A Distinction Between Expectations and Demands: Towards a Wider Conception of Accountability

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A DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXPECTATIONS AND DEMANDS:
TOWARDS A WIDER CONCEPTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY

by

Christiana Eltiste

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ABSTRACT

A DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXPECTATIONS AND DEMANDS: TOWARDS A WIDER CONCEPTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY

by

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Under the Supervision of Professor Andrea Westlund

In the literature on responsibility and blame, ‘expectations’ and ‘demands’ are often used interchangeably. Specifically, R. Jay Wallace construes expectations and demands as equivalent ways of expressing strict prohibitions or requirements. However, expectations and demands are not identical concepts and treating them as such glosses over important nuance. By using these concepts synonymously, Wallace is unable to account for how we blame and hold others responsible for actions that do not violate strict prohibitions or requirements, actions that are merely considered morally bad. In this paper I explore the distinction between expectations and demands and how ignoring this distinction ultimately produces an unduly revisionist account of responsibility and blame. By articulating the distinction between expectations and demands, I am able to put forth a wider conception of accountability, one which better explains our responsibility practices, including why blame and resentment are fitting responses to morally bad actions.
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§1 INTRODUCTION

We routinely hold people responsible in our everyday lives. But the conditions under which we can hold someone responsible and what we can hold her responsible for are controversial. In his seminal paper “Freedom and Resentment” P. F. Strawson suggests that concerns regarding general metaphysical commitments are irrelevant to our responsibility practices, arguing instead that our ability to hold people responsible stems from the attitudes we naturally take towards a person and their actions.\(^1\) Continuing in the Strawsonian tradition, R. Jay Wallace puts forth an account of moral responsibility which is essentially connected to the moral reactive attitudes. He argues that moral responsibility and its characteristic connection to moral blame and sanction are correctly situated within the nexus of moral concepts of obligation, moral right, and moral wrong, such that the reactive attitudes and blame are only appropriate when an action violates a strict prohibition or requirement — when an action is morally wrong.\(^2\)

However in practice, we can and do appropriately hold people morally responsible for actions that fall outside of this deontic realm; the moral reactive attitudes can be a fitting response to actions that are dis-commendable but are not violations of strict prohibitions or requirements.\(^3\) These cases of blame and the reactive attitudes in response to morally bad actions highlight how Wallace’s conception of moral responsibility and the reactive attitudes does not accurately account for all of our blaming behaviors. By suggesting that the moral reactive attitudes are only called for when strict prohibitions or requirements are violated, Wallace


\(^3\) I will use the term ‘morally bad’ to describe these actions which are dis-commendable but do not violate strict prohibitions or requirements.
provides an unduly narrow and revisionist account of responsibility, blame, and the reactive attitudes.

I argue that the narrowness of Wallace’s account is due to his conflation between expectations and demands. I argue that expectations and demands are separate concepts and by using them interchangeably Wallace obscures important nuance in our practices of holding one another responsible. First, I provide an overview of Wallace’s account of the reactive attitudes and moral responsibility as accountability. §3 introduces two examples that I use to demonstrate the fittingness of the reactive attitudes and blame in response to actions that are morally bad. These examples highlight a shortcoming of Wallace's account of responsibility — notably, its restriction to the deontic realm and thus its inability to account for blame as a fitting response to actions that are morally bad rather than morally wrong. Then in §4 I argue that expectations and demands are separate concepts. This includes whether expectations and demands are standards that constitute a relationship or standards that are based in a relationship, how often an instance of an expectation or a demand needs to be fulfilled, the range of excuses they are sensitive to, and when the reactive attitudes are a fitting response. §5 explains why violations of expectations are the kind of actions we can hold an agent responsible and therefore why the reactive attitudes can be a fitting response. And finally, §6 puts forth a unified account of moral responsibility that explains how we hold people accountable for both actions that are morally wrong and morally bad.

§ 2 Wallace’s Account of Moral Responsibility

§ 2.1 Attributability and Accountability

Wallace takes care to restrict his discussion of moral responsibility to a sense of responsibility that is essentially connected to moral blame and sanction. Wallace distinguishes
between two notions of responsibility, citing and attributing this distinction to an earlier, unpublished version of Gary Watson’s paper “Two Faces of Responsibility.” One sense of responsibility, what Wallace calls “conditions for autonomy,” is the sense in which an agent is responsible insofar as there is a causal connection between the agent and her action and the action is a reflection of her evaluative commitments. I will use Watson’s term attributability to describe this sense of responsibility, both for ease and the prevalence of his terminology in the current responsibility literature. Because an agent’s actions reflect her values and commitments, she is subject to aretaic appraisals, an evaluation of the sort of person she is.

Watson notes that aretaic appraisals and holding someone responsible in the attributability sense are concerned with an “agent’s excellences and faults — or virtues and vices” and can be “what we would call moral.” However this kind of evaluation can be moral, it is not always moral: consider how we hold a mature artist to be responsible for her art because it reflects her values and commitments in a way that we would not hold a young child responsible for her finger paintings. While there is a clear sense in which we can evaluate and hold the mature artist responsible for the art she produces in a way that is not applicable to the child and her finger painting, this evaluation or sense of responsibility is not exactly a moral evaluation or an instance of holding someone morally responsible. Even if you were to consider all instances of attributability responsibility or aretaic appraisals “to be moral in a broad sense, they are independent of the particular moral norms” of blame and sanction that are involved in and

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5 This example is originally attributable to Susan Wolf. See her book Freedom within Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
provide the “special force” of the particular kind of moral responsibility that Wallace is concerned with.6

The other sense of responsibility, the one Wallace is interested in, has a characteristic connection to moral blame and sanction.7 In restricting moral responsibility to the sense of responsibility that is essentially connected to blame and sanction, Wallace exclusively conceives of moral responsibility as what Watson coined as accountability; an agent is responsible for an action in the accountability sense if and only if she is liable to be sanctioned.8 This characteristic connection to blame and sanction puts moral responsibility in the deontic realm, in response to actions that are morally wrong. Wallace writes that his account connects the practice of holding people morally responsible with the notions of moral obligation, moral right, and moral wrong, which form the nexus of concepts in which responsibility would seem to belong… the interpretation I offer suggests an appealing explanation of how moral blame and the various sanctioning responses hang together as a class: to blame someone is to be subject to one of the reactive emotions in terms of which the stance of holding people responsible is essentially defined, and these emotions are expressed by the sanctioning behavior to which the stance of holding people responsible inclines us.9

It is clear that Wallace conceives of moral responsibility as accountability responsibility, where to be accountable is to be subject to blame or sanction. These sanctions are expressions of the reactive attitudes,10 which I will discuss in § 2.3, and include behavior like “avoidance, reproach, scolding, denunciation, remonstration, and… punishment.”11 Moving forward, unless otherwise indicated, ‘responsibility’ should be understood in the accountability sense.

