponds to the household and the political realms, which have existed as distinct, separate entities at least since the rise of the ancient city-state.” Habermas’s public sphere is dominantly masculine too. In his model, private people are the owners of property and those who do not hold any public office. Women were more or less limited to the realm of conjugal family; they were not present in the public sphere: “Women and dependents were factually and legally excluded from the political public sphere.” It is convenient to generalize this dichotomy to nineteenth-century Iran. In this deeply patriarchal society, the communal sphere seems to be completely masculine and the private realm belongs to men. However, as my research suggests, this generalization hides the dynamics of women’s world. Chapter One discusses the communal, all-women social interaction at the place of private houses, and Chapter Four demonstrates how the houses and women’s realm became a point of political activism for women, and how women reclaimed and changed the public from their so-called private spaces: Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 28; Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*, 56.
This close examination of urban society in Tehran reveals that the nineteenth-century communal sphere was a precondition for the production of the broader public sphere in the early twentieth century. The public sphere was the outcome of coming together of various communal spheres through the binding force of religion and the political activities of the propertied middle class. Two crucial factors resulted in coming together of various communities and the production of the wider public sphere: social religiosity and the formation of the propertied middle class. I define religiosity as one of the key features of nineteenth-century Iranian urban society.11 Religious discourse was the main producer of public opinion at the communal level in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. In the absence of a free press, clerics were able to produce a shared political understanding among the members of their community through their sermons in mosques and other religious spaces.12 The second factor, the development of the propertied middle class,13 played a decisive role in the coming together of various communities and the formation of the public sphere. Towards the end of the nineteenth century and the early


13 In Chapters One and Four, I discuss my definitions of class and class-less society in more detail. Very briefly, in this research, my definition of classes is based on a Marxist framework, which defines classes through people’s shared economic interests and their conscious collective action for the advancement of those interests. The distinction of class “in itself” and class “for itself” has a great significance in this regard. As Chapter One demonstrates, although it is possible to define some social groups based on economic similarities in segmented Iranian urban society of the nineteenth century, this classification is far away from a class “for itself.” The communal identity was a great obstacle for the coalition of individuals with similar social and economic status. As Chapter Four discusses, the propertied middle class should be considered as the first class with “manifest economic, social, and political attitudes.” For more discussion on the topic see: Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions: 33; Edward Andrew, “Class in Itself and Class against Capital: Karl Marx and His Classifiers,” Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique 16, no. 3 (September 1983): 577-84.
twentieth century, a new urban bourgeoisie, the propertied middle class, formed in Iranian cities. This class was the outcome of the gradual transformation of Iranian urban society through increasing contacts with European countries. The development of foreign trade and encroachment of global capitalism inside the country resulted in the formation of the new class. The members of this class were able to transcend communal boundaries and maintain their communal ties at the same time and managed to bring their communities closer to each other against the state.\textsuperscript{14}

The Tobacco Movement at the end of the nineteenth century and the 1906 Constitutional Revolution were the outcomes of the formation of the new class, the religious leadership of clerics, the coming together of various communal spheres, and the formation of the public sphere. The public sphere was a masculine, segmented entity resulted from the interconnectedness of many smaller communities. This public sphere regulated state authorities and established the first parliament in the modern history of Iran. However, this initial success resulted in the transformation and demise of the segmented public sphere, the communal sphere, and the role of religion as the main producer of public opinion. Religious authorities lost their monopoly as the primary producers of public opinion after the Constitutional Revolution due to the proliferation of free press, the formation of small-scale political organizations called \textit{anjumans}, and the establishment of political parties. The constitutional atmosphere disturbed the

masculinity of the public sphere and provided women with the opportunity to trespass the private sphere’s boundaries and claim the redefinition of the public sphere. Moreover, the top-down modernization, industrialization, and urbanization of the country in the first half of the twentieth century accompanied by the formation of two new urban classes that were free from communal ties: the modern middle class and the urban working class. The formation of these classes and the development of nationalism resulted in the decline of the communal sphere and the transformation of the public sphere in Iranian cities.

By the mid-twentieth century, the modern middle class with its various newspapers and political organizations was the main mobilizing force in Iranian urban society. The analysis of the 1940s and the early 1950s social movements highlights the role of the modern middle class, and to some extent the urban working class, as the primary social forces against the state. Moreover, this analysis suggests the substitution of newspapers and political parties for clerics as the main producers of public opinion. The public sphere transformed from the combination of communal spheres tied together by the religious discourse into a class-based entity formed through the political actions of the modern middle and urban working classes under the influence of political parties and newspapers.

The formation and transformation of the public sphere, however, is only half of the story. I also investigate the spatiality of the communal and public spheres and their transformations from

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15 In this research, my definition of the working class in Iranian society refers to a new urban class that formed in the first half of the twentieth century, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s. The top-down and rapid industrialization of Iran, the construction of numerous factories and workshops in the major cities of the country, and the internal migrations from rural areas to these cities had great impact in the formation of this class. Similarly, the modern middle class developed in the same era. Once again, the state’s top-down and massive social reforms and interventions helped to consolidate this class. The state’s bureaucracy, national education system, industrialization, and modernization of the country had great significance in this process. In Chapter Five, I discuss the formation and consolidation of these new urban classes in more detail.

16 This is a similar transformation to that which Benedict Anderson discusses in the development of nationalism. In the first half of the twentieth century, the communal sphere as the sphere of face-to-face interactions of the people in the same community declined, particularly in the major cities. Instead, greater “imagined communities,” such as the nation of Iran or various classes based on shared economic interests substituted for the communal sphere: Anderson, Imagined Communities.
the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. As a result, the second component of this research is political public space and its relationship with the public sphere. I demonstrate that in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the major sacred spaces of Tehran were the primary public spaces of the city. These masculine spaces were the only places that belonged to all the segments of society and were able to transcend communal boundaries and form the broader public. As a result, during the months of the Constitutional Revolution, these spaces provided the main platforms for people’s protests. However, alongside the transformations of the public sphere, public spaces and people’s political platforms underwent fundamental changes. The streets and the squares of Tehran substituted for mosques and holy shrines as the main stages of protests. In addition, through their political activities, women succeeded in diversifying the gender quality of public spaces. From the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, sacred spaces lost their decisive role as the sole political public spaces of the city.

Through the historical description and social analysis of Tehran and its urban society during the nineteenth and the first half of twentieth centuries and engaging with the main body of theoretical knowledge on the public sphere and public space, my research yields four key findings:

First, there is no universal model for the public sphere; it varies from place to place and in the same place at different times. The notion of the public sphere in each society at any historical era deeply associates with the particularities of that socio-historical context. My research clearly demonstrates that the Habermasian model of the public sphere does not match the dynamics of the public sphere in Iranian urban society at the turn of the twentieth century. However, as a point of departure and connection to various studies of the public sphere, it is possible to boil down the concept to a core definition that works in various socio-historical contexts. The public
sphere at its core can be defined as a normative medium between society or a section of society and the state or any other form of hegemonic power, such as patriarchy, capitalism, and the like, that gives the former the power to control, influence, or challenge the latter. This core definition is like a structure that should be dressed with historical descriptions and social analysis in each context to which it is applied.

In the context of Tehran in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the public sphere was the outcome of the coming together of various communal spheres. The formation of a new urban bourgeoisie, the propertied middle class, and the binding role of religious authorities were decisive factors in this coming together and the formation of the public sphere. This public sphere was segmented and prone to disintegration. Towards the mid-twentieth century, the structural transformation of Iranian urban society and the formation of two new urban classes resulted in the transformation of the public sphere.

Second, political public spaces are among the most significant material manifestations of the public sphere. A genuine public space provides the platform for society or a section of

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17 Public space can range from spaces of consumption and leisure to platforms of protests. The privatization of public spaces, excessive surveillance and control over them, preventing political gatherings and activities, and transforming public spaces into stages of consumption and leisure are substantially studied during the past two or three decades. These studies show how in the neoliberal era, public spaces are losing their political aspect. However, in this research, I join scholars such as Cassegård, Mitchell, and Parkinson to argue that one of the most important duties of public spaces is their political role. In this research, the term genuine public space refers to the political aspect of public spaces. It refers to public spaces that can provide platforms for political activities. It does not mean that spaces of consumption and leisure are not public spaces. They just lack one of the most important duties of a genuine public space. For the privatization of public space and its reduction to the stages of consumption, see: Sharon Zukin, Naked City: The Death and Life of Authentic Urban Places (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Sharon Zukin, The Cultures of Cities (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1995); Dolores Hayden, “Building the American Way: Public Subsidy, Private Space,” in The Politics of Public Space, eds. Setha Low and Neil Smith (New York: Routledge, 2006), 35-48; John Hannigan, Fantasy City: Pleasure and profit in the postmodern metropolis (London: Routledge, 1998); Miriam Greenberg, Branding New York: How a City in Crisis Was Sold to the World (New York: Routledge, 2008). For the political role of public space, see: Carl Cassegård, “Contestation and bracketing: the relation between public space and the public sphere,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 32 (2014): 689 – 703; Mitchell, The Right to the City; John R. Parkinson, Democracy and Public Space: The Physical Sites of Democratic Performance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); John R. Parkinson, “How is space public? Implications for spatial policy and democracy,” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 31 (2013): 682 – 699; David Harvey, Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution (London: Verso, 2012).
society to challenge hegemonic forms of power. It is possible to define other manifestations of 
the public sphere in various arenas such as newspapers, books, and the Internet; however, public 
space can provide people with a spatial platform for collective political action to challenge the 
state or other forms of power, which is the highest quality of public space. Similar to the public 
sphere, political public spaces vary from place to place. As a result, it is not possible to define or 
generalize one type of political public space. As my research demonstrates, revolutions and 
protests do not always take place in the streets and squares of cities. Different societies can 
produce various political public spaces. Moreover, similar to the public sphere, it is possible to 
boil down the concept into a core definition that works beyond socio-historical confinements. 
The materiality of public space is a social necessity for political struggles of various groups. 
Without public spaces, political actions cannot fully represent themselves and meet their full 
potentials.

Third, the production of political public space closely entangles with the dynamics of the 
public sphere. My research demonstrates a reciprocal relationship between the public sphere and 
political public spaces in Tehran in the first half of the twentieth century. In the early twentieth 
century, sacred spaces of Tehran provided many of the primary political public spaces. Similar to 
the formation of the public sphere through religious discourse, the religiositiy of Iranian urban 
society played a decisive role in the production of political public spaces. While the religious 
discourse tied various communities to each other to form the broader public and transform the 
communal spheres into the public sphere, the same discourse nominated sacred spaces of Tehran, 
two mosques and a holy shrine, as their main stages of protest. As a result, the partial 
investigation of political public spaces without the examination of the public sphere can result in
the production of partial knowledge; the investigation of the former demands the analysis of the latter.

Fourth, as my research shows, the public sphere and public space are prone to transformation alongside the transformations of society. The public sphere and (non)political public spaces of Tehran transformed dramatically from the early to mid-twentieth century. These transformations occurred alongside the changes of urban society. The public sphere transformed from a segmented entity into a class-based sphere depending on the modern middle and urban working classes. Similarly, political public spaces transformed from sacred spaces of mosques and shrines to streets and squares. The public sphere and political public spaces are prone to change when their broader social context changes. Each model of the public sphere is based on its specific social context. The changes of the context can result in the changes of the public sphere. Similarly, there is no necessity for the reemergence of the same political public spaces for various instances of political struggle in the same society throughout history. Today’s spaces of collective action can be forgotten and changed into places of recreation and amusement and vice versa.

Major theoretical questions arise from this brief summary of the dissertation. At its core, this research examines Iranians’ political practices in public spaces that contested the state during the first half of the twentieth century; it seeks the geographical manifestations of the troubled relationship between society and the state. Two theoretical concepts stand out in this context: the public sphere and political public space. The research theorizes the relationship between these two in a different geography, beyond the dominance of Western European and North American narratives.
However, a predicament needs to be addressed first: the universality of the theoretical frameworks and terminology that underpin this research. What does the public sphere mean beyond the geographical and historical confines of the eighteenth-century bourgeois society of Western Europe? What is the spatiality of the public sphere in a geographical context different from London, Paris, and Berlin? What are the spatial manifestations of the public sphere in a Middle Eastern city in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? These are legitimate questions that without answering them it would be impossible to provide the essential theoretical framework for this research; commence a dialogue between its findings and the current body of knowledge on the subject; and diversify the historical and geographical range of the theories by encompassing an alternative narrative. It is the task of the introduction chapter to deal with these predicaments and build the theoretical foundation for the project as a whole.

**The Public Sphere: Universal or Contextual?**

Jürgen Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere is a mediator between civil society and the state, which holds the state accountable to society. It is “the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves.” Habermas’s study provides a model of critical social theory by establishing a source for the rise of a new mode of power against the absolutist sovereignty. In this concept, a system of norms, legitimated by public opinion, binds the state’s activity. The new political consciousness was the outcome of critical public debates of the bourgeois public through the medium of the institutions of the public sphere: French *salons*, British coffeehouses,

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18 Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*, 27.
20 Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*, 82.
German *Tischgesellschaften*, and the world of letters. This political consciousness “articulated the concept of and demand for general and abstract laws and which ultimately came to assert itself (i.e. public opinion) as the only legitimate source of this law.” The bourgeois private people were autonomous from the public authority by means of their ownership of private property. The emancipation of commodity exchange and social labor from the state as the result of the structural transformation of European society and the development of early capitalism and trade were crucial for the production of bourgeois society.

Habermas’s public sphere, as a result, seems to be an extremely contextual concept, formed and transformed between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries in Western Europe. The adjective of bourgeois in the bourgeois public sphere emphasizes its contextuality. Nevertheless, Habermas seeks to extract universal rules from the bourgeois public sphere: “The bourgeois public’s critical debate took place in principle without regard to all preexisting social political rank and in accord with universal rules […] These rules, because universally valid, secured a space for the individuated person.” As a result, a tension appears between the contextuality and universality of this concept that has frequently been the subject of criticism.

Called bracketing, the process of disregarding the preexisting social status as a means of elimination of inequality and the imperative of public debates cannot necessarily provide a foundation for democracy. In this view, social equality is not a necessity of public debates; rather, it should be achieved temporarily through the practice of bracketing. Margaret Kohn criticizes the class character of the bourgeois public sphere and argues that the public sphere was

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22 Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*, 55.
far from universal; it was based on a series of prior exclusions. Don Mitchell similarly questions the idea of the universal public sphere because of its “exclusive (male, bourgeois, white)” character. Finally, Benhabib argues that Habermas’s concept not only excluded women but also is “gender blind, that is, these theories have ignored the issue of difference, the differences in the experiences of male versus female subjects in all domains of life.” As a result, the practice of bracketing, in contrast to its universal ideal, worked for a tiny section of bourgeois society. Racial, gender, and class exclusions were the preconditions for this practice.

These critiques question the universal norms upon which Habermas builds the concept of the public sphere. Consequently, besides being highly exclusive, the production of a singular public sphere by temporary bracketing of the differences and inequalities seems to be impossible. Moreover, the production of public opinion through public debates narrows down to the privileged section of society and cannot be generalized to the public, if we understand the public to mean all inhabitants of a given territory. Margaret Kohn explains, “[t]he bourgeois could conceive of his interests as universalizable because they were already reflected in the structures of the economic system.” In an even more pessimistic interpretation, as Kohn mentions, the idealized and universal concept of the bourgeois public sphere can serve “to reinforce the power differentials.”

While the Habermasian universal norms of the public sphere, which are reliant on the bracketing of inequalities, cannot set a framework for the examination of the relationship between the state and civil society beyond the specific historical and geographical context of the

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25 Kohn, Radical Space, 29-35.
26 Mitchell, The Right to the City, 34.
27 Seyla Benhabib, “Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jürgen Habermas,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 92.
28 Kohn, Radical Space, 35.
29 Kohn, Radical Space, 35.
theory, Howell\textsuperscript{30} argues that by boiling down the concept, the normative aspect of the public sphere can be universalized beyond its historical context. Habermas’s public sphere creates a normative relationship between civil society and the state through the collective action of people. In this view, the public sphere is a “normative political model”\textsuperscript{31} through which the former can control, influence, or challenge the latter. However, as Nancy Fraser notes, there is no need to suppose a sharp separation between civil society and the state, as Habermas does. Such an assumption results in what Fraser calls “weak publics, publics whose deliberative practice consists exclusively in opinion formation and does not also encompass decision making.”\textsuperscript{32}

Moreover, the second element of this equation is not necessarily limited to the state. Any forms of hegemonic power, such as capitalism or patriarchy, can be the target of this regulative relationship. Finally, there is no need to assume a seamless, singular public sphere; the public sphere can be segmented, and various public spheres coexist at the same time in the same society.

In the case of Iran in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as my examination suggests, the public sphere was way beyond a coherent body of people. The public sphere was the outcome of coming together of various communal spheres; it was socially segmented. Moreover, shared economic interests were not the main factors in the production of the public sphere. While the formation of the propertied middle class played a crucial role in this regard, it was the religious discourse that was able to transcend communal boundaries and produce a united body of people out of social segments. As a result, a universal model of public sphere

\textsuperscript{30} P. Howell, “Public Space and the Public Sphere: Political Theory and the Historical Geography of Modernity,” \textit{Environment and Design D: Society and Space} 11 (1993): 303-322. Similarly, Nancy Fraser despite her four major critiques, argues that “Habermas's idea of the public sphere is indispensable to critical social theory and democratic political practice.” Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere,” 111. Also see: Peter Uwe Hohendahl, “The Public Sphere: Models and Boundaries,” in \textit{Habermas and the Public Sphere}, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 101.

\textsuperscript{31} Howell, “Public Space and the Public Sphere,” 309.

\textsuperscript{32} Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere,” 134.
does not work in Iran in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; however, the normative implication of the public sphere as a medium between society and the state provides a blueprint for the investigation of the public sphere in the Iranian context.

As my research demonstrates, the early Iranian public sphere in the constitutional era had a fundamental difference with Habermas’s concept of the bourgeois public sphere. The mechanism of the former, coming together of various smaller communal spheres, enabled the broader public sphere to avoid the practice of bracketing. The formation of small-scale political societies, *anjumans*, after the revolution, shows how each segment of society produced its specific political realm for decision making. As a result, the greater public sphere was not the outcome of bracketing of differences and inequalities. This model is similar to Nancy Fraser’s second revision on Habermas’s public sphere. She argues that “the ideal of participatory parity is better achieved by a multiplicity of publics than by a single public.”\(^{33}\) Political activities of *anjumans* show how in the practice Fraser’s model was implemented in Iranian urban society at the beginning of the twentieth century. One reason for the implementation of multiplicity in the Iranian context was the weak class character of society and the dominance of the communal sphere at that time. However, the electoral law of September 9, 1906, which provided the basis for the establishment of the first parliament, disturbed the communal balance in favor of the propertied middle class. The law defined the eligibility for candidacy based on economic virtues instead of communal identities and gave privilege to the propertied middle class.

As the arena of the collective action of civilians to control, influence, or challenge the state, the public sphere demands spatiality for its full manifestation, which takes us to the second significant deficiency of Habermas’s model. Lack of spatiality in Habermas’s bourgeois public

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\(^{33}\) Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere,” 127.
sphere has repeatedly been criticized, and various models have been proposed for its completion. The next section discusses these models and seeks a framework that can bring spatiality into the public sphere, regardless of historical and geographical specificities. In short, I will discuss the relationship between the public sphere and public space.

From the Public Sphere to Public Space

Habermas’s ideal public sphere does not rise from a spatial investigation; it is “deemed universal and thereby, in any meaningful sense, spatially undifferentiated.” Although Habermas introduces particular social spaces as “the social structures of the bourgeois public sphere,” such as clubs, coffeehouses, and salons, the spatiality of these places is not the subject of examination, and he combines them alongside the world of letters and family as the institutions of the public sphere. In the words of Margaret Kohn: “[t]he concept of the public sphere elides the distinction between very different kinds of spaces.” As a result, there is a disconnection between the public sphere and space.

Neil Smith and Setha Low argue that the division between spatiality, in their words public space, and the public sphere is way beyond the Habermasian model. In their view, there is a disciplinary gap between architects, geographers, planners, anthropologists, and urbanists on the one hand and philosophers, political theorists, and literary and legal scholars on the other hand. Strictly speaking, this gap can be summarized “to one of materialist versus idealist

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34 Smith and Low, “Introduction: The Imperative of Public Space,” 1-16; Kohn, Radical Space; Howell, “Public Space and the Public Sphere”; Cassegård, “Contestation and bracketing”.
36 Habermas, The Structural Transformation, 27-56.
37 Kohn, Radical Space, 29.
approaches.”³⁸ Putting it differently, Kohn argues that the concept of the public sphere in Habermas’s work is “an analytic construct” rather than a physical place.³⁹ Finally, Howell joins the same line of criticism and argues that Habermas’s concept lacks “an effective geography,” and Habermas is “all too often effectively silent about space.”⁴⁰ Howell goes as far as arguing that Habermas’s public sphere, due to its universalism, lacks both content and context.⁴¹

Howell attempts to bridge this gap by blending Hannah Arendt’s public space with Habermas’s public sphere. In his view, Arendt’s and Habermas’s models are basically similar; however, Arendt’s public space has not lost its geographical significance.⁴² By emphasizing the “virtues of particularity” and localism, Howell argues that Arendt has succeeded in bringing contextuality, particularity, and localism as the basis of geographical intervention into her model; Arendt’s “principled localism” can be a remedy to Habermas’s “universal pragmatism.”⁴³ In contrast, Carl Cassegård argues that Hannah Arendt does not necessarily provide a spatial foundation for the public sphere. Arendt’s public space is based on philosophical distinctions between three concepts of labor, work, and action. Labor and work fulfill humans’ necessities and produce things, respectively, and do not demand the public realm for their full representation.⁴⁴ In contrast, the action accompanied by speech needs the public realm for its full appearance.⁴⁵ However, as Cassegård mentions,⁴⁶ the Greek polis as the center of disclosure of action and speech was not place-bound. In the work of Arendt, “[t]he polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of

³⁸ Smith and Low, “Introduction,” 4-6.
³⁹ Kohn, Radical Space, 29.
⁴⁰ Howell, “Public Space and the Public Sphere,” 311.
⁴¹ Howell, “Public Space and the Public Sphere,” 312.
⁴² Howell, “Public Space and the Public Sphere,” 314.
⁴³ Howell, “Public Space and the Public Sphere,” 312-8.
⁴⁵ Arendt, The Human Condition, 180.
⁴⁶ Cassegård, “Contestation and bracketing,” 691.
acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be."\textsuperscript{[47]} Arendt’s localism and particularity, via which Howell seeks to redefine the public sphere, retreat into an abstract, universal framework and distance themselves from bringing specific geographies into the concept of the public sphere.

Various historical studies have investigated spatiality of the public sphere in different geographical contexts. Nineteenth-century Paris has repeatedly been examined in the works of Harvey,\textsuperscript{[48]} Castells,\textsuperscript{[49]} Gould,\textsuperscript{[50]} and Sennett.\textsuperscript{[51]} Margaret Kohn studies the Italian working class at the turn of the nineteenth century to define the proletariat public sphere, in contrast to the bourgeois public sphere, and examines the role of place in its construction.\textsuperscript{[52]} Setha Low’s study of Latin American plazas,\textsuperscript{[53]} the well-studied case of Tiananmen Square,\textsuperscript{[54]} the spatiality of the Nepalese revolution,\textsuperscript{[55]} and various similar studies examine the political use of spaces all around the world. The works that focus on the contemporary era in the Global North mostly study the erosion of the public sphere and public space, the privatization of public spaces, and the production of semi-public spaces as the result of neo-liberal capitalism.\textsuperscript{[56]} Moreover, several

\textsuperscript{[47]} Arendt, \textit{The Human Condition}, 198.
\textsuperscript{[52]} Kohn, \textit{Radical Space}, 29.
edited volumes during the last two decades have examined the relationship between power and resistance, geographies of resistance, and the concept of public space through various case studies.\(^5\) However, there remains a theoretical discontinuity between the public sphere and public space that needs to be addressed.

De Certeau, in his classic work, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, provides a structuralist framework for the theorization of the relationship between the geographies of power and resistance. He makes a distinction between strategies of power and tactics of resistance. In his view, the strategy is place-based; this place serves “as the basis for generating relations with an exterior distinct from it.”\(^5\) In contrast, the tactic is placeless; its place belongs to the other. It “insinuates itself into the other’s place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety.”\(^5\) This conception of power and resistance results in a weak opposition against hegemonic power. There is no space for resistance; the only hope is to carve a place among the imposed spatial meanings and structures by what de Certeau calls creative consumption. Consequently, the spatiality of resistance transforms into a temporality. The tactics should seek the right moment to use others’ places and produce their spatial reality and meaning.\(^6\) Moreover, this framework provides a static, fixed, and unchangeable character for space.\(^6\)

In contrast to de Certeau’s conceptualization of the relationship between power and resistance and placelessness of the latter, David Harvey seeks the local places of subaltern groups against the global forces of neo-liberal capitalism. Following Lefebvre, Harvey defines

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the urban working class, broader than Marx’s definition of factory workers, as the main revolutionary force available for producing fundamental changes in the established global power relations. Lefebvre calls the urban working class the only one who can “contribute to the reconstruction of centrality destroyed by a strategy of segregation and found again in the menacing form of centres of decision-making.”62 As a result, in this conception, cities become the most significant location for possible social movements. Following Lefebvre, Castells and Harvey stress the significance of the city.63 However, Harvey presents a new definition of the urban working class that fits the deindustrialized cities of the Global North, and which is not limited to industrial workers. Harvey strongly argues that any alternative to globalization should be sought in local places, particularly urban spaces, where subaltern movements can join each other and make a broader movement. In this view, even the networks of resistance should originate from places. The small fragments and communities should reach out to make new alliances. In this way, they can change into a broader political movement and prevent the danger of instantaneous collapse.64

Harvey’s framework has been criticized recently for the dichotomy that it produces between the dynamism of neo-liberal globalization and bounded places of the subaltern opposition. Instead of examining subaltern movements as fixed and place-based politics, David Featherstone theorizes them as the products of “translocal” negotiations and connections.65 In this view, the geographies of resistance, and spaces more generally, are the products of the interrelations and interactions that can stretch well beyond the confines of their ostensible

63 Harvey, *Rebel Cities*; Castells, *The City and the Grassroots*.

However, the main dilemma has remained unsolved. Is it possible to theorize the relationship between the public sphere and public space? Regarding the normative, universal concept of the public sphere, is it possible to theorize its spatiality in a way that it will not be historically and geographically contextual and temporally limited to the present era?

**Theorizing the Relationship between the Public Sphere and Public Space**

Henri Lefebvre argues that the materiality of public space is a social necessity for any group and ideology. Without producing their spatiality, social groups and ideologies lose their social vitality. In Lefebvre’s words:

It is in space, on a worldwide scale, that each idea of ‘value’ acquires or loses its distinctiveness through confrontation with the other values and ideas that it encounters there. Moreover - and more importantly - groups, classes or fractions of classes cannot constitute themselves, or recognize one another, as ‘subjects’ unless they generate (or produce) a space. Ideas, representations or values which do not succeed in making their mark on space, and thus generating (or producing) an appropriate morphology, will lose all pith and become mere signs, resolve themselves into abstract descriptions, or mutate into
fantasies […] Space’s investment - the production of space - has nothing incidental about it: it is a matter of life and death.⁶⁸

Any political grievance, any objection to the established forms of power, and any opposition to the forces of capitalism need to produce its spaces. Failing to do this, they have to retreat into the realm of abstraction. Space is the arena for the social and political existence.

Don Mitchell and David Harvey have recognized this conception in Lefebvre’s notion of the right to the city. The right to the city is a reaction against the commodification of urban spaces and, more importantly, urban life; it is a reaction against the prioritization of the exchange value over the use value of the city; it is a cry or better to say a demand to restore the city “to all those who inhabit;” it is the “right to urban life.”⁶⁹ Lefebvre idealizes the city and urban life as an oeuvre, which should be produced and appropriated by the participation and the decision-making of its various inhabitants, instead of being commodified, planned, and controlled by the forces of capitalism for its exchanged value. Lefebvre elaborates this tension by introducing his well-known triadic spaces, particularly the distinction between perceived and lived spaces.⁷⁰

Similar to Lefebvre, Harvey defines the right to the city as the collective right to “change and reinvent the city more after our hearts’ desire.”⁷¹ He argues that people should appropriate public spaces and public goods for a common purpose, what he calls the social practice of commoning. The common should be collective and non-commodified, and those who have played a role in its production should have the right to use it. This is “the basis for the claim to the right to the city on the part of the collective laborers who have made it. The struggle for the

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⁶⁹ Lefebvre, *Writings on Cities*, 158.
⁷¹ Harvey, *Rebel Cities*, 4.
right to the city is against the powers of capital that ruthlessly feed upon and extract rents from the common life that others have produced.”72 This reading of the right to the city is tightly related to the production of public spaces. It demands two secondary rights, what Mark Purcell calls the right to participation and the right to appropriation. The former gives the citizens a central role in decision-making for the production of urban spaces, and the latter is “the right to occupy already-produced urban space” and “the right to produce urban space so that it meets the needs of inhabitants.”73 This reading of the right to the city produces a political inevitability for public spaces of the city. The struggle over the authority to produce, reproduce, and define the meaning and vitality of the city, transform public space, as a medium between civil society and the state or forces of capitalism, into a political arena. Public space turns into both the subject matter and the stage of this struggle.

However, Don Mitchell provides a deeper reading of the right to the city and the political role of public spaces. For Mitchell, the political significance of public space is the role it plays in representing various social groups; public space is the space for representation.74 Through the study of the landscape of homelessness in American cities, Mitchell shows how homeless people need to appropriate public spaces, such as People’s Park in Berkeley, to have a spatial representation in society. In contrast, the forces of capitalism tend to curtail the capacity of public spaces to represent various marginal groups.75 As a result, what makes a space public is when “some group or another takes space and through its action makes it public. The very act of

72 Harvey, Rebel Cities, 78.
74 Mitchell, The Right to the City, 33-4.
representing one’s group […] to a larger public creates a space for representation.”  

The struggle over the representation of social groups in public spaces is the fight for their inclusion or exclusion in the public sphere. In this view, the distinction between the public sphere and public space is essentially the distinction between the immateriality of the former and the materiality of the latter. The public sphere is abstract and immaterial and needs a material space from which the political activity flows.  

As my research suggests, the public sphere and political public space are closely interrelated. The normative forces that control, influence, or challenge the state or any form of power need to produce their own spaces. This production is a necessity; it is the outcome of the relationships between the norms of the public sphere and the confrontation of hegemonic power; space is produced through the co-existence and interrelation of these trajectories. It is not fixed; it is prone to constant transformations because the public sphere and various forms of power, whether the state authority or neo-liberal capitalism, are prone to change. The popular geographies of resistance can be left unused or even forgotten years later. They can lose their vitality as the spatiality of the interrelation between various trajectories. They come and go; they live and die; they appear and disappear. 

As a result, public space has a significant political dimension. It is the material necessity of the normative public sphere. The public sphere and political public space are the two wings of the same bird; clipping one, the whole system fails to function properly. Moreover, my research shows that because of the bond between the public sphere and political public space, there is a shared social commonality between them. As the products of civil society, the public sphere and 

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76 Emphasis in the original text: Mitchell, *The Right to the City*, 35.  
77 Mitchell, *The Right to the City*, 134.
political public space contain common traces of their broader social underpinning and its dominant social interactions.

As my research suggests, the production of the public sphere and political public spaces in early twentieth century Tehran was based on certain social commonalities; they were closely related to each other. Religious discourse was the common underpinning for coming together of various communal segments; it defined sacred spaces of Tehran as primary stages of protest; and it was the main producer of public opinion. Religiosity and communal identity worked hand in hand in the formation of the public sphere and political public spaces. Similarly, towards the mid-twentieth century, the public sphere and public spaces underwent the same transformation. Islamic Shiʿi doctrine lost its pivotal role in the formation of the public sphere and coming together of social segments. As a result of the structural transformation of Iranian urban society, the communal sphere declined and broad horizontal classes dominated the urban scene. Consequently, the public sphere transformed into a class-based entity. The same transformation occurred spatially, meaning that sacred spaces lost their monopoly as primary political public spaces of Tehran, and the new network of streets and squares replaced them. To sum up, political public spaces are the spatial manifestations of the public sphere. These two are closely related; they share certain commonalities. The investigation of the commonalities is crucial to understanding the formation and transformation of both of them. Moreover, examination of one component without investigation of the other results in the production of partial knowledge on the public sphere and spaces.

Finally, considering a political necessity for public space does not mean that I narrow down the definition of public space and limit to its political aspect. I do not claim that publicly accessed and used spaces without political manifestations are not public spaces. However, I
insist that the political role is an inseparable and inevitable aspect of public space.\textsuperscript{78} By curtailing this aspect, public space will stop meeting its full potentials; it will erode; it will change to docile space. By accepting the dynamic nature of public space, even under the strictest clampdowns, there is the possibility of change and transformation in public space; the political clampdown on public spaces is only a temporary phase in their political life.

**The Outline of This Dissertation**

I begin this journey with a historical description and social analysis of Tehran in the nineteenth century. Chapter One introduces segmented Iranian urban society and the communal sphere. It introduces various communal spaces in the city and their social characteristics. The chapter shows the reciprocal relationship between social spaces and the segmented identity of urban society. The spatial configurations of urban social life were constructed through social practices and bore the imprints of social relations of the communal identity, and in return, these spaces reproduced the segmented social identity. Moreover, Chapter One examines the private sphere and spaces and the role of gender in their production. In this chapter, I equate the private realm to the realm of the conjugal family, which spatially maps on private houses. However, as the chapter discusses, the politics of gender relations in Iranian cities makes it hard to separate the private and communal realms from each other, at least for women.

Chapter Two studies the formation of new spatial knowledge through the analysis of nineteenth-century Iranian travelogues to Europe. The formation of this knowledge played a decisive role in the 1870s expansion of Tehran. The chapter defines the primary principles of this

\textsuperscript{78} Mitchell, *The Right to the City*; Cassegård, “Contestation and bracketing”; Parkinson, *Democracy and Public*; Parkinson, “How is space public?”
new knowledge. Iranian elites, particularly the Qajar court, were the main receivers of this knowledge.

Chapter Three studies spatial strategies of the Qajar court in the nineteenth century. It introduces two models of legitimation that the court utilized to conduct its relationship with society. The spatiality of these models is the subject of scrutiny in this chapter. The 1870s expansion of Tehran based on new spatial knowledge adopted from European cities was crucial in the transformation of the court’s spatial strategies. While the court had to observe politics of the communal sphere in all its public ceremonies in the first half of the nineteenth century, towards the end of the century it disregarded these politics and adopted new ceremonies to legitimize its power.

Chapter Four examines the 1906 Constitutional Revolution. The chapter investigates the formation of the public sphere in Iran as the outcome of coming together of various communal spheres. Through this examination, I argue that people’s religiosity and the formation of the propertied middle class were the primary social forces in the formation of the public sphere. Moreover, the chapter examines the production of political public spaces and their relationship with the public sphere. Finally, the chapter introduces another decisive shift in the public sphere and political public space in this era. The revolutionary atmosphere provided a valuable opportunity for Iranian women to leave the private sphere and play a more significant role in the public and communal realms.

The Constitutional Revolution and the establishment of a powerful nationalist dictatorship in the 1920s and 1930s brought greater changes to Iran. The top-down and quick urbanization, industrialization, and modernization of the country produced two new classes in cities that were free from communal ties: the modern middle class and the urban working class. Chapter Five
studies the formation of these classes, particularly the modern middle class. The chapter demonstrates how the formation of this class undermined the politics of the communal sphere and produced new social spaces in Tehran. The juxtaposition of new and old spaces and classes in the city resulted in the formation of a power relationship between the modern and traditional classes, which worked in favor of the former and weakened the latter.

By the outbreak of the World War II and the invasion of Iran by the Allied forces, a short period of democracy replaced the dictatorship of the 1920s and 1930s. The twelve-year period between 1941 and 1953 brought unprecedented waves of social movements and protests to Tehran. Chapter Six examines these movements and demonstrates the transformation of the public sphere and political public spaces in this era.

At the first glance, it may seem that the outline of the dissertation is based on independent historical sections. It is necessary to mention that, this outline is for the ease of presenting the findings of research. However, as readers will find, I do not analyze social forces and historical events in separate and detached periods. Throughout the dissertation, I show various continuities between historical sections. The formation of socio-spatial concepts in a given period was the outcome of continuous social discourses for decades and even centuries. As a result, the method of the presentation should not be confused with the epistemological framework.
In this chapter, through the analysis of nineteenth-century Iranian urban society before its transformations towards the end of the century, I suggest that it was a largely classless and segmented society. It is not possible to talk about class consciousness and broad classes based on shared economic interests in early nineteenth-century Iranian cities. Instead, urban society consisted of numerous smaller communities. Through the examination of this era in Tehran in official court newspapers, Iranians’ memoirs, Europeans’ travelogues, maps, and secondary sources, I introduce a sphere mediating between the public and private spheres, the communal sphere. As noted above, there is a range of academic understanding of the term communal sphere. Here I draw on those definitions that see it as the sphere of individual people and families who could identify themselves with a common communal identity, such as religion or sectarian affiliation, profession, city of origin, language, and the like. After a preliminary discussion of the communal sphere in the Iranian context, I examine the spatial manifestations of the communal sphere and investigate various spaces of social life and practices in nineteenth-century Tehran, before its transformations in the 1870s. Through the use of abovementioned sources, I examine the politics, gendered qualities, social role, and social interactions of these spaces. I suggest that there was a reciprocal relationship between communal spaces and the communal sphere. People’s communal identity constituted communal spaces, and in return, these spaces reproduced the communal identity of various communities of the city.
This analysis illustrates significant differences between Iranian urban society and its nineteenth-century European counterparts. Highlighting the gap between the two universes is essential for the investigation of the transformation of Iranian urban society and Tehran towards the end of the nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth century. More importantly, this analysis provides the foundation for the examination of the formation and transformation of the public sphere and political public spaces in Iran and their differences from conventional models of the public sphere based on European urban societies.

I adopt a Lefebvrian point of view for the examination and introduction of nineteenth-century Iranian urban society; I examine social spaces as social products, which can serve as means of social (re)production. Spaces are the products of interactions between various social trajectories; however, they serve to reproduce these trajectories at the same time. Space is both subjective and objective; it is more than a mere container, an unchanging box, or a frozen background for social actions.

The objective examination of spaces results in what Lefebvre names as “perceived spaces”; it reduces space to its “social practices,” an empirical construct to be measured. Social spaces transform into repetitive routines of everyday life labeled by terms, such as private houses,
workplace, spaces of leisure, and so on. Mere subjective examination of space, on the other hand, creates “conceived spaces,” or the “representations of space.” Space reduces to a mental construct, to a “system of verbal construct,” and to the “representations of power and ideology, of control and surveillance.” However, Lefebvre seeks to examine “representational spaces” or “lived space.” These are spaces of inhabitants and users; they are appropriated and lived. Representational space encompasses both perceived and conceived spaces; it is objective and subjective.

The chapter aims to examine lived spaces. It begins with a general introduction to nineteenth-century Iranian urban society and illustrates a segmented urban society that consists of numerous smaller communities. In the second step, the chapter examines social spaces of these communities. Through this examination, I found that there was a reciprocal relationship between the communal identity of urban communities and their spaces; social segmentation and communal identities constituted communal spaces of the city, such as takīyyihs, zūrkhanīhs, coffeehouses, bathhouses, and mosques, and in return they were reproduced through the internal and external social relations and practices of these spaces. Moreover, I demonstrate that the common dichotomy of public and private spheres and their related spaces does not match Iranian urban society of the nineteenth century. I introduce the communal sphere as the sphere mediating the public and private spheres. Examination of this sphere is crucial for studying the formation and transformation of the public sphere in the later chapters.

Historians of nineteenth-century Iranian society usually divide the population into three main sections: (1) nomadic tribes, (2) rural population, and (3) urban dwellers. Regarding the tripartite population as the historical outcome of the specific geographical condition of the country, many scholars believe that neither of these groups had the absolute power to subjugate the other two and form a central government. As a result, the government was highly decentralized; in the words of Ervand Abrahamian, the Qajar dynasty “had no effective instruments for enforcing their power.” Moreover, each of these sections was further segmented into numerous smaller communities along the lines of religion, sectarianism, ethnicity, language, dialects, and the like. Abrahamian uses the term “communal diversity” to describe the social “mosaic” of nineteenth-century Iran.

The social segmentation of the urban population, the subject of this research, took the form of independent wards or quarters. The wards were smaller sections of the city with a more homogenous population. Each ward was like a community whose members had a very similar social identity. Sometimes, they were immigrants from the same region of the country to the bigger cities; the other times, they had a same profession, language, or ethnicity; or they had the same religion or sectarian affiliation. In the words of Hambly, the wards “might have their origin in initial settlement patterns, ethnic or tribal exclusiveness, sectarian solidarity or occupational

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definition;” they were functioning as “urbs in urbe.”\textsuperscript{11} They were “self-sufficing”\textsuperscript{12} units with marketplaces for the daily needs of their inhabitants, bathhouses, religious buildings, gymnasiuums, and coffeehouses.\textsuperscript{13} Not only were the wards independent of each other, they had semi-independent administrative systems too. The head of the ward was the Kadkhudā. Selected by “the prominent families of the ward,”\textsuperscript{14} the elders (Rīsh Sifīds),\textsuperscript{15} or “the leading inhabitants.”\textsuperscript{16} Kadkhudā had a mediating role between the people of the ward and the state. In the words of Lambton, the Kadkhudā exerted “himself for the good of the community over which he presided.”\textsuperscript{17} Inside the ward, they were peacemakers, resolving minor conflicts, overseeing shopkeepers, and so forth. Regarding the outside world, they handled the “allocation of taxes” and “the detailed commission of royal orders.”\textsuperscript{18} Kadkhudās were the official connection of the urban communities to the state and the other communities.

Communal diversity becomes more complicated when one considers the role of the craft guilds. People pursuing the same craft often formed a “closed community.”\textsuperscript{19} Floor argues that the guilds of the Qajar era had certain defining characteristics: they were an urban phenomenon, they chose their leadership independently, they paid guild taxes, and they had specific social, political, and economic responsibilities.\textsuperscript{20} The occupational identity of the guilds had its own specific spatial manifestation. Each guild had a specific section, rāstīh, in the urban bazaars,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Hambly, “The Traditional Iranian City,” 566.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} For more details in this regards see: Ahmad Ashraf, “Vizhigiha-yi Tarihari-yi Shahrnīshīne dar Iran: Durēh-yi Islami [The Historic Characteristics of Urbanization in Iran: Islamic Era],” \textit{Mutaliʿ-i Jamiʿ išhinakhtī} no. 4 (Summer 1353 [1974]): 38-41.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Abrahamian, “Oriental Despotism,” 23.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Abrahamian, \textit{Iran between Two Revolutions}, 22.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Hambly, “The Traditional Iranian City,” 567.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Lambton, \textit{Islamic Society in Persia}, 11.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Hambly, “The Traditional Iranian City,” 566.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Lambton, \textit{Islamic Society in Persia}, 20.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Willem Floor, \textit{Justarhā i az Tarikh-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Iran dar Asr-i Qajar [Excerpts from Social History of Iran in the Qajar Era]}, trans. Abu al-Qasim Sirri (Tehran, Intisharat-i Tus, 1366 [1987]) 2: 31-34.
\end{itemize}
which “strengthened their sense of corporate life.”\textsuperscript{21} Moreover, similar to the wards, each guild had a \textit{Kadkhudā} as the head of the guild. Following more or less the same tasks, he handled the internal conflicts of the guild and its relationship to the outer world, particularly the state.\textsuperscript{22} Both the \textit{Kadkhudās} of the wards and guilds worked under the direct supervision of the \textit{Kalāntar}, who was the state’s representative in the cities.\textsuperscript{23} As a result, there were much similarity between the urban guilds and the wards.

The segmented nature of the urban society – the “communal diversity” – had a downside. A common feature of pre-modern urban life in Iranian cities was the rivalry between different wards. Lambton calls this “factional strife”\textsuperscript{24} and Abrahamian uses the term “communal conflicts.”\textsuperscript{25} Sometimes, the rivalry was manifested in occasional fights between the wards. Due to religious conflicts, ethnic enmities, sectarianism, and the like, wards often had trouble getting along with each other peacefully. The conflict between \textit{Ḥaydarī} and \textit{Nīʿmatī} groups is a well-studied case of urban rivalry, which originates from the Safavid era (1501–1736). These were groups following the practices of two different mystic figures; they often engaged in violent confrontations in the cities.\textsuperscript{26} As a result, the urban population, in the words of Abrahamian, “was split not into a few large blocks but into many small and competing fragments.”\textsuperscript{27}

Using Marxist terminology, it is not possible to talk about class consciousness in early nineteenth century Iranian urban society. Various communities of the cities were not able to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} For more information on the guilds’ organization, see: Willem Floor, \textit{Justarhaʾi az Tarikh-i Ijtimaʾi-yi Iran}, 2: 49-59.
\item \textsuperscript{23} For more information on \textit{Kalāntar}, see: Hambly, “The Traditional Iranian City,” 564-566.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Lambton, \textit{Islamic Society in Persia}, 15.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Abrahamian, \textit{Iran between Two Revolutions}, 26.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Abrahamian, “Oriental Despotism,” 17.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
coalesce based on shared economic interests and form broader social classes. This fact does not mean that it is not possible to divide society based on people’s economic positions. For example, Ervand Abrahamian classifies the general population into four broad classes: the landed upper class, the propped middle class, wage-earners, and masses. Ahmad Ashraf suggests a “trichotomous structure of hierarchies” for the urban population consisted of the patrimonial staff, the religious strata, and bazaar communities. In another occasion, Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi divide Iran’s population into three main classes. First, the dominant strata consisted of princes and tribal chieftains, governors and military commanders, upper-level bureaucrats, and the clerics. Second, the middle classes, included the merchants, the middle-level clerics, the small landowners, the local notables, and, master artisans and shopkeepers. Third, the commoners consisted of peasants, tribal communities, lower-level workers, and poor people. However, these classifications are the scholars’ objective impositions of class structures on Iranian population of the nineteenth century, rather than subjective class consciousness at the time. As Abrahamian and Keddie demonstrate, the communal ties and people’s social affiliations were stronger than their shared economic interests and prevented the formation of class consciousness. Communal ties “cut through the horizontal classes, strengthened the vertical communal bonds, and thereby prevented latent economic interests from developing into manifest political forces.” Similarly, Nikki Keddie uses the term “vertical classes” for describing the Iranian population in the nineteenth century. In the “vertical divisions in society,” the homogenous groups consisted of rich and poor people at the same time. The socio-spatial

28 Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 33-4.
31 Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 36.
divisions of classes were not based on economic values. Instead, religion, sectarian affiliation, occupational relations, ethnic origins, language, and so forth were the main factors in the production of the vertical social classes and their spatial configurations. In other words, the vertical communal bonds were stronger than horizontal social bonds that might have transcended the differences between the communities and created social classes based on common economic interests. The juxtapositions of rich and poor people in the same communities were spatially manifested in their coexistence in urban neighborhoods. As Ashraf and Banuazizi claim “[i]t was not unusual for the prosperous and the poor to live in the same quarter of a city.”

Regarding such a segmented social context, it is important to reevaluate the concepts of public and private. Is it possible to define the public sphere as the aggregate of private people coming together to regulate the public sphere against the state? Who were the private people in this context? Were they the property owners independent of the public authority? It is apparent that the Habermasian conceptions of public and private do not work in this context. Instead of the public and private dichotomy, I suggest a mediating sphere for Iranian urban society in the nineteenth-century, i.e. the communal sphere. In contrast to the bourgeois or proletarian public spheres common in the studies of European societies, the communal sphere was not formed based on economic interests. People’s shared affiliations were the pivotal principle for the formation of the communal spheres. More importantly, there was not a single communal sphere; segmented urban society produced various communal spheres alongside each other. The most important task of this sphere was the identification of the individuals; each person had to be affiliated with at least one community. Moreover, the communal sphere worked towards the

33 Ashraf and Banuazizi, “Class System v. Classes in the Qajar Period.”
34 Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*, 27.
well-being of its members. The rivalry between various communities is the manifestation of this task. In such a context, it is hard to define the public sphere as the normative construct to challenge the state. The absence of wider social classes, as Abrahamian argues, “had far reaching political consequences; for, as long as the central government was not confronted by statewide forces, the Qajar dynasty was able to dominate society in the typical manner of, to borrow a nineteenth century term, oriental despots.” Moreover, I map the private sphere at the conjugal family and center it in private houses. However, I demonstrate that private houses could adopt different roles for men and women. While my research shows that men considered their house as private spaces and prevented other men’s entrance to the inner sections of their houses, by examining women’s social life and interactions through sources such as memoirs and travelogues, I will show that the gendered boundary between the communal and private realms was porous, and these realms could overlap at the place of houses for women.

The boundaries of nineteenth-century Tehran initially formed in the sixteenth century when the Safavid king built a rampart around the existing village and constructed a bazaar inside it. However, it was in the late eighteenth century when Agha Muhammad Khan (1789-1797), the founder of the Qajar dynasty, chose Tehran as his capital. During the reign of the next three Qajar monarchs, Tehran’s population grew from fifty thousand to around one hundred fifty thousand people, and the city expanded inside its sixteenth-century ramparts by transforming the old gardens into new neighborhoods. In the late 1860s and the early 1870s, during the reign of Nassir al-Din Shah (1848-1896), the state demolished the old ramparts and expanded the city, using the European vocabulary of urban planning and design.

36 For the history of Tehran from its establishment to the Qajar era see: Husayn Karimiyani, Tehran dar Guzashtih va Hal [Tehran in Past and Present] (Tehran: Intisharat-i Danishgah-i Milli, 2535 [1976]); Chahryar Adle and Bernard
This chapter focuses on nineteenth-century Tehran, before its 1870s expansion, to study the spatial manifestations of the communal sphere. It starts by examining the social spaces that were based on religious practices. Religious ceremonies were the primary incentives of social life in traditional nineteenth-century Iranian urban societies. Accordingly, this chapter examines the rituals attached to the religious months of Muharram and Ramadan. It shows that the social practices accompanying these religious months created temporary social spaces that were highly attached to communal diversity and rivalry. Moreover, it examines Qurbān rituals to show that the communal identity was present in an instance of state-sponsored activity at the urban level. The chapter then turns to non-religious instances of social life. It looks at three main types of social spaces (coffeehouses, bathhouses, and traditional gymnasiums) and shows that there was a strong reciprocal relationship between these spaces and the communal sphere. It shows how the architectural configurations of these spaces were constructed through social practices and bore the imprints of social relations. While the above social spaces and practices were highly dominated by men, the chapter ends with the examination of women’s social life and spaces. Women’s social interactions were mostly conducted in the private sphere of houses; however, as the chapter discusses, the private houses played the role of communal spaces for women. Contrary to the dominant claims which depict private houses as a prison for women, I found that these spaces could be lively centers of feminine social interactions and communal life.

Figure 1.1. Nineteenth-century Tehran based on Auguste Kriziz’s 1858 map of Tehran. Copyright ©2016 AGSL.

Social Spaces Based on Religious Practices

Nineteenth century Iranian urban society was highly religious. Religious ceremonies were the main instances of social life in the cities with their specific social spaces. This section examines nineteenth-century Tehran, before its first phase of expansion during the Nassiri era and introduces three of these ceremonies, which were of greater importance and popularity. People’s religious togetherness generated particular spatiality; however, the spatial configurations of the religious gatherings had a temporal aspect, which demands a separate explanation before the main discussion.

A temporal duality existed that had a considerable impact on the daily life of nineteenth-century Iranians: the operation of two different time-keeping systems, the lunar and solar calendars. Historically, the solar calendar was used for celebrating Iranian New Years, Nowruz; calculating the agricultural seasons and governmental fiscal years; and tracking the time of some other annual ceremonies with pre-Islamic roots. However, the Islamic lunar calendar was the one constructing people’s daily lives. People used it to calculate all religious events and ceremonies, dating daily and weekly periodicals, counting their ages, and celebrating their birthdays. The two calendars, however, do not match each other. The lunar calendar is eleven days shorter than the solar one. As a result, the events that are based on the lunar calendar move eleven days backward each year. For example, if Muharram ceremonies happen on the first day of spring, usually on March 21 in a certain year, next year it will happen eleven days earlier, around March 10. This gap becomes bigger through the time, and people have to hold their ceremonies earlier each year. The difference between the calendars caused Islamic rituals and

38 Nassiri era refers to Nassir al-Din Shah’s long reign from 1848 to 1896.
39 Nowruz or Iranian New Year starts on the first day of spring, usually March 21st.
40 Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, 10.
events to occur in different seasons, and people had to deal with varied climatic conditions. As this section discusses, this simple fact had certain spatial impacts on people’s social life.

Muharram and the Formation of Takīyyihs

In nineteenth-century Tehran, one of the main instances of social life occurred at temporary spaces called takīyyihs. These were places of mourning ritual during the month of Muharram. In this section, I introduce takīyyihs and examine their social dynamics. My examination suggests that these spaces were highly colored by communal identities of their users. There was a reciprocal relationship between various communities of the city and their takīyyihs. Moreover, I demonstrate that the examination of nineteenth-century Iranian cities’ social spaces demands a different framework from their European counterparts. Equating takīyyihs with European theaters obscures the particularities of these spaces and can result in inaccurate conclusions.

The first month of the Islamic Lunar calendar, Muharram, has a great significance in defining the religious identity of the Shiʿi population. On the tenth day of Muharram in the sixty-first year of the Islamic calendar, corresponding to 680CE, Husayn, the third Shiʿi Imam and the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson, along with his seventy-two companions were killed in a battle against Yazid over the right to the Caliphate. Since then, this incident has stood as the symbol of the hostility between the Shiʿi and Sunni communities. It symbolizes the center of the Shiʿi faith, which should be remembered annually by holding certain ceremonies during Muharram. By the establishment of the Safavid Empire (1501–1736), the Shiʿi faith became the state religion of Iran. The Safavid monarchs advocated Shiʿism as a tool to encounter their western Sunni
neighbor, the Ottoman Empire, and to confront the Ottoman’s claim to Iran’s land under the title of a unique Islamic Empire. As a result, the Safavid state stressed the importance of its Shi’i ties by promoting nationwide Muharram ceremonies. Ta’zīyih, or passion play, was a theatrical art form developed by the end of the Safavid era and reached its pinnacle in the nineteenth century, during the reign of the Qajar dynasty (1796-1925). As Shahidi indicates, for the Shi’i rulers of Iran, ta’zīyih and other Muharram ceremonies were political instruments used to construct the national and religious identity of the new kingdom.

There is a general agreement among the scholars of the field that argues for the gradual development of the process of the preparation of ta’zīyih stages from the Safavid to Qajar era; ta’zīyih stages developed from temporary structures in public spaces to separate architectural buildings, called takīyyih. By the end of the Safavid and throughout the Zand era (1750–1796), the ta’zīyih stages could be erected almost anywhere: in street intersections, private courtyards of houses, mosques, shrines, and caravansaries, and even cemeteries could provide the space for holding ta’zīyihs. However, from the nineteenth century and by the establishment of the Qajar dynasty, separate architectural entities, takīyyihs, began to emerge in Iranian cities. Although some scholars argue that takīyyihs never had a final architectural style and they remained in an

44 Peterson and Floor originate takīyyihs, as separate architectural entities for holding ta’zīyih rituals, to the 18th-century, however, they agree that the takīyyihs became prevalent mostly in the 19th-century. Peterson, “The Ta’zīyih and Related,” 65-66; Willem Floor, The History of Theater in Iran, (Washington DC: Mage Publishers, 2005), 139.
“experimental stage,” certain architectural characteristics were common among them. Unlike the European theaters of the time, the “curtainless” performance stage was located in the middle of the spectators. In caravansaries, mosques, and private courtyards, the central pools, ḥuẓ, were converted into the performance stages simply by covering them with wooden boards. People sat around the central stage, and the players simply jumped down from the stage to announce their absence from the scene or jumped back over the stage to announce their return.

There were empty corridors running through the spectators to the outer circle to provide passages for the entrance of new players, animals, troops, and the like. In takīyyih, with built architectural forms, one or two levels of arches – tāqnamā – usually circumscribed the central space, providing special sitting areas.

Examining takīyyih merely as architectural entities prevents us from seeing their role as temporary communal spaces at the neighborhood level. Consequently, when scholars could not find a distinct architectural category of takīyyih, they concluded that “a distinctly recognizable takia [sic] style of architecture did not emerge” or that “the takiyeh [sic] was constantly in experimental stages in different regions for various patrons with the result that few final solutions were ever found.” In contrast, this chapter considers takīyyih as temporary social spaces, rather than permanent architectural elements, formed for short periods each year. Takīyyih, with or without buildings, were the byproducts of temporary religious and communal

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46 Peterson, “The Taʿzīyah and Related,” 74.
47 Chelkowski, “Taʿzia.”
49 Chelkowski, Taʿzia.
50 Peterson, “The Taʿzīyah and Related,” 74. Similarly, Jakob Eduard Polak, an Austrian physician, who was teaching in the Dar al-Funun Collage of Tehran in the 1850s, mentions that the numbers of the takīyyih are growing “from day to day,” but these building “hardly deserve anything to mention about.” Jakob Eduard Polak, Persien. Das Land und seine Bewohner. Ethnographische Schilderungen [Persia. The country and its inhabitants. Ethnographic descriptions] (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1865), 84.
practices at the neighborhood level, and they did not necessarily need to have a permanent architectural form. These spaces were the byproducts of the religiosity and segmentation of Iranian urban society.

I start my discussion with a survey of takīyyih in Tehran during the nineteenth century. As mentioned above, taʿzīyih, or passion play, reached its pinnacle in the nineteenth century, particularly in Tehran as the capital of the Qajar dynasty. The first document that provides the number of takīyyihs in Tehran is Ilya Nikolaevich Berezin’s map\(^1\) of Tehran. Although the title of the map mentions Nassir al-Din Shah’s name, and Shiraziyan dates it to 1852\(^2\) corresponding to the early years of Nassir al-Din Shah’s reign (1848-1896), it should be dated around ten years earlier to the reign of his father, Muhammad Shah (1834–1848).\(^3\) Two facts support this argument. First, there is no sign of the Muhammadiyyih gate on the map.\(^4\) Muhammad Shah ordered the building of the gate in 1846-7\(^5\) through the south rampart of the city.\(^6\) Second, Berezin, the Russian orientalist who drew the map, came to Tehran on a scholarly voyage.

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\(^3\) The main map should have been surveyed during Muhammad Shah’s reign and few years later contributed to Nassir al-Din Shah. In my personal conversation with Reza Shiraziyan in Tehran on January 4, 2015, he pointed to the fact that the map should have been dated older than its actual date, but in his book, Shiraziyan had dated the map under its common known date.

\(^4\) I credit this point to Reza Shiraziyan. He mentioned this in our personal conversation in Tehran.

\(^5\) 1263 HJ.

\(^6\) Karimiyan, Tehran dar Guzashtih, 210. The discussion about the number of the gates of Tehran and their construction years may be a bit confusing. Although now we know that the Muhammadiyyih Gate, the sixth gate of the old Tehran, was constructed by the end of Muhammad Shah era, there are two travelogues from Fath ʿAli Shah era (1797-1834) that count six gates for Tehran, without naming them. The point is that the surrounding wall of the city was not in a good shape, and there were occasional passages through the wall at some places. Polak points to the fact that people could pass through the wall without a need to go through the official gates. Probably, one of these passages later became Muhammadiyyih Gate. Even on Berezin’s map, one can trace an alley inside the city that ends to the place of the later constructed Muhammadiyyih Gate. It is very probable that the travelers counted this passage as an official gate while it was not necessarily a gate at that time. For the two travelogues form Fath ʿAli Shah era see: James Morier, A Journey through Persia, Armenian, and Asia Minor, to Constantinople, in the years of 1808 and 1809 (Philadelphia: M. Carry, and Wells and Lilly, 1816), 224; William Ouseley, Travels in Various Countries of the East; More Particularly Persia (London: Rodwell and Martin, 1823), 3:119. For Polak’s travelogue see: Polak, Persien, 75.
sometime between 1842 and 1845. There are twenty-nine takīyyihs on Berezin’s map, two of them in the royal compound. However, in his travelogue, Berezin states that there were fifty-eight takīyyihs in Tehran in 1842-3. So, he drew just half of the takīyyihs on his map.

In 1858, during Nassir al-Din Shah’s reign, Auguste Kriziz, the Austrian artillery teacher at the Dar al-Funun College of Tehran, surveyed a new and accurate city map, which became known under his name. The new map records forty-two takīyyihs. Of the twenty-nine takīyyihs on Berezin’s map, only sixteen of them exist on Kriziz’s map, which means thirteen takīyyihs changed in the interim. Four takīyyihs are replaced by stores, two of them by police stations, qarāvulkhanīh, four of them by residential houses; there is an empty space at the location of one takīyyih; and the two takīyyihs in the royal compound are moved to other sites.

Besides the maps, there are three surveys that provide the number of the takīyyihs in Tehran. Six years earlier than Kriziz’s map, in 1852-3, the first building survey of the city counted fifty-four takīyyihs in Tehran. The Tehran Population Survey of 1869-70 counted only thirty-four takīyyihs. The number is far less than what one expects. Shahidi argues that the number of the takīyyihs increased dramatically during the Nassiri era (1848-1896), while the number of the 1869-70 survey contradicts this claim. The last document, Survey of the Buildings

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58 Floor, The History of Theater, 148.

59 1275HJ.

60 Kriziz, “Naqshiy-Dar al-Khalafiy-yi Tehran”.

61 1269HJ.


64 1286HJ.

65 Shahidi, Pazhuhishi dar Ta’zīyih va Ta’zīyikhani, 172.
in the Inner City of Tehran,\textsuperscript{66} 1899-1900,\textsuperscript{67} counted forty-three takīyyihs in the city. This document belongs to the time after expansion of Tehran, so a rise in the number of takīyyihs can be expected. In the 1899-1900 survey, seven takīyyihs were located in the new neighborhood of the city, which means there were thirty-six takīyyihs in the old town, very close to the number of the 1869-70 survey.

What do these numbers indicate? Why are there such inconsistencies between the records? One can call them inconsistencies when searching for takīyyihs primarily as a built form, as an architectural entity. In that case, a city should have a fixed number of takīyyihs, as it has fixed numbers of theaters, zoos, parks, and the like. For example, Kamran Scot Aghaie argues that the 1852 and 1899 surveys counted just the permanent takīyyihs of the city.\textsuperscript{68} Regarding this claim, why did the numbers of takīyyihs in the old town drop from fifty-four in 1852 to thirty-six in 1899 while the general agreement points to an increase in the numbers during the Nassiri era? If one does not examine takīyyih as a permanent architectural form, however, there can be an alternative insight into the proposed questions. As I demonstrate in this project, the takīyyihs were communal spaces based on people’s religious identity. The process of preparing space of takīyyih was a communal act reproducing the communal identity. Moreover, the fluctuations in their numbers were the result of the seasonal fluctuations in the population of the city.

The term takīyyih bastan,\textsuperscript{69} literally means putting together or erecting a takīyyih, was used for an annual ceremony in which the takīyyihs were prepared a few days before Muharram.

\textsuperscript{66} Sʿadvandiyan and Ettehadieh, Amar-i Dar al-Khalafih-yi Tehran, 355.
\textsuperscript{67} 1317HJ.
Designating a place for a takīyyih and its preparation were communal practices. Peter Chelkowski provides a valuable description of this communal event:

Each individual contributed according to his means and ability. The men brought their most precious objects—crystal, lamps, mirrors, china, and tapestry—to decorate the walls of the takīyyih. Even the most humble objects were accepted as they were given or lent with religious devotion. Athletes from the gymnasium eagerly donated their strength and agility to put up the takīyyih. The women provided refreshments; the children of the aristocracy served water, a symbol of the Kerbela martyrs’ thirst, and sweetmeats to all spectators, rich and poor alike.

Even with a permanent building, takīyyihs were not socially accepted as mourning sites without the communal act of takīyyih bastan. The act of decorating takīyyih space or building, covering the floors with carpets, and the walls with black fabrics and shawls, hanging tapestry and pictures of the martyrs, erecting a temporary tent roof, and so forth equated to changing an ordinary courtyard, an empty plot of land, and even a designed and built takīyyih building into the real takīyyih, into a communal space; people’s communal acts and social practices produced the takīyyih spaces. As a result, people’s communal identities constituted these relatively small-scale and temporary social spaces.

It is important to note that most of the takīyyihs existed at the neighborhood level; people’s neighborhood identity constituted the social spaces of the takīyyihs. The communal act of takīyyih bastan happened in each neighborhood separately. This communal act was the spatial manifestation of the segmented urban society. It is no surprise that there were some

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70 Chelkowski, “Ta’zīyiḥ,” 7-8; Floor, The History of Theater, 152-3; Aghaie, The Martyrs of Karbala, 20.
71 Chelkowski, “Ta’zīyiḥ,” 7-8.
72 Munfarid, “Takīyyihs”; Beiza’i, Namayish dar Iran, 127.
73 The exceptions were Takīyyih Duwalat and few takīyyihs belonging to high-ranking people in the royal court and state. These takīyyihs were more elaborate and could accommodate thousands of people, so they were working at the urban level.
occasional rivalries and fights between the mourning processions, *dastih* s, of different neighborhoods.75 *Dastih* s were the most common form of Muharram mourning ceremonies; it was easier and cheaper to organize *dastih* s in the neighborhoods.76 Abdollah Mostofi points to the fights that occurred between various *dastih* s of the neighborhoods during the Muharram ceremonies.77 Even in occasions, the authorities had to implement certain regulations to prevent possible fights between the *dastih* s from different neighborhoods. For example, in 1895, the authorities forbade the *dastih* s to get out of their neighborhoods and march freely in other neighborhoods of the city.78 Besides neighborhood identity, other social stratifications constituted the *dastih* s and *takīyyih* s. People from the same ethnic background79 or belonging to the same profession80 had special *takīyyih* s of their own.81 Aghaie argues that the “planning and financing of Muharram rituals” could “reinforced a sense of cohesion among” the members of different social groups.82 As a result, the segmented communal identity was highly present in the *takīyyih* s. Neighborhood identity, ethnicity, and occupational relations produced the social spaces of the *takīyyih* s, and in return the *takīyyih* s reproduced and reaffirmed the same discourse.

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77 Mostofi, *From Agha Mohammad Khan*, 1: 159.
78 Iran, Muharram 18, 1313 [July 11, 1895].
79 Afsharha, Barbarha, Arabha (arabs), Qafqazha (caucasians), Qumiha (people from Qum city), Kermaniha (people from Kerman city), and Kharraqaniha (from Kharraqan region) were some of the examples. For a comprehensive list of the *takīyyih* s in Tehran see: Sayyid Hujjat Husayni Balaghi, *Guzidih-yi Tariikh-i Tehran [Summary of Tehran History]* (Tehran: Intisharat-i Maziyar, 1386 [2007]), 298-306; Shahidi, *Pazhuhiši dar Taʿzīyih va Taʿzīykhani*, 247-8. Similarly in 1893, *Iran* newspaper counted three of the main *takīyyih* s in Tehran in this way: 1- *A takīyyih* in the Friday Mosque by the merchants and people from Kashan, 2- *A takīyyih* in Shīykh ʿAbd al-Husayn School by the Turk merchants and people from Azarbayjan, and 3- *A takīyyih* in Sayyid ʿAziz Allah Mosque by the merchants and people from Isfāhan. *Iran*, Muharram 18, 1311 [August 1, 1893].
80 Zargarha (goldsmiths), Qatirchiha (people who works with mules), Dabaghkhanih (Tanners), and Kurha (blind people, not a profession of course): Balaghi, *Guzidih-yi Tariikh-i Tehran*, 298-306; Shahidi, *Pazhuhiši dar Taʿzīyih va Taʿzīykhani*, 247-8.
*Takīyyih* was more like a fluid social concept, which could adopt temporary physical formats regarding the necessities of the time, particularly climatic conditions. As I mentioned before, due to the inconsistency between the lunar and solar calendars, the month of Muharram moves around the solar year. As a result, the heat of summer days replaces the cold and snow of winter in eighteen years’ time. Located at the southern foot of Alburz Mountain Range, Tehran has a four-season climate, with hot and dry summers and cold winters with occasional snow-storms. By the end of May and early June, the weather starts to get very warm in the central city, while the northern boundaries of the city just beneath the mountain range, Shimiranat, remains cooler. This condition does not last long, and as summer approaches, people need to travel north, deep into the mountains, to escape the hot and dry weather. After a hot July and by the end of August, summer loses its grip on the northern parts, Shimiranat, and by the end of September that the hot summer days are almost over in the central city.

The population of Tehran followed this seasonal rhythm. John MacDonald Kinneir, who visited Tehran in the early nineteenth century, roughly estimated “that in the months of June, July, and August, the capital cannot boast above ten thousand people. When the King is there, in the winter, the population is supposed to amount to sixty thousand souls.”83 The villages near the mountains were havens for many people of the city during the hot summer days. Consequently, with such a fluctuation in the population, one can expect that part of the changes in the numbers of takīyyīhs in the city were the result of the seasonal displacement of the population. An entry in Vaqayi’ Itifaqiyyih newspaper from 1856 shows that takīyyīhs changed based on the seasons. In that year, Muharram was in the summer, and many people were out of the city at the time;

83 John MacDonald Kinneir, *A Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire Accompanied by a Map* (London: Cox and Baylis, 1813), 119. Similar to Kinneir, William Ouseley who visited Tehran in 1811-12 estimates the same sixty thousands people for the winter and he mentions that the population was much less in the summer. Ouseley, *Travels in Various Countries*, 3: 119-20.
However, *Arba ṯīn*\(^{84}\) ceremonies were in fall. The newspaper mentions that people erected *takīyyih* for *Arba ṯīn* ceremonies, even in places where there were no *takīyyih* during Muharram.\(^{85}\) Particularly, the departure of the affluent people of each community during the summer could result in the lack of financial support for that community to erect its *takīyyih*.

Table 1.1 shows the numbers of the *takīyyih* referred to in different documents. It demonstrates which months from the Gregorian calendar coincided with the Muharram month of the year the documents were surveyed in. This clearly shows that the times of the surveys were critical to the number of *takīyyih* identified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Corresponding months to Muharram</th>
<th>Number of <em>takīyyih</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1843/1259</td>
<td>Berezin Travelogue</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852/1269</td>
<td>Buildings Survey</td>
<td>October and November</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858/1275</td>
<td>Kriziz Map</td>
<td>August-September</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869/1286</td>
<td>Population Survey</td>
<td>April and May</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899/1317</td>
<td>Buildings survey</td>
<td>May and June</td>
<td>36(^{a})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{a}\) The real number is 43. Seven *takīyyih* were in the new neighborhood of the city.

It is no surprise that Berezin recorded fifty-eight *takīyyih* in his travelogue. In 1843, the possible year that he was in Tehran during Muharram, the mourning month was in winter. This means that there was a bigger population in the city, and there were more *takīyyih*. However, while scholars believe that towards the end of the Nassiri period the numbers of the *takīyyih* grew, the coinciding of Muharram with the warmer months resulted in smaller numbers in 1869 and 1899 surveys.

\(^{84}\) People were repeating the mourning ceremonies of Muharram after forty days in the next month, Safar. Forty days after the 10th of Muharram, Hosayn’s murder, is called *Arba ṯīn*. Once again, people were holding takīyyih and ta ‘ziyih performances on this day.

\(^{85}\) *Vaqayi‘ Itīfaqiyih*, Safar 23, 1272 [November 4, 1855].
Takīyyihs were temporary social spaces that formed annually for a short period and were left unused or had other uses \(^{86}\) for the rest of the year. Based on climatic conditions and other factors, such as whether there was support from wealthy people of the communities, \(^{87}\) or instances of diseases epidemics, \(^{88}\) their numbers were fluctuating, and their locations were changing. So it is no surprise that there is an inconsistency between the numbers of takīyyihs recorded in different documents. The problem arises when one tries to look for takīyyihs the same way he looks for theaters, or focusing the search on the architectural medium rather than the social practice. \(^{89}\) Takīyyihs were communal spaces for the demonstration of the religious fervor of various segments of the city, but they were different from the European theaters of the same period and one should investigate them through a different lens. Finally, they were the outcomes of a segmented urban society; as small-scale spaces belonging to different urban communities, takīyyihs were both the products and producers of social segmentation.

