A New Brand of Men: Masculinity in French Republican Socialist Rhetoric

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A NEW BRAND OF MEN: MASCULINITY IN FRENCH REPUBLICAN SOCIALIST RHETORIC

by

Randolph Miller

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ABSTRACT

A NEW BRAND OF MEN: MASCULINITY IN FRENCH REPUBLICAN SOCIALIST RHETORIC

by

Randolph Miller

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Under the Supervision of Professor Carolyn Eichner

Social theorist and activist, August Blanqui, used his appearance before court in 1832 to lay out an argument that condemned the present political and economic system and demanded emancipation of the male worker. During his monologue, along with his devastating portrayal of worker misery and systemic corruption, Blanqui made comparisons between the male bourgeoisie and the male proletariat. Recounting the recent overthrow of Charles X for his audience, Blanqui described the “glorious workers” as six feet tall, towering over a groveling bourgeoisie who praised them for their “selflessness and courage.” According to Blanqui, the workers, unlike the aristocracy of wealth who oppressed them, were both physically dominant and selfless—two features that indicated a superior masculinity in the minds of radicals.

Blanqui’s comparison between the bourgeoisie and proletariat reflected a rhetorical strategy found elsewhere amongst socialists. This tactic, following French political logic, demanded the usurpation of bourgeois masculinity as ideal and thus the symbolic representation of the French nation. In this context, appeals to justice could not suffice. Rather, one had to convince others that the proletariat possessed a greater or more authentic masculinity. This work uncovers a gendered rhetorical strategy used by socialists throughout the nineteenth century, one that claimed the superiority of proletarian masculinity over both the bourgeoisie and the religious male as a necessary feature of their activism on behalf of the workers.
To

My wife, Jana
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Chapter 1: Introduction

In January of 1832, August Blanqui appeared before a French cour d'assises. Earlier in July, the police had arrested Blanqui and fourteen other members of the Friends of the People for publishing material in criticism of Louis Phillip and the newly established Monarchy. Emboldened by the insurrectionary tradition of the first Revolution, recently taught to him by Philip Buonarroti, Blanqui used the platform provided by the courtroom to lay out an argument that condemned the present political and economic system and demanded emancipation of the proletariat. During his monologue, along with his devastating portrayal of worker misery and systemic corruption, Blanqui made comparisons between the male bourgeoisie and the male proletariat. Recounting the recent overthrow of Charles X for his audience, Blanqui described the “glorious workers” as six feet tall, towering over a groveling bourgeoisie who praised them for their “selflessness and courage.”1 According to Blanqui, the workers, unlike the aristocracy of wealth who oppressed them, were both physically dominant and selfless—two features that, during the radical stage of the first Revolution, indicated a superior masculinity in the minds of radicals. These comments were not offhanded: Blanqui understood French political logic and thus the necessity of championing the masculinity of those for whom he advocated if his rhetoric was to be effective. This so-called “Trial of the Fifteen” launched Blanqui’s reputation as a fiery orator on behalf of the worker and resulted in the first of many incarcerations.

This work argues that Blanqui’s speech reflected a widespread rhetorical strategy used by socialists throughout the nineteenth century. In line with French political logic and patriarchy, socialists claimed the superiority of proletarian masculinity over both the bourgeoisie and the religious male as a necessary feature of their activism on behalf of the workers. This thesis adds

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1 Auguste Blanqui, Défense du citoyen Louis Auguste Blanqui devant la Cour d'assises : 1832 (A. Mie: Paris, 1832), 13, 14.
three important elements to the relevant scholarship. One is that it fills lacunae in the general
treatment of French socialism and masculinity. While the study of masculinity has been well
underway since the early 1990s, work on socialism has been a very small part of this with the
bulk of it focused on Great Britain and some on Australia.\textsuperscript{2} In the case of France, masculinity
studies have yet to go this particular route. While Joan Scott’s work, \textit{Gender and the Politics of
History}, does include helpful discussions of masculinity and the French worker, her concern here
is more with masculinity within the dynamics of the working class, rather than exploring or
articulating any kind of relationship between socialism and masculinity. And when class appears
in French-language treatments of masculinity, it functions essentially to explain one of the
mechanisms that helped shape manhood over the nineteenth century. As such, there is need for a
broader treatment of masculinity and French socialism—especially one that may help establish a
paradigm for further study.

The second addition is a deeper understanding of French socialist rhetorical strategy.
Scholarship on women has discovered patriarchy infused in the ideology and practice of French
socialism. Excepting the Utopians in the first part of the century, male socialists in many ways
re-enforced or copied the dominant gender narrative for women. By plugging in the conceptual
tool of hegemonic masculinity, class and gender become complementary markers of power,
allowing new questions to proceed upon the material. In other words, one should be able to see a
rhetoric of masculinity attached to the class conflicts under investigation. In the case of
masculinity, evidence exists that French socialists proceeded with an implicit awareness of
something resembling a counter-hegemonic masculinity. Teasing this out for analysis adds
contours to our understanding of French socialism and the rhetorical strategies of nineteenth-

\textsuperscript{2} For Great Britain see: Karen Hunt, “Strong Minds, Great Hearts, True Faith and Ready Hand: Exploring Socialist
century French radicalism, which in turn reveal more of the intellectual and social elements that challenged socialist vision and activism. Simple appeals to justice or reason were not enough to produce compelling rhetoric for the emancipation of labor. This project therefore works to show that socialists forwarded a counter-hegemonic masculinity in their rhetorical disputes with the bourgeoisie, as well as the reasons for doing so.

Lastly, within the analysis of gender and class issues in nineteenth-century France, a complexity emerges not explained by simply investigating a dichotomy between bourgeoisie and proletariat. The source of that complexity was the Catholic Church and the kind of influence it wielded in the nineteenth century. While historians have well documented the contention between the church and French socialism, as well as unpacking some Catholic masculinities, scholars have not investigated these two phenomena for the presence of consistent masculine discourse along the lines suggested by the conceptual tool of hegemonic masculinity. The fact is that a non-class institution such as the Catholic Church had a huge stake in the character of hegemonic masculinity, and its place in society gave it the ability to affect politics between the bourgeoisie and proletariat. In particular, Catholic discourse directly challenged socialist goals. The implication is that socialists, as activists and spokespeople for the proletariat, should have had two narratives of masculinity to engage at the end of the century—one against the bourgeois and the other anti-Catholic.

The scholarship of R. W. Connell has been formative for this work. For one, Connell presents a conceptualization of gender that is useful to the historian. By focusing on social

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practice as determinative, she avoids the reduction of gender to simple biology, while at the same
time steering clear of the pitfalls that appear with a purely post-structuralist account. If gender is
synonymous with biology, it becomes ahistorical, since there is very little room for the role of
external social forces on human behavior and identity. And if gender is a mere production of
discourse, a displacement of the human body occurs, and accounting for human agency becomes
problematic. For Connell, since the body has a reflexive relationship with social processes and is
the referent for social practice, and bodily ability and potential plays a part in the way people
experience gender, it is in social practice that gender extends itself into the social realm and thus
into history. This does not eliminate the ideological or discursive forces in gender ordering;
rather, it recognizes that bodily ability and potential plays a part in the way people experience
gender. Therefore, as both a product and producer of cultural forces, gender remains in flux and
contestable, and therefore a proper object for historical study.

This complements Connell’s explanation for how gender has come to affect societies. For
Connell, the different factors that have historically separated humans socially and collectively
produce structures that extend themselves into the ordering of societies. One of these “structures
of social relations” comes from bodily difference. She terms this the “reproductive arena,”
which includes “…sexual arousal and intercourse, childbirth and infant care, bodily sex
difference and similarity.” As such, the institutional and social ordering of any given society is,
more or less, an extension of the divisions caused by the “reproductive arena.” Since people
collectively encounter and practice this ordering, the result is a thoroughly gendered society

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6 “Gender is social practice that constantly refers to bodies and what bodies do, it is not social practice reduced to the body.” Connell, *Masculinities*, 71.
detectable on the individual, as well as the cultural, discursive, and institutional levels.⁷

More important has been her conception of hegemonic masculinity.⁸ For Connell, hegemonic masculinity is a “…configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women.” Hegemonic masculinity is neither invincible nor static. Feminists may discover and expose the mechanisms or practices that bolster a particular patriarchy and begin to challenge or dismantle them. In response, new configurations of gender practice may be produced or evolve to assert a new version of male rule. The character of hegemonic masculinity therefore changes and differs across time and location.

While hegemonic masculinity helps explain relationships of power between men and women, it also articulates the ways men relate to one another. In Connell’s vision, while a given society may acknowledge the practice of several different masculinities at one time, it will always “culturally exalt” one particular masculinity above the rest.⁹ The result is that the masculinities that do not “authorize” the exalted version marginalize, forming a hierarchy amongst males.¹⁰ The more important feature is that, for Connell, class is also a “structure of social relations,” giving class and gender an intimate relationship.¹¹ As she writes, gender is “unavoidably involved” with class, making it “…impossible to understand the shaping of working class masculinities without giving full weight to their class…” ¹² One is therefore able to speak confidently of a bourgeois masculinity distinct from a working-class masculinity.

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⁷ Connell, *Masculinity*, 56, 71, 73. “…institutions are substantially, not just metaphorically, gendered.”
Joan Scott points out that in nineteenth-century France, activists who came from the middle class saw the proletariat as weak and feminine, while socialists saw them as strong and masculine. Both groups in this case, in their judgments about the workers’ possession of power or maleness, revealed their class-conditioned ideal of masculinity. Wealth, cultural influence, and leisure time corresponded to middle-class ideals of manhood, while manual labor and loyalty to family and friends corresponded to socialist, showing the intimate relationship between masculinity and class. The implication here is that if the phenomenon of hegemonic masculinity erects a power hierarchy amongst masculinities, and if masculinities are class-conditioned, class and gender become complementary markers of power in a relationship of intersectionality. One should therefore be able to see conflicts involving class as conflicts involving masculinity as well. More specifically, one might expect to see a lower class exalting their masculinity or trying to tear down the masculinity of their oppressors.

During initial research for this work, this understanding of hegemonic masculinity seemed to correlate with some of the relevant scholarship produced in this area. For example, the tensions between the sans-culottes and the anti-revolutionary aristocrats during the radical stages of the Revolution seemed promisingly similar. While the sans-culottes only existed as a coherent group between ‘93 and ’95, and the conflagrations of the ’71 Paris Commune destroyed much of the information about them, scholars understand the sans-culottes phenomenon as one in opposition and condemnation of the anti-revolutionary part of the aristocracy. While it is tempting to express this tension using nineteenth-century terms, the fact is that neither of the groups involved fit nicely into the categories of bourgeoisie and proletariat. In reality, sans-culottes’ concerns and values were rooted in preserving older values and economic structures,

14 “…its refusal of all economic modernization, sans-culOTTISM was certainly a backward-looking movement.”
and the anti-revolutionary part of the aristocracy was a lingering order. However, there was a clear tendency amongst nineteenth century socialists to see this as a precursor to the class conflicts that they were witnessing in France.

