Power, Responsibility, and Sexually Violent War Tactics: a Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Rape During Civil War

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POWER, RESPONSIBILITY, AND SEXUALLY VIOLENT WAR TACTICS: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF RAPE DURING CIVIL WAR

by

Jennifer Clemens

A Dissertation Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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Broadly, this dissertation asks *why rape?* In address, this research posits a leadership preference-based strategic theory of rape during war; marking the first large-N, quantitative exploration of leadership preferences on the use of rape in civil war. Using an original dataset, preferences of armed group leaders are evaluated against the level of rape across all civil conflicts between 1980 - 2009. The results highlight three critical findings. First, evidence suggests that rape is distinctive from other human rights violations and is permitted or controlled differently than are more common forms of extra-combat violence (i.e., torture, extra-judicial killings, disappearances). This work argues that the symbolic meaning of rape, given its gendered nature and uniquely devastating outcomes, makes it a particularly attractive tool of war under some conditions. Second, statistical tests reveal that different factors predict state-perpetrated rape than predict rebel-perpetrated rape; with the strongest predictive power across rebel groups in ethnic war. Finally, results illustrate that the predictive power of the models is conditioned by the type of war. That is, provided the characteristics of ethnic war, models perform better in predicting rape in ethnic war than in non-ethnic war.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

GDP - Gross Domestic Product
GIA - Groupe Islamique Arm
GSF - Graduate School Freakout
GSW - Graduate School Work
JVP - Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (Communist and Marxist-Leninist Party)
PTWR - Preference-based Theory of Wartime Rape
LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
UN - United Nations
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Introduction

Explaining Rape during Civil War

“It already is bigger than everything else. It lives in front of me, behind me, next to me, inside me every single day. My schedule is dictated by it, my habits by it, my music by it.”

Daisy Whitney

As Ziba and more than 100 other Muslim women sat with their infant children in a school gymnasium, a dozen armed Serbian militiamen stormed in. The men screamed, ‘Look at how many children you can have. Now you are going to have our children. You are going to have our little Chetniks’ (Fisk 1993). In Rwanda, chilling accounts detail the experiences of teenage girls raped with such violence and frequency that movements as basic as walking cause internal organs to fall from inside the body. While the phenomenon of wartime rape is as old as war itself, our understanding of rape as a wartime practice remains opaque. In fact, the subject of wartime rape seems to have a near-instantaneous half-life. Stories no sooner emerge than are absorbed by larger discussions of human rights, casualties of war, and terror campaigns. As accounts of the Jihadist rape campaign in Iraq and Syria circle the media, we are once again confronted with our inability to offer adequate explanations.

Despite increased attention in the 1990s, there is little consensus about the forces responsible for rape during war. Only recently have scholars moved beyond documenting individual accounts of wartime rape in an effort to understand the factors that explain variation in its systematic use. For instance, Brown (2012) indicates that more than
65% of sexual violence victims in the DRC were children; noting that the DRC holds an exceptional status as the rape capital of the world. Yet research conducted at the Peace Research institute in Oslo found that in a sample of 48 African conflicts involving 236 armed groups (including both state, rebel, and militia), only 29% were reported to have committed acts of sexual violence. In fact, the study points out that 72% of the armed actors in African conflicts had no known record of sexual violence (Nords and Cohen 2012, 2). While sexual violence is under-reported in nearly all contexts, Sann and Wood (2014) highlight that even after rape achieved salience in 2000, more than half of the armed groups were not reported to have committed acts of sexual violence. What causal factors explain the variation in the incidence of rape across civil conflicts?

While scholars struggle to understand causation, we are continually accosted with the devastating consequences of sexual violence during war. In its wake, weaponized rape results in psychological trauma (Fisher 1996), female victim infertility (Heit 2009), physical trauma (Frljak et al. 1997), infanticide and suicide (Heit 2009), and in some cases, the partial destruction of a group resulting in identity crises (Fisher 1996). Historically, rape has been seen as an expected, inevitable part of war. In fact, the act of rape held a privileged status as one of the spoils of war (Baaz and Stern 2009). Yet despite its historical prevalence (Fisher 1996; Zurbriggen 2010; Benard 1994), rape was not documented as a military practice of war until after World War I (Heit 2009). In fact, it has only been since 2008 that the United Nations recognized rape as a tactic of war.

The delayed recognition of tactical rape by the UN is due, in part, to the challenges associated with documenting and quantifying wartime rape. Every society associates some social stigma with rape. Rape survivors endure everything from harassment, to loss of property, to ‘sanctioned’ murder (honour killings). Victim death and the fail to report attacks leaves available data incomplete (Cohen 2013a). This is particularly disarming given that reports of rape are on the rise. In the DRC, 1,100 rapes were being reported each month in 2011 (UN Report 2011). Even the data that are available present their own obstacles. As Cohen (2013a) points out, we are without precise measures of the number of rape victims per war (466). In addition, the language currently used to quantify rape
is, itself, ambiguous. Words like ‘mass’ or ‘widespread’ often have different meanings in
different contexts (Cohen 2013a, 467). This is particularly problematic given that studies
of gender and war typically rely on data gathered from interviews with the women-victims
or in a select few studies, male perpetrators (Baaz and Stern 2009).

No longer is a lack of awareness an excuse for our failure to offer explanations. Now
is the time to understand the conditions under which rape becomes a widespread com-
ponent of military strategy (Heit 2009; Cohen et al. 2013; Cohen 2013a; Bourke 2007;
Wood 2006; Wood 2008). To date, the fields of psychology, sociology, criminology, po-
litical science, and gender studies have posited niche theories with little interdisciplinary
discussion. What might we learn if we aggregate these theories? What new theories
lay undiscovered in this larger conversation? Addressing the lack of interdisciplinary
discussion, my research will contribute to the literature in four primary ways.

First, this analysis seeks to aggregate scholarly knowledge across disciplines in order to
categorize explanations of wartime rape by level of analysis. Using this interdisciplinary
approach, I propose an a preference-based theory to explain variation in wartime rape
across groups. Second, I move beyond a simple dichotomous reference to ethnic war in
order to offer a more nuanced understanding of the way rape in ethnic civil conditions
both leadership preferences and the use of wartime rape. Furthermore, this work seeks to
fill a quantitative gap in the literature. With the preponderance of research in the form
of case studies and qualitative work (Wood 2008; Wood 2006; Zurbriggen 2010; Fisher
1996; Heit 2009), this dissertation endeavors to apply more advanced quantitative tools
to analyze theories of rape during war. Finally, this research will contribute an original
dataset accounting for variance in wartime rape across actors and civil conflicts. Relative
to the dependent variable, rape, this research seeks to address two primary questions:
(1) What factors explain variation in the use of rape during civil war? (2) Do the same
factors that explain rape also explain other human rights violations in civil war? (3)
What, if any, explanatory differences do wartime rape theories hold in ethnic wars when
compared to application in non-ethnic wars?
Chapter 1

Theories of Rape in Civil War

“Awareness requires a rupture with the world we take for granted; then old categories of experience are called into question and revised.”

Shoshana Zuboff

Why do we see rape used pervasively in some civil wars, but not in others? Under what conditions do groups integrate rape as a tactical strategy? What explains inter-group variation in the use of rape across time, cultures, and war types? The literature on wartime rape reflects the ebbs and flows of its salience. There is a renewed call for research after the horrors of war are revealed. As the memory of the war fades, so too does investigative interest in wartime tactics. Years later, another war, another set of horrors, and another call to academic arms. In this undulating tradition we have become complacent. We have let atrophy our ability to deconstruct old mechanisms and use them in new ways. Our periodic revisitation of wartime rape leaves us in a perpetual state of re-beginning; spending twice as much time re-learning past work as we do pushing forward. Worse yet, we accept what has become the norm and cease to challenge those norms. This work is an effort to upset that normative balance. The following propositions seek to reframe the old while incorporating the new.

Broadly, this review of literature highlights three deficiencies in existing explanations of wartime rape. First, systemic and quantitative accounts of the influence of institutions are absent. Second, the role of leadership preferences is implied, but has never been tested. Third, the influence of war-type has been only nominally addressed, rather than thoroughly investigated. This chapter proceeds in five parts. First, I provide a brief
discussion of the definition of wartime rape. Second, I explore existing classifications
of wartime rape, highlighting theories and their relationships to one another. Third, I
introduce an agency-based theory that accounts for elite preferences. Next, I argue for a
reconceptualization of wartime rape; one which is viewed through the lens of ethnic war.
Finally, I discuss the data and variables used in following chapters.

0.1 Defining Wartime Rape

As highlighted by Gottschall (2004), the term wartime rape never indicates isolated ex-
amples of rape by individual fighters. Rather, the term is used interchangeably with mass
wartime rape to indicate distinct patterns of rape by soldiers at rates that are signifi-
cantly increased over rates of rape during peacetime (129). Using the definition of rape
provided by Cohen (2013a, 462) and Wood (2006, 308), I define rape as “the coerced
(under physical force of threat of physical force against the victim or a third person)
penetration of the anus or vagina by the penis or another object, or of the mouth by the
penis.” This serves to distinguish rape from the broader category of sexual violence that
not only includes rape, but also “coerced undressing and non-penetrating sexual assault”
along with other forms of violence (Cohen 2013a, 462; Wood 2006, 308). Following Co-
hen’s (2013a) classifications of rape frequency, ‘mass’ or ‘systematic’ rape refers to those
conflicts in which rape was most prevalent; described as a ‘tool’ or ‘tactic.’ This differs
from the ‘widespread’ category, indicating a lower incidence of rape described as ‘com-
mon’ or ‘frequent.’ Conflicts with still fewer reports of rape are described as ‘isolated,’ or
those in which there were ‘some reports’ of rape (Cohen 2013a, 10). While not entirely
discrete, these classifications offer the best available measures of the incidence of rape
during civil war.
0.2 Explanations of Wartime Rape: An Overview

Today, explanations of rape are sectioned and sub-sectioned into a litany of classifications. While the literature benefits from a diversified set of lenses, so many subsections can produce a kind of tunnel vision. That is, we risk becoming so routinely classified that we cease to evaluate the overlap between categories and literatures; stifling our own forward progress. Across the spectrum, literature on rape is divided according to biological motivation (Amir 1971; Groth 1979; Baaz and Stern 2009; Thornhill and Palmer 2000; Gould and Lewontin 1979; Siefert 1996; Goldstein 2001), purpose of rape (Brown 2012; Mullins 2009; Groth and Hobson 1983; Pratt and Werchick 2004), type of rape (Enloe 2000; Horvath 2013; Isikozlu and Millard 2010), type of rapist (Groth 1979; Amir 1971; Baaz and Stern 2009), discussed by field (Wood 2008, 2009; Gottschall 2004), or aggregated by theme (Cohen 2013a). This entropic progression means extant theories of wartime rape remain fragmented and incomplete. In address, this dissertation moves away from the hyper-classification of the last ten years. Rather, I integrate literature on sexual violence (from psychology, sociology, and political science), ethnic conflict, and state (or otherwise broad scale) repression to distill explanations of rape into three general categories. Borrowing from Gottschall’s (2004) terminology, these categories include: (1) bio-social explanations, (2) explanations based in the pathology of gendered relations, sexuality, and culture, and (3) strategic explanations. To this end, I make three primary arguments.

First, I argue that current explanations fail to account for (sufficient) differences at the group-level, leaving them incomplete and unable to explain variation in rape across time and conflicts. Second, I argue that in order to create a more group-centric theory of wartime rape, we must account for strategic leadership preferences within the armed group. To this end, I posit a preference-based theory of wartime rape to be tested in subsequent chapters. Finally, I argue that theories must be tested separately in ethnic and non-ethnic war. The practice of relegating ethnic war to dummy variable prevents us from understanding the differential predictive capabilities of individual theories. We may agree that ethnic war matters, but does that mean these theories can explain variation
equally across ethnic and non-ethnic war? In what way do the explanatory powers of our theories change based on war context? The section that follows uses current literature to elaborate on these points.

**Biosocial Theory.** Despite offering some of the earliest suppositions, biology-based theories are among the weakest explanations for rape variation between armed groups. Biosocial theories assume that rape during war is, in some sense, natural to human males. That is, biosocial theories agree that the motive for wartime rape is the simple, innate sexual desire of individual fighters, but that the phenomena cannot be distinguished from sociocultural context (Gottschall 2004, 134). For instance, incentive arguments suggest that “wartime sexual violence is higher because of a putative link between the aggression

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1Gottschall (2004) is careful to distinguish it from its predecessor, biological determinism theory. Biological determinism is described as a theory in which sociocultural factors are insignificant in soldiers’ decisions to rape. Rather, the activity falls entirely under genetic control (Gottschall 2004). In this vein resides a well-developed psychology literature emphasizing the role of inner motivations brought on by psychological factors (e.g., personal trauma, mental illness, anger and aggression, etc.), conceptions of masculinity, and the nature of man as causal forces of rape. More specifically, literature on the psychology of rape incorporates theories of perversion, sexual orientation and fetishes, organic causes (such as disease or mental deficiency), psychiatric and psychoanalytic approaches, studies of aggression, socialization and sexual deviation, trauma, and feelings of sexual inferiority and inadequacy (Amir 1971; Baaz and Stern 2009; Groth 1979). For example, in his typology of lone-offender rape, Groth (1979) used clinical information based on over 500 male sex offenders to identify three components, prominent in patterns of rape: anger (40%), power (55%), and sadism (5%). Here, anger rape refers to attacks that are reactive, often preceded by perpetrator distress, and carried out such that the victim is a ‘vehicle’ of violent aggression. Power rape is committed by offenders who do not seek to harm but rather to possess their victim; often inspired by feelings of inadequacy. Finally, sadistic rape represents the fusion of sexuality and extreme aggression (Groth 1979, 12-58). More narrowly, theories in biological determinism offer male aggression as a primary causal factor. One such explanation suggests that rape is a product of an irrepressible male sexual drive, which, if not restrained, will inevitably have its way (Siefert 1992, 1; Hauffe and Porter 2008). In fact, Siefert (1992), and Feldman (1992) suggest that rape is not always a sexually motivated act, but can be an act of aggression. In this way “rape is not an aggressive expression of sexuality, but a sexual expression of aggression” (Siefert 1992, 1), serving to degrade, humiliate, and subjugate the subject (Brown 2012; Mullins 2009; Groth and Hobson 1983; Pratt and Werchick 2004; Baaz and Stern 2009). Since biological determinism explains wartime rape as a product of genetic control, we would expect the level of rape to fluctuate only narrowly. However, data reveal that wartime rape characteristics vary widely within and across conflicts (Cohen 2013a; Leiby 2009; Gottschall 2004; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Bourke 2007). To this end, biological determinism cannot explain why some rape is implemented with degrees of force that far exceed those required to perpetrate rape. Specifically, if the biological drive to rape is motivated by a latent desire to perpetuate the genes of the rapist, then the excessive brutality of wartime rape (including rape with objects and rape that ends in murder), would be counterproductive (Gottschall 2004). Why would a man, driven to propagate his genetic material kill the individual capable of bringing his offspring into being? Given the profound weaknesses of purely biological rape, biosocial theory reigns as a plausible variant.
necessary for combat and male sex drive” (Wood 2006, 323). More broadly, proponents argue that men may possess condition-dependent biological adaptations that are specifically designed to promote rape in appropriate cost-benefit environments (Thornhill and Palmer 2000; Wood 2006, 2008; see Gould and Lewontin 1979 for a related argument on rape as a non-adaptive byproduct of adaptations for consensual sexual activity). For instance, the “pressure cooker theory” (Siefert 1994, 55) suggests that rape is the result of irresistible biological urges and the chaos of war that encourages men to act on their otherwise stifled impulses (Gottschall 2004, 130). With man’s heterosexuality unleashed by suspension of “normal” societal controls during war, the rules of warfare reign (Baaz and Stern 2009; Siefert 1996; Goldstein 2001). Sometimes called the substitution argument (Wood 2009), another iteration suggests that men will develop a genetic predisposition to rape based on an innate motivation to increase chances of propagating their genes through the rape of women (Wood 2006, 2008; Thornhill and Palmer 2000). Yet, if the biological adaptation (or maladaptation) is primal, the expected compulsion to be to reproduce within one’s own ‘species’ or group. Why then, do soldiers predominantly rape women outside their group? More broadly, if a biological reaction triggers sexual instincts at a pramal, reproductive level, then any woman of child-bearing age should have an equal likelihood of becoming a victim. However, empirics tell us that rape victims are most often intentionally selected.

Biosocial theories raise more questions than they answer. If rape is a product of some primal need to propagate the species, why do we see the extreme violence (rape with objects, mutilations, murder, etc.) that so often accompanies wartime rape? Are all persons who take advantage of crumbling state institutions (through looting, rape, and other crime) predisposed to do so? Does the existence of a power vacuum left by a

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2 Wood (2006) also highlights ways in which levels of testosterone are presumed to effect men (both in and out of the wartime context). Nevertheless, the author is quick to point out that these hormone-based explanations struggle to explain individual behavior, including that of female perpetrators, and fail entirely at group-level explanations.

3 To this end, Wood (2009) notes that some arguments for the absence of rape are based on a lack of female cadres. Still, the author acknowledges that some armed groups with significant numbers of female combatants continue to engage in high levels of sexual violence (i.e., Sierra Leone). In other words, the substitution argument would be expected to follow the logic of Enloe (2000) who argues argues that recreational rape occurs when soldiers are not adequately supplied with sexual partners. Empirically, however, rape persists seemingly regardless of access to prostitutes.
weakening government cause a change in neurochemistry that increases the propensity to rape? More directly, if the biology to rape is triggered by war, then why don’t all men rape? If the trigger is war itself, then rape should exist at a relatively constant level across all wars. Furthermore, as men cannot be impregnated, what biological urge can explain why some women become perpetrators of rape while others do not? This question is becoming increasingly relevant as Cohen’s (2013a) survey data are among the first to question victims about the sex of their attackers. Based on the information collected, the author suggests that the participation of female combatants in sexual violence may be more common than currently believed (Cohen 2013a, 386).

In sum, the broad failure of biosocial theories is that they cannot explain larger patterns in wartime rape (see Amir 1971; Trasler 1962). Why do some armed groups use rape pervasively in one conflict, but not in another? Despite consideration of socio-cultural factors on individual motivation, such factors would be expected to interact differently within each person and therefore remain unable to explain variation in the outcome. Additionally, if rape is the product of primal human nature, and that nature is expressed or repressed by culture, then biology can be assumed away in favor of cultural motivators. In short, biology-based arguments suffer the same achilles heel as do other individual-level explanations in that they cannot explain variation in the use of rape between groups.

Pathology of Gendered Relations, Sexuality, and Culture. Literature in wartime rape owes its roots to the feminist scholars and activists who were among the first to systematically investigate, document, and raise consciousness about the problem of mass rape (Gottschall 2004, 130; Jaleel 2013). Although cultural arguments are often presented as if they are distinct from feminist arguments, these two moieties function quite interdependently. Cultural pathology theory analyzes a nation’s history to see what development factors motivate(d) men to ‘descend to the vilest barbarism’ (Gottschall 2004, 131). Theories in this tradition explain rape as a product of some shared cultural understanding that functions to predispose particular societies to rape. In this way, the very notion of culture is, at least in part, defined by understandings of gender, gender roles, and power.
relationships. Similarly, feminist theories also divorce rape from sexual desire. In the feminist vein, rape is frequently explained as a crime motivated by the desire of man (even unconsciously so) to exert dominance over woman (Gottschall 2004, 130; Siefert 1996; Mullins 2009; Bond 2003; Brown 2012; Reid-Cunningham 2008; Russell-Brown 2003; Enloe 2000; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Anwary 2012; Cook 1994; Kim 2012; Kohn 1994; MacKinnon 1994; Melandri 2009; Richey 2009; Schott 2011; Ttreault 1997; Baaz and Stern 2009; Cerretti 2016; Cohen 2014; 2013a). At present, the strongest cultural arguments use feminist logics to discuss the role of patriarchy, women’s rights, and the relative preservation of a woman’s value. For these reasons, feminist and cultural arguments fit harmoniously into an amalgamated class of explanations exploring the evolution of culture as it defines gendered identities, roles, and hierarchies.

Theories based in gendered relations, sexual and culture posit three primary forces motivating wartime rape. Citing both conscious and unconscious expressions of dominance, these forces include rape cultures or rape-prone societies, the value/preservation of women relative to men, and the symbolic meaning of rape, with its wide-reaching impact far beyond the victim. Beginning with rape cultures, I will explore each of these in turn.

Speaking broadly, Tompkins (1995) argues that rape is rooted in inequality, discrimination, and male domination. To this end, Siefert (1992) and Sanday (2003) argue that there are rape-free and rape-prone societies. For Siefert (1992, 1993), rape-free societies are those in which male supremacy is completely unchallenged; providing the example of Islamic societies. Thus, rape in war and peace is expected to prevail only in a limited subset of societies that evidence specific socialization practices. In particular, rape would be expected in societies in which male power has been destabilized, women have subordinate status and are held in low esteem, and in the presence of rigid definitions of “masculine” and “feminine” that define a gendered hierarchy (Siefert 1993, 2). Citing the example of the United States with its strong women’s movement and correspondingly unstable male power, nearly all modern Western societies would be expected to experience more frequent occurrences of rape (Siefert 1993, 1996). Today, however, we see an increase in rape-based tactics within the Islamic world. Most recently, rape has
been institutionalized by radical Islamic militants seeking to establish a caliphate. More importantly, however, the idea of rape-prone societies implies that within each ‘society,’ there are cultures of rape. In this way, we would expect rape used equally by armed groups within the same society. Empirically, however, this is not the case. Suffering from similar weaknesses are arguments based in cultural understandings of a woman’s value.

Simply explained, proponents argue that gender inequality facilitates the acceptance of violence against women (Cohen 2013a). Emphasizing power relationships, female inferiority is furthered by “the persistence of customs, practices, and legislations that discriminate women” (Brown 2012, 30; Alison 2007). Societies in which women are seen as property or those that emphasize a patriarchal social order reinforce the dehumanization of women and contribute to male beliefs about sexual privilege (Brown 2012, 30). Still, others argue that men in deeply patriarchal societies are conditioned to distrust, despise, and dominate women. Thus, “warrior rapists” are those who act out their contempt for women while perpetuating gendered arrangements from which all men benefit (Brownmiller 1975, 32; Siefert 1994; Gottschall 2004, 130; Wood 2006, 326). Here, wartime rape is the result of an (often unconscious) conspiracy of men to dominate and suppress women (Gottschall 2004, 131). In an alternate example, Ohambe et al. (2005) argue that there has been a feminization of poverty that legitimizes gender-based violence. In particular, it is the subordinate view of women that fuels the use of rape as a weapon of war. Still, these broader theories should be able to explain why beliefs about male sexual entitlement are primarily expressed through the rape of women outside the male’s culture/group. For instance, Wood (2009) points out that the LTTE in Sri Lanka’s civil war had remarkably low levels of rape, despite traditional gendered expectations of women. Simultaneously, the LTTE insurgency was well-known for instituting formal units of female combatants. Thus, while Tamil civilian women were expected to wear dresses or skirts, those serving in the armed force wore pants and otherwise masculine military uniforms.

Despite the logic of the hypotheses, there is little very empirical support linking the use of widespread rape to patriarchal societies (Gottschall 2004; Wood 2009). More broadly, Wood (2006) and Gottschall (2004) point out that data do not support feminist
theories. Not only is peacetime rape a cultural universal (Palmer 1989), but large-scale rape is a common outcome of conflicts among bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and state societies (Gottschall 2004, 131). Furthermore, masculinist notions of honor, a deeply engrained patriarchy, and strict adherence to traditional gender roles are present in many conflicts that do not see the widespread use of wartime rape (Wood 2006). The primary problem is that culture- or society-based arguments tend to be measured at the state-level of analysis. As Siefert (1992) and Heit (2009) note, “cultural” factors often become institutionalized by the state and codified into law. Subsequently, these theories cannot explain variation among armed groups; measurements are too insensitive to capture variation at the group-level. Cultural arguments struggle to explain why wartime rape is perpetrated similarly in areas with vastly different socialization experiences, or why rape is used at different rates within conflicts between culturally homogenous groups (Sann and Wood 2014; Gottschall 2004). Thus, to truly understand the use of rape, theories must capture changes and elements within and between armed units.

Unlike the two motivators discussed above, the a third body of theories focusing on gender, gender relations, sexuality, and culture operates at the group-level of analysis. Resolving state-based measurement weaknesses, these arguments discuss motivations for wartime rape that derive from the symbolic meanings of rape. In particular, the emphasis is on the relationship between gender inequality and the conflict in which wartime rape occurs (Siefert 1992, 1993; Hansen 2001; HRW 2004; Koo 2002; Cohen 2013a; MacKinnon 1994; Baron and Straus 1989), focusing heavily on the symbolic and extending meanings of rape. For instance, in her discussion of the militarization of women’s lives, Enloe (2000) notes that women are stereotypically associated with a need for protection, peacefulness and life-giving, while men are associated with protecting, warring, and killing (Enloe 1990, 2000; Goldstein 2001; Higate and Hopton 2005; Pin-Fat and Stern 2005). In particular, these associations render women and girls particularly vulnerable to the logics of rape.

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4 A lesser, but often-cited problem with cultural arguments is that there is little consensus on the definition and measurement of culture. Cultural variables range from skin color (Von Hentig 1940), ethnicity, religion and region, to male dominance, conceptions of masculinity, societal violence, and the role of women (Wing and Merchan 1993; Sanday 2003; Cohen 2013a). This not only poses broad measurement challenges, but frequently prevents direct comparison between studies.
as a weapon of war (Enloe 2000). To this end, Kohn (1994) and Brownmiller (1975) posit rape as an affront to men as women’s protectors, and mass rape as a conspiracy against national honor and manhood. In this way, rape is a crime that allows men to inflict psychological harm on women and their communities as it shames not only the victim but her husband and other male relatives who failed to protect her (Cohen 2013a; Benard 1994; Green 2006; Seifert 1996; Baaz and Stern 2009; Bastick et al. 2007; Hansen 2001; Wood 2006, 2009; Brownmiller 1975; Kohn 1994).

Theories focusing on the symbolic meaning of rape overcome many of the weaknesses plaguing individual-level and state-level theories. In particular, theories of symbolism are not only able of capturing ideological differences between groups, but they are also capable of identifying who may be the victims of rape. While these benefits make it possible to capture variation between forces within and across cultures, they continue to struggle with time. We know that the use of rape varies across time, even within the same armed unit. Why would an armed group use rape pervasively in one year, but not in others? Here, the conclusions are two fold. First, now operating at the appropriate level of analysis, the symbolic use of rape provides a powerful argument for distinction of rape above and beyond other types of human rights violations. To this end, the first hypothesis is proffered. Second, what is missing from these symbolic explanations is the force that determines when to inflict the unique devastation of rape upon an enemy. This latter point provides strong support for the notion that armed group leadership may play a pivotal role in explaining variation in the use of rape by an armed group over time. While capturing elements of leadership is new, the idea of using rape intentionally has a nascent development in theories of strategic rape.

Strategic Rape Theory. The basis for the preference-based theory of wartime rape proffered in this dissertation finds its foundation in theories of strategic rape. In particular, strategic rape theories argue that rape is used as a tactic to accomplish larger, strate-
dic objectives. The idea is that war increases the opportunity for rape through changes (reductions) in social norms, changes in the willingness or ability to punish offenders, and increased contact with potential victims (by forcibly entering homes for looting, or through displacement camps) (Wood 2006). Here, I argue that strategic arguments can be divided into short-term and long-term strategies.

Short term strategic arguments include those focusing on an immediate pay-off. Most commonly, these include non-biological opportunity arguments. For instance, Carlson (2009) argues wartime rape emerges out of male desperation resulting from poverty, ongoing war, and a destroyed economy. In particular, the author contends that soldiers rape to steal goods. While not likely a military-wide strategy, rape in this case is a strategic means to a specific short-term end. However, there are four critical problems with such short-term strategic arguments. First, as Baaz and Stern (2009) note, in this case all men become potential rapists (Paglia 1993; Thornhill and Palmer 2000) and rape becomes a regrettable side effect of war (Siefert 1996, 36). Secondly, the idea that men would rape to acquire food doesn’t answer the central question: Why rape? If the purpose of the act is to acquire some good, then why not steal, or murder, or beat a victim? In fact, in many cases, it seems these methods would be easier means to the end. Thirdly, raping for goods suggests that we should only see rape in impoverished conditions, but this is not the case. These short term strategies cannot explain why rape occurs in areas where soldiers are provided-for. Finally, short-term strategic arguments may explain the actions of an individual soldier under a particular set of circumstances presented with a specific opportunity, but do not behavior behavior of entire armed groups. To the latter point, long-term strategic arguments hold greater promise for explaining variation between armed units.

Long-term strategic rape theories argue that rape is used by the military as a tactic to

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6Short-term strategic arguments would include Tilly’s (2003) salience of short-run damage (13).

7Additionally, as much as broad opportunity arguments imply that every man is a potential rapist, they also suggest that every woman is a potential victim. This erroneously assumes that every man in the war has an equal potential to rape and every woman has the equal potential to be raped. However, as Wood (2006) points out, armed groups do not target all women with rape. Rather, women of certain ethnicities or those possessing other social characteristics tend to be targeted quite intentionally. Thus, not only do opportunity arguments fail to identify perpetrators, they also fail to identify potential victims.
achieve larger, strategic objectives. Used in this way, strategic rape is usually perpetrated by a well-organized armed group under an order to attack civilians in an effort to fulfill goals of the war (Isikozlu and Millard 2010). One subset of strategic rape theory are theories of social cohesion. Social cohesion arguments are predicated on the notion that rape creates bonds in social groups and therefore may provide psychological benefits to the perpetrators by improving group morale (Benard 1994; Card 1996; Sanday 2007; Wood 2006, 2009; Cohen 2013a). Wood (2009) suggests that such explanations are based in small-group dynamics and primary group cohesion. More specifically, the military process of training and socialization is based in the idea that men are broken down and then reborn as group members through such initiation rituals and are more likely to hold fast under fire; not because of patriotism or ideology, but because of their commitments to their ‘primary group’ of fellow combatants (Wood 2009, 138).

For instance, refuting previously research suggesting that social cohesion emerges easily, Cohen (2013a) contends that where armed groups are comprised of fighters who have been abducted or otherwise forcibly recruited by their peers, cohesion is unlikely to form spontaneously. In such groups, rape, and specifically gang rape, serves as a tool for creating social cohesion among unfamiliar combatants. Thus, used as a tool for socialization, groups with low levels of social cohesion are more likely to commit rape. The problem, of course, is that the level of cohesion (being intangible) is very difficult to test. Additionally, the theory implies that rape would only be used at some points in the conflict (arguably when an armed force is building its cadres through abduction), which does not explain the persistently high levels of rape used by some groups. Further, since data on the level of abduction are absent, it is impossible to tell whether a handful of abductions in only one area of the conflict produce the same levels of rape as a more widespread abduction habit. Most profoundly, however, Cohen’s (2013a) theory suffers the same short-coming as other strategic theories of rape in that it cannot explain, why rape? Arguably any form of shared violence could be used to establish camaraderie,

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8 Long-term strategic arguments would include Tilly’s (2003) extent of coordination among actors (13). Additionally, the long-term / short-term delineation of strategy is also complementary to the work of Bates (2008) who argues that as elites abandoned longer-term strategies in favor of shorter-term maximization of personal benefits, there was an increase in predatory behavior.
beatings, murders, etc. Why would social cohesion require or even preference rape?