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6 Watson, “Two Faces,” 266.
8 ibid. Watson even references Wallace as someone who has done specific work in accountability responsibility. See “Two Faces,” 280.
§ 2.2 RESPONSIBILITY, OBLIGATION, EXPECTATIONS, AND DEMANDS

Wallace conceives of moral responsibility in terms of obligation, moral right, and moral wrong. For Wallace, an obligation is an expectation or a demand that admits moral content or justification.\textsuperscript{12} Wallace uses obligations, expectations, and demands interchangeably since he conceives of expectations and demands as equivalent ways of expressing practical requirements or prohibitions in a given situation. These expectations and demands, according to Wallace, should be conceived of as strict prohibitions or requirements.\textsuperscript{13} Because expectations and demands are construed as strict prohibitions or requirements, expectations and demands outline the actions that are morally forbidden and required, actions that we deem morally right and wrong. This firmly places Wallace’s account of responsibility in the deontic realm considering that any action that violates a obligation or strict prohibition or requirement will be one that is considered morally wrong.

Wallace’s account of responsibility is such that to hold someone responsible is to hold her accountable. In holding someone accountable, you are holding her to an expectation or a demand and holding someone to an expectation or a demand is essentially to adopt what Wallace calls the quasi-evaluative stance. This stance is such that if you believe an expectation or a demand is not met, you are susceptible to experience the reactive attitudes or deem them an appropriate response.\textsuperscript{14} While Wallace uses the word ‘appropriate’ to describe the reactive attitudes as a response to a violation of obligation, ‘fitting’ may be a more appropriate term. Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson distinguish ‘appropriate’ from ‘fitting’ by way of the inclusion of practical or pragmatic considerations when evaluating a response as appropriate.

\textsuperscript{12} Wallace, “Emotions, Expectations and Responsibility,” 165.
\textsuperscript{13} Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 22.
\textsuperscript{14} Wallace, “Emotions, Expectations and Responsibility,” 159.
Although it may be fitting for a graduate student to feel immense amount of anxiety while taking the Graduate Records Exam insofar as it is an intelligible response, it may not be an appropriate response especially if it is negatively influencing her performance on the exam. In some of Wallace’s other work he indicates that he intends the reactive attitudes as an appropriate response to be understood as being “‘called for’ in the sense of being intelligible and fitting reactions.”

For this reason, it seems to me that ‘fitting’ is more felicitous and moving forward, I will use it instead of ‘appropriate’ to discuss the reactive attitudes unless directly quoting Wallace.

It is this fittingness of the reactive attitudes and our susceptibility to experience them that is constitutive of truly holding someone to an expectation. When you are holding someone to an expectation, you are adopting this disjunctive, quasi-evaluative stance and either are susceptible to experience the reactive attitudes or to deem them fitting if you believe the expectation has not been met. Alternatively, if an agent violates an expectation or a demand and you do not experience the reactive attitudes or deem them a fitting response, you are in fact not holding her to that expectation or demand and are not actually holding her responsible.

§ 2.3 THE REACTIVE ATTITUDES

By giving the reactive attitudes a central role in responsibility, Wallace follows in the Strawsonian tradition. However unlike Strawson, Wallace sees the need to clarify the reactive attitudes’ essential characteristics before relying on them so heavily. Strawson conceived of the reactive attitudes as coextensive with any emotions that are central to our interpersonal relationships such as love, forgiveness, guilt, resentment, etc. Wallace restricts the reactive

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attitudes to a smaller scope than Strawson propounded by defining reactive attitudes through their essential connection to an expectation or a demand.\textsuperscript{19} What it is to be a reactive attitude is to be a sentiment that is necessarily tied to the violation of an expectation or a demand. This connection to strict prohibitions or requirements differentiates the reactive attitudes from other non-reactive moral sentiments, such as shame and gratitude. Whereas the moral reactive attitudes are involved with the concepts of moral right and wrong, the moral sentiments are involved with the “modalities of moral value.” These modalities of moral value are concepts that are estimable or disestimable, including courage, beneficence, and perhaps rudeness.\textsuperscript{20}

Wallace also notes that there can be both moral and nonmoral reactive attitudes. When an obligation — an expectation or demand that admits moral content — is violated, the reactive attitudes will also contain moral content and be classified as a moral reactive attitude. These include the paradigmatic moral reactive attitudes of guilt, indignation, and resentment.\textsuperscript{21}

The essential connection between the reactive attitudes and expectations or demands is able to explain why the reactive attitudes are propositional attitudes as well as why they are backwards-looking. Consider the paradigmatic moral cases of resentment, guilt, and indignation: we feel guilty about something or resent someone for something. The connection to an expectation or a demand provides the propositional content for the reactive attitudes. This propositional content explains the attitudinal component of the reactive attitudes. The connection to an expectation or a demand also explains the “backward-looking” nature of the reactive attitudes.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{19} Wallace, “Emotions, Expectations and Responsibility,” 163.
\textsuperscript{20} ibid., 161.
\textsuperscript{21} For brevity, throughout the rest of the paper I will drop the ‘moral’ from ‘moral reactive attitudes,’ even though I intend them to be understood as moral reactive attitudes.
\textsuperscript{22} ibid., 163, 173. The backwards-looking nature of blame is focused on an action that is performed by an agent in the past and the fittingness of the response to the particular action, whereas the forward-looking nature is concerned with ensuring the action is not performed again.
\end{flushright}
It is because the reactive attitudes are directed towards an action in the past, an action that was performed by an agent and violated an expectation or demand, that they are considered backward-looking. The fact that the reactive attitudes are in response to a specific violation of an expectation or demand is what makes the attitude “reactive.” Both the reactive and attitudinal components of the reactive attitudes are attributed to their essential connection to expectations or demands.