Significant is that besides their participation in the politics of opposition to the aristocracy, they practiced and promoted their own masculinity. According to Quinlan, they gendered the aristocratic anti-revolutionaries as effeminate and distinguished themselves in a gendered manner. As Quinlan writes: “The sans-culotte costume alone—the Phrygian, striped pants, wooden clogs and weapons—distinguished their virile patriotism from ‘effeminate’ counter-revolutionaries.” And in contrast to the upper class, in whom they saw hypocrisy, they advocated humility and loyalty to their families. The nascent quality of class-based hegemonic-masculinity dynamics as demonstrated in the sans-culottes phenomenon seemed reasonably clear.

At the beginning of the July Monarchy, a recognizable class of proletarians was coming into existence alongside an established bourgeoisie. According to Margaret Cohen’s careful scholarship, in the attempt to make sense of the working class in relationship to the ruling class, the ruling class gendered them feminine, viewing them as weak in correlation with their conceptualization of women. While Cohen geared her work toward a deeper understanding of

16 Explored in chapters three through five.
the gendering of class on women, elements of her scholarship speak directly to this work. In her close reading of the Communist Manifesto, she detects a challenge to this bourgeois gendering of the proletariat, despite Marx’s claims that only class mattered. Citing Marx’s choice of words, she notes that in the Communist Manifesto he used the generic mensch to discuss “subjects engaged in other social relations.” When discussing the “socially transformative potential of the proletarian class” he used männer, a word to indicate the male gender. On top of this, Cohen points out that Marx, when describing the proletarian experience, used “…figures drawn from a semantic field recognized throughout Western history as the province of men.” The most obvious, here, was military terminology. Marx’s desire, according to Cohen, was to connect the proletariat with the group that the bourgeoisie saw as political rather than passive. In one sense, it was a challenge to bourgeois masculine hegemony. Again, the rhetorical and discursive role of gender in class conflict is clearly present.

Moving forward with a larger project that asked questions about the relationship between socialists as advocates for the proletariat and the bourgeoisie therefore seemed sound.

Development of Scholarship on French Masculinity

Scholarship on nineteenth-century French masculinity had a start with Alain Corbin’s 1978 work, Les filles de noce: Misère sexuelle et prostitution au XIXe siècle. A work ultimately

20 Cohen, 28. She points out that the Saint-Simonians, founded by members of the bourgeoisie and favoring a cooperation and harmony between the classes, gendered them feminine as well. Consistent with Saint-Simonian doctrine, they wanted the ruling class to work with them and not see them as a threat. In this, they could present a working class that was cooperative and submissive to the power of the bourgeoisie.

21 Cohen, 34.

22 Cohen, 33.

23 Alain Corbin, Les filles de noce: Misère sexuelle et prostitution au XIXe siècle (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1978). In 2002, French scholar Alain Corbin observed that Anglo-Saxon scholarship has led the way in treating masculinity as a unique and distinct type of inquiry. For him, most French scholarship that had touched on masculinity up to that point had been reliant on other subject matter—for example, the effects of war or the role of education in the socialization process. Robert Nye echoed this sentiment a few years later by stating that the French have been much less willing to adopt gender as a true category of historical analysis. Historic convictions such as “difference” feminism, he wrote, have contributed to a greater tendency to essentialize sex. This does not negate proper or useful work on masculinity from French-language sources. This work agrees with Florence Tamagne who, while admitting
about prostitution, Corbin’s methodology made it unique and pointed it towards questions about masculinity. For Corbin, writings about prostitution were really about men and ultimately revealed their attitudes, desires, and fears concerning gender and power. The acceptance or unease that men felt about the way they controlled these women therefore had both economic and political consequences. Showing that changing cultural perceptions and thus the practice of prostitution over time corresponded to the changing desires of bourgeois men, he ultimately wrote about men and the power of masculinity as a cultural force. Articulating the history of prostitution with this insight brought new questions to the practice of social history.  

Annelise Maugue meant her 1987 work, *L’Identité masculine en crise au tournant du siècle: 1871-1914*, to uncover the political tensions and disparities of power between men and women for a better understanding of the past and present. In a similar way that Corbin used men’s writings to reveal their uneasiness about gender and the loss or perpetuation of power, Maugue used a methodology that focused on male anti-feminist writings to reveal and explore a certain crisis of masculinity. In doing so, she hoped to locate the true source and quality of the fears facing their loss of literal and symbolic power.

In her narrative, the Revolution had destabilized gender roles and seeded the process for greater female power as a challenge to patriarchy. Maugue’s work focused specifically on the Third Republic up until the First World War. The reason for this specific period concerned the vigorousness of feminist discourse. It was also between the humiliation of the Franco-Prussian war and the build up to the First World War, a particular time of unease for bourgeois France.

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Similar to Corbin’s work, the primary cause of a masculine crisis amongst the bourgeoisie, according to Maugue, was the need for males to define themselves against the feminine “other.”

Edward Berenson’s 1992 offering, *The Trial of Madame Caillaux*, functions as both a general work of gender as well as a distinctive and early work on masculinity. Berenson uses the story of Henriette Caillaux’s murder of Gaston Calmette, the editor of *Le Figaro* who had published some of her husband’s private letters, to demonstrate the changing definitions of gender occurring at that time. By using gender as an analytic tool, Berenson was able to explain the motivations of Henriette Caillaux, the kind of defense she sought at trial, and the reactions of the press and public. While clearly guilty of this murder, she was able to go free by presenting herself as a “real woman,” carried away by passion and trying to save the honor that her husband Joseph had failed to accomplish. For Berenson, it was the tendency of the populace, during this period of national worry, to become favorable towards older values, which made the “real woman” defense work in her favor.

As a distinctive work of masculinity, Berenson anticipated many of the larger themes that will appear in both Anglo- and French-language scholarship on masculinity, including warfare, honor, and national identity. For Berenson, three things made the *Belle Époque* unique for the study of masculinity. The most important was the humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian war. While concerns about the masculinity of bourgeois men had already surfaced, the effect of the war made matters worse. The second part was the development of the penny press, which could spread information to all of Paris. This became a legitimate forum for slights of honor. Thirdly, there were laws that protected this kind of speech. Having no legal recourse, and desperate for a mechanism to rescue one’s masculinity, men used the aristocratic dual to address these slights.

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In one sense, Berenson’s work is about gender channeling and producing itself through honor. He does not work from a male need to define oneself up against the feminine “other.” Rather, his work explores the connection between masculinity and national identity, in one sense the “national other.” Berenson, here, is working with a notion of hegemonic masculinity. It is also about class. Berenson is careful to delineate this drama of masculinity as a problem unique to the bourgeoisie. Berenson notes arguments made at the time that show dueling as a bourgeois practice that did not significantly spill over into the working class. The argument went on to explain this difference as the result of bourgeois life, which made these men more sensitive and needing of a way to defend honor. As Berenson points out, the argument actually unconsciously genders the bourgeoisie as feminine in comparison to the working class. Berenson, as such, is also concerned with a hierarchical ordering amongst men. Berenson’s insights here speak to the thesis of the project.

Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France, Robert Nye’s 1993 work, suggests a dramatic step forward, not only in the potentials and methods of the study of masculinity, but also in establishing foundation understandings of French bourgeois masculinity during the Third Republic. Ultimately, Nye is trying to explain how and why ancien régime codes of honor would make their way into the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie. Since the old nobility hung around a bit after the Revolution, it cast a spell over the new upper order of French society. It also worked well for the bourgeoisie in separating themselves as a distinct class. As the medical profession began to discuss the problems of birthrate and healthy offspring, the needs of the nation became associated with the bourgeoisie. As the need for healthy males to produce healthy

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males became paramount, the bourgeois male took on a special task with a special mission that mirrored the experience or role of an aristocracy. Complementing Bereson’s work, the ultimate expression of this was the predominance of the duel in French culture—although fist fighting remained the preferred method for settling disputes among the lower classes.  

Nye’s impressive work exposes a hegemonic bourgeois masculinity shaped by the influence and cultural pull of Old Regime nobility. It also forwards the influence of medicine and the underlying fears of degeneration amongst the French to explain the kind of cultural tensions that challenged and shaped this dominant masculinity.

André Rauch’s, Le Premier Sexe, titled to evoke Simone Bouvier’s work, the Second Sex, set out to describe the processes that led to the dismantling of the old order and the establishment of a hierarchy between men and women.  

He agrees with Annalise Maugue concerning the role of the Revolution in destabilizing masculine power. For Rauch, with the loss of tradition to hold their identity in place, masculine power became negotiable and a crisis set in. Using this narrative, Rauch proceeds to explain the different mechanisms or institutions that allowed men to reestablish pathways to symbolic and actual virility throughout the nineteenth century. Rauch shows how, in the first part of the century, men began to realize virility by way of the army, which helped reestablish a distinction between men and boys and between men and women. Conscription under Napoleon helped this along as the glory of the Napoleonic soldier reached into myth. After this, with the disappearance of the traditional nobility and the development of a new economic system, some men began to find status within business and commercial accomplishment. Rauch also deals with separate issues such as leisure, which is his area of expertise. He also looks closely at schooling in the socialization process. Rauch does deal with

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29 Interestingly this contrasts with Anne Marie Sohn’s conclusion that honor as a force on masculinity was in decline in the second half of the century. While Sohn’s concern is with a general trend, Nye focuses on only the bourgeoisie.

class, but not necessarily in a comparative manner, or one that would suggest a hierarchy amongst men. For example, he makes a distinction between the bourgeoisie, the peasant, and the working class and their relationship to violence and virility. For the bourgeoisie, violence decreased in proportions to financial success, while violence remained in the working class and often expressed itself as a ...défense contre les couches dominantes. 31 He does not, however, establish any one culturally exulted from of masculinity, and notions of class as determinant are downplayed. In short, Rauch uncovers the dynamics of general masculine construction and evolution by drawing from a wide range of experience in the nineteenth century.

The arch of Roynette’s 2002 La construction du masculin de la fin du 19e siècle aux années 1930 is an explanation of the ready acceptance of so many French men to the demands of the First World War. 32 With this, he adds violence and war into the mix, which has since become an important part of French scholarship on masculinity. In answering this question, he is able to provide an explanation for the development of masculine identity during the Third Republic. The focus on war is purposeful because Roynette sees the direct participation in the violence of war as definitive for the creation of masculinity during this time. The key, here, was the Franco-Prussian war, which forwarded the idea of heroism in defense of the fatherland and made its way into discourse. For Roynette, this event and its aftermath helped to push out older sources for virility and institute a new logic or moral base for masculinity.