Nevertheless, by bringing together elements of strategy cultivated and imposed at the group level, Cohen’s (2013a) theory moves us one step closer to understanding wartime rape. In this way, I argue that Cohen (2013a) has captured some of the important variables, but that the logic of the theory is misplaced. Rather than viewing abductions as a causal force in rape, I contend that the use of abduction is a reflection of the ideology of the leader of the armed force. That is, the use of (what would have to be) systemic abductions to create an army is evidence of a more radical leader who is willing to use unconventional, even violent tactics against his own population in order to achieve his goal. A leader willing to use abusive measures against his own group would also be expected to use more violent tactics against the enemy group. Beginning from this premise, I proffer a preference-based theory of wartime rape.

0.3 A Preference-based Theory of Wartime Rape

The preference-based theory of wartime rape (PTWR) offered here seeks to address four current problems in extant literature. First, given that the emphasis is on the leader of a specific armed group, the PTWR operates at the group-level and can therefore explain variation between armed groups. Second, ideological differences between leaders can identify why armed groups in otherwise homogeneous cultures use rape differently; accounting for differing levels of rape within and across armed units. Third, the ideology of a leader defines both the in-group and the enemy group, and can therefore predict which population is most likely to be victimized by the rape strategy. Finally, the PTWR argues that rape is used intentionally by leaders to accomplish long-term strategic objectives. In turn, the interaction between leadership preferences and war-type posits seeks to directly address the question, why rape?

Contemporary literature is replete with scholarship touting the impact of leadership preferences on conflict (Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 2013c; Horowitz et al. 2014; Ganguly 2001; Powell 1999; Fearon 1995; Rubenstein 1983; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Her-
mann and Kegley 1995; Ungerer 2012; Karsh 2011; Roux 2011). In fact, the impact of elite-level variables enjoys broad support from both international relations and comparative politics literature. For instance, Yashar (1997) argues that outcomes are a product of the interaction between the actions of actors negotiating an issue and the political institutions that constrain or promote a given outcome. Similarly, Grindle (2007) contends that governance is the consequence of new opportunities and resources, the impact of leadership motivation and choices, civic history, and the effect of institutions that constrain and facilitate innovation (3). Within conflict literature, rationalist explanations of leadership behavior during conflict have long benefitted from a privileged place (Toft 2006; Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Higley and Burton 1989; Fearon 1995, 2004; Reiter 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Horowitz and Ye 2013a, 2013c). Despite this consensus, however, the role of leadership preferences in explaining variation in wartime rape has yet to be explored. How might leadership preferences effect the use of rape by armed groups? How might outcomes change as the interactions between leaders and their context changes? As emphasized by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2013) and Hermann and Kegley (1995), the cost-benefit and options-available calculus used by leaders will change depending on the ways in which those leaders internalize institutional constraints. What can we learn from these interactions?

The PTWR seeks to explain variation in the use of rape within and between conflicts, cultures, and armed groups. Based in the bargaining model of war, the PTWR considers war and words as bargaining tools used by leaders to achieve an optimal distribution of goods (i.e., border placement, composition of government control over land/resources, etc.) (see Reiter 2003, 27). Following early bargaining theories that view conflict as a deliberate choice within the bargaining model (Schelling 1960; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Reiter 2003), the theory proffered here recognizes that the fighting (i.e., expression) of warfare is itself serving a function (Goldstein 2001; Snyder 2002; Reiter 2003; Mercer 1995; Wendt 1999). Borrowing elements of constructivist logic, the PTWR supports the idea that the means of war can be used to generate and reinforce an ideology (for a more
detailed discussion, see Wendt 1999, 275). Violence, then, is not just a degree of conflict but a form of conflict; a form of social and political action in its own right (Brubaker and Laitin 1998, 425). In this way, the active preference for the use of rape is deliberate and prioritized over other forms of repression, violence, and human rights violations. Certainly scholars of wartime sexual violence agree that rape is often predicated on the deleterious effects it has on enemy populations, including the instillation of terror, diminishing civil resistance, demoralizing, humiliating, emasculating enemy soldiers, and as an ends in ethnic cleansing and genocidal campaigns (Enloe 2000; Baaz and Stern 2009; Gottschall 2004). Therefore, in parallel with existing rape literature, wartime rape is seen as the coherent, coordinated, logical means of prosecuting warfare (Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Gottschall 2004; Allen 1996; Littlewood 1997; Thomas and Regan 1994; Isikozlu and Millard 2010) to achieve a political goal. Echoing Carl von Clausewitz’s (1976) sentiments the PTWR recognizes that, “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose” (87).

Further support for this logic comes from Roux (2011) who notes that in defining the ideology of the conflict, the main perpetrators of gross human rights violations reinforce the differentiation between the targeted group and the rest of the population by creating juridical-legal separations between citizens and aliens, elites and masses, in-groups and out-groups (Roux 2011, 656). Subsequently, these forces are more than collections of isolated individuals. but rather represent a connected system that carries out genocide and other crimes against humanity (Roux 2011, 660). In fact, McCormick and Mitchell (1997) argue that regimes choose different mixes of torture, killing, and imprisonment depending on their calculation of costs and benefits. Where the use of torture and killing carries the likelihood of higher external costs, governments may opt for ‘disappearing’ the victims rather than killing them (514). Here, leaders perceive different benefits attached to the use of different types of repression depending on their preferences. As regimes see repressive practices as more or less acceptable, decision-makers will frame their choices accordingly. In turn, efforts to explain these practices must account for the different types

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9For a skillfully woven elaboration on the bargaining model of war, its evolution, and its relationships to other theories in international relations, please see Reiter (2003).
of activities, as well as their differing meanings, contexts, and the nature of the political challenge (McCormick and Mitchell 1997, 515).

Similarly, with notable exceptions at the extremes, preferences alone do not imply strong likelihoods of particular outcomes without information on other variables affecting leadership calculations of costs and benefits (Horowitz and Ye 2013a, 509, 2013c; see also Horowitz et al. 2014). To this end, the PTWR assumes that the level of rape is a product of leadership preferences conditioned by two additional groups of variables: the status quo, and relative power. Here, relative power includes those factors that determine potential gains and losses resulting from a change in the status quo. In contrast, status quo conditions determine the opportunity costs of war. As status quo conditions decline, the lower are the perceived costs of conflict (Horowitz and Ye 2013a). To this end, Horowitz et al. (2014) suggest, “leadership preferences influence outcomes by placing different relative values on the various possible outcomes - sticking with the status quo, risking the upside and downside of war outcomes, and accepting a mutually acceptable redistributive bargain...” (3). Thus, where post-Fearon bargaining models emphasize calculations to avoid war, the theory developed here emphasizes the calculations in the use or prevention of conflict modalities. That is, where contemporary bargaining models of war focus on conditions determining when war will occur, the PTWR focuses on how the war will occur.

The ‘how’ of warfare has particularly important consequences for the political landscape of the post-war environment. Just as contemporary bargaining models argue that war is costly, the PTWR recognizes that the tactics used in war also have significant political costs. Focusing on strategies of political actors rather than individual motivations of the perpetrator, Kalyvas (1999) argues that the key element in civil war is civilians as competing political actors need to attract and maintain civilian support in order to secure power. As war threatens the very survival of civilians, political actors will try to commit civilians to their side by providing benefits and sanctions (Kalyvas 1999, 252; see also Taylor 1988). Sanctions (i.e., punishments) are cheaper than benefits and ongoing war further reduces the availability of benefits. Thus, actors are more likely to resort
to terror to shape civilian behavior and reduce the probability of defection. However, to be efficient, terror needs to be selective, as indiscriminate terror tends to be counterproductive (Kalyvas 1999). To this end, Gottschall (2004) highlights evidence that rape committed by soldiers can be a serious threat to the larger strategic interests of the armed group, leading to efforts to proscribe it (Gottschall 2004, 132). As an example, Gottschall (2004) discusses the experience of the Japanese military in Korea and China in the 1930s through the end of World War II. Far from breaking resistant populations, Japanese commanders found that frequent rapes of civilian women served to antagonize and enrage the population. In fact, the institution of “comfort women” was, in large part, because rape was considered detrimental to military goals. Inaugurated in Shanghai in 1932, the first comfort station was arranged in direct response to an official requests for comfort women who could prevent Japanese sailors from raping local women (Gottschall 2004, 132; see also Chang 1997). Said differently, post-conflict leadership goals inform leadership preferences on wartime tactics. Where an organization aspires to govern the civilian population, leaders are more likely to restrain combatants’ use of rape against those civilians for fear of undermining support for the coming revolution. That is, if the present ‘enemy’ is expected to make up the future constituency, leaders will be less likely to risk their political power by pursing terror strategies. Similarly, if an armed group is dependent on civilians (for tax revenue, etc.), leaders have greater incentives to prevent wartime rape (Wood 2006, 328-329; Wood 2009). In contrast, if the purpose of the war is genocide and/or forcible removal of a population from a given territory, leadership is less likely to be concerned with the post-conflict sentiments of the enemy and therefore more likely to exhibit passive preferences of indifferences toward sexual violence or active preferences for the strategic use of rape.

The ability to capture and measure leadership preferences is made possible using Horowitz and Ye’s (2013a, 2013c) two-dimensional leadership preference typology. Within a bargaining framework, the authors select two central concepts repetitive across international relations and specifically conflict, literature: Nationalism (i.e., nationalist behavior), and Power-seeking behavior (i.e., principled versus unprincipled behavior). Applied
to the study of wartime rape, the nationalist dimension assesses how strongly maximum nationalist goals are valued relative to the cost of using a given war tactic. The power-seeking dimension assesses how much pursuing and maintaining political power is valued relative to other political goals (509). Particularly relevant, in their study of the influence of these preferences on civilian targeting in ethno-territorial war, Horowitz and Ye (2013c) find evidence that leaders use civilian targeting in ways that reflect their varying emphasis on nationalist and power-seeking goals (388). Axiomatically, if accounting for nationalist and power-seeking preferences holds explanatory power over the selection of targets in conflict, then it is reasonable to expect that those same preferences are able to provide insight into leadership decisions regarding wartime strategy.

0.4 Ethnic Versus Non-Ethnic War: The Case for Differentiation

Scholarship in sexual violence literature widely agree that ethnic war matters. However, at present, no quantitative research compares the predictive power of theories across ethnic and non-ethnic wars. Plainly stated, the logic to date has been backward. How can we determine whether a theory explains wartime rape within ethnic war if theories are not applied within and compared across ethnic wars? In fact, most culture-based explanations relegate the very idea of ethnic war to the periphery. Those positing strictly cultural explanations (Siefert 1992), fail to recognize and account for variation in the use of wartime between armed groups within cultures. Even so, scholars recognizing the interplay between ethnicity and conflict seem to accept as sufficient the inclusion of an ethnic war dummy variable. Subsequently, empirical evidence suggests that ethnic war likely matters, but the research process seems to have stopped there. Moving beyond an ad hoc account of context, this research seeks to advance current understanding by systematically comparing hypotheses specifically within the context of ethnic war in order to discern explanatory patterns in the conditional effects of ethnic war on inter-group variation in the use of wartime rape.

Wood (2006) argues that the type of war (at the broadest level) does not explain
the variation in wartime rape. Sexual violence varies in prevalence and form between civil wars and inter-state wars, among ethnic wars as well as non-ethnic, across cases of genocide and ethnic-cleansing, and among secessionist conflicts (318). Though empirics emerge in resounding support of Wood’s (2006) argument, ethnic war is all too often confined to little more than a dummy variable. However, ethnicity is neither an afterthought nor a factor operating in isolation of other contextual variables. In fact, the role and salience of ethnicity is inextricable from the norms that guide both conflict and leadership preferences. To that end, Kausikan (1993) argues that human rights are an output of cultural traditions, values, political structures, and levels of development. The force of ethnicity simultaneously informs and is a consequence of institutional, political and social structures, both present and historical. In the context of wartime rape, the interaction between ethnicity and leadership preferences alone holds the power to determine: (a) who are likely to be targets of rape, (b) the extent to which there are likely to be differences in the advocation for, indifference to, or prevention of rape by a given armed group, (c) the level of rape used by a particular group in armed conflict.

Though there is a paucity of literature specifically exploring causal mechanisms of wartime rape in ethnic conflict, there is a clear intersection between ethnic conflict and sexual violence literature. Most basically, conflict literature has clearly established that ethnic war is a distinct type of conflict (Sambanis 2001; Laitin 1995). In the context of ethnic war, scholars note that violence, political mobilization, and military socialization usually work in tandem to polarize local, and specifically ethnic, identities (Wood 2008; Kaufmann 1996; Fearon and Laitin 2001). In fact, because ethnic conflicts engage the very notions of identity and therefore an existential threat, some argue that ethnic conflict is prone to more human rights violations and extreme violence, including rape (Tronvoll 2008, 66; Cohen 2013a; Horowitz 1985; Plimper and Neumayer 2006; Bloom 1999).

Support for the specificity of ethnic conflict and its relationship to rape comes from genocide literature. In particular, at the intersection of literature on genocide, ethnic war, and sexual violence is a body of work devoted to genocidal rape. A specific subset (consciously or not) of wartime rape, genocidal rape is used to annihilate a people and a
culture (Baaz and Stern 2009; Enloe 2000; Sharlach 2000; Gottschall 2004; Allen 1996; Barstow 2000; Hyuan-Kyung 2000; MacKinnon 1994; Salzman 2000; Rittner and Roth 2012; Koo 2002; Wood 2009; Ward and Marsh 2006; Russell-Brown 2003; Hayden 2000; Bloom 1999; Cohen 2013a; Farr 2009). As ethnic wars are also frequently territorial wars (Horowitz and Ye 2013a), the same strategic objectives (removing a population from a territory) that lend themselves to genocide also make rape a particularly rational wartime tactic. To date, however, neither feminist literature nor analyses specifically investigating genocidal rape give real consideration to the circumstances under which mass rape takes place (Hayden 2000, 29). While some argue there is no direct confirmation that rape in Bosnia was used tactically (Gottschall 2004; Hayden 2000), a majority of scholars agree that the use of rape in the Bosnian genocide was strategic and systematic (Kohn 1994; Enloe 2000; Sofos 1996; Volkan 2002, 2006; Diken and Lausten 2005; Salzman 1998; Fisher 1996; Skejlsbk 2001). Still others argue that it is the genocide itself, rather than the characteristics of ethnic war that promote widespread rape (Mullins 2009). However, just as not all wars are ethnic, not all ethnic wars are genocidal. In fact, even within ethnic war violence is not homogenous (Brubaker and Laitin 1998). Subsequently, there is no reason to expect that the heterogeneous components of large-scale

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10Genocidal rape may take several forms: occurring through forced impregnation (Guttman 1993; Diken and Lausten 2006; Volkan 2002, 2006); immediately before the lethal violence of genocide, as a form of lethal violence itself (a victim may be raped until he or she dies or the intentional spread of HIV (Rittner and Roth 2012; Sharlach 2000); as a way of inflicting long-term trauma (e.g., victims may be physically unable to or be emotionally incapable of having children after a rape) (Koo 2002); as an effort to remove a population from a given territory (Isikozlu and Millard 2010; Cohen 2013a; Bloom 1999; Farr 2009). Certainly this list is not exhaustive.

11Evidence for rape as a strategy of war is perhaps most apparent in the forced impregnation that occurred in the rape camps (located in Breko, Dboj, Foca, Gorazde, Kalinobik, Vesegrad, Keatern, Luka, Manjaca, Osmarka and Tronopolje), as such a practice necessitates thorough pre-planning (for more detailed information, see Skejlsbk 2001 and Diken and Lausten 2005). Within the camps, women were continuously raped until a doctor could establish pregnancy and subsequently held in captivity until abortion was no longer possible (Kohn 1994; Diken and Lausten 2005, 112; Fisher 1996, 112; Salzman 1998, 359). Furthermore, television propaganda used footage of Muslim women being raped, but dubbed over the voices in order to make people believe that the victims were Serbian woman (Diken and Lausten 2005, 115; Goldstein 2001, 354; Salzman 1998, 353). In fact, Serbian propaganda entitled ‘Laying Violent hands on the Serbian Women’ written by Milovan Milutinovic claimed, “By order of the Islamic fundamentalists from Sarajevo, healthy Serbian women from 17 to 40 years of age are being separated out and subjected to special treatment. According to their sick plans going back many years, these women have to be impregnated by orthodox Islamic seeds in order to raise a generation of janissaries on the territories they surely consider to be theirs, the Islamic republic. In other words, a fourfold crime is to be committed against the Serbian woman: to remove her from her own family, to impregnate her by undesirable seeds, to make her bear a stranger and then to take even him away from her” corroborated by (Diken and Lausten 2005; Volkan 2002, 2006; Guttman 1993).
violence across ethnic and non-ethnic war can be understood by a single theory. To this end, the role of leadership preferences becomes particularly intriguing. Yet, despite widespread agreement that the role of leadership in ethnic politics is critical (Horowitz and Ye 2013a, 2013b, Kausikan 1993; Brown 2001), literature investigating the impact of leadership preferences on sexual violence outcomes within ethnic war is virtually absent. Highlighting interplay between leadership and ethnic conflict, Brown (2001) argues that in times of political and economic turmoil, leaders can provoke ethnic conflict as a diversionary effort. Fortunately, the work of Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 2013b) provides one of the first analyses exploring leadership preferences in the context of ethnic war. Specifically, relative to ethno-territorial conflict the authors investigate the impact of leadership preferences on outcomes such as war onset, war duration, war strategy choice, and mode of war termination (508). Here, the authors find that accounting for leadership preferences in the investigations of conflict outcomes significantly increases overall explanatory power. Moreover, Horowitz and Ye’s (2013a) detailed account of the ideology, rhetoric, and pre-conflict behaviors suggest that the context of war is a central determinant of leadership preferences. In a separate account, Horowitz and Ye (2013b) argue that in large-scale ethnic conflict, ethnic group leaders make strategic choices about civilian targets as part of an overall strategy (373). The authors go on to note that such civilian targeting strategies are specifically chosen by comparing costs and benefits relative to political goals. In short, these works provide support for the hypothesis that the PTWR may operate differently in ethnic war than in non-ethnic war. Subsequently, seeking to extend the literature, this research expands the scope of Horowitz and Ye’s (2013a) investigation in order to better understand the differential effects of leadership preferences on the use of strategic rape during ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars.

0.5 Data and Methods

Data

This dissertation expands Cohen’s (2013a) dataset documenting the level of rape across 86 civil wars between 1980 and 2009 to include (among other factors) 4 measures
of leadership preferences based on Horowitz and Ye’s (2013) two-dimensional typology. Subsequently, the dataset used in this dissertation represents the first large-N dataset accounting for the impact of leadership preferences on the level of wartime rape perpetrated by armed groups in civil conflict.12

**Dataset Descriptives.** Using Cohen’s (2013a) original dataset, the data used here cover all 86 major civil wars between 1980 - 2009 as defined by Fearon and Laitin (2011), an update of Fearon and Laitin (2003). Data were collected only for those years overlapping with the study period. If a war began before 1980, the data reflect only the period starting in 1980. In total, data account for 983 conflict-years.13

The first empirical chapter of this dissertation seeks to determine whether variation in rape differs from variation in the levels of other human rights abuses during war. Necessarily, this requires different data than are used in the latter chapters of this work. Specifically, chapter two uses individual, ordinal measures of physical integrity violations from the Cingranelli and Richards (2011) CIRI dataset. These include measures for torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings. In addition, a mass-killings dummy variable, taken from Cohen’s 2013a) original dataset and based on Valentino et al.’s (2004) measure, captures whether the government killed over 50,000 civilians. As well, there are two rape variables used in the analysis taken from Cohen’s (2013a) dataset, including government-perpetrated rape and conflict-level rape. These measures are described in more detail below.

Outside of the rape variables, data for the dominant portion of the dissertation differ substantially. First, the unit of analysis is actor type-conflict-year (i.e., state forces in the Afghanistan-Muhajideen conflict in 1981). There are a total of three dependent rape variables. These include: (1) the highest level of rape perpetrated by the insurgent group, (2) the highest level of rape perpetrated by the state, and (3) the highest level of rape

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12 A full list of cases present in the dataset as well as the conflict-years and the highest level of rape achieved in each case are listed in the appendix in Figure 3.

13 Cohen’s (2013a) original dataset was a tremendous undertaking that makes an invaluable contribution to the field. Data are collected from a variety sources including original interviews, surveys, government records, etc., and corroborated with existing literature for definitional and coding consistency. For more information about these data and/or coding specifics, please see Cohen (2013a, 2013b).
in the conflict-year, using the maximum coded level by either actor type in the conflict year. Data for the dependent variables were compiled by Cohen (2013a) and measured using a modified four-point scale that reflects the magnitude of violence.\textsuperscript{14} As Cohen (2013a) highlights, while not fine grained, the four-point scale permits inferences about the relative magnitude of rape committed by warring parties across conflicts (466). To this end, variation across regions as well as the severity of rape across the data is significant. These data confirm Wood’s (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009) longstanding assertions that rape is not a ubiquitous feature of conflict, nor consistent across armed groups within the same conflict.\textsuperscript{15} As discussed earlier, there are three groups of variables that describe the PTWR. These groups include leadership preferences, the status quo, and relative power. Below, variables are presented and discussed by group.

\textit{Leadership Preferences.} Leadership preferences were coded using Horowitz and Ye’s (2013) two dimensional typology. A principled-unprincipled (or power-seeking) dimension assesses how much pursuing and maintaining political power is valued relative to intrinsic nationalist and other political goals (Horowitz and Ye 2013a, 527). Power-seeking preferences are measured using a three-level ordinal scale. Each level is divided into four categories that capture evidence of the preference in terms of level of commitment, consistency and risk acceptance, political organization, and corruption. The first level captures the lowest form of power-seeking (i.e., strongly principles behavior). This level represents the ideologues; those with near-absolute commitment to one or more political goals. In particular, one would expect to see an absolute consistency in the pursuit of core goals.

\textsuperscript{14}For each of the 4 category dependent variables Cohen (2013a) used coding procedures similar to those in Butler et al.’s (2007) study of state-directed sexual violence. The original authors based their coding scheme on the widely used Political Terror Scale (PTS), a five-point measure of the level and degree of physical integrity rights violations (Gibney et al. 2011). For more information see Cohen (2013a).

\textsuperscript{15}As documented by Cohen (2013a), 18 conflicts reached levels of widespread rape (with at least one conflict-year coded as 3), 35 conflict have many or numerous reports of rape (with at least one conflict-year coded as 2), 18 conflicts have isolated reports (with at least one conflict-year coded as 1), and 15 wars had no reports of rape (all conflict-years coded as 0). In broad terms, 53 of the 86 conflicts (62%) have at least one conflict-year coded as either 2 or 3, and 71 of 86 conflicts (83%) have at least isolated reports of rape. Furthermore 62% of the conflicts with rape evidence both state and insurgent perpetrators, while only 31% (22) have rape perpetrated by state only and 7% (5) on conflicts involve only insurgent perpetrated rape (467).
using strategies that are consistent with the stated goals and priorities. Furthermore, commitment is reflected by a frequent willingness to risk power loss or personal safety in pursuit of goals. Within the organization, the leader is expected to value other purely principled leaders, independent of their political stature. Here, no personal corruption is expected and client corruption is strongly discouraged but tolerated if perceived as a necessary-evil in service of substantive goals.

The mid-level power-seekers (i.e., balanced behavior) are kindred to typical career politicians. There is evidence of significant commitment to one or more substantive political goals, but an expectation that these goals will be subverted for a large enough political advantage. Balanced leaders are expected to be generally risk avoidant, evidencing moderate strategies and consistency in pursuit of stated core goals. Within the organization, there is a strong emphasis on principled and effective leaders, with little personal and client corruption expected. However, client corruption will be viewed as acceptable if and when it serves the larger political goals. Finally, the highly power-seeking leaders (i.e., strongly unprincipled behavior) are opportunists with no convincing commitment to any substantive political goals. Any stated goals will be sacrificed for a significant political advantage. Here, leaders are expected to be risk-avoidant, personally and professionally, in pursuit of goals. This behavior is characterized by a pronounced inconsistency in pursuance of goals, with strategies inconsistent with efforts to achieve stated objectives; particularly where inconsistency brings political advantage. The organization is expected to be dominated by the presence of “yes-men”, drawn from personal networks in order to preserve the emphasis on loyalty, though often at the expense of political efficacy. In general, corruption is the primary mechanism used to achieve goals, unless that corruption threatens power.\textsuperscript{16}

In contrast, a nationalist goals dimension assesses how strongly nationalist goals are valued relative to the conflict costs and outcome risks that may result from pursuing them. A more extreme nationalist position is defined as more highly valuing risks of crisis-induced concessions and victory relative to the downside risk of defeat as well as

\textsuperscript{16}For a thorough explanation of coding and a detailed example of the application of this coding to several case studies, please see Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 2013b).
crisis and conflict costs. Nationalist preferences are coded on a five-category ordinal scale beginning at non-nationalist, and ending at extreme nationalist. Non-nationalists are those whose statements and actions convey little to no interest in collective political goals. That is, non-nationalists place very little emphasis on expulsion or assimilation of the outsider group, and no strong feelings toward independence, or institutional and/or cultural autonomy. Thus, there is no significant effort to elicit civilian support for collective goals and the individual rights of ethnic others are strictly respected. In general, non-nationalists are expected to discourage collective goals of own and other groups.

Moderate nationalists are those in which independence or assimilation goals may exist theoretically, but the dominant emphasis is on coexistence and improvement under existing conditions. Moderate nationalists have a strong attachment to the status quo, avoiding political confrontations and economic disruptions. Political pressures may be used for bargaining for institutional or policy changes, but are expected to be confined within the current legal and political framework. Though the leader may prioritize collective goals of his own group, there is general acceptance of the collective goals of other groups. These groups tend to collect other moderate nationalists but identical view are not enforced.

The third level of nationalism is that of the ordinary nationalist. Here, there is an active policy agenda aimed at one or more specific political objectives (i.e., independence, autonomy, or state-sponsored assimilation, etc.), but compromise is acceptable if the costs of pursuing maximal goals cause significant disruption of the current system. Thus, more disruptive measures are only likely to occur under conditions in which there is a very strong possibility of success or a possibility of success at a relatively low cost. While the collective goals of his own group are prioritized and collective goals of the other group are

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17Here, it is important to clarify that Horowitz and Ye (2013a) originally developed this two-dimensional typology following Fearon’s (1995) bargaining model of war. Fearon (1995) argued that if states could agree on the outcome of possible war, then they could also avoid war. Given the concentrated costs of war for both sides, regardless of the winner, war is rarely the rational option. The authors show that the greater relative power and a smaller share of the status quo goods make it more likely that a given side will initiate a crisis (i.e., take a risk, exhibit more extreme behavior) (Horowitz and Ye 2013a, 510). Thus, in the original work, ‘crisis’ refers to the action that marks the start of the war. In this research, the word crisis is used infrequently, but is meant to convey the severity of terrorist tactics and more extreme human rights violations overall.
discouraged, the individual rights of the other-group members are defended. In pursuit of core goals, some extraordinary tactics are plausible, but are likely limited to activities that maintain the defense of others’ individual rights. However, if attacked, moderate nationalists are expected to reciprocate in kind where it is likely to advance core goals. Within the group, ordinary nationalist views are encouraged but not enforced.

The next nationalist level represents strong nationalists. Strong nationalists are expected to have an active policy agenda consisting of one or more (and most likely more) political goals. Goals tend to be ranked hierarchically such that intermediate goals can be discount or sacrificed in pursuit of maximal goals. The intermediate goals offer room for bargaining, high costs are acceptable only if there is a significant chance of victory. In pursuit of goals, the individual rights of the other-group are likely to be restricted where they can be viewed as threatening own-group goals. Violence is possible, but targets are limited to other-group civil society organizations, military operatives, and political institutions. So long as violence is in pursuit of goals, there is likely to be passive support for or indifference to violence against out-groups. Within the organization, strong nationalist views are a pre-requisite for high positions and incumbent leadership goals are prioritized over ‘institutional protocol.’

Finally, the extreme nationalist is one that demonstrates an active interest and policy agenda in pursuit of one or more goals. Maximal goals are preferanced over intermediate goals are pursued almost any cost, even with little short-term prospects for success. As is expected, the collective goals of own-group are prioritized and the collective goals of the other group are completely excluded. In general, the individual rights of the other-group are generally viewed as threatening own-group goals and are likely restricted. An extreme nationalist demands that extreme views are enforced in all positions, and violence is therefore directed not only at political institutions, the military, and civil society organizations of other-group, but also of own-group where differing views are perceived as threats either power or ideology.18

One of the particular challenges of coding leadership preferences is to make sure mea-

18Explanations of the dimensions are contained in the appendix. However, for further information, please see Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 2013b).
sures are distinct from the independent variable. To this end, Horowitz and Ye (2013a) highlight ways through which to ensure that preferences are not conflated with outcomes. The authors recommend collecting information on both actions and statements and evaluating them over a long period of time (to the extent possible). In this work, particular care was taken to implement Horowitz and Ye’s (2013a) recommended strategy of separating actors’ statements from their actions. This is vital, as actions indicating preferences may include elements of the dependent variable. Thus, to implement the two-dimensional typology, information about actions indicating the nature and extent of power-seeking and nationalist goals, as well as the costs and risks in pursuing them was excluded. While this also excludes information on other types of action, the approach minimizes the chance that information on the dependent variable might contaminate the measurement of leadership preferences.\footnote{For a discussion of other approaches, please see Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 512-513.}

**Relative Power.** There are five relative power variables included in the models. Log-GDP is used to provide a broad measure of the resources available to both state and rebel groups. For rebel groups, Log-GDP measures the level of resources available to rebel groups at the time of the conflict. Rebel groups with more resources are expected to be more powerful, and therefore better able to enforce norms and distribute punishments to defectors. For the state, Log-GDP is a measure of the relative prosperity of state leadership. That is, a higher GDP suggests that state leadership has more available money and therefore greater liquidity to use on military resources. In this way, governments with higher GDPs are better able to recruit and train their military. Higher levels of investment are expected to produce a more professional armed unit with more developed institutional processes for enforcing behavior. Therefore, as GDP increases, we would expect rape perpetrated by state soldiers to decline. To more directly account for the power of the state, a measure of military size (i.e., military persons under foot) was used. Similar to accounting for state population in conflict research, controlling for military personnel by the states accounts for the effect of sheer size (i.e., volume of people). Just
as there more deaths in highly populated areas, it would be expected that there would be more rape in larger armies.

In addition, measures for oil and drugs were included to account for the perils of the resource curse. For instance, Weinstein (2007) argues that insurgent groups with access to material resources attract more violence-prone recruits than do groups relying on ideology; thereby increasing the likelihood that resource-supported groups will commit widespread civilian abuses. Furthermore, research suggests that the rampant use of drugs and alcohol enables perpetrators to feel removed from a sense of agency and responsibility (Kassimeris 2006; Baaz and Stern 2009, 498). Thus, an armed unit able to receive funding from sources outside the citizen population is not reliant on civilians to exist and is, therefore, less likely to be concerned about the relative costs of civilian treatment. This is particularly true in territorial war where there is an effort to remove a population from a contested territory. Thus, where leadership places a higher relative value on the citizens, levels of rape are expected to be lower.