Further, because Wallace understands responsibility, accountability, the reactive attitudes, blame, and sanction to hang together in a class, the reactive attitudes’ connection to expectations and demands also explains the backward looking nature of blame. For Wallace, blame and blameworthiness are necessarily understood in terms of the reactive attitudes and therefore are understood by their connection to expectations and demands. To judge someone blameworthy is to deem the reactive attitudes a fitting response, whereas blame requires actually experiencing the reactive attitudes. Therefore, when you hold someone to an expectation or demand and adopt the quasi-evaluative stance, experiencing the reactive attitudes is constitutive of blaming her, whereas deeming them fitting is to judge her to be blameworthy. Because the reactive attitudes are necessarily involved in our blaming responses, just as our reactive attitudes are backward-looking, so too is our blame.

Before moving onto the next section, I will briefly summarize Wallace’s account. First, to hold someone responsible is to hold her accountable in the sense that she is liable to be blamed or sanctioned. To hold someone accountable is just to hold her to an expectation or a demand, where expectations and demands are equivalent ways of expressing strict requirements or prohibitions. When holding someone to an expectation or a demand, if you believe the agent has

24 This judgement of blameworthiness is sufficient for holding someone morally responsible.
violated said expectation or demand, you are disposed to experience the reactive attitudes such as resentment, guilt, and indignation, or to deem them a fitting response. This is the quasi-evaluative stance. If you deem the reactive attitudes a fitting response you are judging the agent to be blameworthy, whereas experiencing the reactive attitudes are necessary for blaming the agent.

§ 3 Two Examples

Overall, Wallace’s account of responsibility provides explanations for certain aspects of responsibility that had previously been unexamined — how responsibility is connected to blame and sanction and what makes an emotion a reactive attitude. Because Wallace draws an essential connection between the reactive attitudes and strict prohibitions or requirements, he limits the reactive attitudes and blame as fitting responses only when an action is morally wrong. However, if we examine our actual experiences and responsibility practices, blame and the reactive attitudes *can* be fitting responses to actions that are not morally wrong, but are instead classified as morally bad. While morally wrong actions are appropriately connected to strict prohibitions and requirements, morally bad actions do not have this connection. Morally bad actions are actions that should not have been done even though they do not violate strict prohibitions or requirements. Nonetheless, morally bad actions are ones which we can still be held accountable for.

In this section I will use two examples, one from Coleen Macnamara and one from David Shoemaker, to illustrate cases where the reactive attitudes and blame are fitting responses to actions that do not violate strict prohibitions or requirements. I argue that this result is something which Wallace’s conception of responsibility is unable to accommodate and that our
understanding of responsibility in actuality is not nor should not be restricted to the deontic realm of morally wrong actions.

This is not to say that responsibility and blame are appropriate outside of the deontic realm merely in some sense. Some philosophers, such as Watson and T. M. Scanlon have suggested that the evaluative realm is primarily concerned with responsibility as attributability. For Watson, aretaic concerns fall within the attributability face of responsibility and yet actions that open agents up to these aretaic evaluations can still be blamed. However, blame in the attributability sense, according to Watson, collapses into merely a judgement of blameworthiness and is separate from the moral norms that are involved in responsibility as accountability. T. M. Scanlon argues that responsibility should be appropriately conceived of as attributability. On his account, to blame someone is to take your relationship with them to be impaired in some way and to adjust the intentions and expectations you have of the other person. This seems to be a very weak conception of blame and is certainly a much weaker conception than the one I am concerned with. I argue that blame and accountability, to which the reactive attitudes are central, can be fitting responses to morally bad actions. The reactive attitudes, blame, and responsibility are not features only of the deontic realm but also can be fitting in the evaluative realm.

In her paper “Taking the Demands out of Blame,” Coleen Macnamara argues that blame’s putative connection to demands excessively restricts when the reactive attitudes are appropriate and therefore fails to capture all of our blaming practices. To illustrate this, she provides the following counterexample:

You are a graduate student and you have a paper due in exactly twenty hours. Your plan is to stay seated at your desk typing away until the paper is finished. It just so happens that you have three library books due today, and though it would not be the end of the world if

23 Watson, “Two Faces of Responsibility,” 278.
you failed to return them on time, your roommate, another graduate student, is headed to campus. You ask her if she will return your books for you. She says no. She refuses, not because she won’t be near the library and her day is jam-packed, but simply because she doesn’t feel like it. You react with resentment.27

Your roommate is not required, let alone strictly required, to return your books for you. Your library books are your responsibility and to strictly require your roommate to take on your responsibilities is absurd. On Wallace’s account, resentment cannot be a fitting response because your roommate did not violate a requirement and therefore her action cannot be considered morally wrong. Nonetheless, your resentment certainly seems fitting — your roommate did not have any reason to deny your very reasonable request.

To respond to this example, Wallace can either deny that you are feeling resentment, suggesting instead that you are experiencing some other moral sentiment that does not fall into the category of the reactive attitudes, or he could insist that you roommate did in fact violate a demand. Wallace could argue that your roommate violated a general demand, perhaps the demand that considering you are a rational agent, your ends need to be taken seriously, rather than the demand that your roommate return your books for you. Although this response may be successful in addressing the library example, it is less successful in response to other examples.

Consider a scenario presented by David Shoemaker:

Anniversary: George and Martha have been married for several years. Each year as their anniversary approaches, Martha drops subtle but increasingly forceful hints about the sort of gift she would greatly appreciate for their anniversary. These should merely be hints, she thinks, because were she to have to tell George explicitly what she wants and where to get it, his gesture would be less a gift than an errand. Unfortunately, each year George misses the hint and buys her some carnations, her least favorite flower. After the tenth year this happens, Martha gives up, deeply disappointed in George. The next year she accepts the carnations with as much feigned enthusiasm as she can muster, but she is no longer disposed to be as chipper about their anniversary or certain ceremonial aspects of it, nor is she disposed to be as thankful to George for what, in her view, amounts to nothing more than an errand.