Other Instances of Religious Communal Life in Tehran

During the nineteenth century before the first phase of urban development in Tehran, there were strict nighttime regulations in the city. Four hours past sunset, drums announced the start of

\(^{86}\) In his memoir, Abdollah Mostofi mentions that the neighborhood takīyyihs were left unused most of the year “collecting refuse, or the stalls and boxes would be used as grocery stores.” Mostofi, *From Agha Mohammad Khan*, 1: 171.

\(^{87}\) High expenses of Muharram ceremonies needed the patronage of wealthy elites, guilds, public contributions, and the court. The act of support could create a local sense of identity; however, the lack of support could result in cancellation of the ceremonies. Mostofi, *From Agha Mohammad Khan*, 1: 169-71; Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala*, 15-29.

\(^{88}\) Such as the cholera outbreaks in Tehran, which I will discuss later in the chapter.

a curfew, and police forces arrested people half an hour after the drumming.\(^9^0\) For one month each year, however, the government suspended these strict nighttime regulations. The fasting month of Ramadan was a break in the daily routine of the city, particularly whenever Ramadan coincided with the warm seasons.\(^9^1\) Fasting from dawn to dusk, people started their social life after sunset. As a result, the government relaxed the night-time curfew and police forces protected rather than arrested people.\(^9^2\)

The city mosques were the main centers of communal life during Ramadan. Mosques were the centers of daily collective prayers of the members of each urban segment, and they were much more crowded during Ramadan month;\(^9^3\) however, the most important ceremony of the month happened on *Qadr* nights,\(^9^4\) when people gathered in the mosques to hold a prayer vigil throughout the nights:

The three nights of Ihyā\(^9^5\) were the praying nights; people were going to the mosques after breaking their fasts […] the preachers would go to the pulpit to do their sermons […] and since people considered crying from fear of God as worship, the preachers would make them cry. Then people would put a Quran over their heads and pray for all the Muslims. Near the dawn, they would return to their houses.\(^9^6\)

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\(^9^2\) *Vaqayi ’Itifaqiyyih*, Ramadan 13, 1268 [July 1, 1852].

In 1853CE, Tehran had 112 mosques and nine imāmzadih shrines. As a result people were able to gather with their own community at a mosque in the neighborhood they belonged to; they did not need to travel long distances in the city. Besides the mosques, people had other options for nightlife during Ramadan. Coffeehouses and bathhouses were open throughout the night. People, particularly tradesmen, would gather in coffeehouses listening to storytellers, reciting poetry, or playing games every night. Bathhouses were open twenty-four hours each day, and people occupied them after their morning prayer until sunset when they would break their fasts, and again after that until dawn. As a result, Ramadan was another religious excuse for the reproduction of the communal ties of urban society.

Besides these scattered centers of social life around the city and in the neighborhoods, the most populous social scene during Ramadan nights happened at a special market. From 1851 to 1857, Vaqayi’ Itifaqīyīh newspaper reported on the Ramadan Market. The newspaper refers to three different locations for the market. Prior to 1851, the market was in front of the entrance to Shah Mosque, the biggest mosque in Tehran. From approximately 1851 to 1853 it was relocated to a bigger place, Imāmzadih Ziyd. Based on Kriziz’s 1858CE map of Tehran, the market was

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97 1269HJ.
101 Vaqayi’ Itifaqīyyīh newspaper started its work in 1851. In that year the market was at Imamzadih Ziyd location. The June 14, 1854 issue of the newspaper mentions the relocation of the market to Sabzīh Miydān. It also mentions that prior to the Imamzadih Ziyd location, the market was at the entrance to Shah Mosque. It does not give the exact time for the first relocation, just mentioning “it was in Imamzadih Ziyd for two or three years.” Based on these dates, one can guess that the market was relocated from Shah Mosque to Imamzadih in 1851. For the newspaper entries see: *Vaqayi’ Itifaqīyyīh*, Ramadan 3 and 17, 1267 [July 2 and 16, 1851]; Ramadan 6, 1268 [June 24, 1852]; Ramadan 18, 1270 [June 14, 1854].
likely located at the big graveyard in front of the imamzādi. Finally from 1854 to 1857, the newly constructed square in front of the royal compound, Sabzih Miydan, hosted the market.  

Similar to takīyyīhs, the Ramadan Market had a seasonal aspect; it was limited to the spring and summer occurrences of Ramadan. From 1858, the time when Ramadan moved into the early spring, there is no sign of the market in the newspapers, mostly because of the inappropriate climatic condition of the season and lower temperatures during the nights. The next appearance of the market happened twenty years later in 1877. At that time, Ramadan had moved around the solar calendar and took place in late summer once again. This time the market was located in the gigantic circular building of Takīyyīh Duwlat. Finally, the third cycle of Ramadan wherein it coincided with the warm seasons during the reign of Nassir al-Din Shah happened in the 1890s. In his autobiography, Abdollah Mostofi mentions that in his youth, during last years of Nassir al-Din Shah’s reign, the Ramadan Market was in the central courtyard of Sipahsalar Mosque. Built in the early 1880s, the mosque was located in the new neighborhood of the city. Based on Mostofi’s accounts, men and women were separated inside the courtyard, and each had their specific market. Moreover, he mentions that later, during Muzaffar al-Din Shah’s Reign, the market was removed because once again Ramadan had moved into the cold seasons.

Besides the religious rituals of Muharram and Ramadan, there was another annual religious ceremony that gathered large numbers of people in nineteenth-century Tehran, the Camel Sacrifice ceremony of the Qurbān day. The Qurbān day is the last day of the Haj season when Muslims kill an animal as the symbol of Abraham’s act of sacrificing his son. Accounts of European travelers from the Safavid era show that the Qurbān ceremonies changed into one of

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102 Yaqayiʿ Itifaqīyyih, Ramadan 18, 1270 [June 14, 1854].
103 Chapter Three discusses Takīyyīh Duwlat. Iran-i Sultani, Ramadan 16, 1294 [September 25, 1877].
104 Mostofi, From Agha Mohammad Khan, 1: 185.
the main annual ceremonies sponsored by the court: “a camel was elaborately decorated with flowers, mirrors, henna, and fine fabrics several days prior to the day of sacrifice. It was then paraded through the streets of the city accompanied by minstrels, dancers, and acrobats.” On the day of the ceremony, the sacrifice ritual happened in an open field outside of the city. In a special ceremony, the king’s representative would slaughter the camel and cut and divide the carcass among the representatives of the guilds and neighborhoods of the city. In Qajar Tehran, an empty plot of land in front of Nigaristan Palace, outside the city ramparts, was the location of the Camel Sacrifice ceremony. After the expansion of the city in the 1870s, this land became part of the main city. However, the sacrifice site did not change until the Constitutional Revolution when that space became the parliament square.

Accounts of European travelers, Iranian memoirs, and the official newspapers show that the main principles of the ceremony remained unchanged since the Safavid era, with the decoration of the camel prior to the main day, the role of the court in assigning a representative, moving the camel around the city with music, and dividing the carcass among the guilds after the slaughter. However, unlike the takīyyih and Ramadan Market, this ceremony took place every year, regardless of various climatic conditions. Moreover, the presence or absence of the Qajar monarchs did not have any impact on the ceremony. Although the court sponsored the ceremony, the rituals would happen with or without the king. In fact, the Qajar “monarchs did not like to

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106 For detailed descriptions of the ceremony see: Bulliet, “Camel”; Husayn Lisan, “Qurbani az Ruzigar-i Kuhan ta Imruz 2 [Sacrifice from the Ancient to Contemporary Era 2],” Hunar va Mardum, no. 167 (1355 [1976]): 60-70.
110 Vagayi’ Itifaqqiyih, Dhu l-Hijja 15, 1268 [September 30, 1852]; Dhu l-Hijja 11, 1269 [September 15, 1853].
take part in the ceremony. Instead, they would assign the task to a prince as their agent.  

Although the *Qurbān* ceremony was sponsored by the state for the entire city, the communal identity was the pivotal element in structuring the ceremony. The camel had to pass through various neighborhoods of the city prior to its sacrifice. After the act of sacrifice, its carcass had to be divided among the guild members.

Religiosity and communal identity played significant roles in the formation of social life and related spaces in nineteenth-century Tehran. Each community had its own specific spaces for conducting its collective religious life. These spaces, as the case of *takīyyihs* showed, were not necessarily permanent architectural entities. Nevertheless, with or without built forms, the interrelation of religion, space, and communal practices reproduced the communal sphere; in return, the communal sphere was the main social force for the production of these spaces. The next section introduces the instances of non-religious communal life and their spaces in nineteenth-century Tehran.

**Non-religious Practices and Corresponding Communal Spaces**

The communal sphere had a non-religious aspect too. Each ward, as a part of the city with more or less homogenous populations, and each *rāstih*, as a section of the bazaar with homogenous crafts, contained certain types of communal spaces that were the centers of non-religious social life for the members of their communities. This section examines three main types of these communal spaces: coffeehouses, bathhouses, and traditional gymnasiums. Men dominated these spaces; women were not permitted into coffeehouses and gymnasiums.

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111 Bulliet, “Camel.”
112 Eugène Aubin, who visited the ceremony in 1907 mentions the main guilds that received main parts of the carcass. Aubin, *La Perse d’aujourd’hui*, 147.
Bathhouses had women-only hours, and some of them belonged to women entirely. Similar to takīyyihs and mosques, after describing each type of space and its communal practices, I will provide an estimate of their numbers. These estimates show a plentitude of communal spaces in nineteenth-century Tehran, and illustrate the vitality of social life at the communal level.

Coffeehouses or Qahvihkhānihs

The Qajar coffeehouses\textsuperscript{113} were remnants of a social trend began in the Safavid era through the mass consumption of coffee in Iranian cities, particularly in Isfahan as the capital of the Empire.\textsuperscript{114} The Safavid coffeehouses owed their success to the specific social role they adopted. They filled the existing void between two different types of social life, the one of the religious organizations, such as the mosques and religious schools, and the one of disreputable places such as the taverns. As Rudi Matthee claims: “The coffeehouse thus struck a happy balance between the mosque, which was a public space but lacked worldly entertainment, and the ubiquitous taverns and gambling houses, which were to be avoided by upstanding citizens.”\textsuperscript{115} Due to such a unique position, coffeehouses spread rapidly in Isfahan and other urban centers during the Safavid era.\textsuperscript{116}

In the Safavid era, as the centers of more affluent people, coffeehouses adopted additional social roles besides leisure and coffee drinking. They were suitable places for the artists,

\footnotesize{\begin{flushleft}113\textsuperscript{Qahvihkhānihs} \end{flushleft}}

\footnotesize{\begin{flushleft}114 For more details on the coffee consumption in Iran during the Safavid Iran see: Rudi Matthee, “Coffee in Safavid Iran: Commerce and Consumption,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 37, no.1 (1994): 1-32; Nasrullah Falsafi, “Tarikh-i Qahvih va Qahvihkhanih dar Iran [The History of Coffee and Coffeehouses in Iran],” Sukhan 5, no. 4 (1332 [1953]): 258-68; Al-i Dawud, “Coffeehouse.”
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\footnotesize{\begin{flushleft}115 Matthee, “Coffee in Safavid Iran,” 23-4.
\end{flushleft}}

\footnotesize{\begin{flushleft}116 For the discussion on the number of the coffeehouses in Safavid Isfahan and their locations see: Matthee, “Coffee in Safavid Iran,” 21-2; Falsafi, “Tarikh-i Qahvih va Qahvihkhanih dar Iran,” 261.
\end{flushleft}}
intellectuals, and the poets to meet up and exchange their works. Moreover, they provided an arena for political debates and freedom of speech, where people could get together and talk freely about political subjects. However, one of the most important roles of the coffeehouses, which continued beyond the Safavid era up to the twentieth-century, was epic storytelling or naqālī. With pre-Islamic origins, naqālī was the recitation of, usually, epic and non-religious stories in front of public audiences. Using different epic stories, especially those of Shahnama, the storyteller recited the story in the middle of a circle in a non-theatrical form. He could cut his stories into pieces, telling each part on a different night. As a result, coffeehouses were great places to guarantee a permanent stage and bring the audience back for the other nights. People knew where and when to find their favorite storytellers to follow their stories.

The architecture of coffeehouses was in direct dialogue to what was happening inside the spaces, particularly the act of naqālī. European travelers and ambassadors to the court of the Safavid monarchs recorded detailed descriptions of coffeehouses in their travelogues. These descriptions are repeatedly used by contemporary scholars. The coffeehouses did not have any chairs or tables. Instead, there were platforms all around the interior spaces made out of masonry

120 Floor, The History of Theater, 87; Beizaʾi, Namayish dar Iran, 65.
121 Beizaʾi mentions different types of naqālī, some with religious themes: Beizaʾi, Namayish dar Iran, 75.
123 In naqālī, storyteller tells the story and performs the roles of all the characters by himself. He does not use any theatrical element such as stage decorations, costumes, or music: Beizaʾi, Namayish dar Iran, 82.
124 Hanaway, “Dāstān-Sarāʾī T.”
125 Matthee, “Coffee in Safavid Iran,” 21; Al-i Dawud, “Coffeehouse”; Falsafi, Tarikh-i Qahvih va Qahvihkhanih dar Iran, 261; Nadjm, Hunar-i Naqali dar Iran, 324-6.
or wood, three feet high and three to four feet wide, and covered with carpets where people could sit. In the middle, there was a water basin, *ḥuż,* and the walls were whitewashed or sometimes covered with tiles up to three to five feet from the ground. Sometimes there was a stage for the storyteller, usually in the middle or to the side near the walls. As a result, similar to *takīyyih,* people could surround the main happenings inside the coffeehouses.

By the demise of the Safavid Empire, the coffeehouses went through a period of hibernation. The political turmoil that began with the 1722 collapse of Isfahan and lasted until the full establishment of the Qajar dynasty in the nineteenth century pushed scholars such as Rudi Matthee to argue that Iranian society “involuntarily” withdrew “into the confines of the private realm.” By the mid-nineteenth-century, the number of the coffeehouses once again grew in Iranian cities, particularly in the new capital, Tehran. However, this time tea had replaced coffee as the main drink while the name of the establishments remained the same: *qahvihkhānih* or coffeehouse.

European travelogues contain fewer accounts of coffeehouses in the Qajar Tehran as compared to the Safavid Isfahan. Similarly, fewer secondary sources examine the topic. The scarcity of the accounts in the Qajar period is the result of the differences between the social roles of these spaces in the Qajar and Safavid eras. During the Safavid era, coffeehouses were places for affluent people of society. There are several accounts that show that the Safavid kings, especially Shah ʿAbas I (1588-1629), hosted their European guests in the coffeehouses around

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127 Beizaʾi, *Namayish dar Iran,* 79.
129 Rudi Matthee, “From Coffee to Tea: Shifting Patterns of Consumption in Qajar Iran,” *Journal of World History* 7, no.2 (Fall 1996): 207.
130 For more information about the gradual process through which tea consumption replaced coffee consumption in Iranian society see: Matthee, “From Coffee to Tea.”
Naqsh-i Jahan Square. The grand urban projects during the reign of Shah 'Abas I had produced well-designed urban spaces in Isfahan where their coffeehouses were suitable places for hosting foreign guests. However, Tehran before its 1870s urban development was more like a small town without any comparable urban space to those of the Safavid Isfahan. The few studies on the Qajar coffeehouses show that these places were the centers of communal life of their owners and customers, and that they adopted functions beyond mere venues for entertainment and conviviality. In many cases, coffeehouses belonged to different communities and professions. They were functioning as “employment exchanges.” Traders belonging to a certain guild knew where to find their suitable workers; similarly, people seeking specific jobs just had to be present in a certain coffeehouse; most guilds had their own specific coffeehouse. Moreover, coffeehouses had the same function for strangers coming from other cities to Tehran. To find their fellow citizens they just had to go to the specific coffeehouses where they were gathering. Using several sources and field studies, 'Ali Bulookbashi names more than forty coffeehouses in Tehran that were the gathering places, pātuq, of specific professions, ethnicities, and people from other cities of the country. As a result, the Qajar coffeehouses had a different social role than their Safavid counterparts; as communal spaces, each had their own particular group of customers, and they functioned as a meeting place. In other words, the coffeehouses, similar to the takīyyih, were the products of communal diversity.

These small-scale social spaces were the spatial manifestation of social segmentation.

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131 Falsafi, “Tarikh-i Qahvih va Qahvihkhanih dar Iran,” 263.
132 Al-i Dawud, “Coffeehouse.”
133 Shahri, Tehran-i Qadim, 2: 141-2; Bulookbashi, Qahvih and Qahvihkhanihnishini dar Iran, 78-84; Al-i Dawud, “Coffeehouse.”
134 Willem Floor, Justarha‘i az Tarikh-i Ijtima‘i-yi Iran, 2: 61; Al-i Dawud, “Coffeehouse”.
135 Al-i Dawud, “Coffeehouse.”
136 Bulookbashi, Qahvih and Qahvihkhanihnishini dar Iran, 78-84.
The interior arrangement of coffeehouses remained almost the same as that of the Safavid era. Moreover, *naqālī* remained an inseparable part of their activities in nineteenth-century Tehran, as far as Beiza’i argues that *naqālī* did not develop in cities that they did not have coffeehouses. Based on an estimate, around eighty percent of Tehran coffeehouses had their own specific sessions of *naqālī*. Besides, coffeehouses were places for other social activities such as poetry recitation, comedy shows (*taqlīd*), and playing specific games.

The only document that provides the number of coffeehouses in the nineteenth century is Mirza Salur’s memoir. In 1886, the king commanded that all the coffeehouses of the city be closed. Mirza Salur mentions that, at the time of the command, there were 360 coffeehouses in the city. The second document that contains the number of the coffeehouses belongs to the *The Guilds’ Stores Survey of Tehran* (1917-18), which counted 416 coffeehouses in the city. Twelve years later, 1929, another survey counted 711 coffeehouses, and in 1933 there were as many as 614 of them. The interesting point is that the first buildings survey of Tehran in 1852-3 does not contain any entry for coffeehouses. This survey was quite accurate for taxing purposes; the surveyors even counted the molding store, of which there was only one in the entire city; it is not probable that they missed the coffeehouses by mistake. Does it mean there

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137 Beiza’i, *Namayish dar Iran*, 81.
138 Bulookbashi, *Qahvih and Qahvihkhanihnishini dar Iran*, 93.
140 *Iran-i Sultani*, Ramadan 17, 1303 [June 20,1886]; Bulookbashi, *Qahvih and Qahvihkhanihnishini dar Iran*, 44.
142 Al-i Dawud, “Coffeehouse.” I could not personally find the original source for this number. I contacted the Encyclopedia of Iranica, and they could not help me in this regard either. As a result, I trust the original author of the Encyclopedia entry and quote his finding.
143 Baladiyyih Tehran, *Sarshumari-yi Nofus-i Shahr-i Tehran: Dar Sanavat-i 1262 va 1270 va 1301 va 1311 [The survey of Tehran population in the years 1262 and 1270 and 1301 and 1311]* (Tehran: Matba’ih-yi Majlis, 1312 [1933]), 33. In order to have access to this booklet, you can refer to the National Library and Archive of Iran.
were no coffeehouses in Tehran in the mid-nineteenth-century? Or were the coffeehouses counted under another title? The latter is more possible; there is an entry for Ṭabākhī, Dīzpazī, Jīgarakī, Kabābī, and Ḥalīmpazī\textsuperscript{145} with 233 stores.\textsuperscript{146} These were various types of traditional kitchens in the city, each preparing a specific type of food. It is probable that some of these stores, particularly dīzpazīs, were functioning as coffeehouses too. Ja'far Shahri gives another clue in this regard. He mentions that in the old Tehran, some of the coffeehouses were serving dīzī, an Iranian dish, for lunch time.\textsuperscript{147} However, one cannot know the exact number of coffeehouses prior to 1886.

Bathhouses or Ḥammāms

Bathing was an indispensable part of people’s life in nineteenth-century Iranian society. Due to religious beliefs, a Muslim must be in a state of purity if he wants to do his daily prayers. Certain activities, such as sexual intercourse, violate the purity of body, and therefore Muslims have to take special baths, ghusl, to restore it.\textsuperscript{148} Having the right ghusl demanded immersion in water in a way that the head goes beneath the surface. In the nineteenth century, with their pools of water, no place was better than bathhouses to perform the right ghusl. As a result, it is no surprise that Samuel Greene Wheeler Benjamin, the first American diplomat in Tehran, states

\textsuperscript{145} These are different types of food preparation stores (kind of traditional restaurants). While Ṭabākhī and Ḥalīmpazī work in the early hours of the day, usually for breakfast, the other three open up later in the day to serve lunch.

\textsuperscript{146} S'advandiyan and Ettehadieh, Amar-i Dar al-Khalafi-yi Tehran, 38.

\textsuperscript{147} Shahri, Tehran-i Qadim, 2: 236.

that there were many public baths in Tehran and “every one [sic] resorts to them at least once weekly; some do it daily.”149

The public baths were nonprofit organizations150 open to everyone without any restriction. They were relatively cheap, and there were no distinctions between rich and poor in having access to them.151 Only wealthy people and people of the court had private baths in their houses.152 Moreover, they could rent a public bathhouse by paying extra fees for certain hours, Qurug.153 Religious minorities were restricted from the Muslim bathhouses, and they had their specific bathhouses, separate from the Muslims’.154 Moreover, men and women’s baths were distinct from each other’s, or they used the same bathhouse during separate hours.155 Bathing was a time-consuming activity, demanding two or three hours. It consisted of other services, such as shaving body and facial hair, dying hair, massaging, and spending time in the hot and cold pools. The inner chambers of the baths were scorching and humid spaces. Before getting to such an intense condition and spending one or two hours there, people had to go through a hierarchy of spaces, usually two stages, to adapt their body to the condition of the inner chamber. Each intervening space had a set of functions and services.156

As a result, bathing was a social activity rather than a private one. People got together and socialized for hours while doing their bath activities. The architecture of the bathhouses provided

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149 Samuel Greene Wheeler Benjamin, Persia and the Persians (London: John Murray, 1887), 90.
150 Muhsin Tabassi, Garmabih-ha-yi Irani dar Ayinih-yi Safarnamih-ha [The Iranian Baths in the Mirror of Diaries], ( Mashhad: Sukhangustar, 1390 [2011]), 29-30.
152 Floor and Kleiss, “Bathhouses.”
154 In her travelogue, Carla Serena mentions that the Christian could not use the Muslim bathhouses in Tehran. She points to the fact that the Armenians had their specific bathhouses in the city. Carla Serena, Hommes et Choses en Perse (Paris: Charpentier, 1883), 161; Polak, Persien, 360.
155 Floor and Kleiss, “Bathhouses”; Shahri, Tehran-i Qadim, 1: 525
156 For more information about different stages of bathing and their additional services see: Floor and Kleiss, “Bathhouses”; Shahri, Tehran-i Qadim, 1: 470-516; Drouville, Voyage en Perse, 78-83; Tabassi, Garmabih-ha-yi Irani dar Ayinih, 19-26; Polak, Persien, 356-360.
the setting for such social gatherings. The inner chamber consisted of two or three pools of water, at different temperatures, where many people could get in at the same time. The best space for socializing, however, was the main lobby after the entrance, called *sarbīnih*. The architecture of the *sarbīnih* was similar to coffeehouses, with masonry or wooden sitting platforms all around the space that were usually covered with carpets, a water basin in the middle, walls covered with tiles, and some pictures from the epic stories of *Shahnama* hanging from the walls.\(^{157}\) Before getting into the inner chambers, and especially after returning from them, people used to spend enough time in *sarbīnih* to adjust their body temperature, while drinking tea or coffee, smoking, having food or snacks, napping, and socializing.\(^{158}\) Gaspar Drouville reports that bathhouses were suitable places for the merchants to get together and do business while they were smoking or having tea or coffee. He adds that they could update themselves with the recent news: “public baths are still used as a rendezvous for middleclass individuals. The foreigners and the merchants also gather to make friends or talk business.”\(^{159}\) Similarly, Willem Floor calls the bathhouse as “a place for passing information and spreading rumors.”\(^{160}\) Moreover, different spaces in the bathhouse had special games, which helped people pass the long hours of bathing joyfully.\(^{161}\) Besides the routine bathing and its accompanying social interactions, bathhouses provided the families of each neighborhood with appropriate loci for certain ceremonies, such as wedding baths, labor baths, circumcision baths, and the like. In these instances, the bathhouse changed into a party stage where the distribution of sweets, drinks, and fruits plus live music were parts of the ceremonies.\(^{162}\) As a result, similar to the mosques and

\(^{159}\) Drouville, *Voyage en Perse*, 83.  
\(^{160}\) Floor and Kleiss, “Bathhouses.”  
*takīyyih,* most of the bathhouses served Iranians at the neighborhood level, meaning that each neighborhood had its own bathhouses and people did not need to travel long distances in the city to go to one. Figure 1.2 shows the changes in the numbers of the bathhouses in Tehran between 1852 and 1933.\(^{163}\) As the chart shows, there was a growth in the numbers of bathhouses during this period.

![Figure 1.2. The changes in the numbers of the bathhouses in Tehran.](image)

However, when one calculates the ratio of population to the number of the bathhouses in different years, a new story emerges. Although the numbers of the bathhouses grew between 1852 and 1933, they had to serve bigger numbers of people in the latter years. The population of Tehran was 147,256 in 1869.\(^{164}\) Since there were 9,580 houses in the city, surveyors estimated that on average there were 16 people living in each house.\(^{165}\) Ettehadieh uses this number to calculate the population of the city in 1852 and 1899. Based on her estimate, Tehran had 125,952

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people in 1852 and 244,400 people in 1899. However, when one recalculates the ratio of the population to the number of houses in 1869, the more accurate ratio is 15.3 rather than 16. Based on this ratio, in 1852, the population of Tehran would be 120,441; it is more than 5,500 people less than Ettehadieh’s estimate. Moreover, one cannot use the same ratio to calculate the 1899 population. The latter was around 30 years after the first expansion of Tehran and, as the 1932 survey shows, the houses in the new neighborhoods were less populated than in the old southern neighborhoods. As a result, using the same ratio after the 1870s expansion would lead to an over-estimation of the population, the same mistake that Ettehadieh made by calculating 244,400 people for 1899. Based on the populations in different years, figure 1.3 illustrates the ratio of population to the number of bathhouses in various years. Since there is no population number for 1918, the closest available year, the population in 1922, is used. Based on figure 1.3, in 1852 and 1869, the ratios are almost the same, with 787 for the former and 775 for the latter. This means that there was a linear relationship between the population and the number of bathhouses in pre-1870s Tehran, and each bathhouse was serving around 780 people on average. This shows that the numbers of the bathhouses were growing at the same pace as the internal growth of the city population was within its sixteenth-century limits. However this ratio changed dramatically in later years and, in 1932, each bathhouse was serving 1,308 customers on average. Distributed evenly, the numbers indicate that, counting on average two weekly baths for each person, in the 1852-69 period, each bathhouse had to serve 222 people daily.

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166 Only the 1869 survey counted the population of Tehran. The 1852 and 1899 surveys counted numbers of the buildings in the city. As a result, Ettehadieh had to use the ratio from 1869 to calculate the population in the other years. Mansureh Ettehadieh, *Inja Tehran Ast: Majmu‘i Maghalati Darbarih-yi Tehran 1269-1344 [Here is Tehran: A Collection of Essays on Tehran 1269-1344HJ]* (Tehran: Nashr-i Tarikh-i Iran, 1377 [1998]), 28.
The latter number shows a lively, crowded place. Similar to coffeehouses, takīyyihs, and mosques, Tehran’s bathhouses were the centers of various social practices at the communal level; they were vibrant communal spaces. This is a crucial point for the analysis of nineteenth-century Iranian urban society. If one tries to search for lively public spaces in the city, she will be disappointed by the scarcity of these spaces; however, by changing the level of analysis from the public to the communal, a different scene reappears that is vibrant and crowded, but segmented.

![Population to Bathhouses](image)

Figure 1.3. The ratio of the population to the numbers of the bathhouses in Tehran.

**Traditional Gymnasiums or Zūrkhānihs**

Zūrkhānihs, literally house of strength, were the traditional Iranian gymnasiums. With an unknown origin,169 zūrkhānihs, at the first glance, were places for male bodybuilding practices

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169 There is no consensus among the scholars of the field about the origins of zūrkhāni. Some scholars such as Insafpur originate it to the Iranians guerilla fighters after the seventh-century Arabs’ invasions, and some other such as Bahar (see Ilahi) believe that zūrkhāni is an older entity originated from pre-Islamic era and Mitrāsim. However, the majority of the scholars agree that the first actual descriptions of zūrkhāni, as we know it today, go back to the Safavid era. For the discussion of the origins of zūrkhāni see: Sadr al-Din Ilahi, “Nigahi Digar bih Sunati Kuhan: Zurkhanih [Another Glance at an Ancient Tradition: Zurkhanih],” *Iranshinasi* 6, no. 4 (Winter 1373 [1995]): 726-745; Ghulamreza Insafpur, *Tarihk va Farhang-i Zurkhanih va Guruh-ha-yi Ijtima-i-yi Zurkhanih-ru [History and Culture of Zurkhanih and Its Social Groups]* (Tehran: Vizarat-i Farhang va Hunar, 1353 [1974]): 38-40; Husayn Partu Beiza'i Kashani, *Tarihk-i Varzish-i Bastani-yi Iran: Zurkhanih [The history of Iranian Traditional Sport:...*
and wrestling competitions. With a particular architectural outline,\(^{170}\) it was an arena where men could train their bodies through specific exercises\(^{171}\) and learn wrestling technics from the elder wrestlers of their neighborhoods. Zūrkhānīhs were masculine, Shi‘i Muslim\(^{172}\) spaces. Only men after puberty were allowed to enter and practice in them. In the words of Philippe Rochard it was/is “an institution that exalts the ideals of traditional masculinity” based on certain social and moral principles, such as: “generosity, mutual help, courage, loyalty, respect for elders, and keeping one’s word.”\(^{173}\) Any Shi‘i adult man was free to enter and become a member of the zūrkhanī in his neighborhood; from lay people to aristocrats, there was no limitation on joining the club.\(^{174}\) However, people’s social status had no place inside the zūrkhānī and “members disregarded social status in order to serve the community more effectively.”\(^{175}\) Ridgeon calls it an “anti-structure” where people had to “cast aside” their social status via symbolic stooping while entering the interior space and putting on special uniforms. He argues that in zūrkhānī, as an anti-structure, “emerges an egalitarian society of undifferentiated social relations among the

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\(^{172}\) The minorities were not accepted in Shi‘i Muslim zūrkhānīhs. However, in the cities with considerable population of Jews, Armenians, and Zoroastrians, they had their own specific zūrkhānīhs. Chehabi, “Zur-Kāna”.


\(^{175}\) Arasteh, “The Social Role,” 259.
athletes.” However, zurkhaṇihs had a specific internal social hierarchy that structured all of their rituals and social relations. This hierarchy was based on the history of participation, merits, athletic power, and social works of the members.

Zurkhaṇihs were not mere gymnasiums; they were the centers of complex social relations penetrating the whole traditional Iranian urban society. Lūtīs were the main members of zurkhaṇihs. Being a lūtī was more than being a good wrestler; the lūtīs were respected in their community, and in return they adopted certain social roles to serve their community. Their social roles were confined to the neighborhood to which they belonged. The zurkhaṇihs and lūtīs had a

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177 Mostofi, From Agha Mohammad Khan, 1: 174; Ridgeon, “The Zurkhānā between Tradition,” 245.
178 There is a well-established ambiguity surrounding the role lūtī, which, in the word of Hambly, presents “the historian with some real epistemological problems.” Many scholars see zurkhaṇihs as powerful social organizations with wide range of altruistic deeds. Lambton describes lūtīs, the main group of the zurkhaṇih members in the following words: “These were local associations, whose objects were the preservation of public morality in the district to which they belonged, the protection of the district from robbers, to which end they would patrol the district at night, and the education of the orphans and the poor children of the district. They caused levies to be made on the rich people of the district and distributed the proceeds to the poor.” At the same time, they are stigmatized with contradictory labels defining them as the centers for people who sold their strength to political parties, rascals who were skillful in using daggers to reach their goals, chāqiḵīsh, agents of the state, and people who were practicing some of the social taboos of nineteenth-century Iran, such as homosexuality. There are different explanations for the ambiguity of zurkhaṇih. Insafpur claims the moral decline of zurkhaṇih happened in the late Nassiri era. Arasteh originates this moral decline later, to the early twentieth century. Rochard rejects these theories and argues that there were three different types of professions related to zurkhaṇih: šātīrs, lūtīs, and Pahlavāns. While the first two caused the stigmatization of the zurkhaṇih, the altruistic character of pahlavāns was the real manifestation of the essence of the organization. This argument is not completely accurate since, in the nineteenth-century literature, the character of lūtī or dāsh Mashdī is usually considered to be the altruistic essence of the zurkhaṇih. Willem Floor gives a more accurate explanation of zurkhaṇih ambiguity by examining the different historical meanings of the term lūtī. He shows that the term referred to three different groups: 1- the entertainment groups, 2- the main athletes of zurkhaṇih, and 3- rascals, also called lūtīs. He argues that the overlap of the term between the latter two groups has caused some scholars to stigmatize the zurkhaṇih. However, Floor does not reject that some of the people in the third group had connections to the zurkhaṇih too, but he rejects the general stigmatization of the organization: Hambly, “The Traditional Iranian City,” 7: 571; Lambton, Islamic Society in Persia, 18-19; Abrahamic, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 22-3; Rochard, “The Identities of the Iranian Zurkhānāh,” 323; Reza Arasteh, “The Character, Organization and Social Role of the Lutis (Javan-Mardan) in the Traditional Iranian Society of the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 4, no. 1 (February 1961): 52; Ali Bulookbashi, “Naqsh va Karburd-i Ijtima’i-yi Zurkhānīh dar Jamī’ih-yi Sunnati-yi Iran [The Role and Social Function of Zurkhānīh in Traditional Iranian Society],” Hafiz, no. 9 (1383 [2004]): 39; Ilahi, “Nigahī Digar,” 740; Shahri, Tehran-i Qadim, 1: 184; Insafpur, Tarikh va Farhang-i Zurkhānīh, 168; Mostofi, From Agha Mohammad Khan, 1: 172-74; Willem Floor, Justarhā’i az Tarikh-i Ijtima’i-yi Iran, 1: 243-66.
deep neighborhood identity, and each lūṭī group was devoted to serving their neighborhood.179 As Lloyd Ridgeon argues, “the influence of the zurkhana [sic] extends beyond the physical structure of its bricks and walls.”180 There is no surprise that there was an “antagonistic relationship”181 and rivalry between lūṭī groups of different neighborhoods; they defended their neighborhoods against “outsiders.”182 Lūṭīs served their communities in different ways such as: preserving the order and safety of the neighborhood,183 helping poor people by collecting money and distributing charity food among them,184 and holding charity events, gulrīzān, at the zūrkhānīh in order to collect money for specific people in need.185 However, the most active times for zūrkhānīh people were during religious events, particularly Muharram.186 Abdollah Mostofi provides us with the firsthand accounts of the Muharram events and how the neighborhoods lūṭīs took on the responsibility for cleaning the takīyyīh, preparing the covering tents, decorating the space, collecting money, and even holding the mourning ceremonies.187 As the social roles of zūrkhānīh show, the organization was somehow the ultimate manifestation of the communal sphere. Once again, social segmentation constituted a social space, and in return it was reproduced through the internal and external social relations and practices of zūrkhānīh.

There is not much data on the exact number of zūrkhānīh in Tehran during the nineteenth-century. Until 1933, the official surveys of Tehran never counted these institutions. In 1907, 179 Floor, Justarhaʾi az Tarikh-i Ijtimaʾi-yi Iran, 1: 251; Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 22-3; Lambton, Islamic Society in Persia, 18-9.
180 Ridgeon, “The Zūrkhāna between Tradition,” 244.
184 Arasteh, “The Character, Organization,” 51; Floor, Justarhaʾi az Tarikh-i Ijtimaʾi-yi Iran, 1: 256.
185 Gulrīzān, flower throwing, was an event in zūrkhānīh in which people were invited to donate money. They had to put their money in a bouquet so no one knew the amount. The money was collected for a specific person and purpose, such as: covering medical expenses, pilgrimage costs, marriage ceremonies, and the like. For more information of the topic see: Shahri, Tehran-i Qadim, 1:179-82.
186 Arasteh, “The Character, Organization,” 51; Arasteh, “The Social Role of the Zūrkhana,” 259; Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 22.
187 Mostofi, From Agha Mohammad Khan, 1: 159 and 170-3.
Eugène Aubin estimated that there were probably around one hundred zūrkhānihs in Tehran.\textsuperscript{188} However, this is likely to be two times more than the actual number. By the end of the nineteenth-century, there were forty-nine zūrkhānihs in the city.\textsuperscript{189} In 1921, thirty-eight zūrkhānihs remained,\textsuperscript{190} and finally in 1933, there were eighteen zūrkhānihs, mostly in the old neighborhoods of the city.\textsuperscript{191}

**Women’s Havens**

The story of nineteenth-century Iranian social spaces is still half-told, because half of the society is absent from the scene. The general urban spaces were masculine; women were only present, unrecognizably, beneath their dark veils. As Ella C. Sykes wonders: “The ladies, who add so much to the attractiveness of European cities, are huddled in Persia in a disguising and shapeless black wrap, by which the prettiest and the plainest are reduced to the same level.”\textsuperscript{192} Zūrkhānihs and coffeehouses were men-only spaces. Women were allowed in the takīyyihs, but they were only bystanders, watching the plays beneath their dark and impenetrable veils.\textsuperscript{193} Even men played instead of women in the taʿziyyihs, and to hide their masculinity, they covered their faces.\textsuperscript{194}

There is no doubt that there was a considerable disparity between men and women in nineteenth-century Iran. Women were deprived of their basic social rights. They could not work

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\textsuperscript{188} Aubin, *La Perse d’aujourd’hui*, 233.
\textsuperscript{189} Ridgeon, “The Zūrkhāna between Tradition,” 252.
\textsuperscript{190} Ridgeon, “The Zūrkhāna between Tradition,” 249.
\textsuperscript{192} Sykes, *Persia and Its People*, 46.
\textsuperscript{193} For a description of spectator women in takīyyihs see: Lady Sheil, *Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia* (London: John Murray, 1856), 127-8. Sometimes women had to watch the performances from the roof tops and the main sitting areas were devoted to men: Peterson, *The Taʿziyeh and Related Arts*, 65.
\textsuperscript{194} Chelkowski, “Taʿzia.”
independently outside the house; they did not receive education; they had to marry as children and adapt to an adult lifestyle at a very young age. In the words of Gavin R. G. Hambly, “every woman, without exception, was subordinate to the authority of and under the restraint of a particular man (i.e., father, brother, husband, son).” As a result, it is not surprising that scholars usually depict nineteenth-century Iranian women as the prisoners of the private realm, who “were primarily confined to the private and secluded world of the family.” In the rest of this chapter, I investigate this seclusion. I demonstrate that there were numerous women-only social spaces in nineteenth-century Tehran, and I examine the dynamics and politics of these spaces and their interconnection with the masculine world.

The data on the everyday lives of nineteenth-century Iranian women is scarce. Most of the travelogues and memoirs belong to men. They are silent or biased against women’s social life. European travellers were “reduced to supposition, gossip, and stereotypical commentary” due to their lack of contact with Iranian women. Similarly, Iranian memoirs were mostly written by men who were silent about the details of their wives’ and daughters’ lives. The only window to the hidden world is a handful of travelogues and memoirs written by European and Iranian women. However, these sources disclose just a fraction of feminine society and do not provide a comprehensive picture. European women were mostly in touch with the women from the court. They were invited to the parties inside the royal harem, of which they provided detailed

196 Hambly, “The Traditional Iranian City in the Qajar Period,” 7: 586.
198 Hambly, “The Traditional Iranian City in the Qajar Period,” 7: 586.
accounts, but they did not reveal the daily lives of ordinary women. On the other hand, the memoirs belong to affluent Iranian women who recorded their daily lives without talking much about lives of impoverished women.

Irvin Cemil Schick, in his valuable essay on the harems, uses the concept of archipelago for women’s spaces in traditional Islamic societies, “where the islands collectively represent the subspace devoted to women, and the sea the subspace devoted to men.” In his view, women’s subspaces consisted of “harems, public baths, saints’ tombs and shrines, recreational areas, cemeteries, and so forth; movement between them was carefully regulated, most notably by the practice of veiling.”199 In this dissertation, I adopt the same concept, however, instead of the term harem I use andarūnī, meaning the inside space. In the Qajar context, the term harem had a royal connotation, mostly referring to the royal women and their living spaces in the royal compound. Harems of Nassir al-Din Shah and Fath ʿAli Shah consisted of hundreds of wives, daughters, and servants. On the other hand, andarūnī was part of the architecture of the houses, and it referred to the inside courtyard where no man, except the head of the family and the sons, was allowed to enter. The term refers both to space and to the women of the household. It is important to note that the harem or andarūnī did not necessarily mean polygamy.200 The concept existed even in the families with a single wife.201

To reach the andarūnī in an Iranian house, one had to pass through a hierarchy of spaces from the entrance gate to the hashtī (entrance room), then to the Bīrūnī (the outer section or

201 Based on the accounts of European travelogues, it seems that polygamy was not a common phenomenon. For example Jakob Eduard Polak mentions that: “In the cities only the Khans and the governmental officials marry three or four wives; the artisans and tradesmen cannot afford the expenditures of several wives; they shun the disorder and squandering in the household and hence usually live in monogamy. On the plains and in the nomadic tribes monogamy is general; at most, a chief takes two to three wives […] In general it can be assumed that monogamy is the rule, polygamy the exception.” Polak, Persien, 209.
court yard belonging to the men), and finally to the andarūnī (the inner section or courtyard). Using the courtyards to provide light and ventilation, the houses had no opening to the outer world, except the entrance gates. As a result, the inner courtyards, andarūnīs, and their adjacent rooms match Schick’s feminine islands. Being physically detached from the outer universe, each andarūnī and its surrounding rooms were an island belonging to the women of a household (figure 1.4).

Figure 1.4. The sketch of a typical traditional Iranian house and the configuration of the interior spaces.

This chapter shows that andarūnīs were much more than mere private spaces creating a secluded life for the women of the household. They were lively feminine social spaces infused with varied social relations.202 Dominic Parviz Brookshaw demonstrates the same notion in his study of “female poets and female patrons” during the Qajar era. He demonstrates how an all-

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202 As the rest of the chapter demonstrates, andarūnīs were the places of various all-women social gatherings, such as Muharram ceremonies, comedy shows, dancing parties, poetry recitation, and music concerts. Using Iranian women’s memoirs and European women’s travelogues, the rest of this chapter investigates various types of women’s social gatherings in andarūnīs and other all-women social spaces. For the memoirs and travelogues, see: Munis al-Duwlih, Khatirat-i Munis al-Duwlih Nadimih-ī Haramsara-ī Nassir al-Dīn Shah, ed. Sirus S’advandīyaν (Tehran: Intisharāt-i Zarīn, 1380 [2001]); Taj al-Saltanīh, Khatirat-i Taj al-Saltanīh [Taj al-Saltanīh’s Memoirs], eds. Mansureh Etehadieh and Sirus S’advandīyaν (Tehran: Nashr-i Tarikh-i Iran, 1361 [1982]); Badr ol-Moluk Bamdad, From Darkness into Light: Women’s Emancipation in Iran, trans. F. R. C. Bagley (Hicksville: Exposition Press, 1977); Ella C. Sykes, Through Persia on a Side-Saddle, (London: A. D. Innes & Company, 1898); Serena, Hommes et Choses en Perse; Sheil, Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia.
women network of poets and patrons existed around the royal harem. This section broadens this view and attempts to introduce the andarūnīs and some other feminine spaces as women’s main social spaces in the nineteenth-century. This point may contradict the accepted public and private dichotomy, or in the case of this research the private and communal dichotomy. Without a doubt, andarūnīs were part of the private houses, and the access to them was highly controlled by the social norms. However, accepting a rigid dichotomy leads us to equalize the life in the andarūnīs to confinement and women to their prisoners. In contrast, analysis of the social relations of these spaces suggests that one should not take this dichotomy for granted. The boundaries of the andarūnīs were porous. Andarūnīs were the centers of various feminine social interactions.

During the mourning month of Muharram, andarūnīs could change into women’s takīyyihs, for the performance of taʿziyih and all the other related rituals. Munis al-Duwlih, one of the few Iranian women from the nineteenth-century who wrote her memoirs, mentions that wealthy women of the city, as well as the women in the royal harem, used to hold taʿziyihs for women during Muharram in the andarūnīs. Women were self-sufficient for these rituals. There were women to do the religious sermons and recitations; taʿziyih performers were female; the stories, unlike the men’s performances, were mostly based on women characters and stories; even, they had trained ponies for the scenes that required horses. Similar to the caravanserais and mosques, the central pools of the andarūnīs were converted into the performance stages by covering them with wooden boards.

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In other months, *andarūnūs* could change into places for women’s parties. Sometimes all-women music bands and comic show groups were paid to perform at these parties. Dancer girls were invited to dance and women storytellers, *naqāls*, to tell stories.\(^{205}\) The accounts of similar ceremonies are available in the European women’s travelogues, who were mostly invited to the big parties in the royal harem, sometimes taking twelve hours, as in the case of Carla Serena.\(^{206}\)

While it seems that women’s and men’s worlds were completely separate, there were numerous interconnections between the two realms. Eunuchs, young boys, and elderly women were the third parties who conducted much of the relationship between the two worlds.\(^{207}\) Eunuchs were an inseparable part of the royal harem and affluent families’ *andarūnūs*. Besides their routine duties to serve women, they regulated all the communications between the inside and outside worlds.\(^{208}\) Munis al-Duwlih’s memoir provides an interesting example. She explains how eunuchs transferred *ta’zīyih* poems, acting skills, and performance tips by learning them from the male players and directors and teaching them to the actresses. Moreover, sometimes eunuchs played music during the performances.\(^{209}\) Similarly, sometimes blind men were allowed into the women’s circles for playing music or reciting the sermons.\(^{210}\)

Besides the relationship between the two realms, the islands of the archipelago were not completely separate from each other either. Some women could move between the various


\(^{207}\) Ella C. Sykes mentions little boys and eunuchs in a royal harem all-women party. Munis al-Duwlih uses the term *ghulām bachih*, little boy servants, to refer to the little boys who were responsible to carry and deliver bathing necessities for women. She, also, mentions the role of eunuchs in all-women Muharram ceremonies. One of the interesting cases was the role of old women as a mediator between unmarried women and men in the streets to find husband for spinsters: Sykes, *Through Persia on a Side-Saddle*, 17 & 20-1; Munis al-Duwlih, *Khatirat-i Munis al-Duwlih*, 98, 112 & 241.

\(^{208}\) One of the best sources for studying eunuchs’ tasks in the royal harem is Taj al-Saltanih’s memoir. She was one of Nassir al-Din Shah’s daughters who provided great details from the internal life of harem in her memoir. Taj al-Saltanih, *Khatirat-i Taj al-Saltanih*. Also Badr ol-Moluk Bamdad gives interesting information on eunuchs: Bamdad, *From Darkness into Light*, 12.


circles and connect them together. Similar to bridges, they conducted the flow of information and social relations between different islands. The andarūnīs were meeting places for women vendors and their customers. These vendors were permitted into the andarūnīs to sell their goods to women. Deprived of independent stores in the bazaar, they were bringing the market into the women’s world. Once again, the boundary between the private spaces and social spaces is blurry. These vendors did not have a single location for their business; they were transcending all the communal-private boundaries of the city and entering different andarūnīs. Munis al-Duwlih mentions that they were andarūnī women’s best sources of news. They transferred news from one island to the other, connecting different women’s circles. A group of these vendors, called dallālih, sold expensive objects such as jewelry, clothes, and fabrics. Munis al-Duwlih mentions that these women had a second duty too. Using their familiarity with different islands, they found brides for the families who had a son ready for marriage. After informing the groom’s family, the elderly women of the household would make the first contact with the bride’s family by paying a visit to their house. Moreover, dallālihs informed other women about the women-only ceremonies around the city and received some money for their information. It was an important social phenomenon. It shows how a parallel feminine network performed alongside the men’s world. However, due to the politics of patriarchal society, men do not reflect these social relations in their memoirs.

An important question to ask is whether women’s social relations followed the same principles as men’s did. In other words, can we find a segmented society in women’s realm?

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211 Munis al-Duwlih, Khatirat-i Munis al-Duwlih, 32-3 & 253.
212 One of these ceremonies was Jahāzburān. Jahāzburān was a ceremony in which the bride’s dowry was transferred into her new house after the marriage. Munis al-Duwlih mentions that this ceremony was one of the most favorite ones between the women, and dallālihs spread the news in the city in exchange for money Munis al-Duwlih, Khatirat-i Munis al-Duwlih, 48-9.
213 For more information of the vendors see: Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, 13-4.
Based on the available data, it is hard to provide an exact answer to this question. First, if we accept that the demographic compositions of the neighborhoods and sub-neighborhoods were based on coherent social segments, then we can guess that women who lived in the same area had a common social affiliation. Consequently, a sense of neighborhood identity conducted women’s relationships. That is the reason the visit of the vendors to someone’s house could coincide with the gathering of other women in that neighborhood. Munis al-Duwlih describes the visits of *dallālihs* to the houses as small parties, which could take several hours.\(^{214}\) Second, based on Munis al-Duwlih’s accounts, the vendors were specialized in selling specific objects. This specialization was closely related to their city of the origin or religion. For example, *dallālihs* and women physicians were mostly Jews. Vendors from Tabriz sold *sifidāb* (whitening substances for bath), women from Isfahan sold wigs, and Kermani women sold needlework.\(^{215}\) Similar to the Grand Bazaar of Tehran where a close relationship existed between the city of the origin and men’s professions, vendors’ specializations followed the social segmentation; however, these segments did not have independent spatial manifestations.

The *andarūnīs* were not the only places for women’s social interactions. Mosques and bathhouses were the other two favorite places for women’s gatherings. Women’s gatherings in mosques were similar to the men’s. In certain times such as Ramadan and particularly during the *qadr* nights, the mosques were crowded by women. On the twenty-seven day of Ramadan, women had special ceremonies in the mosques to celebrate the execution of Ibn al-Muljan, the murderer of Imam ‘Ali. Moreover, similar to men’s Ramadan markets, women had their specific Ramadan markets too.\(^{216}\)

\(^{216}\) Munis al-Duwlih, *Khatirat-i Munis al-Duwlih*, 151-4. Bamdad gives a different description of the ceremonies on the 27\(^{th}\) of Ramadan. Calling it Wish-Blouse ceremony, she describes that women gathered in the mosques “to cut
Women’s bathhouses were interesting woman-only spaces. Even European men were fascinated by the amount of time that Iranian women spent in the bathhouses: “Women’s baths are meeting places for entertainment and exchanging the news of the city. They usually spend half a day in baths, drinking sherbets and killing time with singing and playing music.”

Carla Serena provides a detailed description of women’s bathhouses in her travelogue, *Hommes et Choses en Perse*. In the late 1870s, she had the chance to spend a day in a bathhouse after the invitation of one of the royal ladies. She begins her description in these words: “[Going to a bathhouse for women] is like [going to a] joyful picnic. They go there in great numbers.” With great details, she describes how bathing was an excuse for socializing. Besides bathing, wearing make-up, and dyeing their hair, women spent hours chitchatting, telling stories (*naqālī*), playing music, singing, and having lunch and a nap. She mentions that eunuchs brought the lunch to the bathhouse and later they came back to take out the dishes. The bathing took ten hours, from eight in the morning to six in the afternoon. Carla Serena describes the interesting farewell scene in these words: “it was the [farewell] time. All of them put on loose and wide trousers over their short skirts, put on their slippers, then wrap themselves in dark *chādurs* [veil] connected to *rubands* [face cover]. Under this uniform costume, princesses and maids were the same.” She notes the same contrast when she departed a women’s party in the royal harem, wondering how the royal women who had metamorphosed into beautiful butterflies in the morning, had to return to their “disgraceful covers” one more time. The metamorphosis of women back to the veils guaranteed their safe passage from one island to the other. In Iranian patriarchal society, the

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feminine islands were supposed to remain undiscovered by the public male gaze. Women were like patches of the feminine world who could move around the masculine realm, as long as they were hiding beneath their čādur. It is worth asking if women’s bathhouses and mosques had the same spatial politics that the men’s did. In other words, did the communal identity and social segmentation constitute these social spaces? Once again, the data to examine this argument is scarce. There is a point in Munis al-Duwlih’s memoirs that can help to construct such a picture. In her description of Labor Baths, a special bathing ceremony for women who had delivered their babies, she describes how the choice of the bathhouse could change into a big fight between the bride’s and groom’s families. The bride’s family demanded that she go to the bathhouse where she used to go before her marriage, and the groom’s family wanted to take her to the bathhouse where the mother-in-law and sister-in-law used to go. What was the importance of this choice? Why should there be a fight over such a trivial matter? The Labor Bath was the first bath of the mother and child together. The symbolic choice of the bath could define the mother and child’s communal identities. It could define to which neighborhood they belonged. Consequently, the social space of the bathhouse was a medium for the construction of the social identity of the mother and more importantly the child.

Finally, during the second half of the nineteenth century, women’s social spaces were not immune to the great wave of Europeanization. Although throughout the nineteenth century the andarūnī remained part of the traditional architecture of Iranian houses, and women’s social status remained more or less unchanged, there was a delicate spatial transformation. After Nassir al-Din Shah’s first trip to Europe (see Chapter Two), the clothes of “ballet-girls” were introduced

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222 Munis al-Duwlih, Khatirat-i Munis al-Duwlih, 91.
to the royal harem and soon became common among other sections of society. A new sort of nudity was introduced to women’s realm that did not have precedent in the feminine world. In the words of Sykes:

All the Persian ladies wore loose-sleeved jackets of the richest brocade and velvets, and had short, much-stiffened-out trousers, which did not reach to the knees [...] before the Shah went to Europe the Persian ladies all kept the old national costume [...] but on the return of the monarch, this present ungraceful costume became the fashion in the royal anderoon, and has spread throughout the whole country.

Figure 1.5 and figure 1.6 show the contrast between the traditional and new costumes. While the outdoor costumes did not change during the century, the indoor costumes had a dramatic transformation.

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225 Sheil, Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia, between pages 130 & 131.
Accepting the public-private discourse and assigning the gender dichotomy to the resulted spatiality limit our understanding of the social spaces in traditional Iranian cities. It prevents us from investigating women’s social life and spaces. There were parallel universes in Iranian cities for men and women. Men and women could not pass the threshold and enter each other’s spaces without consequences. While separate from each other, they had interconnections through specific media. Men’s communal and gender identities constituted their social spaces, as the women’s did. For women, besides mosques and bathhouses, the andarūnīs undertook the main role of social spaces. These spaces were more than a private space deep in the houses; they could be lively social spaces, formed based on communal and gender identities of women, and in return they were reproducing the same identities. It is not possible to see these social roles if andarūnīs are left in the private section of communal-private dichotomy.

Moreover, as Chapter Four discusses, the feminine social spaces provided the centers for the first women’s movements in Iran. It would be misleading to assume that women had nothing to do, except have fun, while they were together. With the unjust imbalance of power between

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227 Sheil, Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia, between pages 144 & 145.
228 Sykes, Through Persia on a Side-Saddle, between pages 40 & 41.
men and women, how can one deny the possibility of resistance in women’s social spaces? In 1894-5, Bibi Khanom Astarabadi, a woman from Tehran, wrote a book called *Maʿayeb al-Rejal*, or *Vices of Men*. This book was a response to an earlier book named *Taʿdib al-Nesvan*, or *The Education of Women*, written in 1886-87 by an unknown author. The latter was a controversial guide book for husbands to teach the proper behavior to their wives. The interesting point is that Bibi Khanom mentions that her friends had urged her to write the book in response to *The Education of Women*. In the introduction to the English translation of these books, Hasan Javadi and Willem Floor argue that it is an important piece of information which “shows not only that women talked about more than their hairdos, their clothes, and the like, but also that Bibi Khanom must have been well known in these women’s circles as somebody with strong feelings about the matter of women’s rights.”229 The question that can be asked in the context of this dissertation is where the places for women to have such political discussions were. The answers are limited. In the nineteenth century, women did not have any newspaper or any other sort of media for such a debate. There was no public venue through which they could act against *The Education of Women*. With certainty, one can guess that the debates happened in an *andarūnī* or a bathhouse. These spaces could be active political venues for critical gatherings rather than mere socializing circles.

**Conclusion**

The communal sphere was the sphere of individual people and families who could identify themselves with a common communal identity, such as religion or sectarian affiliation,
profession, city of origin, language, and the like. Unlike the bourgeois or proletariat public spheres, people’s economic status was not the basis for the formation of the communal sphere; each community consisted of wealthy and impoverished people at the same time. The most important task of the communal sphere was the identification of individuals in broader urban society; it provided people with a social base and identified them with a social status. Moreover, the communal sphere worked for the well-being of the community. More affluent members supported the collective ceremonies; members of zürkhānihs protected their neighborhoods against the outsiders, helped the impoverished people, and provided the workforce for ceremonies, such as Muharram mourning rituals; and all the people collaborated for holding their ceremonies collectively.

The spatial representation of the communal sphere was small-scale architectural spaces, communal spaces, inside the wards. These spaces were the centers of genuine social life at the communal lever. From permanent spaces, such as coffeehouses, zürkhānihs, bathhouses, and mosques, to temporary spaces, such as takīyyihs, each segment of the urban population had its particular spaces. These small-scale architectural segments were the products of Iranian communal practices, and in return, they reproduced and reaffirmed their communal identity, sometimes through playing games in coffeehouses and bathhouses, practicing shared rituals in zürkhānihs, producing the place of rituals in takīyyihs, and reciting poetry and stories in coffeehouses. In the words of Massey, “spatial differentiation, geographical variety, is not just an outcome: it is integral to the reproduction of society and its dominant social relations.”

Moreover, there was an architectural commonality between the layouts of various communal spaces. Coffeehouses, takīyyihs, zürkhānihs, and sarbānihs of the bathhouses, as some

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examples, share more or less the same design: a center oriented space where people sit on platforms at the periphery, with the center open for communal activities. The interior spaces were the reflections of segmented society, suitable for small gathering and sharing a communal activity. As a result, each of these spaces had its particular games, events, and different sorts of entertainment. They were small places where people could feel their common bond based on their shared affiliation.

Religiosity had a considerable role in the production of communal spheres in the nineteenth century. The most significant instances of social life were based on people’s religious beliefs and practices. It is important to note that despite practicing the same religion by most of the communities, they were still detached from one another during the major religious ceremonies. Each neighborhood had its own takīyyih, formed its own dastīh, and held its own ceremonies.

The communal spaces and practices of coffeehouses, takīyyihs, and zūrkhānihs were extremely masculine. Women were absent from the communal scene or, at the best case scenario, they were silent, unrecognizable figures beneath their thick and dark veils. As a result, it is convenient to claim that women belonged to the private sphere of the conjugal families. While private houses were the spatial representation of the private sphere, as this research demonstrated, the boundary between the private and communal realms was porous for women. There were considerable interrelations between the two realms at the place of private houses. Private spaces could temporarily change into takīyyihs, theaters, concert and dance halls, market places, and similar places for non-private activities for women of the same community.

The communal sphere was the hallmark of Iranian urban society in the nineteenth century, what makes it different from its European counterparts. Examination of this sphere and its spaces
is crucial for studying the formation of the public sphere in the early twentieth century and its transformation towards the mid-twentieth century.
Chapter 2

European Cities and Iranian Travelers: The Production of Spatial Knowledge

Michel Foucault, through his concept of archaeology of knowledge, shows how in various socio-historical contexts there are substantial constraints on how people are able to think. In this view, certain implicit rules restrict people’s range of thoughts. Through his archaeological analysis, Foucault examines the evolving meaning of madness,¹ the transformation and development of medical professions and institutes of Clinique,² and the origins of human sciences.³ In The Archaeology of Knowledge, however, Foucault formulates archaeology as an independent method for historical investigations.⁴ In this chapter, I examine space as one of the constraints of thought. The spatial discourse restrains people’s spatial imaginations and practices; it sets rules for the way we live, act, and imagine. These constraints were more effective in the context of nineteenth-century Iranian urban society before its increasing contacts with an alternative universe, in this case, Europe. For the members of this society, their immediate milieu was their major spatial discourse, setting implicit rules that could restrict their range of thoughts and actions.

In Chapter One, I discussed some of these socio-spatial rules; nineteenth-century Tehran consisted of socially enclosed neighborhoods, each formed around a communal identity.

People’s social life and identity mostly formed in small-scale communal spaces among the community they knew. The few instances of social life that were able to transcend communal boundaries and gather various communities together, such as the qurbān ceremony (Chapter One) or the royal Muharram ceremony in Takīyyih Duwlat (Chapter Three), were unable to create a unified public in practice; the communal identity and the rivalry between various segments of the city reproduced their micro spaces inside the bigger space of these court-sponsored social gatherings. In addition to socio-spatial constraints of thought, there were physical constraints too. Nineteenth-century Iranian cities consisted of the organic fabric of narrow, crooked alleys running through neighborhoods. The introvert architecture of houses, with their central courtyards, left no opening or window from houses to these alleys. The only openings were entrance gates of houses, and the rest was blank walls.

In such a context, the late 1860s and the early 1870s expansion of Tehran, with its wide and spacious streets and squares and buildings with extrovert architecture, was in stark contrast to the existing fabric of the city. This expansion set a new standard for urban development that has kept changing Iranian cities since then. While Chapter Three studies this expansion extensively, the current chapter looks back as early as the late eighteenth century and demonstrates that this expansion had been incubated in Iranian society, at least among the elites and the Qajar court, for decades, rather than an abrupt change and a sudden disjuncture from the past.

From the eighteenth century and particularly throughout the nineteenth century, transcontinental exchanges between Iran and European countries increased dramatically. This increase was not limited to political contacts between two universes; many individuals traveled between the continents. The growing relationship between Iran and European countries
generated new forms of knowledge and transferred them to Iranian society. This chapter analyzes spatial knowledge that Iranians produced by becoming acquainted with European cities. For this purpose, the chapter examines travelogues of Iranian travelers as a medium of knowledge production and transfer. During the nineteenth century, there were other media for the transfer of spatial knowledge from Europe to Iran, such as *Shahr-i Farang*, geographical texts, photos, and postcards. The main advantage of travelogues over the other means of knowledge transfer is that authors of the former experienced European urban spaces directly. In other words, they lived in the new spatiality, rather than being passive observers, reflected on their personal experiences, and recorded them in their texts. In contrast, the other means were passive representations of European cities, which were generated in Europe without passing through an Iranian filter.

By the analysis of travelogues, I found that the major rules that guided the production of the new spatiality after the 1870s expansion of Tehran were in line with the rules of spatial knowledge Iranians produced through witnessing European cities. By regarding space as one of the constraints of thought, Iranian travelers’ spatial knowledge transformed dramatically after visiting European cities. They experienced an alternative universe entirely different from their former socio-spatial knowledge. In this context, their travelogues contain traces of new spatial knowledge. The discourse analysis of the text of travelogues reveals many overarching similarities between them. I argue that Iranian travelers encountered a new spatiality in European cities, so exotic and so different from their hometowns that resulted in the formation of new spatial knowledge. This knowledge is manifested in overarching similarities between

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5 *Shahr-i Farang* literally means European city. It was a device, peepshow, for watching pictures of European cities, pornography, and exotic places. Vendors were moving these boxes all around the cities to show the pictures to people, and make some money. Staci Gem Scheiwiller has a valuable essay on the subject: Staci Gem Scheiwiller, “Cartographic Desires: Some Reflections on the *Shahr-i Farang* (Peepshow) and Modern Iran,” in *Performing the Iranian State: Visual Culture and Representations of Iranian Identity*, ed. Staci Gem Scheiwiller (London: Anthem Press, 2013), 33-54.
travelogues. It can be investigated by reading and analyzing the texts in search of common themes and, at the same time, contextualizing the analysis by looking back at Iranian cities of the time. The reciprocal reading of the texts, as constructed materials created in the tension between the two universes, reveals and explains the overarching similarities as the elements of new spatial knowledge. However, I should remind once again that travelogues were just one of the means to transfer new spatial knowledge, which are the most appropriate ones for textual analysis.

The analysis of the texts reveals five main common themes among them, which cover a broad range of social and spatial items. The physical order of European cities, public life, nightlife, the presence of women in public spaces, the relationship between power and spaces, and so on are the main sources of wonder among Iranian travelers. As the last section of this chapter discusses, however, there are common silences between texts too. The most important one is that Iranian travelers generated a partial knowledge of the new spatiality. Most of them did not explore European cities entirely to see the harsh living condition of the working class. This partial knowledge resulted in the production of an unrealistic image of European cities.

This research does not aim to investigate what the travelers attempted to express and the ideas they had in mind. Rather, I analyze these texts as clues to the general structure of the system of thought and knowledge in which these writers wrote their travelogues. This system of thought was the result of the socio-spatial tension between Iranian and European urban societies and cities. The expansion of Tehran in the 1870s, as a result, should be investigated through the framework of new spatial knowledge. Iranian elites and the Qajar court were the main producers and receivers of new knowledge, and, as Chapter Three discusses, they played the main role in the expansion of Tehran. In this view, the history of the expansion of Tehran is not necessarily
the history of Nassir al-Din Shah’s decision to transform the city. The king was the subject of the greater system of thought; he was the subject of new spatial knowledge; he was not detached from this system. This view does not imply that I omit individuals from the history of the expansion of the city; rather, I aim to demonstrate the importance of the impact of the system of thought and knowledge on the agents of history. The decisions of the main agents were the products of this system; consequently, it is more important to know the systems prior to the agents, instead of ignoring the former in the favor of the latter.

Finally, before entering the main discussion, I need to briefly reflect on the importance of this investigation for the rest of the dissertation. The formation of new spatial knowledge played a significant role in the transformation of Iranian cities. The production of new urban spaces in Tehran was in line with this spatial knowledge. Accordingly, this chapter provides a reference point for Chapters Three, Five, and Six. As these chapters will show, the production of new urban spaces in Tehran regenerated the new spatial knowledge into a powerful spatial discourse, which dichotomized the city and urban population into two poles and resulted in the destruction of the old city and its communal spaces.

**Iranian Travelers and Their Travelogues**

The nineteenth century witnessed a surge in the number of Iranians who travelled to European countries. Some of the travelers recorded the accounts of their journeys in travelogues; some of the travelogues were published, few of them were even translated into European languages at the time, and many of them remained as manuscripts in libraries all around the world. Iraj Afshar estimates that around five hundred Persian travelogues were written during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The authors of Persian travelogues are not necessarily Iranians; people from India, the Transoxiana, and the Caucasus also wrote travelogues in Persian.

This section examines eight Persian travelogues from the nineteenth century. All of these travelogues were written by men; I did not find any Iranian woman who wrote the accounts of her journey to Europe in the nineteenth century. Two main criteria were considered in selecting these specific pieces. First, I chose the travelogues by travelers who went to Europe before the expansion of Tehran in the late 1860s and early 1870s. I intentionally avoided the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’ travelogues, when Tehran’s new northern neighborhood was fully formed and integrated into urban life. Second, while most of the travelogues were written by people who were part of the royal family or were assigned to travel on a mission by the court, to broaden the scopes of my analysis, I analyzed two travelogues from ordinary travelers who went to Europe at their own expense and who were not officially hosted by European governments.

Table 2.1 presents the travelogues that are discussed in this section. They cover the period between 1799 and 1873, the latter date coinciding with the first visit of Nassir al-Din Shah (1848-1896), king of Iran, to Europe. I chose two travelogues from this trip: the king’s travelogue and the king’s brother’s travelogue, ‘Abd al-Samad Mirza Salur ‘Izz al-Dulih, which was written partly by him and partly by his scribe. Three travelogues belong to Iranian

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ambassadors who traveled to Europe for official missions. Two of them, *Hiyratnamih* and *Dalil al-Sufara*, belong to Mirza Abu al-Hassan Khan Shirazi, known as Ilchi. *Hiyratnamih or Book of Wonder* is the account of Ilchi’s travel to London in 1809 to meet King George and to establish a diplomatic relationship between Fath ‘Ali Shah’s court and the British government. *Dalil al-Sufara* is the accounts of Ilchi’s trip to Russia after the first round of Perso-Russian wars and signing the *Gulistān* Treaty between the two countries, in which vast territories of Iran in Caucasia were lost. The court sent Ilchi to Moscow and Saint Petersburg to renegotiate the terms of the treaty. Ilchi’s travelogue to Russia was written by Mirza Muhammad Hadi ‘Alavi Shirazi, his scribe, and it is more than mere transcription of Ilchi’s words; rather, as Anna Vanzan claims “it is almost entirely ‘Alavi Shirazi’s own production.” Finally *Chahar Fasl* or *Four Seasons*, is the accounts of the travel of Mirza Fattah Khan Garmrudi in 1838, a companion of Muhammad Shah’s ambassador, Husayn Khan Ajudanbashi, to Britain to express complaints against the British Minister in Iran. Besides ‘Abd al-Samad Mirza Salur’s travelogue, Reza Ghuli Mirza is the other Qajar prince whose travelogue I examine here. He went to Europe more or

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13 Mirza Fattah Khan Garmrudi, *Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan Garmrudi bih Urupa Mosum bih Chahar Fasli va Du Risalih-yi Dīgar binam-i: Shabnamih va Safarnamih-yi Mamasani dar Zaman-i Muhammad Shah Qajar* [The travelogue of Mirzā Abu ‘l-Ḥasan Khan to Europe which is Famous as Chahar Fast and Two Other Essays Titled as: Shabnamih and Mamasani Travelogue in Muhammad Shah Qajar Era], ed. Fath al-Din Fattahi (Bank-i Bazargani-yi Iran: 1347 [1970]).
less individually, but was accepted as an official guest by European governments, especially Britain.

Table 2.1. The list of the Iranian travelogues from the nineteenth century discussed in this section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Travelogue</th>
<th>Traveler</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Main Countries Visited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Masir-i Talibi</td>
<td>Mirza Abu Talib Khan (ordinary Merchant)</td>
<td>February 1799- August 1803</td>
<td>Britain, France, and Ottoman Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiyratnamih</td>
<td>Mirza Abul Hassan Khan Shirazi –Ilchi (Iran’s Ambassador)</td>
<td>May 1809- 1810</td>
<td>Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalil al-Sufara</td>
<td>Mirza Abul Hassan Khan Shirazi –Ilchi (Iran’s Ambassador)</td>
<td>May 1814- February 1816</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safarnamih-yi Reza Ghuli Mirza</td>
<td>Reza Ghuli Mirza (Qajar prince)</td>
<td>October 1835- April 1837</td>
<td>Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chahar Fasl</td>
<td>Mirza Fattah Khan Garmrudi (Iran ambassador’s companion)</td>
<td>September 1838-February 1840</td>
<td>Ottoman Empire, France and Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah</td>
<td>Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali Mahallati (ordinary religious student)</td>
<td>1859-1877</td>
<td>Most of European countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safarnamih-yi Nassir al-Din Shah</td>
<td>Nassir al-Din Shah Qajar (king of Iran)</td>
<td>April 1873- September 1873</td>
<td>Russia, Germany, Belgium, Britain, France, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, and Ottoman Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safarnamih-yi ‘Abd al-Samad Mirza ‘Izz al-Dulih</td>
<td>‘Abd al-Samad Mirza ‘Izz al-Dulih (king’s brother)</td>
<td>April 1873- September 1873</td>
<td>Russia, Germany, Belgium, Britain, France, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, and Ottoman Empire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last two travelogues, _Masir-i Talebi_ by Mirza Abu Talib Khan\textsuperscript{15} and _Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah_ by Mirza Muhammad Ali Mahallati, known as Haj Sayyah\textsuperscript{16} were written by independent travelers. Haj Sayyah left Iran when he was just twenty-three years old and, without any destination in mind, he travelled for eighteen years around the world. He learned to speak five different languages, and his trajectory took him to most of European countries. His

\textsuperscript{15} Mirza Abu Talib Khab, _Masir-i Talibi ya Safarnamih-yi Mirza Abu Talib Khan (1210 A.h) [The Talibi Path and Mirza Abu Talib Khan’s Travelogue]_, ed. Hussein Khadiv Jam (Tehran: Shirkat-i Sahami-yi Kitab-ha-yi Jibi, 1352 [1973]).