A tribal variable was also included to account for the relative distance between state leadership and the civilian population. There are two inter-related logics that explain the impact of a tribal state. First, to the extent that there is a presence of tribal politics operating in cities and villages, there is a degree of relative autonomy from the government. In an ethnic war, these locations become easily identifiable ‘out-groups’; both for inter-tribal rivalries and for state-tribe conflicts. In turn, state-perpetrated rape in ethnic war, would be expected to be higher in tribal areas. Alternately, as noted by Kalyvas (1999), “A central feature of civil wars is the breakdown of the state monopoly of violence and its replacement by locally segmented monopolies of violence” (259). In this regard, an insurgent organization controlling an area operates as a counter-sovereign authority, providing protection, administering justice, collecting taxes and implementing social programs. Such an organization also enjoys a monopoly on violence, which can be used to punish enemies and sanction uncooperative behavior (Kalyvas 1999, 259). However, for whatever incentives there may be to avoid rape of one’s own tribe, in many cases there is heightened incentives to perpetrate rape against other tribes in order to accomplish
larger objectives. Since many tribal areas still function as a pre-modern society, norms regarding equal treatment for all may likely be absent or suspended.

Finally, a dummy variable measuring whether group leadership was unified or fractured was used to account for the ability of a given armed group to enforce anti-rape norms and punish defectors. In many ways, this reflects the primary logic of the opportunity arguments that posit state and institutional breakdown as a motivating force in wartime rape (Wood 2006; Kalyvas 1999). As Wood (2006) argues, enforcement of regulatory mechanisms vary and those regulatory mechanisms that exist may break down during war (321). In particular, if there are two competing leadership groups, it is possible that one group may be actively seeking to prevent wartime rape, while another group is less concerned with extreme violence. Similarly, if there is a divide in leadership, hierarchical disruption and communication problems are likely to prevent (or otherwise sidetrack) the armed force from policing soldier behavior. Thus, as the ability to enforce rules of warfare wane, rape levels are expected to be higher.

**Status Quo.** A high-democracy variable was constructed using the top of the polity2 measure. This measure accounts for three inter-related processes. First, the level of democracy provides a general measure of state repression, civil liberties, inclusiveness and corruption. In turn, democracy provides a baseline for existing grievances between rebel groups and state leadership. A higher measure of democracy is expected to indicate a greater contentment with the status quo, and therefore less of an interest in more extreme violence. More broadly, democracy reflects the norms and values present in society. Countries with experience in democracy are more likely to have more moderate preferences in regards to the use of violence. Thus, we would expect rebels from a democratic state to show greater restraint in their level of violence both against their own and enemy populations. Finally, on the side of the government, it is expected that leaders would have a greater interest in preserving citizen support for the leadership. Thus, more moderate levels of violence and a more stringent set of active preferences for the punishment and prevention of rape are expected in states with higher democracy.
scores. When democracy is coupled with Log-GDP, the combination offers insight in the overall level of state development and the strength of existing institutions.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Methods}

This dissertation employs a variety of methods to answer the question, why rape? In this effort, the first step was to determine whether rape is used differently than other human rights abuses during conflict. Since the argument here suggests that rape is used strategically for its symbolic properties, the expectation would be that rape does not vary with other forms of non-combat violence. Thus, three primary methods were used to assess the relationships between variables. Correlation checks were performed to avoid interpretation distortions due to collinearity. Factor analysis was used to determine the extent to which the variables shared the same underlying construct. Finally, Welch’s two-sample t-tests (aka unequal variances t-tests) were used to test whether means for the measures of rape were equal to the means for other human rights violations. Welch’s t-tests were selected over Student’s t-tests as they are more reliable in the face of unequal sample sizes and do not assume equal variance. The results are also presented graphically for ease of interpretation.

The dominant portion of the dissertation uses a combination of cross sectional and time series analysis. A cross sectional dataset is created from the original time-series data by taking the means of each variable during a conflict. Models are run using simple linear regression is used. The benefit of this simplified cross sectional approach is that one can be confident the results are not unduly inflated because of time-dependence. Nevertheless, in order to assess differences in the outcomes, transition models were also estimated for the time-series data. The use of transition modeling follows the direction of Beck et al. (1998), Carter and Signorino (2010). However, results suggests that models are not robust to changes in the type of analysis, form of variables (ordinal, dichotomous, continuous, etc.) or the inclusion of of new variables. Subsequently, the reported results are predominantly from the cross-sectional models as they represent the most conservative

\textsuperscript{20}Log-GDP, given its relationship with democracy, can also be interpreted as a measure of state development.
estimates of significance.

0.6 Contributions

This dissertation offers four contributions to literature on wartime rape and the broader spectrum of scholarship on sexual violence, ethnic conflict, and human rights violations in war. First, this research provides evidence that rape is not ‘just another human rights violation.’ Rather, this work presents support for the hypothesis that there is something strategic and intentional about the use of rape. The results offered here make evident that we need to move past passive acceptance of rape as an unfortunate side effect of war and understand the use of rape as a specialized tactic to achieve larger political objectives. Second, this project unites literature on sexual violence, ethnic conflict, and state repression in order to rethink the way we understand and categorize rape. By aggregating knowledge across areas of specialization, I argue for the need to modify existing group-level theories of wartime rape. In address, this dissertation advances a preference-based theory of wartime rape that suggests leadership preferences, conditioned by the type of war explain variation in the use of rape across armed groups in conflict. Third, the analyses conducted here show theories of wartime rape have different predictive capacities depending on the context of the war. Thus, this work argues that future research must test theories of sexual violence separately in ethnic and non-ethnic war in order to understand the predictive capacities of those theories. That is, it is not sufficient to agree that ethnic war matters. Rather, scholarship must pursue deeper understandings of the ways in which the type of war conditions the expression theories of rape and sexual violence. Finally, multinomial probit analysis is used to highlight existing problems in measurement and modeling that lead to flawed inferences. In turn, I propose the use of transition modeling to better capture the causal relationship between variables seeking to explain wartime rape. A preliminary exploration of transition modeling suggests promising avenues for future quantitative research. In sum, this dissertation seeks to advance our understanding of the causal forces behind the use of rape in conflict and posit ways in which we might overcome existing theoretical and methodological challenges.
Chapter 2

Just Another Human Rights Violation?

_Distinguishing Rape from Other Human Rights Abuses_

“A ‘No’ uttered from the deepest conviction is better than a ‘Yes’ merely uttered to please, or worse, to avoid trouble.”

Mahatma Gandhi

Broadly, this dissertation asks, why rape? However, to ask why rape in the context of civil war necessarily distinguishes it from other forms of violence. Should it be? Literature seems to focus on ‘human rights violations’ or rape, but fails to address the relationship between them. While variation in the scale of human rights violations across the world is widely recognized, relatively little empirical research has been done to account for differences in the use of human rights violations (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Wood 2006, 2007; Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2005; Davenport 2007). In fact, despite public concern and political importance, the theoretical contribution of political science to explaining human rights violations has been modest at best (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, 477).

Historically, there has been general acceptance that the chaos of war unleashes a freedom to commit human rights violations. However, if the mere presence of war was sufficient to explain increases in human rights violations, then all human rights violations should increase at the start of war, and worsening chaos should see all rights steadily increase. But, do they? A vast body of literature posits considerable variation not only in the use of rape, but in the use of a broad spectrum of human violations within and between armed conflicts (Wood 2006, 2008, 2009). However, to date there have been no large-N statistical tests that identify patterns in the use of sexual violence relative to
other forms violence during war. In turn, this chapter makes two powerful contributions wartime sexual violence literature. First, this work provides the first statistical comparison of the use of rape and other disaggregated measure of human rights violations across civil wars. Beyond the methodological contribution, this chapter provides evidence that patterns in the use of rape are distinctive from those of other human rights violations. Specifically, the results detailed below support the hypothesis that rape is not merely a side effect of conflict, but is the product of a much more complex mechanism; one that differs considerably from more commonly analyzed human rights violations. The following section offers a brief review of relevant research.

**Literature**

The research presented here is part of a larger work that seeks to better understand the forces motivating and/or inhibiting the use of sexually violent tactics during civil war. As the foundation of that inquiry, this chapter explores the extent to which the use of rape rises and falls in the same patterns as do other types of extra-combat violence. Asked simply, is there something different about the use of rape that distinguishes it from other types of violence? Is it possible that the forces acting to encourage or control rape differ from the forces operating in other, non-sexual violations of human rights? In this effort, I engage human rights and sexual violence literature in two primary ways. First, I address debates regarding the conceptualization of human rights. Namely, I highlight the ways in which current conceptualizations impact measurement, results, and inferences. Second, I examine the propositions and weaknesses in prominent opportunity arguments that suggest human rights violations, as a broad category, are simply the product of (and therefore inherent in) war.

*Human Rights in Concept and Measurement*

In part, the challenge of evaluating patterns in the use of human rights violations is a product of the lack of consensus surrounding the definition and measurement of human rights. While it does not excuse the slow integration of rape into human rights discourse,
even the concept of gender equality did not emerge in UN documents until 1975. The specific use of rape as a weapon of war did not receive substantial recognition until the mid-nineties, when it was foisted upon the world stage by the horrors of the Bosnian genocide. Having spent the last forty years lobbying for the inclusion of sexual violence in discussions of human rights, the outcome seems to be as much a blessing as a curse. Although there is now widespread recognition that sexual violence qualifies as a violation of human rights, the problem is that rape has become ‘just another’ violation. That is, our efforts have finally succeeded in elevating rape to the status of a human rights violation, but in so doing have added it to an umbrella concept that is already ambiguously defined and conceptually stretched.

Following in the footsteps of Sartori (1970), Jackman (1985) argues that variables should be unidimensional rather than broad constellations of factors that may or may not be empirically inter-related (169). Advocating for a more nuanced understanding of state repression and state-committed human rights violations, Davenport (2007) argues for the conceptual disaggregation of violence across type, time, and space. The author contends that such an approach is not only essential for gauging the robustness of the propositions developed in the literature, but is necessary to explore other arguments that have previously been ignored. In particular, where aggregation presumes a certain degree of coordination among coercive agents that might not exist, disaggregation is useful if we expect actors to respond to different challenges with distinct strategies (Davenport 2007).

In fact, the issue of aggregation and human rights dimensionality has become a polarizing debate in the literature. On one side are those who assert that different types of violations result from different structures of motivations, opportunities, and resources (Davenport 2007; Wood 2008, 2009; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; McCormick and Mitchell 1997). For these scholars, the very recognition of different forces underpinning the expression of violence challenges (if not precludes) the notion that torture, disappearances, killing, imprisonment, and other violations are equally rooted in a single concept. Nevertheless, on the other side of the debate Cingranelli and Richards (1999) refute Mc-
Cormick and Mitchell’s (1997) claim that government respect for physical integrity rights is a multi-dimensional phenomenon.\footnote{In this dissertation, as in most human rights literature, the phrases ‘human rights violations,’ ‘physical integrity rights,’ and ‘personal integrity rights’ are used interchangeably.} Arguing for unidimensionality, the authors use Mokken scale analysis (MSA) to produce an additive measure ‘showing’ that the use of state violence is hierarchical. In particular, the authors argue that human rights violations (specifically imprisonment, torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings) are underscored by the same latent construct and can therefore be placed on an ordinal scale; the touted benefits being that the measure captures the level, pattern, and sequence of state-sponsored human rights violations.\footnote{Here, sequence refers to the order in which governments have a propensity to violate particular physical integrity rights (Cingranelli and Richards 1999).} However, a single hierarchical scale of human rights violations tacitly assumes that gendered or sexual violence and non-sexual violence (like looting or disappearances) are caused by the same underlying construct. That is, the latent motivation for stealing is the same as the motivation for rape.\footnote{Paradoxically, in an 11 page article published in 1999, three years \textit{after} the fallout from atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in a discussion about the actions that define torture (i.e., ‘force, physical or otherwise, that is cruel, inhumane and/or degrading’), the word ‘rape’ never appears. In fact, the phrase ‘sexual violence’ and any references or discussions relating to sexual or gendered violence are entirely absent.} Summarily, if Cingranelli and Richards’ (1999) proposition about the unidimensionality of human rights is true, then we would expect to see covariation in the forms of violence used in war.

Empirically, however, there is little support for the unidimensional argument. Certainly covariation occurs sometimes, but more often than not this is not the case (see Wood 2006, 2009; Kalyvas 2006; Hayden 2000; Potts et al. 2011; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; McCormick and Mitchell 1997; Hill and Jones 2014). In fact, scholars argue that there is no explicit reason why rape should increase proportionally with other forms of violence. Still, perhaps because rape has always been assumed as a given during war, the latent assumption is that it does. The analyses presented here respond directly to this debate in three ways. First, focusing entirely on disaggregated measures of human rights, I use factor analysis to explore the extent to which particular violations share the same latent construct. Second, I employ statistical tests to provide a deeper understanding
of the relationships and patterns among differing human rights violations in ethnic and non-ethnic civil war. Finally, this is the first large-N analysis to directly compare the use of wartime rape with other disaggregated measures of physical integrity in order to discern whether patterns in the use of sexual violence, and rape specifically, differ from other (non-sexual) forms of violence within and across civil wars.

Beginning at Opportunity

Stated broadly, opportunity theories in conflict literature argue that a wartime environment alters the social context of society such that there are increased opportunities for individuals to express behavior that is otherwise outside of ‘normal’ social and legal expectations. Thus, to ask whether the incidents of rape covary with increases in other human rights violations is to evaluate whether the opportunity brought on by war effects the expression of all human rights offenses equally. To this end, where Collier and Hoefler (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that opportunities are the significant factors in predicting civil war, theories of opportunity in sexual violence literature contend that the presence of war increases the opportunity for rape through changes in social norms, expressions of latent primitive desires brought on by wartime chaos, changes in the willingness or ability to punish offenders, and increased contact with potential victims (Wood 2006; Siefert 1994, 1996; Gottschall 2004; Baaz and Stern 2009; Paglia 1993; Thornhill and Palmer 2000). In turn, theories of opportunity expect sexual violence to vary proportionally with other forms of violence.

The most obvious question is why? Certainly literature acknowledges that there are substantial differences in the way governments and other armed groups use types and levels of human right violations (McCormick and Mitchell 1988). Scholarship recognizes that there is considerable distance between regimes that rely on imprisonment and those that rely on torture and killing for political control (Mitchell and McCormick 1988). Moreover, feminist literature has long argued that rape is a war instrument specifically used because of its distinctive impact (Siefert 1994; MacKinnon 1994; Brownmiller 1975; Melandri 2009; McGlynn 2009). While there are strong theoretical reasons and rigorous
qualitative analyses evidencing the sharply contrasted way in which rape occurs against civilians relative to other forms of violence (Wood 2009), the claim has yet to be statistically evaluated. If we accept that violations vary and that rape is a distinctive type of violation unto itself, then why would we expect these phenomena to follow identical patterns of expression? Here again, we reach a theoretical head. While not entirely opposed, the idea that human rights violations are a product of opportunity creates questions for those who believe human rights violations are a purposeful result of the costs and benefits calculated by leaders trying to achieve a desired outcome. What is the relationship between opportunity and strategy? If, for instance, opportunity requires weakened institutions, then at what point do institutions become so weak that strategy can no longer be implemented and opportunities can no longer be controlled? At this point, there are more questions than answers.

Despite the obvious intersection between opportunity theories addressing (what are considered) ‘common’ physical integrity violations (murder, torture, kidnapping, etc.), and those exploring the forces behind and impact of war on rates of rape, investigative overlap is virtually absent. Currently, the majority of research evaluating violence against noncombatants during civil war analyzes homicide to the exclusion of all other violence (de Waal et al. 2014; Weinstein 2007; Kalyvas 1999, 2006; Valentino et al. 2004). To date, few studies focus on rape. Those that extend inquiry beyond murder tend to consider only a small subset of non-sexual human rights violations. Thus, despite broad agreement that theories developed to explain one type of violation cannot readily be applied to other types of violence (Cohen 2013; Davenport 1995, 2007; McCormick and Mitchell 1997; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Hill and Jones 2014), no large-N works to date specifically evaluate the use of sexual violence relative to other forms of human rights violations. In address, this research seeks to bring these literatures into direct

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24 Here, I refer only, and quite specifically to physical integrity rights. This distinction is important as there is a substantial body of work examining the state repressive behaviors including the violations of personal, property, civil and political rights. These broad scale analyses may or may not include violations of human rights, but typically do so only in indexed form. If sexual violence is at all accounted for it is only insofar as reports are considered for or integrated within definitions of ‘torture’; which is rare and often unclear. For works evaluating state repression and human rights as well as those discussing the construction or critique of aggregate measures of human rights, please see: Poe and Tate (1994), Davenport (1995, 2007), Davenport and Armstrong (2004), and Armstrong (2011).
conversation by comparing wartime patterns in the levels of common violations of human rights, specifically torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings, to patterns in the levels of wartime rape.

**Hypotheses**

Based on the positions in the aforementioned literature, this analysis tests two primary hypotheses. Given the substantive body of literature discussing the distinctiveness as of rape as an instrument of war (Wood 2006, 2007, 2009; Cohen 2013a; Thomas and Regan 1994; Hayden 2000; Diken and Lausten 2005; Anwary 2012; Kohn 1994; McKinnon 1994; Reid-Cunningham 2008; Strohmetz N.d.; Ttreault 1997; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Alison 2007; Gottschall 2004; Enloe 1990, 2000), the first hypothesis tests whether the level of rape covaries with other ‘common’ violations of human rights in the same way these other violations correlate with each other.

**H1:** *Rape is used differently than torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings and therefore, I do not expect that rape will correlate with other human rights violations as highly as the 'common' violations correlate with each other.*

The second hypothesis concerns the relationship between rape, ethnic war, mass killing, and genocide. The issue here is whether rape is related to ethnic war (independent of genocide), to genocide (independent of war-type), or to mass-killings (independent of either) (see Mullins 2009; Cohen 2013a; Brown 2012, amongst others). However, debate and confusion dominate in this already nebulous web, largely because of terminological and measurement-based overlap. Although mass-killings and genocides are not the same thing, it is true that they often coexist. In some cases these phrases are used in such close relation that they appear interchangeable. However, where mass-killing refers to a numerical outcome (50,000 or more civilians killed; see Valentino et al. 2004 for a state-based account of mass-killing), genocide refers to the implementation of an intention. Thus, to ask about the relationship between rape and genocide is very different
from asking whether rape is related mass-killing. Unfortunately, using mass-killings as a measure of the presence of genocide conflates outcome with process/intent, increasing the likelihood of type I error.

Fortunately, this research provides a platform on which to begin parsing out these relationships. While state-perpetrated mass-killings are not technically measures of human rights violations (in that they do not distinguish between non-combat and combat related deaths), it is possible to assess the way in which patterns of rape compare to patterns of mass-killing. All arguments made thus far postulate that rape is distinctive from other human rights violations and does not covary with more traditional measures of human rights violations in the same way those violations covary with one another. The broader argument here is that rape is not expected to have the same correlation with mass killings as mass killings have with other forms of human rights violations. In turn, hypothesis two is:

H2: The use of rape is not merely a byproduct of massive-scale attacks and is not expected to correlate with incidents of mass-killing as highly as mass killings correlates with other measures of human rights violations.

Data and Methods

Data

Data for this research comprise an original dataset measuring annual variation in the use of rape by armed groups for all civil war wars between 1980 and 2009. The core of this dataset was taken from Cohen’s (2013a) data exploring the the impact of armed
group social cohesion on the level of rape used in conflict. Additional variables were gathered from the World Bank, the Cingranelli-Richards CIRI dataset, the Correlates of War dataset, and the U.S. State Department. For a total of 86 conflicts covering 983 conflict-years, the analyses presented here compare individual measures of mass-killings, disappearances, extra-judicial killings, torture, government-perpetrated rape, and conflict-level rape. Each measure is explained in turn. First, the variable for mass-killing takes a value of 1 of the state killed more than 50,000 civilians, and is otherwise a 0. The measure is borrowed from Cohen’s (2013a) dataset, but is based on Valentino et al.’s (2004) measure.

The three human rights violations are taken from the 2013 update of the CIRI dataset. Specific to government-perpetrated violations of rights, these data measure only those violations committed by the state government or those sponsored by the state government. The disappearance measure captures cases in which people have disappeared, political motivation appears likely, and the victims have not been found. The original measure was recoded such that a score of 0 indicates that no disappearances occurred in the year; a score of 1 indicates that disappearances occurred occasionally; and a score of 2 indicates that disappearances occurred frequently.

Extra-judicial killing measures the number of killings by government officials without due process of law (excluding combat-deaths). This includes the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of lethal force by the police, security forces, or other agents of the state whether against criminal suspects, detainees, prisoners or others as well as murders by state-sponsored private groups. The original measure was recoded such that a score of 0 indicates that no extra-judicial killings occurred in the year; a score of 1 indicates that extra-judicial killings occurred occasionally; and a score of 2 indicates that extra-judicial killings occurred frequently.

Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, including the use of physical and other force by by government officials, police and prison guards, and those sponsored/instigated by government officials that is cruel, inhuman, or degrading (up to and including deaths in custody due to negligence). The original measure was recoded such that a score of 0 indicates that no torture occurred in the
year; a score of 1 indicates that torture occurred occasionally; and a score of 2 indicates that torture occurred frequently.\textsuperscript{26}

There are two ordinal measures of rape used for comparison, both of which come from Cohen’s (2013a) data; these include a measure of rape perpetrated by government/state forces, and a measure of conflict-level rape that records the highest level of rape used/reached in the conflict regardless of the perpetrator.\textsuperscript{27} Cohen (2013a) coded the rape measures using data from human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the American Red Cross (amongst others), as well as information from original interviews. Both ordinal measures consist of 4 values in which a score of 0 means no mention of rape; a score of 1 indicates infrequent or isolated reports of rape; a score of 2 refers to not irregular use of rape, including reports in which rape is described as ‘widespread,’ ‘common,’ extensive,’ ‘pattern,’ etc.; a score of 3 refers to rape described as ‘systematic,’ ‘massive,’ ‘tool of war,’ etc.\textsuperscript{28} Within a given conflict there is a measure for government-perpetrated and conflict-level rape. All conflicts are divided down into dyads. If there are multiple conflicts within a state in a given year, each conflict is coded separately.\textsuperscript{29}

Three primary methods were used to assess the relationships between variables. First, bivariate correlation tests were performed to assess the extent of covariance between variables. Second, logistic regressions were employed to address the relative ability of some human rights violations to predict the use of others. Finally, factor analysis was used to

\textsuperscript{26}Future research should also explore the relationship between CIRI’s political imprisonment measure and the other human rights measures explored here. The measure was not included because it is also a measure of civil and political rights, and the purpose here was to remain specifically focused on physical violence. In addition, there is overlap between the political imprisonment measure and torture, as torture includes deaths and abuse while in state custody. In this way, most of the information from the imprisonment score is captured in the torture measure. Nevertheless, as research expands to investigate human rights patterns on increasingly broad scales, the imprisonment measure is a good place to begin.

\textsuperscript{27}As will be explained in later chapters, Cohen’s (2013a) data includes three rape variables: government-perpetrated rape, rebel-perpetrated rape, and conflict-level rape. Thus conflict-level rape records the highest level of rape reached in the conflict regardless of whether it was perpetrated by the state or by a rebel group. Because the human rights violations from CIRI measure only those violations committed by the state, the rebel-perpetrated rape variable is not used in this chapter. However, preliminary statistical tests were initially conducted as a check and and the results for rebel-perpetrated rape follow the same patterns as those for government-perpetrated and conflict-level rape.

\textsuperscript{28}For a full list of coding rules, please refer to Table 14 in the appendix.

\textsuperscript{29}Because the CIRI measures were developed with the expressed purpose of evaluating government respect for physical integrity rights, only graphs for government-perpetrated rape and conflict-level rape are displayed here.
determine the extent to which the variables shared the same underlying construct. As an added form of support, Welch’s two-sample t-tests (aka unequal variances t-tests) were used to test whether means for the measures of rape were equal to the means for other human rights violations (see Table 15 in the appendix).30

Data limitations

The data limitations inherent in studying rape are well documented and generally understood across the literature (Baaz and Stern 2009; Enloe 2000; Sharlach 2000; Gottschall 2004; Allen 1996; Barstow 2000; Hyuan-Kyung 2000; MacKinnon 1994; Salzman 2000; Rittner and Roth 2012; Koo 2002; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Ward and Marsh 2006; Russell-Brown 2003; Hayden 2000; Bloom 1999; Cohen 2013a; Farr 2009). Countless authors detail the challenges associated with collecting data on wartime rape as it is a private, gendered, highly-stigmatized matter; often occurring in countries with deep-seeded patriarchies in which raped women are seen as dirty, ruined, unworthy for marriage, shameful, or even deserving of death. For this reason, reports on the number of rapes in any conflict reflect only our best estimates to date given the information we have available. and generally understood across the literature. However, Cohen (2013a) and others note that while conflict rape seems to be on the rise, it is possible this upsurge in reports has more to do with post-Bosnian issue salience and the increased media attention and reporting practices.

Where possible missing data values were supplemented with updated measures from the World Bank, CIA fact book, Human Rights Watch, the U.S. State Department, Amnesty international and others. In other cases, data was imputed using other observations to calculated modal or averaged scores. For instance, Cohen’s (2013a) original dataset contained a small number of missing observations for the rape variables. However, relative to government rape, if the conflict-year prior to the NA value was coded 1, and the conflict-year following the NA value was coded 1, the missing observation was coded 1.30

30Welch’s t-tests were selected over Student’s t-tests as they are more reliable in the face of unequal sample sizes and do not assume equal variance.
Results

For descriptive purposes, the graphs in Figures 1 and 2 display the use of traditional human rights violations at each level of rape, for both government-perpetrated rape and conflict-level rape in ethnic and non-ethnic war. These distributions stand as a basis from which to evaluate the relative covariation between rape, extra-judicial killings, disappearances, and torture.  

Tables 1-3 present the correlation matrices of all the variables across all war types.

In particular, Table 1 provides a correlation matrix for all variables across all (aggregated) war types, offering preliminary support for the first hypothesis. Understanding that a score of 1 represents a perfect correlation between variables, arguably scores at or below 0.5 (or conservatively, 0.4) represent variables with enough distinction that they can be included in the same model (as they would be expected to measure/account for different concepts). Notably, however, the highest correlation between rape and any of the other human rights measures is 0.244 (between conflict-level rape and torture). Across the matrix, the low correlations between rape and the other three human rights violations, relative to the higher correlations between torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings support the idea that there is something distinct about the use of rape. That is, rape does not appear to have the same covariance with other human right violations as these non-rape violations have with one another. In fact, the lowest correlation among the three ‘common’ human rights violations, 0.312 between torture and disappearances, is still higher than the highest correlation between any rape and non-rape correlation.

Still, the fact that the correlations between torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial

---

31 There are 664 conflict-years in which there was at least an ‘occasional’ record of rape, 253 observations perpetrated by rebels and 411 perpetrated by governments, leaving 319 conflict-years without any records of rape. At the lowest level of government-leveraged rape (i.e., no rape / the absence of rape reports) there were a total of 338 observations of frequent torture (486 observations with any level of torture, occasional or frequent), 160 frequent disappearances (327 observations with any level of disappearances), and 287 frequent extra-judicial killings (450 observations with any level of extra-judicial killings). At the highest level of government-perpetrated rape (i.e., mass or tactical rape) there were 22 observations of frequent torture, 11 observations of frequent disappearances, and 21 observations of frequent extra-judicial killings. Across all wars there were 863 instances of torture; 190 observations of occasional torture and 673 observations of frequent torture. There were 632 observations of disappearance; 274 observations of occasional disappearance and 358 observations of frequent disappearance. Finally, there were 827 observations of extra-judicial killing; 250 observations of occasional extra-judicial killing and 577 observations of frequent extra-judicial killing.
killings do not exceed 0.474 challenges Cingranelli and Richards (1999) assertions that human rights measures exist on a unidimensional scale. With low-moderate correlation values below 0.50, these results support the position that there may be different forces underpinning the expression of different forms of violence.
Figure 1: Government-perpetrated Rape versus Other Violations in Ethnic and Non-ethnic War

Figure 2: Conflict-level Rape versus Other Violations in Ethnic and Non-ethnic War
Table 1: Correlation Matrix of Human Rights Violations Across All Wars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Govt Rape</th>
<th>Conflict Rape</th>
<th>Torture</th>
<th>Disappearance</th>
<th>Extra-jud Killing</th>
<th>Mass Killing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Govt Rape</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.856</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Rape</td>
<td>0.856</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearance</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-jud Killing</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Killing</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For added insight, Tables 2 and 3 present the correlation matrices for ethnic and non-ethnic war respectively. Table 2 reveals slightly higher correlations between rape and non-rape human rights violations than were in Table 1; though all remain under 0.30. A comparison of the two tables reveals that the relationship between rape, torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings is stronger during ethnic war than in non-ethnic war. In fact, the correlations between rape and the other three human rights violations decline substantially in non-ethnic war; where the highest correlation is 0.182 between government-perpetrated rape and disappearances. However, while the relationship between rape and non-rape violations changes slightly depending on the type of war, the correlations between torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings remain fairly consistent across war types.

Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Human Rights Violations in Ethnic War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Govt Rape</th>
<th>Conflict Rape</th>
<th>Torture</th>
<th>Disappearance</th>
<th>Extra-jud Killing</th>
<th>Mass Killing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Govt Rape</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.889</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>0.290</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Rape</td>
<td>0.889</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.373</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearance</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-jud Killing</td>
<td>0.290</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>0.373</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Killing</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Human Rights Violations in Non-ethnic War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Govt Rape</th>
<th>Conflict Rape</th>
<th>Torture</th>
<th>Disappearance</th>
<th>Extra-jud Killing</th>
<th>Mass Killing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Govt Rape</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Rape</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>-0.230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearance</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-jud Killing</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Killing</td>
<td>-0.153</td>
<td>-0.230</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These differential changes suggest that the type of war has important implications for the use of violence. Since the factors that produce and operate within the war vary based on context (Sambanis 2001; Laitin 1995), these results support the notion that rights violations emerging from different contexts follow different pairings and patterns. Due to the fact that ethnic war engages notions of identity and thus, existential threat,
scholars argue that ethnic conflict is prone to more human rights violations and extreme violence, including rape (Tronvoll 2008, 66; Cohen 2013a; Horowitz 1985; Plumper and Neumayer 2006; Bloom 1999). To this end, the strength of the correlations between rape and non-rape human rights violations shown in Table 2 suggests that there may be a specific connection between the use of rape and the context, characteristics of, or goals within ethnic war. More specifically, since ethnic conflicts, more so than non-ethnic conflicts, tend to involve disputes of over territory, it is reasonable to expect that there is greater interest in removing or eliminating a population (from a land or otherwise), and therefore a greater likelihood of using more extreme forms of violence.\(^{32}\) That is, provided the characteristics (and usual goals) of ethnic war, these findings support feminist literatures highlighting the conditions under which rape becomes a uniquely strong method of warfare; as the consequences of rape (destruction of society and social fabric, elimination of a population from a particular area, etc.) are precisely aligned with the achievement of common goals in ethnic war. Speaking broadly, these findings reinforce the idea that not all human rights violations are used equally and interchangeably across all contexts.\(^{33}\)

In addition to the bivariate correlation tests, a series of proportional odds logistic regressions were used to assess the relationship between rape and non-rape human rights violations. The regressions in Tables 4 and 5 investigate the extent to which ‘common’ violations of physical integrity predict the use of rape in conflict. Three models were esti-

\(^{32}\)For instance, the dataset for this dissertation contains a total of 291 non-ethnic conflict-years, and yet there is not a single territorial conflict among them. That is, across the 86 conflicts analyzed for this project, territorial war only occurs in ethnic war.