27 Coleen Macnamara, “Taking the Demands out of Blame,” in Blame Its Natures and Norms, ed. D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 145. This example will be referred to as the library example.
she disposed to pay as much attention to George’s hints about what he would like for various holidays.\textsuperscript{28} Shoemaker writes that Martha’s response involves mere disappointment, and her blame “involves no resentment and seeks no sanctions;” George has only dashed Martha’s hopes and has done nothing that would make resentment fitting.\textsuperscript{29} But this does not seem quite right. Martha’s response of mere disappointment, dashed hopes, and a disposition to give up on the possibility of George attending to her preferences is a very mild and unrealistic response to her husband consistently ignoring her subtle hints and communications for ten years.\textsuperscript{30} In fact, the stronger emotional response of resentment seems to be fitting even though George’s actions do not violate a strict prohibition or requirement.

While I agree with Shoemaker that blame would be a fitting response from Martha in the anniversary case, if her response merely includes attributing a moral fault to George and adjusting the expectations she has of him as the example is currently written, this response cannot appropriately be considered blame. This weak response leaves out a quality of opprobrium that is tightly connected to the reactive attitudes and gives blame its special force.\textsuperscript{31} To label Martha’s response in Shoemaker’s anniversary example as blame would be a misnomer.

\textsuperscript{28} David Shoemaker, “Attributability, Accountability, and Answerability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility,” \textit{Ethics} 121 (April 2011), 620-621. While Shoemaker is not addressing Wallace’s account of responsibility in his paper, his examples will be relevant to my purposes here.

\textsuperscript{29} ibid., 622. Shoemaker acknowledges the familiar sentiment that the reactive attitudes and sanctions have an essential connection to accountability. However, if in his anniversary case he portrayed resentment and sanction as an appropriate response from Martha, it would undermine his goal of using this example to pull apart answerability from accountability. See page 617.

\textsuperscript{30} As described, it also seems incorrect for Shoemaker to construe Martha’s changes in behavior and attitude as non-sanctioning.

\textsuperscript{31} Wallace, “Dispassionate Opprobrium,” 368. Wallace lobes this criticism against T. M. Scanlon, saying his account leaves the blame out of blame. Shoemaker makes use of Scanlon’s account of blame when discussing agents who are answerable yet not accountable. Although Shoemaker does point out that Scanlon’s account fails to note the important role that accountability blame and the reactive attitudes play in responsibility, he still considers Scanlonian blame to fall under the “general rubric of blame.” Nonetheless, I think Wallace would object to both Scanlon and Shoemaker’s use of the term ‘blame’ outside of the realm of accountability and the reactive attitudes.
Consider a modified anniversary example, one in which things unfold as Shoemaker imagines, but where Martha responds more realistically by experiencing resentment and actually blaming George. In this case, even though George did not violate a strict requirement, Martha’s resentment and blame seem to be fitting. Wallace’s account of responsibility is unable to explain the fittingness of resentment and blame in this modified anniversary example; unlike the library example, there is not an obvious candidate for a strict requirement which George violates that could be substituted in and would therefore account for the fittingness of Martha’s blaming response.

Rather than stretching to find a general requirement that would account for the reactive attitudes as an appropriate response to morally bad actions, I suggest acknowledging a distinction between expectations and demands, one in which both concepts cannot appropriately be construed as strict prohibitions and requirements. While many philosophers in the moral responsibility literature use expectations and demands interchangeably, some philosophers have alluded to such a distinction. Michael McKenna writes “expectations in particular connote something more open-ended, since we can expect things of others that we do not require of them.” The distinction I argue for creates more than mere conceptual space between the two concepts, explores why expectations are more open-ended than demands, and compared to Wallace’s theory of responsibility, better accounts for all of our blaming practices, including the reactive attitudes as a fitting response to morally bad actions.

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32 Moving forward, references to the anniversary case will be references to this modified version unless otherwise specified.
33 Michael McKenna, *Conversations and Responsibility*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 180. In the rest of the chapter McKenna uses his conversational model to put forth a unified account of moral responsibility. Although I also see myself as providing a unified account, I further explore why expectations are more open-ended than demands and why violations of expectations are morally bad or supereragatory actions.
§ 4 Expectations and Demands

Before discussing the distinction between expectations and demands, I want to clarify that although there are multiple notions of expectations, I, like Wallace, am focused on normative expectations. Whereas descriptive expectations outline actions that are believed to have a high probability to occur, normative expectations outline actions that should occur, even if empirical data indicates otherwise.\footnote{Wallace takes the distinguishing feature of normative expectations to be their essential connection to attitudinal responses. See “Emotions, Expectations and Responsibility,” 159.} Consider an example from Susan Greenspan:

If someone is known to be unusually lazy, say, or simply to dislike a certain kind of action — cleaning up, for instance — it might not be reason for us to ‘expect’ that person to perform it, in the sense of predicting that he \emph{will}; but it might still be reasonable to think that the person \emph{ought} to perform it — to expect it \emph{of} him, in the sense of holding him to a standard which requires it.\footnote{Susan Greenspan, “Unfreedom and Responsibility,” in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. Ferdinand Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 72. This may explain the seeming paradoxical nature of a statement where someone expresses that they (normatively) expect someone to do something while simultaneously (descriptively) expect someone not to do that very thing.}

Some philosophers have acknowledged that the concept of a demand cannot appropriately account for all of our responsibility practices. Jonathan Bennett writes “I doubt if ‘demand’ really covers all the ground” for explaining all of the reactive attitudes.\footnote{Jonathan Bennett, “Accountability,” in Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P. F. Strawson, ed. Zak van Straaten (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 42.} Watson only uses ‘demands’ when discussing the accountability face of responsibility and never in the discussion of the attributability face, so it is possible that Watson is be sympathetic to such a distinction as well. George Sher points out that such a distinction might also be unstated but central to Scanlon’s account of blame:

Scanlon appears to understand the moral relationship as involving two distinct sets of intentions and dispositions, the members of one of which are conditional upon others having corresponding intentions and dispositions while the members of the other are not.\footnote{George Sher, “Wrongdoing and Relationships: The Problem of the Stranger,” in Blame: Its Natures and Norms, ed. by D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 53.}
I mentioned earlier that McKenna also makes a distinction between demands and expectations. But if Wallace introduced the concept of expectation to the quasi-evaluative stance to accommodate for demands’ insufficient explanatory power regarding responsibility and the reactive attitudes, by effectively equating it with the concept of demands he would have undermined the initial reason for introduction.