\textsuperscript{16} Mirza Muhammad Ali Mahallati, _Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah bih Farang [Haj Sayyah’s Travelogue to Farang]_, ed. ‘Ali Dihbashi (Tehran: Nashr-i Nashir, 1363 [1984]).
travelogue contains the accounts of his journeys to Europe. Afterwards, he went to the United States where he spent ten years and became the first Iranian who received the U.S. citizenship.17 Unfortunately, the accounts of his travels in the U.S. have not yet been found. He returned to Iran via Japan, Southeast Asia, and India.

Finally, Masir-i Talebi was written by Mirza Abu Talib Khan, an independent merchant who went to Britain in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. It is the second oldest available Persian travelogue from Europe.18 This travelogue is different from the others in one fundamental aspect. Mirza Abu Talib Khan was an Iranian who was born and raised in India, where he started and ended his journey. I used his travelogue for three reasons. First, Masir-i Talebi is one of the oldest Europe travelogues in Persian, and it can provide an older picture of Europe in Iranian accounts. Second, as Sohrabi shows, there was a relative awareness in Iran about the travelers and their travelogues during the nineteenth century, and accounts of travels were circulating between people in the country. For example, Sohrabi19 demonstrates how Mir ‘Abd al-Latif Shushtari, an Iranian history writer, incorporated information from Mirza Abu Talib Khan in his book Tuhfat al-‘Alam, to write about Europe. Finally, his different origin gives a valuable perspective for comparison with travelogues from Iran.

Four of the travelogues, Masir-i Talebi,20 Nassir al-Din Shah’s,21 Hiyratnamih,22 and Haj Sayyah’s,23 have English translations. The first two were translated into English shortly after

18 Afshar, Persian travelogues, 152.
their transcription in Persian, and the other two were translated and published in the contemporary era. Moreover, there is an English narration, not translation, of the accounts of Reza Ghuli Mirza’s travel to Britain by James Baillie Fraser, from 1838, in which the author records Reza Ghuli Mirza’s journey independently. In the process of this research, I analyzed the Persian texts of the travelogues. However, for the quotations, I compared the English translations to the Persian texts. Whenever the English translation had relative accuracy, I used it; otherwise I translated the quotation into English from the Persian text.

The City and the Persian Gaze

I saw a city of wonder, which forced me to forget all the other settlements I have ever seen. All the streets had the same two hundred feet width; they were paved with hard stones so elegantly that one could sit and rest upon them. The sides of the street were paved higher for pedestrians and the middle was paved lower for the movements of coaches and carriages, one side for coming and the other for going. And the buildings were about the same one hundred meters high, in four levels, built out of stone. The windows were placed in a way that made your mind go crazy, all were opening towards the street and all looked exactly the same. Moreover, the rooftops were aligned exactly in the same line without any ups and downs. The doors were opening exactly in front of each other, what magnificent doors with carved wood, and you could find the name of the owner of each building written by the door. I was going crazy, didn’t know where to look.

The above paragraph is Reza Ghuli Mirza’s initial impression of Bath on his way to London in 1835. It contains many of the main features that fascinated Iranian travelers when they visited European countries in the nineteenth century. Similar sentences are abundant in most of

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25 Reza Ghuli Mirza uses Zarʿ, which is a traditional Persian unit of measurement. One Zarʿ is almost one meter, more accurately 1.04, which is about 3.5 feet. As the number shows, he has the usual exaggeration common among Iranian travelogues.
the travelogues. This section presents the overarching similarities between travelogues in six categories.

New Spatial Order

One of the first impressions of the travelers is the physical order of European cities, which is manifested in qualities such as straightness, length, and the consistent width of the streets. Most of the travelers were coming from Iranian cities with networks of labyrinthine, organic, narrow, and crooked passages.27 Straight, long, and wide streets, with organized façades on their sides were in great contrast to the travelers’ former spatial experience. The gap between the two universes is clearly recognizable in the words that the travelers use for describing the new order.

Today, Kūchih and Khīyābān are the main words that Iranians use for describing urban spaces. Kūchih is a synonym for alley, and people use the term when referring to narrower streets. Khīyābān is a synonym for avenue and is usually used in reference to the main streets of cities. However, these terms were used differently in the context of Iranian cities prior to the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries’ urban developments. Khīyābān was part of the terminology of garden design, and it was used to name the straight passages in Persian gardens with trees and flower beds at their sides.28 Later in the seventeenth century, the term was used in Safavid urban design when Shah Abbas built a new street in Isfahan called Khīyābān-i

27 It is important to mention that there were few examples of urban design in Iranian cities that were based on the straight streets and rectangular squares, such as the Safavid Shah Square and Chāhārbāgh Avenue; however in comparison to the rest of the country, these were few exceptions and by the 19th century most of Iranian cities consisted of organic urban fabrics.

*Chāhārbāgh.*

Chāhārbāgh was regarded as a *Khīyābān* because it had lanes of trees on its sides. Moreover, *Chāhārbāgh* was surrounded by the royal gardens of the Safavid courts.

Based on these instances, the major characteristic of *Khīyābān* is its straightness. The historic usage of the second term, *Kūchih*, was more related to the built environment of the cities and villages. In *Dehkhoda Lexicon* there are two main meanings for *Kūchih* that are related to the built environment: neighborhood and narrow passages of cities or villages.

With the nineteenth-century usage of these terms, one can expect that Iranian travelers had to re-categorize their word usage in order to describe European cities. The best example of such a challenge is evident in *Dalil al-Sufara*, the 1814 to 1816 journey of Iran’s ambassador, Ilchi, to Russia. In his first encounter with a small city on his way to Moscow, the scribe writes: “[The city] has wide and long *Kūchihs* in the manner of *Khīyābāns* in front of each other.” Later in another city he writes: “[This city has] wide *Kūchihs* and *Khīyābāns* in front of each other.” And finally in another instance he writes: “All the *Kūchihs* are built as *Khīyābāns*.” There is not a clear demarcation between *Kūchih* and *Khīyābān* in these sentences, which shows the confusion of the author about finding the right words to talk about the European context. There is the same confusion in the other travelogues. Sometimes, *Kūchih* and *Khīyābān* are used interchangeably, and sometime travelers use *Khīyābān* to talk about the streets with trees, without maintaining the same usage throughout their texts. For example, in Toulon, France, Haj

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32 ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-Sufara*, 57.
33 ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-Sufara*, 70.
34 ʿAlavi Shirazi, *Dalil al-Sufara*, 71.
Sayyah mentions that the best Khīyābān of the city is Strasbourg Boulevard, which is wide with trees and “superb buildings” on its both sides, and later in Dijon he mentions that there are trees planted on the both sides of all the Küchihs of the city.

This confusion shows that the familiar Iranian spatial terminology of the travelers did not suit the new urban spaces. The travelers’ spatial consciousness belonged to another universe and adapting its available terminology to the new universe resulted in the innovative and diverse usages of old terms. However, despite this confusion, there are common overarching themes between these descriptions. In many instances, the travelers equated the quality of a good city with its long, straight, wide, and clean streets: “Karlsruhe is a good and prosperous city. It has thirty seven thousand people with long and straight Küchihs,” “Brussels is a beautiful city, with long and straight Küchihs,” “the best city in the world is Paris. It is not just a city, better to say, the envy of paradise. Bright air, wide streets, Khīyābāns as one can desire, and nice and kind people.” In these sentences, the travelers attached the goodness of a city to its spatial order. A good city is a city with order, and this order was manifested spatially in its streets by being clean, straight, wide, and long. There are other aspects of this goodness that are present more or less in all the travelogues, such as paving, the height of the buildings and number of levels, order of the façades, order of the trees, and many other physical qualities.

35 Mahallati, Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah, 135; Mahallati, An Iranian in Nineteenth Century, 108.
36 Mahallati, Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah, 153.
37 Much of this European urban design and the construction of straight and wide boulevards were relatively new at this time; they were the spatial manifestation of European imperialism and global capitalism. For more information, see: Gould, Insurgent Identities; Harvey, Paris, Capital of Modernity.
38 Nassir al-Din Shah, Safarnamih, 68.
39 Nassir al-Din Shah, Safarnamih, 80.
Public-Private Relationship

There is a decisive physical demarcation between the private realm of the houses and the outside world in traditional Iranian cities. Although Chapter One demonstrated that this boundary was socially porous for women, its spatial representation was rigid and seamless. Moreover, the two realms were extremely gendered; the private realm was in the control of women and they had to reproduce their communal life using private spaces; the main communal realm beyond the private houses was dominantly masculine. Enclosed architecture was the key to such a dichotomy. N.P Mamontov, a Russian missionary in Tehran, describes this dichotomy perfectly: “All the houses and gardens, which have beautiful interiors, are surrounded by mud walls […] The streets are located amid the high walls of houses and look like long corridors. The reason for isolation of Iranians is that they are scared of an alien male gaze at the private spaces of their houses […] One rarely find a real façade among the bare walls.”41 Iranian travelers were aware of the fundamental difference between their former experiences of the communal-private relationship in Iran and what they experienced in the European context. While there is no direct description of the new experience, by analyzing the physical and architectural manifestations of the public-private relationship, interesting themes begin to emerge. The texts are full of the architectural elements that implicate the new relationship between public and private spaces. For example, in Dalil Al-Sufara, Ilchi describes Saint Petersburg’s residential architecture in these words: “Their houses do not have any space, pool,42 or garden,43 [in the middle] as Iranian

42 Ḥuţ is a small pool of water at the center of the courtyards in Iranian Houses.
43 Bāghchih is a small patch of soil in the courtyards for planting fruit trees, flowers, or herbs.
houses do, and in their houses the sky is not visible.”44 There is a subtle comparison in these words, a comparison between two different architectural styles. The Russian houses do not have space or a courtyard in the middle and, as a result, people cannot see the sky. Later in the same paragraph he adds: “They have placed huge windows from glass all around the rooms, through which the streets are visible.”45 These words talk about a new relationship between the interior and exterior spaces of the buildings. The extrovert architecture of European cities stands in contrast to the introvert architecture of Iranian cities. The architectural differences are manifestations of the differences between various forms of spatial consciousness in the two universes.

There are many sentences in the travelogues that talk about the same new relationship. Sometimes, like Ilchi’s description, the public-private relationship is constructed from the interior towards the public space:

Dinner being concluded, we went to a window that faced the church and the square. At least twenty thousand individuals were congregated in this space. They had illuminated the whole church with Bengal lights, which produce different colours. At one moment the entire building from summit to foot was red; at another moment, green, yellow, or some other colour.46

What a new and pleasant experience for the king of Persia, Nassir al-Din Shah, who had to hide behind the walls of his palace in Tehran. But here in Milan, he could stand in a palace and face a square and a magnificent church, the architecture of which he had spent pages admiring, and he can witness an urban stage prepared by lights, crowds, architecture, and color.

One can find other instances of the new relationship of the public space towards the private space, such as in the welcoming of Nassir al-din Shah to Turin, where “[g]reat crowds of women

44 ʿAlavi Shirazi, Dalīl al-Sufara, 143.
45 ʿAlavi Shirazi, Dalīl al-Sufara, 143.
and men were in the streets and at the windows,”47 or in the case of Ilchi in London when he was passing through the streets in a carriage, “the citizens of London heard the news, they gathered in large numbers to see us pass. And when the ladies indoors heard the tumult, they came out on to their balconies to watch. We in turn were looking at them.”48 Mirza Fattah Khan Garmrudi and Haj Sayyah both noticed that the tall buildings of Paris were overlooking the streets through the windows. Garmrudi mentions that one can barely find a building whose windows do not open towards the street49 and Haj Sayyah, wandering aimlessly in the street throughout the night, was fascinated by the charm of Haussmann’s Paris: “All the houses had gaslights [even up to the seventh floor].50 From the houses the sounds of piano and singing were heard.”51

The Feminine City

We arrived at the town of Baden-Baden after the sunset […] For lovers, pleasure-hunters, sybarites, it is a capital nook. Pretty women and graceful ladies continually promenade about its avenues, lawns, and hills, on foot, on horseback, and in carriages. In truth, it is a fairy abode.52

For Iranian travelers of the nineteenth century, European cities were in many ways feminine landscapes, mostly because of the bold contrast between the role of women in Iranian and European urban societies of the time. Regarding this contrast, the representations of European women in Iranian travelogues is a noteworthy subject of investigation.53 However, in

48 Shirazi, A Persian at the Court, 112.
49 Garmrudi, Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan, 807.
50 From the Persian text: Mahallati, Safarnamih-yi Haj Sayyah, 156.
51 Mahallati, An Iranian in Nineteenth Century, 124.
53 Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi has several essays on the subject. He analyzes the image of European women in Iranian travelogues and shows how this image formed the discourse of femininity inside Iran: Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalist and Historiography, (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Mohamad
this chapter, the framing of European women themselves is not the matter of concern. My focus is the presence of women in public spaces and their relation with the city. There are four main spatial settings where Iranian travelers came across European women: (1) parties, (2) formal ceremonies, (3) venues related to the entertainment industry, and (4) daily urban life.

The first two categories are dominant in almost all of the travelogues, with the exception of Haj Sayyah’s, who was traveling individually as a poor unknown dervish. Although, similar to Haj Sayyah, Mirza Abu Talib khan traveled individually to Europe, he became famous as the “Persian Prince” during his stay in London and was repeatedly invited to parties. There are countless instances in which the Qajar princes spent days and nights in parties, masquerades, and balls. British noble women repeatedly invited Ilchi and Reza Ghuli Mirza to their parties. The general descriptions of women in these gatherings are concentrated around the beauty, clothing, and dances, wherein European women are usually compared to heavenly nymphs and angels.

There are numerous accounts in which women are mostly praised for their beauty. Mirza Abu Talib Khan goes further in his narratives and composes several sonnets for individual beautiful women whom he found pleasing. In contrast, there are extremely negative and pornographic accounts depicting European women as lustful, shameless, and sensual people. However the latter accounts should be read based on their specific context, particularly in the case of Iranian ambassadors. Most of these accounts belong to Mirza Fattah Khan’s travel to London and Ilchi’s stay in Tbilisi. Mirza Fattah Khan accompanied Iran’s ambassador to London to submit complaints against the British Minister in Iran and Britain’s interferences in Afghanistan and Iran’s claim over Herat. However, they were ignored and humiliated by the

British government, and all their requests were rejected. As a result, they returned to Iran without any significant success. Mirza Fattah Khan wrote a separate book, Shabnamih or accounts of the night, which contains dark pornographic descriptions of British women. Through the narration of different stories, which he witnessed or heard from his friend, “Mirza Fattah constructed an image of the West centered on women and their sexual debauchery. He portrayed Europeans, both men and women, as irrational, immoral, and aberrant.”54 One can find the same case in Ilchi’s travel to Russia, during which he had to pass through Georgia and stay for a while in Tbilisi. This travel occurred in 1814 between the two rounds of the Perso-Russian wars. During the first round Iran lost Georgia and Tbilisi to Russia. Ilchi’s negative description of Georgian women could be an instrument to demonstrate how Georgian society had become decadent under the rule of Russia: “in the Russian law a woman has too much independence and she can do whatever she wants, and go wherever and talk to whoever she wants […] They can want whoever they want. Now the people of Tbilisi have adopted the same law and due to the Russian dominance no one can control his wife.”55 Based on Naghmeh Sohrabi’s56 view, this can be considered as an instance in which the travelogue was written more with an eye on Iranian readership and used as propaganda inside Iran. However, Anna Vanzan has another assumption in this regard. She argues that in the case of Ilchi’s travelogues to Russia, one should differentiate between what Ilchi says and what his scribe writes, which means the travelogue reflects the scribe’s comments and ideas.57 Whatever the case, these are mostly exceptions, reflecting the broader political context of the time, and the general tendency among Iranian

55 ʿAlavi Shirazi, Dalil al-Sufara, 29.
56 Sohrabi, Taken for Wonder.
57 Anna Vanzan, “Mīrzā Abu’l-Ḥasan Khan Širāzī,” 356.
travelers was more inclined toward praising the beauty and sexual appeal of European women, rather than denigrating them.

While the first two spatial settings, parties and formal ceremonies, are situated between the public and private realms, the second two, the entertainment industry and daily urban life, completely belong to the public realm of cities. Iranian travelers, from Haj Sayyah to Nassir al-Din Shah, spent many nights in opera houses, theaters, circuses, and the like where they watched plays and shows performed by women. The notion of women’s presence in the forefront of public entertainment industry was a new phenomenon for Iranian travelers. From nineteenth-century Iran, there are accounts of dancing women at parties for men or even prostitution in Iranian cities; however, these cases, especially in Qajar Iran, were underground activities or intentionally ignored by society and state.

From the king of Iran to the dervish wanderer, Haj Sayyah, Iranian travelers recorded with obsession the shows and plays they saw in Europe, even recording the names of the singers. On June 21, 1873, Nassir al-Din Shah writes: “They had sent expressly to Paris and had called from thence Patti, who is one of the renowned songstresses of Firangistan.” Similar to the parties and formal ceremonies, travelers were mostly attracted to the beauty of the women: “O my God! Paradise is exactly this place. If someone asks if the nymphs are real, [I will say] yes they are, I swear to the God, I saw them by my own eyes. First, I could not believe they are human,” Abd al-Samad Mirza Salur describes an opera in Russia.

Finally, the daily life of people in urban spaces is the last and the most important spatial setting where Iranian travelers came across European women. Sometimes this acquaintance was

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very brief. This is especially the case of the king and Qajar princes who were accompanied in urban spaces by their host and did not have the chance to delve into the daily lives. They could only observe the presence of ordinary women without having any close conversation. For example, in Frankfurt, Nassir al-Din Shah observes, possibly from the hotel, that in the “mornings the wives of villagers bring in on carts fruit, vegetables, and the like, to sell; and form a market for these commodities opposite our quarters around the church. After a time, when all are sold off, they go away.” Whether while visiting parks, going to the opera and play houses, visiting factories, shopping in the stores, or simply moving around the city in carriages, Iranian travelers recorded whenever they saw a European woman. Moreover, the presence of women and men in public spaces together was another source of interest for the travelers. There are many instances in which the travelers mention that men and women are walking hand in hand or kissing publicly. In the case of the formal ceremonies and parties, similarly, there are detailed descriptions of the dances and how men and women choose each other as their dance partners.

From private parties to public spaces, from opera houses to factories, and from queens and wealthy ladies to workers and prostitutes, there is a common point between all the patriarchal gazes upon and descriptions of European women by Iranian travelers; they were objectifying women. The public presence of women was just another aspect of the numerous beauties of a European city. European cities were charming because of their buildings, gaslights, paving, bridges, trees, streets, restaurants, and also their women. For the travelers, women were just mere objects. It is not surprising that the king of Persia counts the beauties of Jardin Mabille, a garden in Paris, in these words:

The garden is lighted up with lamps innumerable; there are beautiful avenues, basins of water, places like natural hills with cascades or waterfalls; and in the middle of the garden

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a pavilion where an orchestra performs. It also has coffee-shops and handsome apartments well lighted with lamps. Beautiful women of every description frequent this place, which is a curiosity in its way.  

A pleasant public space contains pretty women in the same fashion that it contains pretty lamps, avenues, pavilions, trees and flowers, coffee shops, and the like. These male Iranian travelers were unable to step out of patriarchal discourse of their country; they projected the same discourse over European landscape by objectifying half of society.

The only exception in this regard is Haj Sayyah, who was free to move into any niche of European society and talk with any person. He sees the broader social context that allows women to be relatively more active members of society and to live a freer life in comparison to Iranian women of the same era. One day in a train towards Lucerne in Switzerland, he was shortly accompanied by a young woman for several stations. The young woman lived by herself on a small income as a teacher in Zurich. Haj Sayyah records his feelings: “Again I thought of the people in my country and felt sad. In Europe a girl was safe and secure and lived and traveled freely, unlike the poor women of my country.” Although there was a lot of discrimination against women in nineteenth century European Bourgeois society, the contrast between Iran and Europe was so vast that pushed Haj Sayyah to such a conclusion.

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64 Mahallati, *An Iranian in Nineteenth Century*, 182.
Power and City

Iranian travelers, mostly, visited the prosperous and charming face of European cities. For the king of Persia, European cities were prepared as magnificent stages. His trajectories inside the cities were planned carefully through wide streets and squares, with crowds shouting and waving hands along his path and with fireworks and gaslights shining during the nights. Iranian ambassadors were taken into the royal buildings, where they could stand in the center of baroque cities, looking from a balcony over long distances with carefully designed streets, buildings, trees, and gaslights pointing towards them. Haj Sayyah, as an ordinary person, stands at the other side of this spectrum who was the subject of this design and who experienced the spatial power while wandering through European streets on his own. Iranian travelers realized that many European urban spaces were performing a new duty as ceremonial stages of the states, and that was only possible through the top-down arrangement of the city.

Saint Petersburg was the first European capital that Nassir al-Din Shah visited during his first trip to Europe. He describes his first official reception in a European capital in these words:

Both sides of the road, the balconies, and the roofs, were full of men and women, who shouted hurrahs. Incessantly did we and the Emperor bow to the people. For a while we drove on, until at length, passing beneath an arch and a lofty gateway we entered the square in front of the Winter Palace. In this square there is a very tall and stout column of stone, a monolith, bearing on its summit a statue in metal of the Emperor Alexander I.  

There are certain spatial elements in this description: (1) a long, wide, and straight street, the name of which he mentions earlier, Newsky; (2) the buildings on either side of the streets, balconies, and the sidewalks full of people welcoming him; (3) an arch and a “lofty gateway;” (4) the palace square or Dvortsovaya; (5) a stout column with the metal statue of the Emperor.

Alexander I; and (6) the winter palace. The city was arranged for the reception of the royal and political guests; they were spectacles and symbols of aristocratic power. One can find the same stages all over Nassir al-Din Shah’s travelogue. In Berlin, Paris, London, and many other European cities, he experienced the same landscape. Here and there, he reflects on his wonders and reveals the impact of these spectacles on himself. In the entry of July 5, 1873, when he was leaving Britain to Paris, Nassir al-Din Shah writes: “Large crowds were present, showing great regret. It was evident that the people of England were all sorry and grieved in their hearts at our departure.” Whether propaganda for the usage of his travelogue inside Iran, or a genuine reflection of his thoughts, one point is evident: the preparation of urban spaces for the reception of the Iranian monarch provided him with a new knowledge. Being trapped in the labyrinthine fabric of his capital, with narrow and winding passages, as Chapter Three discusses, he realized that cities can and should be designed from top to bottom instead of leaving them to a gradual organic growth.

Such an understanding is clearly manifested in Nassir al-Din Shah’s account of his visit to Paris in 1873: “The streets of Paris,— thus straight, broad, and level, together with the avenues in which trees have been planted so regularly and tastefully, were all planned and laid out on the instructions and under the supervision of M. Haussman [sic].” The same understanding is reflected in other travelogues too. For example, Haj Sayyah describes Saint Petersburg’s streets as engineer-designed streets or, in the same city, Ilchi describes how the harmony of the streets is the result of a strict top-down regulation of all the new and old construction: “Anyone who wants to build a house in the city […] takes the plans to the king […] if the design is not against

68 Sohrabi, Taken for Wonder.
70 Mahallati, An Iranian in Nineteenth Century, 327.
the general order of the city, he gets the construction permission, otherwise he has to change the plans.71 Moreover, the travelers occasionally mention the ongoing maintenance and cleaning of spaces by certain urban institutions. For example, Reza Gholi Mirza and Haj Sayyah mention how all streets are cleaned and watered daily to prevent any dirt and dust;72 Ilchi describes the continuous process of cleaning and maintenance in Saint Petersburg where streets, paving, trees, and all the elements of the city are repaired and kept working properly;73 Mirza Abu Talib Khan mentions that people should repair the façades every two or three years to maintain London’s new and clean appearance;74 finally, Mirza Fattah Khan mentions the annual income of Paris through taxation and how this money should be spent for the maintenance and cleaning of the city.75

Sometimes Iranian travelers had the chance to be in the center of the spatial manifestation of power in the cities they traveled to. They stood in the buildings or balconies that were situated at the epicenter of a city’s spatial arrangements. One of these occasions appears in Mirza Fattah Khan’s travel account when he was invited to a formal reception in King Louis Philippe’s palace, probably Tuileries Palace, in Paris. After the meal, he accompanied the king to the balcony on the upper level of the palace. Mirza Fattah Khan spends three pages to describe the scene he witnessed from the balcony. He calls the view “one of the rare wonders of the era,”76 and he provides every detail of the trees, flowers, streets and squares in the garden as well as the people, benches, fountains, statues, and the Arc de Triomphe du Carrousel, which holds reliefs of Napoleon’s wars and victories. After providing a detailed account of the scenery, he adds: “the

71 ‘Alavi Shirazi, Dalil al-Sufara, 144.
72 Reza Ghuli Mirza, Safarnamih, 344; Mahallati, An Iranian in Nineteenth Century.
74 Talib Khab, Masir-i Talibi, 184.
75 Garmrudi, Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan, 806.
76 Garmrudi, Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan, 802.
biggest virtue is that if one stands and looks in the middle of the King’s room, he will see the garden’s street and the city square and the streets outside the complex.” This sentence is such a perfect way to summarize his wonder. It perfectly captures the essence of spatial power relations that had formed European urban landscapes, at least the sections he visited.

Fast-forwarding thirty years, circa summer of 1867, there is another account of Paris, this time in Haj Sayyah’s travelogue. While Mirza Fattah Khan stood at the center of power and witnessed people’s presence in the spatial order, Haj Sayyah was the subject of the Parisian spatial arrangements. Haj Sayyah describes the preparation of Paris for the reception of the Ottoman Sultan:

All the streets were cleanly swept and sprinkled with water. The city was decorated [and they had built special [decorative] gates for reverence of the Sultan] [...] The streets were so crowded that it was difficult to walk, although they were about sixty to seventy paces wide [...] Policemen were on guard at every intersection, preventing accidents [...] Suddenly the shouts of “Long live the Sultan” were heard [...] Men, women, and children were on the roofs of the houses and by the windows, watching [...] The Sultan looked to the right and left and answered the greetings of the people with a wave of his hands. People were happy and remarked, ‘The Sultan is gracious and tactful.’ Men took off their hats in respect as the carriage of the Sultan went by [...] Turkish music [and song] was heard from most of the houses [as if they were obliged to play].

Here, the spectacle is similar to Nassir al-Din Shah’s description of Saint Petersburg. There are common spatial elements in both of them. The important point is that Iranian travelers, from the king to the dervish, are parts of these spectacles. We cannot separate them from spatial settings and regard them as mere observers. They are part of the performances; they are practicing a new

77 Garmrudi, Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan, 803.
78 Haj Sayyah’s travelogue lacks the exact dating of the events. He did not record the dates. One should reconstruct the dates by occasional clues in the text. In Paris, Haj Sayyah points to two events, first the International Exposition in Paris, and second Sultan Abdul-Aziz’s (the Ottoman Sultan) presence in Paris. These two events narrow the dates to the summer of 1867 and more precisely to the last days of June 1867.
81 Mahallati, An Iranian in Nineteenth Century, 124.
spatial order. As a result, from Nassir al-Din Shah, sitting in a carriage with European kings and emperors and waving his hand to the people on the sides of the streets, to Haj Sayyah, standing on the side of the streets amid the masses receiving the kings and emperors, Iranian travelers were developing a new spatial consciousness. They learned that the city has functions beyond the daily life of its people; cities can be prepared as grand stages where the play of power and space keeps people amused and consolidates states’ power. Monarchs and rulers can appear in these public stages; they do not need to hide behind their palace walls as sacred unattainable figures. They can arrange the whole city and urban spaces to manifest their power and presence.

A New Temporality; a New Function

Iranian travelers discovered a landscape of fun and entertainment in European cities. There are numerous accounts of places where Iranian travelers visited or were taken for entertainment. During the daytime, they visited zoos, aquariums, museums, botanical gardens, and parks to fill their spare time. From Nassir al-Din Shah to Haj Sayyah, they have a common interest in these places. Reza Ghuli Mirza takes ten pages to describe every animal in the London zoo.\(^82\) Nassir al-Din Shah visited zoos in almost every city he went to. He provides detailed accounts of animals, their distinctions from Iranian species, and their differences and similarities with what he had previously studied in zoology books.\(^83\) Similarly, there are detailed accounts of major European museums. London’s British Museum and Madam Tussauds, the Louvre Museum in Paris, and Saint Petersburg’s State Hermitage Museum are just the main examples. This list could be continued for pages, but what is the broader implication? European cities generated a

\(^{82}\) Reza Ghuli Mirza, *Safarnamih*, 373-83.

\(^{83}\) Nasser al-Din Shah, *The Diary of H.M.*
new meaning for Iranian travelers: the city can be a place of leisure and entertainment. There can be public organizations and spaces whose main function is to fill people’s spare time. As a result, travelers occasionally generalized their experiences claiming that “Farangistan [Europe] is such a huge ‘īshratgāh [amusement land]’ where “each person is relaxing and never thinking of the possibility of grief in his life.” Clearly, this is a false generalization, and, as the next section discusses, Iranian travelers illustrated an incomplete image of Europe. Behind their ideal images, there was the harsh life of the working class.

Analysis of representations of nightlife reveals new insight into Iranian travelers’ wonder towards European cities. They encountered a new spatiality that not only was stretched in its physical dimensions with wide, straight, and long streets, but also was stretched in its temporal dimension as well. Thanks to gaslights and later electricity, European cities were bright and lively even in the dark hours. This is one of the greatest sources of wonder among Iranian travelers, which can be studied in two regards: wonders towards the illumination of urban spaces, and wonders towards nightlife.

A great deal of space in the travelogues is devoted to gas and electric lights in urban spaces. Travelers give detailed descriptions of how the gaslight works; they distinguish between decorative lights and streetlights and give detailed comparisons; they are fascinated by gaslights and huge chandeliers in theaters, opera houses, and indoor shopping malls such as Galleria Vittorio Emanuele in Milan or Palais-Royal in Paris. Haj Sayyah describes a big ‘N’

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85 Reza Ghuli Mirza, Safarnamih, 409.
86 Reza Ghuli Mirza, Safarnamih, 328. Reza Ghuli Mirza describes how the gas is produced from burning of coal in certain plants and is transferred through pipes to gaslights.
87 Talib Khab, Masir-i Talibi, 185 & 218.
88 Mahallati, An Iranian in Nineteenth Century, 98.
89 Garmrudi, Safarnamih-yi Mirza Fattah Khan, 808.
and three lines out of lamps in Paris, which stood for Napoleon III. These words of ʿAbd al-Samad Mirza ʿIzz al-Dulih elegantly summarize the common wonder of the travelers: “Insomuch that there are gaslights burning in every street, it seems that night does not know this city [Paris] at all and sun never abandons the merry and virtue of this city by hiding itself at the sunset.”

If the travelers were the observers of the gas and electric lights in European cities, they also joined the citizens in their nightlife. Most nights, Iranian travelers, particularly the king and those who were travelling as princes or ambassadors, went to operas, concerts, ballets, theaters, circuses, and the like. They joined the crowd cheering, having fun, enjoying the live performances, practicing the role of spectators, and getting lost amid hundreds or thousands of people enjoying their night in a public space. It is not a surprise that they record their experiences with great details, such as Haj Sayyah when he writes for seven pages to explain every trick of a magician in Paris, Reza Ghuli Mirza who writes six pages to describe every scene of a theater in London; Nassir al-Din Shah who enjoys recognizing a play and records the name of Don Quixote and Sancho; and Mirza Abu Talib Khan who goes further and records the architectural features of a theater building, the architectural terms, and a sketch of the floor plan.

While the Qajar princes and the king were mostly describing the indoor nightlife of the theaters and the like, travelers like Haj Sayyah and Mirza Abu Talib Khan were free to explore the outdoor spaces and urban nightlife. Haj Sayyah was especially fascinated by Paris during the night. Moving from one café to another, experiencing the restaurants, observing people playing music in the streets or in the cafés and restaurants, joining others in a garden to see a play or

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90 Mahallati, An Iranian in Nineteenth Century, 124.
92 Haj Sayyay, Safarnamih, 180-7.
93 Reza Ghuli Mirza, Safarnamih, 363-69.
94 Nassir al-Din Shah, Safarnamih, 39.
95 Mirza Abu Talib, Masir-i Talibi, 75. The English translation does not contain the sketch.
some magician’s tricks, getting a carriage, and passing through urban night life, Haj Sayyah builds an exceptional experience that he describes in these words:

> Whatever I saw that night I had never seen elsewhere. All the city looked like jewelry […] There were music and singing in coffee shops and theaters. They were all full, with no place to sit […] The trees were festooned with green lights. Musicians played, and young people and children danced […] After one hour fireworks began […] In all Paris I did not see anyone with dirty clothes […] Anyway that night ended and made me more mature, seeing men attain such a degree of perfection […] I could not sleep. I was thrilled to be in Paris.\textsuperscript{96}

By reading between the lines of these descriptions and examining Iranian travelers’ wonder, an important point emerges that is beyond a mere fascination towards gaslights and urban nightlife. It is the fascination towards the public life of vast social classes in the city. In contrast to communal practices of Iranian urban society, which were small-scale gatherings in interior spaces, in Europe, travelers witnessed the collective presence and entertainment of big sections of society. Back home, few occasions could gather masses together for a collective activity. The main two ones were \textit{qurbān} ceremonies (Chapter One) and the royal \textit{ta'ziyeh}s in Takīyyih Duwlat (Chapter Three). In contrast, in London and Paris, Iranians could go out every night, join the crowd, and entertain themselves. It was in stark contrast to Iran; it was the contrast between communal and public life.

Silences

Coding the text of the travelogues based on their common themes resulted in what has been reviewed to this point. However, sometimes the overarching silences between the texts can provide additional insight into the common understanding of European cities by Iranian

\textsuperscript{96} Haj Sayyah, \textit{An Iranian in Nineteenth Century Europe}, 125-6.
travelers. I would like to start the last part of this chapter with two points in Haj Sayyah’s quotation from the previous section: Paris as a piece of jewelry and Paris as a city without any dirty people. Iranian travelers mostly saw just one side of European cities. They saw the wealth, order, cleanness, and health without realizing that behind the surface of this paradise, the poor and harsh life of the working classes existed, which is depicted in novels and books such as Charles Dickens’ *Oliver Twist* and *A Tale of Two Cities* or Friedrich Engels’ *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. The partial realization of the social life of European cities pushed the travelers to the extreme wherein they equated Europe with paradise: “The sides of the Rhine River are the paradise of *farangistan*, and *farangistan* is the paradise of the world with its gardens, buildings, palaces, and pavilions;”\(^97\) “Honestly, London is the most beautiful city on the planet […] In all the aspects of urbanism, such as architecture, streets, gardens, churches, factories, schools, theaters, and the like, it is much better than Paris, which in its turn it is the best city of *Farangistan.*”\(^98\) Although Naghmeh Sohrabi\(^99\) argues that sometimes the wonder in the language and exaggerations in the descriptions were part of the literary genre of early-nineteenth-century travelogues, the deep silence on the down-sides of European social life is still a notion that deserves more attention.

Then again, there is not consistency among all the travelogues in this regard. Haj Sayyah and Mirza Abu Talib Khan, as independent travelers, provide the reader with a more realistic view of European societies. They had a chance to see both affluent and impoverished neighborhoods and the poor, beggars, and workers more than the other travelers did. This is more apparent in the case of Haj Sayyah as he visited a greater number of European countries. Particularly, during his journey in Italy and Russia, he suffered hardship. The lack of safety and

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99 Sohrabi, *Taken for Wonder*. 
the presence of thieves, prostitutes, beggars, and poor children in towns and cities are abundant amid his accounts. He was robbed two times and almost lost all of his belongings. Similarly, Mirza Abu Talib Khan witnesses the poverty of Irish peasants and writes:

The poverty of the peasants, or common people, in this country, is such, that the peasants of India are rich when compared to them […] they never wear a shoe […] I was informed, that many of these people never taste meat during their lives, but subsist entirely upon potatoes; and that, in the farm houses, the goats, pigs, dogs, men, women, and children, lie all together. Whilst on our journey, the boys frequently ran for miles with the coach, in hopes of obtaining a piece of bread.100

While there are a few instances of descriptions of poverty and dire living conditions in the independent travelers’ accounts, the accounts of the Qajar king, princes, and ambassadors are relatively silent in this regard. They were escorted everywhere and their trajectories were planned carefully inside the cities; even when they had limited independence, they merely visited upscale parts of cities on their own. Sometimes, they were able to see workers and the poor, but their observations were from a distance, seeing people standing on the sides of the streets with poor faces and clothing, and no more elaboration. For example, in Liverpool, Nassir al-Din Shah observes: “In proportion to the inhabitants of London, many more poor people were noticed in these parts, on whose countenances were visibly stamped the signs that they obtained a living with difficulty.”101 Consequently, European cities are depicted unrealistically in these travelogues and they are mostly illustrated as paradise without any pain, poverty, danger, or violence.

There is another silent area that deserves attention. Travelers occasionally use comparison and analogy with Iran to describe different aspects of European societies, landscapes, and the like. Drawing on the similarities and differences between common cases in Europe and Iran, they

100 Talib Khan, Travels of Mirza Abu Talib, 106-7.
could summarize paragraphs in just a few sentences. Travelers even compare the two universes on more critical topics, such as political issues and women, especially the latter, which was their favorite topic. While comparisons and analogies are abundant in all the travelogues, they are completely silent when they reach the cities and urban spaces. In other words, there are no comparisons specifically between Iranian cities and urban spaces with their European counterparts. There are few comparisons on the architecture of buildings, especially the interior arrangements of spaces, but at the larger scale of urban spaces and cities there is a deep silence in the travelogues. One may claim that since cities and urban spaces are large-scale entities, we should not expect any comparison in this regard. I respond that travelers are not completely silent in comparing the cities and their spaces; on the contrary, there are many instances that they compare European cities to each other. This is particularly the case with London and Paris, as if these two cities are the origins that the virtue of other European cities should be compared to, but there is no cross-continental comparison between Iran and Europe in this regard. The only case of comparison between Iranian urban spaces to their counterparts in another country is a very short sentence in ʿAbd al-Samad Mirza Salur’s travelogue. However, in this case he compares Istanbul’s streets to Tehran, which resembled each other to some extent: “After the lunch we went to Istanbul visiting Hagia Sophia. The streets were so dirty and bad, similar to Tehran.” In this case, the spatial contexts of two cities resemble each other; Mirza Salur does not experience Istanbul as an alien landscape, which is deeply different from Tehran.

The only exception is Mirza Abu Talib Khan’s travelogue. Unlike the others, he depends greatly on the similar urban spaces in India to describe European urban spaces: “Of the

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admireable inventions of British are square and park […] Park is similar to Hindi’s *ramna*\(^{106}\) […] but square is an equivalent to Hindi’s *cauka*,\(^{107}\) but India’s *cauka* belongs to the market, and this one is different, there are houses or high class stores around it, and its middle is for walking.\(^{108}\) As this example shows, Mirza Abu Talib Khan uses urban spaces in Indian cities as examples to introduce British urban spaces to his readers properly.

Why did not Iranian travelers use the same method as Mirza Abu Talib Khan does? Or on the contrary, why is the same silence not present in Mirza Abu Talib Khan’s travelogue? It is not possible to provide a definite answer to these questions. One possibility is that the great difference between Iranian cities and their European counterparts made them belong to two different universes, which demanded two different languages and two different forms of spatial consciousness to comprehend and describe them. Iranian urban life and spaces were so different from European counterparts that it made impossible to draw cross continental connections between them. However, the case of India was different. The colonial presence and practices in India had generated spaces based on European, or more specifically the British, spatial consciousness. As a result, Mirza Abu Talib Khan could trace similarities between Calcutta in India, London, and even Cape Town in South Africa.\(^{109}\)

**Conclusion**

European cities were like mirrors in which Iranian travelers could see what was absent in their cities back home. The travelers pointed out and documented the elements that they could

\(^{106}\) रमना.

\(^{107}\) चौक.

\(^{108}\) Talib Khab, *Masir-i Talibi*, 185. The Hindi words are not available in the English translation.

not find in Iranian cities. However, it is very critical to avoid creating sets of binary oppositions; this chapter does not intend to establish binary oppositions between European and Iranian cities or European urban spaces and their counterparts in Iran. Mentioning differences between public and private spaces, the presence of women in public spaces, public life, nightlife, and so on does not necessarily mean that the two universes were opposite entities; it does not mean that they were standing on different sides of a spectrum. Actually, there is no spectrum at all. The spectrum view easily traps us in the modernist discourse of space in which there is a single path, called modernism, and a single destination, called European or Western cities. This chapter argues that the two universes were two different manifestations of human civilizations, which formed for thousands of years in relative isolation, and that, from a certain point of time, interconnections between them started to emerge. They were simply different rather than opposite.

It would be naïve to think that spatial consciousness of Iranian society changed because of the travelogues or because of any other means of knowledge transformation. However, it is more accurate to say that Iranians, or, at least the elites and the Qajar court, generated alternative spatial knowledge to the one they had lived and experienced in Iran. Generating new knowledge does not mean that society became alienated from its long-lived spaces. For Iranians, the new European spatiality was an independent entity, different from the traditional Iranian one. As the next chapter shows, these two modes of spatiality could not be merged at that time; they were just two different universes that could be juxtaposed with each other. In other words, at this

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11 It is essential to recall that the European spatiality which fascinated Iranians was relatively new and in the process of becoming. The history of the urban forms of major European cities, London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, and many others, shows their massive transformations during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Prior to that, many European cities were based on their medieval network of streets and squares. For more information on the history of European cities see: A. E. J. Morris, *History of Urban Form: Before the Industrial Revolution*, 3rd ed. (Oxon: Routledge, 2013); Leonardo Benevolo, *The History of the City*, trans. Geoffrey Culverwell (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980).
point, we cannot construct a power-relation between the two forms of knowledge. These two were so separate and different that it would be inaccurate to claim and generalize with certainty that Iranian society preferred European spaces over their own familiar ones. However, from the moment the new neighborhood was constructed, Chapter Three, the trajectory of events changed. When the new consciousness was physically implemented, it came to be in a direct dialogue with the old one.

Finally, the conformity of the 1870s expansion of Tehran with the main rules of new spatial knowledge shows that spatial meanings can be incubated in the collective conciseness of a society, or a section of a society, for a long time before their physical manifestation. The relational theories of space introduce a dynamic framework for the analysis of spaces. In these theories, as discussed in the Introduction, spatial meanings are outcomes of the constant interrelations and negotiations between various social trajectories. As a result, it is not possible to attach a fixed meaning to a place. The meanings are in the constant process of changing; they exist and coexist together, and they negotiate to produce new spatial meanings. Through this research, I argue that, even before the physical production of spaces, social trajectories can negotiate over their desired spatial meanings. In the case of Tehran and Iranian urban society, spaces began their social life many years before their physical production; they were in the process of becoming decades before the expansion of Tehran.
Chapter Three

The Qajar Court and the City: Spatial Strategies of the State in the Nineteenth Century

Chapter One examined the relationship between society and space in nineteenth-century Tehran. It introduced the communal sphere as the central element in the configuration of urban society and examined the relationship between the communal sphere and communal spaces. The chapter suggested religiosity as the major component in the formation of communal life. However, despite sharing a common religious background, many communities of the city were unable to transcend their communal boundaries to form a united public.

This chapter examines spatial strategies of the Qajar court and demonstrates that in the nineteenth century, the court was the only social force that was able to transcend the communal boundaries and generate collective public life. By tapping into the religious discourse, the Qajar court attempted to legitimize its source of power as the main protector of the religion. The court “meticulously performed religious rites, financed holy shrines, patronized state-appointed imam jom’ehs and shaykh al-islams, girded the Safavid sword-the Shi’i symbol-sat on the Peacock Throne,” and many other similar strategies to legitimize its power; however, as Abrahamian claims, they “failed to obtain divine sanctity,”\(^1\) and the main religious authorities did not observe the Qajar court as the legitimate ruler of the country.\(^2\) By sponsoring various religious ceremonies, the Qajar court had established a fragile relationship with society and had created

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quasi-public life and quasi-public spaces in Tehran. In these instances, although people of various communities of the city gathered for a shared event in a shared space, they could reproduce their communal boundaries and avoid contacting other communities; the communities were able to reproduce their micro-spaces in these state-sponsored ceremonies. As a result, I use quasi-public to refer to these spaces and events; despite people’s presence in a shared space, they could distance themselves from outsiders of their communities. Moreover, a close examination of these ceremonies and their spaces reveals that the court had to observe the politics of the communal sphere.

The religious model of legitimation, the specific relationship between society and state, and the spatiality of this relationship underwent dramatic transformations towards the end of the nineteenth century. The Qajar court adopted a new model after imperial monarchies of Europe. In the words of Afshin Marashi, “Naser al-Din Shah recognized that cultivating a public image was a prerequisite for effective rule.” This model “made use of spectacles, celebrations, ceremonies, parades, and commemorations to break down the barriers separating the monarch from the masses and to circulate the symbols tying state and society together.”3 The 1870s expansion of Tehran provided essential spaces for the new legitimation model. This expansion was in line with specific spatial knowledge that Iranians had produced through their acquaintance with European cities. Chapter Two analyzed this knowledge and defined its primary features. This chapter examines the impact of new spatial knowledge on the 1870s expansion of the city. Spatial strategies of the Qajar court shifted after the expansion of the city, and the state attempted to establish a new relationship with society.

The chapter begins with the traditional model of legitimation and the court’s spatial strategies for the implementation of this model. After that, it examines the 1870s expansion of Tehran and its characteristics. This expansion was closely in line with new spatial knowledge Iranians developed by observing European cities. Moreover, I demonstrate that the Qajar court followed delicate economic objectives through this expansion, which had radical spatial consequences for the city, the court, and society. After the expansion, on the one hand, the relationship between the state and society transformed, and the Qajar court implemented the imperial model of legitimation by holding various ceremonies in new spaces of the city. On the other hand, the communal sphere lost its monopoly as the sole social force in the production of urban spaces and neighborhoods of the city. A new spatial discourse produced the city which was based on new spatial knowledge and followed objectives different from the practices of the communal sphere. The juxtaposition of these two socio-spatial discourses created spatial dichotomies in the city, which transformed Tehran and urban society in the years to come.

In the broader view, through these examinations, I argue that political, spatial, and economic practices of the Qajar court, in addition to the structural transformation of society which will be discussed in the next chapter, were the first manifestations of a powerful social discourse that undermined the dominant communal sphere. This discourse was the outcome of local and global forces that transformed the state, society, and cities simultaneously.

**Spatial Strategies of the Qajar Court before the Expansion of the City**

In the segmented context of nineteenth-century urban society of Tehran, the Qajar court was the most effective force that could transcend communal boundaries and gather various
communities of the city at the same place. By holding mostly religious ceremonies, the court managed to create an ostensibly homogenous public in particular spaces of the city. More importantly, these ceremonies mediated and established the relationship between the court and society. Through these ceremonies, the court could associate itself with the discourse of religiosity and portray itself as the primary protector and sponsor of the religion. As a result, these ceremonies were the basis for the legitimation of the court’s power. However, as this chapter discusses, the public participating in these ceremonies was far from homogenous. The communal sphere could reproduce itself at these events and create micro-spaces of communal identity in the broader site of these ceremonies. I introduce three categories of these ceremonies and their spaces and examine the politics of social relations at these sites: (1) court-sponsored Muharram ceremonies, (2) court-sponsored convivial ceremonies, and (3) welcoming the king into the city.

Court-sponsored Muharram Ceremonies at Takīyyīh Duwlat

Traditionally, the Muharram ceremonies in Takīyyīh Duwlat were the primary venue where the citizens could meet the king from a distance in a pre-arranged spatial setting. Takīyyīh Duwlat was the spatial setting where the king and communities could mourn the martyrs of Karbalā together. It was the state’s takīyyīh, held annually as the symbol of the king’s Shiʿi passion, his support of religious ceremonies, and more importantly establishing his power and following political goals. From Fath Ḵān Ṭahmāsib to Nassir al-Din Shah eras, Arg Square, located in the royal compound, was the traditional site for holding the court-sponsored Muharram ceremonies for the Qajar monarchs. Takīyyīh Duwlat is the most studied takīyyīh from
nineteenth-century Tehran. Generally, scholars of the field conflate Takīyyih Duwlat with the huge circular building located in the royal compound, which was built in the 1870s by the order of Nassir al-Din Shah. However, the building was just one of many representations of the concept. The reason for this confusion originates from the same discourse that conducts the studies of takīyyih buildings (Chapter One), which prioritizes the search for the architectural medium over the investigation of social practices. Similarly, Takīyyih Duwlat was a social, more specifically a socio-political, practice rather than an architectural medium. It was represented in various forms, and the circular building was just one of its many representations.

The available data on Takīyyih Duwlat is much greater than that of any other takīyyih in Tehran. The best documents for the investigation of the subject are the official newspapers of the Qajar court: Vaqayiʿ Itifaqīyyih, Duwlat-i ʿIlīyyih, and Iran. These newspapers provide accounts of the court’s Muharram ceremonies from 1851 on. Analysis of the newspapers shows that Takīyyih Duwlat, as a socio-political concept rather than a building, followed the physical presence of the Qajar monarchs. Consequently, whenever the monarchs changed their location, Takīyyih Duwlat followed them.

Chapter One discussed the particular seasonal rhythm of the displacement of Tehran’s population in hot and cold seasons. The same climatic rhythm is discernible in the movement of

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the Qajar Monarchs away from and back to the city during the hot season. Consequently, the physical location of Takīyyih Duwalat as the court’s takīyyih follows the same seasonal rhythm. The first year that the Vaqayi’ Itifaqiyyih newspaper recorded the accounts of Muharram was 1851, the third year of Nassir al-Din Shah’s Reign. There is a short entry about an accident in Takīyyih Duwalat caused by a storm in that year. The next year, 1852, the newspaper did not use the term “Takīyyih Duwalat.” However, there is the account of a takīyyih in Arg Square where mourning processions, dastihs, from different neighborhoods of the city gathered in the presence of the king on the tenth day of Muharram, ‘Ashūrā. This was one of the important functions of Takīyyih Duwalat: as a platform for gathering the communities’ representatives, dastihs, on the tenth day of the mourning month. The king was present in Takīyyih Duwalat on that day, and each community had the chance to perform in his presence. Abdollah Mostofi provides a great account of Takīyyih Duwalat and shows how the communal identity structured the performance of mourning processions at the state-sponsored Takīyyih Duwalat. Based on his account, various dasti from the city’s neighborhoods entered on the stage and performed their mourning activities one by one. The members of each dasti belonged to the same community and dressed uniformly to emphasize their communal bond. The most important social gathering of the city, which could unite the segments of society into a more coherent public, was structured through the same communal discourse that had produced the entire urban landscape.

5 For the details of Nassir al-Din Shah’s travels during the hot season see: Dust‘ali Khan Mu‘ir al-Mamalik, Yaddasht-ha-‘i az Zindigani-yi Khususi-yi Nassir al-Din Shah [Notes from Nassir al-Din Shah’s Private Life](Tehran: Nashr-i Tarih-i Iran, 1361 [1982]).
6 Vaqayi’ Itifaqiyyih, Muharram 11, 1268 [November 6, 1851].
7 The tenth day of Muharram, ‘Ashūrā, is the most important day of the mourning month. It was the day that the war between Husayn and Yazid ended and Husayn was killed.
8 Vaqayi’ Itifaqiyyih, Muharram 14, 1269 [October 28, 1852].
9 Witnessing the ceremonies of Takīyyih Duwalat during his childhood, he remembers two of the mourning processions that impressed him the most: Brujerdi people (a city in the west from the Luri ethnicity), and “the stone-beaters of Kashan” (referring to a profession and a city in the central Iran at the same time): Abdollah Mostofi, From Agha Mohammad Khan to Naser ed-Din Shah (1794-1896), vol.1 of The Administrative and Social History of the Qajar Period [The story of My Life], trans. Nayer Mostofi Glenn (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1997), 167.
The ceremonies on the tenth day in Takīyyih Duwlat consisted of the most important episode of taʿzīyih performances, Husayn’s murder. Accounts of the exact ceremony are available from the early nineteenth century. On January 25, 1812, William Ouseley, a British orientalist and member of the British diplomatic crew in Tehran, attended the Muharram ceremonies in Arg Square. In his travelogue, he describes the ceremony, dastīhs, taʿzīyih performances, place of the takīyyih, and the king’s presence in great detail.\(^{11}\)

From 1853 to 1855, Nassir al-Din Shah was in Tehran and each year one can find almost the same ritual with the performance of the dastīhs in front of the king on the tenth day. However, Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih mentions two takīyyihs in the court, one in Arg Square, a temporary tent erected annually for the ceremonies, and the other in the form of a building inside the royal compound. In 1854 and 1855 both takīyyihs are mentioned as Takīyyih Duwlat: Takīyyih Duwlatī-yi Arg, and Takīyyih Duwlatī-yi Miydān-i Arg.\(^{12}\) During these five years, Muharram coincided with October and November in 1851 to September and October in 1855.

From 1856 to 1868, however, Nassir al-Din Shah was not in Tehran for Muharram ceremonies. For thirteen years, he left Tehran before the heat and returned when Muharram was over and the weather had cooled. For four years, from 1856 to 1858 and in 1860, Takīyyih Duwlat was held at a newly constructed takīyyih building in the village Niyavaran. For six years, from 1862 to 1868 with the exception of 1866, Takīyyih Duwlat was at another newly constructed takīyyih building in Saltanatabad. Both Niyavaran and Saltanatabad were located at the foot of the mountain range, north of Tehran. In 1859, Muharram happened during the shah’s

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\(^{10}\) Muharram 10, 1227HJ.


\(^{12}\) *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Muharram 12, 1271 [October 5, 1854] and Muharram 7, 1272 [September 19, 1855].

\(^{13}\) Different issues of Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih between, 1273HJ/1856CE to 1277HJ/1860CE.

\(^{14}\) Different issues of Duwlat-i ʿIliyyih between, 1279HJ/1862CE to 1285HJ/1868CE.
long trip to Azarbayan, west of Iran. The time of the ceremonies coincided with his stay at Sultaniyyih. Consequently, Takīyyih Duwlat was held in a big tent there: “they had pitched a huge tent in Chaman-i Sultaniyyih for Imam Husayn’s taʿzīyih and, similar to previous years, they performed the taʿzīyih under the tent, which was Takīyyih Duwlat indeed.” In 1861, Nassir al-Din Shah was far away from the city during Muharram. In this year, he spent the summer in Shahristanak, deep in the mountains. This year was the only exception wherein we can find the title of Takīyyih Duwlat in Tehran, located away from the king. One of the main princes of the court held the Takīyyih Duwlat. However, when the shah came back from Shahristanak, he ordered the Takīyyih Duwlat to be held in Saltanatabad with a two-month delay. Similarly in 1866, Nassir al-Din Shah was on a long trip to Mazandaran, the northern province of Iran. Being away from the main centers of population during Muharram, when he returned to Shimiranat by mid-July, Takīyyih Duwlat was held with a two-month delay in Saltanatabad.

As these accounts show, Takīyyih Duwlat was not in the central city for thirteen consecutive years. Moreover, from 1851 to 1869, Takīyyih Duwlat adopted five different formats: a tent in Arg Square, a building in the royal compound, Niyavaran Takīyyih, Saltanatabad Takīyyih, and a tent in Sultaniyyih. The only common element between these locations and architectural formats was the physical presence of Nassir al-Din Shah. Takīyyih Duwlat was a socio-political concept that “allowed the shah to affirm and acknowledge his attachment to Shiʿism without the intermediacy of the olama [clerics]. It was a conscious effort
to demonstrate the link between king and people.”19 The Qajar elites could ensure “religious and political legitimacy” through Muharram ceremony patronage.20 Moreover, Takīyyih Duwlat was a venue for certain sections of society, Tujār (merchants) and Ashrāf (royal people), to reaffirm their bond with the court by accepting parts of the expenses and donating the objects needed for takīyyih bastan.21 As a result, Takīyyih Duwlat was the place for socio-political practices of the court. Based on Ouseley’s travelogue, this practice originated years before the Nassiri era. Certain elements were necessary to form Takīyyih Duwlat: the shah’s presence, a relatively big space in the royal compound or assigned by the court as the place of the takīyyih, performance of taʿzīyih, and mourning of the communities’ representatives. For years, Arg Square provided the space for such a practice. Based on Ouseley’s travelogue, Takīyyih Duwlat was there in 1812CE, during Fath ‘Ali Shah’s reign; Berezin’s map shows a takīyyih in Arg Square during Muhammad Shah’s reign; and finally, the Vaqayi’ Itifaqiyyih newspaper provides accounts of the Arg Square Takīyyih Duwlat in the early years of Nassir al-Din Shah’s reign. Once again, it is important to mention that Takīyyih Duwlat was not limited to that space. It was moving out of Arg Square and the city whenever Muharram was in the hot season; the political function was prior to its place. Takīyyih Duwlat returned to Tehran in 1869. Few years after its return, the state built a new circular building, the one that many have regarded as the sole Takīyyih Duwlat. The question that to be asked is whether, after the construction of the new Takīyyih Duwlat, is it possible to find the same seasonal transfer, following the movement of the shah? Or on the contrary, has Takīyyih Duwlat found a permanent place and architectural representation since

19 Floor, The History of Theater, 151.
then? The third section of the chapter will discuss this question after the examination of the expansion of Tehran in the 1870s.

Court-sponsored Convivial Ceremonies

While Muharram ceremonies were based on grief and sorrow, there were other religious ceremonies with a convivial atmosphere, ‘iyds. ‘Iyd-i Fitr, Iyd-i Ghadîr, Qurbân, and Prophet Muhammad’s birthday were the traditional festive ceremonies that the court sponsored. In contrast to the camel sacrifice of the Qurbân festival (Chapter One) that took place outside of Tehran, the court celebrated other ceremonies inside the city. Moreover, while the Qurbân festival had a strong social base and the role of the court was secondary to the role of communities, the other convivial religious ceremonies entirely depended on the court and the physical presence of the king in the city; similar to the Takîyyih Duwlat, the court would cancel the ceremonies if the king was out of the city.

From 1852, Vaqayî Itifaqiyyih newspaper records court-sponsored ceremonies at religious holidays. The procedure was almost the same for every holiday. First, there was a Salâm-i ‘Am, literally public greeting, in the court where princes, government officials, ministers, high-ranking military officers, foreign country ambassadors, high-ranking guild members, and the like, were invited to meet the King in person. The ceremony was highly orchestrated, in which each person had a specific place to stand, and every action was pre-arranged. After the Salâm, Nassir al-Din

22 Iyd-i Fitr marks the end of the fasting month, Ramadan. It is a holiday in both the Shi’i and Sunni communities.
23 Iyd-i Ghadîr is the celebration of ‘Ali’s appointment, the first Shi’i Imam, as the successor of the prophet. This holiday is only respected in Shi’i communities.
24 Vaqayî Itifaqiyyih, Dhu l-Hijja 15 and 22, 1268 [September 30 and October 7, 1852].
25 For the detailed descriptions of Nowruz Salâms see: Mu’ir al-Mamalik, Yaddasht-ha-‘i az Zindigani-yi Khususi, 54-58; Mostofi, From Agha Mohammad Khan, 1: 201-3.
Shah met the ordinary people in Arg Square. The king would enter the second floor of a building called ‘Imārat-i Sar Darb’ where he could overlook the square and the crowd. The meeting was usually accompanied by music performances and other forms of entertainment.

Nassir al-Din Shah and his successor, Muzaffar al-Din Shah, added several new religious holidays to the official calendar. In the context of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, promoting the dominant religious discourse seemed to be the only feasible way to consolidate the legitimation of the court’s power. As a result, Nassir al-Din Shah added three new religious holidays: Imam ‘Ali, Imam Mahdi, and Imam Hussein’s birthdays. Moreover, during this era, Munir al-Saltanih, one of the king’s wives, started to have court-sponsored ceremonies for the wives of high-ranking people in the city on Fatimah’s, the prophet’s daughter, birthday. Similar to his father, Muzaffar al-Din Shah added three new religious holidays: Imam Hassan’s birthday, Imam Reza’s birthday, and Prophet Muhammad’s the first revelation holiday. It is important to note that all of these new holidays were festive holidays; as if the court attempted to balance the long Muharram and Safar mourning months with the festive atmosphere of the new holidays. Prior to 1865, these holidays had the same procedure of the Salām-i ‘Am followed by the king’s public attendance in Arg Square. In 1865, Nassir al-Din Shah commanded the rearrangement of space of Arg Square, changing it into a garden-like space with a big pool of water in the middle. Consequently, the court lost its only stage for gathering

27 Vaqayi ‘Itifaqiyyih, Rabi’ al-Awwal 25, 1269 [January 6, 1853]; Jumada t-Tania 13, 1269 [March 24, 1853].
28 Vaqayi ‘Itifaqiyyih, Rajab 15, 1270 [April 13, 1854].
29 Vaqayi ‘Itifaqiyyih, Sha’ban 18, 1272 [April 24, 1856]; Sha’ban 13, 1273 [April 8, 1857].
30 Iran-i Sultani, Sha’ban 6, 1311 [February 13, 1894].
31 Mu’ir al-Mamalik, Yaddasht-ha-i az Zindigani-yi Khususi, 62.
32 Iran-i Sultani, Sha’ban 27, 1321 [November 17, 1903].
huge crowds for its ceremonies. It was a decade before the court produced new spaces to hold public ceremonies.34

Besides religious ceremonies, the court sponsored two secular ceremonies as well. Nowruz, the New Year Day, was the most elaborate ceremony of the court after Muharram. Moreover, it was the only ceremony that was not based on the lunar calendar; it was on the first day of spring, March 21, each year. The ceremony consisted of three parts: (1) A Salām for the exact moment of the vernal equinox, Salām-i Tahvīl, (2) Salām-i ʿAm similar to those of the other ceremonies, and (3) ceremonies in Arg Square for the ordinary people. The second secular ceremony, Nassir al-Din Shah’s birthday, was held from 1852 on, with two stages of the Salām and succeeding gatherings of ordinary people in Arg Square.35

Similar to Takīyyih Duwlat and Muharram ceremonies, all the religious holidays had the seasonal characteristic, depending on the physical presence of the king in the city. During the hot seasons, in the absence of the king in the city, there were no ceremonies for ordinary people in Arg Square. If the king was in his Shimiranat palaces, north of Tehran, he would hold the Salāms, but without any people’s gathering.36 The public manifestation of the state-society relationship completely depended on the king’s physical presence. The king was the state, and without the king there was no need for the court-sponsored ceremonies.

Finally, even the state-sponsored gatherings in Arg Square were not immune to social segmentation; it is possible to trace the communal diversity in these gatherings. As an example,

34 During this period, there are accounts of Nassir al-Din Shah’s presence in the Arg Square after different occasions of Salām-i ʿAm and enjoying entertainments at the square. However, none of these accounts mention the public presence in the Square. See: Duwlat-i ʿIliyyih, Rajab 18, 1282 [December 7, 1865]; Dhu al-Qaʿda 25, 1282 [April 11, 1866]; Mostofi, From Agha Mohammad Khan, 1: 203; Muʿir al-Mamalik, Yaddasht-ha-i az Zindigani-yi Khususi, 59.
35 Vagayiʿ Itifaqiyiyih, Safar 13, 1269 [November 26, 1852].
36 Different entries of Vagayiʿ Itifaqiyiyih and Duwlat-i ʿIliyyih show the lack of the public ceremonies during the hot seasons. For some examples see: Vagayiʿ Itifaqiyiyih, Shawwal 5, 1270 [July 1, 1854]; Dhu l-Hijja 20, 1270 [September 13, 1854]; Duwlat-i ʿIliyyih, Safar 10, 1278 [August 17, 1861].
in November 1857, Nassir al-Din Shah assigned a crown prince. The court arranged four nights of festivities in Arg Square to celebrate the event. Vaqayi’ Itifaqiyyih newspaper mentions that the court divided the area of the square into eight sections, each for a different neighborhood. The Kadkhudās of the neighborhoods were responsible for the decoration and carpeting on the ground of their section.37 Similar to the Qurbān sacrifice ceremony and Muharram mourning in Takīyyih Duwlat, people’s gatherings in Arg Square were conducted through the communal discourse. Social segments of the city could reproduce their communal identities and form their micro-spaces in the larger site of ceremonies; each of the main neighborhoods of the city had their own designated space in Arg Square. The Qajar court had to respect the communal diversity of the urban population. It was unable to transcend fully communal boundaries and had to foresee necessary implementation for the events it sponsored.

Welcoming the King into the City

Besides festive ceremonies on religious holidays and Muharram mourning rituals, there was another occasion in which the court could establish a direct relationship with society. Due to the annual displacement of the king and his travels to cooler locations during hot summer days, there was, at least, one annual occasion for celebrating the king’s return to the city on the day of his arrival. This annual event had its own social and spatial politics with the participation of various groups and communities. Qajar era newspapers are the best sources for studying these ceremonies.

On October 2, 1851, Vaqayi’ Itifaqiyyih newspaper describes preparations for the king’s entrance to the city:

37 Vaqayi’ Itifaqiyyih, Rabi’ al-Awwal 24, 1274 [November 12, 1857].
“First, one hundred people from nobles and astronomers with their special hats and shawls, three hundred people from *hajis* and famous figures with candy bowls and plates [*Kāsih va Dūrī Nabāt*], three hundred guild members and merchants, all the military forces with their uniforms, the neighborhood officials and representatives, and high-ranking people of the city and government will get out of the city for welcoming. Second, semi-nude athletes of *zūrkhānīh* with their athletic equipment, and Armenians, Jews, and Zoroastrians with their holy books and especial clothes will join them as well. Third, one hundred sheep and two pairs of cows will be sacrificed in front of the king’s steps and divided among ordinary people. Fourth, 1200 candy glasses [*Shīshih-yi Nabāt*], and three hundred candy bowls and plates will be broken in front of the king’s horse. Finally, whatever is necessary for a joyful ceremony should be performed on the day.”

The next week the newspaper mentions that all the ceremonies performed as they had been planned, and after the ceremonies, the king entered the city from Shah ‘Abd al-‘Azim Gate and went to the royal compound via the old bazaar. Similarly, on August 10, 1853, Nassir al-Din Shah returned to the city after months of absence because of the summer and a cholera outbreak. *Vaqayi* ‘Itifaqiyyih newspaper mentions that people, merchants, *kadkhudās* of the neighborhoods, shopkeepers, and military personnel went out of the city and crowded by the entrance gate. They sacrificed animals to welcome their king into the city. Similar to 1851, there was a chaotic and crowded scene outside the city gate. However, after explaining the scene, the newspaper adds: “The king entered the city from the Dulab gate and went to the royal compound.”

There are two important points in these accounts. First, the arrangement of the welcoming ceremony was entirely based on the communal identity of participants. Guild members, religious authorities, neighborhood representatives, and the like formed the main body of the welcoming crowd. They wore their special clothes to be separated from the others. Once again, the politics of social segmentation dominated the relationship between the court and society; the state had to

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38 *Vaqayi ‘Itifaqiyyih*, Dhu l-Hijja 6, 1267 [October 2, 1851]. The translation is not word by word.
39 *Vaqayi ‘Itifaqiyyih*, Dhu l-Hijja 13, 1267 [October 9, 1851].
40 *Vaqayi ‘Itifaqiyyih*, Dhu al-Qa‘da 5, 1269 [August 10, 1853].
observe these politics and live up to social norms. Second, the spatial contexts for these welcoming ceremonies were outside the city. Tehran did not have the necessary streets and squares to line the crowd on their either sides. The accounts illustrate chaotic scenes at entrance gates to the city were people broke candy bowls and sacrifice beasts to welcome their monarch. These were in stark contrast to what Nassir al-Din Shah witnessed in European cities during his 1873 trip, where large crowds of people cheered alongside his trajectories and welcomed his presence.

**Tehran under the Qajars: The Production of Spaces and the Transformation of the City**

The second section of this chapter examines the state’s strategies for the production of new urban spaces in Tehran and the maintenance of old and new spaces. The primary objective is to investigate the 1870s expansion of Tehran. This massive urban development had a great impact on the spatial strategies of the Qajar court and the transformation of the relationship between the court and society. However, before examining this expansion, the chapter discusses some examples of urban development and the state’s spatial practices before this expansion. These examples clearly demonstrate the reasons behind the 1870s expansion and its particular features.

**Urban Developments in Tehran before the 1870s**

The studies that investigate the history of urban development in Tehran during the Nassiri period mostly examine the major expansion of the city in the 1870s.\(^4\) However, there were

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\(^4\) Sayyid Mohsen Habibi, *Az Shar ta Shahr: Tahlili Tarikhi az Maftum-i Shahr va Sima-yi Kaludi-yi An: Tafakkur va Ta’ssur [From the Shar to the City: Historical Analysis of the Concept of the City and its Morphology]* (Tehran:
instances of state-sponsored urban projects and infill development in the city prior to this expansion. Studying these instances generates considerable insight into the later expansion of Tehran; the pre-1870s interventions paved the path for the future changes. The court’s seemingly minor decisions of this era had significant impacts on the future of the city.

In 1851, three years after his coronation, Nassir al-Din Shah started the first major urban project of his reign. It consisted of the construction of a new bazaar from Sabzih Miydan, at the southern gate of the royal compound, to the new city gate of Muhammadiyyih, in the south rampart of the city, figure 3.1. In addition to the bazaar, the project consisted of new caravansaries and governmental buildings. Moreover, it provided Sabzih Miydan with a new spatial order by the construction of new stores and its enveloping façades. The project started under the supervision and investment of Nassir al-Din Shah’s first Prime Minister, Amirkabir, and was completed after his dismissal and murder by the King’s command. The project accomplished two main objectives at the same time. First, by the production of new commercial spaces, the court created new sources of revenue for itself. One section of the project alone, called Sara-yi Atabakiyyih, had 336 new stores. Consequently, the whole project could generate a significant monthly income through rents. While there is no available document that provides an estimate of the revenue, an announcement in Itila‘at newspaper shows that even 80 years later, Sabzih Miydan stores were rented by the state for biennial contracts. In 1930, the

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42 *Vaqayi‘ Itifaqiyyih*, Shawwal 16, 1267 [August 14, 1851].
44 *Vaqayi‘ Itifaqiyyih*, Rabi‘ ath-Thani 26, 1267 [February 28, 1851].
45 *Vaqayi‘ Itifaqiyyih*, Rabi‘ ath-Thani 26, 1267 [February 28, 1851].
The collective rent of forty-nine stores for the two-year contracts was 4717.25 qirān per month.\textsuperscript{46} Considering that the new bazaars consisted of hundreds of stores, the court could generate remarkable revenue out of the new construction. As a result, through grand projects at the urban level, the court and high-ranking officials could change cheaper residential lands into high profiting commercial spaces and establish significant revenue resources. This was not a novel spatial strategy. Visiting Shiraz in 1787, William Franklin mentions that the shops in the bazaar “are the property of the Khan,\textsuperscript{47} and are rented to the merchants at a very easy monthly rate.”\textsuperscript{48} Based on these observations, it is very probable that Shah Abbas’s grand projects in Isfahan in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries followed the same economic model.