Roynette is interested in understanding the overtaking of one source for masculinity for another. The question he proceeds to address is the manner in which a particular masculinity can infect a generation. He suggests that it starts with childhood when sex defines social roles collectively. The work world available to more and more men reinforced the notion of

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31 Rauch, 250.
subordination to authority and distinction from women. School as well functioned in this same capacity. Military service then became the rite of passage for men to adulthood. Rigorous discipline of training at the turn of the century produced then a distinct masculinity favorable to war. Roynette’s work assumes that masculinity proceeds from an internalization of practice, but one that requires the over-arching threat of war.

Regis Revenin’s edited work, *Hommes et masculinités de 1789 à nos jours: contributions à l’histoire du genre et de la sexualité en France*, is the most ambitious of the French-language offerings—not only in its time span (over two-hundred years), but also in its diversity of subject matter. It is also of a slightly different kind, perhaps explaining the presence of elements unique to French-language work on masculinity.³³ Revenin’s work moves forward with an understanding of masculinity as constitutive of both gender and sexuality, something this project delineates. By adding the element of sexuality, the perspective changes. Taking into account how the dominant power, which is male, perceives homosexuality, in a sense sorting out power relationships between men, forms of hegemonic masculinity appear in the case studies. This is not the overarching hegemonic masculinity articulated by Connell. Rather, these hegemonic masculinities are the logical product of power hierarchies: there has to be one that is dominant.

One of these essays is Gil Mihaely’s *Un Poil de Différence*. Mihaely is interested in the role of the moustache in the signaling of virility. In particular, he is intent on understanding how it works in the world of labor. For Mihaely, the military represented the masculine, while the domestic worker (*la domestiqué*) represented the feminine. An understanding inherited from the *ancien régime*, the domestic worker was considered weak and dependent. This perception took on a sexual element, including the assertion of sterility and homosexuality. Part of the dominant

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discourse from which this perception could develop was the kind of masculinity that emanated from the military. Having set up the *domestiqué/military* dichotomy, Mihaely is able to ask interesting questions about new service labor that had developed and that seemed to resemble the labor of the domestic worker. For this, he focuses on the cafe server and the low-level bank employee. In both cases, one finds them petitioning for permission to wear a moustache, “…la moustache qu’ils portent à la caserne.” In Mihaely’s interpretation, both groups sought and won this permission in order to take a respected place in the working world.

While a profound study on how masculinity affected this part of French labor, one can argue that the ultimate thesis of Mihaely’s work concerns the overwhelming effect of the military on French society. Mihaely is showing how military culture and mythology had a grip on the definition of virility, and that this understanding is necessary to make sense of French masculinity of the nineteenth century. In this, he is in line with his colleagues in looking for the sources of masculinity and explaining its quality. This work retains the reasoning and character of a work of sociology or anthropology.  

Christopher Forth’s 2004 work on the Dreyfus Affair moves beyond Robert Nye’s work in awareness and method. Medical discourse and anxieties about modern life factored dramatically in French self-perception. The Dreyfus Affair in Forth’s work not only highlighted these facts, but also caused these anxieties to manifest themselves in a new way. During this crisis, commentators from all sides argued their position by challenging the masculinity of their opponents. Here, Forth articulates not only the dynamics of a hierarchy between men, implying an ordering role of hegemonic masculinity, but also the connection between masculinity and national identity. At the same time, he intersects gender and race: Dreyfus’s Jewishness became

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34 While there are seeming nods to intersectionality, that masculinity is “…un lieu où les différences de classe, de religion et de race se dessinent,” none of these categories appear as complementary markers of power, or appear as deep as social structures of ordering, or are as Connell says, “unavoidably involved” with gender.
central in the fight to define or own the masculine. Forth also intersects gender and class as the weak intellectual, associated with the bourgeoisie, could invite an accusation of effeminacy along with the Jewish male. Ultimately, the heightened awareness of masculinity caused by the Dreyfus affair produced a culture of force, modifying the ideal of masculinity.

Forth’s work represents a greater sophistication in the study of nineteenth-century French masculinity. Here, the complexities and ordering force of masculinity as ideal and discourse go on display. The fact that there was intimacy between fears about the nation and anxiety about elite masculinity suggests a particular understanding of state, one that saw the relationship between an ideal masculinity and an ideal nation. As Forth points out, discourse over the Dreyfus affair made connections between the body politic and the bodies of the participants, also reflected in the use of political metaphors that focused on health. Forth’s presentation of gendered discourse centering on the Dreyfus Affair suggests a model for understanding how other political antagonisms might play out, one immensely useful for this present work.³⁵

Christopher Forth continued this approach to masculinity in his co-edited work with Bertrand Taithe entitled French Masculinities: History, Culture, and Politics.³⁶ They organized this work around the awareness that masculinity had a unique relationship to the nation and national identity, which inevitably gives it a “transnational dimension.” Forth’s own offering to this collection of essays is titled “La Civilization and its Discontents: Modernity, Manhood and the Body in the Early Third Republic.”³⁷ Here, Forth shows how the concept of civilization affected French negotiations with masculinity. The association of France with civilization created a

³⁵Christopher E. Forth, The Dreyfus affair and the Crisis of French Manhood (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press ; 2004)
tension. On one hand, civilization meant a higher form of social existence and a preferred distance from savagery. On the other, many understood that civilization refined manners and, as such, effeminized its males by separating them from their former martial capacities. Forth reiterates past work on how medical discourse reflected and encouraged this anxiety. He also forwards exposure to non-Western societies as definitive for this negotiation. These cultures, since they were considered less civilized, seemed to represent a former and better form of masculinity. The result was encouragement for middle class males to expose themselves to a more demanding existence, such as one would find in the colonies, which were the subjects of France’s civilizing mission. One finds a powerful expression of these anxieties in the fact that France used West African soldiers to fight in WWI, acting as a sort of “substitute for…Gallic masculinity.”

Anne-Marie Sohn’s 2009 scholarship, "Sois un homme!: la construction de la masculinité au XIXe siècle, is unique in that she takes time to explain social dynamics more closely and their relationship to gender. She emphasizes the formable factor of social practice as establishing a gendered society that internalizes to establish identity. Her distinguishing method concerns studying children and young men as a privileged place from which to see how masculinity is inculcated. She studies young men from all backgrounds—working class, rural, bourgeois, and different institutions such as school and army. Similar to Rauch, her work is concerned with establishing how masculinity was constructed in general, and not as interested in how differences in class or race might contribute to a particular kind of exulted masculinity.

Her conclusion is that in the second half of the century, violence and aggressiveness receded in place of a masculinity associated with self-control—that is, negotiation replaced fighting.

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This does not sit perfectly with Rauch’s conclusions that among the working classes, fighting and aggressiveness remained. One explanation is that while Sohn’s work is more general, her conclusions represent a statistical decline over the last half of the nineteenth century, which can coincide with Rauch’s observations. Another explanation is that Rauch’s conclusions represent a different kind of violence, one developed or retained in response to class domination, which fits well with this project. Harder to explain is the opposing conclusion of Nye and Berenson, who assert that notions of honor, which fed violence, remained strong throughout the century and actually increased in some cases.

Qualitative differences between French language and Anglo-Saxon treatments of French masculinity in general and French bourgeois masculinity in particular. For example, the latest French monographs on general French masculinity are working with masculine identity and origins, as opposed to Anglo-Saxon works, which are working on how masculinity and the male body relate to the nation and the politics of nation building. In this sense, French scholarship seems to belong more to sociology or anthropology. It sees gender rightfully as a product of social forces, but, as Nye has observed, ignores it primarily as an analytical or conceptual tool. This makes the difference. Starting with the assumption that everything is gendered affects the questions the scholar asks and how they investigate them, as Joan Scott first revealed to scholars in 1986. It can uncover new kinds of cause and effect in the social and political worlds—for example, when one realizes that a nation can be gendered and then reassesses the intricacies of patriarchy. It also allows for masculinity, via Connell, to be “unavoidably involved” with class and for the concept of hegemonic masculinity to be a real explanatory and ordering concept.

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This present work will therefore fit well in English language scholarship on French masculinity. This work will hopefully be a unique addition to not only an understanding of socialism, but that of French masculinity and politics as well.

**Treatments of Masculinity and Socialism**

Direct treatments of French masculinity and socialism are absent from the scholarship. However, relevant work on England and Australian are available. Karen Hunt’s work, *Strong Minds, Great Hearts, True Faith and Ready Hands? Exploring Masculinities Before the First World War*, is an insightful work in this area. She proceeds with a definitive category of socialist masculinity, and tries to understand it within the framework of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic masculinity. In this sense, there is intersection with this project. However, while her work aims to “map a terrain” for the investigation of socialist masculinities, it takes a different path from the present work.

Hunt draws heavily on the work of British Historian, John A. Tosh, in categorizing the forms of masculinity available at this time. Since iconography and general rhetoric are powerful locales for studying this, Hunt uses the Oscar Wilde trial to observe discourse. Her conclusion is that while there was room for a specific kind of socialist masculinity, there was no impetus to create one. She also suggests that socialist masculinity was too much like the dominant masculinity to find the need to challenge it. Several differences emerge here between Hunt’s work and this dissertation. For one, this present work looks directly at socialist discourse over relevant and contentious issues of class and politics. While the Oscar Wilde trial is an interesting site to observe these tensions, it also may hide, downplay, or change the actual gendered rhetoric that may have existed prior. Hunt’s observations therefore become legitimate and applicable only to

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the period after the 1890s when the socialist emphasis went away from defiance of certain forms of living toward political participation. In addition, it fails to address or unpack the sensitive relationship between religion and class, which might have revealed a much more nuanced discourse from the socialists.

Marilyn Lake’s 1986 work, *Socialism and Manhood: The Case of William Lane*, which focuses on the Australian socialist William Lane, is an early but insightful treatment of the topic.\(^{43}\) She uncovers worker anxiety fed by a combination and connection between class status and gender status. She focuses on the working men who migrated to the colonies. Accordingly, men could not find their manhood within a capitalist system, which made workers dependant. William Lane, understanding bourgeois masculinity, wrote *Workingman’s Paradise*, a deep critique of capitalist society that posited a cooperative system allowing men to be self-sufficient. He advocated public ownership of the means of production and insisted that wage labor destroyed independence and thus manhood. According to Lake, however, by the second decade of the twentieth century, the dominance of wage labor changed this kind of masculine discourse. Since wage labor provided the ability to support one’s family, wage labor became a means to realize masculinity among the working class. This work does not go beyond the uncovering of the intersection of class and gender.