Regardless of his motivations for incorporating expectations into the quasi-evaluative stance, the way Wallace uses expectations and demands synonymously to express practical prohibitions or requirements glosses over nuance in our responsibility and blaming practices. Expectations and demands are not identical concepts but differ in the kinds of standards they constitute, how frequently instances of expectations or demands need to be met, and the range of excuses to which they are sensitive. This section draws a distinction between expectations and demands and shows that violations of demands are actions we consider to be morally wrong, whereas violations of expectations are actions which are morally bad. After explaining these differences, I discuss how expectations can call for the reactive attitudes as a fitting response and what role expectations play in responsibility. The account I argue for widens Wallace’s account so that it fits more accurately with our phenomenological experience of the reactive attitudes and provides a unified account of responsibility and blame for both morally wrong and morally bad actions.
§ 4.1 RELATIONSHIP-CONSTITUTING AND RELATIONSHIP-BASED STANDARDS

It is easiest to consider blame and responsibility in the context of our close interpersonal relationships with friends, coworkers, significant others, and so forth. Different kinds of relationships have different standards that define what it is to stand in that kind of relationship and what it would be for that particular relationship to be considered good or flourishing. The standards that define the mere existence of the relationship are the relationship-constituting standards, where those that outline the flourishing of the relationship are relationship-based standards.

Shoemaker explains relationship-constituting standards as “standards defined in terms of the claims the parties have on one another.” These are the minimal claims that make a particular kind of relationship possible and outline what actions are considered necessary and impermissible in that relationship. Alternatively, standards that are relationship-based outline the range of potential for the relationship and give rise to the notion of what a flourishing or thriving relationship of that type looks like. While Shoemaker argues that relationship-based standards express the hopes an individual has for the relationship, I argue that relationship-based standards are expectations that can make claims on another person. The claims that expectations make are similar to those made by demands, however they are not the minimal requirements for the existence of the relationship. This claim-making ability of expectations is what ultimately will

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38 This is not to say that we can only hold people responsible if we have a close interpersonal relationship with them. We clearly hold strangers and others responsible even if it seems that we do not have a particular relationship with them. However, considering that we spend much of our time around those with whom we have close interpersonal relationships, examples of blame and responsibility in this context will be readily available and illuminating.

39 Wallace uses “relationship-constituting” and “relationship-based” in reference to norms in his paper “Dispassionate Opprobrium.” Shoemaker makes use of a similar distinction in “Attributability, Accountability, and Answerability” using the terms “relationship-defining” and “relationship-potential” to discuss standards and impairments. For consistency, in this paper I will stick to the ‘relationship-constituting’ and ‘relationship-based’ terminology.


41 Ibid.
allow us to hold one another accountable when an expectation is not met. If relationship-based standards were mere hopes, as Shoemaker suggests, resentment or indignation would not be an appropriate response when hopes are dashed.  

First, consider relationship-constituting standards as the demands to which the parties hold each other. These are the minimal requirements that constitute the mere existence of a relationship and therefore prescribe behaviors that are impermissible or required in order to be in that kind of relationship. Wallace writes that moral requirements “help to realize valuable forms of interpersonal relation: they are relationship-constituting.” Actions that violate these demands are ones that are morally wrong and will elicit the reactive attitudes and blame as a fitting response. On this, Wallace and I agree. As such, demands are appropriately construed as strict prohibitions and requirements. Since our conception of right and wrong is binary, the clear-cut and compulsory nature of demands mirrors and explains why we consider actions that violate demands to be morally wrong. The modality of demands and the actions they prescribe parallels the modality of our assessment of them.

To explore demands as relationship-constituting standards, consider another scenario put forth by Shoemaker:

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42 Adrienne Martin puts forth an account of normative hope in which reactive attitudes, such as gratitude or pride, can be an appropriate response. She sees herself as making a parallel move to Wallace, where normatively hoping something of someone else is another way to relate to them interpersonally, just has holding others responsible is a way to relate to them interpersonally. See chapter 5 “Normative Hope” in her book How We Hope: A Moral Psychology (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2014). While I am interested in and sympathetic to what she is trying to accomplish, I find issues with her account and reliance on Wallace’s account of responsibility because she does not head Wallace’s instruction to conceive of normative expectations as strict prohibitions or requirements, which is something that he emphasizes heavily. Additionally, from my precursory thoughts on normative expectations and normative hope, it seems to me that expectations will differ from hope in ways of sensitivity to evidence or descriptive expectations, whether or not it would be reasonable to take measures against someone or to create a contingency plan in each case, and ultimately and most importantly for the purpose of this paper, whether or not you can hold someone to an expectation or a hope in the sense of holding her accountable.

43 Wallace, “Dispassionate Oprobrium,” 365, 368. I depart from Wallace’s account by arguing that expectations should not be construed as strict prohibitions and requirements, and that morally bad actions, ones which violate expectations as relationship-based standards, also can appropriately call for the reactive attitudes, blame, and moral responsibility as accountability.
Cheating: George and Martha have been married for several years. One evening, while George is taking a shower, Martha answers his cell phone, but the caller immediately hangs up. She notices that George has received many calls from this particular number recently, and she then discovers a texting thread from his number, along with texting threads from many other numbers. The texts leave no doubt that George has been having multiple affairs. When confronted with this evidence, George initially denies it but then gives in and admits it. Martha is furious, and she reaches for the closest object she can find to swing at George. It is a golf club, which he successfully dodges. He runs for the car. In this example, fidelity is a demand that is constitutive of George and Martha’s marriage, one that defines their monogamous relationship. By having multiple affairs, George has failed to meet this demand: his actions violated a strict prohibition and in turn, his actions are morally wrong.