The second objective of the project was to integrate Sabzih Miydan into the urban fabric. By the construction of the new bazaar network, Sabzih Miydan, as the square in front of the royal compound, obtained a key role in the urban fabric. Before the project, the square was detached from the main bazaar network, figure 3.1. During Fath ‘Ali Shah’s reign, the state was using the lands near the square to detain Russian war prisoners.\textsuperscript{49} However, after the completion of this project, Sabzih Miydan became the joint between the royal compound and the bazaar; it provided a well-designed space as the entrance to both of them. It became the main square of the city.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{46} \textit{Itila’at}, Bahman 27, 1308 [February 16, 1930]. That makes more than $8,300 for the two-year contracts. The calculation is based on the exchange rate from the \textit{Itila’at} newspaper of January 22, 1930, in which every US Dollar was equal to 13.6 Qirāns. It should be mentioned that during Reza Shah era, the Grand Bazaar of Tehran had already lost its significance as the main commercial space of the city and new streets with European-style stores were more popular. So, eighty years earlier, the stores should have been more popular and the rents were higher.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Karim Khan Zand, the king of Iran from 1751 to 1779.
\item \textsuperscript{48} William Francklin, \textit{Observations made on a Tour from Bengal to Persia in the Years 1786-7} (London: Strand, 1817), 58.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Muhammad Mihryar at al., \textit{Asnad-i Taviray-yi Shahr-ha-yi Irani: Duray-yi Qajar [The Pictorial Documents of Iranian Cities: The Qajar Era]} (Tehran: Danishgah-I Shahid Bihishti, 1378 [1999]), 49.
\end{itemize}
While the bazaar project was an instance of direct intervention in the city, there were other cases that suggest that the role of the state may have been less determinative. However, its trivial decisions had an undeniable impact on the future expansion of Tehran. On April 15, 1852, the official gazette of the state, Vaqayi’ Itifaqiyyih, published an announcement stating that:

Since the population of the city has grown bigger, and people are in dire need of accommodation, the king has issued an order and gave his consent to the construction of new houses [outside the city], between Muhammadiyyih and Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Gates, particularly for impoverished people who cannot afford the high prices inside the ramparts. From the moment the King issued his order, around two hundred families have planned and built their houses and stores in that district.51

There are delicate points in this announcement that show how the court’s supposedly philanthropic decision created the foundation for the future center-periphery duality in Tehran.


51 Vaqayi’ Itifaqiyyih, Jamada t-Tania 24, 1268 [April 15, 1852].
The king’s order permitted people to build new houses just in the southern section of the city. Why were they directed to the south and not on the other lands beyond the ramparts? Before its expansion, nineteenth-century Tehran was surrounded by farms and gardens. Outside the ramparts, particularly on the north and west, there were royal gardens that belonged to the king and high-ranking officials. In contrast, on the south there were worthless lands used mostly for extracting clay and baking bricks. The contrast between the south side and the other sections was the outcome of the geographical location of the city. Located on slopes, Tehran’s main water sources flowed from the northern mountains towards the city. By means of qanăts, subterranean aqueducts, water was brought to the city from the foot of the mountains, and it was distributed in the city among the neighborhoods via narrow open gutters in the middle of the streets. As a result, those who were living in the northern section of the city received cleaner water. The court received fresh water from dedicated qanăts. When in 1865 the state constructed a new qanāt with remarkable amount of water for the royal compound, the king ordered the distribution of water among the neighborhoods only after filling all the creeks and pools in the royal compound and watering the royal gardens. Similarly, when in 1871 water from Karaj River was brought to Tehran from 30 miles west of the city it was distributed among the neighborhoods only after watering all the northern royal gardens.

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53 Jennifer M. Scarce, “The Role of Architecture in the Creation of Tehran,” in Téhéran Capitale Bicentenaire, eds. C. Adle and B. Hourcade (Paris: Institute Français de Recherche en Iran: 1992), 83. The 1891 map of Tehran, Naqshih-yi Shahr-i Dar al-Khalafih-yi Nassiri-yi Tehran, clearly shows the contrast between the southern section and the other parts of the city. Although this map was surveyed after the 1870s expansion, the new lands inside the city wall were still in their pre-expansion condition, with gardens on the north and abandoned worthless lands on the south.
56 Duwlat-i ʿIlīyih, Rajab 18, 1282 [December 7, 1865].
57 Duwlat-i ʿIlīyih, Dhu l-Hijja 11, 1287 [March 4, 1871].
Under these conditions, it made sense that the court would try to save the valuable northern lands by accommodating the impoverished people in the south; they were protecting the lands by providing the maximum distance between them and the poor people. Moreover, there was no planning for the new construction in the south and people were free to build on their own. As a result, in 1853, just a year after the king’s authorization of construction of new houses beyond the southern rampart, the southern area was flooded, which destroyed houses, stores, and some communal buildings, such as bathhouses. A similar incident happened in 1867, which resulted in the destruction of 247 houses in the southern city. The analysis of the flood revealed that the destruction occurred because people had blocked part of the ditch around the city with their unplanned construction.

The court’s decision to accommodate poor people on the southern lands was one of the first steps in the creation of center-periphery discourse in Tehran, which played a significant role in socio-spatial formation of the city in the decades to come. It was one of the first instances wherein spatial configuration was the outcome of horizontal class structures rather than traditional vertical social structures; meaning that, for the first time, economic interests rather than communal bonds produced the spatiality of the city. Moreover, the court managed to protect its valuable gardens. The gardens were lucrative properties since the court could easily divide them into pieces and sell them as residential lands at great prices. This process had already begun as early as 1856 when the court divided and sold a garden inside the city. As these instances show, economic incentives played a significant role in the formation of future Tehran. As early as the 1850s and 1860s, the court’s measures were laying the groundwork for the main principles of the future expansion of the city. A map from 1857 clearly shows the main lines of the future expansion of Tehran.

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58 *Vaqayi Itifaqiyyih*, Shaban 17, 1269 [May 26, 1853].
59 *Duwlat-i Iliyyih*, Safar 3, 1284 [June 6, 1867].
60 *Vaqayi Itifaqiyyih*, Rabiat-Thani 24, 1272 [January 3, 1856].
expansion of Tehran. In this map, figure 3.2, there is a dashed line around the old city, which matches the location of the future ramparts. It is no surprise that when, in December 1867, the king ordered the expansion, he decided to stretch the city limits 1,800 zar’s, or 1.16 miles, to the north and only one thousand zar’s, or 0.64 of a mile, in the other directions. In this way, most of the royal gardens were included in the new urban limits and the court provided a great economic resource for years to come.

Figure 3.2. This 1857 map of Tehran and its surrounding clearly demonstrates the main lines for the future expansion of the city.

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61 Zar’ was a Persian unit of measurement equals to 104 centimeters or 41 inches.
62 Sha’ban 29, 1284 [December 26, 1867].
63 Mahvash Alemi shares the same view: Alemi, “The 1891 Map of Tehran,” 76.
Urban Management under the Qajars Rule

The relationship between the state and the city, which fully manifested in the Municipality Act\(^65\) of 1907,\(^66\) was incubated for half a century prior to the Constitutional Revolution and the establishment of constitutional laws. Since the mid-nineteenth century, a new discourse gradually developed in Iranian cities, particularly in Tehran, that obliged the state to adopt certain responsibilities towards the wellbeing of its citizens. This new discourse was a reaction to multiple cholera epidemics in Iran, which had severe impacts on the urban population in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. The Qajar court felt the urgency of top-down regulation of the city for the prevention of cholera outbreaks. As a result, the new discourse provided the court with unprecedented spatial power and responsibilities. This was the first time that the court practiced the top-down management of urban spaces. This initial experience later manifested in the grand expansion of the city and the state’s sponsorship of urban design and development at the northern section of Tehran.

The Qajar monarchy experienced episodes of epidemics as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century. The 1904 epidemic is one of the best-studied cases of the late Qajar era.\(^67\) Brucell estimates that the death toll of the disease, just in Tehran, was around 13,000 people.\(^68\) Twelve years earlier, in the summer of 1892, another cholera epidemic resulted in more than 20,000 deaths in the city, as ‘Iyn al-Saltanih suggests.\(^69\) One of the earliest cases of the disease during the Nassir al-Din Shah era was the 1853 epidemic. The entries of the Vaqayi’ Itifaqiyiyih

\(^{65}\) Qanūn-i Baladīyyiyih.
newspaper help to reconstruct the dimensions of this episode. Started on April 18, 1853, the epidemic was killing around seventy people each day by May 19, reached 130 people before the end of the month, and came down to forty people by June 2. It was not until August 5 that the city returned to its normal condition. Although the disease came back few months later, the second time did not last very long and disappeared by the start of the cold season. Using the numbers from the newspaper entries, a rough estimate shows that at least four thousand people died during this epidemic, as shown in figure 3.3. With the total population of 120,000 people, the casualty rate was at least 3.3 percent of the total population. Before the Nassir al-Din Shah era and during the reign of his father, Muhammad Shah, a cholera outbreak in the summer of 1846 killed twelve thousand people of the thirty thousand summer residents of the city.

Figure 3.3. The casualties of the 1853 cholera outbreak, reconstructed based on the numbers extracted from Vaqayi' Itifaqiyyih.

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70 The June 2nd, 1853 issue mentions that the first case of cholera had been recorded 46 days earlier which makes it April 18th, 1853. *Vaqayi' Itifaqiyyih*, Sha'ban 24, 1269 [June 2, 1853].
71 *Vaqayi' Itifaqiyyih*, Sha'ban 10, 1269 [May 19, 1853].
72 *Vaqayi' Itifaqiyyih*, Sha'ban 24, 1269 [June 2, 1853].
73 *Vaqayi' Itifaqiyyih*, Dhu al-Qa' da 5, 1269 [August 10, 1853]. The newspaper mentions that the king returned to the city on August 5th since there were not any new cases of cholera.
74 *Vaqayi' Itifaqiyyih*, Safar 8, 1270 [November 10, 1853].
Besides the initial fatalities, the impact of the cholera epidemics on urban society was immense, usually followed by famine and the drastic increase in the prices of basic goods.76 People’s first reaction was to flee from the city to nearby villages, in the case of Tehran to the northern villages of Shimiranat,77 which “served only to scatter the disease still wider.”78 The King was the first one to leave the capital and the last one to return.79 In this condition, the presence of Europeans in the country and the measures they took during the outbreaks80 helped to generate new knowledge regarding the low hygienic condition and accumulation of garbage in the city as the main sources of the outbreaks. During the 1853 epidemic, Vaqayi’ Itifaqiyyih wrote:

The physicians of the world have researched on two points about the disease [cholera]. First, this disease happens more in big populations [...] and wherever there are more filth and infection, it is proved that the number of the casualties rises [...] In some cities of Farangistan [Europe] where cholera had become epidemic, the council of physicians suggested three points to people. First, people should pour lime in the toilets. Second, they should whitewash the walls of the houses with lime [...] and finally they should not eat too much.81

Similarly, Jakob Eduard Polak, the Austrian physician who was teaching modern medicine in the Dar al-Funun Collage of Tehran in the 1850s, mentions in his travelogue that the filth of the city was one of the leading causes exacerbating the severity of cholera epidemics. Since there was no

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77 Vaqayi’ Itifaqiyyih, Sha’ban 17, 1269 [May 26, 1853].
79 In 1846, Muhammad Shah departed to a remote mountain village, 20 miles from Tehran. Even there, his camp was not immune and he lost a son, a daughter, and two wives. Elgood, A Medical History of Persia, 496-7. In 1853 Nassir al-Din Shah went to Shimiranat, Sultaniyiyih, and Lar and came back when there were no more cholera cases. Vaqayi’ Itifaqiyyih, Sha’ban 10, 1369 [May 19, 1853]; Dhul-Qa’da 5, 1269 [August 10, 1853]; Muharram 2, 1270 [October 5, 1853]. In 1892, he went to Shahristanak and he isolated himself, permitting nobody to enter the area without spending time in quarantines. ‘Iyn al-Saltanih, Ruznamih-yi Khatirat-i ‘Iyn al-Saltanih, 1: 485. In 1904, Muzaffar al-Din Shah totally panicked, first deciding to escape to Russia, but finally locked himself in his palace in Niavaran away from the outside world for two months. Burrell, “The 1904 Epidemic of Cholera,” 265.
80 For the impact of the Europeans presence and the measures they took during the episodes of epidemics see: Burrell, “The 1904 Epidemic of Cholera”; Elgood, A Medical History of Persia.
81 Vaqayi’ Itifaqiyyih, Sha’ban 10, 1269 [May 19, 1853].
responsible organ for garbage removal in Tehran, the streets and empty lands were full of filth, and stray dogs played the main role in cleaning the city.\textsuperscript{82}

Out of the turmoil, a new discourse grew that gave power to the state to intervene in urban spaces for people’s health. Two years before the 1853 epidemic, Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyih wrote that “since all the physicians of the world have realized that the main cause of the diseases is the filth of the streets, the governor of the city [\textit{kalāntar}] is trying his best to keep the streets clean.”\textsuperscript{83} It was few months after the 1853 outbreak that the same discourse was reiterated, this time with a distinct agenda:

\begin{quote}
Since the streets of Tehran are too narrow and filthy, probably the infection of the streets caused the infection of the air and resulted in the epidemics. Consequently, the government has decided that first, the streets that are too narrow should be widened, wherever it is possible, second the garbage from the streets should be collected, and the streets should be paved to remain clean.”\textsuperscript{84}
\end{quote}

There are several points in this announcement. First, the narrowness of the streets, besides the filth, is related to the cholera outbreaks. Similarly, having proper paving would cause fewer outbreaks. More importantly, the government is responsible for the intervention in urban spaces to prevent the disease and to preserve people’s health by widening, paving, and cleaning the streets. It is necessary to recall that the narrow and crooked streets of the city were far from high-quality urban spaces. They merely provided access to the buildings without supporting a lively social life. The real social life was happening in other spaces, such as mosques, \textit{takīyyih}s, \textit{zūrkhānihs}, coffeehouses, and bathhouses, which had their own owners who could take care of them. No one was looking after the streets and alleys prior to this time. As a result, this could be seen as a decisive shift in the relationship between the state and the city. The new discourse gave

\textsuperscript{82} Polak, \textit{Persien}, 80.
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyih}, Rajab 7, 1267 [May 8, 1851].
\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyih}, Jumada l-Ula 25, 1270 [February 23, 1854].
power to the state to interfere in the city; however, it needed more than half a century to adopt its final form as an independent organ called municipality. The bankrupt and corrupted Qajar state did not have the necessary power and funding to cause fundamental changes in the urban fabric. As a result, year after year, the state reiterated its promises without implementing real changes.\(^85\)

The royal compound was the only exception in this regard. Nassir al-Din Shah spent extravagantly to rearrange the royal compound with new streets, paving, gas lights, new palaces, and the like.\(^86\)

Beginning in 1865, however, a shift happened in the new discourse. Unable to make significant changes during the preceding fourteen years, the state attempted to transfer the responsibility for cleaning and maintenance of the streets to citizens. Chiragh Ali Khan Siraj al-Mulk, the head of a new office called *Iḥtisābīyyih*,\(^87\) was ordered to “oblige the citizens to transfer the garbage in front of their houses to the outside of the city […] and wash and clean [āb va jārū] in front of their houses daily.”\(^88\) Again, it does not seem that the state had much success in this regard, since on December 19, 1869, Nassir al-Din Shah appointed a new head, Amin al-Huzur, for the office of *Iḥtisābīyyih* and defined ten tasks as his responsibilities.\(^89\) Still, the main concern was hygienic issues; eight of the ten tasks dealt with this concern, such as: transferring the piles of garbage, repairing the aqueducts, changing the water in the reservoirs, building public laundries, forbidding burying of dead bodies in the city, and the like. Four tasks aimed to engage residents in the maintenance of the city by urging them to transfer their garbage, clean and pave the streets, and the like. Two tasks dealt with transportation in the city. Finally, there

\(^{85}\) *Vaqayiʿ Itifaqiyyih*, Shawwal 29, 1275 [June 1, 1859]; *Duwlat-i ʿIlīyih*, Dhu l-Hijja 29, 1281 [May 25, 1865]; Shawwal 3, 1286 [January 6, 1870].

\(^{86}\) For the changes in the royal compound see: Zaka’, *Tarikhchih-yi Sakhtiman-ha-yi Arg-i Sultanati*.

\(^{87}\) *Iḥtisābīyyih* was an early version of municipality, which was established during Nassir al-Din Shah’s reign. Its main concern was the cleanliness of the city.

\(^{88}\) *Duwlat-i ʿIlīyih*, Dhu l-Hijja 28, 1281 [May 25, 1865].

\(^{89}\) *Duwlat-i ʿIlīyih*, Shawwal 3, 1286 [January 6, 1870].
was a new concern towards the physical appearance of the city; a section of the tenth task obliged people to build their new buildings with an appropriate appearance. Simple and rudimentary, one can find the origins of a new desire to shape the city towards an ideal image, which would grow as a fully developed discourse in the years to come.

The 1870s Expansion of Tehran

Chapter Two discussed the production of new spatial knowledge through the analysis of Iranian travelogues to Europe. It introduced the major socio-spatial principles of this knowledge and their distinction from the previous spatial background of Iranian travelers. This section investigates the late 1860s and the early 1870s expansion of Tehran and its similarities to new spatial knowledge. This massive urban development was closely in line with the spatial vocabulary Iranian elites acquired in Europe. However, it is crucial to remind that I do not impute a causal relationship to the production of new spatial knowledge in travelogues and the expansion of Tehran. As discussed in Chapter Two, travelogues were just one medium for the transfer of new spatial knowledge to Iran; there were various means for this transfer. The combination of these methods of the production and transfer of spatial knowledge created a discourse that conducted the 1870s expansion of Tehran. Nassir al-Din Shah, Iranian elites, and the Qajar court were the primary receivers of this new spatial knowledge and, at the same time, they were the main force for its physical embodiment.

Decades before this expansion, the intercontinental relationships between Iran and Europe produced new spatial manifestations in the country. One of the earlier examples belongs to Fath ‘Ali Shah’s reign, who intended to build a new city, Sulimaniyyih, miles away from the capital

90 Duwlat-i ʿIlīyyih, Shawwal 3, 1286 [January 6, 1870].
by the Karaj River. William Ouseley mentions that “the king, having consulted Abul Hassan Khan’s [Mirza Abul Hassan Khan Shirazi –Ilchi] description of London, had ordered that the streets should be wide, the meidáns or squares ample and numerous, with buildings of an uniform height and appearance, on the plan of our English metropolis.”91 Although the city was never built, the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed the construction of various buildings with European architectural styles. The best example in this regard is Shams al-ʿImarih palace, which was built on the Eastern section of the royal compound with a hybrid Iranian-European-style of architecture.92 In another instance, two years before the expansion of Tehran, the court built a new broad and straight street, Nassiriyih, by filling and paving the Eastern ditch of the royal compound. The street connected a new city gate in the northern rampart to the grand bazaar.93 Interestingly, this street later became a ceremonial space for the court-sponsored ceremonies and the first street, besides Bab al-Humayun Street, to accommodate the first gaslights of the city.94

The main expansion of Tehran started in 1867. On December 8, after an official ceremony on the northern outskirts of the old city, Nassir al-Din Shah officially launched the project that would permanently change Tehran in the years to come.95 It was a massive project at the time; the area of the city within the ramparts quadrupled from three square kilometers (1.15 square miles) to twelve square kilometers (4.6 square miles). The city expanded on average 1,250 meters (4,100 ft.) to the north, 550 meters (1,800 ft.) to the east, 750 meters (2,450 ft.) to the

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93 *Dawlat-i ʿIliyyih*, Jumada t-Tania 12,1282 [November 2, 1865].
94 *Iran*, Dhu al-Qaʿ da 20, 1289 [January 20, 1873].
95 The official newspaper of the court has a great report on the day of the inauguration of the project, see: *Dawlat-i ʿIliyyih*, Shaʿ ban 29, 1284 [December 26, 1867].
south, and nine hundred meters (2,950 ft.) to the west.\textsuperscript{96} As it was mentioned before, the northern expansion was much bigger in order to embrace more royal gardens and lands. The western section saw the second largest expansion since the western lands belonged to the king or the high ranking people of the court. However, the south and east sides had the least expansions. Since the early 1850s, the south was populated by impoverished people and beyond that, it contained worthless brick burners and clay extraction lands. The east side contained farmlands of mostly ordinary people.

As is clear from the dimensions and directions of the urban development, the court had clear economic incentives to undergo such an ambitious project. Regarding the critical economic condition of the court,\textsuperscript{97} the new expansion was a valuable opportunity to make up a portion of its annual deficit. Nassir al-Din Shah appointed Mustufi al-Mamalik to conduct the project.\textsuperscript{98} He was one of the greatest landowners of the capital and with the help of his brother-in-law, Mirza ‘Isa Vazir, they accomplished the great project.\textsuperscript{99} In the years to come, the court divided the royal gardens and lands of the new northern neighborhood, Duwlat, into smaller parcels and sold them to affluent people of the city. This process can be easily followed through the occasional announcements in the official newspapers of the court. The best example in this regard is Lalihzar Garden, one of the old royal gardens from Fath ‘Ali Shah era.\textsuperscript{100} As a royal recreational garden, Lalihzar began its transformation before the expansion of the city. First, it became a

\textsuperscript{97} Chapter Four will discuss the court’s critical economic condition.
\textsuperscript{98} Dawlat-i ‘Iliyyih, Sha’ban 29, 1284 [December 26, 1867].
semi-public zoo in the mid-1860s. After the expansion, it became part of the northern neighborhood. By the end of 1888, the garden had already lost parts of its land to new north-south streets, one built on its western side and one passing through the center, splitting the garden in two. A few months later, the new western street, now called Lalihzar after the garden, was illuminated by gaslights during the night, and in less than a year it was connected to the newly built network of horse tramways. In February 1890, the newspaper announced that the court divided and sold the garden and new buildings were emerging around the street.

The recipe is simple and clear. A garden outside the city ramparts changed into a valuable asset after the 1870s expansion. By connecting the garden to the new network of European-style streets, illuminating the street with the gaslights, and bringing the horse tramway to it, the court managed to increase the value of its land and made it ready for the market.

It is possible to estimate Nassir al-Din Shah’s revenue from selling Lalihzar Garden. Hidayat claims that Nassir al-Din Shah sold the garden for ninety thousand tumans. Based on Brown’s account, in 1888, every four tumans were 24 shillings, which means that one tumân was equal to six shillings or 72 pence. Regarding these figures, in 1890, Nassir al-Din Shah gained 64,800 pounds by selling just the western half of Lalihzar Garden. Using the British National Archive online currency converter tool, this amount equaled to 3,880,872 pounds in 1890.

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101 Dawlat-i ‘Iliyyih, Muharram 13, 1282 [June 8, 1865].
102 Iran, Rabi’ ath-Thani 25, 1306 [December 29, 1888]. In his book of memoirs, Mukhbir al-Saltanih or Mehdi Ghuli Hidayat, mentions that the eastern street, Sa’di, was constructed through the garden cutting it into two halves. The Eastern half, which was a zoo before, was sold and constructed much earlier than the western half. The western half still existed when the 1891 map of Tehran was surveyed. It is important to note that surveying of the map took several years and by the time it was published in 1891, the western section of the garden had been sold and built. Hidayat mentions that the king sold Lalihzar for ninety thousand tumans. Most probably, he refers to the remaining western half: Mehdi Ghuli Hidayat, Khatirat va Khatarat: Gushih-‘i az Tarikh-i Shish Padishah va Gushih-‘i az Durih-yi Zindigani-yi Man [Memoires and Dangers: The History of Six Monarchs and My Life] (Tehran: Zavvar, 1344 [1965]), 5.
103 Iran, Jumada l-Ula 16, 1306 [January 19, 1889].
104 Probably the remaining western section.
105 Iran, Jumada t-Tania 20, 1307 [February 11, 1890].
106 Hidayat, Khatirat va Khatarat, 5.
2005. It is no surprise that the court claimed most of the lands in the new Duwlat Neighborhood. On August 20, 1877, the court prohibited people from selling or buying the lands in a significant section of the neighborhood. The area of this section was more than 750 thousand square meters (185 acres). Besides the claimed section and the royal gardens, the title of Arāżī-yi Khāliṣīh, Royal Lands, is written over many parcels on the 1891 map of Tehran. The rest of the lands belonged to the people close to the court, such as Mustufi al-Mamalik and his brother-in-law, Mirza ʿIsa Vazir. As these accounts demonstrate, the critical economic condition of the court pushed this organization to commodify the city.

Figure 3.4. Landownership after the 1870s Expansion of Tehran.

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108 There are other websites that calculate historical currency conversions. However, the most reliable source is from British National Archive, which unfortunately does not convert up to 2015: “Currency converter,” The National Archives, under: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency/results.asp#mid (accessed: August 27, 2015). The other website that provides a more detailed calculation is MeasuringWorth.com which gives an estimate between £6,369,000.00 and £80,820,000.00 based on different economic factors: “Five Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a UK Pound Amount, 1270 to Present,” MeasuringWorth, under http://www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare/ (accessed: August 27, 2015).

109 Iran, Shaʿban 10, 1294 [August 20, 1877].
Figure 3.5. The 1870s expansion of Tehran based on 1891 Map of Tehran. Copyright ©2016 AGSL.\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{110} Abd al-Ghaffar, “Naqshih-ye Dar al-Khalafih-yi Nassiri-yi Tehran”.
For the first time, the new neighborhood was produced as a commodity. Instead of the typical organic growth, the court planned the future development of the northern section of the city to turn worthless lands into an invaluable asset. Similar to the accommodation of impoverished people in the south, the northern expansion of the city was based on economic interests rather than communal bonds. Not only was the court the most influential force in transcending the communal boundaries and holding social gatherings for all the segments of the city, but, it was also the only force that could produce non-communal spaces in the city. From the mid-nineteenth century, due to top-down interventions of the Qajar court, new spaces and neighborhoods formed in the city that were not based on the dominant communal discourse. From this time on, economic interests became the main force in the production of spaces. Two discourses juxtaposed each other; the old city was the location of the traditional, dominant communal discourse with its distinct communal interactions and spaces. Southern and particularly northern neighborhoods were the outcome of a new spatial discourse; they were products of economic relations and new spatial knowledge based on the court’s and elite’s interpretations of European cities and urban spaces.

However, it is not fair to claim that the economic incentive was the only reason behind the expansion of the city. The population of Tehran had increased from fifty thousand people in the early nineteenth century to 150,000 in 1852. As a result, there was no empty land in the old city, and all of its gardens had been changed into residential areas. Moreover, the southern outskirts of the city were already populated by the early 1850s. The residential areas outside the ramparts were not immune to occasional floods coming down from the mountains. As a result,

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the expansion of the city embraced the southern sections and protected them against the floods. Moreover, the new ramparts enabled the court to increase its revenue through the taxation of goods entering the city.\footnote{John D. Gurney examines different aspects of this project in details, see: Gurney, “The Transformation of Tehran,” 51-71.}

The question is how the bankrupt court with its empty treasury in the 1870s and 1880s (Chapter Four) managed to accomplish such a massive project. The destruction of the old ramparts, filling the old ditch, building the new ramparts and ditch, and constructions of new streets were costly undertakings. A national disaster helped the court to save the expenses of expansion. The main years of constructions, 1869 to 1871, coincided with a severe drought and famine, which impacted on vast areas of the country. For two years, 1869 and 1870, winter precipitation was negligible, and the farmlands failed to yield enough crops.\footnote{Shoko Okazaki, “The Great Persian Famine of 1870-71,” \textit{Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London} 49, no. 1 (1986): 183. Also see: Xavier de Planhol, “Famines in Persia,” \textit{Encyclopedia Iranica} (December 15, 1999), under http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/famines (accessed August 24, 2015).} The impact of the famine was catastrophic. Around 1.5 million people died throughout the country, which was twenty to twenty-five percent of the total population.\footnote{Okazaki, “The Great Persian Famine of 1870-71,” 185.} The famine caused people to flee from smaller towns and villages to the capital and northern parts of the country.\footnote{Okazaki, “The Great Persian Famine of 1870-71,” 184.} By January 22, 1872, 4,384 refugees were gathered in the capital. Most of the refugees were accommodated outside the city gates: 1,700 people by the southern gate, 1,200 people by the western gate, 1,200 people by the eastern gate, ninety-eight people in the city hospital, and 286 people in the Armenian Neighborhood, south of the city.\footnote{\textit{Iran}, Dhu al-Qa`da 11, 1288 [January 22, 1872].} Once again similar to the 1850s, the court protected its valuable northern lands by creating a buffer zone between the undesired people, poor and refugees, and the new neighborhood. However, the court used the same people to build the new wall, dig the ditch, and construct the streets. James Bassett, visiting the country during
the famine years, mentions that “[t]he famishing were employed to construct roads, and to repair
the moat about the city.”117 George Curzon goes one step further and argues that “[a] good deal
of the money sent out from England by the Persian Famine Relief Fund in 1871 was spent in the
hire of labour for the excavation of the new ditch, […] and for the erection of the lofty sloping
rampart beyond.”118 The great famine provided an opportunity for the Qajar court to hire cheap
labor and to pay workers with the money they received from a third party.

The 1870s expansion of Tehran was based on a new spatial vocabulary. This vocabulary is
similar to spatial knowledge that Iranians, particularly the elites, had produced earlier through
their firsthand observation of European cities. Analogous to the findings from the travelogues
analysis, the urban development of Tehran was deeply focused on implementing certain physical
aspects. As Afshin Marashi puts it, “among the first project of reform were those advocating
physical transformation […] Reform and modernization in the colonial and semicolonial world,
it seems, reflected an obsession with appearance.”119 The presence of Europeans in Tehran,
particularly those who were teaching in the Dar al-Funun Collage, had a significant impact on
the plan of the new city and the design of its new ramparts.120 As an example, General Buhler,
the French military instructor at the Dar al-Funun Collage, designed the new ramparts based on
Vauban’s defense system of seventeenth-century French and Italian towns.121 The main spatial
structure of the new northern neighborhood, Duwlat, consisted of several long and wide streets
starting from a central square. These streets were paved, usually equipped with gaslights, and
planted with straight lines of trees on both sides. Six of these streets began from a central square,
Tupkhanih, at the north of the royal compound, stretching in four directions.\textsuperscript{122} In 1881, the first gaslight plant opened in the city, and the court equipped the main streets with gaslights.\textsuperscript{123} In 1889, these streets and the main streets around the old city were equipped with horse tramway lines, as the first public transportation system of the city.\textsuperscript{124}

Within just a few years, the Qajar court succeeded in the physical production of a new urban landscape. An article in the official newspaper perfectly demonstrates the state’s obsession with the new development. The article begins with the description of old Tehran, before expansion, as a “bad and filthy” land, which was occasionally struck with “cholera and plague.” However, after the expansion, “its prosperity, the cleanliness of its streets, and the public opinion have progressed on hourly basis.”\textsuperscript{125} The most interesting part of the article is where it describes the new streets. In the description of Ilkhani Street it claims:

It is a very straight and long street. Its width is between fifteen to twenty zar’s [fifteen to twenty meters or fifty to sixty-five feet] and its length is around 2,500 zar’s [2,600 meters or 1.6 miles]. Trees are planted on both sides of the street, it is paved with stones, the sides of the creeks are decorated with carved stones, it is illuminated by lamps and lanterns during the nights, and it is surrounded by gardens and majestic buildings […] and there is Ilakhani garden, a royal garden with its street wall made of columns and fences so that it is visible to the pedestrians in the street.\textsuperscript{126}

There are the same descriptions for most of the new streets of the city. Similar to European urban spaces, the straightness of the streets, their length, width, paving, gaslights, and their surrounding buildings and gardens were the focus of attention. For a culture that used to hide its private spaces behind thick and bare walls, it was a fundamental change to surround the new garden with

\textsuperscript{122} For more information on the physical and social dimensions of the new streets see: Karimiyan, \textit{Tehran dar Guzashthi va Hal}; Alemi, “The 1891 Map of Tehran”; Habibi, \textit{Az Shar ta Shahr}; Marashi, \textit{Nationalizing Iran}; Madanipour, \textit{Tehran}.
\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Iran}, Sha’ban 10, 1298 [July 7, 1881].
\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Iran}, Shawwal 13, 1306 [June 13, 1889].
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Iran}, Rabi’ ath-Thani 9, 1294 [April 22, 1877].
\textsuperscript{126} \textit{Iran}, Rabi’ ath-Thani 9, 1294 [April 22, 1877].
fences, so people can see inside the garden. What were the social implications of the new neighborhood and spaces? How was the social life in the new neighborhood? Did the new physicality obtain new sociality too? Was there any dialogue between the old and new?

**Spatial Strategies of the Qajar Court after the Expansion of the City**

It took new urban spaces decades to fully integrate into social life of the city. Contrary to the construction phase, which proceeded relatively quickly, social life crawled gradually into the new neighborhood. While Chapter Five returns to the subject and investigates the northern neighborhood in the first half of the twentieth century, this section examines late nineteenth-century instances of social life in the Duwlat Neighborhood, the new northern neighborhood, and the court’s spatial strategies for the production of a new relationship with society.

As it was mentioned earlier, in the 1860s, the Qajar court lost its sole public platform, besides *Takīyyih Duwlat*, by transforming Arg Square into a garden. For years, the court was deprived of the ceremonial space to share with ordinary people for its ceremonies. While the expansion of the city provided essential spaces for the court, a delicate shift occurred in the management of new spaces for the state’s public ceremonies. Afshin Marashi provides a valuable analysis of this shift. In his book, *Nationalizing Iran*, he argues that the second half of the Nassiri era was a transitional period for the legitimation of the state. Being acquainted with the new models of legitimation practiced in the European nation-states, the Qajar court attempted to implement these models in the Iranian context. The urban transformation of Tehran provided essential spaces for mass state-sponsored ceremonies, which could engage people in great numbers. However, the Nassiri era remained “largely a transitional” period in this regard, and it
was only by the Pahlavi era (1925-1979) that the state succeeded in its nationalization projects and implementation of new models of legitimation.\textsuperscript{127} Marashi introduces the new building of \textit{Takīyyih Duwlat} as the “singular” exception that the state could partially implement the new “style of legitimation rituals” during the Qajar era.\textsuperscript{128} In contrast, I suggest that the new \textit{Takīyyih Duwlat} continued the older practices. Instead, I examine other spatial strategies of the state to show the attempts of the Qajar court to implement a new relationship with society.

The New \textit{Takīyyih Duwlat} and State-sponsored Muharram Ceremonies

Before the main discussion on the spatial strategies of the court in this era, I examine the condition of the new building of \textit{Takīyyih Duwlat}, after the expansion of Tehran. At the beginning of this chapter, I discussed the seasonal character of \textit{Takīyyih Duwlat} and dated it to the earlier years of the Qajar and Fath ʿAli Shah reign. As mentioned, \textit{Takīyyih Duwlat} returned to Tehran in 1869, when the Muharram mourning month had moved around the calendar, passed the summer, and entered the cooler days of the spring once more. For five years after its return to Tehran, the state held its Muharram ceremonies inside the old \textit{Takīyyih Duwlat} in the royal compound. Since Arg Square was redesigned into a garden, the state could not follow the old practice of pitching a tent in the square for Muharram ceremonies. In 1874, accounts of the new \textit{Takīyyih Duwlat} appeared in state newspapers for the first time. On February 18, just before the start of the mourning month, Iran newspaper mentioned that the construction of the new building was finally over after three years. However, the text does not reveal whether the state used the

\textsuperscript{127} Marashi, \textit{Nationalizing Iran}, 11-39.
\textsuperscript{128} Marashi, \textit{Nationalizing Iran}, 39.
building in that year, particularly due to the severe winter\textsuperscript{129} and the concerns about the stability of the wooden arches of the dome.\textsuperscript{130} As a result, 1875 should be considered as the first year that Takīyyih Duwlat was moved into the new location completely.

It is important to note that the transfer of Takīyyih Duwlat into the new location was in continuation of the old practice. In other words, nothing changed by this spatial transformation, except the size of the state-sponsored mourning ceremonies and the population it served; it was more grandiose. As Iran newspaper mentions “in this year [the Takīyyih] is held with greater glory […] and this year’s condition is much better than the previous years.”\textsuperscript{131} As a result, we cannot consider the new Takīyyih Duwlat as a break from the old traditions and examine it as the new method of legitimation rituals for the state.\textsuperscript{132} The state had been following the same practice for years, but by this time it was more iconic. Scholars usually study the circular Takīyyih Duwlat as the only representation of the concept, without noting its previous formats and alternative spatial manifestations. This misunderstanding can be the result of the iconic structure of the building, which is sometimes compared to Albert Hall in London.\textsuperscript{133} While the comparison is legitimate regarding the architectural shape of the building, it has caused a fundamental misrepresentation of the building: examining Takīyyih Duwlat as a permanent theater building rather than a temporary socio-political space and regarding it as the king’s marvelous idea of following modernization projects and incorporating European models for Iranian practices. However, I suggest that the giant circular Takīyyih Duwlat was just one manifestation of the concept, and it was built as a continuation of the old tradition of state-sponsored Muharram ceremonies. Even the interior architectural arrangement of the building was

\textsuperscript{129} Iran, Dhu l-Hijja 29, 1290 [February 18, 1874].
\textsuperscript{130} Iran, Muharram 2, 1292 [February 9, 1875].
\textsuperscript{131} Iran, Muharram 2, 1292 [February 9, 1875].
\textsuperscript{132} Marashi, Nationalizing Iran, 39.
\textsuperscript{133} Peterson, “The Ta’ziyeh and Related Arts,” 69.
based on main architectural necessities of a takīyyih building, with a central stage, people gathering around the stage, and arches or tāqnamās surrounding the space and providing special sitting places for the royals. In the new Takīyyih Duwlat, the king had his own specific room on a higher level, located above the ordinary people.134 The same concept is discernible in the traditional form of Takīyyih Duwlat as a tent in Arg Square, where Fath ʿAli Shah was observing the royal taʿzīyih ceremonies from the second floor of a building called ʿImārat-i Sar Darb,135 the main gate to the royal compound.136 Finally, as Mostofi’s accounts show, the new Takīyyih Duwlat maintained its role as the main stage for performances of various communities’ representatives in the presence of the king.137 In other words, the social function of Takīyyih Duwlat, as a mediator between the court and communities, remained unchanged. This examination of Takīyyih Duwlat shows that the spatial manifestation of the new relationship between the state and society should be investigated in other space. Takīyyih Duwlat was not a deviation from the old-established spatial strategies of the court. As the next section discusses, the Qajar court utilized the new streets and squares of Tehran for conducting its public ceremonies and establishing a new relationship with society.

In 1889 when Muharram reached the hot summer days once again, the king and Takīyyih Duwlat left the city together. The construction of the huge costly building did not guarantee a fixed location for Takīyyih Duwlat. The reason is clear; Takīyyih Duwlat never was a fixed architectural entity. It was a fluid socio-political concept that could adopt different formats. It mostly demanded the physical presence of the Qajar Monarchs for its full manifestation. In their

134 For more information on the architecture and details of Takīyyih Dawlat building, see: Zaka’, Tarikhchih-yi Ṣakhtiman-ha-yi Arg-i Saltanati, 283-315.
135 For more information on Arg Square and ʿImārat-i Sar Darb, see: Zaka’, Tarikhchih-yi Ṣakhtiman-ha-yi Arg-i Saltanati, 25-40.
136 James Morier, A Journey through Persia, Armenian, and Asia Minor, to Constantinople, in the years of 1808 and 1809 (Philadelphia: M. Carry, and Wells and Lilly, 1816), 199.
137 Mostofi, From Agha Mohammad Khan, 1: 167.
absence the gigantic structure was almost useless. Similarly, it did not have any use during the non-mourning months. George Curzon, visiting the empty building, wonders: “I entered and looked around. The building was entirely empty, save for some chained beasts, a curious use to which to put so consecrated a structure.” As a result, the new building was just an update in the size and glory of the Takīyyih. From 1889 to 1896, the year of Nassir al-Din Shah’s assassination, Takīyyih Duwlat was away from the city. When the king was in Shahristanak, deep in the mountains, the state pitched a tent for Muharram there. Similar to the previous summer cycle, sometimes the court held the out of date Takīyyih Duwlat ceremonies in the city, just to perform its annual duty of re-establishing the relationship between the court and the public. After Nassir al-Din Shah’s assassination in 1896, the ritual maintained its old-established rhythm. The new king entered the capital from Tabriz on June 7, 1896, a month after the assassination and five days before the start of Muharram. However, he left the capital for the mountainous villages soon after and did not remain in the city for the possible Muharram ceremonies or for revering his deceased father. Takīyyih Duwlat did not return to the city until 1899, eleven years after its departure, when the mourning month once again occurred during the cooler spring days of May. However, it took the state another six years to reopen the giant circular Takīyyih Duwlat. The wooden arches of the dome had caused structural damage to the building, and it was not until 1905 that the state repaired the building by replacing the wooden arches with a lighter steel structure and demolishing the top level of the building. During these years...

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139 *Iran*, Muharram 15, 1308 [August 31, 1890] & *Iran*, Muharram 13, 1309 [August 18, 1891].
140 *Iran*, Rabiʿ al-Awwal 6, 1308 [October 21, 1890] & *Iran*, Shaʿban 9, 1310 [February 26, 1893].
141 Traditionally, Tabriz in North West of Iran was the seat of the Qajar Monarchs’ Crown Princes.
142 *Iran*, Muharram 7, 1314 [June 18, 1896] & Muharram 20, 1314 [July 2, 1896].
143 *Iran*, Muharram 21, 1317 [May 31, 1899].
144 Zaka’, *Tarikhchi-yi Sakhtiman-ha-yi Arg-i Saltanati*, 294.
six years, different, smaller spaces inside the royal compound hosted the royal tent for the
Muharram ceremonies. 145

As these accounts demonstrate, the new building was not a deviation from the old
practices; it cannot be interpreted as the new spatial strategy of the state. One should look
somewhere else for these strategies. It was the new network of the streets and squares, mostly in
the northern neighborhood and around the royal compound, that created the essential platforms
for the state’s spatial practices. While in the previous era the court-public relationship, besides
Takīyyih Duwlat, was summarized to occasional gatherings in Arg Square, the new urban spaces
elevated this relationship into a new phase.

New Urban Spaces and the Transformation of the State-society Relationship

After the expansion of Tehran, the new streets around the royal compound were platforms
for people’s gatherings for court-sponsored ceremonies on religious holidays. On these streets,
the court could entertain people with performing fireworks, illuminating space with decorative
lights, and playing live music. As early as 1871, Bab al-Humayun Street, north of the royal
compound and south of Tupkhanih Square, transformed into a ceremonial space for the
holidays. 146 Soon, the state used other spaces for its public gatherings, such as Nassiriyyih Street
east of the Royal compound, Tupkhanih Square, and the old Sabzih Miydan. Even the court went
a step further and built a new plaza in Nassiriyih Street, in front of Shams al-’Imārih gate, for its

145 Iran, Muharram 21, 1317 [May 31, 1899], Muharram 22, 1321 [April 20, 1903], & Muharram 15, 1322 [April 2,
1904].
146 Iran, Sha’ban 17, 1288 [November 1, 1871].
public events.\textsuperscript{147} There is a subtle difference between Arg Square and the new streets and squares. New spaces were always open to the public while Arg Square was within the royal compound, and the state could cut the flow of the crowd into the square anytime it wished. In other words, if in the previous era it was the crowd that should be transferred into the state’s realm to take part in the court-sponsored ceremonies, at this time it was the court that was bringing its ceremonies into the public realm.

Nassir al-Din Shah’s birthday was the most extravagant festivity of the court’s calendar. Starting in 1872, the king’s birthday became the main public festival of the city;\textsuperscript{148} the fireworks of this event were larger; the decorative lights were greater; the locations of the gatherings were multiple. Besides the greater quality, a delicate duality appeared. On January 12, 1881, the official newspaper of the court described the eve of the king’s birthday: “On the eve of the holiday, the prime minister, accompanied by the war, commerce, and the city ministers, the head of the police department, and some other nobles of the city, went to the bazaars and caravansaries to see the people’s lights and congratulate merchants, shopkeepers, and ordinary people for the King’s birthday.”\textsuperscript{149} Almost every year on the king’s birthday eve, a group of the high-ranking officials were checking the old city to see people’s “voluntary” participation in the ceremonies. On no other holiday, did they act the same. A duality was forming between people’s spaces and the court’s spaces. As if the new streets and squares did not belong to people. The court was responsible for these spaces, and in important nights, such as the king’s birthday, they

\textsuperscript{147} Iran, Rajab 16, 1306 [March 19, 1889]. Nassiriyyih Street, with its new plaza, and Bab al-Humayun Street were the main centers of the public ceremonies. In addition to these spaces, the court used Tupkhanih Square and Sabzih Miydan occasionally. Even in few instances, the old style public gatherings in Arg Square, with the king visiting the public from the second floor, were revived. The best resource for studying these gathering, which is incorporated in this research, is various issues of Iran Newspaper.

\textsuperscript{148} Iran, Safar 10, 1289 [April 19, 1872].

\textsuperscript{149} Iran, Safar 11, 1298 [January 12, 1881].
would check people to force them to participate voluntarily in the ceremonies and prove their faithfulness to their king.

A valuable account of the court-sponsored ceremonies in new streets is available in Carla Serena’s travelogue. Witnessing the 1878 New Year ceremonies in Bab al-Humayun Street, she describes the fireworks, clowns and other entertainers, music groups, and the big crowd gathered in the street. In another occasion she mentions that

[from the street, I could see] the Shah looked over the street and all the ceremonies from behind the windows of his apartment, accompanied by his wives wrapped in dark veils like ghosts […], The appearance of the street, dazzling for the people in it, should be magical for the king. From his place, he sees the Dowleh gate, with its floors and galleries resplendent in colorful lights which extend to the front of the palace with garlands of lights varying in color and form, as they burst under the spark of fireworks.

This scene is very similar to Nassir al-Din Shah’s visit to Milan. Standing in the royal palace, he had witnessed the central square crowded with people and the church colored with different lights. The king managed to reconstruct his European ideals in Iran. He reconstructed spaces, ceremonies, and more importantly his position as the sovereign observer of his people.

However, similar to the case of Takīyyih Duwlat, the court-sponsored festivities remained mostly dependent on the king’s physical presence in the city. If the king was on a trip or away from the city during the summer, most of the time, there was no ceremony on the holidays. Although the Qajar court attempted to implement new forms of legitimation, as Marashi argues, “ceremonial activity in late Qajar Iran remained grounded largely in the premodern conception of political authority.”

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New Urban Spaces and the Transformation of Welcoming Ceremonies

Alongside the transformation of convivial ceremonies after the expansion of Tehran, the welcoming ceremonies for the king’s annual return to the city underwent fundamental transformations. In contrast to chaotic welcoming ceremonies of the pre-expansion era, the scene was very different when on December 17, 1875, Nassir al-Din Shah returned to the city. On this day, there were perfectly arranged lines of military forces, officials, government employees, physicians, and so forth on both sides of the streets. The king’s trajectory inside the city was arranged precisely. Four music groups were located at strategic points to perform for the king’s passage. From the city gate to Miydan-i Mashq, Military Square, sixty cannons were arranged to fire continuously while the king passed. One thousand horsemen stood at the beginning section of his trajectory, from the city gate to the first square on his way. After the expansion of the city, one can find almost the same detailed welcoming ceremony for the king’s return each year. Sometimes it contained more details. For example, from 1881, the Italian head of the new police department, Conte de Monte Forte, started to build temporary triumphal arches and wooden arches.

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153 *Iran*, Dhu al-Qa‘da 18, 1292 [December 17, 1875].

154 The new police department was opened in 1879. It was established by an Italian officer to modernize the police force of the city. He was hired in the second trip of Nassir al-Din Shah to Europe. In recent years, National Archive of Iran published the daily police reports in two volumes. Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak, “Censorship,” *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1990), under http://www.irancanonline.org/articles/censorship-sansur-in-persia (accessed August 26, 2015); Ensiya Shaykh Rezaei and Shahla Azari, *Guzarish-ha-yi Nazmniyyih az Mahallat-i Tehran [Police (Nazmiya) Reports of Tehran Districts]*, 2 vols (Tehran: Intisharat-i Sazman-i Asnad-i Milli-yi Iran, 1377 [1998]). For the announcement of the establishment of the new police department in the official newspaper, see: *Iran*, Rabī‘ ath-Thani 12, 1296 [April 5, 1879].
columns holding flower pots to decorate the king’s trajectory in the city. The first time that Conte de Monte Forte erected the arches and columns, the newspaper authenticated this act by referring to Europe, declaring that “it is common in Farangistan,” or European, countries. This is a very important point, which shows how effective were the cross-continental relationships in production of spaces and practices in a non-colonial context. A Frenchman with the help of the other European and Iranian instructors of the Collage planned the expansion of the city; the new European-style streets held the welcoming ceremonies for the Persian king; and an Italian officer arranged the details of the ceremonies.

Figure 3.6 compares the king’s trajectories inside the city before and after the expansion. The map on the left is based on the 1858 map of Tehran. Different instances of Nassir al-Din Shah’s entrance to the city and his possible trajectories from the city gates to the royal compound are highlighted on the map. The map on the right is based on the 1891 map of Tehran, and it highlights the king’s trajectory after the expansion of the city. As the comparison between the maps shows, after the expansion, Nassir al-Din Shah did not pass through the narrow alleys of the old city on his way to the royal compound. All the welcoming ceremonies were limited to the new streets and squares, and the old city left out. In contrast, in the pre-expansion era, there is a balance in the king’s choices for the entrance gates, and he used all the gates, except the western Qazvin Gate. A couple of times, Nassir al-Din Shah even returned to the city via the southern Muhammadiyyih gate, near where he had permitted the impoverished people to live. Moreover,

156 Iran, Rajab 29, 1298 [January 27, 1881].
157 In most of the cases, the newspaper does not record the exact trajectory of the king inside the city. The text just mentions the entrance gates. I highlighted the shortest possible paths from the gates to the royal compound. These paths match the main guzars or alleys of the old city, which makes it more probable to be used by the king.
the chaotic scenes outside the city gates in the pre-expansion era changed into the precisely arranged ceremonies with various details inside the city.

![Figure 3.6](image)

**Figure 3.6.** The ceremonial spaces and king’s trajectories in the city before and after the expansion of Tehran.

### Early Attempts for the Production of European-Style Social Life

Besides the ceremonial character of northern streets and squares, the neighborhood accommodated new land uses that had no precedent in Iranian cities. On the one hand, new governmental buildings, such as the telegraph building, post office, bank, police department, and municipality, gradually clustered around Tupkhanīh Square.\footnote{For the comprehensive study of Tupkhanīh Square, its transformation, architecture, land uses, and history, see: Farukh Muhammadzadih Mihr, *Miyan-i Tupkhanih-yi Tehran [Tupkhanih Square of Tehran]* (Tehran: Payam-i Sima, 1382 [2003]).} The state located these buildings at the heart of the expanded city. They were close to the royal compound, attached to the biggest open space of the city, and were representing the symbols of a modern state. As Habibi elegantly...
puts it, the telegraph and post buildings were the symbols of new communication networks; the bank was the symbol of new commercial relations; the municipality was the symbol of the new government; and the police department was the symbol of new military forces.¹⁵⁹ On the other hand, new commercial spaces gathered around the streets, particularly the northern streets of Lalihzar and ‘Ala’ al-Duwlih. Gradually, European-style shops, “with glass windows and European titles,”¹⁶⁰ opened, which in the words of Alemi turned the streets into “the elegant commercial center of the city.”¹⁶¹ Moreover by 1888, two hotels, similar to European hotels, opened in ‘Ala’ al-Duwlih Street.¹⁶² The accumulation of new commercial spaces was partly due to the demographic composition of Duwlat Neighborhood. Most of the European embassies were gathered in the new neighborhood, particularly around ‘Ala’ al-Duwlih Street, sometimes known as Boulevard des Ambassadeurs.¹⁶³ Besides the diplomatic crew, most of the Europeans living in Tehran gathered in this neighborhood.¹⁶⁴ It is hard to estimate the exact number of the Europeans. The only nineteenth-century survey that counted their number belongs to 1852, before the expansion, which counted 130 Europeans in Tehran. In 1888, Brown mentioned that the “European colony in Teharán is considerable.”¹⁶⁵ A year later, Curzon estimated that around 500 Europeans were living in the city.¹⁶⁶ Besides the Europeans, the main population of the Duwlat Neighborhood consisted of the affluent Iranians or in the words of Brown “many of the

¹⁵⁹ Habibi, Az Shar ta Shahr, 141.
¹⁶⁰ Curzon, Persia and Persian Question, 1: 306.
¹⁶² Brown, A Year Amongst the Persians, 92.
¹⁶³ Curzon, Persia and Persian Question, 1: 310; Brown, A Year amongst the Persians, 91-2; Sykes, Persia and Its People, 48-9.
¹⁶⁴ Edward Brown describes different Europeans who were in Tehran but were not part of the diplomatic crews: Brown, A Year amongst the Persians, 85 & 92.
¹⁶⁵ Brown, A Year amongst the Persians, 85.
more opulent and influential Persians,"167 who were more inclined towards the European lifestyle.

Finally, the expansion of the city coincided with an interesting phenomenon. After the expansion, one can find private and semi-private spaces that were modeled after European social spaces, but were working just for a small group of the elites and some Europeans in the capital. There were two parks, a museum, a theater, a gallery, and even a place for holding concerts.168 However, these spaces were not open to the public. In 1885-6, the first theater opened in the Dar al-Funun Collage and continued to operate for five years. Molière’s plays were the first and most popular plays that were acted on the stage in this theater. However, this place was not open to ordinary people. It had a door to the interior of the royal compound, and the plays were mostly acted for the king and the elites.169 Floor argues that none of the performances in this era were public. They “were aimed at a limited target group, which included the officials of the royal court and other members of the Iranian elite, as well as the leading members of the European and the Armenian community.”170 Similarly, the first museum of the city was nothing but a section of the royal compound for exhibiting the royal jewelry, some antique objects, and European states’ gifts to the king. The museum was not open to ordinary people; only people of the court and some European guests were allowed to visit the place.171 Even the official newspaper does not introduce it as a place for the public, instead mentions that “the term museum is adopted from

167 Brown, A Year amongst the Persians, 92.
168 Not necessarily a designed and built concert hall.
169 Jamshid Malekpour, Adabiyyat-i Namayishi dar Iran [Drama in Iran], vol. 1 (Tehran: Intisharat-i Tus, 1385 [2006]), 306-9. Floor dates the first performance of modern theater in Tehran in the late 1870s and argues that the first theater group was established by young Armenians in Tehran: Floor, The History of Theater in Iran, 214-7.
170 Floor, The History of Theater in Iran, 217.
French, meaning a place for holding valuable and weird objects.”172 Similarly, towards the end of his reign, Nassir al-Din Shah ordered to build a new building in the royal compound, naming it as ‘Imarat-i Galiri or the Gallery Building. They gathered old and new Iranian and European paintings, hanging them in the new building. Once more, this building was open only to elites.173 The most interesting case in this regard was the construction of two new gardens by two of the nobles close to the court. These gardens, figure 3.7, located in Duwlat Neighborhood, were designed based on the English landscape design vocabulary,174 and they are recorded as parks on the 1891 map of Tehran. The gardens or parks were the translation of English parks. However, in the Iranian context, they were deprived of their main element, i.e. the public. Finally, the most successful attempt of the court and elites to produce European social spaces at a (semi)private level was holding concert-like gatherings from January 10, 1872. Two years earlier, the royal music group or Anjuman-i Musikan was established under the instructions of the French music instructor of the Dar al-Funun Collage, Alfred Jean Baptiste Lemaire. The official newspaper of the court writes: “In a city like Tehran where the farangi people do not have any relatives, [the concert hall] is a place for them to gather and socialize during the long and cold winter nights.”175 Again, these gatherings were just for the Europeans and few Iranian elites.

172 Iran, Rabi’ ath-Thani 9, 1294 [April 22, 1877].
175 Iran, Dhu al-Qa’ da 15, 1288 [January 26, 1872].
The museum, gallery, theater, concert hall, and parks were manifestations of the fascination of the minority in power with an alternative lifestyle. They were translations of the appearances. Devoid of sociality, they were physical caricatures of an occidental dream depicted on an oriental canvas. The forms were imitated, but the souls remained undiscovered. Analogous to the production of new ceremonies for the legitimation of the state, the production of genuine social spaces after Europe demanded more time for full manifestation. This transitional era created hybrid spatial meanings and practices. These meanings were incubated in the collective imagination of Iranian society, at least the elite minority, since Mirza Abu Talib Khan’s era. The new spatial knowledge, which Iranians began to produce as early as the late eighteenth century, was partial. Through the expansion of the city, this partial knowledge came into existence. However, partial knowledge produced partial spaces. Inherently social spaces came into existence without the presence of ordinary people. The majority of ordinary people did not have precedent experience of these spaces. This fact can be seen in the opposition of clerics to the theater, and simultaneously, lack of the public support for it, which resulted in its closure only
five years after its opening. Similarly, Ernest Orsolle, who visited Iran in 1882, mentions that after the return of the king from Europe, Nassir al-Din Shah permitted the opening of new cafés and restaurants similar to European ones in Tehran. However, despite the royal patronage, they went bankrupt, and only one remained open, which was not a place for respectable Europeans and was frequented by the officers, Armenians, and pleasure-seeking Persians. A city with hundreds of traditional coffeehouses could only have one café-restaurant. This contrast was the manifestation of the contrast between the desired social spaces by Iranian society and new spaces after Europe, which were introduced by the minority elites.

**Formation of Dualities, Formation of Discourse**

The fascination of the Qajar court with the new city and the concentration of the state’s ceremonies and constructions in the Duwlat Neighborhood created a spatial duality. This duality, although negligible in the beginning, became the dominant spatial discourse in Tehran with drastic impacts on its old neighborhoods and urban population in the years to come. The first trace of this duality goes back as early as 1877, the thirtieth anniversary of the beginning of Nassir al-Din Shah’s reign. Describing the ceremonies, Iran newspaper writes: “[People] started the festivities on Saturday, twentieth of Dhu l-Hijja. From the night of twenty-first, they decorated and lighted up all the bazaars, alleys, Governmental Streets, state buildings, and some of the houses.” The newspaper used an interesting phrase that would become the dominant term for the description of new streets and square. *Khīyābān-ha-yi Duwlati*, Governmental Streets, was the phrase that the state adopted to refer to the new network of streets and squares,

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178 *Iran*, Dhu l-Hijja 28, 1293 [January 14, 1877].
such as Lalihzar, ‘Ala’-al-Duwlih, Marizkhanih, Chiragh Gaz, Nizamiyyih, and Nassiriyih Streets and Tupkhanih, Nigaristan, and Shams al-‘Imarih Squares.\textsuperscript{179} There are older instances of the usage of the term Duwlati, governmental, in phrases such as Takīyyih-yi Duwlati (Takīyyih Duwlat), Arg-i Duwlati (Royal Compound), 'Araźī-yi Duwlati (Royal lands), and the like.

However, this was the first time that the state used the term for urban spaces. In the other cases, the state was the actual owner, but here new streets and squares belonged to people as shari ‘i ʿām or public streets.

If the ownership was not the case, what was the difference between the governmental and non-governmental streets of the city? In June 1880, Nassir al-Din Shah appointed a new head to the office of Iḥtisābīyyih, the municipality-like department established in the mid-1860s. In the king’s official command, there is a bold contrast between new and old neighborhoods, which matches the difference between Khīyābān-ha-yi Duwlati and non-governmental streets. Based on the king’s command, people living in the old city were obliged to pave the alleys in front of their houses\textsuperscript{180} and keep them clean and dust free by sprinkling water and sweeping them regularly.\textsuperscript{181} Seven years later, when the court had equipped all the “Governmental Streets” of the city with the gaslights, the government obliged people to put lights in alleys by their entrance doors and light them up during the nights.\textsuperscript{182} In contrast, it is not surprising that the newspaper repeatedly announces that the agents of Iḥtisābīyyih took good care of the “Governmental Streets and

\textsuperscript{179} For some other instances of the usage of Khīyābān-ha-yi Duwlati in the official newspaper of the court, see: Iran, Safar 11, 1298 [January 12, 1881]; Shaʿban 10, 1298 [July 7, 1881]; Shawwal 12, 1303 [July 15, 1886]; Jumada l-Ula 17, 1304 [February 11, 1887]; Shawwal 25, 1304 [July 18, 1887]; Jumada l-Ula 17, 1305 [January 31, 1888]; Jumada l-Ula 16, 1306 [January 19, 1889]; Shawwal 27, 1307 [October 23, 1889]; Rabiʿ al-Awwal 11, 1307 [November 5, 1889]; Rabiʿ ath-Thani 21, 1307 [December 15, 1889]; Dhu l-Hijja 15, 1311 [June 19, 1894].

\textsuperscript{180} Iran, Rajab 5, 1297 [June 14, 1880]

\textsuperscript{181} Iran, Rajab 19, 1297 [June 28, 1880]

\textsuperscript{182} Iran, Shawwal 25, 1304 [July 17, 1887].
Squares” by cleaning them regularly, repairing any damage quickly, and planting new trees in them.183

The state took responsibility for the new city. Paving, cleaning, planting, and lightening of new streets were parts of the state’s duties. Once again, the court’s fascination with the appearance worked in favor of the new neighborhood. After the construction, the state was responsible for maintaining the appearance of the new city, but the old city was left outside the circle of the state’s duties. People were responsible for the labyrinthine network of alleys in the old city. The term Khīyābān-ha-yi Duwlati requires a second component, something like Khīyābān-ha-yi Millati or people’s streets. Although the second term was never used, this duality was evident in the practices of the Qajar court. The court appropriated the Khīyābān-ha-yi Duwlati for holding the official ceremonies, introducing the new land uses, accommodating the Europeans and elites, and the like, while Khīyābān-ha-yi Millati were the continuation of the old way of life.

The latter belonged to the old city; the belonged to various communities of the city. As a result, the communities were responsible for their maintenance. It was not the state’s duty to interfere in communal spaces. The state never planned and constructed alleys of the old city. During the past centuries, the gradual process of urbanization formed them organically. So, why should the state spend money on them? Why should the state feel any responsibility towards them? Communities created them, and communities were responsible. The only duty of the state was to remind them of their duties, oblige them to stick to them, and punish them for their failure. As a result, it is not hard to decipher these sentences from Iran newspaper, when it talks pompously about the expansion of Tehran: “From the most important constructions are the long

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183 *Iran*, Shawwal 12, 1303 [July 15, 1886], Jumada l-Ula 17, 1304 [February 11, 1887], & Jumada l-Ula 17, 1305 [January 31, 1888].
streets with trees planted on their side. [These streets] have no similarity to old alleys that were narrow, crooked, filthy, and stinky, where a horse could hardly pass through them."\textsuperscript{184} The difference between the governmental and non-governmental was the difference between old and new, east and west, modern and obsolete, communal and governmental, and the like.

The duality of old and new cities had another aspect too. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, from the 1850s, the spatial strategies of the state created impoverished neighborhoods beyond the city ramparts in the south. For the first time, the distribution of population solely formed based on economic resources of people. Similarly, the practices of the state during the 1871-72 famine exacerbated the situation, meaning that the state housed poor and starving people away from the northern section of the city. Meanwhile, the expansion of Tehran provided a lucrative opportunity for the state to sell the northern lands in high prices. It is not hard to guess who the main customers of the northern lands were. The city became polarized between the wealthy north and impoverished south. Wealthy people, living in the old neighborhoods of the city, gradually filtered into the northern neighborhood. Interestingly, this process matches the production of the new wealthy class in the country (Chapter Four). As the national wealth accumulated gradually in the hands of the wholesale merchants and landlords and society started to transform its traditional class structure to a new one, the northern neighborhood of Tehran provided the spatial context for the new class. Consequently, the older neighborhoods became more impoverished year after year.

Unfortunately, essential demographic data to illustrate this trend is not available. The best available data in this regard is the 1932 survey of Tehran. The state conducted this survey just before the final destruction of Nassiri ramparts. It is an important document because by 1932 the northern neighborhood was fully formed and integrated into urban life. As the 1891 map of

\textsuperscript{184} \textit{Iran}, Rabi' ath-Thani 9, 1294 [April 22, 1877].
Tehran shows, twenty years after the expansion, most of the lands in the new neighborhood were empty. However in 1932, the city within the wall was fully developed. The 1932 survey of Tehran does not contain the income level of the households to illustrate the economic map of the city at the time; however there are other factors that can be used to reproduce the distribution of wealth in Tehran.

Figure 3.8 shows the average number of the livable rooms, *Yurds*,185 in each house of the nine demographic districts of Tehran. District One corresponds with the royal compound. District Two, Duwlat, and Three, Hassanabad, are the two northern neighborhoods of Tehran that the state sold their lands to wealthy families. District Four, Sangilaj, Eight Bazaar, and Nine Üdlajân almost match the main neighborhoods of the old city. As the map shows, the two northern neighborhoods contain houses with bigger numbers of livable rooms. It can be inferred that the houses in the northern neighborhoods were bigger in size. However, the main difference between the north and the rest of the city becomes evident when this map is combined with the map in figure 3.9, which shows the average number of people living in each room. In the northern houses, the number of the livable rooms is equal to or even more than the number of the residents in the houses. In other words, in average, each person has at least one room for himself. However, two or more people should share a room together in neighborhoods of the old city and also the southern neighborhood of Muhammadiyyih, district six.

185 The survey counted the rooms that at least one person could sleep in during the night. Calling this unit of measurement as *Yurd*, they omitted spaces such as restrooms, kitchens, and water storages. Baladiyyih Tehran, *Sarshumari-yi Nofis-i Shahr-i Tehran: Dar Sanavat-i 1262 va 1270 va 1301 va 1311* [The survey of Tehran population in the years 1262 and 1270 and 1301 and 1311] (Tehran: Matba`i`h-yi Majlis, 1312 [1933]), 38.
What does it mean? In 1932, while the houses in northern neighborhoods were bigger, fewer people were living in them. In other words, the residents of the north, on average, had better economic conditions than the other parts of the city. The worst conditions of all the neighborhoods belonged to District Six, Muhammadiyyih, or the most southern neighborhood of the city. Here, while the houses were the smallest, with fewer rooms to live in, they were the most crowded ones too. It is interesting to note how a trivial decision in the 1850s changed into an enormous urban problem eighty years later. Nassir al-Din Shah took the first step towards the production of the new spatial structure of Tehran by accommodating poor people in the south. The Qajar court’s spatial strategies accompanied by the structural transformations of society and changes in the distribution of wealth between people created a polarized city divided between wealthy and poor poles.

Figure 3.8. The average number of the livable rooms in each house (on the left).
Figure 3.9. The average number of people living in each room (on the right).\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{186} I produced these maps based on the data from: \textit{Sarshumari-yi Nofus-i Shahr-i Tehran}.
Conclusion

In the nineteenth century, the Qajar court was able to bring various communities of the city into a common space. Court-sponsored ceremonies were mostly religious rituals that could transcend communal boundaries and gather representatives and members of various communities and neighborhoods at the same place. They were the most effective venues for the establishment of a relationship between the state and society. The Qajar court aimed to legitimize its power by representing itself as the primary advocate of religious ceremonies and the main protector of people’s religiosity. As a result, it needed a venue to gather various communities at the same place to sponsor their religious practices. However, these venues were quasi-public spaces. As my analysis suggests, communities were able to reproduce micro-communal-spaces at these sites; no coherent public formed in these ceremonies.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century and after the expansion of Tehran, the Qajar court transformed its spatial strategies. By transferring its religious and non-religious ceremonies into the streets and squares of the new neighborhood, the court established a new relationship with society to practice a new model of legitimation based on European nation-states. This model transformed urban spaces into spectacles by holding various commemorative ceremonies, particularly the King’s birthday and his annual return to the city. Through the decoration of streets and squares, fireworks, music, parades, and the like, the state was able to gather people in these spaces and form its desire relationship with the public. For the first time, people’s presence and practices in these ceremonies were not based on their communal affiliation. The new legitimation model was more successful in the amalgamation of various communities into a
public. However, this public was a passive observer of the state’s ceremonies; people were bystanders without collective actions.

Finally, the state’s spatial strategies resulted in the production of a new spatial discourse. There was a great contrast between the dominant communal discourse, which formed the spatiality of the city based on communal practices, and the new discourse, which formed the city based on economic interests and top-down planning and regulation of urban spaces based on European vocabulary of urban design. Moreover, the destructive episodes of cholera epidemics were crucial in the formation and consolidation of the new spatial discourse; the Qajar state felt the urgency of the top-down regulation of the city. Although the two discourses juxtaposed each other peacefully in the 1870s, in the years to come, as Chapter Five examines, the latter became the dominant socio-spatial discourse with decisive impact in the old city and its communities.
Chapter Four

The Constitutional Revolution: From Sacred Spaces to Political Public Spaces and from the Communal Sphere to the Public Sphere

In this chapter, I date the formation of the public sphere in Iran, particularly in Tehran, to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Iranian public sphere differs from the bourgeois\(^1\) and proletariat public spheres.\(^2\) It was not based on economic interests; it was the outcome of coming together of various communal spheres. The binding force of religion and the formation of the propertied middle class were the main factors in the formation of the public sphere in Iran towards the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In this model of the public sphere, there was no need for bracketing of inequalities for the production of temporary parity between participants.\(^3\) The public sphere was achieved by a multiplicity of communities;\(^4\) it was segmented; and it enabled each community to preserve it identity.

The common pivotal element between the bourgeois public sphere and the segmented model is their normative aspect.\(^5\) The formation of the public sphere enabled Iranian urban society to challenge, to influence, and to circumscribe the Qajar court. After the success of the

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\(^4\) Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere,” 127.

\(^5\) As I suggested in the introduction chapter, it is possible to boil down the concept of the public sphere into a normative aspect that enables society to challenge the state. P. Howell, “Public Space and the Public Sphere: Political Theory and the Historical Geography of Modernity,” *Environment and Design D: Society and Space* 11 (1993): 309; Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere,” 111; Peter Uwe Hohendahl, “The Public Sphere: Models and Boundaries,” in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 101.
Constitutional Revolution and the establishment of the parliament, the monarchy was restricted by constitutional laws. Moreover, various political organizations were able to challenge the court and undermine its sovereignty.

Religion had a great impact on the process of the formation of the public sphere. I demonstrate that in the absence of free press and other types of media, religious authorities had the most significant role in the formation of public opinion. They were the true leaders of the revolution and their unity, enhanced by the propertied middle class, encouraged various communities to come together during the months of the revolution. Similarly, political public space formed through the same religious discourse. During the revolution, people chose sacred spaces of the city as their sites of political activities; mosques and shrines transformed into political public spaces and enabled people to act collectively against the Qajar court. They were the only spaces that belonged to all segments of society which were not colored by a communal identity. As a result, the public sphere and public spaces were closely interconnected during the Constitutional Revolution. Public space provided the materiality of the public sphere;6 there was a reciprocal relationship between them, and they shared certain social commonalities, in this case, religiosity and coming together of the segments. The political activities of people in space present the full potential of public spaces and provide the most effective material manifestation of the public sphere.7

Although the Constitutional Revolution was the apex of the religious discourse and resulted in the formation of the public sphere and political public spaces, the revolution brought

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its demise too. After the revolution and by the proliferation of free newspapers, clerics lost their role as the sole producers of public opinion. By the establishment of communal political organizations, anjumans, religiosity was not the only social force for coming together of communities. The establishment of the parliament, as the house of people, provided an alternative to mosques and shrines as the primary sites of political activity.

Similarly, the decline of the communal sphere originates in the same era. After the revolution, the propertied middle class seized power. The electoral law was designed to give the priority of candidacy for the parliament to the propertied middle class. Although the revolution succeeded through the unity of communities and formation of the segmented public sphere, the first parliament was not an accurate representation of the communal spheres. For the first time, class politics overwhelmed the communal sphere.

Finally, the constitutional era resulted in another significant shift in the public sphere and political spaces. For the first time, women entered into the public sphere as an influential social force. They established their own anjumans, newspapers, schools, and some other organizations. They mobilized in support of democracy and questioned the masculine dominance of public spaces. Through their political and nonpolitical activities, they redefined the concept of the public sphere and public space.

I begin this chapter with the story of the formation of the propertied middle class in Iran during the nineteenth century. This class played an important role during the revolution; the members of this class could transcend communal boundaries and mobilize their resource collectively while maintaining their communal ties. I explain their first political move, the Tobacco Movement, before the revolution in the late nineteenth century, as a prelude to the Constitutional Revolution. After that, I will continue with the Constitutional Revolution, and I
will introduce the formation of the public sphere and political public spaces. The chapter will end with the years following the revolution and the role of *anjumans*, newspapers, the parliament, and women’s movements in initiating a process which resulted in the transformation of the public sphere and political public spaces in the years to come.