**Treatments of Socialism and Religion**

A small group of works brings together socialism and religion in the Europe of the nineteenth century. Lillian Wallace’s work, *Leo XIII and the Rise of Socialism*, despite its pro-Catholic stance, works well to articulate how the nineteenth-century church understood and responded to socialism.\(^{44}\) Here, one is able to see the encyclicals that touched on issues of industrial society


being spurred on by a particular challenge posed by socialism and communism, both of which functioned as alternative ideologies to Catholicism. In this reading, there is a specific tension between socialism and Catholicism that required an intellectual debate within the actions and writings of the church. She also places these tensions within the larger problem of modernity and emphasizes the particular and unique problem in France being both the seedbed of revolution and yet the eldest daughter of the church. In her partially triumphalist narrative, while showing the serious problem that developed socialism posed for the church, she suggests the church was the primary force that achieved the “fencing in” of Marxism.

Berenson’s work, *Populist Religion and Left-Wing Politics in France, 1830-1852*, is important here because it explains how, prior to ’48, the Church and socialism could co-exist in a non-volatile way. Addressing the explanation of peasant conversion to left-wing movements in the first part of the century, Berenson turns towards the religiosity and the populist form of Christianity that was in the rural air at this time. While the rural areas experienced some de-Christianization, the worldview and ordering concepts that Christianity had provided for generations was lingering. Berenson records that the Montagnard party, which also referred to itself as democratic socialist (democ-soc), consciously chose to build an ideology appealing to the peasant by using these very concepts and worldview to make the transition easier.

The democ-socs focused on the fraternity and social justice elements of Christianity toward this end. While the bourgeoisie had claimed justification for its own existent via Christianity, the democ-socs took that narrative to emphasize the populist and working-class nature of Christ and to justify an allegiance to what they put forth as the true form of Christianity. Ideas such as Christ being the first proletarian or the first republican were popular and part of the symbolism

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and discourse of the democ-socs. Louis Blanc, perhaps the most popular of the democ-socs, claimed that democratic socialism was the inheritor of a sort of apostolic succession that started with Christ, passed to Rousseau and Robespierre, and then continued with present socialists. While this ideology was successful, the religious elements would fall away after ’51, and the formal condemnation of socialism by the church, and the lack of support for workers, made the church and socialism antagonistic towards one another from that point on.

Robert Stuart’s work, “‘Jesus the Sans-Culottes’: Marxism and Religion During the French Fin de siècle,” picks up the narrative at the end of the century and gives one a close up of the tensions between the church and Marxism from the Marxist perspective. This work reveals how the Marxists viewed the challenge of the church as an alternative ideology. Stuart shows also their strategy, or lack of one, to engage religion. In Stuart’s careful work, he explains that the nature of Marxism encouraged indifference toward the challenge of the church. Class issues, for example, were the only that mattered, and religion, from this perspective, would eventually disappear on its own. Further, the materialism of the Marxists did not take into account the religious dispositions or needs of workers. Indifference was the perfect attitude to have, for they had a better chance at drawing both unbelievers and believers into the socialist fold. What Stuart found, however, was that more often than not they retreated into extremely harsh and common anticlericalism. Stuart’s explanation of this was the Catholic oppression against modernity that many on the left experienced. He cites, for example, Jules Guesde having to flee Italy because he refused to baptize his child. Further was the active advance of the church in turning workers against socialism. Ultimately, according to Stuart, the Marxists did not

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adequately deal with the religious question because of this, and the tensions between socialism and the church remained.

Treatments of Catholic Masculinity

Finally are works that treat Catholic masculinity. Timothy Verhoeven’s 2008 work on the Jesuit during the second Empire, *Neither Male nor Female: The Jesuit as Androgyne 1843-1870*, speaks clearly to a type of Catholic masculinity that the left promoted and yet abhorred. Extending Róisín Healy’s work on anti-Jesuit sentiment in Germany, Verhoeven applies essentially a gendered accounting of anti-Jesuit sentiment in nineteenth-century France. In doing so, he is able to portray the type of masculinity available to the church at this time, one that could be both politically and socially threatening to their enemies.

Verhoeven notes that anti-Jesuit vitriol often aimed at notions of a confused masculinity on the part of the Jesuit, one that, with a mind ready for conspiracy, French critics saw as subversive. On the one hand, Jesuits had what they termed a woman-like character: they perceived submissiveness as well as the ability to persuade or seduce others (characteristics they attributed to women). According to their detractors, Jesuits were too emotional to embody masculinity properly and, like women, they were dependent. Critics perceived these things as working toward greater efficiency in luring women into support of the church. However, while the Jesuit posed was easily gendered feminine, they also manifested elements that the bourgeoisie prized as masculine. For example, many saw Jesuits as courageous in the face of difficult odds. Jesuits were also disciplined and ambitious, so much so that, according to the mythology, some saw them bent on world domination. Further, not being tied down by things like property and family, they could “beat men at their own game.” By applying the conception

of androgyny to Jesuits, anti-clericals gave them the “…capacity to undermine the strict division between men and women upon which social harmony was held to rest.”48 In this sense they were subversive, but also reflected anxiety about masculinity amongst the dominant class.

Carol Harrison’s 2007 work on the growing influence of Ultramontanism in the second half of the French nineteenth century, Zouave Stories: Gender, Catholic Spirituality, and French responses to the Roman Question, adds much to questions this work tries to address. Zouave Stories presents a distinctive and alternative Catholic masculinity, one with an element of influence or potential subversiveness as well.49 As the Jesuit existed with a mission, so did the Papal Zouaves, who were born and nourished in the middle of a battle—sometimes real and sometimes symbolic—between the church and modernity. Zouaves, not manifesting any of the typical attributes that defined the masculine for the dominant culture, were ready bravely to lay down their lives for a cause. As Harrison wrote: “Their stories take seriously both the manliness of their military vocation and the gentle innocence at the heart of their sanctity; they are complementary, not opposite, qualities.” The influence here was profound, even after death. Once Zouave martyrs became immortalized in print and by the church, many of them reached the station of intercessor between humans and God, and many prayed to them for protection. Harrison relates that some claimed to have had their prayers answered and attributed miraculous healings to the Zouave martyr.

Paul Airiau’s 2007 work, “Le Prêtre Catholique: Masculin, Neutre, Autre?,” seeks to explain the origins and challenge of the ambiguous nature of priestly masculinity. He starts by

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48 Verhoeven, 41.
highlighting the appearance of the priest. The priestly uniform, which by its very nature separates the priest from the citizen, affected public perception. Coupled with that was his training and the demands of his vocation. His training kept him from the hardship and difficulties of a life of labor. Neither did he resemble a peasant. In addition, prior to 1889, priests did not participate in the army. And once they began, the participation was too little to make a difference. Ultimately, priests were physically different from other kinds of men.

The most important element was the morality he had to practice. Celibacy had long been a source of criticism from anti-clericals, and it went far to affect perceptions of their virility. Airiau cites Zola who argued that the act of sex was necessary for not only true male and female identity, but was required for the status of human as well. The problem was that the cleric had access to the women via confession. The idea of the hysterical female being manipulated by the priest became popular in the 1850s and 1860s. The very practice of confession became sexualized and seen as a kind of sexual outlet for the priest. While other scholarship has established the problem that working-class men had with confession, Airiau’s work deals with how it challenged the bourgeoisie. This element of confession made priestly gender ambiguity somewhat subversive. But more, because of celibacy, these men could not participate in the building up of the French race, which became so important in the second half of the century. The gender and identity of the priestly male remained unique in the France of the Third Republic and within the tensions of modernity. All three of these articles on Catholic masculinity demonstrate its ambiguous status in the perception of others, and its alternative position to both bourgeois and socialist forms. This speaks to this present work.

Republican Socialism from 1830-1905

The establishment of a liberal government and legitimization of bourgeois power and influence in 1830 makes the July Monarchy the proper starting point to focus on socialist masculinity. While the bourgeoisie were forward-looking in their rejection of the ancien régime, their consciousness about labor and the relationship between rich and poor was retrograde. Aristocratic paternalism guided their thinking about the economy, and they continued the practice of forbidding unions as well as strikes and picketing. With a growing population of powerless workers underneath a growing population of bourgeoisie, the July Monarchy would witness the development of a distinctive working class that produced its own recognizable working-class masculinity. 51

The progressive elements of this liberal government also played an important part in shaping the forces under study. Its liberalization of the press allowed for the return of republicanism and the development of formal socialism. The new government also put an end to the church’s outward attempts to return France to a throne and altar alliance. The result was a rejuvenation of Catholic thinking and administration, essentially shifting how the church would remain influential in society and helping to define its responses to the challenges that were to come. As such, 1830 is a good starting point for this work.

Delineating a specific stopping point is problematic. For example, it should be easy to conceive of total war as shaking up society enough to end a particular interplay of forces, making the outbreak of WWI a natural boundary. But, while the war dramatically affected France, gender is something that is always at play, and therefore hegemonic masculinity is always present. The best one can do here is to look for complicating elements that make the questions

Looking at the way it fore grounded race in the mix of structures that ordered French society, the Dreyfus Affair sufficiently complicates the questions this work is asking. Once race, and its close cousin, nationalism, became visible parts of the political landscape, things became more difficult to sort out along the lines established in this dissertation. For one, it complicated political discourse by muddling identity. Secondly, it created confusion because previously, political blocs had not formed with race as prominent as it had become during the Dreyfus affair. Anti-Semites on the right and the left both had their own versions of anti-Jewish mythology. When the time came to pick sides in the Dreyfus Affair, political blocs had to accommodate. Socialists found themselves defending the Republic and aligning with elements of the bourgeoisie on the side of Dreyfus, while a new kind of right wing formed—nationalist and anti-Semitic—during the humiliation of conservative and traditional institutions of French society. Further, Christopher Forth’s brilliant work on the Dreyfus Affair shows how the confrontation with the racial “other” affected the discourse of masculinity. By bring in race, Forth’s work demonstrates a further or more complicated development in the crisis of bourgeoisie masculinity.

The fallout from the Affair resulted in several changes in the makeup of French socialism. The spirit of cooperation against a common enemy came to a head in 1905 with the formation of the French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO), in reality effecting and representing both a watering down of revolutionary doctrine and appeal, and an increased presence in French politics, a triumph of reformist and parliamentary socialism. The governmental backlash against the church’s role in the affair found its fulfillment in the 1905 as well with a law that

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ended the Concordat of 1801, which had restored much of the church’s privilege lost during the first Revolution, and established a separation of church and state.\textsuperscript{54} Again changing the way the church would relate to culture, the new law allowed the state to confiscate church buildings and end the funding of religion.\textsuperscript{55}

Other scholars have honed in on the last decade of the nineteenth century as being significant as well. David Thomson, in his classic work on the Third Republic, sees 1905 as the completion of a consolidation of power and a working out of political problems that had plagued the Third Republic.\textsuperscript{56} At the same time, the Republic found itself politically unprepared for the build up to war and the changes demanded by further industrialization.\textsuperscript{57} In Weber’s \textit{Peasants into Frenchman}, he argues for a time between 1880 and 1910 where the infrastructure of France was great enough that rural and urban areas could come together toward a singular French identity.\textsuperscript{58} Along with the overcoming of distance and culture came mass politics and a new consumerism. Indeed, industrialization by the middle of the first decade had caught up to England, and the modern world was present in a way it never had been before in France. Therefore, 1905 functions well as a bookend to the particular patterns and forces that came into effect in 1830. The seventy–five years between 1830 and 1905 is a good expanse of time to work out the questions of this work.