The binary nature of demands can be contrasted with the more flexible and nebulous nature of expectations. Expectations set the relationship-based standards and outline the potential flourishing or the quality of the relationship. Michelle Mason, when arguing against what she calls the deontic imperative view of the reactive attitudes, which includes Wallace’s, writes that “normative expectations derive from an ideal of the special relationship; hence just which normative expectations are operative depends on the relationship in question.” In any particular relationship, there are actions that would be better or worse to perform, ones that would impact or reflect the quality of the relationship. Because expectations pick out actions that fall along a gradient, they cannot be construed as strict prohibitions or requirements. These actions will also be ones that we assess as good or bad, better or worse, rather than right or wrong. Again, the modality of expectations and the actions they prescribe parallels the modality of our assessment.

In the anniversary example, it would be silly to say that George picking up on Martha’s hints is a requirement that is constitutive of their marriage. Instead, this expectation is a

44 Shoemaker, “Attributability, Accountability, and Answerability,” 621.
reflection of what a good or flourishing marriage looks like. When George fails to pick up on Martha’s hints, even though he does not undermine the marriage as a whole, he does undermine the idea that their marriage is flourishing. In a way, by meeting expectations and performing actions that an agent is not strictly required to do, she expresses a commitment to valuing the relationship or to the relationship thriving.

Similar to the anniversary case, your roommate is not required to return your books for you, even if it is something that you expect of her. Although returning each others’ books is not a requirement that is constitutive of being roommates, it is a reasonable expectation that would indicate that the roommate relationship is flourishing, especially if such a small favor is of little consequence to your roommate. By not returning your books or picking up on Martha’s hints, your roommate and George are not doing anything wrong since they are not violating something that they are strictly required to do. However, by not meeting their respective expectations, your roommate and George are doing something that would have been better to not have done and to have meet the expectation, instead.

Relationship-based standards only seriously come into play once the relationship-constituting standards are met. In order to hold someone to an expectation, they first must meet the demands that constitute the relationship itself; in order for a relationship to flourish, it necessarily must first exist.⁴⁶

§ 4.2 FREQUENCY OF FULFILLMENT

There is a connection between whether a standard is relationship-constituting or relationship-based and the frequency at which they need to be met. This provides an additional,
although related distinction. Because demands outline the behaviors that are constitutive of the relationship, they identify actions that are required to stand in a particular relationship to one another. Necessarily, the actions prescribed by demands also need to be met at every opportunity in order for the demand to be met overall. George is strictly prohibited from cheating on Martha because it is a standard that is constitutive of the relationship that they stand in. This is not a requirement that occasionally needs to be met, but rather one that needs to meet in every instance. Even if George cheats on Martha only once, he has failed to meet this demand.

Now, this does not mean that a single violation of a relationship-constituting demand is sufficient to annihilate the existence of the relationship. Wallace notes that relationship-constituting norms are “complex, and a single episode of disloyalty would generally not be sufficient to transform a [relation]ship into a non[relation]ship.”47 This is simply to say that an action that violates a strict prohibition is sufficient for the demand to be violated overall. Even if George was unfaithful only once, regardless of the circumstances, George would fail to meet Martha’s demands. While this example uses a standing demand, it is certainly possible that a demand may only need to be fulfilled once, given there was only one opportunity to meet such a demand. The important feature of a demand is that it needs to be met whenever an opportunity presents itself.

On the other hand, sometimes expectations can be met overall even if the actions they prescribe are not performed at every opportunity. In order for a relationship to be considered flourishing, the actions might only need to be performed at a frequency that meets a certain threshold. While George is expected to pick up on Martha’s hints, it is not something that he must always do in every instance. If George picked up on her hints with perfect consistency, he

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47 Wallace, “Dispassionate Opprobrium,” 359. Wallace was talking about friendships specifically in this case.
might be seen as going above and beyond or surpassing Martha’s expectations for the relationship.

In such a case, the expectation might have a temporally extended condition of fulfillment, such that one can only accurately assess whether an expectation is met overall after a sufficient amount of time has elapsed. For example, Martha might not consider her expectations to be unfulfilled the first couple of times George fails to pick up on her hints. If George only missed these hints early on in the relationship or only missed two out of the ten years, this would be insufficient for Martha to assess that her expectations had not been met. The repetitive nature of his actions, the fact that George more often than not fails to pick up on her hints, is what constitutes his failure to meet her expectations.

Contrast this with demands, which can not have this temporally extended condition of fulfillment. Because demands need to be met in every instance, there is not a threshold of relevant data an individual needs to collect in order to appropriately assess whether the demand has been met or not. Even in a standing demand, such as Martha’s demand for fidelity in the cheating case, if there is a single instance of violation, if George cheated on her even once, the demand overall has been violated. The fact that Martha’s demand is continuous does not change the nature of the demand fulfillment or the frequency at which each instance must be fulfilled.

§ 4.3 Excuse Sensitivity

Expectations and demands also differ in the range of excuses they are sensitive to. There is a wide range of various excuses that an agent could provide to explain why she failed to meet an expectation. Your roommate could be running late for a meeting or feeling ill, or perhaps she intended to return your books for you and forgot them on her way out the door. If George failed to pick up on Martha’s hints only early on in the relationship or sparingly, perhaps George’s
uncertainty about how Martha communicated these preferences or his excessive stress at work could excuse his actions. Maybe Martha’s mother told George incorrectly that her favorite flowers were carnations. There are many reasons that could excuse the failure to meet these expectations and demonstrate that the actions were not manifestations of ill-will.

But in the case of demands, this range of effective excuses is limited. Because demands need to be met in every instance and are requirements which constitute a relationship, the reason provided for failing to meet the demand has to reach a high level of excusing power. In the cheating case, there are very few excuses that would actually excuse George from his infidelity to Martha. Perhaps unbeknownst to both George and Martha, Martha had an evil twin. If Martha’s evil twin seduced George and he was unaware that he was being unfaithful, this might excuse the violation of Martha’s demand. But the kinds of excuses that demands are responsive to are extreme situations, ones that are unlikely to come up in everyday, interpersonal relationships. This makes the set of excuses to which demands are sensitive very narrow.

§ 4.4 Fittingness the Reactive Attitudes

The last difference I will point out between expectations and demands is when the reactive attitudes are a fitting response to an action. Implicit in making a demand is the idea that the demander has some authority to make and hold the agent accountable for the demand. Almost by definition, what it is to make a demand of someone is to hold her accountable and to sanction her if she fails to perform the demanded action. This, in conjunction with the frequency at which demands need to be fulfilled and the limited range of excuses to which they are sensitive shows that whenever an action seems to violate a demand the reactive attitudes will almost always be a fitting response. It is true that if an agent was able to provide an excuse for an apparent
violation of a demand that the reactive attitudes would not be a fitting response. However because of the limited range of eligible excuses, this is a very unlikely and irregular occurrence.