**Formation of the Propertied Middle Class**

The fall of the Safavid Empire and the destructive Afghan invasion between 1720 and 1730 brought seven decades of instability, civil wars, and economic collapse to Iran. The social chaos did not fully recede until the establishment of the Qajar dynasty by the end of the eighteenth century and particularly Fath ‘Ali Shah’s long reign. The establishment of the central government and the resulting relative stability in the country caused Iranian society to reconstruct its livelihood once again. This reconstruction formed in a new global atmosphere in contact with European capitalism and colonialism. The long nineteenth century initiated massive structural changes in Iranian society.

The revival of internal and foreign trade was one of the most significant consequences of the relative stability of the nineteenth century. Gilbar believes that trade was “the most significant component of the services sector, in terms of both employment and incomes.” Consequently, its revival was a major economic development for the country. Throughout the century, trade regained its power gradually. However, due to the presence of economic and colonial powers particularly Britain and Russia, European industrial revolution, and global capitalism, the politics

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of trade in the region had been already changed when the Qajar dynasty came into power. The growth of foreign trade was impressive, increasing twelve times during the nineteenth century, with the greater portion belonged to the last decades of the century. In the south, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the establishment of steamship transportation between the Persian Gulf and India in 1862, and the development of Karun River navigation in the late 1880s resulted in the significant increase in foreign trade towards the end of the century. Similarly, in the north, the development of steamship transportation on Caspian Sea in the 1860s and the Russian Transcaspian railway in the mid-1880s contributed to this increase.

There is a delicate difference between Iran and other countries of the region, particularly the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and some North Africa colonies, regarding foreign trade. Scholars studying the economic history of Iran during the nineteenth century agree that, unlike the other countries of the region, the direct involvement of Europeans and other foreigners in the Iranian trade market was very limited. As Nashat puts it “the native Iranian merchant acted as a middle man in the growth of trade with the outside world.” While in the other countries, the native merchants lost their dominance to the foreigners, Iranian merchants succeeded in gaining a

10 Still the rate of growth in Iran was slower than the other countries of the region in the same period. For example, Egypt had a forty-two-fold and the Ottoman Empire had thirty-fold expansion in their foreign trade, see: Guity Nashat, “From Bazaar to Market: Foreign Trade and Economic Development in Nineteenth-Century Iran,” Iranian Studies 14, no. 1/2 (Winter - Spring 1981): 61; Issawi, An Economic History of the Middle East, 23-7.
monopoly over trade. Nashat believes that the poor condition of transportation infrastructure in the country, the absence of foreign communities, the lack of the means of international communication, and the small size of the profit discouraged foreigners from direct trade in Iran. In addition, Hakimian argues that the imperial rivalries between Russia and Britain resulted in their lack of interest for direct involvement in Iranian trade.

The monopoly over trade had far-reaching social consequences. The long-respected Iranian merchants grew gradually to become an effective social force. The accumulated liquid funds in their hands enabled them to adopt additional tasks; in the absence of a modern banking system, the major wholesale merchants were the only social group who had the economic power to play the role of bankers and money lenders. The merchants were the “most prosperous and stable element” of society. They could supply the monarchs with loans for their military expenditures, construction projects, royal ceremonies, and lavish lifestyles. The merchants had the best living conditions, they had “opulent” houses; their wives were occasionally compared to wives of the royal harem; they paid no tax, and they were protected by the state. In the words of Gavin Hambly, “the Government generally protected and cherished geese which laid such golden eggs.”

The merchants’ influence went far beyond mere trade activities. Towards the mid-nineteenth century, the agricultural landscape of Iran went through a major transformation. The production of cash crops for export as raw material became a common trend in the country. As a result, many agricultural centers of the country shifted from the production of wheat and barley to other

17 Hakimian, “Economy”.
crops, such as opium, cotton, tobacco, rice, and fruits. The merchants accompanied by the traditional landlords began to invest in the production of these cash crops. They gradually bought and accumulated lands and improved the irrigation systems to increase their share of production and profit. The economic crisis of the court provided the merchants with an excellent opportunity to increase their access to land by buying and renting the royal lands. As a result, towards the last decades of the nineteenth century the line between the landlords and merchants became blurry. Merchants possessed huge capital, vast agricultural lands, and even villages.

This gradual process caused a major shift in the social composition of Iran during the nineteenth century. The total population of the country doubled in this era, from five or six million in the beginning to ten million by 1914. On the other hand, the proportion of nomads, as one of the main components of the country’s population, dropped from half to a quarter of the total population. With respect to the estimate of the doubling of the total population, it means that the number of nomads remained almost constant throughout the century. In other words, the increase in the population of nomads turned into the sedentary lifestyle; Gilbar’s argues that there was a “movement from nomadism to sedentarization” in nineteenth-century Iran. In addition, the country experienced significant urbanization, particularly in the second half of the century. The urban population increased from eight or nine percent of the total population in the mid-nineteenth century to eighteen percent in the early twentieth century.

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23 Issawi ed., The Economic History of Iran, 20.
24 Keddie, “The Economic History of Iran,” 73.
26 Gilbar, “The Opening Up of Qajar Iran,” 85.
Not all sections of the population, particularly in the cities, benefited from these social changes. The traditional industries and crafts were hit severely. Unable to compete with cheap European products and adapt to the changing taste of society, many of the old crafts vanished gradually, such as textile industry and traditional handicrafts. Even as early as the 1840s, the gradual penetration of European products affected the main cities on the trade routes. An account from 1843 shows that more than three fourths of the contents of the shops in Tabriz bazaar were European, particularly British, imported products, such as fabric, glassware, amber, toys, and leather cloths. Consequently, the old-established guild system underwent some fundamental changes, which weakened its organization. The most important exception to the general declining trend of the traditional crafts and industries was the carpet industry. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the growing popularity of Persian carpets in Europe and America, particularly after the 1873 World Trade Fair in Vienna, helped the industry to flourish and become a major part of the export.

The most dramatic shift of the nineteenth century belongs to the royal court. In the second half of the century, two parallel economic processes deteriorated the financial position of the court. On the one hand, royal expenditures increased rapidly. The kings’ European trips, increasing royal pensions, and increasing military expenditures put the central government under unprecedented economic pressure. On the other hand, not only did the annual revenue of the

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27 There are contradictory claims about the changes in the economic condition of the peasants during the nineteenth century. Issawi argues that the “lack of data makes it impossible to measure the level of living, or even to state whether it improved or deteriorated over the years” in the nineteenth century. Keddie believes that because of the “landlord exactions, which increased with the rise of cash crops and of investment in land” and “extortionate taxes” peasants became severely impoverished in the course of the century. In contrast, Nashat and Gilbar argue that the overall condition of the peasants improved towards the end of the century: Issawi, *The Economic History of Iran*, 22; Keddie, “The Economic History of Iran,” 73; Nashat, “From Bazaar to Market,” 62; Gilbar, “The Opening Up of Qajār Iran,” 80.
30 Hakimian, “Economy.”
court not increase, it lost considerable portions of its revenue due to its inability to adapt to the structural changes of the time. The government did not properly adjust land taxation to agricultural growth, did not consider the fall of the value of the national currency in its tax assessments, and could not enforce tax collection throughout the country. Consequently, “the government revenue from direct taxes, in constant prices, was in the late 1890s, if not earlier, lower by at least fifty percent” in comparison with the 1860s.\textsuperscript{31} The severe deficit of the court had two direct results. First, the court had to use much of the gold and silver in the royal treasury, which decreased by two third during the 1870s and 1880s.\textsuperscript{32} Second, the court had to sell the crown lands, mostly to the big merchants and landlords.\textsuperscript{33}

Moreover, the Qajar court was unable to implement vast reforms to change its deteriorating condition. As early as Fath ʿAli Shah’s era the court began to send students to Europe in an effort to modernize the military. The most significant transformation in this regard was the establishment of Dar al-Funun Collage in Tehran in the early years of Nassir al-Din Shah’s reign. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, the court and some of the prominent merchants attempted to establish new factories to compete with the European industries. Moreover, the court attempted in vain to reform the old-established taxation system. The same was the case for the endeavors to renew the transportation infrastructure of the country. Most of these attempts did not bear any fruit, and such changes had to wait until the advent of Reza Shah in the 1920s.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the structural transformations of Iranian society resulted in an unprecedented phenomenon. A “small capitalist class,”\textsuperscript{34} consisting of merchants

\textsuperscript{31} Gilbar, “The Opening Up of Qājār Iran,” 84-5.
\textsuperscript{32} Gilbar, “The Opening Up of Qājār Iran,” 87.
\textsuperscript{34} Nashat, “From Bazaar to Market,” 53.
and landlords, gradually formed that, despite their communal affiliations, could transcend the old communal boundaries and act as a united body. Abrahamian calls it the propertied middle class and broadens its definition to include merchants, landowners, bazaar shopkeepers, and workshop owners. Disregarding the social segmentation, the newly formed class could mobilize its resources towards common objectives. Certain governmental measures aggravated the gap between the court and the merchants, resulted in confrontations between the two, and helped the new class to become united and act cohesively. The financial crisis of the Qajar court pushed the central state to reform the taxation system, which could result in closing the tax loopholes that had worked in favor of the merchants for decades. Unable to implement these reforms, from the early 1890s, the state began to take out loans with Britain and Russia. These loans were usually accompanied with significant concessions to the lenders in the form of the monopoly on trades of specific products or reformation of the customs administration. These concessions could deeply hurt the merchants. As a result, “[t]he most remarkable feature of the economic development of Iran in the nineteenth century was the emergence of an entrepreneurial, aggressive, and enlightened bourgeoisie.” Before the Constitutional Revolution, the propertied middle class demonstrated its potential in the mobilization of its resource and encountering the state during the 1892 Tobacco Movement.

37 Nashat, “From Bazaar to Market,” 70.
The Tobacco Movement

The history of the Constitutional Revolution is entangled with the Tobacco Movement of 1891-2. In the words of Nikki Keddie, the Tobacco Movement “presents in microcosm many of the features which were to reappear in the Persian Revolution of 1905-11.” Similarly, Lambton calls the movement as the “prelude to Revolution,” and Abrahamian calls it “a dress rehearsal for” the Constitutional Revolution. The movement was a reaction to a concession that gave a fifty years monopoly of the production, sale, and export of Persian Tobacco to Major Gerald Talbot, a British subject. In return, he agreed to pay an annual rent of fifteen thousand pounds and “one-quarter of the annual profits, after the payment of all working expenses and a five per cent dividend on the capital.”

Prior to this concession, the Qajar court had signed many different concessions with Europeans. Even, in 1872, the court had to call off a humiliating concession negotiated by Baron Julius de Reuter, due to the mass opposition in the country and increasing pressure from Russia. However, tobacco was a sensitive crop to be the subject of such a comprehensive monopoly. It was an inseparable part of Iranians’ daily lives through smoking Qalyān, hookah. More than 200,000 people involved in its production and sale, with an internal consumption rate of 5,400,000 kilos, 11.9 million pounds, and an annual export of four million kilos, 8.8 million pounds.

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42 Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran, 4-5; Lambton, “The Tobacco Regie I,” 119-20.
Shortly after the public announcement of the concession in February 1891, the tobacco merchants protested. First, the prominent merchants of Tehran met in the house of their leader and wrote a petition to the king offering him to pay more taxes on tobacco. Unable to persuade the king, they assembled in Shah Mosque, a main mosque in Tehran, and proceeded to Shah ‘Abd al-ʿAzim Shrine, a saint’s shrine outside the city, to take sanctuary. Meanwhile, in other cities, the protests built up, and more serious episodes of contention occurred. The southern city of Shiraz was the first one to rise. In April 1891, the clashes between the state and people left some casualties. In May, the unrest spread to Tabriz where people became radical and prepared for an armed uprising. Afraid of the tense situation in Tabriz, the government had to exempt merchants of Azerbaijan province from the obligation to obey the concession. Isfahan and Mashhad were the next cities to join the movement and rise against the central government. In Isfahan, the leading ʿulamā, clerics, of the city announced a religious prohibition on smoking and trading tobacco. Soon, the consumption and trade ceased completely in the entire city. The ʿulamā, as the primary leaders of the movement, had a great influence over the masses. People observed their fatwas and followed their religious instructions.

Despite the regional differences, the merchants were the leaders of oppositions in various cities, since they were the first group who had to endure the direct impact of the monopoly. Besides merchants, ʿulamā were the second oppositional group, partly because of their own economic interests and involvement in the production and trade of tobacco and partly because of

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44 Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran, 52.
their religious concerns about the penetration of Europeans and possible weakening of Islam in the country.\textsuperscript{46} Fatema Soudavar Farmanfarmaian argues that the merchants were “the forefront of opposition,” and the ‘ulamā “served as a conduit to the mobilization of flocks.”\textsuperscript{47} Similarly, Mongol Bayat rejects the central role of ‘ulamā during the Tobacco Movement as “instigators” or the “actual leaders” of the protests and argues that they “were persuaded to take a strong stand against the concessions by forces outside the religious institution.”\textsuperscript{48} This movement was one of the first manifestations of the new social class, the propertied middle class.

In the cities, the network of mosques was the main spatial setting for mobilization of people. At the climax of the protests in each city, the clerics preached against the concession in mosques and provoked the masses to take action. In the words of Katja Föllmer, “religious, didactic and popular modes of communication were based on direct face-to-face contacts. Only those who had good social networks could communicate with larger groups across the regions. The Shi‘ite clergy [...] was therefore the most influential group and a certain kind of medium for the distribution of information among the masses.”\textsuperscript{49} In cities with saints’ shrines, these spaces transformed into the centers of protest and gathering. Shiraz’s Shah-i Chiragh Shrine,\textsuperscript{50} Mashhad’s Imam Reza Shrine,\textsuperscript{51} and Tehran’s Shah ‘Abd al-‘Azim Shrine were the example of the shrines that changed into platforms of protest.

The mobilization network of the Tobacco Movement was far beyond local mosques, shrines, and even geographical boundaries of the country. A unique phenomenon occurred

\textsuperscript{47} Farmanfarmaian, “Revisiting and Revising the Tobacco Rebellion,” 598-9.
\textsuperscript{50} Keddie, \textit{Religion and Rebellion in Iran}, 67; Karbala‘i, \textit{Gharardad-i Regie 1890}, 34.
during the movement that became an ever-present feature of Iranian movements up to the present time. In the words of Keddie, it was the “peculiar alliances between part of the religious leadership and the liberal or radical nationalist elements of the country in opposition to the government.” Mirza Malkam Khan, an Iranian modernist, and his proponents had a great impact on the movement. His London base newspaper, Qanun, was very popular in Iran, and it had a significant readership. The other newspaper that had a meaningful impact on the movement was the Istanbul-based Akhtar newspaper. It published two articles against the tobacco concession and revealed the unjust content of the concession in comparison to a similar one signed with the Ottoman government. However, the most influential figure in this regard was Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, a political activist who was an advocate of Muslim’s unity against the increasing penetration of Europeans, particularly Britain, in the region. Arrested and expelled from the country, Afghani had a significant role in persuading the prominent Shiʿi clerics in Samara, Ottoman Iraq, to rise against the concession and support the opponents. In Nikki R. Keddie’s words “[f]rom the beginning, there was some organized liaison between various cities, and Jamāl ad-Dīn’s and Malkam’s followers played an important role.”

In December 1891, the movement reached its climax when Mirza Hassan Shirazi a leading Shiʿi mujtahid (prominent cleric) residing in Samara, announced a fatwa boycotting the use of tobacco. The text was short and simple: “In the name of God the Merciful, the Forgiving. Today the use of tobacco (tanbaku va tutun) in whatever fashion, is tantamount to war against the Imam

53 For the role of Malkam and the impact of his newspaper on the movement see: Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran, 44 & 53-7.
54 Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran,44-5 & 49.
56 Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran, 73.
57 Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran, 66. Also see: Lambton, “The Tobacco Regie I,” 138.
of the Age, may God hasten his glad advent.” Although no one saw the original text of the fatwa, and there were rumors upon its forgery by leaders of merchants and the chief mujtahid of Tehran, Mirza Hasan Ashtiyani, the fatwa created the desired impact. The public consumption of tobacco ceased entirely in the country; coffeehouse owners broke their hookahs; all hookah shops closed; even religious minorities joined the public reaction; more importantly, in the royal harem, king’s wives broke all hookahs and stopped smoking.

Soon the rumors of jihad, holy war, spread in Tehran, and people armed to fight against the government. Although Ashtiyani denied these rumors, and people calmed down, Nassir al-Din Shah felt an unprecedented pressure. On January 3, 1892, Nasi al-Din Shah sent a message to Ashtiyani, giving him two choices: whether he would smoke publicly or leave the city. Ashtiyani chose the latter and on the next day, in a religious gathering at his house, he announced his departure. The spark hit the tinderbox, and a massive riot spread in the city. All the shops closed, and people from different parts of the city moved to the Sangilaj neighborhood where Ashtiyani resided. They prevented Ashtiyani’s departure by gathering at his house. The furious crowd, then, moved towards the royal compound to conclude the uprising once and for all. The clashes between the crowd and military forces around the royal compound resulted in latter’s shooting towards the crowd and death of at least seven people. By the evening, the crowd was dispersed, and the city was placed under curfew.

In the context of this research, the spatial setting of the riot on January 4 is crucial. Although the Tobacco Movement is a microcosm of the Constitutional Revolution, this riot

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58 The translation of the fatwa is taken from Lambton article: Lambton, “The Tobacco Regie I,” 145.
59 In her valuable article, Fatema Soudavar Farmanfarmaian investigates the possibility of the forgery, see: Farmanfarmaian, “Revisiting and Revising the Tobacco Rebellion,” 609-10.
60 For the public reaction to the fatwa see: Karbalaʾi, Gharardad-i Regie 1890, 69-75.
61 The details of the event of January 4 is available in all the studies of the movement: Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran, 103-5; Karbalaʾi, Gharardad-i Regie 1890, 110-8; Azhand, Qiyam-i Tanbaku, 132-7; Lambton, “The Tobacco Regie I,” 152-3.
differs greatly from episodes of contention during the revolution. On January 4, 1892, the royal compound was the crowd’s main target. People’s gathering was not an organized protest; instead, it was a spontaneous riot, a reaction to the sudden news of Ashtiyani’s departure. Consequently, spaces that people used were completely different from those during the Constitutional Revolution.

![Map of Tehran](image)

**Figure 4.1.** The locations of protests and clashes on January 4, 1892.

For details of the day, eyewitness accounts are the most valuable sources. Joannes Feuvrier, Nassir al-Din Shah’s personal physician, provides a detailed account in his travelogue.

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On the day of the riot, he was in the royal compound and witnessed all the events personally. Based on his account, from ten in the morning, a big crowd gathered around the royal compound. Around one in the afternoon, the crowd succeeded in breaking into Arg Square, south of the royal compound; however, military forces prevented them from going any further and entering the royal palaces. Afterwards, a section of the crowd retreated and moved around the royal compound, from Jubakhanih and Nassiriyyih Streets, to reach to the northern end of the compound in Darb-i Andarun Street. At this location, the crowd attacked Nayib al-Saltanih, Nassir al-Din Shah’s son and the governor of Tehran, who managed to escape into his palace. When the crowd attempted to break into the palace, the military forces fired towards people. By half past three in the afternoon, the crowd was dispersed, and order was returned to the city.63 Fortunately, the 1891 map of Tehran contains the location of Nayib al-Saltanih’s palace and can be used to reconstruct the trajectory of the riot, figure 4.1.

During the Tobacco Movement, there was no organized demonstration in Tehran, except the first gathering of merchants in Shah Mosque and later in Shah Ḥabib al-ʿAzim Shrine. The public reaction on January 4 was spontaneous and emotional. The events of the day were more like a riot with one goal, entering the royal compound and murdering Nassir al-Din Shah. As a result, Arg Square and the streets around the royal compound were platforms for fighting between people and the state rather than arenas for protest. However, out of the heat of the clashes, the possibility of an organized protest emerged. In the evening of the riot day, religious leaders appointed the next gathering location to protest against the concession. They announced that people should gather at Shah Mosque on January 6.64 However, the situation calmed down

63 Feuvrier, *Trois Ans à la Cour de Perse*, 291-6.
64 Karbalaʾi, *Gharardad-i Regie* 1890, 118.
significantly, and negotiations between the court and religious leaders resulted in the cancellation of the concession. Tehran did not witness mass protests until the Constitutional Revolution.

Who is Who of the Constitutional Revolution

The 1906 Constitutional Revolution is a controversial subject of study. Different scholars have approached the topic from various perspectives, occasionally overstating the role of a particular social group and neglecting the role of another. The majority of historians close to the time of the revolution, who had the chance to witness the revolution personally, overstate the role of the penetration of Western ideas and concepts as the primary player of Iranians’ awakening and their cry for liberation, nationalism, and democracy. These scholars usually originate the process of Iranian’s awakening to the mid-nineteenth century and to the works of Mirza Malkam Khan and Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. These works highlight the role of the intelligentsia with liberal ideas and familiar with European countries as the main force behind the revolution.

Nineteenth century Iranian intelligentsia was the outcome of the court’s earlier reforms. They belonged to affluent families who were more aware of Europe through travel to the continent, attending Dar al-Funun Collage of Tehran or European universities, and reading travelogues and European literary works. Abrahamian argues that the Iranian intelligentsia viewed “royal despotism, clerical dogmatism, and foreign imperialism” as main obstacles to Iran’s progress and advocated “constitutionalism, secularism, and nationalism” as their remedies.


65 Browne, The Persian Revolution.
However, they were too few and “heterogeneous” to form an independent social class. Consequently, they had to make coalitions with other social groups, sometimes the court, sometimes the clerics, and other times with the merchants, to advance their objectives.66

Another line of works steps back from years of the revolution and explains the Constitutional Revolution as the outcome of global changes and the structural transformation of Iranian society.67 Abrahamian’s valuable analysis of nineteenth century Iran demonstrates how the propertied middle class could transcend the old-established communal boundaries and mobilize its resources to protest against the Qajar court.68 Towards the end of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, due to economic policies of the state, particularly customs reforms, foreign loans, and concessions, this class became united and hostile to the Qajar court.

Abrahamian argues that the revolution was the outcome of the coalition of this class and the intelligentsia. However, he argues that “the socioeconomic impact of the West [rather than its ideological impact] can be described as the major determining cause of the constitutional revolution.”69 Gad Gilbar follows more or less the same line of argument. However, instead of focusing on the propertied middle class, he examines the role of big merchants in the success of the revolution. While he admits that the revolution was the result of the cooperation between big


merchants, the intelligentsia, and clerics, he argues that the specific social position of merchants made them the only possible link between the latter two. As a result, big merchants were the primary reason for the success of the revolution.\textsuperscript{70} In contrast to Gilbar, Mohammad Reza Afshari examines the role of masses in the Constitutional Revolution.

Afshari introduces pīshihvarān (craftsmen) and merchants as the main social force behind the success of the revolution. He attempts to present a new argument, different from Abrahamian’s Marxist interpretation, and argues that the revolution “was deeply rooted in the history of social conflicts of the country.”\textsuperscript{71} However, his pīshihvarān and merchants group matches Abrahamian’s propertied middle class, and his argument follows more or less the same trajectory.

Besides the propertied middle class, big merchants, and the intelligentsia, there was another group whose impact on the course of the revolution is undeniable. The ʿulamā, clerics, are usually seen as leaders of the masses. With great ties with merchants and a great influence on the masses, the ʿulamā were the leading group who could encourage various communities to rise against the state. However, the centrality of their position during the Constitutional Revolution is a matter of disagreement. Ann Lambton and Hamid Algar are the biggest advocates of the ʿulamā’s role. Lambton rejects the concept of the revolution and argues that the 1906 movement was “messianic, not revolutionary, and it represented not the assertion of a new theory of government, the outcome of a revolution in man’s concept of his own nature, of society and his place in society, but rather a reversal of the existing order and the establishment of the kingdom of heaven on earth.”\textsuperscript{72} She sees the Constitutional Revolution as a rise against tyranny. As a result, protests were not necessarily against the poverty and economic stress, rather they occurred...

\textsuperscript{70} Gilbar, “The Big Merchants,” 302.
\textsuperscript{71} Afshari, “The Pishivaran and Merchants,” 151.
because people felt that the existing situation was “contrary to the true government of Islam.”

Consequently, people did not “demand for the transfer of power to a group with a new ideology, but simply [they asked] for the restoration of righteous or just government.”\(^7^3\) Through this point of view, ‘ulamā were the natural leader of the opposition. Moreover, by considering the various measures of the Qajar court to curb ‘ulamā’s power since the mid-nineteenth century, the revolution turns into the rise of the religious class against the court.\(^7^4\)

Similarly, Hamid Algar argues that the ‘ulamā were the main leaders of the revolution. As a result, the revolution was “a repetition of the ulama’s traditional role of leading opposition to the state.”\(^7^5\) However, he agrees that the Constitutional Revolution was different from the previous movements, mostly because of the alliance of the ‘ulamā with liberal reformers. Algar wonders whether the ‘ulamā became the reformists’ tool for mobilizing the masses. He avoids providing a definite answer to this question, but he argues that the ‘ulamā failed to perceive the nature of constitutional demands, and despite their “greatest display of their political power,” the Constitutional Revolution brought the beginning of their demise as the sole leaders of the oppositional movements in Iran: “Thus it was that the forces of renewal passed them by.”\(^7^6\)

Nikki Keddie believes that the success of the revolution was the result of a bizarre coalition between the ‘ulamā and the intelligentsia. Initially, the coalition formed during the Tobacco Movement and remained functional up to the success of the revolution. However, after the establishment of the parliament, the two groups could not solve their inherent contradictions, and their fragile alliance broke.\(^7^7\) Mongol Bayat goes one step further and argues that the ‘ulamā

\(^7^3\) Lambton, Qājār Persia, 298-9.
\(^7^4\) Lambton, Qājār Persia, 286-93.
\(^7^5\) Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906: The role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 252.
\(^7^6\) Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906, 258-60.
were victims of the partnership with the intelligentsia. The latter used religious leaders as an instrument towards their political goals. She goes as far as claiming that the ʿulamā were “the least important agents of constitutional change in society.”

Finally, in recent years, more nuanced readings of the revolution have created a more colorful tapestry. In this view, different groups are credited for their roles in the success of the revolution, instead of highlighting one or two social forces as the main agent. To demonstrate the multiplicity of voices during the Constitutional Revolution, John Foran uses the term “populist alliance,” which denotes “the popular, mass social bases of participation” during the revolution. Foran argues that the revolution created a temporary alliance between different social groups, such as “artisans, progressive ulama, merchants, workers, and lower class.”

Reading the revolution without considering its diverse social background can result in a biased account of the events. To sum up, the coalition between the propertied middle class, ʿulamā, and intelligentsia worked side by side to mobilize various communities to participate in the revolution. Any analysis of the revolution needs to consider this multiplicity of players; otherwise it will create a partial narrative of the revolution.

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79 Bayat, Iran’s First Revolution, 9.
81 Foran, “The Strengths and Weaknesses,” 796.
Constitutional Revolution and the Events of 1905-1906

The popular discontent with the Qajar court reached its climax in the early twentieth century. The culmination of series of protests and clashes between the state and people resulted in the establishment of the first parliament and restriction of the court’s power in August 1906. The years 1905 and 1906 witnessed the major protests in Tehran and other big cities around the country. In the capital, three main episodes of contention brought the monarchy to its knees and forced the king to surrender to protesters’ demands. This section focuses on these episodes and examines the spatiality of protests in Tehran.

The first episode started as a reaction to the mistreatment of Belgian customs officials, particularly the head of the department, Monsieur Naus. Merchants appealed to the Prime Minister for his help. Rejected and insulted by the Prime Minister in a private meeting, the merchants of Tehran decided to take action and protest publicly against unjust customs tariffs. Prior to this decision, the disrespectful manners of Naus had caused the ʿulamā of Tehran to raise their voices against him. Earlier in that year, a picture of Naus attending a ball in ʿulamā’s costumes had been circulating in the city. It had offended clerics and urged them to preach against him in their mosques. Consequently when on April 25, 1905, merchants decided to close their shops, leave the city, and gather in Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim shrine, the ʿulamā supported their decision and gave them the necessary instructions. Merchants raised three main complaints, all regarding customs officials and their regulations. Since this protest occurred on the verge of
King’s European trip, merchants calmed down and returned to the city when the crown prince promised them the fulfillment of their requests after the king’s returned. In the context of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the action of merchants and their gathering in the saint’s shrines is called *bast nishīnī*. Originally, *bast* was an inviolable sanctuary for the people, *bastīx*, who were escaping prosecution. By entering the place of *bast*, usually a sacred place, the criminal could remain safe until he/she was pardoned. However, the act of the merchants was different from the act of the criminal seeking the refuge inside the *bast*. Merchants’ *bast* was a form of political protest against the state. As the place of protest, the shrine was not a mere refuge against the tyranny of the state. Instead, it was a platform for merchants to confront the state and follow their political objectives. Since the shrine was the most important destination of pilgrimage for citizens of Tehran, merchants could announce their grievances publicly and seek for possible allies. As long as they were in the *bast*, there was a sign of an unresolved issue between the state and merchants, which could have had political costs for the state. As a result, the state attempted to solve the problem quickly and prevent the spread of the news to the other cities of Iran, which could have led to bigger protests all over the country.

The state did not meet the merchants’ demands after the king’s return. Consequently in December 1905 the second episode of contention occurred on a larger scale. The protest started when the governor of Tehran summoned a group of sugar merchants to force them to lower their prices. Earlier in that month, the sugar price had a significant increase, mostly due to the Russo-

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Japanese War and the 1905 revolution in Russia. Since Russia was the main supplier of sugar in the market, the upheavals in that country had increased the price of sugar in Iran. The governor made demands on merchants to lower their price, a request that did not receive a positive response and ended in the physical punishment of a group of respected merchants. The reaction was enormous. Merchants closed their shops and gathered in Shah Mosque in the bazaar. On the next day, the crowd became bigger; soon, the leading ʿulamā, Tabatabaʾi and Bihbahani, and other clerics of the city accompanied by various groups of theology students, ṭalabihs, joined merchants. The demand was clear: dismissal of the governor and a meeting with the king to declare their complaints directly to him. However, at night the people inside the mosque were assaulted by military forces, farāshs. The assault dispersed people from the mosque.86

That night, by the suggestion of Tabatabaʾi, the leading ʿulamā decided to leave the city and go to a bast in Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim shrine. Nazim al-Islam Kerrmani records the conversations that resulted in this decision. Based on his accounts, Tabatabaʾi was afraid that the state would fabricate a false story about clashes in the mosque and pretend that it was a Ḥaydarī and Nīʿmatī fight or a fight between two different neighborhoods. So, they could suppress protests, cover the real story, and accuse the ʿulamā.87 The next day, most of the prominent ʿulamā of Tehran, a large number of ṭalabihs, and some merchants88 left the city to the shrine. This time, the bast was much longer; it took one month, and the number of bastīs reached to two thousand. Prominent merchants of the city covered all the costs and provided the daily needs of

87 Kerrmani, Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian, 2: 339-40.
88 Kerrmani and Malikzadī mention that only a few merchants joined the protestor and most of them did not dare to leave the city. In contrast Browne argues that merchants and “tradesfolk” had a strong presence in the bast: Kerrmani, Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian, 2: 344; Malikzadī, Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran, 275; Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909, 114.
the protestors. The protesting group issued eight requests, with three of greater importance: (1) establishment of the house of justice throughout the country, (2) dismissal of Belgian customs officers, and (3) dismissal of Tehran’s governor. The negotiations were successful; after receiving the king’s official script, on January 12, 1906, ‘ulamā and other bastīs returned to Tehran among people’s warm welcome.  

At this point, there was no request for the parliament or the constitutional law from the protester. All they asked for was the house of justice. Browne mentions that it “was to consist of representatives elected by the clergy, merchants, and landed proprietors, and presided over by the Shāh himself; to abolish favouritism; and to make all the Persian subjects equal in the eyes of the law.” However, the court did not adhere to its words, and the third episode broke out in the summer of 1906. By this time, protesters’ demands had grown to embrace constitutional government and the abolition of absolute despotism.

In summer 1906, the state’s pressure on activists and people grew significantly more. The night-time curfew prevented the ‘ulamā from holding their evening gatherings in mosques to denounce the state. Some activists were arrested and exiled far away from the capital or even killed suspiciously. One of these arrests started the third episode. On July 10, 1906, the state’s forces arrested one of the prominent preachers and activists of the city. His arrest quickly changed into a scene of clashes between talabihān of a nearby theology school accompanied by ordinary people against the state’s forces, which resulted in the death of one student and injury of another. The crowd took the body of the student to Friday Mosque in the bazaar, and soon, most of the ‘ulamā of the city accompanied by a huge crowd gathered in the mosque. The shops

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closed and bāzārīs gathered there too. Once again, activists used this gathering to move against the central government. Upon his arrival at the mosque, Tabatabaʾi, one of the chief clerics, addressed the crowd: “O people! Today is the day of unification. Set aside your old enmities. Cast away the old hatreds. Let us unite and demand the constitutional monarchy in this age that the ministers are traitors but the king is merciful.”91 For the next two days, July 11 and 12, bazaars remained closed, and people gathered to protest in the mosque. Cloth merchants pitched an tent in the mosque courtyard and brought all the necessary furniture for the bast. Protestors used the bloody clothes of the killed student as a flag. They formed mourning processions, similar to Muharram ceremonies, circulated in the bazaars, entered Shah Mosque, and returned to Friday Mosque. However, on July 12, military forces blocked the mourning procession’s trajectory in the bazaar, which resulted in firing towards the crowd and killing protestors. People retreated to Friday Mosque, and military forces besieged the mosque. The state threatened the ʿulamā that unless bāzārīs opened their shops the next day, they would break into the mosque and disperse the crowd by force. To prevent further bloodshed, the ʿulamā urged people to leave the mosque and reopen the bazaar, while they remained in the bast to achieve their goals: the establishment of the house of justice and the dismissal of the Prime Minister. On the next day, the bazaar regained its routine life; however, there was a heavy presence of military forces in the city. The government cut off Friday Mosque from the outside world. For two days, July 13-14, the state blocked the flow of water to the mosque. Moreover, it prevented people from entering the mosque and smuggling in food or water. On July 14, the ʿulamā declared that they would leave the city and country and go to holy cities of Ottoman Iraq, ʿAtabat, if the state would guarantee their safety. Receiving the state’s guarantee, the next day a huge caravan of the ʿulamā accompanied by their families and followers left the city. It is estimated that around one

91 Kermani, Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian, 3: 481.
thousand people left Tehran; however, they bluffed and went to Qom, a city south of Tehran, instead of leaving the country. The capital was left without religious guidance.  

Although it seemed that the state gained an absolute victory against the ʿulamā and activists without any compromise, the course of events entered into a new phase. Two days after the departure of the ʿulamā to Qom, two merchants went to the British legation and asked for the permission to enter the embassy inside the city. Kermani argues that the arrangement for the British embassy bast was prepared by Bihbahani, one of the chief clerics who had a close relationship with the embassy. In two letters to the embassy before his departure to Qom, he had asked British officials to accept merchants and people to bast in the embassy. On the other hand, he informed merchants upon this possibility. Tafrishi Husayni argues that after the departure of the ʿulamā, the state began to persecute those merchants who had ties with clerics and covered their costs during their bast in Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim shrine. As a result, the first group of nine entered the embassy on the night of July 16. Soon, the news spread in the city and merchants, talabīhs, bazaar artisans, and others closed their shops and left their schools to gather in the embassy. In just a few days, the number of people inside the embassy garden reached to fourteen thousand.

The organization of the crowd inside the embassy garden deserves closer attention. Once again, the segmented society was manifested; each guild pitched a separate tent. Kasravi

94 Tafrishi Husayni, Ruznamih-yi Akhbar-i Mashruṭiyyat va Inghilab-i Iran, 26.
estimates that up to five hundred tents were pitched inside the garden.96 People were separated based on their professions and social affiliations; on each tent, there was a sign to define whose space it was; each tent had its own preacher to denounce the state and preach religious sermons. Although a big portion of the active working population of the city was gathered in the embassy garden, once again the small communal segments reproduced their micro-spaces inside the garden. However, this time, various communities were united against the state authorities. A broader public formed from bonding various communal spheres that could act collectively.

Similar to the previous episode, the big merchants of the city covered all the necessities of bastīs. People prepared a kitchen at a corner of the garden, and every meal was catered for the crowd. Huge amounts of rice, bread, tea, sugar, and other food items were carried to the garden and its kitchen over carts from the city. Moreover, merchants accounted for the families of impoverished bastīs. Since men were the heads of households and usually the only breadwinners of families, during the days of the bast in the embassy garden, their families were deprived of their daily incomes. As a result, merchants specified daily pensions for the protesters who did not have a strong economic condition.

At this time, protesters’ demands had grown, and they were not satisfied with the establishment of the house of justice anymore. Nazim al-Islam Kermani compares the atmosphere in the embassy to a school of political science, where the Dar al-Funun students, educated people, and members of secret societies were educating protesters.97 At this time, protesters demanded a parliament and constitutional law, so that they could restrict the absolute despotism of the Qajar court. Moreover, they asked for the dismissal of the Prime Minister, the return of the ʿulamā, and compensations to the families of martyrs. Finally, on August 5, 1906,

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97 Kermani, Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian, 3: 514 & 534.
the court surrendered to the demands of protesters and Muzaffar al-Din Shah released the royal proclamation and agreed to the constitutional monarchy. After a couple of days of back and forth between protesters and the court upon the exact wording of the proclamation, finally, the crowd left the embassy on August 10, 1906, after 25 days of bast.\textsuperscript{98}

From Communal to Public: The Street-less Revolution

The Constitutional Revolution brought various communities of the city together. The public sphere formed by coming together of numerous social segments. The formation of the public sphere was essential for oppositional groups and enabled them to challenge the Qajar court. In this context, two social forces played the most important role for the formation of the public sphere. First, members of the propertied middle class had the power to transcend their communal boundaries, coalesce into a bigger sphere, and form the public sphere. They could drag their communities together. Second, religious authorities were the real leaders of the revolution who could drag the masses into the scene. By utilizing the religious discourse, they created a shared platform for various communities to act upon; religiosity overshadowed communal identities. As a result, from the moment the ʿulamā came together and worked on their common religious foundation, their power amplified, and they were able to work alongside the propertied middle class to challenge the state. Besides these two main groups, there was the smaller group of the intelligentsia. The latter had looser communal ties, which gave them more mobility and enabled them to work for the coalition between various communities and clerics.

\textsuperscript{98} For the details of the bast inside the embassy see: Kermani, Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian, 3: 509-568; Dulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, 2: 71-81; Malikzadî, Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran, 2: 373-379; Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909, 118-121; Kasravi, History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1: 133-48; Tafrishi Husayni, Ruznamih-yi Akhbar-i Mashrutiyat va Inghilab-i, 26-41; Qudsi, Kitab-i Khatirat-i Man, 1: 127-135.
The coalition between the two most important religious figures of the city, Tabataba’i and Bihbahani, was the outcome of the intelligentsia’s activities. Without that coalition, the victory of the revolution was out of reach.

What about the spatiality of the revolution? What do these spatial settings, the two mosques, the shrine, and the embassy garden, mean? Why did people choose these spaces rather than the new streets and squares of Tehran? During 1905 and 1906, people used three sacred spaces, the two mosques and the shrine, and the lands of a foreign country. First of all, why did people choose Shah and Friday Mosques of the city and not any other mosque? The first chapter reviewed main traditional communal spaces in Iranian city. I demonstrated that there was a reciprocal relationship between Iranian urban society and its social spaces; both consisted of smaller patches that were highly colored with communal identities; zūrkhānihs, takīyyihs, mosques, coffeehouses, and bathhouses belonged to small segments of society; they did not belong to the public as a whole. As a result, people could not choose a single mosque or any other social space at the neighborhood level as the place of protest. In that case, their protest would be labeled as a communal grievance rather than a public matter. However, the two central mosques of the city, Shah and Friday Mosques, did not belong to a certain section of society. They were the only mosques, besides Sipahsalar Mosque, which could be accountable to the public. Situated in the bazaar, the business district and the most crowded area of the city during the daytime, these mosques belonged to the whole Shi’i population of the city. Shah Mosque was the biggest mosque of Tehran, built by Fath ’Ali Shah as the sign of his religious passion.99

Similarly, Friday Mosque functioned beyond a certain community or neighborhood. Friday

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mosques in all the cities were places for holding Friday prayers. Friday prayer is a communal activity and the sign of unity between Muslims. Consequently, Tehran’s Friday Mosque did not belong to a certain section of society.

Consequently, when in 1905 and 1906 merchants and guild members were under unprecedented economic pressures as the result of the state’s policies, they needed a space to represent all of them. They could not gather in their communal mosques because that would mark their protest as a communal conflict. They needed to protest as a unified body, so their choice of space was very critical in this regard. Shah and Friday Mosques were perfect choices; they were spacious enough, with vast central courtyards, which could contain few thousand people; they did not belong to a specific community; they were located in the bazaar, close to merchants’ shops and guild members’ workshops. In short, the Shah and Friday Mosque were places for the public; they could make genuine public spaces.

Figure 4.2. Shah and Friday Mosques in the bazaar at the heart of the city.
When on July 10, 1906, after the shooting and the death of a talabih, people and the ʿulamā gathered in Friday Mosque, Tabatabaʿi and his followers gathered in a different mosque of the city. People in Friday Mosque forced him to leave his place and join other groups over there. The reason is clear; Friday Mosque was a better choice; it belonged to the entire city. Similarly, upon his arrival in Friday Mosque, Tabatabaʿi’s first words was an invitation to unity and forgetting old enmities. All the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle were available. The protest was a move beyond a certain segment; its causes had affected a significant section of society; its goals could benefit many social segments; it demanded a space to represent diverse communities; it needed a leader who could transcend communal boundaries.

Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Shrine should be examined through the same framework. It was a holy shrine for all the Shiʿi Muslim population of Tehran. It was different from the city’s imāmzādihs, which belonged to different neighborhoods. Even its location emphasized its detachment from communal ties; it was located five miles south of the city. As a result, when in December 1905 people left the city to Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Shrine, it was a clarifying act announcing that the incident of Shah Mosque was not based on old-established communal conflicts. Gathering in the shrine, similar to ones in mosques, was the manifestation of a bigger social crisis; it was a tribune to announce the political conflict between the state and society.

However, these spaces had a common shortcoming. They were not large enough to support a population larger than a few thousand. The central courtyard of Shah Mosque is sixty-four by sixty-four meters (210 by 210 feet), which makes it around four thousand square meters (43,000 square yards). Shams Jafarī, Tārīkh-i Bīdari-yi Iranian: 381–381.

100 Kermani, Tārīkh-i Bīdari-yi Iranian, 3: 481.
101 Kermani, Tārīkh-i Bīdari-yi Iranian, 3: 481.
102 Imāmzādihs are the shrines and tombs of the descendants of a Shiʿi Imams. The 1852-3CE building survey of Tehran counted nine imāmzādihs inside the city. These imāmzādihs were smaller and less important than Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Shrine. Although the latter was an imāmzādih too, it was situated outside the city and it was the most important imāmzādihs for the citizens of Tehran. Sirus ʿAdvandiyan and Mansureh Ettehadi, Amār-i Dar al-Khalajih-yi Tehran: Asnādi az Tārīkh-i Ijtimaʿi-yi Tehran dar ʿAsr-i Qajar [Statistics from Tehran the Capital: Documents from Social History of Tehran in the Qajar Era] (Tehran: Nashr-i Tārīkh-i Iran, 1368 [1990]), 38.
square feet). If each person in the protesting crowd occupies one square meter, the courtyard can only hold four thousand people when it is full. Friday Mosque is even smaller. Its central courtyard is thirty by forty meters (hundred by 130 feet). Based on the same logic, the courtyard can only support 1,200 people. Even if people crowded all the interior spaces of the mosque and the rooftops, there could not have been more than four thousand people in the mosque on the days of July 10 to 12, 1906.103

As a result, when protests became bigger, and there was not a large enough space for protesters; they had no other choice than leaving the city, which happened in July 1906. People’s departure happened in two different forms. First, the ʿulamā, accompanied by their followers and families, literally left the city for Qom. Second, fourteen thousand people, some say twenty thousand,104 left the city symbolically by entering the British embassy garden. It is important to note that the garden was the ground of a foreign country, so people entered into another country. While in cases of mosques and the shrine, these places transformed from a sacred place into a political public space, in the cases of the British embassy and departure to Qom, spaces of protest and resistance formed through the physical absence of citizens; people boycotted the city. The city lost it its primary workforce; it was a protest through their absence. While the British embassy was in the city, it was not the territory of the state; it was not Iranians’ land; it was not citizens’ public space. Political public space formed through the absence of people.

103 Malikzadih exaggerates the number of the people in Friday Mosque and estimates that between 20 to 30 thousand people gathered over there, which is completely unrealistic: Malikzadih, Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran, 2: 358.
104 Dulatabadi, Hayat-i Yahya, 2: 73; Malikzadih, Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran, 2: 374.
The question is how big the number of the *bastis* was. In other words, what do fifteen thousand people mean in the context of early twentieth century Tehran? The closest survey of Tehran’s population to the time of the revolution was conducted in 1922, sixteen years after the revolution. In that year, the city and its surrounding had the population of 210,000 people. Based on this figure, Tehran had around 200,000 people at the time of the revolution, if not less. Ten years later, in 1932, the state conducted another survey and this time the population was categorized based on different group ages. In 1932, the male population between the ages of

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twenty and sixty-five consisted twenty-eight percent of the total population.\textsuperscript{107} Using the same ratio, in 1906, there were approximately 56,000 men between twenty and sixty five living in Tehran. Assuming that these age groups include the majority of the protesters in the embassy, more than one-fourth of the productive male population of the city was in the British embassy. If we consider the higher estimate of \textit{bastīs}, 20,000 people, it means that more than one-third of the productive population of the city was absent. More importantly, if we consider the seasonal displacement of the population from the city to northern villages during the summer, the number of the protesters in the embassy becomes more meaningful. Moreover, these people were from more affluent sections of society, mostly merchants, shopkeepers, artisans, and students. It is not hard to imagine the political and economic pressure of their absence on the state. Moreover, based on Kasravi’s and Nazim al-Islam Kermani’s accounts, the protest gradually spread throughout the country, and people in other cities followed the protesters in Tehran, which was an extra pressure on the state.\textsuperscript{108}

There is one more question to be answered. Why did not people use the newly built streets and squares of Tehran as places of protest? To answer this question, we need to go back to the previous chapter and the notion of \textit{Khīyābān-ha-yi Duwlatī} or Governmental Streets. As it was claimed, the new network of streets and squares did not bear significant social life; they were not people’s spaces; they were the state’s stages for different political objectives. Even Sabzih Miydan in front of the royal compound in the old city was part of this network. The duality between the state and people’s spaces reached to its full manifestation during the revolution. While the new network was called \textit{Khīyābān-ha-yi Duwlatī}, Mosque courtyards and the holy shrine outside the city should be considered as \textit{Khīyābān-ha-yi Millatī}, or more accurately

people’s spaces. People chose spaces that belonged to them; new streets and squares were not social products. They were the outcomes of the top-down spatial production of the state.

The Impact of Newspapers, Anjumans, and the Parliament on the Public Sphere and Political Public Spaces

The 1906 revolution resulted in the establishment of the first parliament in the modern history of Iran. Starting its work from the fall of 1906, the parliament undertook the arduous task of reforms. It curbed the political and economic power of the court, defined a strict budget for the monarchy, made the ministers accountable to the parliament and the provincial governments to the elected representatives, initiated land reforms, and encountered the ever-increasing foreign interventions by rejecting the court’s proposed loans from Britain and Russia. However, democracy did not last long, and two years later, the court seized back the power through a military coup supported by Russia; bombarded the parliament; and executed, imprisoned, and exiled many representatives and activists. From 1908 to 1921, the country did not regain peace. Iran went through a civil war in which revolutionary forces defeated the monarchy one more time in 1909. The second parliament continued reforms by employing American counselors. Soon, Russia issued an ultimatum to the parliament to dismiss counselors, which was rejected and led to the military occupation of northern Iran. By the beginning of World War I, democracy was the least concern of Iranians. The occupied country, first by Russia and then by Britain, went through famines and diseases outbreaks. Finally, Reza Khan’s 1921 coup brought an end to the failed experience of democracy and began a new era of dictatorship.
The two-year period of relative stability and democracy after the 1906 revolution brought unprecedented phenomena that had decisive impacts on the future of the public sphere and political public spaces in Iranian society and led to their transformation. The electoral law of September 9, 1906, provided the basis for the establishment of the first parliament. This law qualified six groups as the eligible groups to present candidates: (1) princes and Qajar tribes, (2) the ʿulamā and theology students, (3) nobles, (4) merchants, (5) landowners and farmers, and (6) guilds. However, the law put some restrictions for these groups: lands of landowners and farmers should be worth at least one thousand tūmān; merchants must own a definite office and business; shopkeepers and people of the bazaar should be affiliated with a certain guild, and the rent of their shops should be more than the local average.109 These conditions worked in the favor of main revolutionary groups: the propertied middle class, the merchants, and the ʿulamā. As Abrahamian demonstrates, the ʿulamā and affluent bazaar people occupied sixty percent of the seats in the first parliament, and landowners, civil servants, and few professionals occupied the rest forty percent. He writes, “The propertied middle class, together with their religious allies, had gained control of the Majlis [parliament], and had effectively barred the propertyless lower classes from the corridors of power.”110 Similar to the spatial polarization of Tehran during Nassir al-Din Shah reign, the distribution of power between the masses followed the same trajectory. The economic interests had priority over the communal affiliation. The parliament was not the precise representation of the population. Similarly, its future measures were not totally devoid of faction and self-interest. By the end of the two-year period, “[t]he middle class areas, therefore, remained hot-beds of revolution, and lower class slums turned into bulwarks of

The next section of this chapter will discuss how this polarization worked against the parliament in 1907 and 1908.

Anjumans: The medium between the Communal and Public Spheres

Shortly after the establishment of the first parliament, small political societies emerged in Iranian cities. Called *anjumans*, these societies provided arenas for the direct political participation of Iranians. Before the revolution, there were some secret societies in Iran. Mirza Malkam Khan established the first secret society in the modern history of Iran. *Farâmūshkhanih*, the House of Forgetting, was established in 1858 in Tehran, based “on the model of European Freemasonic lodges, with secret cells and a hierarchy of leadership.” Bayat believes that it was a means to follow westernization and modernization in Iran. Ann Lambton originates the first *farâmūshkhanih* to 1851 and argues that Mirza Malkam Khan’s father established it in the early years of Nassir al-Din Shah reign. Moreover, she believes that the secret societies were an inseparable aspect of Islamic Persia throughout the history, and the nineteenth century societies were continuations of this old-established tradition. After Nassir al-Din Shah’s assassination in 1896, his son, Muzaffar al-Din Shah, relaxed the political situation, which helped the secret societies to develop their activities in the years leading to the revolution. Abrahamian names five secret societies on the eve of the revolution that their activities had essential contributions to the success of the revolution. Secret societies played a great role in awakening people, inviting

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113 Lambton, *Qājār Persia*, 301 & 306.

However, the post-revolution anjumans were different from their earlier counterparts. They cast away their clandestine status and followed their political objectives freely. The two-year period between the 1906 revolution and the 1908 coup witnessed an unprecedented flourishing of the political anjumans. There are three main theories regarding their roots, which originate them to the Russian soviets before the Russian revolution, to the French revolutionary societies, or to the traditional Iranian secret societies.\footnote{Brown, The Persian Revolution, 357-8. For the Persian text see: Kermani, Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Persian, 3: 605.} Regardless of their root, the 1906-1908 anjumans can be divided into two main general groups: official and popular.\footnote{Brown, The Persian Revolution, 357-8. For the Persian text see: Kermani, Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Persian, 3: 605.} The official anjumans were the result of the electoral laws. Based on the article nine of these regulations,

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\text{[i]n every place where elections are carried out, a Council (anjuman) shall be formed of well-known local representatives of the six classes of electors to supervise the elections. This Council shall be under the temporary supervision of the Governor or Deputy-Governor of that place. In this way two Councils shall be formed, one local and one provincial, the former in each of the individual towns in the province, the latter in the chief town of the province.}\footnote{Brown, The Persian Revolution, 357-8. For the Persian text see: Kermani, Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Persian, 3: 605.}
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The article ten allowed official anjumans to investigate complaints in connection with the election.\footnote{Brown, The Persian Revolution, 357-8. For the Persian text see: Kermani, Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Persian, 3: 605.} As a result, official anjumans established in major cities and towns around the
country, except Tehran as the seat of the parliament, to supervise the election process. Many of these *anjumans* continued to work and oversee local governments even after the election.

In contrast to the official ones, popular *anjumans* appeared spontaneously. They did not have any legal foundation until the passage of the supplementary fundamental laws of October 7, 1907. The latter was a supplementary to the initial fundamental laws passed and approved on December 30, 1906. The article twenty-one of the supplementary laws states: “Societies (*anjumans*) and associations (*ijtimáʿát*) which are not productive of mischief to Religion or the State, and are not injurious to good order, are free throughout the whole Empire, but members of such associations must not carry arms, and must obey the regulations laid down by the Law on this matter.”

The establishment of numerous popular *anjumans* throughout the country developed a sense of public life in Iranian cities, particularly in Tehran. In main cities, the *anjumans* were manifestations of a transitory era from the old-established forms of social life and practices based on segmentation and communal diversity to a more coherent public. They were able to unite and transcend communal differences for a shared goal. In some provinces, Gilan and Azerbaijan, even small towns and villages had their own *anjumans*. Their numbers in Tehran was extraordinary and increased throughout the two-year period. Close to the time of the military coup in July 1908, there were around two hundred *anjumans* just in Tehran. Kharabi counts

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120 Lambton, “Persian Political Societies,” 46
121 An interesting case in this regard is Tabriz electoral *anjuman*: Kharabi, “Naghsh-i Anjuman-ha dar Inghilab-i Mashruṭiyat,” 66.
123 Kharabi, “Naghsh-i Anjuman-ha dar Inghilab-i Mashruṭiyat,” 64.
124 Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911*, 74; Bayat, Iran's First Revolution, 161; Bayat, Anjoman (Organization); Kharabi, Naghsh-i Anjuman-ha dar Inghilab-i Mashruṭiyat, 76. Kasravi mentions that close to the time of the coup, there were 180 anjumans in Tehran: Ahmad Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashruṭih-yi Iran [History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution]*, vol. 1 (Tehran: Intisharat-i Amirkabir, 1363 [1984]), 569. Different sources present different numbers for *anjumans* in Tehran. This is mostly because in a short period of less than two years, these *anjumans* appeared in the political scene of Tehran. As a result, it depends when different
forty *anjumans* in Isfahan, fourteen in Kashan, thirteen in Rasht, ten in Kermanshah, ten in Qom, seven in Babul, eight in Mashhad, and five in Qazvin.\(^{125}\)

There was a significant difference between the number of the *anjumans* in Tehran and the rest of the country, which was not necessarily related to the difference between Tehran’s population and the other cities’. For example, by the early twentieth century, Isfahan had around eighty thousand inhabitants, forty percent of Tehran’s population.\(^{126}\) However, the number of its *anjumans* was around one-fifth of Tehran’s. To realize the reasons for the disproportionate number of the *anjumans* in Tehran, the social composition of these miniature societies can be helpful. *Anjumans* were the products of Iranian urban society and they reproduced its particular characteristics. Similar to other social practices, they were closely based on social segmentation; the social segmentation constituted the social practices of *anjumans*, and in return it was reproduced through their internal and external social relations. Fatimih Shirali has gathered the names and description of seventy-five *anjumans* in Tehran. Of her list, fifteen *anjumans* belonged to communities that originated from other cities of the country; eleven *anjumans* were based on neighborhood identities; ten *anjumans* were based on professions and guilds; five *anjumans* belonged to various religious groups in the city; seven *anjumans* were dedicated to cultural activities. From the remaining twenty eight *anjumans*, at least eleven had shared communal bonds, such as Qajar princes, women, and Muzaffar al-Din Shah’s servants’ *anjumans*.\(^{127}\) The fever of establishing new *anjumans* became so widespread that even music

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\(^{125}\) Kharabi, *Naghsh-i Anjuman-ha-yi Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat*, 76.

\(^{126}\) Peter Christensen, *The Decline of Iranshahr: Irrigation and Environments in the History of the Middle East, 500 B.C to A.D 155* (Odense: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1993), 149.

players\textsuperscript{128} of the city established their own.\textsuperscript{129} A report from the British embassy crew in Tehran describes smaller \textit{anjumans} in these words: “very many of the smaller ones have been formed simply to forward their own private interests.”\textsuperscript{130} These words clearly describe the segmented nature of \textit{anjumans}. Each entity had to follow the interests of its own community. In the colorful communal canvass of Tehran, the juvenile democracy created an opportunity for each community to raise its voice. Since in the course of the nineteenth century Tehran grew out from a small town to the biggest city in the country, it had the most diverse population among all the other major cities. The small segments of the population managed to produce their own \textit{anjumans}; therefore, Tehran had the biggest number.

However, the membership in \textit{anjumans} was not strict, and some of them accepted people outside their own community.\textsuperscript{131} Moreover, the number of members varies from one \textit{anjuman} to another. While some \textit{anjumans} had a few thousand members,\textsuperscript{132} many were just small circles of people with shared identities.\textsuperscript{133}

Although \textit{anjumans}, similar to other social practices, were based on social segmentation, they engendered a greater public, greater than the communal sphere of each community, which indicates that a fundamental shift happened during the constitutional era. There were many interconnections between the \textit{anjumans} of Tehran. They coordinated their activities, protested together, had group meetings with representatives from various \textit{anjumans}, and held shared ceremonies together. For example, the \textit{anjumans} of Tehran cooperated with one another to hold

\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Murtibs}
\textsuperscript{130} Lambton, “Persian Political Societies,” 63.
\textsuperscript{131} Shirali, \textit{Anjuman-ha-yi Tehran dar ‘Asr-i Mashrutiyyat}, 151-2.
\textsuperscript{132} For example, Azerbaijan \textit{anjuman} of Tehran had 2,962 members in February 1908: Lambton, Persian Political Societies, 50.
\textsuperscript{133} For more information on the numbers of the members see: Kharabi, \textit{Naghsh-i Anjuman-ha dar Inghilab-i Mashrutiyyat}, 78-9; Yazdani, \textit{Anjuman-ha-yi Melli dar Marrutiyyat-i Iran}, 28.
the first anniversary of the revolution and a ceremony for its martyrs. More importantly, many anjumans created a shared Central Anjuman to coordinate their activities, particularly for the defense of the parliament against the threats of the court. Two representatives from forty-one major anjumans of Tehran were present in the Central Anjuman. Moreover, the Central Anjuman functioned as a referee in the possible disputes between other anjumans. As a result, the decisions of the Central Anjuman was accepted and followed by them. Mutual cooperation substituted factional strife. The anjumans were proof that various segments of society could cooperate with each other without rivalry and fights; they could cooperate for a shared objective.

Abdollah Mostofi mentions that after the revolution, the old rivalry between neighborhood mourning processions was changed into a state of friendship; various neighborhoods hosted the mourning processions of the other neighborhoods in their own takīyyih.137

There is not sufficient data on the spatiality of anjumans. Probably, due to their short life, these organizations did not form specific spatial settings. Kasravi and Kermani provide few clues to the places of anjumans. Based on their account, some anjumans used residential houses, theology schools, mosques, and similar locations as their meeting places. Sipahsalar mosque and the parliament courtyard were two spaces that all the anjumans of the city used collectively. As the next two sections show, anjumans used these sites repeatedly to coordinate their activities.

134 Kasravi, Tarikh-i Mashrutiy-yi Iran, 408 & 412-5.
135 Shirali, Anjuman-ha-yi Tehran dar ʿAsr-i Mashrutiyat, 268; Yazdani, Anjuman-ha-yi Melli dar Marrutiyat-i Iran, 36.
136 Kermani, Tarikh-i Inhitat-i Majlis, 47-8.
137 Mostofi, From Agha Mohammad Khan, 1: 159-60.
138 For example, Nazim al-Islam Kermani mentions that Junūb Anjuman (South Anjuman), consisted of people from south, particularly Shiraz, was established in Haj Nayīb al-Sadr-i Shirazi’s house in Tehran: Kermani, Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian, 4: 102. In another example, Kasravi and Malikzadih mention that Madrisih-yi Sadr (Sadr religious school) was the center of Tulāb (religious students) anuman: Kasravi, Tarikh-i Mashrutih-yi Iran, 1: 375; Malikzadih, Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran, 3: 479.
Tehran’s *anjums* became so powerful that they could change the course of events. They were great supporters of liberals in the parliament and greater threats to the court. The two-year period after the success of the revolution is full of episodes in which the *anjums* acted collectively to support the parliament against the court, transfer people’s grievances in other cities to the parliament, put pressure on the representatives to vote for reforms, and curtail the power of clerics, particularly counter-revolutionary ones. They even went so far as assassinating the Prime Minister, performing an unsuccessful assassination attempt on the king, and overthrowing the moderate head of the parliament. Some *anjums* recruited volunteers and formed independent militias to defend the parliament. They trained their volunteers and gathered ammunition for possible clashes with the court.139

Although the *anjums* formed based on the old social pattern of Iranian society, they were manifestations of a transitory phase of Iranians’ social practices. Through their interconnections, *anjums* “fostered a certain sense of solidarity among those who were seeking to assert themselves against the arbitrary, and often tyrannical, rule.” They played an unprecedented role “in creating a public opinion in favour of constitutional reform and in defending” parliament.140

It was one of the first times that various segments of society united for a common cause. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Qajar court was able to stretch its power by, in the words of Abrahamian, “manipulating the many communal conflicts within their segmented society.”141 Now the *anjums* transcended social boundaries without adhering to the unifying characters of theʿulamā. They were the heralds of future social practices that would distance themselves from

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139 Various resources can be utilized for studying the activities of the *anjums*. From secondary sources, Lambton and Shirali works are valuable resources in this regard. Besides, the history books and memoirs written closer to the time of the revolution are great resources in this regard. For different activities of the *anjums* during the two-year period see: Lambton, “Persian Political Societies”; Shirali, *Anjuman-ha-yi Tehran dar ʿAsr-i Mashrutiyyat*, 155-216; Kermani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian*, 4: 1-164; Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashrutiyy-yi Iran*, 1&2: 259-675; Brown, *The Persian Revolution*, 98-232.

140 Lambton, “Persian Political Societies,” 53-4.

141 Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 41.
communal bonds and define a public that could embrace all various social groups; *anjumans* were the manifestation of the transitory stage from communal sphere to the public sphere.

Newspaper and the Formation of Public Opinion

In addition to *anjumans*, the two-year period fostered another phenomenon that deserves close scrutiny. In the years following the revolution, an extraordinary increase in the number of newspapers occurred. In all the cities, particularly in Tehran, independent free newspapers published. Before the revolution, there were few state-sponsored newspapers in Iran. Their articles were under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Publication.\(^{142}\) These newspapers did not have any political significance against the establishment, and their contents were restricted to praise of the royal family.\(^{143}\) In the pre-revolutionary era, the Persian newspapers published outside the country filled the gap of free press inside Iran. These newspapers were smuggled to Iran from London, Cairo, Calcutta, and Istanbul.\(^{144}\) Saʿidi Sirjani argues that these newspapers did not have much influence on ordinary people and were circulated mostly between the educated citizens. He believes that before the Constitutional Revolution neither Persian papers outside the country nor the few papers inside “were effective in molding general public opinion.”\(^{145}\) Hassan Kamshad and Peter Avery argue that the newspapers printed outside Iran at


\(^{144}\) For information about the newspapers printed outside Iran see: Peter Avery, “Printing, the Press and Literature in Modern Iran,” in *The Cambridge History of Iran: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, eds. Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, and Charles Melville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 7: 831-6.

least were useful in arousing the political awareness of their few readers, developing journalism within the country, and providing the basis of the Constitutional Revolution.¹⁴⁶

Before the revolution, the most efficient element in the formation of public opinion was based on the oral tradition.¹⁴⁷ The network of mosques provided a permanent stage and audience for the ʿulamā to influence the masses through their weekly or daily sermons. As this chapter discussed, this network perfectly performed its duty during the Tobacco Movement and the Constitutional Revolution. As Saʿidi Sirjani puts it, before the revolution, “any eloquent speaker could persuade hundreds of listeners to support justice and freedom and, by playing on their emotions, either incite them to rebellion and self-sacrifice or the opposite.”¹⁴⁸ The oral tradition did not disappear after the success of the revolution; activist preachers continued to use mosques as the perfect stages to address the masses, “attracting the largest crowds to their mosques, transforming the place of worship into a public forum for mass rallies and political demonstrations.”¹⁴⁹ However, this monopoly ended by the establishment of free newspapers. The number of the emerging newspapers is astonishing. While during the last seventy years before the revolution at most ninety-one publications had been issued in the whole country, just in the one year following the revolution ninety-nine new newspapers went under print.¹⁵⁰ Edward Browne’s comprehensive list of newspapers helps to construct an image of how fast they spread throughout the country, particularly in big cities.¹⁵¹ Table 4.1 is based on Browne’s list.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ Bayat, Iran’s First Revolution, 168. Mongol Bayat argues that the use of mosques as stages for addressing the public was a new social phenomenon limited to the victory of the revolution. However, as this chapter shows, this role was well-established prior to the revolution and played an important role during the Tobacco Movement and the Constitutional Revolution.
¹⁵⁰ Nabavi, “Readership, the Press and the Public Sphere,” 213.
Table 4.1. Numbers of new newspapers published between 1906-11 in different cities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1906</th>
<th>1907</th>
<th>1908</th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>59</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>120</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rasht</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>89</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Browne provides the year in which each paper started its publication. As a result, just in 1907, fifty-nine newspapers were printed for the first time in Tehran, and between 1906 and 1911, 120 newspapers were printed in the city. Obviously, not all papers had the same number of readers, and many of them published just for few issues. In any case, these numbers show the popularity of the newspapers. Hundred and twenty newspapers in six years for a city with the population of 200,000 was an unprecedented phenomenon in Iran. Besides great numbers, newspapers witnessed a widespread readership in the period following the revolution. Quoting from a correspondent’s letter, Browne mentions that

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152 Sometimes Browne gives two consecutive years as the starting year of the publication of a newspaper. This is because of the mismatch between the Islamic and Gregorian calendars. In these cases, the earlier year is considered.
[t]he most remarkable manifestation of the popular awakening is the large increase in the number of newspapers. Not the old, stilted, futile style of paper, but popular journals, written in comparatively simple language. Everyone seems to read a paper now. In many of the Qahwa-khánas (coffee-houses) professional readers are engaged, who, instead of reciting the legendary tales of the Sháh-náma, now regale their clients with political news.153

Similarly, semipublic reading rooms, qirā’atkhānas, established around the cities. These spaces “were privately endowed libraries established with a public mission through the initiative of benefactors, many of whom were merchants and booksellers.” They “contributed to the expansion of the public’s engagement with print” and “an increase in the number of newspapers published.”154 Moreover, newspapers attempted to become more affordable to a larger public by lowering their prices and direct distribution in public places of the city. There are accounts that newspapers passed from person to person to reach to those who could not afford to buy them.155 Most of newspapers were printed around five hundred copies; however, the number of the copies of popular newspapers of the city reached to a few thousand, with Majlis between seven and ten thousand, Sūr-i Isrā’īl 5,500, and Musāvāt three thousand.156

Although the literary level was relatively low, the public reading of newspapers helped to spread new revolutionary concepts among various social groups. The old-established communal circles, such as coffeehouses, became places for the spread of news. Through this process, the separate social segments gathering in their own coffeehouses became connected by the invisible threads of newspapers. Newspapers transcend communal boundaries, connected communities, and helped to form a more coherent public.157 Negin Nabavi shows how newspapers were

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155 Nabavi, “Readership, the Press and the Public Sphere,” 218-9.
156 Sa’idi Sirjani, “Constitutional Revolution vi. The Press.”
157 This process is similar to what Benedict Anderson demonstrates about the impact of print culture on the formation of the “imagined communities” in Europe as the foundation of nationalism. Newspapers can create “ideas
effective in promoting new political meanings between people and shaping the common understanding towards subjects such as constitution, progress, and freedom. She writes, “In short, newspapers saw their task to consist of informing public opinion and imparting notions that were considered fundamental to the shaping of a modern era.”158 As a result, similar to anjumans, newspapers played a significant role in the transformation of the communal sphere; they helped to form common understandings among separate communities. These commonalities were decisive in the formation of the public sphere.

The constitutional era witnessed the formation of the Iranian public sphere. While the events of the revolution helped to bring the communal spheres together, the two-year period consolidated the public sphere. Anjumans and newspapers played a significant role in this regard. Newspapers spread common understandings between various communities and connected them intellectually. They formed public opinion on different social and political issues and undermined the significance of religious authorities. Anjumans were novel manifestations of segmented society; they were the products of the communal sphere. However, in contrast to the previous instances of communal life, they were able to cooperate and follow political objectives collectively. Anjumans demonstrated that the public sphere could be the realm of the multiplicity of segments. Rather than bracketing their differences, they generated the public sphere with respect to their communal identities; they were able to form a bigger public and maintain their communal ties at the same time. The anjumans and newspapers were the manifestations of a transitory era, and at the same time.

of simultaneity” among people that do not necessarily have any social relationship. Newspapers can connect people who do not have any face-to-face communication and are not from a same community. As a result, they can create a sort of imagined community. While in the case of Anderson’s study, these imagined communities are nations, in the case of this research, it is the public sphere: Anderson, Imagined Communities, 34-7.

Political Public Spaces in the Post-revolution Era

By the establishment of the first parliament, the opening of anjumans, and the publication of newspapers, a new historical era began. For a short period of two years, Iranians experienced democracy and freedom of speech. People could protest freely against the tyranny of the court and local governments without fear of persecution. This unique era brought a delicate spatial shift. The main places of protests shifted from Friday and Shah Mosques in the old city and Shah ‘Abd al-‘Azim Shrine outside the city to the parliament building, its courtyard, and the adjacent mosque, Sipahsalar.

The two-year period witnessed countless episodes of protests in the parliament building and particularly in its courtyard. Different groups of people used these spaces as venue for the direct contact with their representatives, protest against the court and local governments, announce provinces’ grievances, and support the parliament. Besides the parliament, Sipahsalar Mosque was an alternative place of gatherings and protests. The mosque soon changed into the center of revolutionary forces and anjumans. Sipahsalar Mosque is located south of the parliament, and it was connected to the parliament courtyard through a gate, figure 4.4. The history books and memoirs of the constitutional era record many instances of gatherings and protests in these spaces.159

Similar to the old city’s main mosques and the shrine outside the city, new spaces of protest belonged to all segments of society; they were not colored with communal identities. Edward G. Browne perfectly describes the diversity of people in these spaces:

It is typical of this movement that the rallying-point of the people should have been the House of Parliament and the Mosque, standing side by side. In and around these two buildings gathered the strangest throng which has ever been seen fighting the old, old battle against the powers of tyranny and darkness. Europeanized young men with white collars, white-turbaned mullás, Sayyids with the green and blue insignia of their holy descent, the kulák-namadís (felt-capped peasants and workmen), the brown ʿabás (cloaks) of the humble trades-folk;—all in whose hearts glowed the sacred fire gathered there to do battle in the cause of freedom.  

Various groups and communities gathered in these places to follow their political objectives. The anjumans were the primary social forces that could gather different sections of society in these spaces. Although the parliament and the mosque were working as a shared political public space, similar to the bast in the British embassy, there were occasional manifestations of segmentation in gatherings of anjumans. For example, on June 9, 1908, when anjumans of Tehran gathered in Sipahsalar Mosque to protest against the court, each anjuman occupied a separate room around the central courtyard and put a sign to show its location. Kasravi mentions that around 180 different signs were attached by the rooms. This segmentation of protesters inside shared public space is similar to people’s gathering in the British embassy when different guilds pitched their own tents and attached their signs to show their location. The public was the outcome of coming together of communities; the public sphere was fractured and segmented into numerous communal identities.

The active role of new political public spaces does not mean that the old ones were forgotten. There are few instances of gatherings in Shah and Friday Mosques and even Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Shrine; however, this time, the anti-constitutional forces were the primary users of these spaces to encounter the revolutionaries. A group of clerics with close ties to the court, who demanded a stronger position for the religion and the ʿulamā in the constitutional laws, used

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these spaces to protest against the parliament and revolutionaries. Once, they attempted to start a bast in Friday Mosque, but they were prevented by constitutionalist forces and had to depart the mosque. In two other occasions, they left the city and began their own bast in Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Shrine. They gathered a group of five hundred people in the second time and even published a newspaper against revolutionaries from the shrine; however, they did not have any success in drawing considerable attention and had to return to the city in both cases.