\(^{33}\)For reference, Table 15 in the appendix provides the results of Welch’s two-sample t-tests; exploring the difference of means between rape and other human rights violations. For the vast majority of comparisons we are able to reject the null; recognizing a statistically significant difference between the means of rape compared with those of the other three types of human rights violation. Though it could be the case that the means are always different, and at the same time, that rape and other violations still increase with other, the comparison is provided as additional confirmation for the uniqueness and distinction between the forms of violence. The exceptions to statistical significance are the pairwise relationships between conflict-level rape and torture, and government-perpetrated rape and extra-judicial killings in both ethnic and non-ethnic war. Only in these four cases do we fail to reject the null. These four deviations are most likely explained by issues of data availability and measurement. The lack of statistically different means between rape and torture, as well as extra-judicial killings and government perpetrated rape reiterate the need for better specified (and thus distinguished) human rights measurements.
Table 4: Do Other Human Rights Violations Predict Government-perpetrated Rape?

**DV: Government Rape across All War**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(model 1)</th>
<th>(model 2)</th>
<th>(model 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>0.907**</td>
<td>1.009**</td>
<td>0.995**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearances</td>
<td>0.289**</td>
<td>0.432**</td>
<td>0.995**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-judicial Killing</td>
<td>0.507**</td>
<td>0.685**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1306.8</td>
<td>1314.2</td>
<td>1311.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRE</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ePRE</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-square</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DV: Government Rape in Ethnic War**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(model 1)</th>
<th>(model 2)</th>
<th>(model 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>1.322**</td>
<td>1.506**</td>
<td>1.490**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.294)</td>
<td>(0.287)</td>
<td>(0.291)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearances</td>
<td>0.248*</td>
<td>0.462**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-judicial Killing</td>
<td>0.818**</td>
<td>0.968**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>926.4</td>
<td>942.0</td>
<td>928.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRE</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ePRE</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-square</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DV: Government Rape in Non-ethnic War**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(model 1)</th>
<th>(model 2)</th>
<th>(model 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>−0.048</td>
<td>−0.100</td>
<td>0.264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.356)</td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
<td>(0.334)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearances</td>
<td>0.781**</td>
<td>0.608**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-judicial Killing</td>
<td>−0.559</td>
<td>−0.105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.342)</td>
<td>(0.300)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>334.1</td>
<td>334.7</td>
<td>342.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRE</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ePRE</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-square</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
mated for each of the rape variables. The first model contains all three ‘common’ human rights violations. In order to account for any distortions due to collinearity, the second and third models separate extra-judicial killings from disappearances, given that they are correlated above a 0.4. Table 4 displays the regression results for non-rape human rights violations on government-perpetrated rape. Here, three points become particularly important. At first glance, the statistical significance appears to contradict the information from the correlation matrices. However, a closer review of the AIC, PRE and ePRE scores reveals poor model fit and an overall lack of substantive significance. Specifically, across all war types, the combination of torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings, at best, allows us to predict 5.5% of the variation in government-perpetrated rape (based on ePRE value). In probabilistic terms, the same variation could likely be explained by error. Second, as was revealed in the correlation matrices, the picture changes somewhat when we consider the impact of ethnic war. In ethnic war, the predictive capacity of the non-rape variables on the use of government-perpetrated rape increases marginally. All non-rape human rights violations retain statistical significance and have the potential to explain 9% of the variation in the dependent variable (though again, at least half of which could be attributable to error).

In the context of non-ethnic war, however, virtually all of the power of non-rape human rights violations to predict the use of government-perpetrated rape vanishes. In fact, torture and extra-judicial killings flip their signs and lose statistical significance, leaving only disappearances with a statistically significant impact on the use of government-leveraged rape. Though model fit scores improve slightly, the overall model is close to powerless. With an ePRE score of 0.034, at best the non-rape variables might predict roughly 3% of the variation in government-leveraged rape. Table 5 shows the same

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34Notably, in non-ethnic war, the use of rape never reached the highest ordinal value. That is, rape never reached the level of being “tactical.” Relative to government perpetrated rape in non-ethnic war, there were 142 observations of no rape reports, 61 observations of infrequent rape, 11 observations of frequent rape, and 0 observations of tactical rape. For conflict-level rape in non-ethnic war, there were 120 observations of no rape reports, 64 observations of infrequent rape, and 30 observations of frequent rape. In ethnic war, the distribution of government-perpetrated rape included 329 observations of no rape reports, 95 observations of infrequent rape, 75 observations of frequent rape, and 14 observations of tactical rape. For conflict-level rape in ethnic war there were 303 observations of no rape reports, 92 observations of infrequent rape, 96 observations of frequent rape, and 22 observations of tactical rape.
Table 5: Do Other Human Rights Violations Predict Conflict-level Rape?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: Conflict-Level Rape across All War</th>
<th>(model 1)</th>
<th>(model 2)</th>
<th>(model 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>1.110***</td>
<td>1.270***</td>
<td>1.187***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.253)</td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td>(0.250)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearances</td>
<td>0.256**</td>
<td>0.435***</td>
<td>0.665***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-judicial Killing</td>
<td>-0.888***</td>
<td>-0.531*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.319)</td>
<td>(0.263)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations                          | 513      | 513      | 513      |
| AIC                                   | 1029.3   | 1041.2   | 1031.7   |
| PRE                                   | 0.000    | 0.000    | 0.000    |
| ePRE                                  | 0.059    | 0.048    | 0.044    |
| R-square                              | 0.161    | 0.134    | 0.152    |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: Conflict-level Rape in Ethnic War</th>
<th>(model 1)</th>
<th>(model 2)</th>
<th>(model 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>0.570*</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>0.817**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.343)</td>
<td>(0.336)</td>
<td>(0.328)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearances</td>
<td>0.622***</td>
<td>0.360*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.232)</td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-judicial Killing</td>
<td>-0.888***</td>
<td>-0.531*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.319)</td>
<td>(0.263)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations                          | 214      | 214      | 214      |
| AIC                                   | 465.3    | 411.2    | 410.9    |
| PRE                                   | -0.021   | 0.000    | -0.011   |
| ePRE                                  | 0.041    | 0.024    | 0.020    |
| R-square                              | 0.084    | 0.043    | 0.045    |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: Conflict-level Rape in Non-ethnic War</th>
<th>(model 1)</th>
<th>(model 2)</th>
<th>(model 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>0.965**</td>
<td>1.032***</td>
<td>1.054***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.198)</td>
<td>(0.195)</td>
<td>(0.195)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearances</td>
<td>0.292**</td>
<td>0.385***</td>
<td>0.494***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-judicial Killing</td>
<td>0.319**</td>
<td>0.494***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.153)</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations                           | 727      | 727      | 727      |
| AIC                                     | 1474.0   | 1476.4   | 1479.8   |
| PRE                                     | 0.000    | 0.000    | 0.000    |
| ePRE                                    | 0.059    | 0.048    | 0.044    |
| R-square                                | 0.167    | 0.101    | 0.096    |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
series of regression results for the three non-rape human rights violations on conflict-level rape. Following a similar pattern as that evidenced in Table 4, we see the broad statistical significance accompanied by poor model fit scores and low predictive capacity. Finally, the output for models in non-ethnic war suggests that models are not robust to changes. Here, extra-judicial killings appears to be necessary for torture to reach statistical significant and also seems to augment the significance of the disappearances variable. While torture retains a positive sign, the extra-judicial killings variable becomes negative in non-ethnic war, just as it did in the government-perpetrated rape models. Here, the negative sign would seem to suggest that increases in extra-judicial killings result in decreases in conflict-level rape. One plausible explanation is that murder is place of rape, as has been noted in the Sri Lankan civil war (see Wood 2009). However, at this stage an equally likely explanation is that the unexpected sign is a product of the lack of controls and errors in data and measurement. That said, Tables 4 and 5 reiterate the conclusions drawn from the correlation matrices, offering broad support of the first hypothesis. Specifically, results indicate that the use of rape does not covary with more ‘common’ human rights violations in the same way they correlate with each other. Here, war context matters. The relationship between rape and other violations is strongest in the context of ethnic war. In non-ethnic war, there is virtually no relationship between the use of rape and the use of other human rights violations.

Directly addressing the relationships between variables, exploratory factor analysis was used to assess the relative multidimensionality of the human rights measures. To briefly explain, exploratory factor analysis is a method for analyzing covariation among a set of observed variables in which the researcher makes no a priori assumptions about the relationships among factors. Factor analysis searches for joint variations in the observed

35 In fact, relative to the levels of rape, models reveal that if one were to guess a value of zero, the guess would be correct more than 50% of the time, regardless of the type of war or the type of rape. In particular, relative to non-ethnic war, if 0 was assumed for government-perpetrated rape, the estimate would be right 66.4% of the time; for conflict-level rape, 0 would be correct 56% of the time. In ethnic war, a 0 estimate for government-perpetrated rape would be correct 64% of the time; for conflict-level rape, 0 would be right 59.1% of the time. Across all war, an estimate of 0 for government-perpetrated rape would be correct 64.8% of the time; for conflict-level rape, 0 would be right 58.2% of the time.

36 Here, models are presented for purely exploratory purposes. While these regressions can be illustrative for understanding general relationships, the results must be interpreted cautiously as full models (complete with controls) were not specified.
variables that may be ‘caused’ or motivated by unobserved, latent variables. That is, interdependencies between observed variables are used to reduce the set of variables in the dataset to reflect a smaller number of underlying constructs. Thus, a factor refers to a latent construct that ‘causes’ variation in the observed variables. Algebraically, factors are estimated using linear combinations of observed variables. In turn, the set weight for each factor gives the factor score coefficients for that factor. Subsequently, analogous to Pearson’s r, factor loading is the percent of variance in the observed variables that is explained by the latent factor. So, where the uniqueness of an observed variable is the variance unexplained by latent factors (and is therefore unique to that variable), communality refers to the variance within the observed variable that is accounted for by all the factors (i.e., Uniqueness = 1-communality).

Table 6: Factor Analysis: Uniqueness and Loadings Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict-level Rape</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Rape</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Rape</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearances</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-judicial Killing</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Killing</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS loadings</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion Var</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Var</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: p = 0.165; using promax rotation

Table 6 shows the results of factor analysis performed on all variables, including rebel-perpetrated rape (for comparative purposes) and mass killing. The low uniqueness, high commonality, and high loadings scores of conflict-level rape and government-perpetrated rape indicate that the same underlying construct motivates variance in both measures of rape. In contrast, the force underlying rebel-perpetrated rape stands largely on its own. Equally, note that measures of rape are not represented by the same factor as are the three CIRI human rights violations. This finding further supports the first hypothesis suggesting that rape does not covary in the same way as do other forms of violence; adding credence to the idea that rape is used tactically or symbolically to accomplisher
larger, strategic objectives.

Relative to the unidimensionality of the CIRI measures, the factor analysis output is consistent with the earlier results from the bivariate correlation tests. Here, the output suggests that the construct underlying torture may be different than the latent force underlying extra-judicial killings and disappearances. The high uniqueness score for the torture measure (0.77) and relatively lower loading score on the second factor (0.43) indicates that torture may have a more unique, independent motivator than do disappearances and extra-judicial killings. This is, in many ways, expected as many who are disappeared are later found to be dead. Nevertheless, these scores indicate that Cingranelli and Richard’s (1999) unidimensional scale of human rights may not be appropriate; as scores are not high enough across all three CIRI measures to suggest a single latent factor.

At the bottom of Table 6, the proportional variance score gives the proportion of variance accounted for by the factor, while the cumulative variances gives the cumulative proportion of variance accounted for by this factor in combination with all previous factors. At best, the cumulative variance explained by all three factors accounts for roughly 56% of the variation in the observed variables. To this end, the fact that the mass killing variable did not load on any of the three factors, and instead retained a uniqueness score of 0.96, suggests that mass killing is distinct from all other human rights violations accounted for here. Certainly, in support of the second hypothesis, these results provide some confirmation that mass killings do not share a strongly causal force with occurrences of rape in conflict. However, it is equally important to note that while rape is not strongly aligned with mass killings, mass killings are not strongly aligned with other human rights violations. That is, not only is rape distinct from mass killing, but mass killings are distinct unto themselves. Overall, provided the low proportional variance scores, there is cause to reject the idea that human rights violations exist on a unidimensional scale. Rather, misalignment remains, and greater efforts to disaggregate
(and potentially re-aggregate) human rights violations are necessary.\textsuperscript{37}

Speaking to the second hypothesis, Tables 2, 3, and 7 provide some interesting insights. Comparing the correlation matrix of variables in ethnic war presented in Table 2 with the correlations from non-ethnic war in Table 3, the sign change in the mass killing variable becomes particularly important.\textsuperscript{38} That is, where rape and mass killing evidence a positive relationship in ethnic war, there appears to be a negative relationship between the two variables in non-ethnic war. Noted earlier, there is a stronger (positive) relationship between all human rights violations in ethnic war than in non-ethnic war. Coupled with the evidenced negative relationship in non-ethnic war, the results here have two important implications. First, these findings challenge Mullins’ (2009) assertions that rape is more so a product of mass killings than it is a characteristic of ethnic war. In fact, the output presented here directly contradicts that assertion; showing a positive relationship between rape and ethnic war, and a relationship between mass killing and rape with is specifically conditioned by ethnic war. Second, to the extent that rape is prohibited or avoided in non-ethnic war, there is support for the idea that the distinctive characteristics and/or outcomes of rape make it a particularly attractive weapon in ethnic conflicts. While more research is necessary, this finding provides a particularly strong platform from which to investigate strategic uses of rape in war.

Table 7 identifies the number of mass-killings that occurred at each level of the rape variables for which rape was present. The numbers not only indicate that rape is independent of mass-killings, but that mass-killings typically happen when there are lower

\textsuperscript{37}While it is outside the scope of this research to provide a full discussion on the pros and cons of the factor analysis technique, it is fair to say that factor analysis is only as good as data allow. The method is not flawless and it is possible that more than one interpretation can be made of the same data factored in the same way. Nevertheless, factor analysis provides yet another tool to understand the interrelationships and covariation among human rights measures. While no one method provides a determinative conclusion, understanding the ways in which different instruments interpret and relate these complex constructs can only aid in creating a more complete picture of their relative interdependence.

\textsuperscript{38}There are 108 instances of mass-killing in the dataset, and 733 instances of no mass-killing. Of the 108 observations, 54 of them occurred in ethnic war and 54 occurred in non-ethnic war.
levels of rape. The Welch t-test for mass-killings and government rape revealed a statistically significant difference between means at the alpha 0.05 level. A subsequent Welch test between mass-killings and conflict-level rape also revealed a statistically significant relationship. These results provide additional confirmation that rape is not merely a byproduct of mass-killings and should not be expected to covary with mass killings in the same way that other, ‘common’ human rights violations covary with one another. Though the tests presented here are simple, they are consistent and sufficient to establish broad relational patterns between rape and other types of human rights violations.

Table 7: Distribution of Mass-killings Relative to Rape in Civil War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rape Source</th>
<th>Level of Rape</th>
<th>Incidents of Mass-killing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic War</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict-Level Rape</td>
<td>Occasional Rape</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequent Rape</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass Rape</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Rape</td>
<td>Occasional Rape</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequent Rape</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass Rape</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Rape</td>
<td>Occasional Rape</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequent Rape</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass Rape</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ethnic War</td>
<td>Occasional Rape</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequent Rape</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass Rape</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here, it is important to keep in mind the weaknesses in the data. It is entirely possible, and even likely in some cases that victims of mass-killings were raped prior to their murder. Often, in these instances, reports of those rapes would only occur if a witness or combatant reported the experience. In fact, there are many qualitative studies that detail interviews with and personal narratives from former combatants who reveal the violent tactics and processes they (and their compatriots / commanders) used in the conflicts (for instance, see Cain 1999; Alexandra 2010). However, much of the data on rape relies on the self-reporting that occurs at the NGOs and/or medical facilities in which the rape victims seek care. Since murdered rape victims do not seek care or self report, there are no data available that can truly reveal the extent to which rape occurs at mass-killings. At present, however, this research uses the data that are available to make the most-informed, albeit far from flawless, inferences. For an innovative approach to dealing with data challenges challenges, see Potts et al. (2011).

For reference, relational patterns were also explored between the rape variables and the presence of genocide. In all three war categories (all war, ethnic war only, and non-ethnic war only), the lowest number observations for genocide occurred at the highest levels of rape. Once again, this is particularly relevant for non-ethnic wars, in which the highest level of rape is never achieved. Thus, the lowest number of genocide observations occurred at rape level 2 (“frequent rape”). Correlation tests were also performed using the number of conflict deaths. Across all wars, mass-killing correlates with genocide at 0.60 and with deaths at 0.40; deaths and genocide correlate at 0.33. In ethnic war, mass-killing correlates with genocide at 0.54 and with deaths at 0.30. In non-ethnic war, mass-killing correlates with genocide at 0.66 and with deaths at 0.46.
Conclusion

This chapter explored broad-scale patterns in the use of rape compared to other forms of violence; specifically, other violations against physical integrity. In support of both hypotheses, findings from this research suggest three important points. First, the results here challenge literature advocating for a unidimensional concept of human rights (Cingranelli and Richards 1999). Preliminary evidence highlights that human rights violations may not be strictly scalar, nor unidimensional. In fact, the comparisons presented here show that forms of violence are not used equally and interchangeably across all types of war, as levels of rape do not covary in the same way as other common ‘side effects’ of war. Rather, data from this chapter reveal that wartime rape may be used instead of other forms of violence. In turn, several potentialities exist. First, using Mokken scale analysis to test rape with other forms of human rights violence will provide valuable insights into the unidimensionality argument. Additionally, it is plausible that relationships between forms of violence, and the extent to which they are scalar or inter-related may differ across war-types.

As well, further exploration into the connections between the symbolic meanings and strategic use of rape is imperative. Here, it is possible that armed groups committing tactical and mass rapes are focused on imposing the kind of outcomes typical of (if not unique to) wartime rape. Alternately, it could be that the mechanisms allowing armed groups to control combatant behavior are different for differing types of human rights violations. Where institutional arrangements or group dynamics may allow for some behavior modification among combatants, it is likely that not all behaviors are so easily modified. That is, the ability and incentives to promote and/or inhibit certain combatant behaviors are likely to change not only within the context of the conflict, but among the armed groups within that conflict. Subsequently, in support of McCormick and Mitchell (1997), these analyses extend advocations to better differentiate between measures of human rights, and therefore better understand the complex mechanisms that motivate or inhibit the violation of those rights.

Second, this research buttresses arguments emphasizing the differences between ethnic
and non-ethnic war and the impact of those differences on the expression, length, and processes of conflict. The results here lay groundwork for the argument that the goals and problems that characterize ethnic war also have a determinative impact on the types of violence used by armed groups within the war. As much, the changing relationship between rape and mass killing (and to a lesser extent between extra-judicial killing and rape) based on the type of war suggests that war type may condition the choice and level of violence used in conflict. By using the differences between ethnic and non-ethnic war as a point of entry, this work extends the work of Wood (2006, 2008, 2009), Mitchell and McCormick (1988), Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) and others emphasizing the politics of violence. In particular, the form of violence depend on its meaning to social actors in a cultural context (Ellis 1995; Wood 2008). More than a mere side-effect of mass-killings, genocides, institutional weakness or conflict induced chaos, the social nature of violence, and of rape more specifically, forces it into the political bargaining space. In this way, rape is just as likely to be used as a coercive means to achieve a goal.

Finally, the analyses here and the challenges presented reiterate the need to focus on concept development and appropriately operationalized measurement instruments. Future research should expand efforts to disaggregate human rights violations and determine the extent of the relationships between different forms of violence and the conditions under which certain (seemingly) prescriptive combinations emerge. Only with sensitive measurement instruments can we avoid the problems of collinearity that confound an accurate assessment of the differential patterns in human rights violations. Additionally, with the vast majority of research focusing on human rights abuses by state governments, efforts to better record and understand rebel violations are paramount to a holistic understanding of dyadic (or polyadic) conflict. We necessarily, though unintentionally, limit our own progression by continuing to examine human rights abuses from a single side of the conflict. In this sense, data collection, issues of conceptualization and measurement, and increasing the number of two-sided large-N analyses is imperative.
Chapter 3

Explaining Rebel-leveraged Rape

“Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities.”

Voltaire

Why do some insurgent groups use rape pervasively while others hardly use it all? What explains variation in the use of rape across rebels groups? While there is broad consensus that patterns of violence vary across conflicts and armed groups (de Waal et al. 2014; Suhrke 2010; Valentino et al. 2004; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Sann and Wood 2014; Cohen 2013a; Leiby 2009; Bourke 2007), there is a paucity of information and theory specific to violent patterns by rebel groups (Davenport 2007). Yet, there is no reason to expect that non-state insurgencies have the same resources, motivations, goals or strategies as the state. That is, if violent means are used to pursue a particular end, and we know that states and insurgencies often seek different ends, it is only logical that they would employ different means. In turn, the purpose of this research is to better understand the factors that explain variance in rebel use of wartime rape. The objectives of this chapter are three-fold. First, the presented literature will highlight theoretical weaknesses in existing theories of wartime rape, with particular focus on group-level theories. Next, a preference-based theory of wartime rape will be offered as a way of addressing theoretical weaknesses. Finally, the preference-based theory will be applied separately to ethnic and non-ethnic war in order to determine how the type of war impacts the explanatory power of the models.

In turn, this analysis makes three contributions to existing literature on sexual violence in conflict. Most broadly, this research contributes to a body of work seeking
to understand sexually violent patterns exemplified by non-state armed groups. While there is a rich qualitative literature evaluating rebel motivations for wartime rape (Wood 2009; Bloom 1999; Leiby 2009; Sharlach 2000), quantitative analyses are only beginning to emerge. In turn, the analyses here offer statistical insights into broad patterns in rebel violence. To that end, this work represents the first large-N study of rebel group leadership preferences for rape in civil war. In all, this research examines leadership preferences across 86 civil conflicts between 1980 and 2009. Finally, this study illustrates that an appropriate account of the type of war is paramount to understanding the strength and weaknesses of new and existing theories. That is, the explanatory power of theoretical models varies considerably based on whether they are applied in ethnic versus non-ethnic war.

**Theories of Wartime Rape**

*Individual-level Theories*

Generally speaking, theories of wartime rape can be classified by the level of analysis. Bio-determinist and bio-social theories sit at the individual-level, social cohesion and other sociological theories sit at the group-level, and cultural or institutional theories largely exist at the state-level. While psychological theories offered some of the earliest explanations for rape (Amir 1971), these and other biology-based explanations struggle to explain group-level patterns in the use of sexual violence. Where bio-determinism explains rape as a product of genetics, biosocial theories argue that the motive for wartime rape is the innate sexual desire of individual fighters, but that the phenomena cannot be distinguished from sociocultural context (Gottschall 2004, 134). While the biological motivators range from hormone levels (Wood 2006) and primal drives for reproduction (Thornhill and Palmer 2000; Wood 2006, 2008), to socio-chemical (mal)adaptations (Gould and Lewontin 1979) and illness (Amir 1971), or to an intrinsic heterosexuality ‘unleashed’ by war (Sierfert 1996; Baaz and Stern 2009; Goldstein 2001), the conclusions are the same. If rape is a product of some primal or otherwise genetic need within males, why don’t all men rape? If there is a need to propagate the species, why do we see the
extreme violence (rape with objects, mutilations, murder, etc.) that so often accompanies wartime rape? Simply stated, these biology-based individual-level explanations cannot explain variation in the levels of rape within and between conflicts or among groups.

**State-level Theories**

On the other side of the spectrum are state-level explanations. Feminist literature has made the most significant contributions to the development of state-level theories. To this end, there are three broad arguments. First, citing both conscious and unconscious expressions of dominance, scholars argue that wartime rape is a product of rape cultures or rape-prone societies (Siefert 1992, 1993; Sanday 2003). In particular, higher levels of rape would be expected in societies in which male power has been destabilized, women have subordinate status and are held in low esteem, and in the presence of rigid definitions of “masculine” and “feminine” that define a gendered hierarchy (Siefert 1993, 2). Citing the example of the United States with its strong women’s movement and correspondingly unstable male power, nearly all modern Western societies would be expected to experience more frequent occurrences of rape (Siefert 1993, 1996). In contrast, rape free societies are those in which male supremacy is completely unchallenged (Siefert 1992, 1993).

However, Siefert’s (1992) hypotheses challenge another prominent state-level argument; namely that gender inequality facilitates the acceptance of violence against women (Cohen 2013a). Here, customs, practices, institutions, and various legislation serve as forces that discriminate against women (Heit 2009; Brown 2012, Alison 2007). Siefert’s (1992) argument implies that a greater power-disparity, so long as it isn’t challenged, should translate to low levels or the absence of rape.41 In contrast, proponents of the gender equality argument emphasize that a patriarchal social order reinforces the dehumanization of women, contributes to male beliefs about sexual privilege, and conditions

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41 Siefert’s (1992, 1993, 1994, and 1996) works are far more complex than this singular, simplified hypothesis. However, it merits mention that the notion of rape free societies is difficult to accept. For instance, if the argument is that rape-free societies are those in which existing arrangements are unchallenged, this would be akin to arguing that war-free societies are those in which there is no conflict. While true, the argument is endogenous. As much, it would be erroneous to believe that there are no challenges to women’s right in Islamic countries (argued to be rape-free societies); in which case the argument rests on the degree of challenge or unrest, which is also quite problematic.
men to distrust, despise, and dominate women (Brown 2012). Thus, the greater the inequality between men and women, the more likely we are to witness “warrior rapists” acting out their contempt for women while reifying male-dominant gendered arrangements (Brownmiller 1975; Siefert 1994; Gottschall 2004; Wood 2006, 326). In this way, rape becomes a strategy for men to dominate and suppress women.

Despite the logic of the arguments, there is little very empirical support linking the use of widespread rape to patriarchal societies (Gottschall 2004; Wood 2009). These, as well as more broad cultural arguments, struggle to explain why wartime rape is perpetrated similarly in areas with vastly different socialization experiences, or why rape is used at different rates within conflicts between culturally homogenous groups (Sann and Wood 2014; Gottschall 2004). That is, theories measured at the state level cannot explain variation among armed groups. While there are likely very important and applicable theoretical points, measurements are too insensitive to capture variation at the group-level. Thus, to truly understand the use of rape, theories must capture changes and elements within and between armed units at the group-level.

**Group-level Theories**

Group-level theories resolve the primary weakness of individual-level and state-level theories in that they are able to explain the varying use of rape by culturally homogeneous groups within the same conflict and similarities between heterogeneous groups across time and conflicts. There are two dominant theoretical camps that explain rape at the group-level of analysis; these include theories of social cohesion, and theories based in the symbolic meaning of rape. Most recently, supported by literature suggesting that gang rape builds social bonds, camaraderie, induces feelings of power or victory, improves morale, and can offer a way to build intra-group social status (Benard 1994; Card 1996; Sanday 2007; Franklin 2004; Morrow 1993; Wood 2008, 2009; Groth 1979), Cohen (2013a) offered a social cohesion theory of wartime rape. The author argues that that a central challenge for armed forces is creating a coherent fighting unit out of a group of frightened strangers who have no existing loyalties to the group. In these cases, rape can be a tool
for creating social bonds among unfamiliar combatants. Since cohesion among fighters who have been abducted or otherwise forcibly recruited by their peers is unlikely to form spontaneously, Cohen (2013a) argues that gang rape becomes an important instrument of socialization that is used solidify bonds among group members; ultimately creating a sense of cohesion and loyalty among members. Thus, when trapped in a group of hostile strangers, individuals are likely to choose participation in (potentially) costly group behavior over continued estrangement from their new peers (Cohen 2013a, 465). Simply stated, the central hypothesis is that levels of rape should be higher where there are greater rates of abduction.

Both theoretically and empirically, however, there are significant weaknesses in Cohen’s (2013a) theory. Most centrally, Cohen’s (2013a) social cohesion hypothesis doesn’t address why rape (or more specifically, gang rape), as opposed to other forms of violence, is used as a bonding exercise. There are substantial literatures in criminal justice (particularly those dealing in gang violence), as well as sports and military sciences that discuss the relationship between violence and social bonds within groups. The crucial point is that while rape can be a bonding experience, it is by no means the strongest or modal method of bond creation. In fact, scholars cite football, beatings, non-rape forms of terrorist violence, ritualistic physical abuse (routine sleep deprivation, successive bouts of physical exertions - i.e., drills, etc.) and academic hazing, as well as songs, slang, customs and ceremonies as forces that create social cohesion between current (and often past) group members (see Sageman 2004; McCoy 1995; Athens 1992; Kruglanski et al. 2014). So, why rape? Cohen’s (2013a) theory of social cohesion fails to make a convincing argument for the use of rape, specifically, in building social bonds between combatants.

In a related vein, Cohen (2013a) argues that gang rape is a form of performative violence that signals combatants are willing to take risks to remain in the group. However, it is difficult to believe that all, or even most rapes in war are performances. Plus, while

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42 For clarification, the author notes that rape carries grave risks to the perpetrator, including the potential for contracting sexually transmitted infections, the emotional toll experienced because of the physical contact required, and the fact that rape takes longer to commit than other acts of violence (thereby increasing risk to personal safety from would-be defenders of the victim).
scholars cite general increases in gang rapes during war, there is widespread recognition that the use of rape in all forms increases during conflict. Certainly it would be a stretch to argue that the preponderance of wartime rapes are gang rapes. Yet, if the rape is a performative act used to gain social standing and acceptance in a group, then what explains the broad scale increase in individually-perpetrated rapes? Are these also performative? Furthermore, if the act of rape (gang or otherwise) serves the purpose of social bonding, then it would suggest that all women have an equal chance of becoming victims. If the point is to commit rape for the sake of rape, then what explains the selection of the victims? Arguably demonstrating that you are willing to rape a member of your own group would suggest that it is all the easier to rape a member of an out-group. In the end, the theory of social cohesion raises more questions than it answers. To boot, it would seem that whether a soldier voluntarily joined a group of strangers or was abducted into a group of strangers, the same problem persists: an individual is now a member of a group with whom s/he has no familiarity or bond. As the same underlying logic applies, this suggests that social cohesion would be a necessary construct across all new recruits in all militaries. Once again, we are left unable to explain empirical variation in the use of rape across groups and conflicts.

While Cohen’s (2013a) use of social cohesion as a motivating force faces significant challenges, her supposition that group-level theories promise the strongest explanations for wartime rape and her original dataset bring us ever-closer to an answer. In fact, Wood (2009) and Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) argue that groups with low cohesion are unable to effectively police combatants and enforce standards of behavior. Is it possible that low social cohesion is a byproduct of motivating force responsible for the use of rape? That is, to what extent do the power, purpose, and preferences of the armed group impact the forms of violence used by that group? If group leadership is more radical, and thus more willing to use abduction and other violent methods against its own group, then it is logical to assume that cadres are at once less socially cohesive and more likely to use rape against an enemy out-group. That is, based on Cohen’s (2013a) analysis, it seems that social cohesion matters in some cases, but not across all cases and perhaps not in
the originally theorized way. To that end, this work seeks to develop a new theory that relates, but ultimately redirects and repackages ‘social cohesion’ variables into measures of organizational control and preferences. To do so, however, assumes that there is a shared understanding about the distinctiveness of rape as a weapon of war. To this end, an account of the meaning of rape is necessary.