The focus is on Republican socialism. Republican socialism openly connected itself to the Republican tradition stemming from ’93, had a pro-Mountain understanding of the first Revolution, and advocated republicanism similar to that tradition as the proper form of

\textsuperscript{56} David Thompson, \textit{Democracy in France since 1870} (New York, Oxford University Press, 1964), 72.
\textsuperscript{57} Thomson, 171.
government for a socialist France. The exceptions are socialisms traditionally understood as Utopian, or ones that were direct extensions of formal religion. Utopian and Christian socialisms were too different in their aims and moral parameters to include them in the analysis, and without a grouping of ideologies with similar philosophical characteristics and notions of justice, legitimate conclusions would be too difficult to make.

The list of primary characters this work focuses on begins with François-Noël Babeuf. Born in St. Quentin, Aisne in 1760, Babeuf’s upbringing was meager. His father was a disgraced military officer and had a difficult time making ends meet. Self taught, Babeuf was able to make a living in business within the bureaucracy of the ancient regime. Negotiating financial relationships between peasants and nobility, he was radicalized over the injustices and inequalities that existed between these two orders. During the Revolution he helped bring peasants into the political process and pushed for sans-culottes influence during the Terror. With the death of Robespierre, Babeuf came to believe in the necessity of overthrow and the abolition of private property. Authorities thwarted Babeuf’s plan to bring together Jacobins, members of the military, and all the angry and starving people of Paris to take over the government, and he was executed in 1797. 59

One of Babeuf’s fellow conspirators was an Italian radical named Philippe Buonarroti. Born in Pisa in 1761 to a noble family, he chose a life of political agitation. This consisted of the creation of secret societies and the promotion of insurrection. When the French Revolution broke out, his sympathies were with the Jacobins. Moving to Paris, Buonarroti worked alongside of Robespierre. He joined Babeuf’s conspiracy and wound up sharing a cell with him before Babeuf’s execution. Sent into exile, and following through with his comrade’s wishes,

Buonarroti published the testimony of Babeuf. In 1830 he brought it to Paris and shared it with other revolutionaries.

Perhaps Buonarroti’s most famous protégée was August Blanqui. Born in 1805 in Puget-Théniers located in southeastern France, Blanqui’s father belonged to a faction of Jacobins referred to as the Girondins during the first Revolution and had served as a delegate to the Convention. While his father lost his wealth when the Empire collapsed, Blanqui was still able to attend school in Paris. Formally studying law and medicine, he became great orator. By the mid 1820s, Blanqui had joined the radical republican Carbonari in Paris, and his friendship with Buonarroti fueled his hatred toward the Bourbons. After 1830, Blanqui began his revolutionary career, carrying on the insurrectionary tradition. He spent the majority of his life behind bars.60

Louis Blanc was also in thrall to Buonarroti. Born to an official of the French Empire in 1811, Blanc had a comfortable upbringing. Louis’ father was connected enough to secure a pension and a scholarship for Louis to attend the royal college at Rodez. Blanc received a classical and religious education. Decisive for Blanc’s radicalism was his move to Arras, the hometown of Robespierre. A working class district, Arras exposed him to left-wing thought and the plight of the workers. Through the influence of Buonarroti, Blanc adopted a republican socialist position. Blanc became a prolific author of historical and economic works. He would also head up the Luxembourg Commission to study the plight of workers during the Second Republic, which resulted in his exile after the coup d’état of Louis Napoleon.61

A colleague of Louis Blanc, Constance Pecqueur was born in 1801 at Douai located in the Nord département. His upbringing was bourgeois, but he used his education to carve out a career as an intellectual writing on behalf of the workers. His first socialist influence came from

the Saint-Simonians. From there Pecqueur became a follower of Utopian socialist Charles Fourier and joined one of his communities. Between 1837 and 1844, however, he published several works on political economy that separated him from his earlier utopian influences. In particular, Théorie nouvelle d’économie sociale et politique, ou Études sur l’organisation des sociétés moved him towards a materialist position. Along with Louis Blanc, he participated in the ill-fated Luxembourg Commission. He also took part in the National Assembly of the Second Republic. Louis Bonaparte’s overthrow in ’52 soured Pecqueur on politics, but later in life he would use his expertise on economic issue to advise integralist socialist, Benoît Malon, a prominent socialist during the Third Republic.62

Another contemporary of Louis Blanc was Theodore Dézamy, who was born in 1808 in Luçon in the Vendee. Like Pecqueur, Dézamy followed a path from utopianism to materialism. A former follower of the utopian socialist Etienne Cabet, Dézamy made his way towards a materialist position. Moving to Paris in 1835, he worked as a pamphleteer. By 1842 he had denounced Cabet and began advocating a materialist socialism. His desire was to rid French socialism of its religious features and overtones. Adopting materialism and the insurrectionary tradition from Babeuf, Dézamy maintained a working relationship with Blanqui throughout his lifetime.

Representing the generation born after the Revolution of 1830, Jules Vallès was born in 1832 and grew up in Puy-en-Velay. While his mother came from the peasantry, his father was a school teacher. Vallès became radicalized when he moved to Paris to attend school. Working as a journalist, he focused on describing the bohemian and outcast elements of society. His print attacks in print on the bourgeoisie made him popular. Vallès’s most famous periodical was Cry

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of the People, and his participation in the Paris Commune, for which he was exiled, demonstrated the strength of his convictions.⁶³

Lastly, like Babeuf, Benoît Malon was a manual laborer before becoming a self-educated intellectual who spoke and wrote on behalf of the proletariat. Born in Précieux to peasants in 1841, his first job was as a shepherd. He would eventually find work as a dyer and the director of a grocery store. He suffered financially because of his radical commitments. Joining the International, he served a short prison term for his proclamation of socialism. After participating in the Commune as an elected official, he was exiled to Switzerland. In his final years, he edited The Socialist Review, a journal that promoted the integration of differing schools of socialism that drew on the politics and ideology of the French.

This work proceeds, therefore, in the following way. Chapter two explains how the bourgeoisie and the proletariat came to embody their particular masculinities. The goal here is to understand properly the class-based masculinities that are clashing and to highlight the backgrounds to their antagonisms. It is in two sections. The first part explains how and why the bourgeoisie became beholden to ideals concerning the ancien régime aristocracy, which became a major factor shaping its masculine identity. The second part does the same with working class masculinity. It highlights the role of the peasant experience on labor and the need for laborers to distance themselves from the oppressing “other.” Most importantly, the shows the sans-culottes becoming models for worker identity and masculinity. The chapter argues for the presence of a psychosocial need in French society for a group of people to function as a preservative of French society, similar to what the ancient nobility had provided in previous centuries. This explains how the French conceptualized society, adding an important depth to discourse of French

socialists during the nineteenth century.

Chapter three investigates the way in which patriarchy manifested itself in language, and how French political logic shaped that language into a gendered discourse of masculinity during the first Revolution. This includes French concerns with health and national strength, something that became more apparent during the Third Republic, but was certainly present as a shaping factor as early as the Revolutionary period. The chapter further demonstrates the effect of the sans-culottes on the aesthetics of masculinity, which became useful for anti-bourgeois socialist rhetoric of the nineteenth century.

Chapter four shows early rhetorical use of masculinity by socialists from 1830 to 1852. A gap in analysis exists between ‘52 and ‘69 because of Louis Napoleon’s suppression of socialism after his coup d’état. Chapter five therefore continues from 1869 to 1905. French fears of personal and national degeneration, present already during the first Revolution, remained a constant over both periods, helping to preserve a political logic that allowed a counter-hegemonic masculine discourse to function similarly in both periods, despite the political and social differences between the two. The confrontation with the racial “other” through imperialism and the Dreyfus affair, as well as the popularity of physical fitness amongst the bourgeoisie, undermining socialist claims to superiority, complicated male socialist rhetoric and language in France. By 1905, the logic that supported their counter hegemonic rhetoric could no longer be effective.

Chapter six looks at how socialists rhetorically dealt with the challenge that the non-class institution of the Catholic Church posed to them. They worked from a position that masculinized materialism, requiring a rejection of medieval metaphysics and the replacement of it with an epistemology built around reason for the status of male. However, in their emasculating rhetoric,
socialists did not use any of the terminology they had utilized against the bourgeoisie. This requires explanation. Socialists may have perceived male Ultramontane piety as something odd, enough so that they were comfortable using a broader set of concepts with which to emasculate the religious. The desire to win female converts to the socialist cause from the church, which had an even worse track record with women, could also help explain the unwillingness to draw on the mythology of female inferiority in these cases. Chapter seven summarizes the evidence in final support of the thesis and conveys final conclusions. Emerging here is clear picture of French patriarchy, how it affected political logic, and the way socialists navigated this terrain in their advocacy of the workers. Power structures signified by gender conditioned or limited reasonable appeals to justice or compassion, shaping the language and rhetorical strategy of socialists.
Chapter Two: Sources of Class-Based Masculinity

The purpose of this chapter is to clarify and delineate two parallel narratives from which the main part of this work draws its material. This consists of demonstrating the sources and content of the masculinities that attached themselves to both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The reason to proceed this way is to provide, necessarily, the background and support for the material under analysis, something that the previous chapter’s literature review could not accomplish.

The Male Bourgeoisie and the Burden of the Old Regime

Understanding bourgeois masculinity requires recognition of the duties and expectations that it inherited from the ancien régime and that helped define its role in nineteenth-century French society. This necessitates awareness of continuity in the French transition from the ancien régime to the nineteenth century in spite of the Revolutionary break. Antoine de Baecque, in his profound work on the role of bodily metaphors in the Revolution, looks closely at how revolutionaries conceptualized the transfer from the old system to a new one during the period of Louis XVI’s desacralization. Baecque articulates a strong reliance on ancien régime precedent in the construction of a new France. The most important here was the analogous conceptualization of sovereignty. In the ancien régime, the king’s body, through hereditary succession, embodied the state and its perpetuity. In the new order, the national or citizen body replaced the king’s body, renewing itself and remaining in perpetuity through the regular election of representatives. In this sense, with a sort of conceptual continuity, revolutionaries hoped to preserve the stability that monarchy and the king’s body provided, as well as its necessary symbolic content.