![Diagram](image)

Figure 4.4. The parliament building, courtyard, and Sipahsalar Mosque located next to Baharistan Square.

There are two episodes of clashes between pro- and anti-revolutionary forces that deserve a closer scrutiny. The Qajar court attempted to suppress the parliament and defeat revolutionaries on two occasions. The first attempt occurred in mid-December, 1907. Earlier in that year, the parliament had decreased the court’s annual budget to prevent the regular annual deficit and the need for a foreign loan. Although the budget reforms had targeted unnecessary payments to high-

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ranking courtiers, the king\textsuperscript{164} cut the payments to lowest sections of the court’s petit economy and pretended that it was the result of the parliament’s financial reforms.\textsuperscript{165} Therefore, the court managed to create a sense of discontent towards the parliament among its ordinary pensioners. Meanwhile, by paying the thugs of the city, dissident clerics, some groups from outside the city, and its military forces, the court managed to gather a huge crowd in central Tupkhanih Square on December 14, 1907. The counter-revolutionary force chose Tupkhanih Square because it was the only open space near the royal compound and close to the parliament. They were receiving all sorts of supports from the royal compound during their stay in the square. Consequently, they were ready to act quickly at the right moment and attack the parliament to occupy it. In this occasion, Tupkhanih Square was a strategic site for the assault to the parliament. The initial attack was defeated by present armed guards inside the parliament. Soon, the news of the assault spread in the city like a wildfire, and all \textit{anjuman}s gathered in Sipahsalar Mosque. During the next two days, \textit{anjuman}s managed to gather thousands of guns and armed volunteers inside the mosque and the parliament. Two poles formed inside the city. Revolutionaries were gathered in the Parliament and Sipahsalar Mosque and royal forces to the court in Tupkhanih Square, figure 4.5. The course of events changed the balance of power in favor of revolutionaries. Gradually, their number grew, and they gathered enough guns to stand against any attack. Moreover, through numerous telegraphs, \textit{anjuman}s of other cities announced their preparedness to send armed forces to Tehran and fight against the monarchy. Finally, negotiations between the parliament and the court resulted in the surrender of the king and dispersal of his supporters.\textsuperscript{166}

\textsuperscript{164} At this time Muhammad ʿAli Shah, Muzaffar al-Din Shah’s son.
\textsuperscript{165} Malikzad\textit{h}, \textit{Tari\textit{kh}-i Inghilab-i Mashru\textit{tiyat-i Iran}, 3: 530-1.
Quoting his correspondent in Tehran, Browne argues that “[t]he anjumans were the cause of the victory. They had drawn the people together and united them in one common cause, and had organized their strength to such an extent that in the day of trial tyranny found, to its surprise, a united front against it.”¹⁶⁷ Once again the public sphere was a rich collage of various communal forces.

Learning from the failed coup, the court managed to perform a successful military coup in June 1908. Earlier that year, the revolutionary forces attempted to assassinate the king. Their plot failed, and he escaped from the scene unharmed. Few months earlier, another attempt had resulted in the death of the Prime Minister, Amin al-Sultan. He was summoned to Iran from Europe by the king to work against the parliament. After the attack, the assassin killed himself onsite to prevent being captured by military forces. A card in his pocket showed his affiliation to a secret anjuman. These two events scared the Qajar monarch and resulted in his seclusion in the royal compound for months. In June 1908, consulting Russian military officers, the court

performed a successful coup, during which the bombardment of the parliament building by heavy artillery neutralized the armed resistance of *anjumans*. Under the direct commandership of Russian officers, the final attack started early in the morning when there were few armed forces in the parliament and the mosque. The blockage of streets prevented people from accessing the fighting scene on time. Soon after the bombardment was over and the parliament was destroyed, the court performed the similar attacks against all *anjumans* and newspapers, arrested most of activists and deputies in the city, executed the main revolutionary figures, exiled or imprisoned the rest, and placed a military curfew all over the city. The short spring of democracy ended in bloodshed, and revolutionaries lost the game to the combination of oriental despotism and Russian militarism.⁴⁶⁸

The Production of a New Political Public Space

Prior to the revolution, people used the main mosques in the old city and the shrine outside the city as their main political public spaces; however, after the revolution, they used the parliament courtyard and the mosque next to it. All these spaces belonged to the public, instead of a certain social segment. Sipahsalar Mosque, similar to Friday and Shah Mosques, was not affiliated with communities. Built by a wealthy and popular court member, Mirza Husayn Khan Sipahsalar, it was the third major mosque of the city. Its physical location helped it to remain

unaffiliated. It was located beyond the limits of the old city in the new northern neighborhood.\textsuperscript{169} The parliament, originally Mirza Husayn Khan Sipahsalar’s palace, had the same characteristic. It was the house of people; it belonged to the public.\textsuperscript{170} Moreover, the connection between these spaces helped them to work with each other during the two-year period. The movement of people inside these spaces could happen disregarding the adjacent street and square, figure 4.4. As a result, similar to the mosques of the old city, the combination of small-scale architectural spaces, instead of streets and squares, functioned as public spaces of the city.

There is a delicate difference between the parliament and other protest sites. For the first time, a secular space provided the platform for people’s protests. The mosques and the shrine worked as political public spaces because they could address the majority of the Shi’i population disregarding their social affiliation; they belonged to the entire Shi’i population as places for their prayers and pilgrimage. In contrast, the parliament building and courtyard could address people as the center of people’s power and as the means of their political participation. People generated the possibility of the existence of the parliament through the 1906 revolution, and in return, it reproduced the public, disregarding any social affiliation. By the establishment of the parliament, the reciprocal relationship between society and public space entered into a new phase. For the first time, an alternative social force could bond various social segments; people did not depend of a sacred space to produce their desired public spaces. The parliament and its courtyard were the first non-sacred spaces in Tehran that transferred into platforms of protest and political action. The new conception of political public space became possible because of people’s collective actions and resistance against the court’s tyranny during the revolution. People produced new political public spaces, and new spaces reproduced the public.


\textsuperscript{170} For more information on the building of the parliament see: Bani Mas’ud, \textit{Mi’mar-yi Mu’asir-i Iran}, 113-7.
It is important to note that despite the proximity of the spacious squares and wide streets of the northern neighborhood to the parliament, people chose to protest inside the small-scale architectural spaces of the mosque and the parliament, similar to those of the old city. New streets and the square did not belong to people. While the main body of protestors came from traditional neighborhoods of the city where communal spaces contained social life, the new streets and square did not contain any social life related to communal practices.

The few cases of people’s presence in Baharistan Square were overflows of the population in the Mosque and the parliament courtyard. Whenever these spaces could not contain the entire crowd, people gathered around the mosque and the parliament building. For example, when on May 26, 1907, anjumans invited people to gather at the parliament to support people of Tabriz, Kasravi writes: “People filled the rooms and halls of the Parliament and the entire parliament garden and Parliament julukhān [Baharistan Square] and the surrounding streets.”171 The only exception was the anniversary of the revolution in 1907. For the first time, people used Baharistan Square for a public ceremony. The anjumans collectively held the ceremony and decorated the square. Each anjuman and guild built a temporary arch around the square and lit up the entire square and the parliament courtyard with decorative lights. There were fireworks inside the square, and for two days and nights people were entertained by different ceremonies.172 It was the first public ceremony held by people in a space different from traditional spaces of Iranian cities.

171 Kasravi, Tarikh-i Mashrutih-yi Iran, 1: 341
172 Kasravi, Tarikh-i Mashrutih-yi Iran, 1: 412-5; Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909, 144; Malikzadih, Tarikh-i Inghilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran, 3: 520-1.
Iranian Women and Redefinition of the Public Sphere and Political Public Space

The main historiography of the Constitutional Revolution ignores women; women’s activities are absent, and they are depicted as bystanders. Afsaneh Najmabadi argues that the dominant narrative of the revolution is centered on the urban male groups and the alliance of merchants, the intelligentsia, and the ʿulamā against the Qajar court. As a result, stories that seemed to be unrelated to the triangular alliance were omitted from the main historiography of the revolution.\(^{173}\) However, the revolution days and particularly the years after the establishment of the parliament brought to fruition the most significant shift of political public space and the public sphere in the contemporary history of Iran.

The revolution and its aftermaths were a milestone in Iranian women’s awakening and Iranian feminism. Janet Afary argues that “the roots of modern Iranian feminism were firmly planted during that early, turn-of-the-century revolution.”\(^{174}\) Bayat sees the revolution as “a fertile ground” for the seeds of women’s emancipation.\(^{175}\) Similarly, Sedghi believes that by the time of the Constitutional Revolution, women began “to articulate feminist ideas that spoke to their own gender interest.”\(^{176}\) In contrast, Susynne M. McElrone rejects the abrupt change narrative common in studies of Iranian women’s awakening. McElrone shows that the main principles of women awakening, such as education, were already developed extensively among

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\(^{175}\) Bayat, “Women and Revolution in Iran,” 306.

minority groups, long before the revolution. She rejects the dominant narrative of women’s awakening which “portrays Iranian women as ‘Sleeping Beauties’ who suddenly awoke to the world at the turn of the twentieth century and began to study and to participate in political activity and feminist activism.” Similarly, in the case of the public sphere and spaces, I argue that the revolution years brought a significant shift into fruition, rather than initiating or causing the change in the first place.

Before the revolution, the presence of women in riots was not unprecedented. There are many accounts of bread riots in which women played significant roles. Usually, a sharp rise in the price of bread could cause angry mobs of women to attack bakeries. Moreover, they could assault those officials who were the victims of the rumors about the hoarding of wheat. Similarly, women were active during the Tobacco Movement. On January 4, 1892, when Mirza Hasan Ashtiyani decided to leave the city, women joined men in Arg Square to break into the royal compound. Hasan Karbala’i recorded women’s cries on that day in the square: “O Almighty God! They want to take away our religion, exile our ‘ulamā, so tomorrow farangīs [Europeans] contract our marriages, farangīs bury our dead and pray over their bodies.” Similar to bread riots, women’s upsurge during the Tobacco Movement was an abrupt reaction against the threats that could jeopardize their immediate well-being and religion. In the words of Stephanie Cronin, women were present whenever “the protests were more spontaneous and plebeian in character.”

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177 Susynne M. McElrone, “Nineteenth-Century Qajar Women in the Public Sphere: An Alternative Historical and Historiographical Reading of the Roots of Iranian Women’s Activism,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 25, no.2 (2005): 317.
179 Karbala’i, Gharardad-i Regie 1890, 112.
180 Stephanie Cronin, Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran Opposition, Protest and Revolt, 1921–1941 (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 204.
During the main episodes of the Constitutional Revolution, there were instances of the same reactionary protests by women. On January 9, 1906, when the main ‘ulamā had left the city to Shah ‘Abd al-‘Azim Shrine, there was a meeting between four representatives of the ‘ulamā and the Prime Minister to negotiate protesters’ requests and their conditions to return to the city. However, the governor used the opportunity to hold the negotiators in an unofficial detention to exile them later. The next day, the news spread in the city, and women managed to block the king’s coach screaming: “We want Their Eminences and the Leaders of the Faith […] Their Eminences have performed our marriages, Their Eminences lease our houses […] O King of the Muslims, please have the leaders of the Muslims respected.” Besides these reactionary episodes, there was no organized women’s gathering before the initial success of the revolution. The British embassy rejected their only attempt for such a gathering. Based on the British Ambassador’s accounts, a few thousand women intended to join the bast in the embassy. He later adds: “I will do my best to persuade those presently involved in the occupation to oppose women’s participation.” Although there is no more information on women’s request to join the bast, and the other sources just point to it partially, the fact that a few thousand women were ready to take a bast in the embassy implies that a sort of organization or network was functioning to unite them.

After the revolution, the electoral and fundamental laws did not provide a legal basis for women’s political participation. Article three of the electoral laws categorizes women besides foreigners, bankrups, murderers, thieves, criminals, and “persons not within years of discretion”

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182 Paidar, Women and the Political Process, 54; Ra’ìn, Anjuman-ha-yi Serri dar Inghilab-i Mashruitiyat, 99.
183 For example Nazim al-Islam Kermani points to women’s possible bast just in one sentence. “There is a conversation between women to come and set up their tents in ‘Ala’ al-Dawlih Street, next to the embassy: Kermani, Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian, 3: 536.
as “persons who are entirely deprived of electoral rights.”184 In contrast, women began to create their own independent institutions. Women’s anjumans opened in Tehran and other big cities. These anjumans organized routine meetings to discuss national topics and coordinate women’s activities. For example, when the parliament decided to establish the National Bank, women and their anjumans were very active in collecting donations to fund the bank; women even donated their jewelry. Moreover, women’s anjumans boycotted European textile and other products to free the nation from the burden of dependence. Particularly, after the defeat of royalists in 1909 and reopening of the Parliament, the number of women’s anjumans and the circle of their activities expanded. Members of these anjumans were mostly among affluent women.185 W. Morgan Shuster, an American counselor who was employed by the parliament as Treasurer-General of Persia after the reopening of the parliament, writes:

It was well known in Teheran that there were dozens of more or less secret societies among the Persian women, with a central organization by which they were controlled. To this day I know neither the names nor the faces of the leaders of this group, but in a hundred different ways I learned from time to time that I was being aided and supported by the patriotic fervor of thousands of the weaker sex.186

The most significant development of the feminine sphere, however, was not the anjumans, but the girls’ schools. The constitutional era provided a fertile context for women’s education. In January 1907, a women meeting in Tehran adopted ten resolutions, which one was the establishment of girls’ schools. By April 1910, there were fifty girls’ schools, and by 1913, the

number reached to sixty-three schools educating around 2,500 students.\footnote{Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911, 182.} These schools were privately funded by wealthy women’s donations and fundraisings from women’s communities.\footnote{For pioneers of women’s education see: Sedghi, Women and Politics in Iran, 53-4; Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, 41-50.} It took several years until the end of the First World War for the establishment of the state-sponsored girls’ schools.\footnote{Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, 41.} The importance of these figures becomes clear when we know that before the constitutional revolution, there was no independent institution for Muslim women’s education. Only women of affluent families had the chance to learn reading and writing from old male private tutors at home. Besides, the few missionary schools established for minorities around the country accepted a small number of Muslim girls among their student.\footnote{McElrone argues that the missionary schools played an important role in awakening of Iranian women before the revolution. However, the number of the graduates from these schools is negligible in comparison to the number after the establishment and prevalence of girls’ education. For McElrone’s discussion of missionary schools see: McElrone, “Nineteenth-Century Qajar Women,” 306-11.} Even after the revolution, the pioneers of women’s education received serious threats from the conservative ‘ulamā who were against women’s education.

Moreover, women established health clinics, orphanages, and adult education classes.\footnote{Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911, 207.} More importantly, the constitutional era, particularly after the 1909 defeat of royalists, witnessed the establishment of women’s periodicals for the first time in the history of Iran. Danish weekly was one of the first papers that specifically dealt with women’s topics, such as “hygiene, medicine, family matters, and especially child care.”\footnote{Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911, 200.} Between 1910 and early 1920, women published at least thirteen journals. Similar to schools and other women’s organizations, affluent women’s supporters made the publication of these journals possible.\footnote{For examples of the early women journals see: Sedghi, Women and Politics in Iran, 54-7; Camron Michael Amin, The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman: Gender, State Policy, and Popular Culture, 1865–1946 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002).}
It is important to note that many of early women’s institutions, particularly anjumans and schools, were located in private houses. For example, ‘Iyn al-Saltanih provides the exact address of the first women’s anjuman in Tehran, at Nazim Darbar’s house, Ghapuchi Street, in Sangilaj neighborhood. Similarly, many of the first girls’ schools were in private houses. For example, Hamideh Sedghi mentions that in 1907, Toubi Azmoudeh established Tehran’s first Muslim girls’ school, Namus, at her house. Similarly, Yusef Khan Riyshahr founded the Ecole Franco-Persane at his house for his daughters and relatives’ girls.

The establishment of women’s political and educational societies at private houses was in continuation of the gendered configuration of Iranian social spaces. As the first chapter suggested, the andarūnīs, women’s sections of houses, were far beyond a prison-like space to seclude women from the rest of the world. They could be lively all-women communal spaces with various social functions. There were networks of these feminine spaces all over the city, connected to each other via individuals who could transcend communal boundaries and move between them. As a result, women’s first available options for the establishment of new organizations were their houses. These houses hosted schools and anjumans and through it, they reproduced the old-established gendered spatial discourse. However, there was a significant difference. The schools, political anjumans, and newspapers had functions and consequences far beyond the confines of the feminine world. They were the precursors of a new order to be established in the years to come. By enabling women to have a bigger audience, bigger that their immediate communal circles, and perform in a field larger than their enclaves, these spaces and organizations modified social boundaries and transformed public space in the future.

195 Sedghi, Women and Politics in Iran, 53-4.
How did this transformation begin? What was the importance of these (semi)independent women’s organizations in this process? To answer these questions, one needs to step back and examine the articulation of women’s position in the nationalist discourse that developed before, during, and after the Constitutional Revolution. Afsaneh Najmabadi’s valuable works show how the dominant patriarchal discourse carved a specific position for women, *zanān*, and womanhood, *zanānīgī*, during the constitutional era. On the one hand, women entered into the nationalist discourse through the “political language of grievances against” the Qajar court. In this language, recitation and remembrance of injustices, cruelties, and transgressions against women’s sexual integrity attached them to the nation as signs of national honor. On the other hand, the same discourse reproduced the patriarchal power relation in which women, as the weaker sex, should be protected by men’s rising against autocracy and defense of their honor, *nāmūs*, and the country. In the words of Najmabadi, “[t]he language of honor, in this new political re-writing, became the language of political mobilization.” And the language of political mobilization reaffirmed the old-established social norms in which women were attached to the private realm and men were responsible for the public affairs, most importantly, resistance against the hegemonic power of the state. Consequently, as I mentioned earlier, women were absent in the main episodes of contention during the Constitutional Revolution; women were not allowed in the *basts* in Friday and Shah Mosques; the British embassy and *bastīs* did not permit women to enter *bast* in the embassy. Women could assist the movement only through their

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clandestine financial support,\textsuperscript{198} abrupt riot in the city, or through royal women’s direct pressure to the king.\textsuperscript{199}

However, the constitutional atmosphere disturbed the old-established norm. After the establishment of the parliament, there were various instances when women gathered in the parliament and even in Sipahsalar Mosque to protest against the court and support the parliament. For example, when in late 1911 Russia issued an ultimatum to the parliament to dismiss Shuster, the American financial counselor, women held a large meeting in Sipahsalar mosque to put pressure on the parliament to reject Russia’s demand.\textsuperscript{200} Shuster recorded a similar gathering, but this time a big group of armed women entered the parliament:

Out from their walled courtyards and harems marched three hundred of that weak sex […] Many held pistols under their skirts or in the folds of their sleeves. Straight to the Medjlis [parliament] they went, and, gathered there, demanded of the President that he admit them all […] these cloistered Persian mothers, wives and daughters exhibited threateningly their revolvers, tore aside their veils, and confessed their decision to kill their own husbands and sons, and leave behind their own dead bodies, if the deputies wavered in their duty to uphold the liberty and dignity of the Persian people and nation.\textsuperscript{201}

Moreover, after the 1908 coup and during the civil war, women were present actively, sometimes in men’s clothing, as revolutionary armed forces; they fought bravely and were killed in Tabriz; they were present among the troops that marched towards Tehran to liberate the city.\textsuperscript{202}

A comparison between these accounts and previous women’s gatherings, such as bread riots or their reaction to the exile of the ‘ulamā, reveals a significant shift. After the revolution,

\textsuperscript{198} Nazim al-Islam Kermani tells the story of an unknown woman who came to the British embassy and donated some money to be spent for the expenses of the \textit{bast}: Kermani, \textit{Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian}, 3: 539.
\textsuperscript{199} The best example in this regard occurred during the Tobacco Movement. The royal ladies broke their hookahs and did not smoke tobacco when the religious \textit{fatwa} for the ban of tobacco was announced: Keddie, \textit{Religion and Rebellion in Iran}, 96.
\textsuperscript{200} Bayat, “Women and Revolution in Iran,” 303.
\textsuperscript{201} Shuster, \textit{The Strangling of Persia}, 198.
women’s gatherings were not reactive moves to protect their immediate well-being. In 1911, they did not gather in the parliament and the mosque to protect their religious beliefs or lower the price of bread. They were supporting their country; they mobilized as a part of the nation. If, in the past, men had to mobilize to defend their women, as a part of their belongings and consequently their national honor, now, women’s independent mobilizations, in the words of Najmabadi, became the grounds for claiming citizenship.\footnote{Najmabad, “Zanhā-yi millat,” 66.} They managed to transform their image “from private beings to public participants,”\footnote{Paidar, Women and the Political Process, 74.} and through this process, they transformed the public sphere and public spaces. Although confined within the boundaries of andarūnīs, women’s organizations provided the context for their political participation. Women’s anjuman\textsc{\textregistered}s became tools to redefine the meaning of the public sphere. Moreover, after the revolution, political public spaces, the parliament and the mosque courtyard, belonged to both sexes; public space expanded socially. Public space expanded from within, from the private realm of houses.

Finally, women’s claims did not necessarily match men’s expectations. They encountered serious opposition, particularly by conservative clerics; the parliament denied their suffrage claims; no woman was permitted to the first anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution and its public ceremonies in Baharistan Square.\footnote{Kharabi, Anjuman-ha-yi Zanan, 37.} The masculine parliament and society attempted to maintain its dominance, reclaim the public domain, and redefine andarūnīs as women’s universes. However, the wind of change had already blown, and old-established discourses were on the verge of transformation.
Conclusion

The first two decades of the twentieth century brought colossal changes to Iran. Iranians followed shared objectives by casting away their old enmities; the Constitutional Revolution toppled the old-established despotism; people experienced a short period of democracy and the rule of law.

The constitutional era produced unique manifestations of the public sphere and political public spaces in Tehran. The public sphere was the outcome of the cooperation of the religious discourse, the propertied middle class, and the communal spheres. Iranian society produced political public spaces based on its particular socio-spatial vocabulary. Political public space was a means of unification of a segmented society with diverse communal conflicts. People needed to seek spaces that could detach them from their communities and attach them to the larger public. These spaces needed to be neutral grounds; they could not be colored with communal identities. At the same time, these spaces needed to contain traces of each community; each segment of society needed to feel a previous attachment to these spaces. They should be everybody’s and nobody’s spaces simultaneously. Certain sacred spaces of Tehran were the only eligible sites. Shah, Friday, and Sipahsalar Mosques and Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Shrine could address all the Shiʿi Muslim population, the majority of people, without highlighting any communal affiliation. They were the religious manifestation of everybody’s and nobody’s spaces. The spatial manifestation of Shiʿi Islam was the binding force for people’s gathering. Moreover, the formation of political public spaces in these religious sites followed another principle. All people’s gatherings before the victory of the revolution were masculine ones; the patriarchal society erased women from
political public spaces and the geographies of resistance. The religious political public spaces were highly gendered.

However, the success of the Constitutional Revolution and the establishment of the parliament brought some changes to the public sphere and political public spaces. As this chapter discussed, by the establishment of newspapers and anjumans, religious authorities lost their monopoly on forming public opinion. The new organizations were decisive venues for the spread of news and political ideas. Similar shifts occurred in political public spaces; after the revolution, besides Tehran’s sacred spaces, people utilized the parliament and its courtyard as stages of protest. These two can be named as the first non-religious political public spaces of the city. In addition, women made their way into the public sphere and political public spaces. Women’s public presence began from the innermost spaces of Iranian society. Private houses and andarūnīs were the platforms for launching Iranian women’s presence in the public realm. After the revolution, Iranian women established anjumans, girl’s schools, and newspapers and they participated in some protests. In many cases, private houses were the centers of these public organizations. They claimed their position in the public sphere from their private spaces.

Moreover, the anjumans and newspapers provided new venues for the formation of public opinion. Before the revolution the oral tradition through the sermons in the mosques was the only possible way to address the public and mobilize them. Therefore, the ʿulamā were the only leaders of movements. The Tobacco Movement and the Constitutional Revolution clearly demonstrated the impact of their leadership. However, free newspapers and anjumans created a different atmosphere after the revolution. People followed these new institutions vigorously. As a result, they had a great impact on the formation of public opinion and demise of the ʿulamā’s role as people’s sole leaders.
The Constitutional Revolution and the opening of the parliament became an arena for the embodiment of another social change. The electoral law, representatives’ composition in the first parliament, and activities of the parliament were manifestations of a transition in Iranian urban society. Class concessions were substituting communal affiliations. Alongside the spatial polarization of Tehran based on economic values, urban society went through the same polarization. Alongside the city’s filtration into rich and poor neighborhoods, power distribution followed the same trajectory. The parliament was not the precise representation of Iranian society; it served the propertied middle class. Political power and the city transformed hand in hand, heralding a different future.

The constitutional era was a transitory period. It was the tipping point that manifested the long process of social change in Iran. Iranian society commenced its structural transformations from the late eighteenth century through the interplay of local and global forces. The revolution and its aftermath provided a fertile ground for the manifestation of these changes. It would be imprecise to claim that the revolution produced the entire socio-spatial shift, and Iranian society left its traditional trajectory and started a new one just in the course of a few years.

Chapter Five examines the continuation of the trajectory that the constitutional era commenced. It studies Reza Shah’s dictatorship in the 1920s and 1930s to demonstrate how the shaky steps of the Constitutional Revolution converted into dramatic structural transformations in this era, and how as the result of these steps, Iranian urban society and Tehran witnessed significant changes.
For fifteen years after the Constitutional Revolution, the central governments in Tehran were unable to rule over the country effectively. In 1921, however, a military coup resulted in the abolition of the Qajar dynasty and the establishment of a new dictatorship, the Pahlavi state, under the rule of Reza Shah. In this chapter, I study Reza Shah’s dictatorship and the socio-spatial transformation of Tehran during the 1920s and 1930s. By the establishment of a powerful military government and the centralization of power, Iranian urban society underwent massive transformations. The outcomes of these changes were the destruction of the communal sphere, the demise of the propertied middle class and other traditional strata of society, the decline of communal spaces in Tehran and other Iranian cities, and the demolition of vast sections of the old neighborhoods of cities. In contrast, the state’s reforms reinforced two broad social classes in Iranian cities: the modern middle class and the urban working class. These classes did not have any communal ties, and their social practices resulted in fundamental spatial transformations in Iranian cities, particularly Tehran. In the words of Gavin R. G. Hambly:

Between 1921 and 1941, the social structure of Iran changed dramatically, with new occupations, new jobs and the migration of workers to new locations eroding long-established patterns of living. Most striking of all was the phenomenon of rapid urbanization, as the surplus population of the villages began to move to the cities, responding to rumours of opportunities for an improved way of life. Tehran, in particular, saw the beginnings of that phenomenal growth which became virtually unmanageable by
the 1970s. These changes were accompanied by a tremendous amount of familial and personal dislocation and tension.¹

In this chapter, I investigate this structural transformation in Tehran and the formation and consolidation of the modern middle class. I examine the production of new social spaces in the city and the decline of the old ones. The modern middle class played a decisive role in the spatial transformation of the city. This class was the main social force behind Reza Shah’s dictatorship and became the primary advocate of political reforms in the 1940s and the early 1950s after Reza Shah’s abdication from power.

The cooperation between the military dictatorship and the modern middle class resulted in fundamental socio-spatial changes. The centralization of power enabled the state to restrict the communal sphere. Through the analysis of spatial strategies of the state, I demonstrate that the First Pahlavi state targeted communal spaces of the traditional sections of society. The codification of spaces was the state’s key method for accomplishing social reforms, modernization, and Westernization. By designing and imposing detailed guidelines for various communal spaces of the old city, the state annihilated their communal life. Similar to Foucault’s concept of the carceral archipelago,² the First Pahlavi state succeeded in imposing strict social control and discipline over urban populations through spatial guidelines. The codification of spaces was an effective strategy for the subjection³ of the urban population. The state’s spatial codes, similar to Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon,⁴ stretched the state’s omnipresent control in every corner of the communal sphere. The Pahlavi state transformed lived spaces of the old city

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⁴ Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 200-3.
into representations of space. Before the state’s top-down regulations of these spaces, communal spaces were true representations of the communal sphere. They were appropriated by social practices of various communities to reflect their social life. However, through the codification of these spaces, the state managed to reduce them to means of social control.⁵

Parallel to the general decline and denigration of the communal sphere and spaces as the result of the state’s and the modern middle class’s interventions, this era witnessed the proliferation of social spaces of the latter group. Through the production of new forms of social life and spaces, the modern middle class consolidated its position in Iranian urban society.⁶ These spaces had no precedent in Iranian cities; they were based on Western social spaces. The West became the modern middle class’s desired image for the production of new spaces and social life. Theaters, cinemas, cafés, restaurants, sports clubs, and hotels became the social hubs of this class; they could distinguish themselves from the traditional strata of society by practicing new forms of social life in new social spaces of the city.

Through these investigations, I found that the dichotomy of new and old spaces resulted in a powerful social discourse that generated a destructive power relationship between the modern middle class and traditional strata of society. The modern middle class, backed by the state, utilized this discourse to depict itself as modern, progressive, European, secular, healthy, scientific, and happy and the traditional strata as backward, obsolete, traditional, religious, unhealthy, unhappy, and ignorant. They recognized themselves as the eligible bright future of the country and portrayed the others as the dark past that should be avoided. This discourse resulted in the destruction of the communal sphere, communal spaces, and the neighborhoods of the old


⁶ This is a Lefebvrian notion. Lefebvre argues that various social groups and ideologies have to produce their own spatiality to confirm their social existence: Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 416-7.
city. However, I argue that socio-spatial manifestation of this discourse was the outcome of its incubation for more than a century in Iranian society. Its traces are recognizable in the wonders of Iranian travelers when they visited European cities in the first half of the nineteenth century, in Nassir al-Din Shah’s descriptions of *farang* in his travelogue, in the 1870s expansion of Tehran, in thoughts and actions of the intelligentsia during the constitutional era, and in the formation of the First Pahlavi state. The passage of time had enhanced the inherent power relationship of this discourse. If the nineteenth century travelogues were devoid of any spatial comparison between Iran and Europe, and the state conducted the 1870s expansion of Tehran with respect to the communal sphere and the old city, in contrast, by the 1930s the power relationship between the Westernized modern middle class and the traditional sections of society had reached its climax. This power relationship bore disastrous social outcomes, particularly for the latter group.

The chapter continues with a brief overview of the post-constitutional era until the 1941 abdication of Reza Shah from power. After that, I will discuss the formation of the modern middle and urban working classes and the decline of the communal sphere. In the next step, I will focus on the spatial strategies of the state and their impacts on the old and new classes and their social spaces. The chapter ends with a discussion of the socio-spatial discourse that resulted in the transformation of Tehran and its urban society during the First Pahlavi era.

**The Post-constitutional Era: An Overview**

On February 21, 1921, hours before the sunrise, thousands of military forces from the Russian-trained Cossack Brigade marched into Tehran and performed a bloodless coup under the
commandership of forty-two-year-old Colonel Reza Khan. Supported by the British generals in Iran, Reza Khan expressed that the coup was aimed to save the Qajar monarchy and bring back peace to the chaotic condition of the country. However, within a few years, he climbed the ladder of power, and on December 12, 1925, the parliament selected Reza Khan as the new king of the country. The Pahlavi dynasty replaced the Qajar, and Reza Khan became Reza Shah. The young democracy resulted in a new era of autocracy.

There is a general agreement among the scholars of the contemporary history of Iran that depicts Reza Shah’s rise to power as the result of the chaos after the Constitutional Revolution. In this view, the dark and unstable years after the revolution, particularly after Russia’s military occupation in 1911, paved the road for Reza Khan’s seizure of power. Exhausted from the civil war, outbreaks of diseases, famines, various upheavals throughout the country, the presence of the Russian army in the north and the British Army in the south, and the central government’s inability to bring back peace, many people welcomed a military figure who was capable of controlling the country. In the words of Banani, “Reza Shah was not the leader of an organized, program-bearing, ideology-spouting revolutionary movement. He was, in fact, the product of the failure and futility of such movements in Iran.” Homa Katouzian even goes one step further and

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7 The role of British government in the coup and rise of Reza Khan to power is one of the popular conspiracy theories among Iranians. While it is improbable that the British Foreign Office was directly involved in the coup, however, it is clear that a British general, Sir Edmund Ironside, played a significant role in pinpointing Reza Khan and aiding him in performing the coup. For more discussion of the topic see: Shareen Blair Brysac, “A Very British Coup: How Reza Shah Won and Lost His Throne,” World Policy Journal 24, no. 2 (Summer, 2007): 90-103; Homa Katouzian, State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis, (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2000), 214-241; Hambly, “The Pahlavi Autocracy,” 219-20; Michael P. Zirinsky, “The Rise of Reza Khan,” in A Century of Revolution: Social Movements in Iran, vol. 2 of Social Movements, Protest, and Contention, ed. John Foran (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 53-6.


9 Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 44.
claims that the ebbs and flows of autocracy and chaos throughout the history of Iran are a characteristic of Iranian society. Using the terms “arbitrary society and state,” he constructs a theoretical framework of state and society to examine various changes of dynasties throughout the Iranian history. In this view, each period of autocracy, the arbitrary rule as he says, leads to a period of rebellion, followed by chaos, and finally, the establishment of another arbitrary rule.10

In recent years, however, the dominance of the discourse that depicts the chaotic condition and futility of the years between the Constitutional Revolution and the 1921 coup has been questioned. Stephanie Cronin argues that the discourse of the chaos period was fostered by the Pahlavi regime to portray Reza Shah as the “national savior.”11 As a result, the Pahlavi monarchy systemically belittled all the achievements of the Constitutional Movement to legitimize Reza Shah’s rise to the power. In another study, Afshin Marashi demonstrates the importance of the pre-coup era as the “origin of modern Iranian nationalism.” He argues that during this period “the process of reform and modernization underwent a crucial shift from the late imperial project of the Qajar state and toward the nationalistic project that would dominate Iranian politics for much of the twentieth century.”12

During the two decades after the 1921 coup until Reza Shah’s abdication from power in 1941 as the result of the British and the Soviet invasion of the country during the Second World War, Iranian society experienced dramatic transformations; the First Pahlavi state managed to bring many projects to fruition. The main key to Reza Shah’s success in implementing long-anticipated reforms was his control over military forces. By combining different military forces in Iran and replacing foreign officers by Iranians, Reza Khan soon made an army of forty

10 For the articulation of this theory see: Katouzian, State and Society in Iran, 1-24.
thousand that was able to reach the farthest places and suppress local and tribal rebellions. Throughout his reign, the army was the biggest consumer of the national budget; it was continuously modernized by purchasing military equipment, and by the time of his abdication in 1941, it had grown to 400,000 men.\(^{13}\) The main purpose of the army was to establish the power and control of the central government throughout the country. For the first time since the Safavid era, the central government was able to rule the entire country, and the local rulers lost their autonomy. However, the army was literally useless when Britain and the Soviet Union occupied Iran to change the course of the World War II against the Nazis. In the words of Cronin, Reza Shah’s army “was oriented exclusively towards domestic security.”\(^{14}\)

Most of the reforms and changes of the First Pahlavi era can be examined through four main frameworks: nationalism, secularism, modernization, and centralization. The nation-building project was the fruition of a long process started in the mid-nineteenth century. The project utilized the pre-Islamic era as the origin for the construction of a modern national identity. Through this process, the pre-Islamic past was popularized to distinguish the Iranian nation from its neighbors. By implementing national education, mandating particular dress codes for men and women, holding commemorative ceremonies, and building commemorative monuments, the Pahlavi state managed to construct the new national identity.\(^{15}\)

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\(^{14}\) Cronin, “Reza Shah and the paradoxes,” 61.

At the same time, the state followed various policies to secularize society and curtail the ʿulamāʾ’s power. The national education reduced the number of religious schools dramatically and brought an end to the ʿulamāʾ’s dominance in the education system. By establishing a new secular judiciary system, the religious judicial courts declined. By forcing women to unveil in public, developing women’s education, forcing government employees to attend the state’s ceremonies with their unveiled wives, banning traditional hats and clothes, changing the religious devotion of properties, vaqf, into a governmental subject and limiting the clerics’ authority on the matter, prohibiting religious ceremonies of Muharram and Qurbān, and even jailing and murdering some of the high ranking ʿulamāʾ, the Pahlavi state constrained the powerful religious strata and promoted secular values. The state even showed no compromise in respecting the old-established tradition of taking bast in mosques and shrines. The massacre of bastis in Imam Reza Shrine of Mashhad put an end to the old practice of protests in sacred spaces had reached to its end.


17 Vaqf is the donation of property and land for charitable purposes with no intention of reclaiming them. Traditionally, it was a nongovernmental matter handled by the religious authorities.

Reza Shah’s reign witnessed an unprecedented wave of modernization. Many of the long-anticipated projects, such as the national railway system, came to fruit during this era. Iran’s transportation and communication systems underwent a rapid transformation; the total length of the country’s roads, paved and unpaved, increased from 8,500 kilometers (5,300 miles) in 1927 to twenty-four thousand kilometers (fifteen thousand miles) in 1938. The state undertook the 1,394 kilometer (870 mile) trans-Iranian railway, connecting the Persian Gulf in the south to the Caspian Sea in the north, by an additional import tax on sugar and tea. In the 1930s, a German company began regular flights between Iranian cities, and the national telephone system was in operation by 1935. Similarly, the state initiated many new industries during this era; textile and oil industries developed rapidly; the state established several sugar refineries throughout the country; the production of cement started in this period; many other small-scale industries flourished around the country. However, the state was not as successful in agricultural and land reforms. The major success in this regard was the production of industrial crops for the new industries.19

Finally, centralization can be considered as the hallmark of the First Pahlavi era. In contrast to the Qajar court, which was unable to implement its power beyond the capital, Reza Shah managed to reach all over the country. The new army and the government bureaucracy, which

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Abrahamian calls the pillars of Reza Shah’s regime, were the key factors in the creation of a capable central government. Reza Shah’s tribal policies destroyed a continuing threat to the central government. Not only did the tribes and nomads lose their capability of armed resistance, but, they were also forced into a sedentary lifestyle, which destroyed their long-established nomadic lifestyle forever. Moreover, the national conscription forced all the young male adults to join the army for a two-year military service. The conscription took away the work and defense forces from the tribes and weakened them even further. By establishing a national bank, centralizing and reforming the methods of tax collection, establishing state monopolies on import and export of certain goods, centralizing the education and judiciary systems, and closing down the oppositional parties and newspapers, the Pahlavi state managed to become the sole economic, political, financial, industrial, and military force by the early 1940s, before Reza Shah’s abdication.

**New Urban Classes and the Decline of the Communal Sphere**

The state-sponsored reforms of Reza Shah era caused profound changes in various sections of Iranian society, particularly in the cities. Rapid urbanization and internal migration from rural areas to the cities increased the urban population. Tehran’s population in 1922, a year after

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20 Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 135.


Reza Shah’s military coup, was around 210,000 people.\textsuperscript{23} The second census of Tehran by the municipality in 1932 showed that the population of the city had reached 310,000 in just ten years in the same city limits.\textsuperscript{24} However, the main growth happened in the second half of Reza Shah’s reign when he had succeeded in suppressing various rebellions around the country and begun his structural reforms. In 1941, just before Reza Shah’s abdication, the population of Tehran had passed 540,000 people, and the city had grown considerably.\textsuperscript{25} Fifteen years later, the first national census of November 1956 counted more than 1.5 million people in the city.\textsuperscript{26}

The rapid urban growth, accompanied by state-sponsored projects and reforms, disturbed the old social structure. As mentioned before, the religious groups lost their central position in society; clerics lost their authority over the judiciary and educational systems, and religious endowment of properties. Big merchants were gradually replaced by “new industrial entrepreneurs and traders, contractors, consulting engineers, financiers, and bankers.”\textsuperscript{27} The old-established guild system, similarly, lost its control over the bazaar, crafts, and trades, which resulted in the weakening of the bazaar organization. By the establishment of municipalities, these institutions began to regulate various guilds. For example, the municipality of Tehran issued separate \textit{nizāmnāmihs}, guidelines, for each guild, which discredited \textit{Kadkhudās}\textsuperscript{28} as the heads of the guilds and recognized the Office of Food Control of the municipality, \textit{Idārih-yi Arzāq}, as the authority for handling the internal disputes of the guilds and their relationship to

\textsuperscript{23} Baladiyyih Tehran, \textit{Sarshumari-yi Nofus-i Shahr-i Tehran: Dar Sanavat-i 1262 va 1270 va 1301 va 1311 [The survey of Tehran population in the years 1262 and 1270 and 1301 and 1311]} (Tehran: Matba’ih-yi Majlis, 1312 [1933]), 16.
\textsuperscript{25} Ehlers and Floor, “Urban Change in Iran,” 262.
\textsuperscript{28} See Chapter One.
the outer world. Moreover, by abolishing guild taxes, the state took away the sole internal regulating force that had provided a power structure in guilds for centuries. In the words of Abrahamian, “the elimination of the guild tax was a kiss of death designed to sap the control of the craft and trade masters over their apprentices, artisans, journeymen, and wage earners.”

Through these systematic changes, the state managed to destroy one of the oldest and strongest forms of segmentation and communal affiliation in Iranian urban society. By the elimination of the bonding forces that had held professional communities together for centuries, retail stores and workshops proliferated independently inside and outside the bazaar. Ashraf and Banuazizi explain “In Tehran, for example, the number of persons in such occupations increased from 12,000 in […] 1928 to 250,000 in […] 1976.” The old-established power structures that had enabled the commercial interactions in Iranian cities for centuries lost their power over their members.

As I discuss in the rest of the chapter, these systematic reforms and the state’s regulations of traditional social spaces commenced three important changes. First, urban bazaars lost their centrality as the main business districts of cities; second, the propertied middle class, which had played a significant role during the Constitutional Revolution, lost its cohesion and solidarity; third, social segmentation lost its crucial role in structuring the traditional sections of society. In a broader view, the state’s policies and interventions led to the decline of the communal sphere. The communal sphere, as the main social force structuring Iranian urban society during the nineteenth century, lost its centrality to conduct social interactions in cities; it lost its semi-

29 The first article of these guidelines says: “Handling all the internal disputes and defining the confines of the guilds are the duties of the Department of Food Control of the municipality.” For some examples of these guidelines see: Majalih-yi Baladiyyih /Baladiyyih Magazine/ 4, no. 13 (Bahman 1304 [February, 1926]): 1-6. Various issues of this magazine are available at the University of Tehran, Central Library, the Department of Periodicals.
30 Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 151-2.
31 Ashraf and Banuazizi, “Class System vi”.

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independency against the central state; and the First Pahlavi State succeeded in subjugating the 
communal sphere.

These changes are half of the story. The other half is the story of new urban classes that 
started to form after the Constitutional Revolution, particularly during the First Pahlavi era. Two 
major urban classes appeared in Iranian urban society, which continue to live up to the present 
time. First, by the proliferation of new industries, an urban working class formed in Iranian 
cities. By 1937 and 1938, six percent of 14.9 million Iranian citizens were employed in the 
industrial sector.32 Despite its small size, the concentration of the new industries in the main 
cities of the country meant that the most of the working class lived in these cities. Abrahamian 
estimates that there were 64,000 workers in 62 “modern manufacturing plants and numerous 
handicraft workshops” of Tehran.33

What do these numbers mean? What is the importance of the emerging working class? In 
contrast to the old crafts, new industries, particularly those established by the state, were a source 
of employment for all the sections of society; the communal backgrounds of the workers were 
not important for their employment. Based on Abrahamian’s estimate, the first generation of 
industrial workers had diverse rural backgrounds: “According to the first national census taken in 
1956, 14% of the migrants in Tehran were from neighboring villages, 23% from Azerbaijan, 
19% from Gilan, 10% from Mazandaran, 10% from Kermanshah, 9% from Isfahan, 6% from 
Khurasan, 4% from Khuzistan, and 2% from Fars.” 34 As a result, the new industries were 
effective in the transformation of the communal sphere and the formation of a class-based social

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32 Boroujerdi, “Triumphs and travails of authoritarian modernisation,” 155. For a comprehensive discussion of the 
size of the working class and the number of the industrial plants see: Ashraf and Banuazizi, “Class System vi”.
33 Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 147.
34 Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 147.
structure. Members of the new urban working class could be identified based on their common economic interests, rather than their communal identity.

In the context of this research, however, it is the second urban class that plays a significant role. Called by different titles, such as professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia, new middle class, intelligentsia, modern middle class, and ruwshanfikran or intellectuals, this class was mainly the product of the national education system and the growing central bureaucracy of the post-revolution era. By the establishment of the Pahlavi state, this class consolidated its central position in Iranian cities and grew rapidly to become a decisive urban force in the years to come. I call it the modern middle class, which stands in contrast to the propertied middle class of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, or as we can call it now, the traditional middle class.

It is important to note that due to the novelty of this class in Iran, there are various definitions for it. For example, Banani traces back members of the modern middle class to various social backgrounds, from sons of affluent strata in the Qajar era to a few sons of peasants, and from the sons of the clergy to the sons of minor officials: “In Iranian society these young men formed the professional class—journalists, doctors, lawyers, teachers, army officers, and government officials.” Adib defines technicians, white-collar workers, and teachers as the

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37 Abrahiamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 145.
core of the modern middle class. Ashraf and Banuazizi count “independent professionals, civil servants, military personnel, white-collar employees and technicians in private enterprises, and the intelligentsia” as the members of this class. Finally, Al-i Ahmad claims that the modern middle class, ruwshanfikran in his terminology, was composed of five different groups: (1) writers, artists, poets, and professional experts, (2) professors, critics, judges, lawyers, and white-collars, (3) physician, engineers, and researchers, (4) teachers and clerks, and (5) journalists, TV and radio hosts, and publishers.

Although there are overlaps and discrepancies between these definitions, the central bureaucracy of the Pahlavi state has a significant position in these lists. The state’s centralization contributed to the formation and development of the modern middle class. During the First Pahlavi era, the state grew from a weak and small circle of courtiers to a capable central government, forming ten ministries with ninety thousand full-time personnel. Moreover, the military forces had thousands of personnel in their service. As a result, the state became the biggest employer in the country. Based on the figures that are provided by Ashraf and Banuazizi, in 1928, there were twenty-four thousand government employees in Tehran, which reached to 240,000 in 1976. Similarly, the number increased from 200,000 to nearly a million from 1956 to 1976 in the entire country. Based on censuses of the Municipality of Tehran in 1922 and 1932, it seems that there is an exaggeration in Ashraf’s and Banuazizi’s number of employees in 1928. The 1922 municipality census counted 6,369 government employees in Tehran, and in 1932, there were 12,105. In 1932, the number of the employees plus their family members was 40,838, which suggests that the governmental employment had direct impact on more than thirteen

41 Adib, Tabaqih-yi Mutivasit-i Jadid dar Iran, 94-6.
42 Al-i Ahmad, Dar Khidmat va Khivanat-i Ruwshanfikran, 81-7.
43 Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 136-7.
44 Ashraf and Banuazizi, “Class System vi.”
percent of the total population of the city. Although the number of the government employees in Tehran almost doubled in ten years, it is still half of Ashraf’s and Banuazizi’s estimate for 1928. Finally, Al-i Ahmad provides an estimate of the modern middle class in 1956. Based on his detailed calculations using the 1956 national census and his particular categorization of the class, the modern middle class consisted of 450,000 people in that year throughout the country.

Besides the state’s central bureaucracy, the development of the national education system played a significant role in the consolidation of the modern middle class. The new education system trained the manpower for the state’s bureaucracy, industries, and commercial enterprises. Moreover, it was a crucial element in the nation-building project of the state. The education reforms were extensive. Although the basis of these reforms had been initiated by the establishment of a few modern primary schools in the late nineteenth century and, more importantly, the 1910 passage of the *Fundamental Law of Education* by the parliament, the main national reforms occurred after the 1921 coup and the establishment of the Pahlavi monarchy. The 1935 yearbook of the Ministry of Education provides a reliable source to depict a picture of the progress. Between 1925 and 1935, the budget of the Ministry of Education increased 7.5 times, from 7.7 to fifty-eight million rials, and reached to eighty-four million in 1940.

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47 Ashraf and Banuazizi, “Class System vi.”  
53 Matthee, “Transforming Dangerous Nomads,” 146.
Although Matthee argues that in comparison to the military budget the increase in the educational budget was negligent, still, in a historical perspective, the contrast between the Pahlavi’s and Qajar’s education policies is astonishing. The number of the schools, the old fashioned schools (maktab) and new schools, increased from 612 in 1922-1923 to 5,339 in 1934-1935. During the same period, the number of the students rose from 55,131 to 255,673, and by the time of Reza Shah’s abdication from the power, this number had reached to 366,095, of which only 51,922 students were in maktabs. However, due to the state’s anti-religious policies and its attempts to curtail the clerics’ power, the number of the theology students dropped dramatically from 4,879 in 1924-1925 to 784 in 1941-1942.

Women’s education witnessed an impressive expansion during this era too. The slow process that had been initiated after the revolution by the individual activists in private houses became part of the official education program of the state. The number of female graduates from the modern primary schools increased from three, in comparison to forty-four male graduates, in 1912 to 2,253, in comparison to 6,631, in 1935. The first group of forty girls graduated from the modern high schools in 1928, fourteen years after the first male graduates. This number reached to 211 girls, in comparison to 537 boys, in 1935.

Finally, in 1935, by combining various institutes of higher education, particularly the old Dar al-Funun college of 1851, the state established the first modern university in Iran, the

54 Matthee, “Transforming Dangerous Nomads,” 146.
56 Vizarat-i Ma’arif ‘Uqaf va Sanayi’ Mustazrafi, Salnamih va ‘Ihsa’iyyih, 2: 82.
57 Menashri, Education and the Making of Modern Iran, 102.
58 Menashri, Education and the Making of Modern Iran, 102.
60 Vizarat-i Ma’arif ‘Uqaf va Sanayi’ Mustazrafi, Salnamih va ‘Ihsa’iyyih, 2: 85. For the numbers of boy and girl students in different years between 1922 and 1942 see: Menashri, Education and the Making of Modern Iran, 110. Also see: Matthee, “Transforming Dangerous Nomads,” 133-4.
The university soon changed into the engine of economic development, secularization, and nation building. Moreover, the Pahlavi state needed the graduates of the university to implement its modernization projects. Although six years after its foundation Reza Shah had to step down from power in favor of his son, the university gradually grew to become an important factor in the production of the modern middle class. The total number of students in the University of Tehran, not counting the future universities, grew from 1,034 in 1934-1935 to 2,023 in 1940-1941 and reached 18,183 in 1976-1977.

What do these figures mean? What are the social impacts of the state’s bureaucracy and national education system? Similar to the emergence of the urban working class, the state’s bureaucracy and education system were not continuations of their Qajar counterparts. The centralized and national state was detached from the politics of segmented society. Its schools and higher education institutes had the same curriculum for all the people of Iran. They accepted students regardless of their communal affiliation. They were centers for the amalgamation of people under the rubric of nationalism. The same goes for the bureaucratic system; it was an employer beyond any communal identity. Although by the end of the First Pahlavi reign, the sizes of the modern middle class and the working class were relatively small in comparison to the entire population, the course of the events was in their favor; the national education system became bigger and bigger to cover all the population; the institutes of higher education became prevalent in almost all the cities of the country; the state’s bureaucracy grew in size and stretched throughout the country; finally, every year, new industries and factories were established around

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61 For more information on the establishment of the University of Tehran and its early years see: Christl Catanzaro, “Policy or Puzzle? The Foundation of the University of Tehran between Ideal Conception and Pragmatic Realization,” in Culture and Cultural Politics under Reza Shah: The Pahlavi State, New Bourgeoisie and the Creation of a Modern Society in Iran, eds. Bianca Devos and Christoph Werner (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 37-54. Matthee, “Transforming Dangerous Nomads,” 134-5; Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 85-111; Menashri, Education and the Making of Modern Iran, 143-54.
62 Catanzaro, “Policy or Puzzle?,” 44.
63 Menashri, Education and the Making of Modern Iran, 151 & 213.
Iran. These changes promised the beginning of the decline of the old social structures. The new classes had powerful reproductive forces. Their momentum was incomparable to the declining force of the traditional strata of society. In the decades to come, more and more people entered new classes, and the traditional strata shrunk to become smaller and smaller.

In addition to these transformations, the modern middle class differed from the traditional section of society in another significant factor. The first Pahlavi state commenced a top-down project to integrate women into public life. By increasing women’s education, providing employment opportunities for women, and compulsory unveiling,\(^6^4\) the state attempted to redefine the image of modern Iranian women. The modern Iranian woman in this desired image was defined “against the ignorance and moral confusion of traditional woman” and “her progressive qualities were derived from successfully adapting Euro-American culture to an Iranian context.”\(^6^5\) In the words of Paidar, the formation of a link between gender equality and national progress helped women to achieve some social rights in this era.\(^6^6\)

As a result, the modern middle class, as the primary receivers of these achievements, distinguished itself from traditional sections of society by including women into the social scene. Although these steps were elementary, they had significant importance. In the words of Camron Michael Amin:

Some privileged Iranian women, rather than European or American women, could serve as inspiration for their countrywomen as to what was possible. In public discourse, the very meaning of male guardianship had been expanded from familial relationships (son, brother, father) to other socioeconomic relationships: teacher, mentor, supervisor, coworker, and classmate.\(^6^7\)

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\(^{66}\) Paidar, *Women and the Political Process*, 103.

\(^{67}\) Amin, *The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman*, 188.
The most significant shift was the transformation of gendered qualities of public and private spaces. Starting from the constitutional era, women’s attempts to stretch the public sphere and spaces to include themselves found a new momentum. New definitions of women in society, besides daughters, mothers and sisters, became possible during the first Pahlavi era, and the modern middle class was at the center of this social change.

Finally, the modern middle class had another fundamental difference with the other social groups, which had decisive impacts on its social life and spaces. In the words of Bianca Devos, “[t]hese middle-class Iranians were not just passively modernized through state-enforced reforms, they themselves acted as pioneers promoting a progressive way of life, primarily by adopting a modern Western lifestyle.” Ahmad Ashraf suggests that this class turned away from Iranian and religious culture to enjoy “the fruits of modernization and Westernization.”

Multiple motives can be mentioned for the modern middle class’s adoption of Western culture, such as their sense of backwardness of the country, their concerns to improve Iranian society, and their adaptation of Western lifestyle as a marker of their social status. This characteristic has caused some scholars to use terms such as intelligentsia or ruwshanfikr to identify this class. For example, Abrahamian sees this class as the expansion of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’ intelligentsia, claiming that the reforms caused the intelligentsia to transform “from a stratum into a social class.” Al-i Ahmad’s ruwshanfikr group is based on the same logic. He uses the term ruwshanfikr to refer to the intelligentsias of the constitutional era. In contrast, I intentionally avoid merging together the modern middle class and the earlier groups of

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68 Devos, “Engineering a Modern Society?,” 270.
71 Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 145-6.
72 Al-i Ahmad, Dar Khidmat va Khiyanat-i Ruwshanfikran, 21.
intelligentsias. While I do not deny the connections and continuities between these two, I prefer to highlight their different social origins by using different terms. The nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries intelligentsias were the individuals who had produced an independent understanding of the West, mostly from visiting European countries. However, the modern middle class was the outcome of the state’s top-down social reforms. In any case, both groups were inclined towards the West and the Western lifestyle. In describing the characteristics of a ruwshanfīr from the viewpoint of the lay people, Al-i Ahmad calls him farangī maāb: “A person who wears Western clothes, hats and shoes. If it happens, he drinks alcoholic beverages. He sits on chairs. He shaves. He wears a tie. He eats using a spoon and a fork. He uses farangī words. He has been to Europe, or he intends to go […] He goes to cinemas. He goes out to dance.”73 As a result, in Al-i Ahmad’s view, being farangī maāb is the first and the most important characteristic of a ruwshanfikr. The other two characteristics are being secular and having some education.74 Similarly, James Alban Bill believes that many members of the intelligentsia became “obsessed with Western ideas and culture.”75 To sum up, the inclination towards the West and active promotion of their lifestyle were two of the key characteristics of the modern middle class.

There was a great bond between Reza Shah’s military dictatorship and the modern middle class. The modern middle class constituted the state’s growing bureaucracy. It was the main social force behind the First Pahlavi’s reforms. Abrahamian claims that Reza Shah “aroused ambivalent sentiments among the modern middle class.” While in the first half of his reign he had the support of this class, he gradually lost this social support towards the end of his reign.76

73 Al-i Ahmad, Dar Khidmat va Khīyanat-i Ruwshanfikran, 44.
74 Al-i Ahmad, Dar Khidmat va Khīyanat-i Ruwshanfikran, 44-5.
75 Bill, The Politics of Iran, 61.
76 Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 152.
Bianca Devos goes one step further and argues that the modern middle class had an active role in the modernization project of the state. Through the analysis of the newspaper articles of the era, Devos claims that: “Most of the middle-class modernists widely supported the state’s ambitious reform agenda. They believed a strong centralized state to be of utmost importance for it to succeed, and this belief in a patriarchal state was widespread among them. Hence, many modernists advocated a rigorous enforcement of the reforms by the official authorities.”77 The members of the modern middle class “considered their own material interests and aspirations tied to the monarch’s program of modernization and secularization.”78 This class played a great role in the substitution of secular nationalism for religious fanaticism. Without their support, the First Pahlavi state could not implement many of its reforms.79

The modern middle and urban working classes were in stark contrast to the traditional strata of society. The members of these classes were not affiliated with the city’s communities. As a result, the communal sphere did not have considerable influence over these people. They did not need the communal sphere to identify themselves; their social well-being was independent of their affiliation with a certain community. There is a significant difference between these classes and the propertied middle class of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Although the members of the propertied middle class were able to work collectively and transcend communal boundaries for their greater good, they had their specific communal ties and maintained their ties during the constitutional era. As a matter of fact, their communal ties enabled them to mobilize their communities during the revolution. The propertied middle class was a class above the communal sphere but deeply attached to it. In contrast, the modern middle

77 Devos, “Engineering a Modern Society?,” 272.
78 Ashraf and Banuazizi, “Class System vi.”
79 Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 24
and the urban working classes were detached from the communal sphere and did not need to insist on communal ties to define their social position.

These social transformations led to the formation of, in the words of Ahmad Ashraf, “dual class structure” in Iranian cities. On one hand, there was the traditional section of society with all its communal politics, and on the other hand, there were new social classes that were free from religious and communal politics. In this era, a social gap developed between the two sections of this dual structure, particularly between the modern middle class and traditional sections of society. Ashraf describes this gap in these words:

The rift between these two principal strata intensified in the process of modernization in the interwar period [...] These developments have led to the formation of an increasing cultural alienation of the ruling elite and the new middle classes from the religious stratum and the masses of bazaaris, rural migrants, workers, peasants, and tribesman, whose ideological leanings run toward traditionalism and populism.

In this condition, the close bond between the state and the modern middle class resulted in the consolidation of this class and further decline of the traditional section of urban society. In the next section, I examine the social life and social spaces of the modern middle class in Tehran. As a new social group, the modern middle class had to produce its specific spaces to maintain its social vitality. In Lefebvre’s word: “groups, classes or fractions of classes cannot constitute themselves, or recognize one another, as ‘subjects’ unless they generate (or produce) a space.” The state was the biggest advocate and sponsor of the modern middle class in its process of spatial production. The spatial rise of the modern middle class coincided with the decline of the communal sphere and communal spaces. The state’s policies played a decisive role in the spatial consolidation of the former and the spatial demise of the latter. The institutional organ for the

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80 Ashraf, “The Roots of Emerging Dual Class.”
82 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 416.
implementation of the state’s policies in the capital was the municipality of Tehran. First, I continue by illustrating the bigger picture of the transformation of the city and the municipality’s role in this regard. Second, I examine the fate of communal spaces and the production of new spaces for the modern middle class.

Tehran and the First Pahlavi State

The transformation of Tehran during the First Pahlavi period was in line with the state’s national policies. The four principles of the Reza Shah era—nationalism, secularism, centralization, and modernization—brought drastic physical and social changes to the city. By the time of Reza Shah’s abdication in 1941, Tehran was unrecognizable from what it had been in 1921. By undertaking a massive project of construction of new streets and squares, both in the old and new cities, the state transformed the physicality of Tehran dramatically. The municipality of Tehran widened the streets of the northern city from the Nassiri expansion, and built new squares at their cross sections. In the southern city, the municipality destroyed buildings and constructed new straight and wide streets by cutting through the old neighborhoods; through these actions, it superimposed a new spatial pattern on the old fabric, which was in stark contrast to its labyrinthine network of narrow alleys. Moreover by constructing buildings with uniform façades and extrovert architecture at the sides of the new streets and squares and incorporating pre-Islamic motifs in the façades of the governmental buildings, as the architectural manifestations of the state’s nation-building project, the state provided a new physical appearance for the city.83 The municipality wiped out a vast section of

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83 For more information on architecture in the First Pahlavi era see: Talinn Grigor, “The King’s White Walls: Modernism and Bourgeois Architecture,” in Culture and Cultural Politics under Reza Shah: The Pahlavi State, New
the Sangilaj neighborhood for the stock exchange building. This project never finished, and years later, the institution transformed the empty land into a public park. Similarly, the destruction of many of the Qajar palaces in and out of the royal compound provided open space for new governmental buildings and ministries. In 1933, the state tore down the city ramparts without replacing them; the last barrier against Tehran’s limitless expansion was wiped out, and the city began to grow from four directions. New industries began to emerge around the city, mainly, on the southern side. Similarly, the state built Tehran’s massive railway station and its facilities in the south of the city. In contrast, the northern lands of the city accommodated new urban facilities of the modern world, such as the University of Tehran, the National Garden (Bāgh-i Millī), the National Bank, the National Museum, and a new hospital. The state provided a new water resource for the city by digging a ditch and transferring water from Karaj River to the city. Moreover, long avenues connected Tehran to the northern mountainous region. These streets provided the spatial structure for expansion of the city towards the north in the decades to come.84

Bourgeoisie and the Creation of a Modern Society in Iran, eds. Bianca Devos and Christoph Werner (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 95-118; Grigor, Building Iran; Bani Mas’ud, Mi’rāj-yi Mu ‘āsir-i Iran, 190-263; Mina Marefat, “Building to Power: Architecture of Tehran 1921-1941” (PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988), 68-248; Mustafa Kiyani, Mi’rāj-yi Duvrī-yi Pahlavi-yi Aval: Digargunti-yi Andisht-i-ha, Piydayish va Shiklgi-yi Mi’rāj-yi Duvrī-yi Bistalih-yi Mu ‘āsir-i Iran, 1299-1320 [Architecture in the First Pahlavi era: Transformation of Thoughts, Formation of Architecture in the Twenty years Period of Contemporary Iran, 1921-1941] (Tehran: Mu ‘āsīsī-yi Mutal-i at-i Tarikh-i Mu ‘āsir-i Iran, 1368 [2008]).

Two different factors assisted the state for the massive transformation of Tehran. First, the
Pahlavi state used the parliament and legislation as means of knowledge production, and the
production of knowledge helped the state to consolidate its control over the city. One of the first
and most important laws in this regard was the *Mandatory Real Estate Registration Law.*
Discussed and passed by the parliament in early 1928, this law obliged all the property owners to
register their properties in the state’s offices.85 While this law had specific impacts at the national
level through recording all the agricultural lands, at the urban level, it led to the official
documentation of the land parcels in the cities. To register one’s property, the owner had to
record the legal boundaries of the property by surveying it. This process solidified the property
lines and legally defined the boundaries, which had a great impact on the cities, particularly, on
their old fabrics.86 In the old neighborhoods, built out of mud and clay, the buildings could not
last long and were repeatedly prone to the destruction and change through the time. As a result,
the property lines and the morphology of the city were in a constant process of gradual
transformation. A comparison between the 1858 and 1891 maps of Tehran reveals some of these
ggradual changes, figure 5.1.

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85 Layihih-yi Sabt-i Asnad va Amlak-i Ijbari, *Itilaʿat,* Bahman 5, 1306 [January 26, 1928]. For the complete text of
the law and all its changes through the time see: Islamic Parliament Research Center, “Qanun-i Sabt-i Asnad va
86 This process can be interpreted through notion of commodification of space. From a Lefebvrian point of view,
lived spaces transformed into spatial commodities and means of control. The commodification of space in the neo-
liberal city has been vastly discussed in the works of David Harvey, Sharon Zukin, and Don Mitchell: David,
1992; David Harvey, *Paris, Capital of Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2003); David Harvey, *Rebel Cities: From
the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution* (London: Verso, 2012); Don Mitchell, *The Right to the City: Social
Justice and the Fight for Public Space* (New York: The Guilford Press, 2003); Sharon Zukin, *The Cultures of Cities*
(Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1995); Sharon Zukin, *Naked City: The Death and Life of Authentic Urban Places*
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Lefebvre, *The Production of Space;* Henri Lefebvre, *Writings on Cities,*
Solidification of the city led to two other laws in the years to come. The first was the *Residential Properties Taxation Law* of 1930,\(^8\) and the second was the *Law for the Construction and Development of the Streets* in 1933.\(^8\) By recording the owners, boundaries, and locations of properties through the registration law, the *Residential Properties Taxation Law* provided a sustainable source of revenue for municipalities. Similarly, the second law legalized municipalities’ interventions in the old city, destruction of old neighborhoods, and construction of new streets. This law urged the municipalities to draw the maps of new streets and define the exact area of each property that they had to demolish to build these streets. The maps were the basis to pay compensations to the owners.\(^9\) However, long before the passage of this law, the

\(^8\) \'avariz-i Khanih-ha-yi Maskuni, *Iiila'at*, Shahrivar 20, 1309 [September 12, 1930] and Azar 10, 1309 [December 2, 1930]


\(^9\) Although the municipalities were obliged to pay the owner the value of the destroyed houses, it seems that they were not totally fair in all the cases. The data on the practices of the municipalities is scarce, however there are a few examples amid the articles of the newspaper that prove the unjust procedures of street building and compensation. For example, a year after the construction of a new street in the city of Kerman, the owners of the destroyed houses were living in tents in front of their old properties without receiving the money to buy a new place: Qanun-i Baladiyyih-ha, *Iiila’at*, Urdibihisht 23, 1309 [May 13, 1930]. Similarly, through the examinations of people’s grievance letters to the parliament, a recent study shows that the street building constructions did not happen smoothly and without any protest: Suhyla Safari, Muhammad Amir Shiykh Nuri, and Shahram Yusififar, “‘I’tirazat-i Mardum Bih Nusazi-yi Shahri dar Duwrih-yi Pahlavi-yi Aval [People’s Protests Against Urban Renewal in the First Pahlavi Era],” *Tahghighat-i Tarikh-i Ijima’i* 4, no. 1 (Spring and Summer 1393 [2014]): 29-60.
municipalities were following the same procedure. In other words, the law codified the existing practices. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 are some examples of these maps in Tehran. The maps record the owner of each property and boundaries of the new streets that pass through peoples’ lands. Figure 5.4 is the map of Tehran at the end of this era.

Figure 5.2. Widening map of Chiraghbarq Street, starting from Tupkhanih Square.  

Figure 5.3. Widening map of Istanbul Street from Lalizar intersection.  

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Figure 5.4. The 1944 map of Tehran (the scale at top-left corner is added).92

The construction of new streets and squares affected Tehran’s old neighborhoods dramatically. The First Pahlavi state demolished the spatial structure of these neighborhoods. For centuries, the old neighborhoods of Tehran had gradually formed based on various factors, such as politics of the communal sphere, the distribution of water in the city, the location of communal spaces of each neighborhood, and so forth. The Qajar court was unable to confront the spatial characteristics of these neighborhoods and had to respect the old city during the 1870s.

expansion of Tehran. In contrast, the Pahlavi state superimposed a new spatial pattern without observing the social relations of the communal sphere. Consequently, the state demolished the old neighborhoods; the communal sphere lost its spatiality; it lost its vitality. Figure 5.4 demonstrates the outcome of the state’s interventions in Tehran three years after Reza Shah’s abdication.

The second factor that helped the state to transform the cities was the empowerment of municipalities. The existence of these governmental institutes had become possible for the first time after the Constitutional Revolution by the passage of June 2, 1907 Baladiyyih Law. These institutes turned into the most efficient instruments for the state’s socio-spatial reforms in the cities, particularly in Tehran. The law, which was edited and passed again in 1927, gave a broad range of responsibilities to municipalities, from improving public health to regulating prices, and from performing cultural reforms to constructing new streets and squares.

These institutes managed to unify various power structures in Iranian cities. First of all, they abolished neighborhoods’ semi-autonomy by overruling their self-organization and kadkhudās’ roles as the heads of the neighborhoods. In Tehran, the municipality divided the city into eleven districts, each with its own internal organization and hierarchy of responsibilities and duties. Similarly, as mentioned earlier, the municipality replaced the old guild system and made all the guilds accountable to the Office of Food Control. Moreover, the municipality of Tehran took the responsibility of water distribution in the city. Through this process, it managed to cover all the

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93 Islamic Parliament Research Center, “Qanun-i Baladiyyih”. Also see: Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine] 1, no. 4 (Shawwal 25, 1339 [July 2, 1921]): 8-12; vol. 1, no. 5 (Dhu al-Qa‘da 3, 1339 [July 9, 1921]): 9-10; vol. 1, no. 5 (Dhu al-Qa‘da 3, 1339 [July 9, 1921]): 9-10; vol. 1, no. 6 (Dhu al-Qa‘da 10, 1339 [July 16, 1921]): 7-8; vol. 1, no. 7 (Dhu al-Qa‘da 17, 1339 [July 23, 1921]): 6 and vol. 1, no. 8 (Dhu al-Qa‘da 24, 1339 [July 30, 1921]): 4-5.

94 For the complete text of the 1927 law see: Qanun-i Baladi [Municipality Law], Itila‘at, Isfand 1, 1305 [February 21, 1927]; Isfand 6, 1305 [February 26, 1927]; Isfand 10, 1305 [March 2, 1927]; Isfand 19, 1305 [March 11, 1927]; Isfand 22, 1305 [March 14, 1927] and Isfand 24, 1305 [March 16, 1927].

95 Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine] 6, no. 1 (Aban, 1306 [October 1927]): 11.
mīrābs, water distributers, in Tehran. To accomplish this task, the municipality began to rent all the subterranean aqueducts, qanāts, from their owners. At the same time, it forbade the owners to rent the qanāts to anybody else. Through these policies, the municipality managed to get the monopoly of the city’s water resources.96 Finally, the municipality replaced various governmental offices of the Qajar era that were responsible for different aspects of urban life, such as Iḥtisābīyyih and Tanẓīf.97 Similar to the national government, the centralization of power was the state’s primary key to push ahead its reform programs in the cities. This centralization was in stark contrast to the communal politics of the Qajar era. It abolished various power structures of the communal sphere and destroyed the semi-autonomy of the old city’s communities. Neighborhoods and guilds lost their ability to organize and manage their own affairs.