At the root of symbolism-based arguments is the relationship between gender inequality and the conflict in which wartime rape occurs (Siefert 1992, 1993; Hansen 2001; HRW 2004; Koo 2002; Cohen 2013a; MacKinnon 1994; Baron and Straus 1989). For instance, discussing the militarization of women’s lives, Enloe (2000) points out that women are stereotypically associated with a need for protection, peacefulness, and life-giving. In contrast, men are associated with protecting, warring, and killing (Enloe 1990, 2000; Goldstein 2001; Higate and Hopton 2005; Pin-Fat and Stern 2005). These associations render women and girls particularly vulnerable to the logics of rape as a weapon of war (Enloe 2000). In this way, rape can be used as an affront to those seen as her protectors; namely, men. Thus, mass rape becomes an assault against manhood and national honor as it shames not just the victim, but her husband and other male relatives who failed to protect her (Cohen 2013a; Benard 1994; Green 2006; Seifert 1996; Baaz and Stern 2009; Bastick et al. 2007; Hansen 2001; Wood 2006, 2009; Brownmiller 1975; Kohn 1994). More broadly, a woman’s body becomes the symbolic representation of the body politic and rape of women is the symbolic rape of the national or communal body (Mookherjee 2008; Siefert 1994). This can also explain why ‘enemy’ women are targeted for sexual violence, as women are both literally and symbolically at the core of maintaining an ethno-national group (Alison 2007). Stated plainly, the gendered-nature of rape determines (in large part) the symbolic meanings of rape in a given context, which in turn helps to define the costs and benefits associated with the use of rape in war.

The idea of symbolism as a weapon, expressed here through rape, is supported by Siefert (1992) who argues that rape does not have the same function across time or societies. Rather, the purpose of rape depends on the respective historical and cultural context. The symbolic understanding of rape makes it a particularly powerful weapon in
ethnic war. For instance, Hayden (2000) notes that in secessionist wars, rape increases hatred and fosters the idea that life together is finished (32). Given that many ethnic wars are territorial, the use of sexual violence serves not only to accomplish tangible objectives, but to reify (or destroy) group identities and boundaries. In fact, just as ethnic war is characterized by an ideology the encompasses an understanding of identity, Kalyvas (1999), Roux (2011), and McCormick and Mitchell (1997) argue that the ideology within a conflict justifies (if not predicts) the means of violence. This, however, is where literature on the symbolic use of rape stalls. While the symbolic meaning of rape suggests contexts in which rape may be used, there is no specific mechanism that can explain variation in the use of rape between groups or conflicts. Although symbolism is important for building a more complete theory of wartime rape, in and of itself it is not sufficient to explain the phenomenon on a larger scale.

Here I offer the ‘missing link’ that connects group-level theories discussing characteristics of the armed group with literature on the symbolic meaning behind rape as a weapon of war; namely, leadership intention. The contention in this research is that the same factors that impact an understanding of identity and assign meaning to various modes of violence, also define the set of violent alternatives available to armed leadership. Already scholars widely recognize the political alignment between leadership ideology, goals, and modalities of violence (Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Bloom 1999; Sharlach 2000; Farr 2009; Hayden 2000). However, the relationship between rape, identity, and political objectives has far-reaching implications that have yet to be explored. Whether the intention is to use a specific form of violence in the hopes of accomplishing a goal, or to inhibit a particular form of violence in order to prevent undesirable consequences, the point is that the intention drives the expression of violence. Thus, insofar as armed group leaders have knowledge of conflict goals and an awareness of the effects of different violent tactics, leadership has incentives to perpetrate or control certain tactics based on their objectives. Otherwise stated, this work argues that there is an alignment between the political objectives of leadership and the modalities of war. To develop this line of thought more thoroughly, a preference-based theory of wartime rape is proffered below.
Preference-based Theory of Wartime Rape

The preference-based theory of wartime rape (PTWR) advanced in the first chapter argues that violence is a form of social and political action; a deliberate choice within a bargaining model of conflict. Here, it is assumed that violence is the outcome of an elite calculus of costs and benefits based on the leadership preferences. In turn, wartime rape is seen as the coherent, coordinated, and logical means of prosecuting warfare in a given context, to a strategic end (Allen 1996; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Littlewood 1997; Thomas and Regan 1994; Enloe 2000).

There are three interrelated logics that shape the expression of violence, and in particular, rape; these include leadership ideology, leadership goals, and leadership capacity. The impact of leadership ideology on conflict is widely recognized (Kalyvas 1999, 2006; Hayden 2000; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; McCormick and Mitchell 1997; Mitchell and McCormick 1988), albeit under-studied. In her discussion of the three phases of gross human rights violations, Roux (2011) explains the second phase as the ideological phase. During this phase, leadership formulates the ideology guiding the war (653). Using historical examples, Roux (2011) argues that varying facets of state authority serve to generate an appropriate ideology in order to perform the necessary nationalist dirty work. Subsequently, human rights violations are the implementation of the formulated theory, belief, or ideology and the victims are part of, and located within, the perpetrators’ societies (Roux 2011, 654). Here there is space for an armed force to create an ideology that encourages and advises the use of rape, as well as the creation of an ideology in which rape is prohibited and punished (Hayden 2000; Kalyvas 1999).

Seeking to formally develop a way of measuring ideology, Horowitz and Ye (2013a) devised a two-dimensional typology of leadership preferences based on nationalist goals and principled-versus-unprincipled behavior. Relative to nationalism, the authors argue that ideologically extreme leaders are more likely to place greater value on achieving the ideal upside goals of war, and lesser value upon the downside risks and costs of war (Horowitz and Ye 2014, 3). Thus, as leaders move toward the more extreme nationalist
end of the spectrum, they become more likely to use unconventional forms of (terrorist) violence. Where the nationalist dimension captures the ideology of the leadership, the power-seeking dimension of the typology accounts for leadership goals. Here it is assumed that highly power-seeking (i.e., unprincipled) leaders are more likely to care about the political consequences for retaining power and less likely to value the intrinsic outcomes of war (Horowitz and Ye 2013a). To this end, Wood (2008) notes that wartimes patterns of violence, including the indiscriminate or selective targeting of individuals / civilians, as well as the intensity and diversity of violence, are products of the strategies of armed actors. Subsequently, violence becomes permissible in one of several ways. Leadership may make active decisions about the targeting and timing of particular populations or may make explicit choices to prohibit or promote specific forms of violence against particular groups; this can include delegating certain forms of violence to particular groups (i.e., death squads, etc.). Alternately, leaders who have not made explicit decisions on the use of violence may be forced into making a choice or may passively accept its occurrence. Finally, it is possible for leaders to signal to combatants that they will not be punished for perpetrating particular acts (i.e., “atrocities by connivance”) (Osiel 1999).

One can think of the expression of leadership goals as having two components. First, leadership goals are simultaneously a product of and a causal force behind the type of war. Otherwise stated, leadership goals are conditioned by and reflected in the context of the war. For instance, when leaders anticipate post-war relations with the warring party, they are not likely tolerate sexual violence against civilians for fear of eroding their base of support (Wood 2006, 2008, 2009). This may also be true in cases where leadership is under international pressure to follow norms, where new leadership seeks to establish a new social order, or where there is fear of reciprocal offenses. Provided the goals and nature of ethnic wars, it becomes clear why particular forms of violence (i.e., genocide, ethnic cleansing) become more common in an ethnic context. For this reason, many scholars argue that rape is more likely in ethnic wars than in non-ethnic wars (Bloom 1999; Plumper and Neumayer 2006). Additionally, rape can depend on the pre-existing relationship between state and sub-state elites. For example, in his analysis
state failure and fragility in West, Central, and North-East African states, de Waal (2009) discusses a relative spectrum of patrimonialism in greater or lesser degrees as it relates to and integrates with existing state institutions. As few institutions are capable of exercising the monopoly on organized violence, the author argues that a political life akin to an ‘auction of loyalties’ emerges. Here, provincial elites seek to extract from one or other metropolitan centres the best price for their allegiance (de Waal 2009, 103). This marketplace of loyalties becomes the space for political bargaining where local-level elites seek to maximize the price they can obtain for their loyalty from state (government) elites using the resources available to them (including votes, finances, guns, and/or the use of violence), while minimizing the cost they need to pay (de Wall 2009, 103-104). In turn, violence is less a product of formal military encounters between governments and rebels, but more an expression of bargaining within the political marketplace; whereby fear or threats of change result in increased violence by an order of magnitude (de Waal 2009, 105). Here, emphasis is on short term agreements, lasting 2-3 years at most, subject to renegotiation every time conditions change. In short, existing social relationships and institutional arrangements both define and are conditioned by the context of war. Thus, to the extent that leadership preferences emerge from, they are also conditioned by the wartime context. As a result, the expressed violence is a product of the interaction between the goals and existing social and institutional arrangements. This brings us to the second component.

The second component shaping the expression of leadership goals, and the final logic active in the expression of preferences, is leadership capacity. Here, capacity refers to the leaders’ abilities to work within existing institutional and social structures to fulfill goals. That is, while it is possible that an armed group may desire to prohibit the use of sexual violence, it is possible that fractured leadership, institutional or hierarchical weaknesses, economic conditions, or even geography (lack of centralization) can impact the capacity of a leader to implement or enforce an effective strategy. To this end, characteristics of the armed group, including organizational structure and relative power become particularly influential in conditioning the expression of violence. In short, leadership preferences,
including ideology and strategic objectives, conditioned by the wartime context, are expected to have a determinative impact on the level of rape used by armed rebels in civil conflict.

**Variables**

The dependent variable in this analysis is the level of rape perpetrated by rebel groups in a given conflict-year. Originally developed by Cohen (2013a), rebel-perpetrated rape is a four-level ordinal variable constructed using data from human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the American Red Cross (amongst others), as well as information from original interviews (see Cohen 2013a). The measure consists of 4 values in which a score of 0 means no mention of rape; a score of 1 indicates infrequent or isolated reports of rape; a score of 2 refers to not irregular use of rape, including reports in which rape is described as ‘widespread,’ ‘common,’ extensive,’ ‘pattern,’ etc.; a score of 3 refers to rape described as ‘systematic,’ ‘massive,’ ‘tool of war,’ etc. For purposes of comparison, the dependent variable is measured two ways; first using the original, 4-category, ordinal scale, and second, as a dichotomous measure. The dichotomous measure was created by collapsing the latter three ordinal categories. Thus, 0 remains a measure of no rape reports, and levels 1, 2, and 3, are combined into a single rape-is-used category.

The independent variables fall into four broad categories: organizational variables, state capacity measures, control variables, and preferences. The two organizational variables refer to factors specific to the composition and nature of the armed group. The first organizational measure is Rebel Fracture. A dichotomous measure, rebel fracture assumes a value of 1 when the leadership of the armed group is divided or factional, and a value of 0 when the leadership is unified. Here, it is expected that divided leadership

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43 For a full list of coding rules, please refer to Table 14 in the appendix. For clarity, it should also be noted that a coding of zero does not mean that no rape occurred in a particular conflict, only that the State Department received no reports of its occurrence (Cohen 2013a, 466).

44 The minimum value for rebel-perpetrated rape was 0 (no reports of rape), the maximum was 3 (tactical rape), and the mean was 0.44. In total there are 731 observations at 0 (519 of which are in ethnic war); 112 observations at 1 (73 of which are in ethnic war); 102 observations at 2 (70 of which are in ethnic war); and 39 observations at 3 (31 of which are in ethnic war).
involves dissenting opinions (if not directly oppositional orders), uncertainty on behalf of the cadres, and some degree of loss of control. As the hierarchy fractures, the ability of leadership to control deviant behavior declines and there are greater opportunities for soldiers or individual units to increase civilian abuse without fear of consequences. In this way, it is also possible for one or more radical (“splinter”) factions to implement increasingly violent tactics where moderate leadership would have been more restrained.

The Recruitment Index variable is an indexed measure created from Cohen’s (2013a) rebel abduction and rebel forced variables. The abduction measure is a dummy variable based on data gathered from State Department reports. The variable is coded a 1 if abduction by the rebel groups was reported in a given conflict. The forced measure indicates whether the insurgent group used coercive recruitment more generally in the conflict (Cohen 2013a, 467). 45 Both variables were scaled prior to creating the index so as to assure the measures were equally weighted. Once scaled, the measures were added together. 46 Moving away from the weakness of the social cohesion argument, the logic here is that rebel groups who are forcing otherwise unwilling participants into their ranks are less professional. This lack of professionalism is evident in three ways. First, abducted soldiers are less likely to share the same commitment to the armed group’s ideology. Second, abductees are expected to have greater uncertainty regarding (and less overall) trust in the leadership hierarchy, and may therefore be less likely to adhere to behavioral regulations or restrictions. Finally, forcibly recruited individual are likely to spend less time training and in turn, may use less conventional military tactics. Summarily, less professional militaries are expected to be less disciplined and therefore higher levels of

45Cohen (2013a) offers examples of each of these measures. For instance, where reports included: “The LRA regularly abducted children,” the variable was coded for abduction. In contrast, where reports used phrases such as “...committed human rights violations including...forced labor and recruitment,” the variable was coded as forced. For more detailed information on variable construction and coding practices, please see Cohen 2013a, 467-468; 2013b.

46The recruitment measure was indexed primarily for theoretical reasons. First, Cohen’s (2013a) social cohesion argument contends that armed groups having to abduct or ‘force’ individuals into their ranks are more likely to have low social cohesion and are, therefore, more likely to rape. If this were true, the same theoretical mechanism would be expected to underlie both the abduction and forced measures. Prior to creating the index, correlation tests were performed. The rebel abduct and rebel forced variables were correlated at 0.47.
rape are expected.\textsuperscript{47} Additionally, an alternate index was created in the same fashion using dummy variables that captured whether the rebel group had ever used abduction or forced recruitment methods. Thus, where the recruitment index measures recruitment practices within the given conflict, the Recruitment Ever variable measures whether that rebel group has ever used such practices.\textsuperscript{48}

Following prominent cross-national analyses (Fearon and Laitin 2003), the Log GDP was included as a measure of state capacity. This is supported by a wealth of work that finds repression decreases and economic standing increases (Poe and Tate 1994; Mitchell and McCormick 1988). While GDP is an imperfect and much-debated measure of state capacity, it is sufficient to provide a rough estimate of overall state resource availability and function. To this end, three control variables are included in the models. In order to address some of the weaknesses of log GDP as a measure of state capacity, a dummy variable for Oil is included to account for those instance in which GDP may be ‘artificially’ inflated. A Tribal variable is also included as there is an expectation that tribal areas operate with some autonomy; formally or informally so. As much, where governments are perceived as illegitimate, tribal laws and customs can usurp state-stipulated practices. Here, rebels may not fear reprisals for deviant behavior, particularly if the tribe against whom the offenses are committed is considered an out-group. In general, the maintenance of tribal politics suggests less control by the central state apparatus. Thus, where tribal areas are present, levels of rape are expected to be higher.\textsuperscript{49}

Finally, several variables are included to capture preferences. Following common practices in conflict literature (Chiozza and Goemans 2004), a Democracy dummy variable was created from the polity 2 regime classification scale. Countries scoring a 6 or above were considered democracies and coded a 1, while all others were coded as 0.

\textsuperscript{47}It can also be argued that these recruitment practices are indirect reflections of radical leadership preferences. That is, more violent recruitment processes suggest a more radicalized leadership that is willing to use violent tactics against their in-group. Where leaders are willing to use more violent tactics against their in-group, one would also expect increasingly violent tactics to be used against the enemy out-group.

\textsuperscript{48}The recruitment ever variable is only used to demonstrate the variability of the regression results, and is not central to the primary analysis.

\textsuperscript{49}Given that tribes are often defined by ethnic group, this follows the same rationale that motivates rape in ethnic war. That is, ethnic rivalries are expected to produce greater levels of overall violence, and more specifically, higher levels of terrorist-based (otherwise unconventional) violence.
ture detailing the relationship between democracy and levels of repression is quite clear. Higher levels of democracy are consistently associated with lower levels of repression and human rights violations (Davenport 1995, 2007; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). While democracy may be an indirect measure of wealth, it provides a more direct measure of social norms, including civil and political liberties. To the extent that rebels are part of a democratic society, it is expected that they will have more moderate preferences that will, in turn, translate into lower levels of rape.\footnote{Given their consistent collinearity, it can be argued that democracy and log GDP measure development, state capacity, and preferences. While there are slightly different theoretical logics motivating the inclusion of each of these variables, ultimately the relationships between rape and these variables is expected to be in the same direction. As GDP increases, rape is expected to decrease. This is consistent with the expectation that where there are higher levels of democracy, levels of rape are expected to be lower.} A second indirect measure of rebel preferences is the dichotomous Drugs variable. The measure is coded a 1 if there is a drug economy present, and a 0 otherwise. The expectation is that the availability of a drug economy provides political distance between the armed group leadership and the civilians. Where leaders are not dependent on the population for votes, taxes, or other forms of support, there are fewer incentives for leaders to actively preserve the armed group-civilian relationship. Thus, rebel group leaders are less likely to stipulate restraints on or enforce punishments for soldier behavior, therefore leading to higher levels of rape.

The primary preference variables used in this analysis are based on the leadership preference typology put forth by Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 2013b). The two dimensional typology codes leadership preferences according to the leader’s level (espousal) of nationalism and the level of power-seeking behavior (i.e., principled or unprincipled behavior). Specifically, the nationalist goals dimension assesses how strongly nationalist goals are valued relative to the conflict costs and outcome risks that may result from pursuing them. A more extreme nationalist position is defined as more highly valuing risks of crisis-induced concessions and victory relative to the downside risk of defeat as well as crisis and conflict costs. Nationalist preferences are coded on a five-category ordinal scale beginning at non-nationalist (0), and ending at extreme nationalist (4). In contrast, the power-seeking dimension assesses how much pursuing and maintaining political power is valued relative to intrinsic nationalist and other political goals (Horowitz and Ye 2013a,
Power-seeking preferences are measured using a three-level ordinal scale; where 0 represents low power-seeking individuals (ideologues), 1 identifies mid-level power-seekers (typical career politicians), and 2 refers to high power-seekers, (opportunists with no convincing commitment to any political goals). The nationalist and power-seeking measures were indexed in the same manner as the recruitment variables. Variables were scaled in order to make sure weights were distributed equally, and then added together; providing a single score, Preference Index, for each rebel group in a given conflict-year.

**Hypotheses**

Recall that this analysis endeavors to understand why some rebel groups use rape tactically while others hardly use it at all. Based on the discussions above, the following hypotheses are used to test the explanatory strength of the PTWR. Relative to the organizational variables, the following hypotheses are proffered:

H1: *Rape is more likely where armed group leadership is fractured.*

H2: *Armed groups composed of abducted and/or forced individuals are assumed to be less disciplined. Thus, where there are forcible methods of recruitment, rape is expected to be higher.*

Regarding state capacity and control, there is reason to expect that greater state capacity and greater centralized control will result in higher levels of behavioral enforcement. That is, where the state lacks control, levels of rape are expect to be higher. To this end:

H3: *Higher state capacity reflected through higher log GDP values is expected to be associated with lower levels of rape.*

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51 A more detailed explanation of each dimension as well as the coding considerations is provided in the appendix. Also see Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 2013b).
H4: *Levels of rape are expected to be higher in conflict where there are tribal areas and politics present.*

Finally, with respect to preferences, three hypotheses follow:

H5: *Where democracy is higher, levels of rape are expected to be lower.*

H6: *Where drugs are present, levels of rape are expected to be higher.*

H7: *Rape is more likely where leaders are more radical. Thus, where there are higher values for the preference index, levels of rape are also expected to be higher.*

Additionally, one of the contributions of this research is to test models of rape separately in ethnic and non-ethnic war. As noted by Davenport (2007), it is erroneous to assume that motivations and perceptions are universal and equally applicable across different types of political contexts. Seeking to account for these differences and capture their relative impact on the outcome, the following broad hypothesis is offered:

H8: *Given the theoretical relationship between the symbolic use of rape and the typical leadership goals in ethnic war, models are expected to have greater predictive power in ethnic war when compared to non-ethnic war.*

**Data and Methods**

The data used to assess the aforementioned hypotheses come from an original time series dataset covering all civil wars from 1980 to 2009. In the time period under investigation, there are a total of 86 wars. All conflicts are divided down into dyads. If there are multiple conflicts within a state in a given year, each conflict is coded separately. As Cohen (2013a) notes, in addition to a rich body of qualitative literature, there have been several efforts to create datasets and lists of wartime rape and sexual violence (Bastick et
However the scope of these analyses tended to focus on a specific subset on conflict and therefore did not capture significant variation in wartime rape. In turn, Cohen’s (2013a) time series dataset marks the first systematic effort to record instances of limited and widespread rape by armed groups, across conflicts, over time. Building on this effort, I expand Cohen’s (2013a) original dataset to include annual measures of leadership preferences for each party in the conflict dyad as well as other organizational measures (i.e., fracture).

Methodologically, statistical choices were shaped by an interest in providing reliable inferences that were not confounded by time dependence. To ensure that time was not an issue, the time series data was transformed into a purely cross-sectional sample by taking the mean of variables across each conflict. Thus, each conflict was condensed into a single row of data. Using the cross-sectional data, two models were estimated. Each model contains the same theoretical distribution of variables, but due to issues with collinearity, it was not possible to keep both organizational variables (rebel fracture and rebel recruitment) in a single model. Thus, model 1 uses rebel fracture as the organizational variable and model 2 uses rebel recruitment as the organizational variable. Both models are specified below.

**Model 1**

Level of Rebel-Leveraged Rape = $\alpha + \beta_1$Rebel Fracture + $\beta_2$Rebel Preferences

$\quad + \beta_3$Democracy + $\beta_4$Log GDP + $\beta_5$Oil

$\quad + \beta_6$Drugs + $\beta_7$Tribal + $\epsilon$

**Model 2**

Level of Rebel-Leveraged Rape = $\alpha + \beta_1$Rebel Recruitment + $\beta_2$Rebel Preferences

$\quad + \beta_3$Log GDP + $\beta_4$Oil

$\quad + \beta_5$Drugs + $\beta_6$Tribal + $\epsilon$
Linear regressions were performed on both models using three different samples: all war (aggregated ethnic and non-ethnic war), ethnic war only, and non-ethnic war only. In addition, models were estimated using two different forms of the dependent variable.\footnote{Correlation tests were performed prior to model specification in order to avoid results confounded by issues with collinearity.} Tabled below are the results using the mean calculated from the 4 category, ordinal dependent variable. In the appendix are the tabled results of the models using the mean of a dichotomous dependent variable.\footnote{Initially, efforts were made to account for time dependence using transition modeling. However, missing data and variation in sample sizes posed unforeseen challenges. First, since correlation tests are impacted by changes in the sample, the variation in the sample sizes between ethnic and non-ethnic wars effectively prevented the same models from being compared across samples. That is, where variables were not collinear in ethnic war, a substantially reduced sample meant that the same variables were often collinear in non-ethnic war. Thus, model specifications were different and subsequently not comparable across samples. The lack of robustness in the results was also a concern. As an important part of this analysis was predicated on the ability to make meaningful inferences about the differences between ethnic and non-ethnic war, a more conservative approach was favored in this first iteration of the research. In the future, a broad effort to impute data from existing values and/or expanding the dataset and increasing the sample size across both ethnic and non-ethnic war will help alleviate this problem.} A final series of linear regressions was estimated in order to evaluate the extent to which preferences predict recruitment practices. While primarily exploratory, this regression used non-standardized data (i.e., original values rather than means) so as to preserve the maximum number of observations.

**Data Limitations**

The data limitations inherent in studying rape are well documented and generally understood across the literature (Baaz and Stern 2009; Enloe 2000; Sharlach 2000; Gottschall 2004; Allen 1996; Barstow 2000; Hyuan-Kyung 2000; MacKinnon 1994; Salzman 2000; Rittner and Roth 2012; Koo 2002; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Ward and Marsh 2006; Russell-Brown 2003; Hayden 2000; Bloom 1999; Farr 2009; Cohen 2013a). Three problems become particularly important for this analysis; these include data availability, data reliability, and coding challenges. Relative to the availability of data, Gottschall (2004) draws attention to “the mushiness of rape statistics” (130). In fact, it is nearly impossible to get information on the real number of rape cases (Baaz and Stern 2009). Collecting data on rape is particularly challenging for a multitude of reasons, not the least of which is that it is a form of violence often leaving no visible scars. Additional
reasons for the limited availability of data include fear of stigma (Cohen 2013a; Wood 2006; Ertrk 2008; Gottschall 2004), dishonor and shame (Baaaz and Stern 2009; Cohen 2013a; Horwood 2007), fear of consequences (i.e., divorce, honour killings, etc.), fear of revenge from the perpetrators (Ertrk 2008; Wood 2006), failure to recollect events (Wood 2006), inaccessibility of victims in remote areas (also resulting in sampling bias) or resources available to create/gather reports (Wood 2006), overall taboo (Baaaz and Stern 2009), general lack of data during war, and/or difficulties estimating rapes associated with death or massacres (Wood 2006). For these reasons, the available data reflect only our best estimates to date given the information we have.

Where possible missing data values in this analysis were supplemented with updated measures from the World Bank, CIA fact book, Human Rights Watch, the U.S. State Department, Amnesty international and NGOs. In some cases, data was imputed using other observations to calculate modal or averaged scores. For instance, Cohen’s (2013a) original dataset contained a small number of missing observations for the rape variables. In such cases, if the conflict-year prior to the NA value was coded 1, and the conflict-year following the NA value was coded 1, the missing observation was coded 1. Nevertheless, some missing data remain in cases where there was no reasonable or reliable basis on which to impute, supplement, or otherwise calculate the missing values.

A second problem with data on wartime rape concerns the relative reliability of rape data; specifically with respect to the increase in the conflict-rape phenomenon. Over the last 10 years, statistics reveal a substantial increase in levels and use of war rape (Ertruk 2007; Baaaz and Stern 2009; Cohen 2013a). Still, scholars are left to question whether those statistics truly reflect an increase in the number of rapes, or whether these data are products of increased reporting, heightened interest and attention, intensities of domestic and international monitoring, different reporting techniques producing variation in quality and focus, and/or politically motivated under- or over-reporting (Cohen 2013a; Ertrk 2008; Baaaz and Stern 2009; Gottschall 2004; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009). Certainly these issues would pose challenges to data collection on a well-defined phenomenon, so one can imagine their effect on an already ambiguous definition of sexual violence. Additionally,
variation in the description of sexual violence as “widespread” or “systematic” may vary between researchers and organizations as may the distinction between rape and other sexually violent phenomena. As Cohen (2013a) notes, because there are no precise measures of the number of victims, coding for the rape variable was based on verbal/written descriptors (466). In the end, however, it is unlikely that such hurdles could occlude the potential to extract meaningful information. Error, though prevalent, is likely to be distributed equally enough that broad scale patterns remain discernible.

Finally, a brief mention of coding-related challenges is necessary. This research represents the first large-N implementation of Horowitz and Ye’s (2013a) two dimensional leadership typology. While illuminative, this inaugural effort presented a number of trials. First, there were several conflicts in which multiple rebel groups were active simultaneously. Relative to the dependent variable, rebel rape, Cohen (2013a) notes that “while the specific armed group, rather than the aggregated group-type, may be the ideal unit of analysis, it is challenging to code accurately conflict-year data on wartime rape by individual armed groups on the cross-national level because reports are not always specific about the identities of the perpetrators” (466). Thus, while reports document “widespread” rape, it is not clear which particular rebel groups were perpetrating the offenses. Coding rebel leadership preferences in the face of multiple rebel groups was similarly challenging (i.e., Afghanistan, Burma, etc.). In these cases, choices had to be made about which rebel leader to code. Decisions were based on the size and impact of the group; where still opaque, the salience of the group. In parallel, many public accounts of the rhetoric and pre-war behaviors of rebel leaders (particularly those leading smaller or factional groups, or from less salient conflicts) are absent. In very few cases, preferences were uncodable.54

Ultimately, the difficulties related to the coding of leadership preferences are born out of efforts to avoid issues of endogeneity. As Horowitz and Ye (2013a) caution, the principle challenge of coding preferences is to avoid conflating the dependent variable (in this

54Every effort was made to corroborate information used to code the leadership variables. If data on
the individual were not available, efforts were made to understand the platform of the group or political
party from which that individual was a part/member/leader. Arguably, as a member of that party, there
is a reasonable expectation of ideological similarity.
case, rape, the behavioral outcome of the preferences), with the preference itself. That is, one must avoid coding leadership preferences by using the dependent variable (i.e., the leader was an extreme nationalist because they committed extreme and widespread violence during the war). Though there were few instances in which the level of rape was a clear consequence, particular care was taken to avoid highly correlated data, such as conflict intensity, level of violence, broad measures of human rights violations, massacres, etc. Rather, public statements, rhetoric, writings, and past experiences were used to code leadership preferences.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{Results}

The regression results for model 1 are displayed in Table 8. Two versions of the model are displayed in the table. The first version contains a variable for democracy, while the second version contains a variable for Log GDP. Due to collinearity, democracy and Log GDP were modeled separately. Each version of the model was run on three separate samples; these included all war (aggregated ethnic and non-ethnic war), ethnic war only, and non-ethnic war only.\textsuperscript{56}

The most striking results are the differences in the explanatory power of the models across ethnic war and non-ethnic war. While the results in ethnic war and all war are reasonably consistent, all variables lose significance in non-ethnic war. In the first iteration of the model, rebel fracture, democracy and drugs are significant across all wars and within the ethnic war sample. Notice, however, that the level of significance increases when the model is run on the sample of only ethnic wars. The more moderate results evidenced in the aggregated war sample make sense given that there are particularly strong results in ethnic war and an absence of significant variables in non-ethnic war. Consistent with the expectation outlined in hypothesis 8, models have greater explanatory

\textsuperscript{55}In some cases, this too was challenging as media reports can contain considerable biases. As an exemplar, this was the case with the second insurrection of the JVP in Sri Lanka. Media reports and personal accounts were heavily biased toward one side or the other. In these cases, the researcher sought to prevent coding biases by corroborating media with scholarly or historical analyses.

\textsuperscript{56}For reference, in the appendix, Table 18 has regression results with models that contain both Log GDP and democracy. Table 19 has regression results for the full models (including all organizational, preference, and state capacity variables).
power in ethnic war when compared to non-ethnic war. To this end, it is imperative to point out that the ethnic war dummy variable never achieves significance despite the considerable differences in the explanatory power of the models across ethnic and non-ethnic war. This finding provides evidence that simply including a dummy variable for ethnic war is insufficient to capture the importance of the wartime context or to understand how the explanatory power of models change given changes in the type of war. Despite the lack of statistical significance, the results in Table 8 make clear that a considerable amount of information is lost when ethnic war is relegated to a dummy variable.

The significance of the rebel fracture variable in the first iteration (first three columns) of model 1 provides preliminary support for the first hypothesis. That is, where leadership is fractured, there is expected to be a loss of control and an increase in uncertainty. This is expected to disrupt leadership’s ability to enforce punishments for deviant behavior and weaken the ability of the hierarchy to disseminate unified orders and control the cadres. Here, the sign is in the expected direction; where leadership is fractured, the level of rape increases.