66 Baecque, Body, 8.
Dorinda Outram expressed this characteristic of revolutionary culture as an attempt to redistribute, “…various attributes of the king’s body throughout the new body politic.”

Penny Robert’s work on the sixteenth-century monarchy adds more to the role of the king’s body in relation to the state. In her scholarship, the king and the state had “both a physical reality and symbolic status,” which allowed the understanding of interdependence regarding their health.

In other words, connection between the “health of the monarch and that of the realm,” one representing the other, existed. This served monarchy well because the logic emphasized or encouraged the health and well-being of the king. The dramatic reliance on metaphors of body and health in Revolutionary language, both in the criticism of the ancien régime and in the articulation of a new France, underscores the survival of this conceptualization in the transfer from the old to the new.

This transfer from king to body politic also extended itself into the realm of masculinity. As Linton wrote, ancien régime “kings appeared as the embodiment of masculine virtue, an image that served to emphasize and reinforce their claim to be the embodiment of sovereignty.”

Fleshed out in chapter three, the subversive language of virtue, connected with the language of masculinity, suggests that the notion of ruling masculinity, formerly belonging to the king, survived and was seeking a new locale. The language of socialism reveals that, when the bourgeoisie rose to power in 1830, they, as ruling elites, became the possessors of sovereignty and inherited the role of national and masculine representation.

The capacity of the elite bourgeoisie to inherit some of the lingering responsibilities from Old

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70 See chapters four and five.
Regime rule expressed itself in the survival of nobility. Historians, most dramatically Robert Nye, have noted that as the French bourgeoisie formed, its men adopted many of the distinguishing values and characteristics of the ancien régime nobility.\(^71\) Indeed, the similarities between expressions of old nobility and the characteristics of bourgeois masculinity were striking, even more so when understood that they outlived France’s transition into modernity as well as a violent Revolution. Further, bourgeois ideology, one that supposedly championed economic liberalism and meritocracy, was, in theory, diametrically opposed to the notion of privilege and inherited distinction. The clearest manifestation of this survival of nobility concerns the notion of honor, which came to inform bourgeois masculinity. The connection between honor and masculinity was intimate enough that by the middle of the nineteenth century, social markers of nobility-influenced honor became social markers of masculinity itself.\(^72\)

The oddity is that even though the bourgeoisie formed in the Middle Ages, it actually grew between the cracks of the medieval orders. Prior to the Revolution, lack of awareness and out-of-date politics lumped it into the Third Estate. Ultimately, however, the bourgeoisie had very little to do with the tradition Third Estate: it was in spirit irreligious, defying traditional theology by its mobility, seeming freedom, and accumulation of wealth; it was neither part of the blessed poor, nor the inherited rich. This helps to explain why bourgeois masculinity drew from noble, rather than peasant, worker, or religious masculinity. The pattern, therefore, one sees over time

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shows the evolution and transfer of nobility from its medieval manifestation towards a modern one located in the bourgeoisie. At some point in this evolution, its archetype and the notion that its presence was necessary for the preservation and flourishing of French society became part of the mental framework that informed French culture. When it came time for the bourgeoisie to triumph, the values that saw noble attributes as necessary for a healthy France found its place in society, and the bourgeoisie remained captive to this mental framework. Despite the historical turn against nobility, therefore, France maintained a definitive psychic and thus social need for various elements of this medieval phenomenon that long ago had served its purpose. While other social, political, and economic structures had changed underneath and all around it, the values that had ensconced the ideal of nobility guaranteed its continued relevance and even necessity into the nineteenth century. Further, the hierarchical system that ensconced the medieval nobility in its position also allowed them to model certain ideals for masculinity. For a feudal society, the monopoly on violence, the role of protector, the physical skill and prowess in warfare all seem to be the proper expressions of dominant-group masculinity. If one uses the anachronistic language of class, Connell’s assertion that class is “unavoidable involved” with gender makes an appearance, as nobility and warrior masculinity were complementary markers of power. The psychosocial need for nobility, therefore, brought with it an assumption of dominant masculinity, and the transfer of the noble ideal from one group to another imported complementary elements of hegemonic masculinity. Even more, shifting ideas of nobility


74 “… it would be the one that other men most frequently looked up to, emulated, and/or pursued. Secondly, it would also be the one most respected and prized by women.” “…superiority was demonstrated by the ability to use physical and military force with little fear of retribution.” Darrin Cox, *The knight and the courtier: The meaning of masculinity among the warrior aristocracy in France from the 100 Years’ War to the Wars of Religion* Unpublished dissertation. 22-23. See also Ruth Mazo Karras, *From Boys to men Formations of Masculinity in Late Medieval Europe* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 60.

75 “What men were proving against one another was that they had the physical and mental characteristics that made them masculine, a member of the nobility, and as such worthy of honor.” Cox, 270.
indicated a renegotiation and adaptation of hegemonic masculinity.

**Honor: From Ancient Nobility to Nineteenth-Century Bourgeoisie**

By the eleventh century, the order of nobility had evolved to provide military force and to render selfless and virtuous service for the collective good of the French kingdom. To aid in the fulfillment of these duties, traditions evolved that gave nobility distinct privileges. The seigniorial system and the exemption from certain direct taxation provided the income to support the nobility in the fulfillment of these duties. Along with these economic benefits, the system also prohibited nobility from engaging in commerce. The purpose for this prohibition was to give nobles the free time to dedicate themselves to honor and virtue. A common belief was that engaging in commerce would produce selfishness and corruption. Therefore, being free from having to make a living from this kind of practice would allow them to remain ethically special and keepers of a higher kind of life.

As one might expect from an institution that evolved along with early feudalism, once France began the changes that would at first centralize it as a state and then move it towards democracy, the second order had a hard time staying relevant. By the sixteenth century, this traditional exchange of service and privilege ceased to be efficient. The Wars of Religion had made it clear that the shifting needs and contours of society were not in line with the interests and services of the second order. Military and administrative innovations had made the presence of a distinct nobility less necessary, as the king could now hire non-nobility to these posts and

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77 Bloch, 289.
responsibilities.\(^{80}\) When the Wars were reaching their last legs, the Third estate and the nobility went before the council of Henry IV to address the issue of privileges and exceptions from taxation.\(^{81}\) Even though the arguments against them seemed strong, the nobility did not lose its privileges. The reason for their preservation was the sudden popularity of the ancient notion that a privileged nobility was necessary for preserving culture and order. Since France was seeing international and civil warfare at this time, and experiencing the growing pains that accompanied a new notion and subsequent development of state, the idea that the nobility was “one of the bulwarks against degeneration” lessened the push to make changes.\(^{82}\)

By the middle of the seventeenth century, the influx of the bourgeoisie into the nobility required the distinction between sword and robe,\(^{83}\) a distinction indicating that a new discourse for masculinity had developed that went beyond a strict adherence to warfare and violence.\(^{84}\) As France moved further away from its medieval forms and structures, a deracination of the second order occurred and thus a renegotiation of hegemonic masculinity. Since it was clear that male commoners were capable of military service and virtuous action, the nobility began to emphasize birth as the dominant marker. While some were buying their way into the nobility, birth was the element that distinguished the old (true) nobility from the rest. The result of this new emphasis was freeing for them. Since virtue and its connection to military service were no longer

\(^{80}\) Ultimately, the warfare required during the Wars brought this issue succinctly to the surface, as many in the nobility did not seek to fulfill its military obligations.


\(^{81}\) Bitton, 18.


\(^{84}\) Cox, 171-173.
determinative for nobility, they were open to choose any profession they wanted to without loss of noble status. As the nobility made its way into other professions, and more people made their way into the nobility, rather than being something special, the traditional nobility became part of a greater makeup of elites in society. A mixing between the Second and Third Estates occurred and thus a transfer of noble attributes outside of the order. The notion of honor or nobility trickled into evolving institutions. This newer conception of nobility found an acceptable place in the order of society that lasted into the eighteenth century.

Other trends had made their way out of the sixteenth century as well. One was the growing understanding and necessity of a national identification with la patrie. The other was the greater development towards a commercial economy and, with it, greater accumulations of wealth. Both inspired reevaluations of French values and institutions. Trying to make sense of the terrible defeat to the English in the Seven Years’ War (1755-1764), many suggested that the French people lacked a necessary love and dedication to the nation as a whole. The fear was that the French had no predilection towards this kind of collective sentiment, leaving them fatally flawed

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86 Norbert Elias is his classic work, The Civilizing Process, also suggests that the historic connection between nobility and a courtly bourgeoisie brought noble manners into the larger population. Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process, trans. Edmund Jephcott. (Cambridge, Mass. : Blackwell , 1994), 36,49. This refers only to a transfer of manners and values, not a shared economic and political outlook, which Guy Chaussarrant-Nogaret argued for in his key revisionist work on the nobility in the nineteenth century. See Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, The French nobility in the eighteenth century: From Feudalism to Enlightenment trans. William Doyle (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Further critique has reasserted an antagonistic relationship between the orders, one more nuanced and scrubbed of Marxist notions of class. Indeed, there were members of the nobility and the bourgeoisie that were ideologically outside this antagonism, but they were not the majority and did not guide the direction of the revolution. The fact is that the legislation, vitriol, and outright persecution of nobility by revolutionaries was real politics reflecting real ideology—not as some revisionist scholarship has suggested: a strategy to appear more populist. See Jeffrey Merrick’s review of this book. Jeffery Merrick, The French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century by Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret. Eighteenth-Century Studies 21 (Winter, 1987-1988): 253-257. See also: Patrice Higonnet, Class, ideology, and the rights of nobles during the French Revolution (New York, N.Y. : Oxford University Press, 1981). This is not to reject the insight Higonnet provides with this narrative regarding the motivations of the revolutionaries during the Republic, especially when reliance on “the people” became necessary. Hatred of nobility became easier at this time, not necessarily more genuine.
87 Schaulk, 214.
as a collective entity. Analogously, the growing commercialization of the economy brought out similar concerns. The fear was that the individualism and self-interest that accompanied the new economy would dehumanize social relations and destroy the essential identity of French society, which they viewed in contrast to the English.

The response to both of these concerns was a reimagining of the French nation. The primary tool to accomplish this reimagination consisted of an extraction of the noble ideal from its concrete form. Even though the French may not have a predilection towards patriotism, many agreed instead that there was a strong partiality towards honor, the kind that the ancient nobility manifested or at least symbolized. The ensuing debate tried to locate the potential for French patriotism in the noble virtue of honor, which had as its historic character a selfless love and dedication to the whole. For example, radically minded individuals like Baron d’Holbach favored the idea of a citizen nobility, that is, nobility as a moral character inherent in all and practiced by all French citizens. Since manifestations of nobility were conceivable and desirable outside the Second Estate, everyone could be honorable and thus dedicated to la patrie.