The municipality of Tehran accomplished various projects during the two decades of Reza Shah’s reign. The analysis of the articles in Baladiyyih magazine and Itilaʿat newspaper, the main venues through which the municipality addressed the public, demonstrates a transformation in the organization’s discourse for justifying its interventions in the city. After the 1921 coup, for several years, the primary concerns of the municipality were the continuations of the Qajar era’s main urban problems, such as the improvement of the public health, regulation of water distribution in the city, prevention of food and water shortages, and controlling prices. In these years, fighting diseases outbreaks and the microbial contamination of drinking water absorbed the bulk of the budget and energy of the municipality. This concern is clearly reflected in Baladiyyih magazine: “Between all the problems of the urban life, public health is the most

96 Iʿlan [Announcement], Itilaʿat, Isfand 29, 1305 [March 21, 1927]. Also for municipality’s water guidelines see: Iʿlan [Announcement], Itilaʿat, Khurad 9, 1313 [May 30, 1934].
97 These offices were responsible for managing various aspects of the city in the Qajar era. For more information see Chapter Three.
important one. While all the other social matters have their own opponents and proponents, it is only on this issue that everyone agrees." As a result, one of the first measures of the municipality was the establishment of the Office of Health and Public Affairs, 'Idārih-yi Ṣīḥīyyih va Muʾāvinat-i ʿumūmī. This office had the power to interfere in all aspects of urban life in order to improve public health and prevent the outbreaks of disease; its duties covered all the businesses that dealt with food provision; and it could regulate and control all social spaces in the city. In cases such as epidemics, it had even the legal authority to enter residences and disinfect people’s clothing and furniture. The construction of hospitals, asylums, new bathhouses, clinics, and the like were some of the other duties of this sector.99

In this era, the municipality issued dozens of nizāmnāmihs, guidelines, to regulate different aspects of public life and improve the sanitary condition of the city. These nizāmnāmihs were designed separately for different stores, particularly food product stores, and were aimed to regulate all various aspects of their work.100 Even the municipality went as far as connecting all constructions in the city to the public health and demanded people receive approval of the Office of Construction of the municipality, Idārih-yi Sākhtimān, before any building operation.101

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98 Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine] 1, no. 9 (Dhu l-Hijja 1, 1339 [August 6, 1921]): 1.
99 For the complete list of the duties of this office see: Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine] 1, no. 9 (Dhu l-Hijja 1, 1339 [August 6, 1921]): 5-7; Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine] 3, no. 4 (Jumada I-Ula 28, 1343 [December 25, 1924]): 9-13.
100 For the regulations of the fruit sellers, confectionaries, groceries, kalih pazīs (a kind of food), kabābīs (selling kebabs) see: Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine] 1, no. 5 (Dhu al-Qaʿda 3, 1339 [July 9, 1921]): 9-10. For the regulations of salmānīs (hair saloons) see: Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine] 1, no. 8 (Dhu al-Qaʿda 24, 1339 [July 30, 1921]): 16. For the regulations of the bathhouses see: Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine] 9, no. 3 (Aban, 1309 [November, 1930]): 91-3. For regulations of the public garages see: Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine] 11, no. 6 (Farvardin, 1314 [March, 1935]): 184. For the regulations of all the traditional kitchens see: Iʿlan az Taraf-i Baladiyyih-yi Tehran [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], Itilaʿat, Mihr 26, 1307 [October 18, 1928]. For the regulations of the bakeries see: Iʿlan az Taraf-i Baladiyyih-yi Tehran [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], Itilaʿat, Aban 8, 1307 [October 30, 1928]. For the regulations of the bakeries and butchers stores see: Iʿlan az Taraf-i Baladiyyih-yi Tehran [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], Itilaʿat, Mordad 23, 1309 [August 15, 1930].
101 Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine] 1, no. 7 (Dhu al-Qaʿda 17, 1339 [July 23, 1921]): 5. Later, in 1933, the municipality issued a separate guideline for new constructions. For this guideline see: Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine] 10, no. 6 (Farvardin, 1312 [March, 1933]): 323-8.
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, by abolishing the old guild system and issuing separate *nizāmnāmihs* for each guild, the municipality managed to control all the commercial interactions in Tehran and succeeded in controlling the prices and preventing food shortage.

The municipality of Tehran succeeded in subjugating various sources of power that had enabled the communal spheres to act as semi-independent entities. The centralization of power, besides the destruction of the neighborhoods, was a serious blow to the vitality of the communal sphere, which disabled the communities and prevented them from regulating their internal affairs and their relationships with the outer world. Two separate discourses worked in favor of the state in its confrontation with the communal sphere. On the one hand, the continuation of the Qajar era’s concerns about the improvement of the public health, regulation of water distribution in the city, prevention of food and water shortages, and controlling prices gave the state the privilege to justify its actions. On the other hand, towards the end of the 1920s and throughout the 1930s, the municipality’s priorities transformed and a second discourse worked in favor of the state to undertake fundamental social reforms. Instead of approaching the city through the discourse of public health, in this era, the main concerns of the state and municipality were concentrated on social reforms and the transformation of people’s traditional lifestyle. The social reforms of the municipality were accompanied by the structural transformation of urban society and the rise of the modern middle class. Two parallel processes commenced in this era. On the one hand, the state and municipality began a systematic control and transformation of communal spaces and practices of traditional strata of society. On the other hand, new alternative social spaces and practices flourished in major cities around the country, particularly in Tehran. In the rest of this chapter, I focus on the state’s second discourse and demonstrate its impact on the decline of communal spaces and the proliferation of new spaces for the modern middle class.
Demise of Coffeehouses and Rise of Cafés

The traditional coffeehouses and kitchens\textsuperscript{102} of the old city underwent major socio-spatial transformations in this era. The municipalities’ nizānmāmihs targeted these spaces and transformed them dramatically. A close reading of the nizānmāmihs shows that they were the state’s means to implement delicate socio-spatial transformations to annihilate the traditional social functions of these spaces. The state’s regulations of these spaces happened at the expense of sacrificing the old social practices and relations of these spaces.

On September 25, 1928, the municipality of Tehran issued its first nizānmāmih for cafés and coffeehouses. It consisted of twenty-five rules in four sections: construction, opening, products, and range of services.\textsuperscript{103} The very first line of this nizānmāmih states that “cafés and coffeehouses are the same.” By placing cafés and coffeehouses under the same category, the state was able to regulate them in the same way. As Chapter One discussed, coffeehouses were lively centers of communal life with their old-established social interactions. In contrast, cafés mostly belonged to the modern middle class; they were imitations of European cafés. The state’s regulation resulted in the decline of the former and the prevalence of the latter. Article three of the first section of this nizānmāmih forbade coffeehouses to draw pictures on their walls and ceilings; article five forbade them to build sitting platforms around interior space; article six obliged them to separate the food, tea, and coffee preparation area from serving space; article one of the second section obliged them to have tables and chairs instead of platforms; and article seven of the fourth section prohibited naqālī and similar communal activities in coffeehouses.

\textsuperscript{102} Kabābis, tabākhīs, halāmpazīs, and džāpzīs.
\textsuperscript{103} For the complete text of this nizānmāmih see: Tarz-i Bana-yi Kafih [Guideline for Building a Cafē], \textit{Itilaˈat}, Mihr 3, 1307 [September 25, 1928].
These regulations went far beyond the public health discourse. By targeting one of the most vibrant traditional social spaces, the state was able to alienate the traditional strata of urban society from them. By forbidding the drawings, the storytellers were unable to use them to perform their acts, since drawings were an inseparable part of **naqqālī**. The rearrangement of the seats of interior space affected the communal atmosphere of coffeehouses. Instead of sitting on platforms around interior space, watching the performance, and participating in the collective act in the middle, now people had to sit at separate tables. Moreover, these laws directly forbade all the communal activities in coffeehouses, particularly **naqālī**.104 Finally, by separating the food preparation and serving areas, the laws disregarded the central role of the owner of coffeehouses, **qahvihkhānihchī**. As prominent public figures in their neighborhoods and communities, the owners had a significant role in all the communal activities inside their enterprise, and at the same time, they could control the food preparation and serving processes. But these regulations forced them to move behind the walls of the kitchen, detached from their communities.

The same socio-spatial regulations affected traditional kitchens. The municipality’s regulations obliged these stores to separate their kitchen from their serving area; otherwise, they would be shut down.105 Later, detailed rules determined all the socio-spatial aspects of these

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104 It is usually assumed that the development of the other forms of public entertainment and introduction of gramophones, radio, and later T.V. sets into **qahvihkhānihs** resulted in the demise of **naqqālī**. 'Ali Al-i Dawud argues that “[a]fter the introduction of radio broadcasting in Persia in 1319 Š./1940 the character of coffeehouses began to change. Customers were more interested in hearing news of the world, particularly World War II, than in listening to stories or poems, with the result that reciters soon began to disappear.” 'Ali Bulookbashi has the same argument and believes that the new forms of public entertainment replaced the traditional communal activities. However, Kumiko Yamamoto briefly points to the role of the state in the decline of **naqqālī**: “In the late 1920s **naqqāls** were accused of instigating members of guild organizations (whose members formed the main part of their audiences) to rioting and were forbidden to perform in coffeehouses.” 'Ali Al-i Dawud, “Coffeehouse,” in *Encyclopedia Iranica* (December 15, 1992), under http://wwwiranicaonlineorg/articles/coffeehouse-qahva-kana-a-shop-and-meeting-place-where-coffee-is-prepared-and-served (accessed June 16, 2015); Ali Bulookbashi, *Qahvih and Qahvihkhānihchī dar Iran [Iranian Coffeehouses: Traditions of Meeting and Passing Time at the Coffeehouses]* (Tehran: Daftar-i Pazhuhish-ha-yi Farhangi, 1393 [2014]), 115-6; Kumiko Yamamoto, “**Naqqālī**: Professional Iranian Storytelling,” in *A History of Persian Literature*, vol. XVIII, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 246.

105 I’lan az Taraf-i Baladiyyih-yi Tehran [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], *Itīlā’īt*, Mihr 7, 1307 [September 29, 1928].
spaces. Similar to coffeehouses, the platforms were forbidden; they were obliged to have tables and chairs; they had to separate interior space from the streets by installing store windows; they had to wipe out all the drawings on the ceilings and walls. Even, the laws forbade customers to eat with their hands and obliged them to use utensils.\textsuperscript{106} To realize the impact of these regulations on the social relations of these spaces, knowing the spatial configuration of traditional kitchens is necessary. A painting from the early 1840s provides an image of traditional kitchens in the Tehran bazaar, figure 5.5. Painted by Eugène Flandin in his trip to Iran, this painting shows how the location of the platform in front of the shop was necessary for its social functions. It was a stage for the preparation of food; at the same time, the food was served on the same platforms to the customers; more importantly, it could bring all the people together. The owner of the kitchen and the customers were at the same platform; serving and being served were combined. This platform was a vibrant social stage for chit-chatting and spread of news.

This image helps to show how separating the kitchen and serving place, installing windows and doors for the shop, and using chairs and tables instead of platforms were transforming all the old-established socio-spatial relations. Subtle architectural transformations had profound social impacts. The resulting stores did not belong to traditional Iranian society; they were alien spaces in the old city. Through these spatial transformations, the First Pahlavi state managed to disturb the old-established spatial arrangements that could enhance communal interactions between traditional strata of society and construct a socio-spatial image that matched the desired norms of the state.

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Ilan az Taraf-i Baladiyyiy-yi Tehran} [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], \textit{Itila‘at}, Mihr 26, 1307 [October 18, 1928].
As I discussed in Chapter One, coffeehouses and traditional kitchens were the centers of communal life in the nineteenth-century Tehran. They were the spatial manifestations of the communal sphere with their particular social norms and practices. The state’s regulations targeted these spaces and their internal practices. As a result, the First Pahlavi state managed to control and transform them. Through these interventions, the state managed to weaken the traditional strata of society, particularly the traditional (propertied) middle class. Disturbing the socio-spatial configuration of coffeehouses, as one the main types of communal spaces, could result in the loss of social vitality of traditional strata of society and the communal sphere.

Figure 5.5. A traditional kitchen in Tehran Bazaar by Eugène Flandin.⁹⁷

¹⁰⁷ This picture is in the public domain and is free to use without restriction. It is accessible through the New York Public Library web site: General Research Division, the New York Public Library, “Tourneur de Caliouns; Cuisine de Bazar,” New York Public Library Digital Collections, under http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47e2-9066-a3d9-e040-e00a18064a99 (accessed January 4, 2016).
modern middle class’s desire for the modernization and Westernization of the country and society necessitated the transformation of spaces that they regarded as traditional and obsolete.

However, the systematic transformations and regulating of coffeeshouses and traditional kitchens are half of the story. In contrast to the fate of these spaces, the First Pahlavi era witnessed the proliferation of European-style cafés, restaurants, and hotels in Tehran. Alongside the development of the modern middle class, these spaces increased and spread in the northern neighborhoods of the city. Cafés, restaurants, and hotels became the hangouts of the modern middle class. These spaces became the embodiments of this class’s desire for a new lifestyle, which was modern, mixed-sex, nontraditional, and European. Articles of Itilaʿat newspaper, as the main venue that reflects the social views of the modern middle class, clearly demonstrate how this class equated progress and the modernization of society with the proliferation of European-style social spaces. In this view, a modern city and society had to have cafés, restaurants, and hotels: “Hotels are one of the principles of civilization and one of the requirements and necessities of every city.”108 Another article from October 25, 1931 asks whether people have changed as the result of the state’s modernization. The article encourages people to go to theaters, cinemas, cafés, and concerts to become modern:

People who are trying to change, not only have changed their appearances but also have changed their identity and adopted the modern principles of social life from a few years ago; they are eager to learn [about the modern world]. Now that they have to go to theaters, cinemas, cafés, and concerts, they want to know which moral principles they should adopt and which [flaws] they should abandon.109

108 Mihmankhanih [Hotel], Itilaʿat, Shahrivar 24, 1307 [September 15, 1928].
109 Mardum Haman Mardumand yaʿavaz Shudihand? [Are People the Same or Have They Changed?], Itilaʿat, Aban 2, 1310 [October 25, 1931]
The modern middle class advocated new forms of social life and social spaces as venues for the modernization and Westernization of society. As if, by participating in the social life of these spaces, people could change and become modern.

There is no surprise that the most of the names of these enterprises were non-Iranian, mostly European, such as Grand, Paris, Victoria, Renascence, Luxe, Imperial, and Continental Hotels. Similarly there were Continental, Vuka, Imperial, Mikado, Modern, Lausanne, Luna Park, Lotto, and Bristol Cafés or Café-Restaurants. Some of the cafés went as far as advertising in Persian and French at the same time, figure 5.6 and figure 5.7, and in their advertisements, they were highlighting their western features:

Important Announcement. Imperial Hotel and Restaurant in Lalihzar Street next to Didihban Mayak Cinema inaugurated on Monday night, Azar 3, 1309 [November 25, 1930], based on the best European-style. For the reception of respectable gentlemen, there are various options such as soirée, evening tea, American bar, lunch, and dinner. The orchestra for the evening tea plays from four to six pm and for the soirée from eight pm to two hours after midnight.126

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110 Itila’at, Aban 17, 1305 [December 9, 1926].
111 Itila’at, Khurad 10, 1306 [June 1, 1927].
112 Itila’at, Urdibihisht 17, 1308 [May 7, 1929].
113 Itila’at, Khurad 13, 1308 [June 3, 1929].
114 Itila’at, Mihr 28, 1308 [October 20, 1929].
115 Itila’at, Azar 7, 1310 [November 29, 1931].
116 Itila’at, Shahrivar 23, 1311 [September 14, 1932].
117 Itila’at, Aban 5, 1308 [October 27, 1929].
118 Itila’at, Tir 5, 1309 [June 27, 1930].
119 Itila’at, Azar 1, 1309 [November 23, 1930].
120 Itila’at, Mihr 12, 1310 [October 5, 1931].
121 Itila’at, Azar 4, 1310 [November 26, 1931].
122 Itila’at, Azar 6, 1310 [November 28, 1931].
123 Itila’at, Urdibihisht 12, 1311 [May 2, 1932].
124 Itila’at, Murad 31, 1311 [August 22, 1932].
125 Itila’at, Shahrivar 5, 1311 [August 27, 1932].
126 Itila’-i Muhim [Important Announcement], Itila’at, Azar 1, 1309 [November 23, 1930].
The advertisements in Itila’at newspaper show that new forms of social life developed around these spaces, such as garden parties, masquerades, public parties for the New Year, dancing nights, concerts, theaters and the like. These forms of social life were relatively new in Iranian cities. If, in the late Nassiri era, the European-style social gatherings were limited to a tiny section of the courtiers and a few Europeans in Tehran, in the First Pahlavi era, the modern middle class eagerly advocated the new lifestyle. The growing modern middle class had produced its spaces, which were in stark contrast to traditional strata’s social spaces. The contrast between these spaces is traceable in the literature of both sections of society. On the one hand, the traditional strata used particular terms to humiliate the modern middle class and people with European appearances, such as *fikulī, mustafrang, ghirtī, farangimaāb*, and the like. On the other hand, the modern middle class compared the old and new spaces and ridiculed the traditional people in their periodicals. For example, Itila’at newspaper writes about the unhealthy condition of coffeehouses and explains that the customers of these places were either low-income workers or opium addicts. In a series of comic articles in Tehran-i Musavar magazine, the author depicts a countryman, *dihātī*, who comes to Tehran and is impressed by its

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127 Itila’at, Khurdad 24, 1310 [June 15, 1931].
128 Itila’at, Shahrivar 7, 1310 [August 30, 1931].
129 See footnotes 102-117.
131 3-Ijtimā’at [3- Social Gathering], Itila’at, Diy 12, 1307 [January 2, 1929].
132 This word sometimes used as curse to humiliate people who do not know much about the city.
progress. Unable to recognize the city anymore, he talks about its different marvels. In one occasion, the poor countryman enters a modern café and describes it in these words:

Wow! What is this place?! It is not a coffeehouse! Definitely, it is not a coffeehouse! If it is a coffeehouse, why there is no painting of Rustam, Suhrab, and Giv on the walls?! If it is a coffeehouse, why does it not have a storyteller? […] If it is a coffeehouse, what are these chairs and table?! If it is a coffeehouse, why does it have a gramophone?! […] Maybe it is the house of farangīs! O my God! I seek refuge in You. I am about to go crazy.

The distribution of modern spaces follows the same social pattern of old and new. The 1932 census of Tehran counted fifty-five cafés in the city, which forty-three of them were in the two northern neighborhoods, Hasanabad and Duwlat. A 1914 travel guide to Tehran mentions only three hotels in the city, Hotel de Paris, Hotel de France, and Hotel de L’Europe, all in the northern street of ’Ala’ al-Duwlih. In 1932, this number had reached fifty-four hotels and inns, thirty-three of which were in Hasanabad and Duwlat, and sixteen in the Üdlājān neighborhood. Finally, the census counted thirty-three restaurants, nineteen of them in the northern neighborhoods. There were no cafés and hotels in the two main southern neighborhoods of Muhammadiyyih and Bazaar, and there were only two restaurants in the latter. The south and north, old and new, traditional and modern, and Iranian and European dichotomies had formed distinct spatial representations in the city. The city and society followed similar trajectories; they polarized; they divided.

133 The heroes of epic stories of Shahnamih whose paintings were part of qahvihkānīhs so the naqqāls were able to use them to tell their stories.
134 Tehran Musavar, no. 2 (Azar 23, 1308 [December 14, 1929]): 15. Various issues of this magazine are available at the University of Tehran, Central Library, the Department of Periodicals.
136 Üdlājān neighborhood was the only neighborhood in the old city that hosted some of the state’s early constructions before the Nassiri expansion of Tehran. Nassiriyiyih Street and square were the first examples of European-style spaces in Tehran before the main Qajar expansion. See Chapter Three.
137 Baladiyyih Tehran, Sarshumari-yi Nofus-i Shahr-i Tehran, 30 & 33.
Finally, the new European-style cafés, restaurants, and hotels were not immune to the state’s strict regulations. The authoritative and bureaucratic state soon passed new *nizāmnāmihs* for these growing enterprises. The September 25, 1928 cafés and coffeehouses *nizāmnāmih* was aimed to regulate cafés too. The *nizāmnāmih* for the restaurants was published less than a month later. Beginning in November 1930, the municipality began to grade cafés, restaurants, and hotels to define their specific taxes based on their grades. Ultimately, the most effective law was proposed in 1933, this time by the Interior and Justice Ministries. Titled as the Public Places Guidelines, *Niżāmnāmih-yi Amākin-i ʿUmūmī*, this law set unified regulations for all the public places of the cities, from cafés and restaurants to hotels and cinemas. In contrast to the regulations of traditional spaces, the municipality did not aim to disturb the well-established socio-spatial relations of these enterprises by this *nizāmnāmih*. Instead, it set strict standards for new spaces to maintain their European style and prevent them from transforming toward traditional spaces.

Parallel to the destruction of the communal sphere and its spaces, the state and the modern middle class advocated new forms of social life and spaces, which were Western. As a result, a dichotomy developed between the traditional and modern spaces, people, and lifestyles. This dichotomy defined the state and the modern middle class as the powerful section of society and, at the same time, restricted the sources of power of the traditional section of society and the communal sphere. It was the full manifestation of a social discourse that had started decades earlier. This discourse is traceable in the text of Iranian travelogues to Europe. Although in that
case, the analysis of the texts of travelogues reveals no power relationship between Iranian and European cities, the travelogues provide the manifestations of the beginning of the process that led to the state’s spatial interventions in the 1930s. There is an invisible line connecting Nassir al-Din Shah’s wonders in London and Paris, the 1870s expansion of Tehran, the post-revolution intelligentsia, and the First Pahlavi top-down spatial interventions leading to the decline of the communal sphere and the production of new spaces. This line is a socio-spatial discourse incubated for more than a hundred years until its full emergence in the 1930s. The spatial interventions of this discourse were not limited to coffeehouses, kitchens, cafés, restaurants, and hotels. The next two sections highlight its other significant impacts in Tehran, which led to the decline of religious performances and traditional gymnasiums and the proliferation of cinemas, theaters, and sports clubs.

Demise of takīyyihs and Rise of Cinemas and Theaters

The Pahlavi’s war on religion escalated in the second half of Reza Shah’s reign. The prohibition of Muharram mourning rituals, particularly taʿzīyih performances and mourning processions, was the most severe manifestation of the state’s clampdown on religion. It is important to note that there is a transitional period from the formation of Pahlavi state until the ban of the religious rituals. As a result, claiming that the mourning rituals were banned entirely after the 1921 coup is not correct.142 The advertisements in Itilaʿat newspaper prove that the municipality of Tehran sponsored Muharram ritual up to 1933. A short article from June 1, 1931 shows that in that year the mourning ceremonies were held in Takīyyih Duwlat in the royal

142 Bahram Beizaʾi, Namayish dar Iran [A Study on Iranian Theater], 3rd ed. (Tehran: Rushangaran va Mutaliʿat-i Zanan, 1380 [2001]), 150.
compound and even Reza Shah gave two visits on Muharram 9 and 10.\textsuperscript{143} This was the last time that the newspaper mentioned the Muharram ceremonies in \textit{Takīyyih Duwlat}. In the next two years, there were very short announcements about mourning ceremonies at the municipality building. However, there is no talk of \textit{Takīyyih Duwlat} and \textit{taʿzīyih} performances in these years.\textsuperscript{144} After 1933, there is no sign of the state-sponsored Muharram ceremonies. As a result, Shahidi’s and Floor’s estimates that 1932 or 1933 were the possible years of the official ban of Muharram rituals seem to be correct.\textsuperscript{145} There are several reasons mentioned for this prohibition. Peter J. Chelkowski believes that the incompatibility of these rituals with the state’s modernization programs and the fear of the transformation of the rituals into political demonstrations were the main reasons for their ban.\textsuperscript{146} Aghaie sees the ban as the state’s method of eliminating possible political opponents.\textsuperscript{147} Beiza’i and again Aghaie argue that the state’s ban of the ceremonies was to create a more civilized image of Iranian society in the international arena, since some of these ceremonies could be judged as violent and backward by foreigners.\textsuperscript{148}

The articles of \textit{Itila’at} newspaper provide clues of the hostility of the modern middle class towards the religious rituals. The authors of these articles, members of the modern middle class, depict mourning ceremonies as dark rituals against public virtue,\textsuperscript{149} as contrary to public health,

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\textsuperscript{143} Dar Takīyyih Duwlat [In Takīyyih Duwlat], \textit{Itila’at}, Khuradād 10, 1310 [June 1, 1931].
\textsuperscript{144} Tazakur az Tārāf-i Balādiyyiyī-ye Tehran [Notification from Municipality of Tehran], \textit{Itila’at}, Urdibihisht 22, 1311 [May 12, 1932]; Ijrā-yi Marāsim-i Sugvari [Performing the Mourning Ceremonies], \textit{Itila’at}, Urdibihisht 6, 1312 [April 26, 1933].
\textsuperscript{147} Kamran Scot Aghaie, \textit{The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi’i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran} (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 51.
\textsuperscript{148} Beiza’i, \textit{Namavīsh dar Iran}, 150; Aghaie, \textit{The Martyrs of Karbala}, 52. For a comprehensive account of Muharram rituals under the First and Second Pahlavi States see: Aghaie, \textit{The Martyrs of Karbala}, 47-86.
\textsuperscript{149} Majalis-i Sugvari [Mourning Ceremonies], \textit{Itila’at}, Tir 4, 1314 [June 26, 1935]\
\end{flushright}
and as an element of the humiliation of Iranians in front of Europeans.\textsuperscript{150} Similarly, they introduce Ramadan fasting month as the month of “silence, boredom, lethargy, and inaction.”\textsuperscript{151} Muharram rituals were not the only religious ceremonies that were prohibited under Reza Shah’s rule. The \textit{qurbān} camel sacrifice suffered a similar fate. In 1935, the state abolished the ceremony, which was supposed to be held in March of that year. The announcement of the ban in Itila’at newspaper provides valuable insight into its public framing. On the one hand, the two articles mention that the camel sacrifice ceremony was against the real essence of Islam, and it was a shame for all Muslims. On the other hand, the articles connect the ceremony to the dark ages of Iran, claiming that they were not compatible with a modern and progressive nation.\textsuperscript{152}

Whatever the reasons behind the restrictions of religious ceremonies were, these bans had profound impacts on the traditional strata of Iranian society. Similar to the transformations of coffeehouses and kitchens, the state attempted to curb the traditional forms of social life in Iranian urban society. By abolishing or altering social life, their social spaces began to disintegrate and disappear in the cities. Tehran’s \textit{takīyyih}s, as the lively centers of the old neighborhoods, disappeared one by one in the years to come. In 1946, the state demolished the gigantic circular \textit{takīyyih Duwlat} in the royal compound to provide open space for the bazaar branch of the National Bank.\textsuperscript{153} In losing their communal spaces and social practices, the traditional sections of society lost their reproductive forces. They lost the game to the modern middle class, which aimed to modernize and westernize the country.

However, the disintegration of the old forms of communal life and spaces was not the sole process. Similar to the previous case, a parallel social process generated new forms of social life

\textsuperscript{150} ‘azadari [Mourning], \textit{Itila’at}, Khurdad 10, 1310 [June 1, 1931].
\textsuperscript{151} Mah-i Ramizan [Ramadan Month], \textit{Itila’at}, Bahman 1, 1309 [January 21, 1931].
\textsuperscript{152} Shetur-i Qurbani [The Sacrificed Camel], \textit{Itila’at}, Isfand 21, 1313 [March 12, 1935]; ‘Iyd-i Qurban [Qurban Holiday], \textit{Itila’at}, Isfand 23, 1313 [March 14, 1935].
\textsuperscript{153} Zaka’, \textit{Tariikhcheh-yi Sakhtiman-ha-yi Arg-i Saltanati}, 310.
and spaces. In this case, cinemas and theaters were offering an alternative to the abolished religious performances. Beginning in the constitutional era, the intelligentsia had already begun to popularize cinema and theater when the First Pahlavi state consolidated. The constitutional era helped to transfer theatrical performances from the small circle of the Qajar courtiers to the broader public.¹⁵⁴

However, this process accelerated during the First Pahlavi era. The growth of the modern middle class was a decisive factor in the proliferation of cinemas and theaters. Gradually the number of these spaces increased in Tehran. In 1925, there was only one cinema in the entire city. The number reached seven in 1929,¹⁵⁵ fifteen in 1933,¹⁵⁶ and thirty-six, twenty-eight cinemas and eight theaters, in 1949.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, the cinemas became more affordable for all sections of society. An article in Itilaʿat newspaper on August 19, 1929 criticized the prices of the tickets and complained that the poor and ordinary people cannot afford the tickets. From 1932, the municipality began to define the ticket prices for each cinema separately.¹⁵⁸ However, with the increase of the number of the cinemas, the municipality graded them into three levels and issued a separate ndef for the cinemas. The cinema ndef defined the maximum price of the tickets for each grade: ten rials for the first grade, five rials for the second

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¹⁵⁴ For the history of theater during the constitutional era see: Floor, The History of Theater in Iran, 222-39; Jamshid Malekpour, Adabiyyat-i Namayishi dar Iran [Drama in Iran], vol. 2 (Tehran, Intisharat-i Tus, 2006).
¹⁵⁵ Sinima [Cinema], Itilaʿat, Murdad 27, 1308 [August 19, 1929].
¹⁵⁶ Baladiyyih Tehran, Sarshumari-yi Nofus-i Shahr-i Tehran, 33. This number seems to represent all the places that were used for public play of movies in the city and not necessarily the saloons specifically built as cinemas. In the First Pahlavi era, many time hotels and even cafés were used to play movies for the public. Another document counts 7 cinema saloons and 4 theaters in 1936. The latter seems to count just the cinema and theater saloons and ignores the other places. Vizarat-i Maʿarif ʿUqaf va Sanayi ʾMustazrafi, Salnamih va ʾIhsa iyyih, 2: 148.
¹⁵⁸ Ilan az Taraf-i Baladiyyih-ye Tehran [Announcement from Municipality of Tehran], Itilaʿat, Isfand 12, 1310 [March 3, 1932];
grade, and three rials for the third grade. Through these measures, cinemas and theaters became an inseparable part of people’s life, particularly for the modern middle class. Articles of Itila’ at newspaper depict crowded cinemas, long lines in the streets, and popularity of cinemas and theaters by the second half of the First Pahlavi era. The best document that shows their popularity is a municipality’s census of the annual ticket sales in 1931-1932 and 1932-1933. Based on this census, in 1931-1932, 136,074 theater tickets and 1,032,973 cinema tickets were sold in Tehran. The next year, the sale of the theater tickets reached to 217,732 and the cinema tickets decreased to 927,986. These figures show that on average, in 1931-1932, each person in the city went to cinemas or theaters five times, and in 1932-1933, the number decreased to four times.

Finally, a significant transformation was the presence of women in the cinemas and theaters. At first, the cinemas were men-only spaces with occasional women-only showing times, figure 5.8. One of the early articles that asked for women’s presence in cinemas and theaters appeared on January 2, 1929 in Itila’at newspaper. Soon women overcame this obstacle and were allowed into the saloons. Similar to the takīyyih, men and women were separated on two different sides. However, from March 1936, men and women could sit together.

160 For some examples see: Ti’atr va Sinima [Theater and Cinema], Itila’at, Azar 26, 1307 [December 17, 1928]; Ilahih, Itila’at, Bahman 8, 1308 [January 28, 1930]; Ti’atr-i Liyli va Majnun [Liyli va Majnun Theater], Itila’at, Azar 15, 1309 [December 7, 1930]; Ti’atr va Sinima dar Iran [Theater and Cinema in Iran], Itila’at, Azar 17, 1309 [December 9, 1930]; Ti’atr va Sinima [Theater and Cinema], Itila’at, Diy 21, 1309 [January 11, 1931].
161 1310 HJ.
162 1311 HJ.
164 3-Ijtima’at [3- Social Gathering], Itila’at, Diy 12, 1307 [January 2, 1929].
The decline of takīyyihs and other instances of religious life and the proliferation of cinemas and theaters were the outcomes of the same social discourse that created the dichotomy between coffeehouses and cafés. There was a commonality between cinemas, theaters, cafés, restaurants, and hotels. They were the products of the modern middle class, and at the same time, these spaces, similar to the national education system, were the (re)producers of the modern middle class. The articles of Itila’at newspaper show that how this class regarded cinemas and theaters as efficient instruments for social reforms. For example, they regard the cinema as a “necessity of life,” an instrument for “enhancement of morality,” and a means of “enlightenment.”

Cinemas and theaters were the bridges connecting the modern middle class to the modern European world. Consequently, the distribution of these organizations in the city follows the same pattern of the cafés, restaurants, and hotels. They were concentrated in the northern city, away from the old neighborhoods. Notably, Lalihzar Street became the cultural center accommodating most of the cinemas and theaters in the city. In 1949, five out of eight theaters

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166 *Itila’at*, Urduhi List 20, 1306 [May 11, 1927].
167 *Sinima* [Cinema], *Itila’at*, Murdad 27, 1308 [August 19, 1929]; *Itila’at*, Aban 6, 1308 [October 28, 1929]; *Tehran Musavar* no. 3&4 (Diy 21, 1308 [January 11, 1930]): 12-3; *Tī’ār-i Liyli va Majnun* [Liyli va Majnun Theater], *Itila’at*, Azar 15, 1309 [December 7, 1930]; *Tī’ār va Sinima dar Iran* [Theater and Cinema in Iran], *Itila’at*, Azar 17, 1309 [December 9, 1930]; *Tī’ār va Sinima* [Theater and Cinema], *Itila’at*, Diy 21, 1309 [January 11, 1931].
and nine out of twenty-eight cinemas in Tehran were located in Lalihzar Street. The rest of the theaters and cinemas of the city were mostly gathered in the same neighborhood.\textsuperscript{168}

From \textit{Zūrkānīh}s to Sport Clubs

The traditional gymnasiums of Iranian cities faced a similar fate to coffeehouses, kitchens, \textit{takīyyīh}s, and the other instances of religious gatherings. The decline of \textit{zūrkānīh}s had already started after the Constitutional Revolution, long before the advent of the Pahlavi Regime, when the royal patronage ceased to support the institute. However, the major blow to the well-being of the institute occurred during Reza Shah’s reign. By the establishment and consolidation of the First Pahlavi state, the ban of religious ceremonies, the founding of the municipalities and police forces in the cities, and the eradication of semi-independent neighborhoods and their administration, the \textit{zūrkānīh} communities lost all the reasons that connected them to broader urban society. They lost their roles as the protectors of their neighborhoods to police forces who did not tolerate any rivalry. By the ban of Muharram ceremonies, \textit{zūrkānīh} people lost one of their main communal activities. Finally, coffeehouses as their main gathering place outside gymnasiums, underwent fundamental socio-spatial transformations.\textsuperscript{169}

The negative framing of the organization during the First Pahlavi era by the modern middle class accelerated its decline. An example from Itila’at newspaper on October 18, 1928, perfectly summarizes this framing. The article mentions three main drawbacks of \textit{zūrkānīh}s that made


them inefficient for the modern way of life. First, although zūrkhānihs strengthen some muscles, they do not contribute to the enhancement of the general condition of the body. Second, zūrkhānihs exercises are not based on modern scientific design and can cause deformation of certain body parts. Finally, zūrkhānihs do not have proper ventilation, and exercising in their unhealthy air can cause harm.\footnote{Islahat-i ‘ijtimai [Social Reforms], \textit{Itila’at}, Mihr 26, 1307 [October 18, 1928].} Chehabi mentions four main themes that the modern middle class used to stigmatize zūrkhānihs, mostly in their periodicals: the moral corruption of their members, zūrkhānihs as the centers of ruffians and urban thugs, their incompatible exercises with the modern way of life, and unhealthy air condition.\footnote{Chehabi, “Zur-Ḵāna.”} Moreover, Cyrus Schayegh recognizes a class discourse in this stigmatization: “The modern middle class thought that the corruption of ‘old’ sport in the unhygienic zūrkhānahs had been caused by human factors. After all, these institutions were frequented mostly by the urban lower classes and by some members of the traditional urban middle class, ignorant of modern science and hostile to disciplined sport and human interaction.”\footnote{Cyrus Schayegh, “Sport, Health, and the Iranian Middle Class in the 1920s and 1930s,” \textit{Iranian Studies}, 35, no. 4, Sports and Games (Autumn 2002): 367.}

In contrast to the general decline of zūrkhānihs and their stigmatizations, a second process was at work to popularize modern European sports in society, particularly amongst the modern middle class. Schayegh’s study shows how the modern middle class adopted modern sports as a socio-cultural marker to distinguish itself from the traditional strata of society. This incentive “propelled sport into the field of state policy and made it a part of the government’s attempt to create a healthy and productive nation.”\footnote{Schayegh, “Sport, Health, and the Iranian Middle Class,” 344.} Through this process, this class tied modern sport to a discourse that exemplified it as a means of production of healthy and fit individuals, a way for
the enhancement of the mental and moral condition of people and society, and an instrument for the nation-building project of the state.\textsuperscript{174}

The first step by the Pahlavi State to promote modern European sports was the passage of the \textit{Compulsory Daily Physical Education in the New Public Schools Law}, \textit{Qanun-i Varzish-i Ijbari dar Madaris-i Jadidih}.\textsuperscript{175} The curriculum for the physical education in schools completely ignored the “zūrkhanīh-type exercises”\textsuperscript{176} and adopted a Swedish calisthenics system for boys’ and girls’ physical education.\textsuperscript{177} In 1934, the Office of Physical Education was opened in the Ministry of Education to arrange soccer teams in the schools and hold interschool competitions. Later in that year “a number of Iranian statesmen and educators founded the National Association for Physical Education,” and an American, Thomas R. Gibson, was invited to establish and organize sport clubs and events in the country.\textsuperscript{178} A year later, Itila’at newspaper translated and published Gibson’s speech in Alburz College of Tehran, in which he enumerated his first year achievements: establishing forty-seven sport clubs in the country, increasing the annual sport budget from ten to 25,000 tūmāns, determining mandatory physical education hours for primary school, one hour per day, and high schools, two hours per week, arranging a specific curriculum for children, educating special trainers for physical education hours in schools, and expanding physical education among girls and women.\textsuperscript{179}

\textsuperscript{174} Schayegh, “Sport, Health, and the Iranian Middle Class,” 347-69.
\textsuperscript{176} Chehabi, “Zur-Kāna.”
\textsuperscript{178} Chehabi, “The Politics of Football in Iran,” 239.
\textsuperscript{179} Tarbiyat Badani dar Iran [Physical Education in Iran], \textit{Itila’at}, Azar 11, 1314 [December 3, 1935].
The popularity of modern sports, particularly soccer, grew among men gradually but constantly throughout the First and Second Pahlavi eras. Chehabi’s study of the popularization of soccer shows how the state policies and the social demand transformed it from an unknown phenomenon into the most popular sport in the country in just a few decades.\textsuperscript{180} The modern middle class’s newspapers had a great role in the popularization of modern sports. After the establishment of the National Association for Physical Education, Itila’at newspaper frequently devoted several columns to reflect various sport events in the country. Many times, sport news made its way to the first page of the newspaper, figures 5.9-5.11.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{180} Chehabi, “The Politics of Football in Iran.”

\textsuperscript{181} For some early examples from the newspaper see the first page of these days: Itila’at, Khurad 11, 29, & 31, 1315 [June 1, 19, & 21, 1936]. For some article on Iran’s modern sport movement in Itila’at newspaper see: Musabiqih-yi Futbal [Soccer Match], Itila’at, Farvardin 20, 1312 [April 9, 1933]; Nihzat-i Varzish dar Iran [Sport Movement in Iran], Itila’at, Isfand 21, 1312 [March 12, 1934]; Dar Midan-i Varzish: Iftitah-i Musabiqih-ha-yi Varzishi [In the Sport Field: Inauguration of Sport Matches], Itila’at, Dey 15, 1313 [January 5, 1935]; Varzish [Sport], Itila’at, Bahman 30, 1313 [February 19, 1935]; Itila’at, Dey 15, 1313 [January 5, 1935]; Jumbish va Nihzat-i Varzish dar Iran [Sport Movement in Iran], Itila’at, Murdad 12, 1314 [August 4, 1935]; Musabiqih-ha-yi Varzishi [Sport Matches], Itila’at, Azar 4, 1314 [November 26, 1935]; Tarbiyat Badani dar Iran [Physical Education in Iran], Itila’at, Azar 11, 1314 [December 3, 1935]; Nihzat-i Varzish dar Iran [Sport Movement in Iran], Itila’at, Khurad 3, 1315 [May 24, 1936].

\textsuperscript{182} From left to right, Itila’at, Khurad 11, 29, & 31, 1315 [June 1, 19, & 21, 1936].
The spatial dichotomy of the distribution of modern sport fields and zūrkhānihs in Tehran follows the same pattern that was explained for other modern and traditional spaces in this chapter. In 1932, there were eighteen zūrkhānihs in Tehran. Only three of them were located in the new northern neighborhoods of the city, and none of them were in the Duwlat neighborhood. Eleven zūrkhānihs were located just in Bazaar and Ūdlājān neighborhoods, the main neighborhoods of the old city. In contrast, in 1949, there were nineteen sport clubs, seven swimming pools, and seven sport fields in Tehran, mostly in the northern neighborhoods of the city.

**Modern Middle Class and the Production of a Social Discourse**

The struggle for power between the constitutional era’s intelligentsia and the traditional middle class entered a new phase after the 1921 coup. The intelligentsia, at this time, transformed into the modern middle class, initially supported the new dictator since they saw him as the only way towards peace and the modernization of the country. In the words of Banani: “An increasing number of younger intellectuals substituted nationalism for religious fanaticism. The changes that Reza Shah Pahlavi was able to bring about in so short a time in social, political, and economic conditions of Iran were accomplished with the support of this group.” The First Pahlavi era provided this class with the opportunity to produce their desired

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social image, and they filled the positions in the new administration apparatus of the state and played a significant role in its social reforms.  

These reforms had significant spatial manifestations. In this chapter, I told the stories of many spaces, old and new, in Iranian cities, particularly Tehran. In these stories, new public schools substituted old-style *maktab*; the state regulated coffeehouses and traditional kitchens in favor of new European-style cafés, restaurants, and hotels; the governmental ban on religious ceremonies accompanied by the proliferation of cinemas and theaters in Iranian cities; and modern sports clubs and fields overshadowed *zūrkānih* and their social practices.

These stories were the spatial manifestations of the social discourse, which had started in the nineteenth century, were strengthened after the Constitutional Revolution, and reached its apex during Reza Shah reign. In this discourse, the West, particularly Western Europe and the United States, became a model for the modern middle class. However, it is important to remind once again that this discourse incubated in Iranian society for a long time. It took more than a hundred years for the transformation of the wonder-like sentences of a few Iranian travelers in their travelogues into a powerful discourse with a particular social base. The modern middle class was its the primary advocate and beneficiary.

This social discourse helped the modern middle class to distinguish itself from the rest of society and defined its position as the eligible future of Iran. There are numerous articles in the newspapers and magazines of this era that show how the modern middle class looked into the

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188 There were other similar cases that I did not open up to prevent further prolongation. For example, in this era, the bathhouses lost their internal socio-spatial structures. The municipality’s bathhouses *nizāmnāmīh* encouraged all the traditional bathhouses to abandon their old system of pools of water and divide their internal space into separate cabins and install showers. As a result, all the social practices that were formed around the stages of bathing were affected. Moreover, by development of architectural techniques and construction of houses with bathrooms, traditional bathhouses lost their monopoly as the sole spaces for taking bath. For bathhouses *nizāmnāmīh* see: *Majalih-yi Baladīyyih [Baladīyyih Magazine]* 9, no. 3 (Aban, 1309 [November, 1930]): 91-3.
Western countries to find examples for the progress of Iran. They studied Paris, London, Berlin, New York, and the like to compare them to Tehran. They searched for infrastructure, cinemas, theaters, parks, streets and squares, buildings, transportation systems, and many other features of these cities as model for the transformation of their own cities, in this case, Tehran. They constructed an image of the West and reproduced their city after that desired image. In their view, cinemas, theaters, modern sports, hotels, cafés, restaurants, and other Western social spaces and practices were the cure for the obsolete, backward, and traditional sections of society. Social reform was equal to watching plays, going to cinemas, attending garden parties and masquerades, spending time in cafés, and playing soccer. These practices and their related spaces were means to revolutionize traditional Iranian society. The modern middle class observed the right for itself to continuously educate the other sections of society on how to behave like a modern person and how to act in new social spaces of the city.


190 Ti’atr va Sinima [Theater and Cinema], *Itila’at*, Azar 26, 1307 [December 17, 1928]; 3-Ijtima’at [3- Social Gathering], *Itila’at*, Diy 12, 1307 [January 2, 1929]; jì’tima’at [Social Gathering], *Itila’at*, Diy 17, 1307 [January 5, 1929]; Yik Shab dar Hotil Impirial [A Night in Imperial Hotel], *Itila’at*, Azar 26, 1309 [December 17, 1930]; Jum’ih ya Ta’ il-i ‘umumi [Friday or Public Holiday], *Itila’at*, Isfand 12, 1309 [March 4, 1931]; Risturan-i Baladiyyih [Municipality’s Restaurant], *Itila’at*, Mihr 12, 1310 [October 5, 1931]; Mardum Haman Mardumand ya ‘avaz Shudihand? [Are People the same or have they changed?], *Itila’at*, Aban 2, 1310 [October 25, 1931]; Ra ayat-i Huqeq-i jì’tima [Observence of the Community rights], *Itila’at*, Aban 3, 1310 [October 26, 1931]; ubur va Murur dar Khiyaban-ha [Commuting in the Streets], *Itila’at*, Aban 4, 1310 [October 27, 1931]; Az Qahirih ta Tehran [From Cairo to Tehran], *Itila’at*, Tir 16, 1311 [July 7, 1932]; Aya Tarz-i Fikr-i Ma ‘vaz Shudih Ast? [Has Our Way of Thinking Changed?], *Itila’at*, Murdad 3, 1311 [July 25, 1932]; Zindigi-yi Imruz-i Ma [Our Life These Days], *Itila’at*, Aban 4, 1311 [October 26, 1932]; Girani-i Qiymat-i Tafrih [The High Price of Recreation], *Itila’at*, Aban
Consequently, this social discourse produced a power relationship between the modern middle class and the rest of society. In this relationship, the former defined itself by terms such as modern, progressive, European, secular, healthy, scientific, and happy; and it portrayed the latter by backward, obsolete, traditional, religious, unhealthy, unhappy, and ignorant. These dichotomies went way beyond social groups and people. The two types of social spaces and the two poles of Tehran, north and south, were redefined through the same discourse. The unhygienic, traditional, religious, ignorant southern neighborhoods with its takīyyihs, coffeehouses, zūrkhānihs, and bathhouses stood in contrast to the modern, Western, clean, and enlightened north with its cafés, cinema, theaters, sport fields, and the like. In addition to the numerous articles in newspapers, these dichotomies can be traced in the pictures and the logos of popular magazines of the era, figures 5.12-15.


191 ʾijtimaʿat [Social Gathering], Itilaʿat, Diy 15, 1307 [January 5, 1929]; Saʿy va ʿamal-i Baladiyyih [Municipalities Efforts], Itilaʿat, Tir 17, 1308 [July 8, 1929]; Sakhtiman-ha-yi Gili [Mud Buildings], Itilaʿat, Bahman 26, 1309 [February 15, 1931]; Mardum Haman Mardumand yaʿavaz Shudihand? [Are People the same or they have change?], Itilaʿat, Aban 2, 1310 [October 25, 1931]; ʿubur va Murur dar Khiyaban-ha [Commuting in the Streets], Itilaʿat, Aban 4, 1310 [October 27, 1931]; Akhharin Baqaya-yi Vagun [The Last Remnants of Tramway], Itilaʿat, Farvardin 22, 1311 [April 11, 1932]; Girani-i Qiymat-i Tafrih [The High Price of Recreation], Itilaʿat, Aban 10, 1311 [November 1, 1932]; Shadi va Nishat-i ʿUmumi [Public Happiness and Exhilaration], Itilaʿat, Isfand 22, 1311 [March 13, 1933]; Jashn [Festival], Itilaʿat, Mihr 12, 1313 [October 4, 1934]; Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine] 1, no. 2 (Shawwal 9, 1339 [July 16, 1921]): 3; Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine] 3, no. 5 (Rajab 10, 1343 [February 4, 1925]): 2-3 & 9-10; Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine] 6, no. 4 (Bahman, 1306 [February, 1928]): 9; Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine] 11, no. 1 (Khurday, 1313 [May, 1934]): 34-6.
Figures 5.12. The left picture shows a mourning procession with the subtitle of “The Caravan of Grief” and on the right are two pictures of a carnival for Reza Shah’s birthday ceremonies with the subtitle of “The Caravan of Happiness”.

Figures 5.13. Juxtaposition of two places of food consumption in old and new Tehran. On the left a kabābī from Qajar era and on the right a modern café, Café Pars, on Lalīhzār Street.

193 Majalih-yi Baladiyyih 10, no. 11/12 (Farvardin, 1313 [March, 1934]): after page 532.
Figures 5.14. On the left the state-sponsored hat and on the right various hats from the Qajar era, which belonged to various communities of the city.  

Figure 5.15. The logo of Tehran Musavar magazine. It consisted of different social groups in the city. The contrast between modern and traditional middle classes is clear in this picture.

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194 Majalih-yi Baladiyyih 10, no. 9/10 (Azar, 1312 [November, 1933]): between pages 442-445.
The confrontation between the modern and traditional middle classes was not a fair one. The two groups did not possess the same resources and power. The general policies of the state worked in favor of the modern middle class. The military, state’s bureaucracy, education system, national oil revenues, legislative body, and judicial system all provided the foundation for the consolidation of the modern middle class and supported its desired social reforms. In cities, the municipalities were the most effective forces for the implementation of these changes. From a weak bankrupt institute in the Qajar and constitutional eras, the municipality of Tehran evolved into an organization that could affect all the aspect of people’s lives. In an article in municipality’s magazine, *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih*, the responsibilities of the institute are described in these words:

> The public health, food provision, city’s beautification, illumination, and cleaning, and the most important of all, disciplining citizens’ morality and preventing their harmful habits are some of the thousands of duties of the municipality. To sum up, from the birth to the death of a person, he has to deal with the municipality, and the organization is his guardian.  

The municipality was the main force behind the spatial implementation of the discourse that had given the power to the modern middle class. Throughout the First Pahlavi era, Tehran witnessed the systematic, top-down and bottom-up destruction of social spaces and practices of the traditional social strata. It was systematic and top-down because the state had a fixed and efficient plan and the required instruments for its implementation. The legislative power of the state and municipality, which were manifested in the numerous *nizāmnāmihs* and laws, were the clues for the top-down systematic transformation of social life and spaces of the traditional strata of society. It was bottom-up because a section of society, the modern middle class, had a great

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196 *Majalih-yi Baladiyyih [Baladiyyih Magazine] 6, no. 5 (Isfand, 1306 [March, 1928]): 34-6.*
role in its embodiment. Through their numerous articles in newspapers of the time, the modern middle class played a great role in framing the south and north, old and new, progressive and obsolete, and many other dichotomies of the era. These dichotomies positioned this class at the powerful side and the traditional strata at the powerless side of their power relationship.

**Conclusion**

The transformation, destruction, and prohibition of communal practices and spaces were the biggest blows to the vitality of the traditional middle class and other similar strata of society. By losing their spaces and practices, they lost their reproductive power; they were unable to reproduce their communal identities and transfer them to the next generation. They had to send their children to the new public schools, which were based on a national and unified curriculum. They lost their gathering places and the games and rituals related to them. The old city was destroyed with the excuse of renovation, and the old neighborhoods were depicted as unhealthy, poor, and unsafe places. To sum up, urban communities lost the means they needed to reproduce their communal identity. As a result, the communal sphere was the biggest loser of the transformations after the Constitutional Revolution and particularly during the First Pahlavi era. Ironically, the main social force behind the revolution received the most severe losses.

In contrast, this era witnessed the proliferation of spaces and practices that generated the modern middle class. The north city witnessed healthy growing numbers of cafés, cinemas, theaters, sport fields and the like. The new national education system brought up generations of young students who defined themselves as people of the nation of Iran. The members of the new

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197 Yik Shab dar Hotil Impirial [A Night in Imperial Hotel], *Itila’at*, Azar 26, 1309 [December 17, 1930]; Risturan-i Baladiyyih [Municipality’s Restaurant], *Itila’at*, Mihr 12, 1310 [October 5, 1931]. Also see footnotes 181 to 183.
class spent their time in spaces that belonged to no specific communal group. They produced these spaces based on a desired Western image, and in return, these spaces (re)produced and reaffirm their social identity.

Finally, the process of regulating old and new spaces requires a re-examination. Unlike the Qajar court, the Pahlavi state discovered the social power of space as an instrument of social control and change. The municipality’s niẓāmnāmihs should be seen as the manifestations of the power relations through which the state controlled social spaces to transform society. In another word, the codification of spaces was a means of subjection;198 the state was able to (re)produce its desired subjects through the subtle control of spaces. The state was present in every aspect of social life; similar to Foucault’s Panopticon concept,199 through the legislation and spatial control, the state regulated social spaces and practices. In the case of coffeehouses and cafés for example, the change from sitting platforms around space to chairs and tables throughout space, the ban on naqālī and other communal activities, separation of the food preparation and serving areas, and many other similar small changes were actually means of social control. These laws served as the omnipresent gaze of the state; they regulated people’s behaviors; the spatial codes codified people.

Whether intentional or unintentional, these laws served the state beyond mere modernization and Westernization of society. Through spatial regulation, they prevented any major threat to its the state’s dominance. The Muharram ceremonies were banned, and takīyyihs were abandoned, so there was no danger of the transformation of an emotional religious ritual to a fully-fledged political protest. The vibrant coffeehouses of the constitutional era, as spaces for the exchange of news and political discussions, altered to docile spaces for recreation and having fun. Instead of

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198 Foucault, “The Subject and Power.”
199 Foucault, Discipline and Punish.
taʿzīyih performances with the centrality of the war between the just and unjust, people were invited to watch the plays and movies based on the Western stories. Finally, instead of zūrkhānihs as the centers of people who devoted themselves and their physical power for the well-being of their community, people were encouraged to play soccer and sports that were amusing competitive activities.

After the consolidation of the First Pahlavi state, no major episode of contention occurred in Iranian cities, particularly Tehran. Through its various measurements, the state managed to control society and clamp down on its opposition. However, from the moment of Reza Shah’s abdication from power, Tehran and other Iranian cities became arenas of political activities and social movements. For twelve years, the state was unable to reconstruct its absolute power. Ironically, the modern middle class was at the forefront of the most of the political movements of this era. In the next, I discuss the dynamics of this turbulent, twelve-year period.
Chapter 6

The Age of Social Movements: The Transformation of the Public Sphere and Political Public Space

In this chapter, I demonstrate that in the span of forty years from the early twentieth century to the 1940s, the segmented model of the public sphere, manifested during the Constitutional Revolution, and its relationship to the production of political public spaces lost its efficiency to a great extent; it is not possible to analyze the 1940s and the early 1950s social movements through the same framework. The study of these movements highly depends on the social changes of Iranian urban society after the Constitutional Revolution, particularly during the two decades of Reza Shah’s reign. The formation of the modern middle and urban working classes played a decisive role in the transformation of the public sphere and political public spaces. In this era, these classes, particularly the former, were the main social forces in various episodes of contention.

This chapter suggests that the transformation of the public sphere and political public spaces of Tehran occurred alongside the transformations of urban society. The formation of two new classes, particularly the modern middle class, undermined the communal and religious character of the public sphere and political public spaces. The analysis of social life and spaces of the modern middle classes is essential for the investigation of the public sphere and political public spaces. During the period between 1941 and 1953, the class structure of urban society was
the determinative factor in the formation of the public sphere and the production of political 
public spaces.

In Chapter Four, I studied the Constitutional Revolution and the formation of the public 
sphere and political public spaces in Iranian urban society. I argued that the public sphere was 
the outcome of coming together of various communal spheres through the binding force of 
religion and political activities of the propertied middle class and, to some extent, the 
intelligentsia. Moreover, religious authorities had a significant role in the production of public 
opinion. Similarly, religiosity was a decisive factor in the production of political public spaces of 
the city. Sacred spaces of Tehran, three mosques and a holy shrine, were the principle political 
public spaces in this era. As a result, religiosity was the social commonality between the public 
sphere and political public spaces.

By the mid-twentieth century, the public sphere’s communal and religious aspects 
transformed considerably. Religious authorities lost their monopoly in the formation of public 
opinion to newspapers and other forms of media. Broad social classes overshadowed the 
communal sphere. The public sphere, consequently, depended on the political mobilization of 
these classes rather than coming together of communities. More importantly, political parties 
proved to be the most effective forces for the mobilization of masses. Finally, women became an 
inseparable part of the public sphere in this era. Political parties established women’s 
organizations, and women, alongside men, participated in the episodes of contention in Tehran; 
the public sphere witnessed gender diversification.

Alongside the relative secularization of the public sphere and the decline of the 
significance of the communal sphere in its formation, political public spaces of Tehran 
underwent the same fundamental transformations. Instead of sacred spaces of the city, streets and
squares provided the main platforms of protest; streets and squares of Tehran witnessed many episodes of contention in this era. This spatial shift accompanied by another significant change. People’s repertoires of contention transformed too. Instead of taking *bast* in sacred spaces, people and political organizations held public meetings, marches, and gatherings in new public spaces of the city. Furthermore, the timing of these episodes differed from the Constitutional Revolution period. People’s *basts* in the constitutional era could last for multiple days. In the case of Shah ‘Abd al-ʿAzim’s *bast*, it lasted for one month. In contrast, the 1940s and the early 1950s protests were daily activities, ending before or few hours after the sunset.

Through this investigation, I argue that there is a close interrelation between the public sphere and political public spaces. Their examinations greatly depend on the historical description and social analysis of their social context. The transformations of Iranian society were the most significant elements in the formation and transformation of the public sphere and political public space, and without studying the former, it is not possible to investigate the latter.

I begin this chapter with a brief review of the major events of the era. Afterward, I travel back to the early years of Reza Shah’s rule to introduce the major instances of social movements before the solidification of his dictatorship. This flashback helps to provide a comparative framework to construct the chapter’s arguments. Next, by examining the political parties of the twelve-year period, I demonstrate how the working and modern middle classes were the key social forces during numerous episodes of contention in this era. Moreover, I trace the former player of the political scene, the traditional middle class, and show that by the early 1950s, the traditional middle class still had the potential to mobilize its resources and revive the sacred spaces of the old city for political objectives.
In August 1941, the Red Army from the north and the British Army from the south invaded Iran to open a supply route to stop the Germans’ progress towards the East. Iran’s national railway system was crucial to their victory over the Nazis in the World War II, which helped them to transfer supplies from the Persian Gulf to the borders of the Soviet Union in the north. Unwilling to cooperate with the Allies, Reza Shah had rejected their requests to use Iranian territory during the war. His uncooperative policies led to the invasion of the Allies, which brought an abrupt end to his dictatorship. He had to step down in favor of his son, Muhammad Reza Shah, and left the country shortly after. Twelve turbulent years of relative freedom and democracy began. Iran was under occupation until 1946. During these years, the shortage of food, particularly bread, and high inflation due to the Allies’ invasion were the major problems of the country. Moreover, under the influence of the Red Army, separatist movements emerged in the western and northwestern Kurdish and Turkish speaking sections of the country.¹

In comparison to the Reza Shah era, the political scene became highly diverse and unstable. During this twelve-year era, the government had seventeen premierships and thirty-one cabinets. On average, each premiership lasted eight months and each cabinet only five months. Throughout this era, three primary sources of power continuously competed for their dominance.

¹ For an overview of the twelve-year period and the troubled years of Allies’ invasion see: Jami, Guzashtih Chiragh-i Rah-i Ayandih Ast: Tarikh-i Iran dar Fasilih-yi Du Kudita 1299-1332 [The Past is the Light for the Future Path: The History of Iran between the Two Coups 1921-1953] (Tehran: Intisharat-i Quqnus, 1362[1983]); Baqir ‘aqili, Ruzshumar-i Tarikh-i Iran: Az Mashrutihi ta Inghilab [Chronicle of the History of Iran: From the Constitutional Era to the Revolution], vol. 1 (Tehran: Nashr-i Guftar, 1990), 249-351; Hassan I’zam Qudsi, Kitab-i Khatirat-i Man ya Rushan Shodan-i Tarikh-i Sad Salih [The Book of My Memories or Demystifying One Hundred Years of History], vol. 2 (Chapkhanih-yi Hiydari, 1342 [1963]), 393-817.
over the political scene: the court, the Parliament, and the Executive Branch (premier and the cabinet).  

The highlight of the era was the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement. The movement was a reaction to Britain’s control over the oil resources of the country in the south and the oil concessions of 1901 and 1933. The 1901 concession guaranteed a sixty-year monopoly over the southern oil resources to the British contractor, D’Arcy, in return for a royalty of sixteen percent of the profits. In 1932, Reza Shah canceled the concession, but he was forced to sign another one-sided contract without much difference less than a year later. However, in the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement became a momentous campaign to end the control of foreign powers over the oil resources of Iran. Under the leadership of the popular parliament deputy, Muhammad Mossadegh, the movement managed to attract broad social support from various sections of society. In March 1951, the movement reached its climax with the passage of the Oil Industry Nationalization Bill in the Parliament. Shortly after, Mossadegh became the Prime Minister and managed to hold the position for around two and a half years. The nationalization brought Iran and Britain into conflict. Britain evacuated all its oil industry crew from Iran, boycotted Iranian oil in the international markets, demanded other countries not buy Iranian oil, imposed economic sanctions against the country, prevented the United States from giving financial loans to the Mossadegh government, complained against Iran to the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, and destabilized inside the country by provoking tribal communities against the central government and distributing weapons among

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them. In response, the Mossadegh government shifted to an oil-less economy, succeeded in breaking the boycott by selling oil to Italy and Japan, managed to control the inflation, won the cases in the international courts, created national unity against Britain, expelled all the British diplomats, and closed down the British embassy and consulates in Iran.  

The final chapter of this era was the highly controversial 1953 coup against the Mossadegh government. Designed and performed by the CIA and MI6 and accompanied by the internal forces and part of the military, the coup brought an end to the nationalization movement and replaced democracy with another era of dictatorship. After the coup, Muhammad Reza Shah seized power, imprisoned or executed his opponents, kept Mossadegh in house arrest, and renewed the oil concessions with the great powers. Once again, a short span of democracy was followed by a long period of dictatorship that continued for twenty-six years until the 1979 revolution.

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5 The 1953 coup is strongly present in the collective memory of Iranians. It is a highly controversial event. Even at the present time, various scholars attempt to highlight the role of some groups and ignore the others’. For example, Darioush Bayandor and Fariborz Mokhtari frame the coup as an internal affair. They portray it as a nation’s uprising against the dictatorial character of Mossadegh. Gasiorowski strongly rejects this claim as unfounded and highlights the role of the US and Britain. Faghoory focuses on the role of religious forces in the country and the broken alliance between Mossadegh and Kashani as the main reasons behind the defeat of the Nationalization Movement. For the United States’ CIA reports of the coup see: Donald Wilber, Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953 (CIA Clandestine Service History, March 1954). For different accounts of the coup see: Mohammad Hassan Faghoory, “The Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran with Particular Reference to Ayatullah Haj Sayyid Abul-Qasim Kashani” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin Madison, 1978); Darioush Bayandor, Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Fariborz
The Age of Social Movements

The twelve-year period witnessed numerous instances of protests and public political gatherings in Iranian cities, particularly Tehran. The dynamics of these episodes were different from those of the constitutional era. The growth of the modern working and middle classes had created new players in the political scene and had pushed the traditional middle class aside. During the Constitutional Revolution, the traditional middle class—the propertied middle class—was the main mobilizing force, capable of uniting different social segments against the Qajar court. In the words of Abrahamian: “The Constitutional Revolution was a movement of the bazaar. Its rank-and-file came from the guilds, its financial backing from the merchants, its moral support from the religious authorities, and its theorizing from a few westernized intellectuals.”

In the segmented society of the constitutional era, as Chapter Four discussed, sacred spaces of the city were the main political public spaces for political gatherings and the protesters. These spaces belonged to all segments of society and under the “moral support” of the clerics and “financial backing” of the bāzārīs, they could create a unified body of protestors against the state.

The period between the Constitutional Revolution and the post-World War II era, particularly twenty years of the Reza Shah rule, was long enough to bring fundamental changes


7 Merchants and shopkeepers of the bazaar.
to Iranian urban society. The principal players in the political scene had changed; the traditional middle class had lost its monopoly as the major socio-political force. The modern middle class, in contrast, had grown into a decisive social class that could mobilize its resources for various political goals. Moreover, the new working class was free from the elaborate conventions of the guilds. It was a potent social force that could be pushed into the political arena by the modern middle class. In addition to these changes, during Reza Shah’s reign, religious authorities had faced severe attacks from the state. They lost their primary social responsibilities, and their social position diminished considerably. One of the significant changes after the Constitutional Revolution and during the First Pahlavi era was the proliferation of newspapers and other forms of media in Iranian cities. As a result, clerics lost their pivotal role in the production of public opinion.

Finally, the city had changed considerably. Tehran had grown from a medieval city surrounded by walls with a population of 200,000 people into a modern metropolitan area with 1.5 million people. Beyond the limits of the old city, the new city had grown based on a spacious network of streets and squares. The modern middle class had occupied the northern city with its various social spaces. The social life and spaces of the new city were in stark contrast to the old forms of social practices and spaces in the old town.

As I discuss in this chapter, the combination of these socio-spatial changes resulted in the fundamental shift of the public sphere and political public spaces of the city. First, I continue by a flashback to the Reza Shah era to review a few episodes of contention before the consolidation of his power. After that, I investigate the twelve-year period and introduce the major political organizations that could mobilize the masses into the political scene. Instead of focusing on the

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8 In his extremely valuable analysis of the crowds in political scene, Ervand Abrahamian provides a detailed comparison between the constitutional era and the post-World War II era. I am deeply in debt to him for his valuable research: Abrahamian, “The Crowd in Iranian Politics 1905-1953.”
last two years of the Mossadegh government and the 1953 coup, I scan the whole twelve-year period for the instances of social movements and define the spaces of protest and political gatherings in each case to provide a comprehensive view of political public spaces of this era.

Popular Resistance during the Reign of Reza Shah

Although Reza Shah managed to suppress his opponents and seize power to rule the country as a dictator, during the first five years after the 1921 coup, he faced many challenges. The constitutional atmosphere was still alive in Tehran and many major cities up to the mid-1920s. Taking bast in mosques, shrines, and the Parliament was a well-established method of protest, and the traditional middle class accompanied by the high-ranking clerics were able to mobilize the masses.9

After the 1921 coup, the major challenge to Reza Shah’s rule occurred during his campaign for republicanism. In early 1924, following his counterpart in Turkey, Reza Shah proposed a bill to transform the political system of the country from the constitutional monarchy to a republic, to pave the path towards his own presidency. The republican campaign started from the press with the publication of various articles in favor of the Iranian republic and against the monarchy. The progressive forces and intellectuals backed Reza Shah, at that time Reza Khan, in this process. However, afraid of the fate of the religious forces after the elimination of the monarchy in Turkey, the conservative deputies of the Parliament accompanied by the clerics and the traditional classes opposed the bill. Utilizing the methods of protest similar to those of the constitutional era, the traditional middle class under the guidance of the clerics and the guilds-

9 In her valuable book, Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran, Stephanie Cronin studies various episodes of contention during the Reza Shah reign: Stephanie Cronin, Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran: Opposition, Protest and Revolt, 1921–1941 (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
leaders took *bast* in the main mosques of the city and the Parliament to oppose the bill. By the occupation of the Parliament, conservatives managed to fight republicanism effectively. This popular resistance resulted in the repeal of the republican movement and the transformation of the Qajar monarchy into the Pahlavi monarchy.\textsuperscript{10} However, in the heat of the protests against the republican movement, a small group of “mostly militants from the recently formed trades unions, teachers, telegraphists, pharmacists, and workers” protested on the far side of Baharistan Square from the Parliament in support of the movement. Abrahamian calls this group “the first ‘modern’ crowd in Persian history, for it was organized by political parties and its participants were members of the new classes.”\textsuperscript{11}

After his rise to power as the new king of Iran, Reza Shah managed to suppress his opponents effectively. Tehran remained calm under his rule, and no major protests occurred in the city. Through the implementation of various policies, as discussed in the previous chapter, the First Pahlavi state weakened many of the traditional sources of power in the country. Yet, the other cities of Iran witnessed few episodes of contention even after the solidification of his power. The oil industry workers’ strike in 1929\textsuperscript{12} and the 1935 army’s massacre of the protesters in Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad\textsuperscript{13} were the main instances of uprisings after Reza Shah’s rise to power. As Cronin argues, after the consolidation of the First Pahlavi state, the balance of power between people and the state tilted in favor of the latter. As a result, the authoritarian Pahlavi

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\textsuperscript{12} For the accounts of the oil industry workers’ strikes in the southern city of Abadan see: Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran*, 201-37.

state managed to suppress and abolish traditional repertoires of urban protest. The new state did not acknowledge the rights of bastīs, and its forceful measures in confronting instance of bast, particularly in the case of Mashhad, and the weakening of traditional middle classes resulted in the eclipse of this long-lived custom in the years to come.

With this brief flash back to the First Pahlavi era, I continue the discussion with examining various political agents of the twelve-year period.

The Tudih Party and the Mobilization of the Modern Middle and Working Classes

The Tudih Party was the Communist party of Iran, established on October 2, 1941, shortly after the invasion of the Allies. The background of the left movements in Iran, particularly in the northwest of the country, goes back to the 1906 Constitutional Revolution because of Iran’s proximity to Russia, later the Soviet Union. Fred Halliday originates the first Iranian Communist Party to “June 1920 before any other in Asia, months earlier than China, India, Vietnam or Japan.” However, the core of the Tudih Party formed during the Reza Shah dictatorship among a group of educated Persian-speaking young men in Tehran. In 1937, a group

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14 People who take bast.
15 Cronin, Soldiers, Shaws and Subalterns in Iran, 35-8.
of fifty-three young men was arrested in connection with the establishment of a communist organization. Becoming famous as *Panjāh va Sīh Nafar*, the Fifty-three, they formed the core of the Tudih Party after the invasion.\(^{19}\)

For five consecutive years, the Tudih Party had incredible growth. By 1946, the party had fifty thousand core members and one hundred thousand active members.\(^{20}\) Matin-asgari argues that the Tudih owed its success to the fact that “it offered the most coherent vision of social reform to Iran’s urban middle and lower classes.”\(^{21}\) In addition, the physical presence of the Red Army was not ineffective in the initial success and growth of the party.\(^{22}\) In the election of the fourteenth parliament, the party succeeded in winning eight seats, and at its high point, the party received three cabinet ministries in the Qavam al-Saltanih government. After the evacuation of the Red Army from Iran in 1946, Qavam broke his ties with the Tudih, suppressed the party, arrested its high-ranking members, and banned its public meetings. The unsuccessful plot to assassinate Muhammad Reza Shah on February 4, 1949, resulted in the further clampdown on the party by the court and military forces. After the 1946 suppression, it took the Tudih four years to find a chance to rearrange and gain strength once again. The Oil Industry Nationalization Movement and the resulting political openness in Iran provided the party with the opportunity to enter the political scene as a decisive force. This revival did not last long, and after the 1953 coup, the Tudih received the most severe attacks from the court and the military.


\(^{20}\) Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 303.


The state executed many of its high-ranking members or sentenced them to long-term confinement, and many of the members had to flee the country.\textsuperscript{23}

Ervand Abrahamian provides a comprehensive analysis of the Tudih’s social composition. He divides the party into three levels. The modern middle class dominated the “top echelons” of the party; ninety-seven percent of the Central Committee appointed after the party’s First Congress belonged to the modern middle class. This percentage was eighty-eight percent after the Second Congress. These proportions were slightly different for the “middle echelons” of the party with seventy-two percent middle class and twenty-seven percent working class after the First Congress and almost half and half after the Second Congress. In the “lower echelons” of the party, however, the working class had the dominance, and the modern middle class was the second group.\textsuperscript{24} As Abrahamian perfectly describes, the party “was like an iceberg, with the party organization corresponding to the visible tip, and the much larger labor movement to the hidden mass below.”\textsuperscript{25} Other analyses of the party’s social composition show the same combination of the modern middle and urban working classes.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, after the destruction of the complex guild system in the Reza Shah era, the long-established master-apprentice relationship had vanished. Consequently, the Tudih party even appealed to the wage earners of the bazaar.\textsuperscript{27} Finally, the party had considerable presence among students. In the words of Khamih’i, “the university was totally in the capture of the Tudih. The student unions not only

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\textsuperscript{24} Abrahamian, \textit{Iran between Two Revolutions}, 327.
\textsuperscript{25} Abrahamian, \textit{Iran between Two Revolutions}, 347.
\textsuperscript{26} Khamih’i, \textit{Fursat-i Buzurg-i az Dastraftih}, 471; Matin-asgari, “From Social Democracy to Social Democracy,” 42.
\end{flushleft}
followed the party, but also, their members were the party members. A big number of the professors and academic staff at the University had joined the party too.\textsuperscript{28}

Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the Tudih was the most successful organization in using urban spaces as political stages to pursue its objectives. The broad social basis of the party gave it the power to mobilize tens of thousands of people for its public gatherings, marches, and demonstrations. The party was extremely creative in these episodes. From long marches throughout the main streets of Tehran to gigantic gatherings in the spacious squares, and from public meetings in front of the party’s club to public speeches in smaller squares, the Tudih Party demonstrated a great capacity in turning Tehran’s streets and squares into political public spaces. To study these episodes, one needs to utilize various resources. Many of the popular periodicals of the era censored the party’s gatherings. In contrast, the Tudih’s newspapers highly exaggerated the numbers of the people and the sizes of the protests and gatherings.\textsuperscript{29} A combination of these newspaper accounts, memoirs of the party members and non-members, and historical books can provide more realistic images of the events.