The significance of democracy in the first iteration of model 1 is also in the expected direction. That is, consistent with the findings of Davenport (1995, 2007), Davenport and Armstrong (2004), and in support of hypothesis 5, increases in democracy are associated with lower human rights abuses. Here, the presence of democracy results in lower levels of rape. In terms of preferences, leaders coming from within a democracy are expected to have more moderate preferences (favoring non-violent modes of conflict resolution, etc.) and are therefore expected to be more averse to the use of rape during conflict. Additionally, democratically motivated leaders are expected to place greater value on the citizen population and are, in turn, less likely to select overt forms of civilian abuse. In contrast, however, the preference index does not achieve statistical significance in either iteration of the model, regardless of the sample. In fact, in non-ethnic war, the sign of preference index is also in an unexpected direction. This unexpected result runs counter to the expectation detailed in hypothesis 7.
In support of hypothesis 6, the results in Table 8 indicate that rape is higher in areas where drugs are present. One plausible mechanism to explain this positive relationship is that the presence of drugs offers an illicit secondary economy, and therefore independent access to resources. In places where rebel groups do not need to rely on the population for support (financial, political or otherwise), there are fewer incentives for rebel leaders to maintain positive relations with the population. In this way, it may be that leaders are not concerned with the negative effects of drugs on the populous, and are therefore willing to turn a blind eye to sexually violent behavior. Overall, less elite dependence on the population increases the likelihood of civilian abuse. This finding echoes support for Weinstein’s (2007) argument that resource-supported groups are more likely to commit widespread abuses against civilians. Still, despite a similar underlying logic, the tribal variable never achieves statistical significance. In fact, in the second iteration of the model, the sign for the tribal variable becomes negative across the aggregated and ethnic war samples; in the opposite direction of the expected relationship.

The second iteration of model 1 (i.e., the latter three columns in Table 8), presents mixed results. First, like democracy, Log GDP is significant across aggregated and ethnic-only war with the sign in the expected direction. Drugs is also significant and in the expected direction. Similar to the first iteration, variables achieve significance in aggregated and ethnic war samples, but lose significance in non-ethnic war. However, unlike the first iteration, rebel fracture is no longer significant in any of the samples.

Here, two primary points become important. First, Log GDP achieves statistical significance in the aggregated war and ethnic war samples, but loses significance in non-ethnic war. With the sign in the expected direction, these results provide support for the third hypothesis. Here, a higher GDP is expected to produce lower levels of rape. In particular, where state capacity is higher, and there is greater contentment with the status quo, levels of rape are expected to be lower. Second, given the sign changes, the loss of significance in the rebel fracture variable with the addition of Log GDP (in place of democracy), and the fluctuations in the R-squared and adjusted R-squared values, the
results indicate that models are not robust to changes. 57

Table 9 displays the regression results for both iterations of model 2. Specifically, model 2 provides a test for the second hypothesis, positing an increase in rape where forcible methods of recruitment are used. The results in Table 9 support the notion that less discipline within the rebel groups results in higher levels of rape.

57Further evidence of this sensitivity is provided in the appendix. Table 16 displays the same two iterations of model 1 using the mean of a binary dependent variable (rather than the mean of a 4 category dependent variable). Despite being substantively identical, this more blunt measure of the rape variable results in changes in independent variable significance and added variation in R-squared and adjusted R-squared scores. Most notably, the rebel fracture variable loses significance in the first iteration of the model across all samples, while democracy loses significance in the aggregated war sample. The addition of Table 16 is intended to provide additional evidence of model sensitivity and an overall lack of robustness.
Table 8: Ordinal Rebel-leveraged Rape in Civil War: Group Fracture (*model 1*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Fracture</td>
<td>0.351*</td>
<td>0.482*</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>0.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(0.292)</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Preferences</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>−0.026</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>−0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.203)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>−0.367*</td>
<td>−0.651**</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>−0.26</td>
<td>−0.026</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.199)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
<td>(0.308)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>−0.290***</td>
<td>−0.307***</td>
<td>−0.018</td>
<td>−0.081</td>
<td>−0.100</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>−0.165</td>
<td>−0.115</td>
<td>−0.167</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>−0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
<td>(0.227)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>0.450**</td>
<td>0.827***</td>
<td>−0.069</td>
<td>0.327**</td>
<td>0.465**</td>
<td>−0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td>(0.228)</td>
<td>(0.257)</td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
<td>(0.223)</td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>−0.005</td>
<td>−0.041</td>
<td>0.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.224)</td>
<td>(0.244)</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
<td>(0.244)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic War Dummy</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>2.203***</td>
<td>2.607***</td>
<td>0.317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
<td>(0.299)</td>
<td>(0.680)</td>
<td>(0.890)</td>
<td>(1.370)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>−0.190</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.261</td>
<td>0.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>0.605 (df = 77)</td>
<td>0.619 (df = 56)</td>
<td>0.486 (df = 15)</td>
<td>0.573 (df = 77)</td>
<td>0.607 (df = 56)</td>
<td>0.486 (df = 15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Statistic</td>
<td>2.721** (df = 7, 77)</td>
<td>4.102*** (df = 6, 56)</td>
<td>0.441 (df = 6, 15)</td>
<td>4.317*** (df = 7, 77)</td>
<td>4.648*** (df = 6, 56)</td>
<td>0.443 (df = 6, 15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
The rebel recruitment variable achieves significance in the expected direction in the aggregated war and the ethnic war samples, across both iterations of the model (regardless of whether democracy or Log GDP is included). In fact, between the two models only the rebel recruitment and Log GDP variables appear to be robust to changes in variable inclusion and sample. Unlike model 1, democracy is no longer significant across any of the samples once the rebel recruitment variable is added. Additionally, the drugs variable is only significant at the .05 level in the first iteration of the model run on the ethnic war sample.

Overall, R-squared and adjusted R-squared scores show fairly dramatic increases compared to those from model 1. This result suggests that the measure of discipline has greater explanatory power over the level of rape than does armed group fracture. However, similar to the first model, model 2 holds considerably less explanatory power in non-ethnic war than in ethnic war, as all variables lose statistical significance. At the bottom of Table 9 are R-squared and adjusted R-squared scores for the rebel-recruit-ever variable. Recall from the earlier discussion that the rebel recruitment measure captures whether a rebel group used abduction or forced recruitment practices within the given conflict. In contrast, the rebel-recruit-ever variable captures whether the rebel group has ever used such practices. Briefly, consider the changes in the R-squared values with the rebel-recruit-ever variable in non-ethnic war. The the number and level of significance among the variables did not change with the substitution of the rebel-recruit-ever variable, the discrepancies presented here highlight two important points. First, the changes in the R-square values reiterate the sensitivity of the models to alterations in the form of the variables. Second, such fluctuations confirm the need for greater precision in the measurements of human rights violations. While this call is not easily answered, the results presented here showcase the variability of output (and in turn inference) that can stem from slight changes in measurement. In turn, a more complete understanding of the use of human rights violations and the forces that explain variation in the use of rape specifically are directly related to more precisely capture and represent these concepts in theoretical and operational form.
### Table 9: Ordinal Rebel-leveraged Rape in Civil War: Recruitment Tactics (model 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Recruit</td>
<td>0.208***</td>
<td>0.365***</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.201***</td>
<td>0.345***</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Preferences</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>−0.053</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>−0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>−0.215</td>
<td>−0.342</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td>(0.215)</td>
<td>(0.308)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>−0.123</td>
<td>−0.030</td>
<td>−0.156</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>−0.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.283)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>0.324*</td>
<td>0.554**</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>0.034</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
<td>(0.209)</td>
<td>(0.257)</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>−0.008</td>
<td>0.213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>0.350**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic War Dummy</td>
<td>0.519***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.259***</td>
<td>2.313***</td>
<td>0.561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
<td>(0.604)</td>
<td>(1.404)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.519***</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>2.259***</td>
<td>2.313***</td>
<td>0.561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
<td>(0.604)</td>
<td>(0.697)</td>
<td>(1.404)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td>−0.022</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>−0.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>0.572 (df = 77)</td>
<td>0.539 (df = 56)</td>
<td>0.493 (df = 15)</td>
<td>0.511 (df = 77)</td>
<td>0.518 (df = 56)</td>
<td>0.492 (df = 15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Statistic</td>
<td>4.373*** (df = 7, 77)</td>
<td>8.405*** (df = 6, 56)</td>
<td>5.493 (df = 6, 15)</td>
<td>6.844*** (df = 7, 77)</td>
<td>9.666*** (df = 6, 56)</td>
<td>6.846 (df = 6, 15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
While both ethnic war dummy variables in the second model achieve statistical significance, it is essential to point out that this significance does not provide an increase in substantive knowledge. In the first model, the ethnic dummy did not achieve statistical significance despite considerable differences in variable significance and explanatory power across samples. Here the ethnic dummy achieves significance, despite considerable differences in variable significance and explanatory power across samples. Otherwise stated, while it is clear that there are differences between models 1 and 2, the conditions under which ethnic war becomes significant are not clear; particularly when both models evidence distinct differences in their applications across ethnic and non-ethnic war. These ambiguous findings reiterate the need for future research to disaggregate types of war in order to test models separately in different wartime contexts.\(^{58}\)

Finally, this section concludes with a discussion of the contradictory leadership preference results. That is, despite the statistical significance of democracy in the first model (Table 8), the rebel preference measure did not achieve significance in any either model across any of the samples. Furthermore, democracy lost significance in the second model with the addition of the rebel recruitment variable (in place of the rebel fracture measure). What explains these results? Is it possible that rebel preferences don’t matter at all?

The argument made in the first chapter of this dissertation posited that it is possible to examine existing variables (assigned to pre-existing constructs) in new ways. More specifically, the contention in this chapter is that previously defined “social cohesion” variables (abduction and forced recruitment) can be redefined as reflections of the armed group organization and/or leadership preferences. As an organizational variable, the logic is that armed groups resorting to methods of forced recruitment are creating ad hoc fighting units that receive less training, are less ideologically attached to the parent group, have greater uncertainty, and ultimately less discipline. In this way, it is expected that cadres have fewer incentives to follow orders from commanders stipulating regulations on

\(^{58}\)In the full model presented in Table 19 in the appendix, only rebel recruitment, Log GDP, and the ethnic war dummy variables are significant. However, the results are consistent across aggregated and ethnic war and appear to be robust to changes in the form of the dependent variable. Still, all variables lose significance in non-ethnic war.
behavior and commanders have less control over their combatants. In turn, levels of rape are expected to be higher where these forcible recruitment methods are used.

Table 10: Preferences Predicting Recruitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Rebel Recruitment Index (current conflict)</th>
<th>Rebel Recruitment Index (any conflict)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Preference Index</td>
<td>0.118*** (0.036)</td>
<td>0.144*** (0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Nationalism</td>
<td>0.058 (0.072)</td>
<td>0.236*** (0.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Power-seeking</td>
<td>0.303*** (0.093)</td>
<td>0.155* (0.094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.026 (0.056)</td>
<td>−0.419* (0.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.054 (0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.801*** (0.222)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 942 942 943 943
R²: 0.012 0.014 0.017 0.018
Adjusted R²: 0.011 0.012 0.016 0.016
Residual Std. Error: 1.732 (df = 940) 1.731 (df = 939) 1.739 (df = 941) 1.739 (df = 940)
F Statistic: 11.101*** (df = 1; 940) 6.744*** (df = 2; 939) 16.277*** (df = 1; 941) 8.645*** (df = 2; 940)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

However, what logic explains recruitment as a leadership preference? Here, the argument is that radical leaders are more likely to use radical methods (violence) against their own group and are, in turn, all the more likely to use more extreme forms of violence against an out-group. In this way, methods of forcible recruitment become proxies for radical preferences. Despite the logic, transposing a preference argument onto an outcome variable can be complicated by issues of endogeneity. Nevertheless, the viability of the argument, given its centrality to this research effort, deserves consideration.

One way of clarifying the relationship between rebel preferences and rebel recruitment is to determine the extent to which preferences predict the use of recruitment tactics. That is, if recruitment practices are predicted by (and therefore an outcome of) leadership preferences, then there would be support for the argument that, beyond discipline, rebel recruitment provides a proxy for radicalized preferences. Table 10 shows the results of the linear regression used to assess the relationship between preferences and recruitment. Specifically, the indexed recruitment variables as dependent variables, a total of 4 models were estimated; two models for each dependent variable. Thus, for each recruitment variable, the first model uses the preference index to predict variation in recruitment while the second model uses disaggregated preference measures (individual measure of nationalism and power-seeking).
The results in Table 10 provide preliminary support for the use of rebel recruitment practices as a proxy for rebel preferences.\textsuperscript{59} In particular, both the rebel preference index and rebel power-seeking variables have a statistically significant relationship with rebel recruitment in a given conflict. Using the rebel-recruit-ever measure as the dependent variable, we see that all preference measures, including the rebel preference index, nationalism, and power-seeking measures, have a statistically significant relationship with the occurrence of rebel forced recruitment practices. While these results provide a platform for a more in-depth inquiry, they are far from conclusive. Without appropriate controls or assurances that time has been appropriately accounted for, these data suggest only general patterns for further investigation. Nevertheless, the broad patterns presented here buttress the advocations for ongoing research into rebel preferences.

Conclusion

The analysis presented tested hypotheses relevant to a preference-based theory of wartime rape as it applied to rape perpetrated by rebel groups in ethnic and non-ethnic civil conflict. Results from the analysis are mixed, but support three broad conclusions. First, relative to the division of ethnic and non-ethnic war, this work confirms the need for future studies to test models of wartime separately in differing wartime contexts. Here, the results indicate that models of wartime rape have markedly different explanatory power based on the wartime context in which they are applied. Specifically, while the variables tested here achieve statistical significance in ethnic war and (largely) across aggregated war, there are no statistically significant results in non-ethnic war.\textsuperscript{60} Clearly future research ought to explore the reasons behind the drastic differences in model power. Could it be that the forces motivating or inhibiting rape in non-ethnic war are entirely distinct from those forces operating within ethnic war? Is it possible that the enforcement mechanisms in ethnic war are more difficult to implement given the characteristics of

\textsuperscript{59}For reference, preliminary efforts in transition modeling also produced statistically significant results for preference variables. However, in order to be certain those results were not distorted due to methodological errors, time dependence, or collinearity, more refinements are necessary.

\textsuperscript{60}Here it is important to acknowledge the role that limited data play in contributing to the lack of results. In particular, the absence of significant results could be a product of low N in the non-ethnic war sample.
ethnic conflict? Could the differential results be the result of measurement error? While this analysis provides a platform from which to construct new inquiries and hypotheses, the answers remain elusive.

Second, the results from the statistical analyses cloud a clear understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the preference-based theory of war. While it is unlikely that there is a single reason for this confusion, the two primary culprits are issues of measurement and method. Across all models, the indices specifically capturing leadership preferences along nationalist and power-seeking dimensions failed to achieve significance. However, a preliminary examination of the relationship between leadership preferences and recruitment techniques suggests that preferences are able to predict the use of forcible recruitment. While more research is needed, the results indicate that measures of forced recruitment, like democracy (and plausibly Log GDP), may provide proxies for leadership preferences. Yet, where both recruitment and democracy were statistically significant across aggregated and ethnic war samples, what explains the failure of the nationalist-power-seeking index to reach statistical significance? Furthermore, in support of Weinstein (2007), the drugs variable was statistically significant across aggregated and ethnic war samples. As this also has leadership implications, to what extent is measurement error or conceptual opacity obstructing the real relationship between leadership preferences and levels of wartime rape?

While the creation of a large-N dataset containing annual data for leadership preferences across armed groups in civil dyads provides a foundation for ongoing research, it also serves as a note of caution. In particular, while significant care was taken to preserve rigor and reliability when measuring leadership preferences, future efforts would do well to employ multiple coders and perform checks for inter-coder reliability. While measurement error is unlikely to be completely eliminated, such a step would certainly limit un-necessary variance (and error) in preference measurements.

In parallel, a priority of this work was to err on the side of conservative inference. Thus, cross-sectional analyses were used at the expense of information preservation. Additionally, such small sample sizes led to problems with robustness. The models presented
here are not robust to changes in model specification or the form of included variables; making inferences all the more difficult. In addition, although the presented statistical approach has avoided distortions due to time dependence, what nuances and relational data have been lost in the process? What relationships lie uncovered within the rows of collapsed observations? Here, two points become particularly important. First, the issue of time dependence is more complicated than previous research admits (see Beck et al. 2002; and Beck et al. 1998 for more information.) In fact, just as the inclusion of an ethnic dummy variable is insufficient to provide meaningful insight into ethnic war, the problem of accounting for time extends well beyond the inclusion of a ‘year’ variable. Second, there is cause to question the validity of previous inferences and conclusions. That is, as statistical methods advance, it is not enough to pick up with ‘current’ understandings and move forward. Rather, we must revisit the steps that led us to our current understandings and question whether new approaches can offer insights that may redirect or entirely alter our pre-existing conclusions.
Chapter 4

Explaining Government-leveraged Rape

‘Violence is not just a degree of conflict but a form of conflict, or a form of social and political action in its own right.’

Brubaker and Laitin (1998)

Why do some governments use rape pervasively in civil conflict while other governments do not? As Davenport (2007) notes, to date, researchers have paid far more attention to the evils done against governments (and citizens) by dissidents, rebels, and terrorists than to the evils done by presidents, the police, military, secret service, national guard, and death squads against those within their territorial jurisdiction (1). Not only do we know that rape varies, but we know that the willingness of the state to constrain variation in the use of rape also varies. Why do some states seek to punish sexually deviant behavior while others do not? The concern is ever more relevant as scholars point out that since World War II, military practices increasingly include massacres, genocide, politicide, democide and ethnic cleansing and not just by officially constituted national and armed forces, but by paramilitaries, death squads, secret police and other irregulars (Tilly 2003). In no uncertain terms, there has been an increase in state-seeking violence against civilians, especially as entire categories of the population are stigmatized for their religious, ethnic or political identities (Tilly 2003, 57). Why explains these trends? Are the conditions under which civilian abuse becoming more prevalent? What forces work in concert to determine the types of violence by the state? More specifically, under what conditions the state use rape as a military tactic?

Speaking broadly, the literature recognizes three inter-related logics that purport to
explain the state use of violence. These include ideological norms, identity chasms, that state capacity. Literature discussing ideological norms is largely based in bodies of work exploring the relationship between democracy and repression. In fact, there is a considerable body of literature that finds a link between democratic political institutions and declines in state repressive behavior (Davenport 1995, 2007; Russett 1993; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Tilly 2003; McCormick and Mitchell 1988). In fact, on the whole Mitchell and McCormick (1988) find that liberal regimes are superior protectors of human rights (including individual measures of killing, torture, and political imprisonment). On the other side of the spectrum, Abraham (2003a) argues that totalitarian states use the indoctrination of child soldiers (through repetitive beatings, forced human rights abuses, sex slavery, and isolation from their families) as a means of consolidating power, maintaining control, and militarizing society. Still, most agree that regime type is not sufficient to explain patterns in violence. That is, while ideology of the regime matters, what remains unaccounted for is the ideology of the individual acting within (or on behalf of the regime). Otherwise explained, to assume that regime is sufficient is to assume that individuals don’t have goals outside of the regime. That is, while the regime may condition individual objectives, it cannot replace them. So while regime is an important consideration (primarily for its conditional effects), what remains absent is an account of the individual preferences of the group leaders.

The second logic refers to identity chasms. Here, identity chasms refer to internal, polarized divisions that activate boundaries (physical, identity-based or otherwise) between an in-group and an out-group. As Tilly (2003) explains this increased polarization results in a social space between claimants (combatants). To the extent that internal division can provide the basis for civil war (Heo and DeRouen 2007), “boundary activation” (i.e., process of creating or solidifying an in-group and an out-group) can raise or lower the stakes of political bargaining (Tilly 2003). That is, the sharper the boundary, the higher the stakes, and the higher the likelihood that violence will either become a part of or escalate within the bargaining space. In most wars, and specifically in ethnic war, the concept of identity is inextricably linked to the conflict. In this way, accounting for the
wartime context is one war of accounting for the extent to which these identity chasms exist (or are activated) within society. Finally, the last logic is state capacity. Here, state capacity refers to the relative ability of the state to enforce discipline. And yet, given war-driven changes in state institutional structures, and specifically the well-known breakdown of hierarchical structures, there is no reason to expect that all states have the same capacity or will to enforce prohibitions on rape or other sexual violence.

Though each of the aforementioned logics provides some theoretical insight, what is missing from the literature is a unified theory capable of bringing those logics into concert. That is, firmly grounded in the bargaining model of war, the PTWR recognizes three critical linkages between the aforementioned arguments. First, the PTWR recognizes that state violence is a form of bargaining used to achieve political objective (Tilly 2003; de Waal 2009). In this way, collective destruction can be a choice born out of broken negotiations; wherein violence becomes the political continuation of a social process (Tilly 2003). Second, dominant beliefs within society have a determinative impact on the choice of methods of political control and the relative propensity of governments to violate human rights (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, 479-480). Here, the dominant beliefs are assumed to be the product of a marriage between an ideology and a set of strategic objectives. That is, an armed could leader could have an ideology, but lack an objective that would motivate some ideological action. In contrast, a leader could have an objective, but the pursuit of that objective would take very different forms depending on the ideology of the leader. In turn, the marriage between these two social forces become a dominant belief. This belief, otherwise named, is simply the preference of the leader. In sum, violence is an output of an ideology, guided by preferences in pursuit of an objective.

The final link recognizes the connection between the capabilities and objectives. For instance, McCormick and Mitchell (1997) argue that as opposed to imprisonment, the use of torture requires a different set of government activities, involving different resources and capabilities at different costs for the government, and with differing consequences for the victims (513). In fact, relative to resources, Tilly (2003) notes that historically, the inability (lack of capacity) to capture most criminals meant that those who were captured
were subjected to public violent rituals. That is, where resources were scares, violence was used strategically to produce the maximum benefit (behavior modification) at the lowest cost. Others suggest that a similar calculous is used to determine the victims of violence. Namely, Azam and Hoeffler (2002) argue that civilians become targets either because of the extortive activities of the parties to the conflict or because targeting civilians serves a direct military purpose. Additional support for this idea comes from Achvarina and Reich (2006) who suggest that significant poverty has little impact on the government’s choice to use of child soldiers. Rather, the authors find that the only statistically significant predictor of increases in the use of child soldiers is access to refugee and IDP camps. These results indicate that use that government brutalization of the population is not so much a matter of need, but a matter of strategy. Summarily, where the first two linkages pave the way for measures of nationalism and power-seeking behavior that shape a multidimensional set of preferences, the final link relates those preferences to the set of constraints in which they operate.

Preference-based Theory of Wartime Rape

Filling gaps in the literature, the PTWR unites state-level factors (war type, context, etc.) with group-level factors in order to explain variation among armed groups (include armed groups shaped by and acting on behalf of the state). In particular, the PTWR concerns itself with predicting the how of warfare; as conflict modalities have important consequences for the political landscape of the post-war environment. Just as contemporary bargaining models argue that war is costly, the PTWR recognizes that the tactics used in war also have significant political costs. Thus, it is expected that post-conflict leadership goals inform leadership preferences on wartime tactics. Where an organization aspires to govern the civilian population, leaders are more likely to take strides restrain combatants’ use of rape against those civilians for fear of undermining support for the coming revolution. That is, if the present ‘enemy’ is expected to make up the future constituency, leaders will be less likely to risk their political power by pursing terror strategies. Similarly, if an armed group is dependent on civilians (for
tax revenue, etc.), leaders have greater incentives to prevent wartime rape (Wood 2006, 328-329; Wood 2009). In contrast, if the purpose of the war is genocide and/or forcible removal of a population from a given territory, leadership is less likely to be concerned with the post-conflict sentiments of the enemy and therefore more likely to exhibit passive preferences of indifferences toward sexual violence or active preferences for the strategic use of rape.

The ability to capture and measure leadership preferences is made possible using Horowitz and Ye’s (2013a, 2013b) two-dimensional leadership preference typology. Within a bargaining framework, the authors select two central concepts repetitive across international relations and specifically conflict, literature: Nationalism and Power-seeking behavior. Applied to the study of wartime rape, the nationalist dimension assesses how strongly maximum nationalist goals are valued relative to the cost of using a given war tactic. In contrast, the power-seeking dimension assesses how much pursuing and maintaining political power is valued relative to other political goals (509). Particularly relevant, the authors find evidence that leaders use civilian targeting in ways that reflect their varying emphasis on nationalist and power-seeking goals (388). Axiomatistically, if accounting for nationalist and power-seeking preferences holds explanatory power over the selection of targets in conflict, then it is reasonable to expect that those same preferences are able to provide insight into leadership decisions regarding wartime strategy.

**Variables**

The dependent variable in this analysis is the level of rape perpetrated by the government (state forces) in a given conflict-year. Originally developed by Cohen (2013a), government-perpetrated rape is a four-level ordinal variable constructed using data from human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the American Red Cross (amongst others), as well as information from original interviews (see Cohen 2013a). The measure consists of 4 values in which a score of 0 means no mention of rape; a score of 1 indicates infrequent or isolated reports of rape; a score of 2 refers to not irregular use of rape, including reports in which rape is described as
widespread,’ ‘common,’ extensive,’ ‘pattern,’ etc.; a score of 3 refers to rape described as ‘systematic,’ ‘massive,’ ‘tool of war,’ etc.\textsuperscript{61} For purposes of comparison, the dependent variable is measured two ways; first using the original, 4-category, ordinal scale, and second, as a dichotomous measure. The dichotomous measure was created by collapsing the latter three ordinal categories. Thus, 0 remains a measure of no rape reports, and levels 1, 2, and 3, are combined into a single rape-is-used category.\textsuperscript{62}

The independent variables fall into four broad categories: organizational variables, state capacity measures, control variables, and preferences. The organizational variables refers to the factor capturing the composition and nature of the armed group. For the state, the organizational measure is \textit{Government Fracture}. A dichotomous measure, government fracture assumes a value of 1 when the leadership of the armed group is divided or factional, and a value of 0 when the leadership is unified. Here, it is expected that divided leadership involves dissenting opinions (if not directly oppositional orders), uncertainty on behalf of the cadres, and some degree of loss of control. With a decline in the the ability to effectively discipline defectors, rape would be expected to increase. More specifically, as the hierarchy fractures, the ability of leadership to control deviant behavior declines and there are greater opportunities for soldiers or individual units to increase civilian abuse without fear of consequences. In this way, it is also possible for one or more radical ("splinter") factions to implement increasingly violent tactics where moderate leadership would have been more restrained.

Two measures of state capacity are included for analysis. First, an estimate of \textit{Military Personnel} (in thousands) is taken from the Correlates of War dataset. Here, it is important to note the digression from traditional opportunity arguments. To this end, one such opportunity argument suggests that increased contact between military personnel and civilians will likely lead to increases in rape via increased contact with potential victims (see Wood 2006). However, as a measure of state capacity, the contention here

\textsuperscript{61} For a full list of coding rules, please refer to Table 14 in the appendix.
\textsuperscript{62} The minimum value for government-perpetrated rape was 0 (no reports of rape), the maximum was 3 (tactical rape), and the mean was 0.597. In total there are 573 observations at 0 (398 of which are in ethnic war); 261 observations at 1 (162 of which are in ethnic war); 124 observations at 2 (108 of which are in ethnic war); and 26 observations at 3 (25 of which are in ethnic war).
is that larger militaries are a sign of power powerful states. Thus, it is expected that powerful states are more likely to have professionalized militaries with solidified hierarchies that will be more capable of enforcing punishments for deviant behavior. In turn, increases in military personnel are expected to be associated with lower levels of government-perpetrated rape.

Supported by a wealth of work that finds repression decreases and economic standing increases (Poe and Tate 1994; Mitchell and McCormick 1988), Log GDP was included as a second measure of state capacity. Although GDP is an imperfect measure of state capacity, it is sufficient to provide a rough estimate of overall state resource availability and function. To this end, three control variables are included in the models. In order to address some of the weaknesses of log GDP as a measure of state capacity, a dummy variable for Oil is included to account for those instances in which GDP may be ‘artificially’ inflated. A Tribal variable is also included as there is an expectation that tribal areas operate with some autonomy; formally or informally so. Thus, where tribal areas remain active, it is expected that the state has less control. Here, soldiers may not fear reprisals for deviant behavior, particularly if the tribe against whom the offenses are committed is considered an out-group. Thus, where tribal areas are present, levels of rape are expected to be higher.

Finally, several variables are included to capture preferences. Following common practices in conflict literature (Chiozza and Goemans 2004), a Democracy dummy variable was created from the polity 2 regime classification scale. Countries scoring a 6 or above were considered democracies and coded a 1, while all others were coded as 0. Literature detailing the relationship between democracy and levels of repression is quite clear. Higher levels of democracy are consistently associated with lower levels of state repression and human rights violations (Davenport 1995, 2007; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Mitchell and McCormick 1988). While democracy may be an indirect measure of wealth, it provides a more direct measure of social norms, including civil and political liberties. To the extent that state leadership is part of a democratic society, it is expected that

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63 There were 218 observations of high democracy in ethnic war and 102 observations of high democracy in non-ethnic war.
they will have more moderate preferences that will, in turn, translate into lower levels of rape. A second indirect measure of rebel preferences is the dichotomous Drugs variable. The measure is coded a 1 if there is a drug economy present, and a 0 otherwise. The expectation is that the availability of a drug economy provides political distance between the armed group leadership and the civilians. Where leaders are not dependent on the population for votes, taxes, or other forms of support, there are fewer incentives for leaders to actively preserve the armed group-civilian relationship. Thus, state leaders are less likely to stipulate restraints on or enforce punishments for soldier behavior, therefore leading to higher levels of rape.

Additionally, the Recruitment Index variable provides a proxy for leadership preferences. The recruitment variable is an indexed measure created from Cohen’s (2013a) government pressgang and government conscription variables. The pressgang measure is coded a 1 if pressganging by the government was reported in a given conflict. Conscription is a dichotomous measure by year that indicates whether the government had a policy of military conscription (Cohen 2013a, 468). Both variables were scaled prior to creating the index so as to assure the measures were equally weighted. Once scaled, the measures were added together.

Social cohesion arguments assert that forcing otherwise unwilling participants into the ranks leads to low social cohesion and thus, higher levels of rape. However, for the state it can be argued that these recruitment practices are indirect reflections of radical

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64 Given their consistent collinearity, it can be argued that democracy and log GDP measure development, state capacity, and preferences.
65 There were a total of 296 conflict-years containing the presence of drugs and 688 conflict years without the presence of drugs. There were 175 conflict-years in ethnic war containing drugs and 121 conflict-years in non-ethnic war containing drugs.
66 The recruitment measure was indexed primarily for theoretical reasons. First, Cohen’s (2013a) social cohesion argument contends that armed groups having to ‘force’ individuals into their ranks are more likely to have low social cohesion and are, therefore, more likely to rape. If this were true, the same theoretical mechanism would be expected to underlie both the pressgang and conscription measures. Prior to creating the index, correlation tests were performed. conscription and pressganging were correlated at a 0.18.
leadership preferences. That is, more violent recruitment processes suggest a more radicalized leadership. Where leaders are willing to use more violent tactics against their in-group, one would also expect increasingly violent tactics to be used against the enemy out-group. Additional support for this hypothesis comes from literature on child soldiers. In particular, Abraham (2003a) notes that the use of child soldiers is characterized by violent, excessive brutalization, including repetitive beatings during training, forced human rights abuses against civilians, sex slavery, isolation from their families. The author argues that this type of indoctrination is a means for totalitarian regimes to consolidate power, maintain control, and militarize society (Abraham 2010, 18). As the the author suggests, the use of violence against the in-group represents a concerted effort to radicalize society and indoctrinate members of society into a more radical ideology. In this way, we can think of the use of this brutality as an expression of radical preferences.