Social critics informed by the Enlightenment applied similar reasoning to the problems that a growing economy based on self-interested behavior presented. Similar to the issue of inspiring patriotic behavior, critics interested in modernizing France were concerned also with how to

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91 “Honor is the idol of the French.” quoting Sacy’s L’Honneur Francois. in Smith, Nobility, 176.
93 Smith, 205.
keep economic actors from behaving detrimentally to society. An economic actor, with the incentive to act honorably, that is, with the good of the whole in mind, would thus prevent the worst elements of the new economy from taking shape. The discussion then focused on the source and distribution of these incentives towards honorable action. Conservative discourse argued that a Monarchy should dispense these incentives. This was similar to the system they already had, the difference being that it would be open to all and not just nobility. The more radically minded argued for the elimination of a monarchical source. Instead, they stated, public opinion could act as the dispenser of incentive and thus the prod toward honor. Abbe Sieyès entered this debate with *Essai sur Les Privilèges*, which he published in 1788 during the debates on representation in the Estates General. Sieyès’ position was similar to d’Holbach’s in that he favored the idea of a citizenry imbued with noble qualities. Sieyès, however, went a bit further, asserting two major points in his work.

The first point he made was that the present practice, where recognition and incentive came from a combination of birth and the authority of the king, has been the formula that has held back the flourishing of France. This system, he wrote, debases everyone. The reason was that acquiring recognition and incentive because of one’s birth breeds superstition, false notions of superiority, as well as an unproductive focus on the past. Ultimately, the practice of hereditary nobility encourages that group to avoid real honor. In the case of the king granting privilege and recognition to an individual, the effect is to focus the receiver away from “l’interet commun”

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95 Shovlin, 37.
96 Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, *Essai sur les privilèges* (Published anonymously in France, 1789).
97 Sieyes, 24.
98 Sieyes, 36.
and onto his adoptive *la caste*. In either case, the greater good was “despoiled.”

The second thing he argued in this pamphlet was that a mechanism already existed in society that, if not polluted by the present practice, encouraged honorable behavior in the whole of the population. According to Sieyès, this mechanism was natural and respected the will and wisdom of the people. He started from the premise that there were two things people desire most and therefore move society along, that is, *l’argent et l’honneur*. When those two things worked together in a properly ordered society, they produced a moral nation. The reason for this is that the need for public respect and recognition “is a necessary restraint on the passion for wealth.”

The way to let these elements work, therefore, is to eliminate the present system and let the people judge whether the behavior is honorable. He wrote:

> Let’s applaud this admirable exchange of benefits and respect that established itself, for the comfort and consolation of the world, between the need for the people’s recognition and the great men abundantly paid for all their services by a simple tribute of recognition. All is pure in this exchange; it is fertile in virtues and powerful in happiness…

In this popular strain of Revolutionary thought, the bourgeoisie and the nobility switch philosophical places in society. The nobility, rather than being the keepers of social good, appear as selfish and materialistic, a cancer on society. They work only for the good and preservation of their caste to the detriment of all others. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie engaged in commerce emerge as the upholders or keepers of the public good by way of their honorable actions—a quit literal exchange of reputation from a few centuries ago. In this re-evaluation, the Second Estate could no longer keep the nation from degeneration. That would eventually fall

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99 Sieyes, 17.
100 Sieyes, 36.
101 Smith points out the growth of the public sphere as a way to understand this trend. To use his metaphors, under absolutism, it was the monarch’s gaze that judged. This was giving way to a gaze from the people, who would then become the judges of what was meritorious. Smith, *Merit*, 274.
102 Sieyes, 11.
103 John Shovlin, *AntiNoblism*, 57. Maza’s work, *The Myth of the Bourgeoisie*, shows how the bourgeoisie had always been perceived in a negative light up to that time.
into the hands of the bourgeoisie, who would take over the role as keepers of the noble ideal and, with it, the burdens of nobility. The distinction between a “moral nobility” that drew from an idealized expression of noble honor, and the “institution of nobility,” would allow one to associate noble honor with those outside the second order. As Jay Smith wrote, the Revolution would commence with the “…widely shared assumption that some form of nobility [moral or institutional] would play a vital role in the regeneration of the patrie.”

Both moral and institutional nobility survived the Revolution and Restoration, and the nobility’s ideological enemies were not able to replace the symbols of power that they had preserved and maintained from the pre-revolutionary era. Thus, the psychic and social needs for nobility would accompany the rise of the bourgeoisie over the nineteenth century, and the bourgeoisie would find themselves captive to their historic role. The fact that socialists had many times envisioned the proletariat as a nobility is further demonstration of this. This preservation of the noble ideal explains the transfer of old noble honor to the bourgeoisie, making the collective values of nobility compatible with the meritocracy of the bourgeoisie.

**Emulation and Social Clubs: A Mechanism for Hegemonic Masculinity**

The post-Revolutionary world left Frenchmen without a definitive script for sociability and with the task of developing a new system that reflected the emerging values of democracy.

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104 “Before the Revolution, to be motivated by ‘interest’ was to be less than honorable. Only a commoner might avow such a motive; that is precisely what distinguished commoners from those of noble status, whose wealth, education, and family traditions oriented them toward selfless dedication to king and public service.” William M. Reddy, *The Invisible Code: Honor and sentiment in Post-Revolutionary France, 1814-1848* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 11


107 See chapters three, four, and five.

108 Post revisionist scholarship on the revolution has sorted out this difficulty in understanding the role of nobility in the Revolution and the actions of the revolutionaries towards them. This separation produced the seemingly schizophrenic reaction to the second order that one sees in French history and especially at the time of the Revolution.
Having the greatest mechanisms for wealth accumulation and thus power, the bourgeoisie would make the dominant contribution to the evolution of French democratic society. It did so with the help of two Old Regime elements—the concept of emulation, and the model of the aristocratic salon, which manifested itself in the form of voluntary associations and social clubs (Le Cercles). These elements coming together allowed for a public sphere dominated by bourgeois values and reproductive of its power.

Emulation began as a pedagogical tool in the seventeenth century that encouraged students to emulate the actions of their teachers in order to internalize their virtue. Over time, the students began to compete for their teachers’ attention and for prizes, and “emulation” took on the notion of competition. As an academic practice, it made its way out of the schools and into the public life of the Old Regime by way of the concours académique, in which individuals were able to compete in academic contests focused on problems affecting society. Observed in these events was intense competition directed by virtuous attitudes—that is, the participants, by trying to outdo one another were benefiting themselves as well as adding to the public good. The concept of emulation therefore expanded to indicate a competition amongst individuals properly motivated that ended up benefiting everyone. By the nineteenth century, emulation became a

109 John Shovlin, “Emulation in Eighteenth-Century French Economic Thought,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 36 (2003), 225. Running next to this discussion of honor was a concept and a corresponding practice called emulation. In John Shovlin’s scholarship, emulation, in the context of these debates, was another way of talking about the role that honor would play in keeping a check on socially destructive behavior. For some revolutionaries, [m]erchants and entrepreneurs…were re-imagined as emulators…” In these debates, emulation was in the semantic field of higher or noble attributes, ones that applied to those outside of the Third Estate.


112 Kaplan, 242.
way to understand formal sociability by wrapping it up in the notion of public benefit.  

Social clubs and voluntary associations were not popular with Napoleon or with subsequent governments of the nineteenth century. Authorities, seeing them as too dangerous or potentially destructive of order, watched them very carefully. Nonetheless, governments cautiously permitted them because of their potential usefulness and the tacit agreement that they would remain politically neutral. In this milieu, emulation informed the bourgeoisie’s development of sociability, as they justified them by their ability to instigate a “noble” or “honorable” emulation. The social clubs and associations that formed therefore had a meritocratic pretense, a manifestation of bourgeois ideals that would allow bourgeois ideology to shape and dominate the public sphere. As such, the claim to support socially beneficial works became a means to confirm their assertions of hegemony. While voluntary associations had the pretence of being open to all, regardless of wealth or class, in reality it excluded all outside of the male bourgeoisie. Further, it separated public and private life for the bourgeoisie and helped define and promote its masculinity.  

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115 Harrison, 2. See also Agulhon, 27-18. It could justify itself as providing reasonable needs. Catherine Pellissier, Loisirs et sociabilités des notables Lyonnais au XIX siècle. It was expected that a bourgeois male would belong to at least one scientific community to bring benefit to the world, and one that concentrated on charity to relieve the suffering of the world. It was also a way to affirm blood and wealth. Catherine Pellissier, Loisirs et sociabilités des notables Lyonnais au XIX siècle (Lyon: Editions lyonnaises d'art et d'histoire: Presses universitaires de Lyon, 1996), 95.

116 Harrison, 51. “learned societies—in the nineteenth century most commonly known as emulation societies—were a major venue for this cultivation of class.

117 Christopher Johnson, Becoming Bourgeois: love, kinship, and power in provincial France, 1670-1880 (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2015), 13. See also Harrison, 12. "With their voluntary associations, bourgeois men staked their claim to France’s nineteenth century public sphere…”

118 Harrison, 229. For Harrison, “…voluntary associations [were] an effective tool for representing and navigating class and gender in the decades immediately following the upheaval of the French Revolution.”

119 Harrison, 51. “learned societies were locations where both members and non-members could see who was bourgeois and what bourgeois manliness meant.”
notion of merit while maintaining hegemony on their assertions or practice of maleness.\textsuperscript{120} In reality, this manipulation of democratic sociability helped develop definitive markers of bourgeois masculinity.\textsuperscript{121}

An impressive demonstration of this social dynamic comes from noting the challenge that leisure time posed to the bourgeoisie male.\textsuperscript{122} The notion of emulation helped with this problem because of the pretense of having something to do with the public good. This was one way that associations could redeem leisure time for the bourgeois male.\textsuperscript{123} The other was the subject matter of the association and its practice. The aristocratic salon being the model for bourgeois sociability, upper class associations therefore inherited the practice of exchanging learning. The most popular of these kinds of societies focused on science.\textsuperscript{124} While essentially lifting the practice of science from the aristocratic salon model, they also modified it to accomplish their gender/class domination.

A practice that acted to conquer and tame nature, bourgeois males, unlike aristocratic salon practice, restricted women from participation and adopted science as an element of both class and masculine identity. The fact is that women had participated in amateur science during the Enlightenment. The Cartesianism that had become popular in aristocratic culture emphasized a practice that acted to conquer and tame nature, bourgeois males, unlike aristocratic salon practice, restricted women from participation and adopted science as an element of both class and masculine identity. The fact is that women had participated in amateur science during the

\textsuperscript{120}Harrison, 224. “emulation made it possible for bourgeois French men to imagine a meritocratic society in the midst of an emerging industrial economy.”