The Tudih held its first public meeting in October 1942.\textsuperscript{30} The meeting was in a strange setting, the ruins of Sangilaj neighborhood.\textsuperscript{31} Anvar Khamih’i mentions that the party had requested to hold its meeting in Tupkhanih Square,\textsuperscript{32} but the government had turned down its request and assigned the ruins as their meeting site. While the party’s newspapers claimed that there were more than forty thousand people at the meeting, Khamih’i rejects this claim and

\textsuperscript{28} Khamih’i, \textit{Fursat-i Buzurg-i az Dastraftih}, 471. For the appeal of the party to the students also see: Abrahamian, \textit{Iran between Two Revolutions}, 331-3.

\textsuperscript{29} Khamih’i, \textit{Fursat-i Buzurg-i az Dastraftih}, 307.

\textsuperscript{30} Abrahamian dates the meeting on October 21 while Anvar Khamih’i dates it on October 18: Abrahamian, “The Crowd in Iranian Politics 1905-1953,” 189; Khamih’i, \textit{Fursat-i Buzurg-i az Dastraftih}, 307.

\textsuperscript{31} As the Chapter Five discussed, the municipality of Tehran destroyed a huge section of Sangilaj neighborhood for the construction of the stock exchange building. The project was never started and the land was left empty until it was transformed into a park in the mid-1940s.

\textsuperscript{32} At this time Sipah Square.
argues that the number was not more than ten thousand. It was the first and the last time the Tudih had to hold its meetings and demonstrations in such an uncanny place. After this meeting, the party succeeded in holding its political gatherings and protests in the main streets and squares of Tehran.

The May Day ceremonies were the peaks of the party’s activities. The Tudih could boast its ability to mobilize thousands of workers and middle-class members on this particular day. As I mentioned above, the party had a great influence among the workers. As a result, it was able to call out big numbers of protestors for the May Day demonstrations. The party usually led long marches in the main streets of the city and finished the march by gathering in a square or in front of the party’s club for speeches. The Tudih held three major May Day marches during the twelve-year period: in 1945, 1946, and 1951. In 1948 and 1949, workers had their May Day marches; however, due to the suppression of the party, the Tudih did not contribute directly to the events. The first May Day march was in 1945. The comparison between the very short report in Itilāʿat newspaper and Khamihʾi’s description proves the need for the multiplicity of the resources in the investigation of the Tudih’s demonstrations and public meetings. Itilāʿatʾs report does not refer to the party at all. It briefly mentions that some groups of workers gathered and marched for the day, and the police forces headed the march to guarantee the order of the event. In contrast, Khamihʾi, as a high-ranking member of the party, estimates fifty thousand participants in the march. He argues that the party’s agents were responsible for the order of the event, and to prevent possible military attacks on the marchers, the Tudih deputies, who had parliamentary immunity, headed the lines of the workers.

33 Khamihʾi, Fursat-i Buzurg-i az Dastraftih, 307.
34 ‘Iyd-i Avval-i Mih dar Tehran [May Day in Tehran], Itilāʿat, Urdibihisht 11, 1324 [May 1, 1945].
35 Khamihʾi, Fursat-i Buzurg-i az Dastraftih, 372.
The next year’s May Day march, in 1946, was one of the biggest gatherings of the party. The Tudih demonstrated its real strength by gathering around one hundred thousand people on the streets of Tehran.\textsuperscript{36} The University closed down for the day; many high schools had to shut down because the teachers and students participated in the march; the public transportation stopped working because the bus drivers’ union supported the march. The huge crowd started its march from the party’s club and ended in gigantic Tupkhanih Square where the party’s leaders used the balcony of the municipality building to talk to the crowd.\textsuperscript{37} In addition to Tehran, similar events occurred in most of the major cities around the country; just in the southern city of Abadan, the heart of the British-controlled oil industry, eighty thousand workers marched in the city.\textsuperscript{38}

Besides the May Day events, the Tudih party held numerous public meetings, protests, and marches in the twelve-year period. All these events occurred in the main streets and square of northern Tehran. On October 27, 1944, the Tudih held an enormous protest against the government of the time and in support of an oil concession in favor of the Soviet Union. This protest coincided with Sergey Kavtaradze’s trip to Tehran. He was a high-ranking diplomat from the Soviet Union, who traveled to Tehran to put pressure on the government for the north oil concession. This coincidence caused a backlash against the Tudih Party and brought the party into disrepute.\textsuperscript{39} Many saw the party as a Soviet agent, who was ready to compromise the sovereignty of the country over its resources. The presence of the Soviet soldiers in this protest prevented the government from banning the event and resulted in more hesitation towards the

\textsuperscript{36} There are various estimates for the number of the demonstrators on this day, see: Khamih i, \textit{Fursat-i Buzurg-i az Dastraftih}, 483; Abrahamian, “The Crowd in Iranian Politics 1905-1953,” 190; Abrahamian, \textit{Iran between Two Revolutions}, 300.

\textsuperscript{37} Khamih i provides a detailed account of the day, see: Khamih i, \textit{Fursat-i Buzurg-i az Dastraftih}, 482-4.


party’s legitimacy as an independent political organization.\(^{40}\) The north oil protest ended in the Parliament Square, Baharestan, where thirty-five thousand people gathered and chanted against the government. Shortly after this rally, the government resigned.\(^{41}\) Some other significant instances of the Tudih Party demonstrations and gatherings in the street and squares of Tehran were: (1) the march for the end of World War II on May 11, 1945,\(^ {42}\) (2) the Tudih sponsored workers demonstration on July 19, 1946,\(^ {43}\) and (3) the fifth anniversary of the party’s establishment in October 1946.\(^ {44}\) Figure 6.1 maps various episodes of public meetings and demonstrations by the Tudih Party. As the figure shows, most of these episodes are concentrated beyond the old city, in the wide and spacious streets and squares of northern Tehran. The party did not hold any demonstration in the newly built streets of the old city.

One of the significant features of the Tudih Party was women’s participation in its political activities. The party enabled women’s membership and established a women’s organization, Tashkilat-i Dimukratik-i Zanan or the Democratic Association of Women, in 1942.\(^ {45}\) The women’s organization of the party published an independent periodical named Bidari-yi Ma or

\(^{40}\) Karim Sanjabi, *Umid-ha va Naumidi-ha [Hopes and Hopelessness]* (London: Intisharat-i Jibhih-yi Miliyun-i Iran, 1368[1989]), 73. Khamih’i argues that the Soviets did not ask for the party’s permission to send their soldier and did it on their own to increase the pressure on the government: Khamih’i, *Fursat-i Buzurg-i az Dastraftih*, 346-7. Nuri argues that the party did not have any intention to support the north oil concession and the coincidence of Kavtaradze’s trip and the protest was out of their bad luck: Kiyanuri, *Khatirat-i Nur al-Din Kiyanuri*, 100.


\(^{43}\) Ijtima’-i Kargaran dar Miyan-i Sipah [Workers’ Gathering in Sipah Square], *Itila’at*, Tir 29, 1325 [July 20, 1946]; Khamih’i, *Fursat-i Buzurg-i az Dastraftih*, 497-8;

\(^{44}\) Abrahamian, “The Crowd in Iranian Politics 1905-1953,” 190; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 301.

\(^{45}\) Kiyanuri, *Khatirat-i Nur al-Din Kiyanuri*, 100. Parvin Paidar dates the establishment of the Tudih party’s women’s organization to 1944. She claims that this organization was named Tashkilat-i Zanan, which was outlawed in 1949, and the party established a new organization called Tashkilat-i Dimukratik-i Zanan in 1951. Hamideh Sedghi dates the party’s focus on women issues and the establishment of women’s organization to 1943: Paidar, *Women and the Political Process*, 124-5; Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran*, 93-4.
Our Awakening. The party targeted both working-class women and women from other strata of society particularly the modern middle class.

In the political openness after Reza Shah’s abdication, women’s political participation was not restricted to the Tudih Party. As Amin mentions “[t]he politics of the women’s movement in the 1940s mirrored the larger political scene in Iran—partisan and a tad chaotic.” As a result, various women’s political organizations and periodicals established in the country, which

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46 Kiyānūrī, Khātīrāt-i Nur al-Dīn Kiyānūrī, 100.
47 Pa’īdar, Women and the Political Process, 124; Sedgī, Women and Politics in Iran, 93-4.
48 Amin, The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman, 239.
enabled them to fight for gender equality and women’s suffrage. These organizations confronted the threats of religious forces who attempted to bring back obligatory veiling to the country.49

Women’s participation in the Tudih Party’s demonstrations became common in this era. Years after the constitutional era, women found the opportunity to become active in the political scene. Women were active participants in the party’s mass demonstrations and workers’ strikes around the country.50 However, in comparison to men, women’s presence in these gatherings were limited and in smaller numbers. Iranian urban society was still heavily patriarchal, and women’s political participation was restricted. Figure 6.2 shows one of the Tudih Party’s marches in Tehran in 1951. This fascinating image contains three interesting points. First, women had their own colony among the protesting crowd; men and women were not mixed in the protest. Second, both veiled and unveiled women were present in this protest together, which shows the diversity of the women who participated in the party’s political activities; the participation of women was not restricted to the upper class, progressive women who were less religious. Third, surrounding the protesting women, there were two groups of men holding each other’s hands and making a human chain between the protesting women and the rest of the crowd. The male guardianship reproduced itself in the public political realm. Men had to protect women against the possible threats of patriarchal society.

50 Paidar, Women and the Political Process, 134.
The National Front and the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement

The National Front Party was an amalgamation of various socio-political forces formed during the election for the sixteenth parliament, in 1949. Enraged by the court’s interference in the process of the election, a group of popular politicians, backed by their followers, protested against the court and entered the royal gardens to negotiate the cancelation of the election and to hold an honest one. Later, this group formed the core of a new party, the National Front, and soon was joined by four influential political organizations. The assassination of the Court Minister by a member of a radical Islamic group, on November 4, 1949, and a huge anti-court protest in favor of the National Front in Baharistan Square, on February 7, 1950, forced the court
to surrender to the opposition’s requests, nullify the previous election, and hold a new one. The February protest in front of the Parliament in Baharistan Square was the first political public maneuver of the party. Gathering around twenty thousand people in the square, the party proved that a new popular political force had grown in the country after the attacks on the Tudih Party.51

In the new election, the National Front succeeded in entering eight highly popular delegates into the Parliament.52 In the words of Abrahamian, “as the forthcoming months proved, the eight, supported by the middle classes, could shake not only Parliament but also the shah and the whole country.”53 The National Front was the main political force behind the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement. Similar to the Tobacco Movement and the Constitutional Revolution in which a temporary coalition of incompatible social forces resulted in great political achievements, the National Front was a volatile mixture of social groups ready to disintegrate after its initial victories. However, the main difference between the current movement and the earlier ones was the substitution of the modern middle class for the small social group of the intelligentsia. As I discussed in Chapter Five, the forty-year span between the Constitutional Revolution and the nationalization era had resulted in the formation of the modern middle class. At this time, instead of the small group of intelligentsia, the progressive component of the movement was a fully-fledged social class, able to mobilize its resources and pursue its political goals.

The National Front is a well-studied topic in the contemporary history of Iran. Based on secondary sources, the major four political organizations forming the main body of the National

51 Miting dar Miydan-i Baharistan [Meeting in Baharistan Square], Itila’at, Bahman 18, 1328 [February 8, 1950]; Khamihi, Az Inshi’ab ta Kudita, 795.
52 For the story of the election for the sixteenth parliament and formation of the National Front Party see: Jami, Guzashtih Chiragh-i Rah-i Ayandih Ast, 549-51; Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 251-61; Bahram Afrasiyabi, Khatirat va Mubarizat-i Duktur Husayn Fatimi [Memoirs and Struggles of Dr. Husayn Fatimi] (Tehran; Intisharat-i Sukhan, 1366[1987]), 111-21.
53 Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 261.
Front belonged to the modern or traditional middle classes. Their coalition mixed of intellectuals, university professors and students, white-collar professionals, petit shopkeepers, bāzārīs, traditional religious classes, and clerics. Moreover, the party had some support among the working class. The Toilers’ Party, one of the affiliated organizations, was an anti-Tudih party that had won workers’ supports to some extent. In a broad view, the National Front was divided between two main poles: the modern middle class supporting Muhammad Mossadegh and the traditional middle class supporting the high-ranking cleric of Tehran, Sayyid Abu al-Qasim Kashani. The unity between these two resulted in the nationalization of the oil industry and Mossadegh’s premiership between 1950 and 1953, and their division resulted in the failure of the movement and the 1953 coup.

The dichotomy of the socio-political forces forming the National Front produced dichotomous political public spaces in return. Although the major episodes of protest and public meetings during the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement and after that in support of the National Front happened on the streets and in the squares of Northern Tehran, there were several protests and gatherings in the main mosques of the city, particularly Shah Mosque. The enormity of the events of July 17-21, 1952, and August 15-19, 1953 has overshadowed numerous instances of protests and public political meetings during the late 1940s and early 1950s and has

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55 Besides Mossadegh and Kashani Muzafar Baqa’i and Khalil Maliki were the other two influential leaders of the party; however, Mossadegh’s and Kashani’s popularity overshadowed the position and popularity of the latters. For the leadership of the party see: Siavoshi, “The Oil Nationalization Movement,” 114-5.
caused scholars to overlook the smaller protests and gatherings in alternative public spaces of the city.\textsuperscript{56}

Table 6.1 at the end of this chapter provides a comprehensive list of all protests and political gatherings and their spaces in the twelve-year period in Tehran. I created this list through cross-checking of the events in multiple resources belonging to various political groups. Examination of this list during the oil nationalization era shows that the social compositions of the crowds and the leaders of these episodes can be categorized into three main groups. The gatherings of the modern middle class, whether in support of the National Front or against it, exclusively occurred in the main streets and squares of the northern city, particularly Baharistan Square. The shared gathering of the modern and traditional middle classes mostly happened in the same spatial contexts. However, the traditional middle class held its own political gatherings in the main mosques of the city.\textsuperscript{57}

Based on the daily entries of Itilaʿat newspapers, the first gathering of the traditional middle class in Shah Mosque took place almost three years before the beginning of the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement. On January 11, 1948, in response to Kashani’s invitation, a crowd of fifteen thousand gathered in the mosque to support the Muslims in Palestine and Pakistan. The gathering provided an opportunity for the leaders and the crowd to protest against

\textsuperscript{56} Please see footnote 4.

\textsuperscript{57} One of my main resources for providing the comprehensive list presented in table 6.1 was the daily entries of Itilaʿat newspaper, the most popular newspaper of the country with the biggest numbers of print at that time. I went through every single issue of the newspaper, day by day, between 1941 to 1953. Moreover, I checked Tehran Musavar and Khandaniha magazines for the episodes of contention during this era. These periodicals had good relationships with the court and the traditional middle class. As a result, I added the memoirs of the leading figures in the National Front and Tudih Parties and three history books containing the chronicles of the events of the twelve-years period to provide a more comprehensive image: \textit{Khatirat-i Nur al-Din Kiyanuri}; Khamih’i, \textit{Fursat-i Buzurg-i az Dastraftih}; Khamih’i, \textit{Az Inshi ab ta Kudita}; Afrasiyabi, \textit{Khatirat va Mubarizat-i Duktur Husayn Fatimi}; Karim Sanjabi, \textit{Umid-ha va Naumidi-ha}; Jami, \textit{Guzashtih Chiragh-i Rah-i Ayandih Ast}; ʿaqili, \textit{Ruzshumar-i Tarikh-i Iran}; Abrahamian, \textit{Iran Between Two Revolution}. 
the cabinet and the high prices. Kashani invited people to a similar gathering on May 21, 1948. This gathering, once again in Shah Mosque, followed by a march to Sipahsalar Mosque close to the Parliament. This was the first time after the consolidation of Pahlavi’s power that people used Sipahsalar Mosque as a stage of protest. The traditional middle class revived the main mosques of the city as political public spaces once again after the constitutional era.

When the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement began and the coalition between Mossadegh and Kashani formed, four major protests in support of the movement took place in Shah Mosque. Kashani and the political Muslim groups, such as the Assembly of the Militant Muslims and the Population of the Devotees of Islam, sponsored three of these protests and invited people to participate in them. The only exception between the four was a protest on January 26, 1951. On this day, Mossadegh and Kashani asked their supporters to gather in Shah Mosque to protest against the government and in support of the nationalization. The huge crowd filled the entire space of the mosque and all the surrounding streets, and the bazaars were full of people. Khamih’i reveals the reason for the joint protest of the modern and traditional middle classes in Shah Mosque. Facing an unprecedented pressure from the National Front, the government had banned the protests in Baharistan Square and the other squares of the city.

58 Diruz Bish az Panzdaah Hizar Nafar dar Masjid-i Shah Jam’ Shodih Budand [Yesterday more than fifteen thousand people gathered in Shah Mosque], Itila’at, Diy 21, 1326 [January 12, 1948].
60 Majma’-i Musalmanan-i Majahid.
61 Jam iyyat-i Fada iyan-i Islam.
62 These three took place on December 17 and 22, 1950 and March 2, 1951. For the details of December 17, 1950 protest see: Khamih’i, Az Inshi’ab ta Kudita, 838; Faghfoory, “The Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran,” 222. For the details of December 22, 1950 protest see: Miting-i Diruz-i Masjid-i Shah ba Nazm va Tartib Barguzar Shod [Yesterday’s Meeting in Shah Mosque was Held Orderly], Itila’at, Diy 2, 1329 [December 23, 1950]; ’aqili, Ruzshumar-i Tarih-i Iran, 1: 317. For the details of March 2, 1951 protest see: Tazahurat-i Fada iyan-i Islam [The Protest of the Population of the Devotees of Islam], Itila’at, Isfand 12, 1329 [March 3, 1951]; ’aqili, Ruzshumar-i Tarih-i Iran, 1: 319.
63 Tazahurat bara-yi Milli Shudan-i San’at-i Naft [Demonstration for the Oil Industry Nationalization], Itila’at, Bahman 7, 1329 [January 27, 1951].
64 Khamih’i, Az Inshi’ab ta Kudita, 845.
a result, the two classes used Shah Mosque as their protest site. This gathering was the last time during the movement that the mosque supported a diverse crowd of people from different social classes, particularly the modern middle class.

Baharistan Square and the other major squares and streets of the northern section of Tehran were the modern middle class’s main platforms of protest during the Oil Industry Nationalization Movements and after that in support of Mohammad Mossadegh. Besides the exception of January 26, 1951, in all the other protests in which the modern and traditional middle classes used a public space together, Tehran’s northern squares and streets provided the shared stages of their protests. One of the biggest protests occurred on December 29, 1950. Various political and Islamic groups and parties had invited people to participate. Sixty thousand people gathered on the day, and the crowd filled entire space of Baharistan Square and its surrounding streets. Similar gatherings and protests occurred on February 16, March 9 and 10, and April 13, 1951. Figure 6.3 shows people’s gathering in Baharistan Square in one of the major protests during the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement.

65 Tazahurat dar Baharistan [Demonstration in Baharistan], Itila’at, Diy 9, 1329 [December 30, 1950]; Khamih’i, Az Inshī’ab ta Kudīta, 839.
66 Tazahurat dar Miydan-i Baharistan [Demonstration in Baharistan Square], Itila’at, Bahman 28, 1329 [February 17, 1951].
67 Khamih’i, Az Inshī’ab ta Kudīta, 853; Faghfoory, “The Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran,” 223; Tazahurat dar Miydan-i Baharistan [Demonstration in Baharistan Square], Itila’at, Isfand 19, 1329 [March 10, 1951].
68 Miting-i Diruz dar Miydan-i Baharistan [Yesterday’s Meeting in Baharistan Square], Itila’at, Farvardin 24, 1330 [April 14, 1951].
After the nationalization of the oil industry and during the Mossadegh’s premiership, Baharistan Square and the other major squares and streets in northern Tehran witnessed various episodes of contention. Throughout this era until the 1953 coup, these spaces were the platforms through which Mossadegh faced his opponents. Any threat to his government was followed by demonstrations and clashes in these spaces. The most notable instances happened on July 17-21,
1952, February 29 and 30, and August 15 and 19, 1953. However, the last day brought an end to this turbulent era. The deterioration of the relationship between Mossadegh and Kashani during the months leading to the coup and the disruptions of the Tudih party in the political process of the National Front left Mossadegh without the sufficient support on the day his enemies united to overthrow him from power. The combination of the court, military forces, American and British agents, and the paid thugs of the city brought an abrupt end to twelve years of relative democracy in Iran and re-established a brutal dictatorship for the years to come.

Although figure 6.3 shows a dominantly masculine crowd in Baharistan Square, the accounts of the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement imply women’s active political participation during the movement. Parvin Paidar’s study shows that “[t]he struggle for nationalisation of oil brought thousands of banner-carrying women into the streets of Tehran and other major cities.” Because of its inherent dichotomy of progressive and conservative forces,

69 In July 1952, Mossadegh requested to appoint the War Minister by himself. It was the only ministry that Muhammad Reza Shah had kept for himself. The rejection of Mossadegh’s request led to his resignation. The Shah took the advantage of the moment and appointed a new Prime Minister. This caused a great insurgency in the city. For five days, the streets and squares of Tehran were the scene of severe clashes between the military forces and people. Finally, on July 21, 1952, the Shah surrendered and gave the War Ministry to Mossadegh. The events of July became famous az Qiyām-i Si-yi Tīr or the July 21st uprising. For the details of the event see: Hassan Arsanjani, Yadasht-ha-yi Siyasi dar Vaqayiʿ-yi Si-yi Tīr [Political Note on the Events of July 21st] (Tehran: Intisharat-i Hirmans, 1366[1987]); Jami, Guzashtih Chiragh-i Rah-i Ayandih Ast, 635-40; Kianuni, Khatirat-i Nur al-Din Kiyānuni, 242; Khamihi, Az Insīʿab ta Kudita, 937-57; Imruz Khiyabān-ha-yi Shahr Mutishanj Bud [Today, the Streets of the City were Volatile], Itilaʿat, Tir 28, 1331 [July 19, 1952]; Imruz Mujadadan dar Nught-i Mukhtalīf-i Shahr Zad va Khurdhaʿi bi Vuqūʿ Piyvast [Once More, There were Clashes around the City Today], Itilaʿaṭ, Tir 29, 1331 [July 20, 1952]; Havadis-i Sih Ruz-i Akhir-i Tehran [The Events of the Last Three Days in Tehran], Itilaʿaṭ, Murdad 1, 1331 [July 23, 1952].
70 On February 28, 1953, the court staged a protest to overthrow Mossadegh. The paid thugs and retired military forces were disguised as ordinary people and attacked Mossadegh’s house to murder him. Mossadegh escaped the incident. The next two days, once again, the city witnessed a huge uprising in support of Mossadegh: Kiyānuni, Khatirat-i Nur al-Din Kiyānuni, 255; Tazahurat-i Imruz-i Payitakht bar Mihvar-i ham Shahr ham Mossadegh Dur Mizad [Today’s Protests in the Capital were in Support of Both Mossadegh and the Shah], Itilaʿat, Isfand 10, 1331 [February 29, 1953]; Imruz ham dar Miydān-i Baharistan va Khiyabān-ha-yi Tehran Vaqayiʿ-i Rukh Dad [Today There were More Incidents in Baharistan Square and Tehran’s Streets], Itilaʿaṭ, Isfand 11, 1331 [February 30, 1953].
71 Before the final coup on August 19, 1953, Mossadegh’s opposition attempted an unsuccessful coup in the late hours of August 15. Mossadegh managed to prevent the coup, and on the next days, people got out into the streets in support of Mossadegh one more time. Being frightened of the rising power of the Tudih and because of the chaos all over the city, Mossadegh asked people to stay at their homes. This mistake paved the road for the final coup. For the details of these coups and the intervening events see footnote 5.
72 Paidar, Women and the Political Process, 134.
the National Front had difficulties incorporating women in its political organizations. Unlike the Tudih Party, the National Front did not establish an independent women’s organization. The presence of religious forces in the party was a great obstacle in this regard. Kashani and his religious allies blocked every movement that could provide women with more social freedom. They went as far as organizing demonstrations against women’s struggles for obtaining the right to vote.73 Once again similar to women’s participation in the Tudih Party’s political gatherings, the numbers of women in the protests for the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement were much smaller than men’s. As figure 6.3 shows, the demonstrations and political gatherings were dominantly masculine. However, even the limited presence of women in the political scene implies the gender diversification of the public sphere. It shows that Iranian women had continued their struggle to claim their position in the public sphere and public space since the Constitutional Revolution. At this time, patriarchal society had formally accepted women’s presence in the political scene. Although in a preliminary stage and very restricted, women’s official participation in the public sphere was crucial to the Iranian women’s movement in the years to come.

Two More Mobilizing Forces of the Era

The National Front and Tudih Parties were the most active socio-political forces which could mobilize thousands of people during the twelve-year period. However, they were by no means the only forces. Qavam al-Saltanih was an experienced politician who had served various governments since the reign of the last Qajar Monarch, Ahmad Shah (1909-1925). During the twelve-year period, he became premier for two terms, a shorter term from August 1942 to

73 Paidar, Women and the Political Process, 133-4.
February 1943 and a longer term from January 1946 to December 1947. Moreover, he was the first choice for the premiership after Mossadegh’s resignation in July 1952. During his second term, Qavam negotiated the Red Army’s evacuation from the country and suppressed the separatist movements in the Northwest of Iran. These achievements brought him and his party, the Democrat Party, short term popularity.74

During its relatively short existence, Qavam’s Democrat Party held various public meetings in the squares of Tehran. Public political meetings were the most effective way to demonstrate the strength of a Party. Similar to the Tudih and the National Front, by filling a gigantic square with thousands of people, the party was able to boast its popular support and use it as a tool for further political achievements. The Democrat Party’s short-term affiliation with the Tudih provided it with the essential social force for these political demonstrations. The first of these gatherings occurred on the last day of the fourteenth parliament when Qavam had to report his achievements during the negotiations with the Soviet Union in the Parliament. On March 12, 1946, Qavam’s supporters and the members of the Tudih Party filled Baharistan Square to support the Prime Minister. However, the Democrat Party’s favorite spot for its public meetings was the gigantic Tupkhanih Square. The party held four public meetings in the Square on August 5,75 September 6,76 and October 26,77 1946, and July 4, 1947.78

74 For Qavam’s premierships during the twelve year period and his Democrat Party see: Azimi, Iran, 63-79 & 147-82; Jami, Guzashih Chiragh-i Rah-i Ayandih Ast, 375-511; Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 225-45.
75 This meeting was for the anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution: Miting-i Hizb-i Dimucrat [Democrat Party’s Meeting], Itila at, Murdad 13, 1325 [August 4, 1946].
76 aqili, Rozshumar-i Tarikh-i Iran, 1: 282.
77 This meeting was for the hundredth day of the establishment of the Democrat Part. It was the first meeting after the break of Qavam and the Tudih. Consequently, Qavam attempted to gather a huge crowd in the square. Although a few thousand people gathered, Khamih’i argues that the crowd was much smaller that the Tudih’s gatherings: Khamih’i, Fursat-i Buzurg-i az Dastraftih, 560-1.
78 Held for the second year of the establishment of the Democrat Party, this gathering was one of the most successful public meetings of the party in Tupkhanih Square; Jashn-i Duvumin Sal-i Ta’sis-i Hizb-i Dimucrat-i Iran [The Second Anniversary of the Democrat Party’s Establishment], Itila at, Tir 13, 1326 [July 5, 1947].
Finally, the University of Tehran was an important center of the formations of the protests and political marches. Whether following the popular parties such as the National Front and the Tudih or forming independent student protests, the University’s students and academic staff created several episodes of contention during the twelve-year period. As a matter of fact, the first protest of the era started as a student demonstration on December 9, 1942. In the morning of this day, a big group of the students gathered in Baharistan Square to demonstrate against the deteriorating living condition after the invasion of the Allies. Soon the gathering changed into a riot in which people assaulted and looted the Parliament and even the Prime Minister’s house. The clashes between the military forces and people resulted in several casualties, and only after the intervention of the British forces the city found out its peace once again.79

During the Oil Industry Nationalization Movement, students held several demonstrations in support of the movement. Similar to many other social groups, their main gathering point was Baharistan Square. Sometimes they planned their protests in the square after a long march from the University. The trajectory of these marches passed through the main northern avenues of the city, and the students were able to attract bystanders into their crowd.80

Transformation of the Public Sphere and Political Public Space

The twelve-year period between the invasion of the Allies in August 1941 to the coup of August 1953 was a unique era in Iranian history. Presence and competition between several

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79 Jami, *Guzashtih Chiragh-i Rah-i Ayandih Ast*, 174; Khamih’i, *Fursat-i Buzurg-i az Dastraftih*, 281-8. As a result of the events of the day, the government closed down the newspapers for 43 days. After its reopening, *Itila’at* newspaper covered the whole event during several issues between January 30 and February 27, 1943.
80 Tazahurat dar Miydan-i Baharistan [Demonstration in Baharistan Square], *Itila’at*, Azar 30, 1329 [December 21, 1950]; Tazahurat Danishjuyan-i Danishgah dar Miydan-i Baharistan [Demonstration of the University Students in Baharistan Square], *Itila’at*, Diy 4, 1329 [December 25, 1950]; Tazahurat dar Barabar-i Baharistan [Demonstration in front of Baharistan], *Itila’at*, Diy 10, 1329 [December 31, 1950]; Tazahurat Danishjuyan Danishamuzan-i Tehran [Demonstration of the Students of Tehran], *Itila’at*, Urdibihisht 1, 1330 [April 22, 1951].
poles of power and various political parties and organizations resulted in a vibrant socio-political atmosphere. After twenty years of Reza Shah’s dictatorship, these twelve years provided a chance for the practice of democracy in Iranian society. The multiplicity of political parties and their newspapers, and the diversity of the parliament deputies, in comparison to the hand-picked deputies of the Reza Shah era, were the main manifestations of this semi-democratic period.

Three fundamental social shifts came to fruition in this era. The first shift is the transformation of the public sphere. The old constitutional era model based on coming together of social segments does not match the formation of the public sphere in the twelve-year period. First of all, religious authorities had a minor role in the formation of public opinion in this era. If this group was the main contributor to the formation of public opinion and the public sphere during the Constitutional Revolution, at this time, their impact was limited to the traditional section of society. Political parties with their newspapers, organizations, and public gatherings in public spaces of the city were decisive factors in the formation of the public sphere and public opinion. Second, the segmented nature of the public sphere transformed into a class-based model. While the propertied middle class accompanied by the intelligentsia had to struggle for the alliance of various communities of the city during the Constitutional Revolution, at the twelve-year period, the political parties and organizations had to mobilize social classes for their political objectives. Third, the modern middle class was the key social force in the formation of the public sphere in this era. Unlike the traditional middle class, the modern middle class did not have any communal affiliation. This relatively new class was the core group in most of the political parties of this era. The Tudih, National Front, and Democrat Parties heavily depended on this social class. Through their political activities, the modern middle class was able to mobilize the working class or the traditional section of society. Fourth, although Iranian women
still did not have the right to vote and participate in the political process directly, they managed to become an official section of the public sphere. If in the constitutional era they had to fight independently to open up and diversify the public sphere, at this time, the political parties accepted women as an essential part of this sphere. They received the membership of some political parties such as the Tudih and participated in demonstrations, even though in limited numbers.

The second fundamental social shift was the transformation of political public spaces of Tehran. More than any other time in the modern history of Iran, Iranian cities witnessed episodes of protests, political meetings, and marches. In Tehran, as table 6.1 shows, at least, eighty-eight episodes occurred during this era. The diversity of the mobilizing social forces contributed to the abundance of public political gatherings in the city. Major political parties—the Tudih, the National Front, and to some extend the Democrat Parties—were effective forces in the mobilizations of masses. Moreover, smaller political organizations, radical groups, workers’ and students’ unions, religious groups, and the guilds repeatedly brought people out to the streets and square to follow various political objectives.

As the table clearly demonstrates, since the constitutional era, a fundamental shift had occurred in political public spaces of Tehran. Only nine episodes of political gatherings, out of eighty-eight, took place in sacred spaces of the city. While during the constitutional era up to the earlier years of the Reza Shah rule, people held almost all of their protests and political gatherings in the three major mosques of Tehran and a holy shrine outside the city, in the twelve-year period, the major squares and streets of the city replaced sacred spaces as the main political public spaces of Tehran, figure 6.4. The only non-religious space of the constitutional era, the
Parliament, was not utilized as a stage of protest anymore. Instead, the Parliament Square, Baharistan, was one of the most popular public spaces for political activities in this era.

The public sphere and political public spaces transformed alongside each other. Similar to the former, the latter lost its religious characteristic. There is a move from religiosity to relative secularization in both of them. The new classes were not affiliated with the communal spheres; they were secular or less religious; they lived and worked beyond the boundaries of the old city. In short, they did not belong to the social groups that had caused the Constitutional Revolution in
the early twentieth century. As a result, the sacred places of the city did not have the same bonding effect they had for the traditional middle class. The traditional middle class had to protest in the mosques and the shrine because those were the only large-scale spaces in the old city that belonged to all various communities of Tehran. Moreover, in the early twentieth century, the northern streets and square of the city were devoid of any social life related to the traditional middle class. Those were alien spaces, both physically and socially. They belonged to the court and were titled as Khīyābān-hā-yi Duwlatī or governmental streets. They were not people’s spaces.

In the new social atmosphere, however, the traditional middle class was not the sole mobilizing force for protests and political gatherings. They had lost their monopoly to the modern middle class and, to some extent, the urban working class. The new classes did not reside in old Tehran. As a result, they carved new public spaces in the city. As I demonstrated in Chapter Five, the modern middle class had spent twenty years portraying the old city as filthy, obsolete, unhealthy, religious, ignorant, and unhappy. How could they refer to such a badland and utilize its sacred spaces as political public spaces in the so-called modern era? They needed spaces that belonged to the modern, traditional, and working classes simultaneously. They found these spaces in Tehran’s new network of streets and squares. The streets and squares of the northern city were spacious enough to support huge crowds up to one hundred thousand people; people were well-acquainted with these spaces through their daily life; and these spaces belonged to various social groups.

In addition, the presence of different political organizations, such as the Parliament, party clubs, and newspaper offices, had a great impact on the formation of the protests in the streets and squares. The Tudih Party used its club at the beginning of the Firduwsi Street as a rallying
point. The presence of the Parliament by Baharistan Square was like a magnet to absorb thousands of people to the square. Various political groups, particularly the Tudih, designed the trajectory of their marches in a way to pass by the clubs and newspaper offices of their rivals. The possible clashes with their opponents at these places could provide excellent opportunities for the demonstrators to loot these places.

In the twelve-year period, the winners of the political scene were decided through their capability in occupying and filling the streets and squares. The Tudih and National Front accomplished many political goals because they were able to mobilize the masses. By dominating public spaces, these groups could determine the result of the political struggles. The Oil Industry Nationalization Movement succeeded because the National Front and Mossadegh managed to bring the masses to the streets and squares whenever they faced an obstacle.

The third fundamental shift was the transformation of the repertoires of contention and their length of time. In the previous era, taking bast was the main form of protest. The protestors used to occupy a mosque or a shrine and remain there until the state had to surrender to their requests or evacuate them forcefully, which could result in the state’s disgrace. By choosing the main sacred places in the city, as the main destinations of pilgrimage and the daily prayers of the citizens, the protesting groups could guarantee themselves an increasing number of audiences. For example, the protestors’ bast in Shah ‘Abd al-‘Azim Shrine, during the Constitutional Revolution, lasted for one month and the news of their bast spread throughout the country. However, the occupations of the streets and squares were daily activities. All the episodes of contention during this era, even those that continued for days, started in the morning and ended before or a few hours after sunset; the protests were daytime activities. People left the streets and squares for the night and could return in the next morning to continue their protest. Occupation
of public spaces did not mean to last more than a few hours. Moreover, the repertoires of contention became more diverse. Sometimes people targeted a single square, such as Baharistan or Tupkhanih, for a huge gathering. By filling up the squares, they could demonstrate their numbers and their power to their opponents. Moreover, the squares were great platforms for other activities, such as speeches and various ceremonies. On the other occasions, the protestors or political organizations held long marches in the main streets of the city. By marching throughout the city, they were able to attract bystanders into their crowd and disrupt the daily flow of traffic in the city.

Conclusion

The public sphere in Iranian urban society as the medium between society and the state through which the former can influence, challenge, or control the latter transformed dramatically during the first half of the twentieth century. The similar transformation occurred in political public spaces of Tehran. A commonality is recognizable between the public sphere and political public space. During the twelve-year period, the class structure of urban society was the determinative factors in the formation of the public sphere and the production of political public spaces. Analysis of the modern middle and urban working classes, their origin, formation, and characteristics are crucial to this investigation. The lifestyle of the members of these classes, particularly the modern middle class, their social spaces, and their daily interactions had a significant influence on their political and spatial practices and choices. Without examining these classes, the investigation of the public sphere and political public spaces would be partial.
Political public spaces and the public sphere are deeply interconnected; they form and transform together; they share certain social commonalities. People’s spatial choices are not accidental; they are the products of complex social interactions. Socio-historical analysis of the social context is necessary for the investigation of political public spaces and the public sphere. Any study of political public spaces without investigation of the public sphere is partial. Similarly, an aspatial public sphere is abstract and unfinished. The only way for its full representation is the production of space. Any study of these two, demands detailed socio-historical analysis.

As social products, the public sphere and political public space are not fixed and stable. They are in the constant process of transformation. They change from time to time. As a result, no model of the public sphere and no type of political public space should be taken for granted. Just in the span of forty years, they underwent dramatic transformations in Iranian urban society. Finally, it is not possible to define a universal model for the public sphere and spaces. The only universal aspect is an intellectual agreement; a shared definition for the starting point and the rest should be constructed through detailed investigations.

Table 6.1. The list of protests, public meetings, and marches in Tehran, 1941-1953.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When</th>
<th>Who</th>
<th>Where</th>
<th>Why</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec 9, 1942</td>
<td>Students and Lower Classes</td>
<td>Baharistan Square</td>
<td>Protesting against the living condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 18, 1943</td>
<td>The Tudih Party</td>
<td>Sangilaj Ruins</td>
<td>The first Public meeting</td>
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<td>Jan 9, 1944</td>
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<td>Funeral of one of the leaders</td>
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<td>Feb 4, 1944</td>
<td>The Tudih Party</td>
<td>Arani grave (Imamzadih Abdullah)</td>
<td>Arani's anniversary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar 8, 1944</td>
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<td>Baharistan Square</td>
<td>In support and against him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 27, 1944</td>
<td>The Tudih Party</td>
<td>Tudih Club to Baharistan Square</td>
<td>Against the government and for the north oil concession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Location/Detail</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 3, 1945</td>
<td>The Tudih Party</td>
<td>Arani grave (Imamzadih Abdullah)</td>
<td>Arani anniversary</td>
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<td>?</td>
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<td>Firdouwsi Street (At the Tudih Club)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Tupkhanih Square</td>
<td>Public meeting of the party</td>
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<td>Democrat Party</td>
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<td>Court-sponsored</td>
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May 21, 1948 Kashani’s Invitation-TMC Shah to Sepahsalar Mosques Solidarity with the Muslims in Palestine
Jun 11-17, 1948 Students, TMC, and MMC Baharistan Square Against the Hazhir's government
Jun 23, 1948 Kashani’s Invitation-TMC Shah Mosque Against the Hazhir's government
Feb 3, 1949 Students, The Tudih Party, TMC, and MMC Bazaar, University to Baharistan, and in Baharistan Square Against the South Oil Concession and the Shahi Bank
Feb 4, 1949 The Tudih Party Arani grave (Imamzadih Abdullah) Arani anniversary
May 1, 1949 Workers Railway Square, Amiriyiyih, Pahlavi, Nadiri, Istanbul, Sa’di to Tupkhanih Square May Day
Feb 7, 1950 The National Front Baharistan Square Against the government
May 2, 1950 Students From the University to the Court Protesting against the University's condition
Jun 29, 1950 Supporters and Opponents of Razmara Baharistan Square In support and against him
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Dec 24, 1950 Students From the University to Baharistan Square Oil Industry Nationalization Movement
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<td>Oil Industry Nationalization Movement</td>
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<td>Baharistan Square</td>
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<td>Oil Industry Nationalization Movement</td>
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<td>Jun 27, 1951</td>
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<td>Organization(s)</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>Jul 8, 1951</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 21, 1952</td>
<td>The National Front Party</td>
<td>Fuwziyyih Square and many northern streets and square</td>
<td>Supporting the Mossadegh's Government</td>
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<td>A Tudih Affiliated Group</td>
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<td>The Tudih’s Student Section</td>
<td>Fuwziyyih Square to Tudih Club</td>
<td>International Youth Week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 17-22, 1952</td>
<td>The National Front Party and Other Parties</td>
<td>All over the city, particularly in Baharistan Square</td>
<td>Supporting the Mossadegh's Government—The public reaction to his resignation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 29, 1952</td>
<td>The Tudih and the National Front Parties</td>
<td>Fuwziyyih Square and Ibn-i Babuyyih Cemetery</td>
<td>Forty days after the July 21st Uprising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 28, 1952</td>
<td>Kashani’s Invitation and Muslim Organizations</td>
<td>Arg Mosque</td>
<td>Supporting Iraqis people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 28, 1952</td>
<td>Students</td>
<td>The University of Tehran and ShahReza Street</td>
<td>Supporting Iraqis people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 4, 1953</td>
<td>Students</td>
<td>The University of Tehran</td>
<td>Against changes in the University's regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 19, 1953</td>
<td>The National Front Party</td>
<td>Bazaar, Sabzih Miydan,</td>
<td>Supporting the Mossadegh's Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and Bazārīs and Baharistan Square

Feb 29-30, 1953
The National Front Party and many parts of the city Supporting the Mossadegh's Government and in reaction to the court's staged protest and coup

Apr 16, 1953
The National Front Party, Bazārīs, Students, and Workers Marched from different parts of the city to Baharistan Square Supporting the Mossadegh's Government

Jun 19, 1953
The National Front Party Baharestan Square Supporting the Mossadegh's Government

Jul 21, 1953
The Tudih and National Front Parties Baharistan and Tupkhanih Squares Anniversary of the July 21st Uprising

Aug 16-19, 1953 National front and Various Groups Baharistan Square and many parts the city Between the two coups

Conclusion

I follow three goals in the conclusion chapter of this dissertation. First, I recap the history of the formation and transformation of the public sphere and political public space in Iran; I briefly review the central story and the key definitions. Second, I move from the context to theory. Building on my contextual analysis, I contribute my share to the body of theoretical knowledge on the concepts of the public sphere and political public space and their relationship together. Third, I move from theoretical discussions to methodological implications. I discuss the methodological attributes of my theoretical framework, which can result in new contextual studies in its own turn.

The History of the Formation and Transformation of the Public Sphere and Political Public Space in Iran

In the modern history of Iran, the formation of the public sphere, as the medium between society and the state that enables the former to challenge, control, or have an influence on the latter, originates to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Iranian public sphere initially emerged during the 1892 Tobacco Movement, and later during the 1906 Constitutional Revolution. This public sphere was the outcome of coming together of various communal spheres trough the binding force of religion and political activities of the propertied middle class. Iranian urban society was a segmented society consisted of various smaller communities. The communal sphere was based on religious, sectarian, linguistic, ethnic, professional, and
other similar affiliations between the members of each community. It provided social
identification and support for its members. The communal sphere was not based on economic
values; each community consisted of wealthy and impoverished people at the same time.
However, the constant rivalry and social conflicts between communities prevented them forming
a coherent social body to challenge the state. By the end of the nineteenth century, as the result
of the formation and consolidation of a new urban bourgeoisie, the propertied middle class,
communal spheres coalesced to form the broader public sphere. The propertied middle class was
able to transcend communal boundaries to interconnect various communities together. The
members of this class, while maintaining the communal ties with their own communities, were
able to work collectively and mobilize their resources, including their communities, against the
Qajar court. This mobilization resulted in the Constitutional Revolution and the establishment of
the first parliament in the modern history of Iran.

In this process, a second social factor, religiosity, was as significant as the mobilization of
the propertied middle class. In the nineteenth century, through their sermons in mosques and
sacred spaces, religious authorities were the primary producers of public opinion. Shiʿi Islam
was the social commonality among a majority of the communities in Iranian cities. The close ties
between religious authorities and the propertied middle class resulted in the formation of a
shared basis for the mobilization of communal spheres and the formation of the public sphere.
The unity between high-ranking clerics, advocated by the propertied middle class, created a
unified front for the leadership of communities and led to the coalition between various social
segments. Consequently, the public sphere was the outcome of coming together of various
communal spheres through the binding force of religion and the leadership of clerics.
This sphere was highly gendered; men were the main players in the public sphere and prohibited women’s participation. Women belonged to the private realm of the conjugal families. Finally, in the Constitutional Revolution, a tiny social group, the intelligentsia, who were familiar with European societies helped to theorize the political foundations of the revolution and its final achievements, such as the parliament and constitutional laws.

During the revolution, political public spaces were the products of the same religious discourse that contributed to the formation of the public sphere. In Tehran, as the center of the revolution, the major sacred spaces of the city, two mosques and a holy shrine, were the main protests sites of the revolution. These spaces were the only sites that were not colored with a distinct communal identity; they belonged to the majority of the Shiʿi Muslim population. As a result, these sacred spaces turned into primary political public spaces during and after the revolution. They supported various episodes of contention and helped to unite segmented society into a coherent body. Similar to the public sphere, public space was highly masculine. The patriarchal society prevented women from entering public spaces and having an active role during the revolution. The public sphere and political public space worked alongside each other; they were deeply interrelated; and they shared certain social commonalities.

The Constitutional Revolution, as the apex of the power of communal spheres, religious authorities, the propertied middle class, and the patriarchal discourse, commenced the process that sooner or later brought the decline of its directors. After the revolution, the proliferation of free newspapers undermined the role of the clerics as the sole producers of public opinion. Newspapers overshadowed the clerics’ oral tradition in molding public opinion through their sermons in the mosques. Newspapers were like invisible threads connecting various communities of the city together and forming a shared understanding of political matters among them. Also,
the revolution brought up a unique social phenomenon in Iranian cities: small-scale political organizations called *anjums*. As the manifestations of segmented society, *anjums* were highly colored by communal identity. However, their political collaboration against the Qajar court resulted in the consolidation of the public sphere. They were the outcomes of the segmented public sphere and demonstrated that the public sphere did not necessarily demand the bracketing of differences for its formation; the members of the *anjums* could maintain their social characteristics and collaborate, at the same time, to form the public sphere. *Anjums* brought the further demise of the religious discourse as the sole binding forces between various communities; they proved that the communal spheres could collaborate and form the broader public sphere without depending on religion.

The Constitutional Revolution provided women with the opportunity to enter the public sphere and public spaces and claim their position. The political openness after the revolution resulted in the first collective political activities of women. Women established girls’ schools, women’s newspapers and *anjums*, and some other all-women institutes. They opened their way forcefully in the public sphere and public spaces and participated in limited numbers of protests.

However, the greatest transformation after the revolution was the formation of two new urban classes. The establishment of the parliament, the top-down modernization and industrialization of the country, the rapid urbanization, and the development of the national education system and the state’s bureaucracy, particularly during the 1920s and 1930s, accompanied by the formation of the modern middle and urban working classes. The members of these classes did not have communal affiliations, and their social well-being did not depend on their communal ties. During the two decades of the First Pahlavi rule, the 1920s and 1930s, the
modern middle class backed by the state resulted in dramatic socio-spatial changes in Tehran. This class redefined itself as the progressive, enlightened, Western-oriented, and modern section of society and portrayed urban communities in the old section of Tehran as obsolete, ignorant, religious, and traditional. The modern middle class dichotomized society and city into two opposite poles and consolidated the powerful social discourse that was incubated in Iranian urban society for more than a century. This discourse positioned the modern middle class on the powerful side of the social spectrum. In Tehran, this class claimed the northern half of the city, produced new European-style social spaces, and created its social life. At the same time, the state, backed by the modern middle class, undertook massive socio-spatial reforms that resulted in the further decline of the communal sphere and traditional strata of society and the destruction of communal spaces and the neighborhoods of old Tehran. By the early 1940s and the end of the First Pahlavi era, Tehran and its urban society were unrecognizable from what they had been forty years earlier at the time of the Constitutional Revolution.

The social movements of the 1940s and the early 1950s should be investigated in this new social context. Alongside the changes of urban society and the city, the public sphere and political public spaces underwent fundamental transformations. In this era, the public sphere was based on the political activities of the modern middle class and, to some extent, the urban working class. From a segmented model, it transformed into a class-based model. The modern middle class constituted the main body of the political parties and organizations. This class was the primary social force capable of mobilizing other groups, such as the working class and traditional strata of society. Religion lost its dominance as the main force for the political mobilization and became restricted to the traditional sections of society. The proliferation of newspapers and other forms of media, the activities of various political parties and organizations,
and their numerous political gatherings in the city became the main producers of public opinion.

Women officially entered the public sphere. Although in smaller numbers than men, the political parties accepted women as their members; women established their political and social organizations; they fought for the gender equality; and they entered the political scene actively. If during the constitutional era, women had to open up the masculine public sphere for themselves forcefully, at this time, their position as an essential component of the public sphere was accepted at least by a section of urban society.

Alongside the transformations of the public sphere, political public space went through the same changes. Instead of the sacred spaces of old Tehran, the network of streets and squares of the northern city became the main platforms of protests. Public space lost its religiosity; it transformed from a segmented whole into a class-based entity and underwent gender diversification. Moreover, the repertoires of contention diversified and transformed with the changes of public spaces. While the main repertoire of contention in the Constitutional Revolution was taking bast in sacred spaces, in this era, daily gatherings and temporary occupations of the squares and streets of Tehran, holding ceremonies in these spaces, and long marches in the streets of the city became the prevalent repertoires of contention.

Theoretical Contributions

Until now, I have mostly focused on Iran, particularly Tehran, in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. What are the broader theoretical implications of this research? In another word, how can I bridge the gap between the historical and social descriptions and analysis and the more abstract and conceptual realm of theories? I firmly
believe that any contribution to theoretical knowledge should rise from a detailed empirical analysis.

First, there is no fixed model of the public sphere and political public space for a specific society. Any definition of these two is prone to change. Not only spaces are in the constant process of becoming, but also the public sphere transforms alongside public spaces. As a result, any analysis of the public sphere and public space in a certain society at a given moment should be reassessed for the same analysis at a different time. Similarly, there is no universal model of the public sphere and public space. The generalization of certain models to encompass other societies in different historical eras can result in the production of an inaccurate analysis. In another word, instead of beginning with fixed models and imposing them on various socio-historical contexts, the research should be conducted the other way around, starting from a context and generating the model.

This argument can result in the empirical diversification of the studies of the public sphere and public space. It questions the validity of certain dominant models of the public sphere for other socio-historical contexts. There is no ground for the validity of the bourgeois public sphere and its particular mechanisms in nineteenth-century Iran. The abstract, universal norms of this sphere do not match the dynamics of the public sphere during and after the 1906 Constitutional Revolutions. The *anjuman* of Tehran, as the manifestations of segmented society, were the proofs that the public sphere could form without the practice of bracketing of differences. Similarly, it is not possible to use fixed spatial models without questioning their validity. There is no need to look for the streets and squares of cities as the authentic places of protests. Streets and squares are just two types of social spaces amid a diverse spectrum of spaces in various societies. Also, there is no reason that today’s political public spaces of a city carry the same
political function for tomorrow’s social movements. Similar to the public sphere, political public spaces change through the time.

An important question lingers in the air at this point. Regarding the lack of universal models and fixity of the public sphere and public space, is it possible to compare and connect various studies of these concepts? Should there be a kind of commonality among different studies of the topic? The answers to these questions are my second and third arguments. I argue that by boiling down the concept of the public sphere, it is possible to generate a core normative definition that provides a point of departure for various studies of the subject. In the introduction chapter, I extracted this core definition from a critical reading of Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere in dialogue with different critiques of his study. I defined the public sphere as the medium between society or a section of society and the state or any form of hegemonic power that enables the former to influence, challenge, or control the latter. This point of departure allowed me to theorize the relationship between segmented and class-based urban societies and various forms of the state in Iran during the nineteenth and the first half of twentieth centuries.

Moreover, I provided a core definition for political public space that can be utilized regardless of its contextuality. I argue that genuine public space is the spatial manifestation of the public sphere. The public sphere demands spatiality for its full representation, and political public space is the possibility of its spatial manifestation. This view generates a political necessity for public spaces. Public space is the arena of struggle for power and democracy. Without this political aspect, public space will be reduced to a passive platform for social life; it will be a docile space for recreation and amusement. However, there is always hope in public space. As I mentioned above, public space is not fixed; it is in the constant process of becoming;
it is always prone to change. As a result, today’s docile spaces can be active political platforms of tomorrow’s social movements.

Finally, my research suggests that the public sphere and political public space are deeply interconnected. They form and transform together, and any analysis of each demands the investigation of the other. The public sphere and public space are social products. They are the outcomes of the numerous social and political interactions of various social forces. This interconnectedness can be investigated through certain social commonalities. As the products of their broader social context, the public sphere and political public space share common characteristics. The investigation of these characteristics through historical descriptions and social analysis is the key to the examinations of the public sphere and political public spaces.

**Methodological Implications**

Finally, the theoretical framework of this dissertation implies certain methodological contributions. These contributions close the circle and provide a blueprint for more contextual studies. A loop forms between the context, theory, and methodology, which has substantial importance for the studies that focus on socio-historical contexts beyond the conventional geographies of the theories of the public sphere and public space. The dominant body of theoretical knowledge on the subject is based on the studies of Western European countries and North America. How can this theoretical knowledge engage with a contextual analysis in a country beyond their particular geographies?

In this dissertation, I went through two processes of deconstruction and reconstruction. I deconstructed the main theoretical concepts of the public sphere and political public space. This
process enabled me to produce two core definitions that can be utilized in various contexts. The core definitions of the public sphere and political public space do not have contextual attributes. As a result, they enabled me to create a shared platform, a point of departure, to enter into a dialogue with the conventional theories of the public sphere and public space.

In the second step, I went through a detailed process of the reconstruction of these abstract core definitions. This process was conducted through historical descriptions and social analysis of the context of this research. Urban social history provided the materiality for my abstract core definitions. It grounded these definitions in time and space and helped me to engage in a dialogue with the initial theories of the public sphere and public space that created the point of departure for this research.

Finally, the interconnectedness between the public sphere and political public space has a methodological implication. Any study that investigates these two should examine both sides of the story together. My research suggests that the search for social commonalities can be helpful in this endeavor. I undertook a detailed investigation of socio-historical context for this purpose. This investigation enabled me to pinpoint the commonalities between the public sphere and political public space and theorize their relationship in Iran during the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries. Similarly, the search for the social underpinnings of the public sphere and public space based on the detailed investigation of their socio-historical context can be the starting point for various studies of the topic.
Appendix 1

Conducting Dissertation Research in the Digital Era

Writing a dissertation in social sciences and humanities can result in using hundreds of paper sheets. From data collection to analysis and from writing to editing the manuscript, paper is usually an inseparable part of this process. Nevertheless, in the process of conducting this research the paper usage was almost nil. In this appendix, I would like to share the various methods that I utilized to eliminate paper usage at different stages of my research. Not only did these techniques helped me to manage a huge amount of data, but also they increased the pace and efficiency of my research process. I divide this appendix into three sections: (1) managing the primary sources, (2) dealing with the secondary sources, and (3) the precautions. The second appendix provides the description of data analysis, which is also based entirely on digital devices.

Managing the Primary Sources

This dissertation is heavily based on the data collected from daily and weekly newspapers, magazines, and some archival materials. I used a hand scanner, figure A1.1, for scanning the articles and pieces of news in the periodicals. The hand scanner gave me a great amount of flexibility to pick out the exact amount of data and the articles that I needed. To keep track of the collected data, I used a three-column table in Microsoft Word. In the first column, I recorded the
number of the scanned file in the scanner; in the second column, I wrote the content of the scanned material using short sentences or some keywords. Finally, the third column recorded the date or the issue number of the periodicals, figure A1.2.

Figure A1.1. Hand scanner utilized for data collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scan #</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3643</td>
<td>Execution in Pay Ghasghai in Tehran</td>
<td>3-Jamadi al-aval 1267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3644-5</td>
<td>Ad: Selling some farangi stuff in Tehran</td>
<td>10-Jh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3646</td>
<td>New Year ceremony in the roya palace</td>
<td>24-Jh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3647</td>
<td>13 beh-dar</td>
<td>1-Jamadi al-sani 1267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3648</td>
<td>Tekiyeh Haji Reza Ghulikhan and destruction of a school</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3649-50</td>
<td>Destruction of a house in Udayan</td>
<td>8-Jh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3651</td>
<td>Punishment of criminals in Pay Ghasghai</td>
<td>23-Jh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3652-4</td>
<td>Cleaning the streets+ Water problems+ Theft in and out of Tehran+ Ae selling a house</td>
<td>7-Rajab 1267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3655-6</td>
<td>Water for Tehran from Darband- Repairing the city wall- Repairing some qanat- Theft and punishment</td>
<td>21-Jh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3657-8</td>
<td>Building wall around the ice reservoirs and the problem of public space</td>
<td>27-Jh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3659-6</td>
<td>Imamzadeh is a public space in Jamadar+ punishment of criminals</td>
<td>12-Shaban 1267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3661-2</td>
<td>Imamzadeh is a public space in Jamadar+ Tehran Water+ Weddings in Tehran+ Nightlife in Ramadan</td>
<td>3-Ramadan 1267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3663-4</td>
<td>Nightlife in &quot;ehran-Hot weather and leaving the town for Shemiran</td>
<td>17-Jh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3665-7</td>
<td>Fit ceremonies (private space)- Abya Ceremonies (public space)+ night life+ theft</td>
<td>2-Skavak 1267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3668</td>
<td>Repairing and building the Qajar palaces</td>
<td>16-Jh 1267</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure A1.2. A Screenshot of the table I used for the arrangement of the scanned data.
The arrangement of data in the Word files allowed me to search the collected data later. For example, for finding the scan number of the materials about Takīyyih Duwlat in the Qajar periodicals, all I needed to do was to search the term Takīyyih Duwlat in the Word file that recorded the Qajar periodicals. This search highlighted all the cells that contain the keyword of Takīyyih Duwlat. Moreover, the short explanations in the second column provided extra information about the scanned image, reminding me of the content of that certain piece of news. I used the same technique for the archival materials; however, this time, instead of the hand scanner I used a digital camera, because the archives’ regulations did not permit the usage of a hand scanner.

**Dealing with the Secondary Sources**

I developed a second system of digitalization for the secondary sources and some of the historic books that were available online for downloading. Using the hand scanner, I scanned the paragraphs and sections I needed from secondary sources and combined the scanned images in PDF files. Although this process may seem time consuming, the digitized notes gave me a lot of flexibility and increased the pace of analysis later. As a result, at the end of my research process, the time that I had saved during the analysis stage, compensated for the time I had spent on scanning. Finally, the digital notes helped me to permanently have the material I used. I borrowed many books from the interlibrary loan, which means I had to return them after two or three weeks. Sometimes, I needed to come back to my scanned sections of the books months after my initial reading. The digitization of notes helped me to skip the constant process of renewal or reordering of the books.
The Adobe Acrobat Reader has a *Take a Snapshot* tool, which allows taking the image of any rectangular frame from the digital notes. Reading the notes, I had a Microsoft Word file open to paste my snapshots in it. For example, if I was reading my digital notes from Habermas’s *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, I had a Microsoft Word file saved with the same title. Inside the file, I just needed to write down the page number and paste the snapshots of the desired sentences or paragraphs.

After pasting the snapshots, I used the *Insert Comment* tool to write reviews of and observations about the pasted notes. Moreover, I created a system of color coding to highlight my own comments based on their relevance and importance, figure A1.3. Many times, the same review could be highlighted with various colors. At the time of rereading the notes, the color codes were very useful as they could reveal a lot of information in a fraction of a second.

![Color codes used for the initial highlighting the notes.](image)

Finally, there are a lot of digitized books available on the Internet; the Google Books Library Project has provided thousands of digitized books for free. Those books that are out of copyright and are considered in the public domain are free to read and download. This project has provided a valuable resource for historians and other researchers to download old books. In my research, I was able to download all the European travelogues to Iran. The great advantage of these books was that their texts were searchable, meaning that besides scanning the books, the Google Books Library Project had made the words recognizable. Moreover, it was possible to copy and paste the text in Google Translator for the translation of non-English European texts into English. However, it is not wise to totally depend on Google Translator because of its
imperfections. For downloading the books, just a simple search of the book title in Google was sufficient. Another website that provided the same service was Internet Archive, accessible at this address: https://archive.org/index.php.

The Precautions

Although the digitalized materials increase flexibility and speed of the research, it has its own risks and shortcomings. In this section, I introduce them and my solutions.

Organizing Data on the Computer

Digitizing all of the materials incorporated in a Ph.D. dissertation and saving them on the computer creates thousands of files and folders. At the moment of writing this appendix, two months before my defense, there are 30,918 files and 1,209 folders in my dissertation folder. If you do not create a meticulous and simple system of saving and arranging, soon you will be lost amid the mess you have created. Here, I explain my system of organizing the materials. I suggest you create the system that works the best for you. In order to follow my words more easily, please see the figure A1.4 at the end of this section.

Clicking on my Dissertation folder, three new subfolders can be found: (1) Primary Sources, (2) Secondary Sources, and (3) Types. The names clearly suggest their contents. In the first folder, Primary Sources, I saved all the primary material that I gathered. The Primary Sources folder contains many different subfolders based on the type of the primary materials: (1) Governmental Documents, (2) Maps, (3) Memoirs, (4) Reports, (5) Newspapers and Magazines,
(6) Novels, (7) Pictures, and (8) Travelogues. Each of these subfolders can be divided into many new subfolders, and those subfolders can have their own subfolders. I do not go into the details of each, but just to provide an overview for the readers, I open up the Travelogues folder. This folder has three subfolders: (1) Iranians’ Travelogues, (2) Westerners’ Travelogues, and (3) Women Travelogues. The Westerners’ travelogues folder, is divided into two more subfolders: (1) Before the Expansion of Tehran and (2) After the Expansion of Tehran. Inside each, I have saved the PDF files arranged based on the Family name of the author and the title of the travelogue, for example, Edward Eastwick, Journal of a Diplomat’s Three Years Residence in Persia Vol2. Beside each PDF, a Microsoft Word file can be found with the same title, which contains my notes from the travelogue.

Going back to the main Dissertation folder, now, I introduce the Secondary Sources folder. This folder consists of three subfolders: (1) Context, (2) Method, and (3) Theory. The Theory Folder contains all the theoretical readings, which is further divided into many subfolders. This folder is one of the oldest folders and goes back all the way to my preliminary exam. The Method folder contains the readings on methodology and was initially developed when I wrote my dissertation proposal. The most important folder is the Context folder, which contains all the secondary sources directly related to the socio-historical context of my dissertation. Similar to the Method folder, the Context folder was initially created when I wrote my proposal. At that time, not being aware of the future chapters of my dissertation, I created four main subfolders inside the Context folder: (1) History, (2) Literature, (3) Society, and (4) Space and City. Each had their own numerous subfolders, which I do not get into their details; however, explaining the organization of the PDF files in the subfolders might be helpful to the readers. These files, similarly to the travelogues, are arranged based on the family name of the authors or editors and
the title of the book, paper, or dissertation. Nevertheless, I use three prefixes at the beginning of each title: B, D, and P, standing for Book, Dissertation, and Paper respectively. For example, a PDF file with the title of *B- Rahimi, Theater State and the Formation of Early Modern Public Sphere in Iran* means it is my digital notes of a book, by an author named Rahimi, with the title of *Theater State and the Formation of Early Modern Public Sphere in Iran*. This method of sorting allowed me to categorize and organize all the notes from the books, dissertations, and papers with their similar formats. In addition, it provides a system in which one can have a quick estimate of the amount of the materials that she/he needs to read by looking at the prefixes. Finally, inside each folder that contains the PDF files and the Microsoft Word files of my notes, there are two more folders: (1) Already read and (2) read. Each time that I finished reading a text, I dragged and dropped the PDF file in the *Already Read* folder to separate it from the remaining unread materials. Moreover, the *Read* folder held the readings that I had to read in the future. For example, if I had written and finished the *takīyyih* section of my dissertation in the summer of 2015 and later in the fall I came across a new paper on the topic, I put it in the *Read* folder, so that I could come back to it when I was revising my writings in later stages.

Besides the main four subfolders (History, Literature, Society, and City and Space) of the Context folder, this folder has five more subfolders representing each chapter of my dissertation. These five subfolders contain the readings related to the chapters, and each has its own subfolders. It is possible that a single reading, based on its content and relevance to different sections, appears in various subfolders.

Once again, let us go back to the main Dissertation folder; now, I will explain the last main folder, *Type*. This folder has five subfolders related to each chapter of the dissertation, an introduction subfolder, a conclusion subfolder, and two appendixes subfolders, each representing
their own section in the dissertation. Inside the chapters’ folders, I have the Analysis, Comments, Figures, and Type subfolders, which contain the result of data analysis, the comments from the dissertation committee members, the figures or tables I used in that chapter, and the text of the chapters respectively.

Figure A1.4. The organization of my dissertation folder on my computer.
Saving, Size, and Backups

If one decides to go for a paper-less dissertation, one needs a lot of space on one’s computer. At the time of writing this appendix, two months before my defense, the size of the dissertation folder on my computer is 112 Gigabytes, which is about one-fourth of the total space of my computer. It is equivalent to dozens of boxes of paper sheets and notebooks and hundreds of books and papers. Although the data occupies so much digital space, it is easier to carry your dissertation everywhere you want in comparison to the old-school system of research and writing.

Nevertheless, there is a downside to this system that can cost two or three years of your life; severe damage to your computer can result in the loss of the entire dissertation. If you lose your laptop, or someone steals it, you are in serious trouble. As a result, you need to build the habit of taking regular backups from your work; an external hard drive is a useful device in this case. I copied the whole dissertation folder on my external hard drive once a month, or even every three weeks, depending on the amount of change. In the worst case scenario, I could have lost three weeks of reading and note taking, which was reasonable to recover. Moreover, whenever I was typing a chapter, I uploaded the file on my Dropbox space by the end of the day so that, I would not lose even a day of final writing. It is critical not to carry the laptop and the external hard drive outside the house together; one does not want to lose both of them at the same time. So, keep the hard drive at home, hidden, and secured.
Methods of Analysis

The primary method utilized in this project for the analysis of textual documents was Foucauldian discourse analysis.¹ The main concern of some chapters, particularly Chapters One, Two, Three and Five, was to investigate how particular spatial knowledge became common sense, and how these taken-for-granted concepts have dominated the public realm throughout the past two centuries. For example, Chapter Two focuses on how Iranians’ current spatial knowledge about certain spatial elements, such as streets and squares, was initially a historical variable. The spatial formations that nowadays people call streets and squares were absent from the urban landscape of Iranian cities about a hundred and fifty years ago; these variables were the outcomes of the uneven social relations, technology, and power between Iran and Europe as well as between Iranian elites and ordinary people. In addition to Foucauldian discourse analysis, I utilized other methods of investigation for various parts of my research. In some chapters, I researched as a historian and put together smaller pieces of data to create a bigger picture. In some other sections, I utilized coding for the arrangement of data without going through the steps of discourse analysis. However, introducing Foucaultian discourse analysis will provide the general picture for my various methods of analysis. For example, my coding process matches what I present here for the coding process of the discourse analysis.

The notion of discourse in Foucault’s works shows how people accept social and historical statements as true, and how our current spatial knowledge (in the context of this research) is a social construct. Foucaultian discourse analysis, as a method of textual analysis, utilizes text in its broad definition, written and unwritten materials such as photos, in order to provide insight into these socio-historical processes. In my research, I adopted Gordon Waitt’s method of discourse analysis discussed in the third edition of *Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography*. I use the second chapter as an example to demonstrate my method here.

**Doing Foucaultian Discourse Analysis**

After choosing the right source materials or texts and contextualizing the selected materials in their specific socio-historical context (these tasks were initially covered in the process of writing and preparing the proposal), the main step of data analysis was conducting two separate levels of coding. The first level of coding was used for organizing the text, and the second level for analyzing and interpreting the organized text.

I conducted both levels of coding in Microsoft Word software. As it was explained in the first appendix, in the first step, I digitized all the primary and secondary sources required for this project. As I read the digitalized texts, I copied and pasted all the sections I needed in a Word file. For example, in chapter two, I used eight Iranian travelogues to analyze the production of Iranians’ spatial knowledge during their first encounters with European cities. To conduct my note taking and coding, first, I scanned these travelogues and converted them to PDF files. Second, I designated a separate Microsoft Word file to each travelogue. Reading the PDF files, I
copied and pasted the sentences and paragraphs I found useful for my research in the related Word files.

After finishing the data collection stage, reading the travelogues and collecting the required materials, I used the Review toolbar in Microsoft Word to insert the first phase of coding by using the New Comment option. In this process, I used color codes for descriptive coding. The color codes were specific words that were highlighted with various colors. The color codes made it quick and easy to sort out the desired texts for the next phases of analytical coding, interpretation, and writing. Figure A2.1 demonstrates the color codes I used in descriptive coding of the travelogues, and figure A2.2 shows the screenshot of the Word file related to Nasser al-Din Shah’s travelogue after the first round of coding.

Figure A2.1. Color codes for the descriptive coding of the travelogues.

Figure A2.2. The screenshot of the coding of Nasser al-Din Shah’s travelogue in Microsoft Word.
After conducting the first phase of coding, I copied and pasted the texts with the same codes in all the travelogues in individual files. For example, all the texts with the Women code highlighted in blue were gathered in the same file for the second round of coding using analytical codes. New sets of color codes were designed for each new file. In other words, the analytical codes for the analysis of the Women file were different with the codes for the analysis of the Street, Square, and Descriptions of Public Space file. Figure A2.3 shows the analytical codes for the coding of the Women file and figure A2.4 shows the screenshot related to coding of this file with the codes.

![Figure A2.4](image_url)  
**Figure A2.4.** The analytical codes for the coding of the Women file.

Other examples would be figure A2.5 that shows the analytical codes for Street, Square, and Descriptions of Public Space file and figure A2.6 that shows the screenshot related to coding of this file with the codes.
Breaking down the texts with descriptive and analytical color codes and re-assembling the sections with the same color codes made the writing process easier. For example, during the process of writing about the comparison between Iran and Europe in the travelogues, all I needed to do was to copy and paste the texts with the color code of Comparison, highlighted in yellow, in a single file and re-read their codes and contents.
Moreover, this process made the investigation of the silences in the text easier. As Gordon Waitt suggests, investigating the silences of the texts can be as productive as what is present. Sometimes, the dominant discourse ignores certain understandings of the world. Identifying these silences is an integral part of discourse analysis. For example, chapter two demonstrated how the new spatial knowledge was silent on the comparison of Iranian urban spaces with their European counterparts. By combining all the texts with the analytical color code of Comparison, highlighted in yellow, in a single file, I quickly realized the absence of this code regarding the comparison of urban spaces in the two universes.

Although I did not use the available programs for the coding and analysis of the texts, mainly because the resource materials were in Farsi and they were in the JPEG format, the utilized methods increased the pace of my research and gave me flexibility in handling the process. Moreover, as the first appendix discussed, digitalization prevents wasting extra paper.

\footnote{Waitt, “Doing Foucauldian Discourse Analysis,” 235-6.}
Appendix 3

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