Additionally, an alternate index was created in the same fashion using dummy variable that captures whether the government had ever used pressganging. Thus, where the recruitment index measures pressganging (plus conscription) within the given conflict, the Recruitment Ever variable measures whether the state ever used the pressganging approach (plus conscription).

The primary preference variables used in this analysis are based on the leadership preference typology put forth by Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 2013b). The two dimensional

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67 This differs from the discipline and control-based logic that was presented in the preceding chapter. While it would make sense that a non-state army would use abduction and forced recruitment to set up ad hoc militias without formal training, state training regimens don’t change based on recruitment tactics. That is, a recruit is subjected to the same training whether they join voluntarily or are conscripted. Thus, there is no theoretical reason to expect that the level of discipline changes based on the type of recruitment. A similar logic exists for ideological differences. Where lack of formal training could leave ideological gaps between new recruit and indoctrinated members of an insurgency, the state military training regime also take care of ideological conditioning. Thus, there are fewer reasons to expect ideological differences between voluntarily joined military members and conscripted or otherwise forced military members.

68 For this argument to be strongest, it would be ideal to include independent measures of pressganging and conscription. While it makes sense for the two measures to be indexed according to the social cohesion argument, one would not expect the same degree of leadership radicalization to be expressed in conscription as it would in pressganging. Unfortunately, however, once data were collapsed at their mean (based on conflict), there were not enough observations of either pressganging or conscription for the variables to run independently the models. Given the statistical approach, the existing index, while far from ideal, was the only available way of capturing recruitment.

69 The recruitment ever variable is only used to demonstrate the variability of the regression results, and is not central to the primary analysis.
typology codes leadership preferences according to the leader’s level (espousal) of nationalism and the level of power-seeking behavior (i.e., principled or unprincipled behavior). Specifically, the nationalist goals dimension assesses how strongly nationalist goals are valued relative to the conflict costs and outcome risks that may result from pursuing them. A more extreme nationalist position is defined as more highly valuing risks of crisis-induced concessions and victory relative to the downside risk of defeat as well as crisis and conflict costs. Nationalist preferences are coded on a five-category ordinal scale beginning at non-nationalist (0), and ending at extreme nationalist (4). In contrast, the power-seeking dimension assesses how much pursuing and maintaining political power is valued relative to intrinsic nationalist and other political goals (Horowitz and Ye 2013a, 527). Power-seeking preferences are measured using a three-level ordinal scale; where 0 represents low power-seeking individuals (ideologues), 1 identifies mid-level power-seekers (typical career politicians), and 2 refers to high power-seekers, (opportunists with no convincing commitment to any political goals). The nationalist and power-seeking measures were indexed in the same manner as the recruitment variables. Variables were scaled in order to make sure weights were distributed equally, and then added together; providing a single score, Preference Index, for each rebel group in a given conflict-year.

**Hypotheses**

Recall that this analysis endeavors to understand why some governments use rape tactically while others hardly use it at all. Based on the discussions above, the following hypotheses are used to test the explanatory strength of the PTWR. Relative to the organizational variables, the following hypotheses are proffered:

H1: *Rape is more likely where state leadership is fractured.*

Regarding state capacity and control, there is reason to expect that greater state capacity and greater centralized control will result in higher levels of behavioral enforce-
ment. That is, where the state lacks control, levels of rape are expect to be higher. To this end:

H2: Higher state capacity reflected through higher log GDP and military personnel values is expected to be associated with lower levels of rape.

H3: Levels of rape are expected to be higher in conflict where there are tribal areas and politics present.

Finally, with respect to preferences, three hypotheses follow:

H4: Where democracy is higher, levels of rape are expected to be lower.

H5: Where drugs are present, levels of rape are expected to be higher.

H6: Rape is more likely where leaders are more radical. Thus, where there are higher values for the preference index and higher displays of radical behavior via increasingly violent recruitment practices, levels of rape are also expected to be higher.

Additionally, one of the contributions of this research is to test models of rape separately in ethnic and non-ethnic war. As noted by Davenport (2007), it is erroneous to assume that motivations and perceptions are universal and equally applicable across different types of political contexts. Seeking to account for these differences and capture their relative impact on the outcome, the following broad hypothesis is offered:

H7: Given the theoretical relationship between the symbolic use of rape and the typical leadership goals in ethnic war, models are expected to have greater predictive power in ethnic war when compared to non-ethnic war.
Data and Methods

The data used to evaluate the posited hypotheses come from Cohen’s (2013a) original time series dataset covering all 86 civil wars from 1980 to 2009. All conflicts are divided down into dyads. If there are multiple conflicts within a state in a given year, each conflict is coded separately. Building on this effort, I expand Cohen’s (2013a) original dataset to include annual measures of leadership preferences for each party in the conflict dyad as well as other organizational measures (i.e., fracture).

The methods used here are consistent with those employed in the previous chapter. To ensure that time was not an issue, the time series data was transformed into a purely cross-sectional sample by taking the mean of variables across each conflict. Using the cross-sectional data, two models were estimated. Model 1 uses government fracture as the organizational variable and model 2 uses government recruitment as the organizational variable. Both models are specified below.

\[
\text{Government-Leveraged Rape} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Government Fracture} \\
+ \beta_2 \text{Government Preferences} \\
+ \beta_3 \text{Democracy} + \beta_4 \log \text{GDP} + \beta_5 \text{Oil} \\
+ \beta_6 \text{Drugs} + \beta_7 \text{Tribal} \\
+ \beta_8 \text{Military Personnel} + \epsilon
\]

\[
\text{Government-Leveraged Rape} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Government Recruitment} \\
+ \beta_2 \text{Government Preferences} \\
+ \beta_3 \text{Democracy} + \beta_4 \log \text{GDP} + \beta_5 \text{Oil} \\
+ \beta_6 \text{Drugs} + \beta_7 \text{Tribal} \\
+ \beta_8 \text{Military Personnel} + \epsilon
\]
Linear regressions were performed on both models using three different samples: all war (aggregated ethnic and non-ethnic war), ethnic war only, and non-ethnic war only. In addition, models were estimated using two different forms of the dependent variable. Tabled below are the results using the mean calculated from the 4 category, ordinal dependent variable. In the appendix are the tabled results of the models using the mean of a dichotomous dependent variable. A final series of linear regressions was estimated in order to evaluate the extent to which preferences predict recruitment practices. While primarily exploratory, this regression used non-standardized data (i.e., original values rather than means) so as to preserve the maximum number of observations.\textsuperscript{71}

**Results**

Tables 11 and 12 display the regression output for models 1 and 2 respectively. Each table contains two versions of the model. The first version (evident in the first 3 columns) contains a variable for democracy, while the second version (in the latter 3 columns) contains a variable for Log GDP. Due to collinearity, democracy and Log GDP were modeled separately. Each version of the model was run on three separate samples; these included all war (aggregated ethnic and non-ethnic war), ethnic war only, and non-ethnic war only.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{71}As has been discussed in previous chapters, the data limitations inherent in studying rape are well documented (Baaz and Stern 2009; Enloe 2000; Sharlach 2000; Gottschall 2004; Allen 1996; Barstow 2000; Hyuan-Kyung 2000; MacKinnon 1994; Salzman 2000; Rittner and Roth 2012; Koo 2002; Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Ward and Marsh 2006; Russell-Brown 2003; Hayden 2000; Bloom 1999; Farr 2009; Cohen 2013a). Collecting data on rape is particularly challenging for a multitude of reasons, not the least of which is that rape represents a form of violence that often leaves no visible scars. Additional obstacles to estimating the real numbers for rape include fear of stigma (Cohen 2013a; Wood 2006; Ertrak 2008; Gottschall 2004), shame and dishonor (Baaz and Stern 2009; Horwood 2007), fear of consequences or revenge (i.e., divorce, honour killings, etc.) (Ertrak 2008; Wood 2006), failure to recollect events (Wood 2006), sampling bias due to inaccessible victims in remote areas, fluctuations in salience and media attention (Ertrak 2007; Baaz and Stern 2009; Cohen 2013a), political incentives by organizations and/or governments to misrepresent statistics, insufficient resources available to create reports (Wood 2006), overall taboo (Baaz and Stern 2009), general lack of data during war, and/or difficulties estimating rapes associated with death or massacres (Wood 2006). Precisely for these reasons, the available data reflect only our best estimates to date given the information we have. Nevertheless, it is assumed that data-based deficiencies are not significant as to prevent insights into broad patterns in the variation of sexual violence.

\textsuperscript{72}For reference, in the appendix, Tables 20 and 21 contain the output for each model using mean from the bivariate dependent variable. Table 22 has regression results with models that contain both Log GDP and democracy. Table 23 has regression results for the full models (including all organizational, preference, and state capacity variables).
Of the seven hypotheses proffered in this chapter, the results offer only low-level support for the fifth hypothesis. Namely, where drugs are present, rape increases. Still, the regression outputs indicate that drugs only reach statistical significance in ethnic war; and only reach significance at the .05 level when the government recruitment variable is included in the model (despite the fact that the recruitment variable does not reach statistical significance). The results for government-perpetrated rape are otherwise confounding. There is no support for any of the other 7 hypotheses and no other significant variables.

Equally surprising, these findings contradict well established literatures discussing the relationships between democracy and state repression (Davenport 1995, 2007; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Mitchell and McCormick 1988). Instead of following the typical patterns of violence evidenced by other works (i.e., Davenport and Stam 2003), the regression outputs do not suggest any relationship between liberal or democratic regimes and the level of violence in war. That is, where Mitchel and McCormick (1988) argue that liberal regimes should be more concerned with protecting human rights, the empirics offered here fail to support this assertion. That is, not only do Tables 11 and 12 fail to provide any kind of support for the preference-based theory of wartime rape, but the results seemingly contradict the otherwise consistent relationships noted in the wider literature.
Table 11: Ordinal Government-leveraged Rape in Civil War: Group Fracture (*model 1*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Fracture</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>−0.254</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>−0.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td>(0.239)</td>
<td>(0.218)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
<td>(0.237)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Preferences</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>−0.092</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>−0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>−0.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
<td>(0.236)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.090</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>−0.118</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.265</td>
<td>−0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.447*</td>
<td>−0.150</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.437*</td>
<td>−0.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.163)</td>
<td>(0.231)</td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td>(0.232)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Persons</td>
<td>−0.00002</td>
<td>−0.00003</td>
<td>0.00002</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>−0.00000</td>
<td>0.00004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic War Dummy</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.518**</td>
<td>0.891</td>
<td>0.586</td>
<td>−0.067</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.172)</td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td>(0.668)</td>
<td>(0.829)</td>
<td>(1.294)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>−0.132</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>−0.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>0.588 (df = 76)</td>
<td>0.624 (df = 55)</td>
<td>0.401 (df = 14)</td>
<td>0.586 (df = 76)</td>
<td>0.624 (df = 55)</td>
<td>0.413 (df = 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Statistic</td>
<td>1.425 (df = 8; 76)</td>
<td>1.952* (df = 7; 55)</td>
<td>0.650 (df = 7; 14)</td>
<td>1.498 (df = 8; 76)</td>
<td>1.967* (df = 7; 55)</td>
<td>0.501 (df = 7; 14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Recruit</td>
<td>−0.002</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>−0.106</td>
<td>−0.007</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>−0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Preferences</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>−0.054</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>−0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>−0.007</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>−0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
<td>(0.269)</td>
<td>(0.272)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.106</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>−0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>−0.127</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>−0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td>(0.235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>0.509**</td>
<td>−0.036</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>0.477**</td>
<td>−0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>(0.230)</td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.232)</td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Persons</td>
<td>−0.00004</td>
<td>−0.0001</td>
<td>0.00001</td>
<td>0.00003</td>
<td>−0.00005</td>
<td>0.00001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic War Dummy</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.337**</td>
<td>0.468**</td>
<td>0.932</td>
<td>0.777</td>
<td>0.459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
<td>(0.673)</td>
<td>(0.841)</td>
<td>(1.227)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations | 85       | 63        | 22        | 85       | 63        | 22        |
|Adjusted R²    | 0.121    | 0.179     | 0.249     | 0.128    | 0.182     | 0.223     |
|Residual Std. Error | 0.028 | 0.074 | −0.126 | 0.036 | 0.078 | −0.166 |
|F Statistic    | 1.307 (df = 8; 76) | 1.709 (df = 7; 55) | 0.684 (df = 14) | 1.390 (df = 8; 76) | 1.746 (df = 7; 55) | 0.573 (df = 7; 14) |

Note: "p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Finally, the results in Table 13 provide support for the idea that state recruitment tactics can be indirectly interpreted as leadership preferences. Here, the argument is that radical leaders are more likely to use radical methods (violence) against their own group and are, in turn, all the more likely to use more extreme forms of violence against an out-group. In this way, methods of forcible recruitment become proxies for radical preferences. Despite the logic, transposing a preference argument onto an outcome variable can be complicated by issues of endogeneity. Nevertheless, the viability of the argument, given its centrality to this research effort, deserves consideration.

One way of clarifying the relationship between rebel preferences and rebel recruitment is to determine the extent to which preferences predict the use of recruitment tactics. That is, if recruitment practices are predicted by (and therefore an outcome of) leadership preferences, then there would be support for the argument that government recruitment techniques function as a proxy for radicalized preferences. Table 13 shows the results of the linear regression used to assess the relationship between preferences and recruitment. Specifically, the indexed recruitment variables as dependent variables, a total of 4 models were estimated; two models for each dependent variable. Thus, for each recruitment variable, the first model uses the preference index to predict variation in recruitment while the second model uses disaggregated preference measures (individual measure of nationalism and power-seeking).

The results in Table 13 provide preliminary support for the use of government recruitment practices as a proxy for government preferences. In particular, both the preference index and state nationalism variables have a statistically significant relationship with government recruitment in a given conflict. Using the Government-recruit-ever measure as the dependent variable, we see the same pattern of significance; wherein the preference index and state nationalism have a statistically significant relationship with the occurrence of government recruitment practices. While these results provide a platform for a

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73 For reference, preliminary efforts in transition modeling also produced statistically significant results for preference variables. In particular, while the conscription variable was never significant, the pressgang variable was significant and in the expected direction. However, in order to be certain those results were not distorted due to methodological errors, time dependence, or collinearity, more refinements are necessary.
more in-depth inquiry, they are far from conclusive. Without appropriate controls or assurances that time has been appropriately accounted for, these data suggest only general patterns for further investigation.

Table 13: Preferences Predicting Recruitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Government Recruitment Index (current conflict)</th>
<th>Government Recruitment Index (any conflict)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Preference Index</td>
<td>0.216*** (0.029)</td>
<td>0.321*** (0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Nationalism</td>
<td>0.612*** (0.062)</td>
<td>0.747*** (0.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Power</td>
<td>−0.111 (0.091)</td>
<td>0.072 (0.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.012 (0.048)</td>
<td>−1.611*** (0.185)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 971 971 972 972
R²: 0.055 0.096 0.120 0.163
Adjusted R²: 0.054 0.094 0.120 0.161
Residual Std. Error: 1.491 (df = 969) 1.458 (df = 968) 1.438 (df = 970) 1.404 (df = 969)
F Statistic: 56.059*** (df = 1; 969) 51.405*** (df = 2; 968) 132.866*** (df = 1; 970) 94.269*** (df = 2; 969)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Conclusions

This analysis applied a preference-based theory of wartime to the instances of government perpetrated rape during ethnic and non-ethnic civil conflict. The purpose of this study was to evaluate to extent to which leadership preferences affected levels of wartime rape perpetrated by government armed groups. However, the results presented here confounded easy interpretation. With the exception of the drugs variable in ethnic war, none of the variables in either of the models are statistically significant across any of the samples. Thus, while there is support for the assertion that the presence of illicit resources provides enough political distance between leadership and citizens (such that leadership is relatively unconcerned with civilian support and therefore more likely to active engage in or ignore civilian abuse), we fail to reject the seven remaining null hypotheses.

Nevertheless, implications for the future direction of research are clear. Summarily these results reiterate that models possess different explanatory powers in ethnic versus non-ethnic war. Most profoundly, the results here suggest that theories do not apply to the broad spectrum of wartime rape ‘equally.’ It is possible that the forces motivating or inhibiting rape are not the same across groups. To this end, it is equally possible
that leadership preferences, institutions, and social networks work together in ways we have not yet captured. Certainly the evidence from this chapter implies the need for new variables, or at the very least new measurements. In addition, this work suggests that the strategic use of rape may be limited to certain contexts. That is, despite the occasional outliers, tactical rape may not be a strategy of career politicians but may be a tool or radical criminal groups. Otherwise stated, the tactical use of rape may be a strategy among only a small subset of groups, and may not have the same explanatory power across all groups in conflict.

Relative to future research, Wood (2009) notes that survivors of the Sri Lankan civil war discussed how the preference of the armed group was to kill enemies immediately rather than waste time with more involve methods of brutality (i.e., rape). In addition, de Waal et al. (2014) find that while rebel armed movements mostly killed government soldiers and militia men, pro-government forces mostly killed civilians (374). Given the empirics, an interesting avenue for future research would be to evaluate the extent of covariation among human rights violations (similar to the approach taken in the second chapter) by specifying a particular group-environment context. That is, bring the examination of covariation down the group level. While this would undoubtedly be an involved effort in data collection, there is potential that certain groups, conditioned by particular contexts demonstration similar patterns in the use of violence.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

“Clearly, one cannot overestimate the part played by individual actors in defining the nature of the threats posed to their respective communities, framing strategies designed to counter such threats, rallying support for their cause, bringing pressure to bear on key decision makers, and, in short, politicizing ethnoregional identities.”

Rene Lemarchand

This dissertation asks, why rape? Investigating this question, the research presented here aggregates literature on sexual violence, psychology, feminist studies, sociology, ethnic conflict, and state repression to analyze variation in the use of rape across armed groups in ethnic and non-ethnic civil conflict. Across these literatures, scholars agree: rape varies (Wood 2006, 2008, 2009; Gottschall 2004; Cohen 2013a; Alison 2007; Brown 2012; Siefert 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996; Sanday 2003; Bond 2003; Reid-Cunningham 2008; Russell-Brown 2003; Enloe 2000; Anwary 2012; Cook 1994; Kim 2012; Kohn 1994; MacKinnon 1994; Melandri 2009; Richey 2009; Schott 2011; Treault 1997; Baaz and Stern 2009; Cerretti 2016; Tompkins 1995; Brownmiller 1975; Koo 2002; Goldstein 2001; Higate and Hopton 2005; Pin-Fat and Stern 2005; Wing and Merchant 1993; Thornhill and Palmer 2000). As an instrument of war rape varies across time, conflicts, regions, cultures, and groups. More specifically, the chapters contained here endeavored to understand the factors motivating the variation in the use of rape within and across civil conflict.
In contribution to the literature, this work proffers a preference-based theory of wartime rape. Grounded among other strategic theories of rape, the PTWR addresses four problems in extant literature. First, the PTWR focuses on the leadership of each armed group within a dyad and can therefore explain variation at the armed group-level. Second, ideological differences between leaders can identify why armed groups in otherwise homogeneous cultures use rape differently. Additionally, since the ideology of a leader defines both the in-group and the enemy group, the PTWR can also predict which population is most likely to be victimized by a rape strategy. Finally, the theory proffered here argues that the gendered, symbolic meanings of rape set it apart from other human rights violations. Provided the characteristics (and particularly tragic) outcomes of rape, the PTWR contends that rape is a product of strategic leadership decisions conditioned by the wartime context; including the social and institutional arrangements that both create and constrain leadership preferences. That is, the level of rape in war is a violent expression of an effort to meet some political objective within a given context. Thus, based in the bargaining model of war, the PTWR argues that armed group leaders make decisions about the use of rape (to institute, promote, prohibit, ignore, etc.) based on a rational calculous that favors some desired outcome.

The unique contribution of the PTWR is the construction of an original dataset that marks the first large-N effort to measure group-level leadership preferences for sexual violence in civil conflict. Measurements were coded using Horowitz and Ye’s (2013a) two dimensional leadership typology that scores preferences along nationalist and power-seeking dimensions. In order to determine its relative utility in explaining the level of rape used in conflict, the PTWR was applied across 86 civil wars between 1980 and 2009 to independent samples of ethnic, non-ethnic, and aggregated wars. Expanding Cohen’s (2013a) original wartime rape dataset, preferences were coded annually for the leader of each armed group within a conflict dyad.

Summary of Results
The application of the PTWR occurred in three phases. First, a foundational analysis sought to determine whether rape covaried with more ‘common’ violations of human rights in the same way those violations covaried with each other. That is, at the core of the PTWR is the assumption that there is something distinct about the use of rape that makes it a particularly powerful instrument of war given in a particular context, given certain strategic objectives. Thus, the first substantive chapter of this dissertation examined the extent to which rape was correlated with measures of human rights. Results revealed that rape is a distinct phenomenon that does not share a latent construct with other human rights violations and that does not correlate with other human rights measures in the same way they correlate with each other. Not only does this finding reiterate the importance of the parent research question (why rape), but it also poses a passive challenge to existing explanations that fail to identify what it is about rape, distinct from other forms of violence, that motivates its use. That is, across the spectrum of violent modalities, what predicts the use of rape over other forms of civilian abuse?

Next, The PTWR was applied to rebel-perpetrated rape. The results from this application were three fold. First, findings indicate that there is a marked difference in the predictive power of the PTWR in ethnic versus non-ethnic war. In fact, this research makes clear that future analyses can benefit from separately applying theories to samples of ethnic and non-ethnic war. In order to fully understand the strengths and weaknesses of a given theory, it is imperative to see how that theory behaves in different wartime contexts.

Relative to explaining variation in rebel-perpetrated rape, the results suggest that democracy and Log GDP have a statistically significant, negative relationship with the use of rape in civil war. More specifically, as democracy and Log GDP increase, the level of rape within a conflict declines. Here, findings are consistent with more broad human rights literatures, providing additional confirmation that democracy, higher quality of life, and greater contentment with the status quo decrease the likelihood of human rights violations during war (see Davenport 2007; Davenport 1995). Interpreted through the PTWR, the results are consistent with the expectation that experiences with democracy
(i.e., leaders emerging from democracies) are more likely to have moderate preferences and therefore less likely to use rape as a military tactic. In contrast, the presence of an illicit drug economy has a statistically significant (and largely robust) positive relationship with the level of rebel-perpetrated rape. That is, in areas with an active drug economy, levels of rape are higher. Here, the expectation is that the availability of a drug economy decreases the reliance of armed group (and specifically, leadership) on the civilian population for resources (i.e., votes, taxes, etc.). Subsequently, leadership has fewer incentives to maintain positive relationships with civilians and is therefore more willing to use, or ignore the use of wartime rape. Finally, though not as robust as the other variables, there is some support for the notion that the condition of the armed organization matters for the use of rape. In this way, a fractured leadership resulted in increases in rebel-perpetrated rape. To this end, it is possible that the splintered hierarchy has lost enough control of the organization so as to make enforcing punishments or disseminating information more challenging, thereby results in higher levels of rape. Still, none of the variables achieved significance in non-ethnic war, suggesting that factors within ethnic war predispose a conflict to the use of rape.

Finally, when applied to government-perpetrated rape, the only significant variable across any of the models was drugs. Even so, the only time the drugs variable reached significance at the .05 level was in a sample of ethnic war when the government recruitment variable was included in the model. Across all other samples and model iterations there were no statistically significant results. The findings highlight two important points. First, the level of explanatory power non-ethnic war and across the spectrum of government-perpetrated rape suggests that one model of wartime rape cannot be assumed to be uniformly applicable across all groups and all contexts. Broadly, this work provides support for the idea that the theories of wartime rape are conditioned by the type of group and the type of war. Second, the lack of significant results across state-run armed groups suggests that the use of rape may be largely relegated to criminalized organizations. That is, echoing the logic of the PTWR, it may be that career politicians are more cognizant of the costliness of rape and therefore more likely to take strides to
prevent its use. Certainly, however, more research is necessary to confirm this hypothesis.


goint forward

The challenges encountered in this research provide important implications for the direction of future research. In particular, there are three foci moving forward. Perhaps the most dominant issue concerns concept development, specification, and operationalization. The largest hurdles to this research were issues of measurement. While data availability will always be a problem, conceptual stretching surrounding the already ambiguously defined “human rights violations” necessitates clarification. If we are to understand the specific relationship among types of violence, and the relationships between forms of violence and wars, groups, and strategic objectives, we must disaggregate and clarify existing constructs; making sure that any proposed theoretical combinations are supported empirically, not just heuristically. Most immediately however, we must return to basics; disaggregating long-combined concepts in order to appropriately test their relationships to one another. Here, it will beneficial to better integrate rape into existing repression literature; broadening the use of Mokken scale analysis in order to better understand the relationships among violations of physical integrity.

Additionally, there is a need to better account for the symbolic meanings of rape within a given war context. In order to understand the conditions under which tactical rape is employed by a group, then an account of what rape may mean to that group must be considered. To this end, understanding the role and symbolism of women within a given society must translate into an operational measurement that captures how a leader may view (and therefore weigh) the use of rape. Similarly, research should continue to develop and refine coding schemes and standards for leadership preferences. Here, the use of multiple coders and inter-coder reliability checks will be particularly helpful. Ultimately, time and continued use will help specify new tools that can assist in developing a more standardized implementation.

The second area concerns a push toward increasing the number of quantitative analyses. The rich body of qualitative case studies has provided a wealth of detail and innumerable hypotheses. Testing these hypotheses across broad samples of cases and
fully specifying theories is the next step in understanding the boundaries of existing knowledge. Following in the tradition of Cohen (2013a), research in wartime rape must ensure that samples/data capture sufficient variation in order to be able to explain that variation. Extending analyses of civil conflict to include inter-state conflicts is a good place to begin.

Finally, methodological innovations will also be imperative moving forward. We must take seriously the need to accurately account for issues like wartime context and time. Despite an occasionally daunting learning curve, the techniques are available. We have no excuses not to learn them. Methodological complacency comes at the expense of information. While there is much to be learned through incremental progression and a commitment to conservative and reliable inference, we must continue to extract new information out of old data; particularly in areas where new data are exponentially more difficult to come by.
References


Fisk, Robert. 1993. “Bosnian women ‘had to work in brothel’: Robert Fisk hears how Serb rapists determined that Muslim women should ‘have our little Chetniks’.”


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Appendix

Discussion of Isikozlu and Millard’s (2010) Typology

To date, one of the most detailed typologies is offered by Isikozlu and Millard (2010). Based on their in-depth analyses of El Salvador and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the authors posit a three category typology based on the perpetrator-raped individual relationship. This consequence-driven typological effort identifies six themes that surround and influence the perpetration of wartime rape (Isikozlu and Millard 2010, 27). It is from these themes that three categories emerge. Themes include: (1) type of conflict (intra-state versus inter-state, etc.); (2) characteristics of the armed group (group hierarchical structure, level of discipline, chain of command, etc.); (3) motivations for the rape (considers motivations of the individual actively perpetrating the rape); (4) characteristics of the rapist (background and experiential factors, psychological considerations, marital status, etc.); (5) characteristics of the raped person (age, sex ethnicity, general background information, etc.); and (6) characteristics of the rape (location, frequency, the use of weapons or objects, etc.) (Isikozlu and Millard 2010, 27-28). Each category is further divided into multiple types of wartime rape. Categories include: (1) Rape perpetrated by members of an armed group toward members of the same armed group or armed force. (2) Rape perpetrated by an armed group or armed force against a member of the civilian population. (3) Rape perpetrated by an armed group or armed force against members of another armed group (Isikozlu and Millard 2010, 42). Exploring rape perpetrated against civilians in more depth, the authors specify eight types of rape within this category: rape by an ally, sexual slavery, rape as a military strategy, rape by a neighbor, rape camps, rape in detention, opportunistic rape, and targeted rape. The authors further divide the ‘sexual slavery’ type into 4 additional subtypes (Isikozlu and Millard 2010, 47).

While are many advantages to a typology of this specificity, its practical use in research is questionable. For instance, the eight subtypes in the category of civilian rape are not mutually exclusive. Particularly problematic are situations in which individuals have multiple roles during a conflict. Certainly it is possible to imagine a scenario in which a
neighbor, who was once an ally, kidnapped the victim, committed rape, and sold her into sex slavery where she later escaped to a camp. If more than one rape happened during that time, then classification of the rape becomes impossible. In fact, it is possible that a rape victim could fit into each of the eight subtypes over the course of the conflict. Even so, nothing in our hypothetical scenario precludes rape being used as a military strategy by one side or the other.