While it is almost universally the case that if a demand appears to be violated, the reactive attitudes would be a fitting response, the more nebulous nature of expectations complicates the fittingness of the reactive attitudes for violations of expectations. Because expectations can have a temporally extended condition of fulfillment and are sensitive to a wider range of excuses, there are more instances where the reactive attitudes may be an unfitting response. In order for the reactive attitudes to be a fitting response, the expectation overall must be violated. If an action would provide a single instance of when an expectation was not met but there is not sufficient data to assess whether an expectation is met overall, the reactive attitudes may be intelligible but they would not be fitting. The reactive attitudes will be fitting only when we can assess that the overall expectation was violated.48

Additionally, in a manner similar to demands, if a viable excuse is provided for an action that was initially thought to violate an expectation, the reactive attitudes would be unfitting. Unlike demands, because expectations have a large range of excuses they are sensitive to, instances where the reactive attitudes are not fitting will be fairly common. Even if an excuse is not explicitly provided, it is possible for the person who is holding the agent responsible to manufacture one. Because expectations are susceptible to more excuses, it will be much easier to concoct a plausible excuse for a perceived violation of expectation rather than a perceived violation of a demand.49

48 This may delay when it is acceptable to assess whether an expectation is met or not and may require more discretion because of its ambiguous nature.
49 I am of the opinion that we should try to interpret actions in a charitable manner, where someone who has been apparently slighted assumes there is a good excuse, just not one to which she is privy. Overall, it seems that to assume positive intent of others is something we ought to do.
Nonetheless, there comes a point with repeated behavior where the reactive attitudes seem to be unequivocally called for, even if there is a temporally extended condition of fulfillment. If Martha insisted that resentment was not a fitting response after ten years of George ignoring her hints, even if he had excuses for some of those years, we would question whether or not she is actually holding George to that expectation.

Having pulled expectations apart from demands and explicated a few distinguishing features including violations of expectations as morally bad actions, the next two sections aim to demonstrate why the reactive attitudes can be a fitting response to a morally bad action and how this fits into a larger account of responsibility.

§ 5 Expectations and Normative Claims

In §4 I argued for a significant distinction between expectations and demands that is lost when the two terms are treated interchangeably. The synonymous use of expectations and demands fails to recognize that we can expect behaviors of an agent that we do not require of her. Wallace’s use of expectations and demands as equivalent ways to express strict prohibitions or requirements fails to acknowledge the conceptual differences between the two. When Wallace does note the distinction between relationship-based and relationship-constituting standards in “Dispassionate Opprobrium,” he argues that the normative significance of moral obligations cannot be based in relationships, since relationship-based standards are conditional on the existence of the relationship.50 However, he does allow for moral requirements to be relationship constituting:

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50 Wallace, “Dispassionate Opprobrium,” 364. I agree with Wallace that obligations and therefore demands, as I have construed them, cannot be based in relationships. However, I disagree with Wallace’s definition of obligation as an expectation or a demand that admits moral content. After drawing the distinction I have, I would argue that obligations are appropriately construed as strict prohibitions or requirements so that obligations should be understood in only terms of demands which admit moral content, not expectations.
moral requirements help to realize valuable forms of interpersonal relation: they are relationship constituting… even if they are not relationship-based. They are also directional requirements, specifying forms of conduct that are owed specifically to other individuals (whom we *wrong* when we fail to comply with the requirements.\(^{51}\)

Here, Wallace maintains the connection between relationship-constituting standards, requirements, and wrongdoing when those requirements are not met. On Wallace’s view, because relationship-based standards are conditional and often dependent on reciprocity, they are not grounded in the values at the heart of morality.\(^{52}\) Relationship-based standards, and therefore expectations, as I have argued for them, cannot appropriately call for the reactive attitudes on Wallace’s account. Shoemaker comes to a similar conclusion in his paper. In his version of the anniversary case, Martha does not experience resentment nor are George’s actions such that he can appropriately be held accountable precisely because his behavior does not violate a relationship-constituting demand.\(^{53}\) On both Wallace and Shoemaker’s accounts, the reactive attitudes and blame cannot be a fitting response when an expectation is not met.\(^{54}\)

While I agree with Wallace that demands and obligations cannot be based in a special relationship and are instead relationship-constituting, I depart from his view by arguing that violations of relationship-based expectations can call for the reactive attitudes or blame as a fitting response. The library example and the modified anniversary example are two cases where resentment and blame are fitting responses to actions that do not violate a strict requirement or prohibition; in both examples an agent is being held to a normative expectation, rather than a

\(^{51}\) ibid., 366. His emphasis.

\(^{52}\) ibid., 368.

\(^{53}\) Shoemaker, “Attributability, Accountability, and Answerability,” 624.

\(^{54}\) Here blame is to be understood as accountability blame, blame that is necessarily caught up with the reactive attitudes. Shoemaker writes that Martha’s response of disappointment and modified attitudes falls under the general rubric of blame, although in a weaker, Scanlonian sense. I made this comment in §3 Two Examples, however I think it bears repeating: this weaker sense of blame is a misnomer — it lacks the necessary quality of censure or opprobrium that is required for blame to be blame.
demand. Even though expectations are not strict requirements, they still prescribe actions that ought to be done. When you hold someone to an expectation you still make a claim on her.\textsuperscript{55}

Claims have a particular kind of normative force that when violated, a claim calls for the actions to be personally justified to whomever made the claim. Making a claim on an agent puts you in a distinctly second-personal space such that if a claim is violated, you have special standing to ask her why she acted in such a way.