Furthermore, the reporting of rape in any given conflict is rarely (if ever) broken down into such narrow categories. In reality, the numbers of reported rape in a conflict are already subject to so many sources of error that practitioners and scholars are lucky if any numbers exist at all (Wood 2008, 2009; Cohen 2013a; Gottschall 2004; Baaz and Stern 2009). In addition, while Isikozlu and Millard (2010) offer a brief review of scholarly literature on rape during war, there appears to be no theoretical consideration given to the construction of the typology itself. That is, although the authors present important ethnographic research, the typology is based on 37 interviews in two countries. While the explanation explores a single subtype, that subtype is the product of 30 separate classifications. Given that there are 6 themes, 3 categories, each with 3 types of rape, potentially 8 or more sub-types in each type, and further divisions on each subtype, the number of variations far exceed the 37 interviews on which the typology is based. While the authors make an effort to corroborate their categorization with excerpts from shadow cases, there is no methodological rigor on which to control for exogenous factors, identify patterns, or apply theory. Despite its bold exploratory effort, the very construction of this typology prohibits its use in questions of causal inference.
### Figure 3: Descriptive Statistics from Cohen (2013a, 12-13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (Case name)</th>
<th>(Foresn 2011)</th>
<th>War Years</th>
<th>Highest Level</th>
<th>State Perpetrators</th>
<th>Insurgent Perpetrators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFGHANISTAN (Mujahedten)</td>
<td>1979-92</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFGHANISTAN (v. Taliban)</td>
<td>1992-2001</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFGHANISTAN (v. Taliban II)</td>
<td>2003-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALGERIA (FLGLGA, GSPC)</td>
<td>1992-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANGOLA (FLEC (Cahonda))</td>
<td>1992-2004</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANGOLA (UNITA)</td>
<td>1975-2002</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZERBAIJAN (Nagorno-Karabakh)</td>
<td>1992-94</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANGLADESH (Chittagong Hills)</td>
<td>1976-97</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOSNIA HERZ. (Rep. Serpa/Croatia)</td>
<td>1992-95</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURMA (CPL, Karrins, etc.)</td>
<td>1988-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURundi (Huta groups v. gov't)</td>
<td>1993-2006</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURundi (Org. massacres, both sides)</td>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMBODIA (Kmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC, etc.)</td>
<td>1978-98</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAD (FROLINAT, various ...)</td>
<td>1985-1992</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAD (FARF, other rebels in South)</td>
<td>1992-98</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHINA (Xinjiang)</td>
<td>1992-1994</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLOMBIA (FARC, ELN, etc)</td>
<td>1965-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONGO/BRAZZAVILLE (Factional fighting)</td>
<td>1997-99</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHADIA (Kongolo)</td>
<td>1992-95</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM. REP. CONGO/ZAIRE (AFDL, Kabilis)</td>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM. REP. CONGO/ZAIRE (RCD, etc. v. gov't)</td>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJIBOUTI (FRUD)</td>
<td>1991-94</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL SALVADOR (FMLN)</td>
<td>1979-92</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHIOPIA (Erteza, Tigrean, etc.)</td>
<td>1982-92</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHIOPIA (Oromo Lib. Front)</td>
<td>1992-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEORGIA (Akhalkalisi)</td>
<td>1992-94</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUATEMALA (URNG, various)</td>
<td>1996-96</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUINEA (MSE)</td>
<td>1988-99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAITI (Mil. Coup)</td>
<td>1991-95</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIA (Kashmir)</td>
<td>1989-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIA (N. East rebels)</td>
<td>1996-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIA (Naxalites)</td>
<td>1988-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIA (Sikhs)</td>
<td>1982-93</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDONESIA (EI, Timor)</td>
<td>1995-99</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDONESIA (GAM (Aceh))</td>
<td>1995-99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDONESIA (GAM (Aceh, Sumatra))</td>
<td>1999-2002</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDONESIA (GPM (West Papua))</td>
<td>1965-85</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA (KDP-PUK, Kurdistan)</td>
<td>1997-99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAQ (KDP, PUK, (Kurd))</td>
<td>1974-93</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAQ (Shia uprising)</td>
<td>1991-95</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAQ (Semi and Shia rebels)</td>
<td>2003-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISRAEL (Palestinian insurgents)</td>
<td>1993-95</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVORY COAST (anti-Gbagbo)</td>
<td>2002-07</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEBANON (v. various militias)</td>
<td>1975-90</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERIA (NPFL, Taylor), (NPFL (Johnson))</td>
<td>1989-96</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERIA (LURD)</td>
<td>2003-05</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALI (Tuareg)</td>
<td>1994-98</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOROCCO (Policos)</td>
<td>1972-88</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOZAMBIQUE (RENAMO)</td>
<td>1972-92</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAL (CPN-Mohan, Monchhas)</td>
<td>1995-2006</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICARAGUA (Contras)</td>
<td>1980-90</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKISTAN (MQM, Sindhi v. Mohajirs)</td>
<td>1983-98</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKISTAN (Baluchistan)</td>
<td>1992-95</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKISTAN (Taliban)</td>
<td>1997-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAPUA N.G. (BRA (Nabugasa/kev))</td>
<td>1988-98</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Dependent Variable Coding Scheme

Table 14: Summary of Coding Rules: Levels of Wartime Rape

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Rape</th>
<th>Coding Rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rape likely related to the civil conflict: described as “systematic,” or “massive;” used as a “means of intimidation,” an “instrument of control and punishment,” a “weapon,” a “tactic to terrorize the populace,” a “terror tactic,” a “tool of war,” on a “massive scale.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Rape likely related to the civil conflict, but did not meet the requirements for a 3 coding: described as “widespread,” “common,” “commonplace,” “extensive,” “frequent,” “often,” “innumerable,” “persistent,” “recurring,” a “pattern,” a “common pattern,” or a “spree;” occurred “commonly,” “frequently,” in “large numbers,” “periodically,” “regularly,” “routinely,” “widely,” or on a “number of occasions;” there were “many” or “numerous” instances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rape likely related to the civil conflict, but did not meet the requirements for a 2 or 3 coding: instances were described as “isolated reports,” “some reports,” “reports,” or “there continued to be reports.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>No mention of rape or other sexual violence related to the civil conflict.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For more information, please see Cohen 2013a

### Independent Variables: Description

There are three groups of variables that describe the PTWR. These groups include leadership preferences, the status quo, and relative power. Below, variables are presented and discussed by group.

**Leadership Preferences: Power-Seeking Dimension.** Leadership preferences were coded using Horowitz and Ye’s (2013) two dimensional typology. A principled-unprincipled (or power-seeking) dimension assesses how much pursuing and maintaining political power is valued relative to intrinsic nationalist and other political goals (Horowitz and Ye 2013a, 527). Power-seeking preferences are measured using a three-level ordinal scale. Each level is divided into four categories that capture evidence of the preference in terms of level of commitment, consistency and risk acceptance, political organization, and corruption. The first level captures the lowest form of power-seeking (i.e., strongly principled behavior). This level represents the ideologues; those with near-absolute commitment to one or more political goals. In particular, one would expect to see an absolute consistency in the pursuit of core goals, using strategies that are consistent with the stated goals and priorities. Furthermore, commitment is reflected by a frequent willingness to risk power loss or personal safety in pursuit of goals. Within the organization, the leader is expected to value other purely principled leaders, independent of their political stature. Here, no personal corruption is expected and client corruption is strongly discouraged but tolerated if perceived as a necessary-evil in service of substantive goals.
The mid-level power-seekers (i.e., balanced behavior) are kindred to typical career politicians. There is evidence of significant commitment to one or more substantive political goals, but an expectation that these goals will be subverted for a large enough political advantage. Balanced leaders are expected to be generally risk avoidant, evidencing moderate strategies and consistency in pursuit of stated core goals. Within the organization, there is a strong emphasis on principled and effective leaders, with little personal and client corruption expected. However, client corruption will be viewed as acceptable if and when it serves the larger political goals.

Finally, the highly power-seeking leaders (i.e., strongly unprincipled behavior) are opportunists with no convincing commitment to any substantive political goals. Any stated goals will be sacrificed for a significant political advantage. Here, leaders are expected to be risk-avoidant, personally and professionally, in pursuit of goals. This behavior is characterized by a pronounced inconsistency in pursuit of goals, with strategies inconsistent with efforts to achieve stated objectives; particularly where inconsistency brings political advantage. The organization is expected to be dominated by the presence of “yes-men”, drawn from personal networks in order to preserve the emphasis on loyalty, though often at the expense of political efficacy. In general, corruption is the primary mechanism used to achieve goals, unless that corruption threatens power.\footnote{For a thorough explanation of coding and a detailed example of the application of this coding to several case studies, please see Horowitz and Ye (2013b, 2013c).}

\textit{Leadership Preferences: Nationalist Dimension.} A nationalist goals dimension assesses how strongly nationalist goals are valued relative to the conflict costs and outcome risks that may result from pursuing them. A more extreme nationalist position is defined as more highly valuing risks of crisis-induced concessions and victory relative to the
downside risk of defeat as well as crisis and conflict costs. Nationalist preferences are coded on a five-category ordinal scale beginning at non-nationalist, and ending at extreme nationalist. Non-nationalists are those whose statements and actions convey little to no interest in collective political goals. That is, non-nationalists place very little emphasis on expulsion or assimilation of the outsider group, and no strong feelings toward independence, or institutional and/or cultural autonomy. Thus, there is no significant effort to elicit civilian support for collective goals and the individual rights of ethnic others are strictly respected. In general, non-nationalists are expected to discourage collective goals of own and other groups.

Moderate nationalists are those in which independence or assimilation goals may exist theoretically, but the dominant emphasis is on coexistence and improvement under existing conditions. Moderate nationalists have a strong attachment to the status quo, avoiding political confrontations and economic disruptions. Political pressures may be used for bargaining for institutional or policy changes, but are expected to be confined within the current legal and political framework. Though the leader may prioritize collective goals of his own group, there is general acceptance of the collective goals of other groups. These groups tend to collect other moderate nationalists but identical view are not enforced.

The third level of nationalism is that of the ordinary nationalist. Here, there is an active policy agenda aimed at one or more specific political objectives (i.e., independence, autonomy, or state-sponsored assimilation, etc.), but compromise is acceptable if the costs of pursuing maximal goals cause significant disruption of the current system. Thus, more disruptive measures are only likely to occur under conditions in which there is a very strong possibility of success or a possibility of success at a relatively low cost. While the

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75Here, it is important to clarify that Horowitz and Ye (2013a) originally developed this two-dimensional typology following Fearon’s (1995) bargaining model of war. Fearon (1995) argued that if states could agree on the outcome of possible war, then they could also avoid war. Given the concentrated costs of war for both sides, regardless of the winner, war is rarely the rational option. The authors show that the greater relative power and a smaller share of the status quo goods make it more likely that a given side will initiate a crisis (i.e., take a risk, exhibit more extreme behavior) (Horowitz and Ye 2013a, 510). Thus, in the original work, ‘crisis’ refers to the action that marks the start of the war. In this research, the word crisis is used infrequently, but is meant to convey the severity of terrorist tactics and more extreme human rights violations overall.
collective goals of his own group are prioritized and collective goals of the other group are discouraged, the individual rights of the other-group members are defended. In pursuit of core goals, some extraordinary tactics are plausible, but are likely limited to activities that maintain the defense of others’ individual rights. However, if attacked, moderate nationalists are expected to reciprocate in kind where it is likely to advance core goals. Within the group, ordinary nationalist views are encouraged but not enforced.

The next nationalist level represents strong nationalists. Strong nationalists are expected to have an active policy agenda consisting of one or more (and most likely more) political goals. Goals tend to be ranked hierarchically such that intermediate goals can be discount or sacrificed in pursuit of maximal goals. The intermediate goals offer room for bargaining, high costs are acceptable only if there is a significant chance of victory. In pursuit of goals, the individual rights of the other-group are likely to be restricted where they can be viewed as threatening own-group goals. Violence is possible, but targets are limited to other-group civil society organizations, military operatives, and political institutions. So long as violence is in pursuit of goals, there is likely to be passive support for or indifference to violence against out-groups. Within the organization, strong nationalist views are a pre-requisite for high positions and incumbent leadership goals are prioritized over ‘institutional protocol.’

Finally, the extreme nationalist is one that demonstrates an active interest and policy agenda in pursuit of one or more goals. Maximal goals are preferanced over intermediate goals are pursued almost any cost, even with little short-term prospects for success. As is expected, the collective goals of own-group are prioritized and the collective goals of the other group are completely excluded. In general, the individual rights of the other-group are generally viewed as threatening own-group goals and are likely restricted. An extreme nationalist demands that extreme views are enforced in all positions, and violence is therefore directed not only at political institutions, the military, and civil society organizations of other-group, but also of own-group where differing views are perceived as threats either power or ideology.\footnote{Tables explaining each of the dimensions are contained in the appendix. However, for further information, please see Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 2013b, 2013c).}
One of the particular challenges of coding leadership preferences is to make sure measures are distinct from the independent variable. To this end, Horowitz and Ye (2013) highlight ways through which to ensure that preferences are not conflated with outcomes. The authors recommend collecting information on both actions and statements and evaluating them over a long period of time (to the extent possible). In this work, particular care was taken to implement Horowitz and Ye’s (2013a) recommended strategy of separating actors’ statements from their actions. This is vital, as actions indicating preferences may include elements of the dependent variable. Thus, to implement the two-dimensional typology, information about actions indicating the nature and extent of power-seeking and nationalist goals, as well as the costs and risks in pursuing them was excluded. While this also excludes information on other types of action, the approach minimizes the chance that information on the dependent variable might contaminate the measurement of leadership preferences. NOTE: Poe and Tate (1994) also talk about keeping genocides and massacres distinct from repression (i.e., personal integrity abuse) as a DV.

Relative Power. There are five relative power variables included in the models. Log-GDP is used to provide a broad measure of the resources available to both state and rebel groups. For rebel groups, Log-GDP measures the level of resources available to rebel groups at the time of the conflict. Rebel groups with more resources are expected to be more powerful, and therefore better able to enforce norms and distribute punishments to defectors. For the state, Log-GDP is a measure of the relative prosperity of state leadership. That is, a higher GDP suggests that state leadership has more available money and therefore greater liquidity to use on military resources. In this way, governments with higher GDPs are better able to recruit and train their military. Higher levels of investment are expected to produce a more professional armed unit with more developed institutional processes for enforcing behavior. Therefore, as GDP increases, we would expect rape perpetrated by state soldiers to decline. To more directly account for the

\footnote{For a discussion of other approaches, please see Horowitz and Ye (2013a, 512-513.)}
power of the state, a measure of military size (i.e., military persons under foot) was used. Similar to accounting for state population in conflict research, controlling for military personnel by the states accounts for the effect of sheer size (i.e., volume of people). Just as there more deaths in highly populated areas, it would be expected that there would be more rape in larger armies.

In addition, measures for oil and drugs were included to account for the resource curse. The presence of illicit economies can be influential in both state and rebel behavior. An armed unit able to receive funding from sources outside the citizen population is not reliant on civilians to exist and is, therefore, less likely to be concerned about the relative costs of civilian treatment. This is particularly true in territorial war where there is an effort to remove a population from a contested territory. Thus, where leadership places a higher relative value on the citizens, levels of rape are expected to be lower.

A tribal variable was also included to account for the relative distance between state leadership and the civilian population. There are two inter-related logics that explain the impact of a tribal state. First, to the extent that there is a presence of tribal politics operating in cities and villages, there is a degree of relative autonomy from the government. In an ethnic war, these locations become easily identifiable ‘out-groups.’ In turn, state-perpetrated rape in ethnic war, would be expected to be higher in tribal areas. Alternatively, as noted by Kalyvas (1999), “A central feature of civil wars is the breakdown of the state monopoly of violence and its replacement by locally segmented monopolies of violence” (259). In this regard, an insurgent organization controlling an area operates as a counter-sovereign authority, providing protection, administering justice, collecting taxes and implementing social programs. Such an organization also enjoys a monopoly on violence, which can be used to punish enemies and sanction uncooperative behavior (Kalyvas 1999, 259). ?? Rebels wouldn’t ant to rape in these areas as they would not want to risk alienating public support. In many ways, tribal regions are still living in a pre-modern society, without the same norms for treating everyone according to a unifying set of standards. Government isn’t there, so soldiers have a free for all. Tribal variable
is particularly strong in ethnic war.\textsuperscript{78}

Finally, a dummy variable measuring whether group leadership was unified or fractured was used to account for the ability of a given armed group to enforce anti-rape norms and punish defectors. In many ways, this reflects the primary logic of the opportunity arguments that posit state and institutional breakdown as a motivating force in wartime rape (Wood 2006; Kalyvas 1999). As Wood (2006) argues, enforcement of regulatory mechanisms var and those regulatory mechanisms that exist may break down during war (321). In particular, if there are two competing leadership groups, it is possible that one group may be actively seeking to prevent wartime rape, while another group is less concerned with extreme violence. Similarly, if there is a divide in leadership, hierarchical disruption and communication problems are likely to prevent (or otherwise sidetrack) the armed force from policing soldier behavior. Thus, as the ability to enforce rules of warfare wane, rape levels are expected to be higher.

\textit{Status Quo.} A high-democracy variable was constructed using the top of the polity2 measure. This measure accounts for three inter-related processes. First, the level of democracy provides a general measure of state repression, civil liberties, inclusiveness and corruption. In turn, democracy provides a baseline for existing grievances between rebel groups and state leadership. A higher measure of democracy is expected to indicate a greater contentment with the status quo, and therefore less of an interest in more extreme violence. More broadly, democracy reflects the norms and values present in society. Countries with experience in democracy are more likely to have more moderate preferences in regards to the use of violence. Thus, we would expect rebels from a democratic state to show greater restraint in their level of violence both against their own and enemy populations. Finally, on the side of the government, it is expected that leaders would have a greater interest in preserving citizen support for the leadership. Thus, more moderate levels of violence and a more stringent set of active preferences for the punishment and prevention of rape are expected in states with higher democracy

\textsuperscript{78}Inter-tribal violence accounts for the plurality of fatalities over the study period (48%) due especially to several major events near the end of the period (de Waal et al. 2014, 373).
scores. When democracy is coupled with Log-GDP, the combination offers insight in the overall level of state development and the strength of existing institutions.\textsuperscript{79}

Table 15: Difference of Means Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rape Source</th>
<th>Human Rights Violation</th>
<th>Diff. of Mean</th>
<th>95% C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disappearance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict-Level Rape</td>
<td>0.649*</td>
<td>-0.728 -0.569</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-Judicial Killing</td>
<td>0.018*</td>
<td>-0.031 0.045</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>-0.047 -0.099</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt-Perpetrated Rape</td>
<td>0.466*</td>
<td>-0.539 -0.391</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-Judicial Killing</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.035 0.075</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>0.161*</td>
<td>0.102 0.220</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel-Perpetrated Rape</td>
<td>0.399*</td>
<td>-0.384 -0.233</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearance</td>
<td>0.163*</td>
<td>0.098 0.228</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-Judicial Killing</td>
<td>0.317*</td>
<td>0.257 0.378</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt-Perpetrated Rape</td>
<td>0.465*</td>
<td>-0.539 -0.391</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-Judicial Killing</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.035 0.075</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>0.161*</td>
<td>0.102 0.220</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel-Perpetrated Rape</td>
<td>0.399*</td>
<td>-0.384 -0.233</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearance</td>
<td>0.163*</td>
<td>0.098 0.228</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-Judicial Killing</td>
<td>0.317*</td>
<td>0.257 0.378</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{79}Log-GDP, given its relationship with democracy, can also be interpreted as a measure of state development.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Fracture</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Preferences</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>−0.023</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>−0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>−0.099</td>
<td>−0.181**</td>
<td>−0.004</td>
<td>−0.009</td>
<td>−0.010</td>
<td>−0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>−0.044</td>
<td>−0.043</td>
<td>−0.111</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>−0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>0.158**</td>
<td>0.265***</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.122**</td>
<td>0.156*</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>−0.007</td>
<td>−0.004</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>−0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic War Dummy</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>−0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>−0.003</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.698***</td>
<td>0.830**</td>
<td>−0.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
<td>(0.321)</td>
<td>(0.520)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>1.996*</td>
<td>3.114**</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>3.158***</td>
<td>3.830***</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.218 (df = 77)</td>
<td>0.225 (df = 56)</td>
<td>0.209 (df = 77)</td>
<td>0.219 (df = 56)</td>
<td>0.184 (df = 15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>1.998* (df = 77)</td>
<td>3.114** (df = 6.56)</td>
<td>3.158*** (df = 7.77)</td>
<td>3.830*** (df = 6.56)</td>
<td>0.113 (df = 6.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Table 17: Bivariate Rebel-leveraged Rape in Civil War: Recruitment Tactics (model 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Recruit</td>
<td>0.068***</td>
<td>0.124***</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.065***</td>
<td>0.115***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Preferences</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>−0.028</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
<td>−0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>−0.052</td>
<td>−0.079</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.084***</td>
<td>−0.073**</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>−0.031</td>
<td>−0.016</td>
<td>−0.009</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.014</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>0.113*</td>
<td>0.171**</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.023</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>−0.004</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic War Dummy</td>
<td>0.118**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.130**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.670***</td>
<td>0.725***</td>
<td>−0.056</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.223)</td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
<td>(0.528)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations         | 85       | 63         | 22             | 85       | 63         | 22             |
| R^2                  | 0.238    | 0.415      | 0.031          | 0.314    | 0.457      | 0.036          |
| Adjusted R^2         | 0.168    | 0.353      | −0.036         | 0.252    | 0.399      | −0.350         |
| Residual Std. Error  | 0.207 (df = 77) | 0.199 (df = 56) | −0.036 (df = 15) | 0.196 (df = 77) | 0.192 (df = 56) | 0.185 (df = 15) |
| F Statistic          | 3.430*** (df = 7; 77) | 6.634*** (df = 6; 56) | 0.080 (df = 6; 15) | 5.033*** (df = 7; 77) | 7.846*** (df = 6; 56) | 0.093 (df = 6; 15) |
| R^2 Rebel Rec. Ever  | 0.204    | 0.281      | 0.052          | 0.267    | 0.332      | 0.055          |
| Adjusted R^2 Rebel Rec. Ever | 0.131 | 0.204 | −0.327 | 0.200 | 0.260 | −0.323 |

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table 18: Rebel-Perpetrated Rape: Combination Log GDP and Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rebel Rape (mean 4-category)</th>
<th>Rebel Rape (mean dichotomous)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All War</td>
<td>Ethnic War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Fracture</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Preferences</td>
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<td>(0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>−0.129</td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
<td>(0.272)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>−0.269***</td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>0.353***</td>
<td>(0.166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.166)</td>
<td>(0.244)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>−0.008</td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
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<td>Ethnic War Dummy</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.055)</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.723)</td>
<td>(0.970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
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<td>0.356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
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<td>0.274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>0.575 (df = 76)</td>
<td>0.601 (df = 55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(df = 8, 76)</td>
<td>(df = 7, 55)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Table 19: Rebel-Perpetrated Rape: Full Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Rebel Rape (mean 4-category)</th>
<th>Rebel Rape (mean dichotomous)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All War</td>
<td>All War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Fracture</td>
<td>Rebel Fracture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Recruit</td>
<td>Rebel Recruit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.199***</td>
<td>0.330***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Preferences</td>
<td>Rebel Preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−0.035</td>
<td>−0.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.192)</td>
<td>(0.240)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>Log GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−0.259***</td>
<td>−0.185*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.682)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>Oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>Drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.376*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.160)</td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.00005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic War Dummy</td>
<td>Ethnic War Dummy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.351**</td>
<td>0.121**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.988***</td>
<td>1.832**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.671)</td>
<td>(0.852)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>85</th>
<th>63</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>85</th>
<th>63</th>
<th>22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>−0.335</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td>−0.537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>0.533 (df = 75)</td>
<td>0.523 (df = 54)</td>
<td>0.515 (df = 13)</td>
<td>0.198 (df = 54)</td>
<td>0.195 (df = 54)</td>
<td>0.198 (df = 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P Statistic</td>
<td>5.449*** (df = 9, 75)</td>
<td>7.403*** (df = 8, 54)</td>
<td>0.342 (df = 8, 13)</td>
<td>3.919*** (df = 9, 75)</td>
<td>5.739*** (df = 8, 54)</td>
<td>0.082 (df = 8, 13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Table 20: Bivariate Government-leveraged Rape in Civil War: Group Fracture (model 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Fracture</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>−0.037</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>−0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Preferences</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.019</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>−0.027</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>−0.065</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>0.114*</td>
<td>0.194**</td>
<td>−0.065</td>
<td>0.117*</td>
<td>0.205**</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>−0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Persons</td>
<td>−0.00002</td>
<td>−0.00001</td>
<td>−0.00003</td>
<td>0.00000</td>
<td>−0.00001</td>
<td>0.00002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic War Dummy</td>
<td>0.154***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−0.065</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.270)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>−0.188</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>−0.188</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>−0.281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(df = 76)</td>
<td>(df = 55)</td>
<td>(df = 14)</td>
<td>(df = 76)</td>
<td>(df = 55)</td>
<td>(df = 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Statistic</td>
<td>2.261**</td>
<td>1.949*</td>
<td>0.525</td>
<td>2.254**</td>
<td>1.938*</td>
<td>0.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(df = 8; 76)</td>
<td>(df = 7; 55)</td>
<td>(df = 7; 14)</td>
<td>(df = 8; 76)</td>
<td>(df = 7; 55)</td>
<td>(df = 7; 14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Table 21: Bivariate Government-leveraged Rape in Civil War: Recruitment Tactics (model 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
<th>All War</th>
<th>Ethnic War</th>
<th>Non-ethnic War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Recruit</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>−0.007</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>−0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Preferences</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.022</td>
<td>−0.002</td>
<td>−0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>−0.006</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>0.112*</td>
<td>0.209**</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.116*</td>
<td>0.218**</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>−0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Persons</td>
<td>−0.00003</td>
<td>−0.00003</td>
<td>−0.00003</td>
<td>−0.00000</td>
<td>−0.00002</td>
<td>0.00002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic War Dummy</td>
<td>0.153***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.153***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−0.052</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
<td>(0.320)</td>
<td>(0.257)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations | 85 | 63 | 22 | 85 | 63 | 22 |
R²           | 0.190 | 0.198 | 0.178 | 0.188 | 0.196 | 0.163 |
Adjusted R²  | 0.105 | 0.096 | −0.233 | 0.183 | 0.093 | −0.256 |
Residual Std. Error | 0.215 (df = 76) | 0.239 (df = 55) | 0.084 (df = 14) | 0.215 (df = 76) | 0.240 (df = 55) | 0.085 (df = 14) |
F Statistic  | 2.229** (df = 8, 76) | 1.939* (df = 7, 55) | 0.412 (df = 7, 14) | 2.204** (df = 8, 76) | 1.911* (df = 7, 55) | 0.388 (df = 7, 14) |
R² Govt. Rec. Ever | 0.186 | 0.196 | 0.198 | 0.185 | 0.192 | 0.168 |
Adjusted R² Govt. Rec. Ever | 0.100 | 0.093 | −0.202 | 0.099 | 0.090 | −0.248 |

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table 22: Government-Perpetrated Rape: Combination Log GDP and Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Govt Rape (mean 4-category)</th>
<th></th>
<th>Govt Rape (mean dichotomous)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All War</td>
<td>Ethnic War</td>
<td>Non-ethnic War</td>
<td>All War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt Fracture</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>−0.257</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
<td>(0.240)</td>
<td>(0.240)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt Preferences</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>−0.094</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
<td>(0.283)</td>
<td>(0.312)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>−0.127</td>
<td>−0.059</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>−0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.203)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>−0.124</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.250)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>−0.153</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Persons</td>
<td>0.00001</td>
<td>−0.00002</td>
<td>0.00001</td>
<td>−0.00001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic War Dummy</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.159***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.118</td>
<td>0.746</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>0.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.690)</td>
<td>(0.885)</td>
<td>(1.437)</td>
<td>(0.254)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td>0.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>−0.219</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>0.584 (df = 75)</td>
<td>0.629 (df = 54)</td>
<td>0.416 (df = 13)</td>
<td>0.215 (df = 75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Statistic</td>
<td>1.514 (df = 9, 75)</td>
<td>1.721 (df = 8, 54)</td>
<td>0.528 (df = 8, 13)</td>
<td>2.997** (df = 9, 75)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Table 23: Government-Perpetrated Rape: Full Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Govt Rape (mean 4-category)</th>
<th>Govt Rape (mean dichotomous)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All War</td>
<td>Ethnic War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt Fracture</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td>(0.243)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt Recruit</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt Preferences</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
<td>(0.300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Persons</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic War Dummy</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>0.163***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.159</td>
<td>0.857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.710)</td>
<td>(0.921)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>0.587 (df = 74)</td>
<td>0.632 (df = 53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Statistic</td>
<td>1.354 (df = 10; 74)</td>
<td>1.531 (df = 9; 53)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Education

Ph.D., Political Science, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, August 2017
Exam Fields: International Relations and Comparative Politics
Dissertation: *Power, Responsibility, and Sexually Violent War Tactics: A theoretical and empirical analysis of rape during civil war.*
Committee Members: Shale Horowitz (Chair), David Armstrong, Natasha Borges Sugiyama, Steven Redd

Dissertation Abstract: This dissertation posits a leadership preference-based strategic theory of rape during war; marking the first large-N, quantitative exploration of leadership preferences on the use of rape in civil war. Using an original dataset, preferences of armed group leaders are evaluated against the level of rape across all civil conflicts between 1980 - 2009. The results suggest that rape is distinctive from other human rights violations and is permitted or controlled differently than are more common forms of extracombat violence. Subsequently, this work argues that the symbolic meaning of rape, given its gendered nature and uniquely devastating outcomes, makes it a particularly attractive tool of war under some conditions. Statistical tests reveal that different factors predict state-perpetrated rape than predict rebel-perpetrated rape; with the strongest predictive power across rebel groups in ethnic war. Overall, findings reveal that the predictive power of the models is conditioned by the type of war.

Thesis: *Conceptual Comparisons in Afghan Statebuilding: A Dual-Methodology Approach*

B.S. Major 1: Interpersonal and Public Communication; B.S. Major 2: Health Promotion and Rehabilitation, Central Michigan University. Graduate with honors, May 2003.

Publication / Under Review

“What to Expect When You’re Electing: The Relationship Between Far-Right Strength and Citizenship Policy in Europe.” Received a revise and resubmit request from *Comparative European Politics* (with Michael A. Hansen).

Working Papers

“A Mixture Model Comparison of the Explanatory Power of Classical Realism, Neorealism, and Neoclassical Realism for U.S. Foreign Policy”
“Triads in International Relations: A Re-exploration of Superpower Aid on the Occurrence of Conflict” (with Dr. Uk Heo).

**Courses Taught**

*Upper-Division*
- Politics of Developing Nations, Carroll University, Fall 2014

*Lower-Division*
- Introduction to Comparative Politics, Marquette University, Spring 2017
- Introduction to International Relations, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Fall 2015-2017 *(online)*
- Introduction to International Relations, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Fall 2014-2017
- Contemporary Global Politics, Carroll University, Fall 2013

**Teaching Assistantships**

- Contemporary Problems in International Relations (S. Horowitz), New York, NY, Summer 2016
- Capstone Course in Political Science (K. Ferguson, S. Benesh, S. Horowitz), University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Fall 2013-Spring 2014
- International Conflict (U. Heo), University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Fall 2013
- State and Local Politics (J. Bohte), University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Spring 2013
- State and Local Politics (D. Hatch), University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Fall 2012-Spring 2013
- The Soviet Union and Successor States (D. Pienkos), University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Fall 2012
- Introduction to Global Studies: People and Politics (R. Beck), University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Fall 2012
- Introduction to International Relations (M. Tyburski), University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Spring 2012
- Introduction to Political Science (K. Gleason), University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Spring 2012

**Conference Presentations**

- “What to Expect When You’re Electing: The Relationship Between Far-Right Strength and Citizenship Policy in Europe,” Midwest Political Science Association Annual Con-

**Guest Lectures**


“Team-Based Learning in Political Science: The Skill-Centered Solution to Capstone Failure.” Presented to the Undergraduate Committee as part of the Major Assessment Action Plan for the Political Science Department; University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2014.

“Rwanda: War and Politics.” Guest Lecturer, Introduction to International Relations; University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Spring 2012.

**Previous Professional Experience**


**Academic Awards and Appointments**

Visiting Instructor, Marquette University, Spring 2017
Graduate Assistant United Nations Summer Seminar, UW-Milwaukee, Summer 2016
Graduate Teaching Assistant, UW-Milwaukee, January 2012 - 2017
Adjunct Professor, Carroll University, Fall 2013 - Fall 2014
Recipient of the National Collegiate Award 2003

**Additional Training and Skills**

Computational Proficiency: SPSS, \LaTeX, R, Stata
Certificate in Grant Writing and Research Proposals from The Grant Writing and Proposals Institute
Mediation Training through Intercultural Management Institute
Problem-Solving Workshop Facilitator Training
American University Mediation Training
Conflict Resolution Skills and Practices Institute: Focus on Reconciliation and Dialogue

**Professional Memberships**

Midwest Political Science Association
American Political Science Association
Pi Sigma Alpha, Political Science National Honor Society
Lambda Pi Eta, Communication National Honor Society (Founding Member of Central Michigan Chapter)

**References**

Dr. Shale Horowitz (shale@uwm.edu)
Dr. David Armstrong (davearmstrong.ps@gmail.com)
Dr. Natasha Borges Sugiyama (sugiyamn@uwm.edu)
Dr. Steven Redd (sredd@uwm.edu)