The notion of a second-personal stance and the reactive attitudes as moral address have been popularized by Stephen Darwall. On Darwall’s account, the reactive attitudes as moral address respond not to an agent just as a wrongdoer but also call on the agent to recognize that there is a distinctly second-personal reason to have complied with the demand her actions violated.\textsuperscript{56} However, like Wallace, Darwall conceives of the reactive attitudes as tied to demands and obligations. In her attack on Darwall’s account, Mason raises the same objection I do against Wallace: the reactive attitudes are appropriate in response to actions that do not violate demands. She writes that our proneness to the reactive attitudes partly constitutes our valuing the other as an accountable party to the relationship, a partner who in reciprocally valuing us both recognizes the normative expectations constitutive of the specific relationship and a more general ideal of mutual answerability for succeeding or failing to comply with legitimate normative expectations.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{55} I intend claims to be taken as weaker than a demand or strict requirement but stronger than a simple request. I also conceive of claims as necessarily having an interpersonal component to them.


\textsuperscript{57} Mason, “Reactive Attitudes and Second-Personal Address,” 166. Mason takes the broad view of the reactive attitudes as Strawson initially laid out, which include shame, gratitude, forgiveness, etc. My account departs from Mason’s in this way. Further, because she includes emotions that are directed at an agent’s character she conceives of the reactive attitudes having an aretaic nature. This also means that the reactive attitudes play a central role in responsibility as attributability. Because I agree with Wallace’s conception of what it is for a sentiment to be an attitude as well as reactive, I disagree that shame and forgiveness ought to be included in the reactive attitudes and believe that the reactive attitudes are appropriately understood as being restricted to the realm of accountability, so long as accountability is not exclusively understood in deontic terms.
It is important to note that normative expectations are constitutive of a good or flourishing relationship, rather than the relationship itself, something which I believe Mason is inclined to agree with. Regardless, when violated, both demands and normative expectations place us in this distinctly second-personal space such that we are justified in pursuing an answer to why the other person acted in a way which did not take the claim they were subject to as reason to comply. In this second-personal space, when it is clear that the individual does not take the claims that are made to them as reason giving, the reactive attitudes will be a fitting response.

I have argued that both expectations and demands make claims; by holding an agent to an expectation or a demand, you are making a normative claim on her. In doing so you are adopting the quasi-evaluative stance, such that if you believe the claim has been violated, you are susceptible to experience the reactive attitudes or to deem them fitting. It is because expectations make claims on an agent that the reactive attitudes can be a fitting response when they are not met. This connection to the reactive attitudes also connects expectations and claims to responsibility as accountability.

Consider the library example: you are not demanding that your roommate return your books for you. Nonetheless, by holding her to the expectation that she will, you make a claim on her and enter into a second-personal space such that when your roommate refuses, you can appropriately ask why she refused to do this small favor for you. If she is unable to provide a good excuse, the reactive attitudes would be a fitting response because she violated a claim. The same actions that failed to meet your expectations also violated the claim you made on her, making the reactive attitudes a fitting response.

Similarly, Martha is not demanding that George pick up on the hints that she drops. However, by expecting this behavior, she is making a claim on him. Although George is not
required to pick up on Martha’s hints, when he continually fails to do so, he fails to meet her overall expectation and therefore violates a claim she made on him. This violation of a claim makes the reactive attitudes a fitting response.

In both the library and anniversary case, although the actions did not violate any strict prohibitions or requirements, the actions are considered morally bad, rather than morally wrong. However, your roommate and George still violated claims that were made of them and it is this violation that calls for the fittingness of the reactive attitudes.

The ability of expectations to make normative claims keeps them from falling into a purely aretaic realm. It is not the case that when expectations are not met, the agent is only open to a purely aretaic evaluation or is only responsible in the attributability sense. In holding someone to an expectation you are making a claim on her, such that when the claim is not met, the reactive attitudes can be a fitting response. Given the reactive attitudes’ central role to responsibility as accountability, the fittingness of the reactive attitudes in response to the violation of an expectation also indicates that agents can be blamed and held accountable for actions that are morally bad.

The unifying feature between expectations and demands is such that when you hold someone to either, both expectations and demands make a claim on the other person and call for the same kind of response. Both expectations and demands call for the agent to personally justify her actions such that if a satisfactory justification cannot be provided, the reactive attitudes can be warranted. However, because expectations can be met overall even if the action that is prescribed is not performed in every instance, failing to perform an action that is prescribed by an expectation does not always call for the reactive attitudes as a fitting response because it does not always violate the claim that is made. It is only when bad actions meet a certain frequency
threshold or that it is clear the expectation will not be met the the claim is violated and the reactive attitudes can be a fitting response.

§ 6 A WIDER CONCEPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AS ACCOUNTABILITY

Wallace has laid what I see as an elegant framework for responsibility as accountability. His work provides a unified account that explains how and why the reactive attitudes, blame, and sanctions are essentially connected to accountability. However, because Wallace construes expectations and demands as synonymous ways of expressing strict prohibitions or requirements, his account of moral responsibility only allows for resentment and blame as fitting responses to morally wrong actions.

I have argued that blame and the reactive attitudes can be fitting responses to actions that fall outside of the deontic realm — actions which are more appropriately categorized as morally bad rather than morally wrong. As it stands, Wallace’s account of responsibility precludes this possibility.

However, if the distinction between expectations and demands that I argue for is acknowledged, the structure provided by Wallace can account for the full range of our responsibility practices. Holding someone accountable still is to adopt the quasi-evaluative stance, which remains unchanged: if you believe an expectation or a demand is violated, you are susceptible to experience the reactive attitudes or to deem them a fitting response. However, because expectations and demands refer to separate standards, leaving the quasi-evaluative stance unchanged allows for the reactive attitudes to be a fitting response to both actions that are morally wrong and actions that are morally bad.

This account of responsibility as accountability still explains the propositional content and the backwards looking nature of blame and the reactive attitudes, as Wallace’s original
account does, however this account also better fits with our phenomenological experience of the reactive attitudes and recognizes the nuance within our blaming practices. While it is true that demands and requirements do play a significant role in accountability and blame, solely relying on strict requirements and prohibitions does not give a complete picture of responsibility. The account that I have put forth allows for demands to play their role but also provides a wider and unified conception of accountability that encompasses more of our practices within responsibility and blame.

Wallace writes that “the tendency to blame can be seen to be a peculiarly appropriate way of taking to heart the values around which morality is structured.”58 It just so happens that the values at the heart of morality include more than the concepts of moral obligation, right, and wrong.

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