\textsuperscript{121} Harrison, 12. While salon and café life had made it into the Restoration period, its character was aristocratic. Bourgeois needs required something different, however, and they adopted elements of the salon and the café in the creation of voluntary associations and social clubs. Agulhon, 17, 27. In Maurice Agulhon’s narrative, bourgeois social clubs differed from the salon by being purely bourgeois and purely masculine. Agulhon, 52 The \textit{Cercle} began during the Restoration and grew well throughout the century. Agulhon, 23. By 1830 as salons and thus domination of aristocratic sociability died out, bourgeois sociability developed in the \textit{Cercle}. Agulhon, 82. Once a more distinctive bourgeoisie, one shaped by economic change and the dissolving influence of nobility, began emerging during the Restoration, associations and clubs became the sociability of choice. Vincent, K. Steven, “Elite Culture in Early Nineteenth-century France: Salons, Sociability, and the Self.” \textit{Modern Intellectual History}, 2007, 4 (2), 333.

\textsuperscript{122} Leisure was a double-edged sword for the bourgeois elite. On one hand, leisure time demonstrated that one had wealth and was thus a clear marker of status. On the other, it was something that made them vulnerable to the negotiations of masculinity.

\textsuperscript{123} As Harrison notes: “…membership proclaimed a man to be leisured, respectable, cultivated, and public-spirited…” Harrison, 87.

\textsuperscript{124} Harrison, 64.
neutral or sexless method of inquiry,\textsuperscript{125} which worked well in the salons where popular gender discourse did not reign.\textsuperscript{126} Lacking aristocratic influence, post-Revolution bourgeois gender discourse was able to dominate once they had incorporated the salon model into the democratic sociability they were developing. In which case, sharing research and discovery, science became a “field of masculine endeavor” as it gendered masculine and attached to the bourgeois male.\textsuperscript{127} Reason and usefulness in the practice of science—that is, the ordering and mastering of the physical world—helped redeem their leisure and keep it from charges of unmanliness.\textsuperscript{128} It also helped them reproduce their power by dictating a quality of masculinity not available to women or wage earners.

\textbf{The Duel: A Dramatic Symptom of Honor-Derivative Masculinity}

The ultimate expression of the pull of honor for the bourgeoisie was the revival of the duel in French culture, a practice associated with the old nobility.\textsuperscript{129} While of much older and diverse origins, the practice of dueling found its pathway into the modern world around the time that the nobility had begun the redefinition of itself in the sixteenth century. Initially, the dual had a judicial function, an officially sanctioned way for certain types of justice to be meted. While scholars agree that certain challenges to the status of nobility in the sixteenth century had much to do with a reinvigoration of the duel, there seems to be two main incentives at play. One

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\textsuperscript{127}Harrison, 87, 51. “Through these rituals of learned society sociability, bourgeois Frenchmen established and performed class and gender identities.”
\textsuperscript{128}Harrison, 66.
\textsuperscript{129}Both Robert Nye and Andrea Mansker articulate the connections between honor and the duel towards the end of the nineteenth century. This contrasts with Anne Marie Sohn’s conclusion that honor as a force on masculinity was in decline in the second half of the century. Sohn’s concern is with a general trend rather than the bourgeoisie. Fist fighting remained the preferred method for settling disputes among the lower classes. See Andrea Mansker, \textit{Sex, Honor and Citizenship in Early Third Republic France} (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Robert Nye, \textit{Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Anne Marie Sohn, \textit{"Sois un homme!": la construction de la masculinité au XIXe siècle} (Paris: Seuil, 2009).
\end{flushleft}
concerns competition within the nobility itself. Cox and others have suggested that the popularity of the duel at this point represented the rise of robe nobility and the gendered nature of this challenge. Expressions of violence were tacit assertions that warrior nobility was superior to the new juridical or robe nobility. The other was competition with those outside the order. The religious wars saw some nobility fighting on differing sides of the same war, reinvigorating old disagreements and enflaming honor. Along with this was a financial crisis that constricted the sources of titles and wealth amongst them. This means of advancement created competition for the scarcity of privileges, and the violence of the duel could settle those scores. Duelling developed from this point on as a point d'honneur and marquée de noblesse. Always in the line of judgment, the nobleman could use this as a mechanism to solidify his “superiority over ordinary men.”

The pathway into the nineteenth century and the adaptation of dueling by the bourgeoisie as a mark of masculinity comes about by the rejuvenation of military culture. Noble honor as the foundation of patriotism and source for the rejuvenation of France attached itself to the army that formed in the Revolution and under Napoleon. The Napoleonic wars and the glory of the Napoleonic soldier reached into myth, and military culture and mythology would influence the discourse of masculinity for the bourgeoisie as it did that of the medieval nobility. The military and warfare, with its rigorous discipline and training, transferred an older logic or moral base for masculinity into the nineteenth century, and by the first part of the century, men already began to

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130 Cox, 209.
132 Schneider, 270.
realize virility by way of military service, developing into a rite of passage.\textsuperscript{135}

With these elements in the mix, the connection between noble honor and the military made it easy to revive a vigorous practice of dueling amongst the soldiers.\textsuperscript{136} Represented and demonstrated by the military, the duel became ensconced in the national psyche and worked itself out in differing ways into society.\textsuperscript{137} Amongst civilians, the practice became popular with those who were socially mobile and competed with one another for position, and who looked for ways to demonstrate a manifestation of honor equivalent of the highest classes.\textsuperscript{138} The adaptation of the duel amongst the bourgeoisie therefore helped legitimize social status amongst them and helped define themselves against the proletariat.\textsuperscript{139} This is the same dynamic historians witness between the traditional nobility and “ordinary men.”\textsuperscript{140}

Since one’s status was heavily dependent on symbol, and masculinity is negotiable and always up for challenge, the bourgeois pretense to masculine nobility was constantly insecure and indefinite. In other words, these men were more sensitive to slights of honor and in greater need of a dramatic way to defend it.\textsuperscript{141} Certain phenomena were exceptionally important in making sense of how this mechanism functioned and how the pull of honor affected the bourgeoisie. For one, the duel was a way to defy what they saw as an effeminate church. The fact that the church had condemned the duel made its practice an assertion of their

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\textsuperscript{136} Guillet, 884.
\textsuperscript{137} Guillet, 886. Guillet points to the Directory period when the politics fused together the old nobility with the new.
\textsuperscript{138} Guillet, 887, 891.
\textsuperscript{139} Kiernan, \textit{Duel}, 135.
\textsuperscript{140} Without these pressures unique to male bourgeoisie life, and without the pull of noble honor, it is not surprising that one does not find this widespread phenomenon or even a significant spillover of dueling into the working class. See Edward Berenson, \textit{The Trial of Madame Caillaux} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
\textsuperscript{141} Guillet, 890, 892. Further, this almost superstitious clinging to this manifestation of old nobility notions of honor was seen by some as a way to hold back the decline of morals.
masculinity. Further, the Third Republic saw the development of the penny press, which became a new mechanism for spreading information quickly to all of Paris. This became a legitimate forum for slights of honor, for which there was no legal recourse. Desperate for a mechanism to rescue one’s masculinity, the aristocratic duel was a logical recourse for the defense of bourgeois honor and masculinity. Again, one finds this dynamic within the nobility of earlier centuries.

More striking, however, was that the duel invigorated in importance and frequency once the threat and participation in warfare occurred. This has caused a greater focus on the Franco-Prussian War and the ensuing Third Republic in the build up to war as a privileged cite from which to study masculinity. The correlation between the increase in bourgeois male defense of honor by way of the duel and the decrease in perceived national strength and status demonstrates not only the role of hegemonic masculinity but also the distinctive pull of nobility on the bourgeois male. While concerns about the masculinity of bourgeois men had already surfaced, the effect of the war made matters worse. Coupled with greater discourse for female equality in the Third Republic, the exploitation of mechanisms for masculine dominance was logical.

The Revolution had destabilized masculine power by eliminating the tradition that held male identity and power in place. The subsequent reconstruction of patriarchy and thus hegemonic masculinity therefore took place during the development of modernity in France. As such, the

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142 Guillet, 893-894.
social group that became the bearer of hegemonic masculinity found its power and identity through democratic and economic means rather than tradition. It also, however, became captive to a lingering *mentalité* that required them to be “a bulwark against degeneration” much like the nobility of the Middle Ages.  

**The Working Class**

While France went into the nineteenth century with a relatively established and self-aware bourgeoisie, its working class, unlike England, was essentially non-existent. There are a few reasons for this peculiarity in French class formation. One was that the bourgeoisie developed in between the cracks of the medieval orders and thus appeared in French society as a sort of anomaly. As such, it could develop without the moral and economic restraints that feudal society had placed on the rest of the population. Further, its conspicuousness invited reflection by society and engendered self-awareness very early on. By the time France got to its Revolution, several centuries of development, self-consciousness, and social accommodation had already occurred. The result was that the bourgeoisie had a relatively solid identity and social place in the earliest post-Revolutionary period and was thus free to continue to develop its established role as a class.

The proletariat, on the other hand, would not make a real appearance until the beginning of the July Monarchy. Unlike the relatively independent development of the bourgeoisie, the working class evolved out of the traditional order of peasantry and thus carried much of the regulation and baggage of the Old Regime. Further, transitions from peasant to wageworker

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were dependant on significant shifts and developments in the economy. The formation of a working class, therefore, would lag behind that of the bourgeoisie. Even more, France’s industrial growth was sporadic, slow, and disjointed. As such, it did not experience an economic “take off” period until well into the nineteenth century.\footnote{W. W. Rostow, and International Economic Association. \textit{The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained Growth: Proceedings of a Conference Held by the International Economic Association} (London: Macmillan, 1963), 31.} As a result, there was no critical mass to coalesce into a cross-occupational solidarity before the Revolution.\footnote{Ronald Aminzade, \textit{Class, Politics, and Early Industrial Capitalism: a study of mid-nineteenth-century Toulouse, France} (Albany, N.Y. : State University of New York Press, 1981), 76.}

Despite the late start,\footnote{As historians have noted, France’s particular economic trajectory is very misleading. As such, one has to reject the notion that consciousness develops only the factory floor or in perfect reaction to economic evolution in favor of a more diverse understanding of how consciousness develops and how classes may form. There is a sense in which class is a discursive production, in which case one must abandon economism and go to work in the realms of social and intellectual history. Lenard Berlanstein, “The Distinctiveness of the Nineteenth-Century French Labor Movement,” \textit{The Journal of Modern History} 64 (1992), 658. See also, Tony Judt, \textit{Marxism and the French Left: Studies on Labour and Politics in France, 1830-1981} (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 112. See also, Katznelson, Ira, and Aristide R. Zolberg, ed., \textit{Working Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and United States} (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1986), 34.} however, France actually produced the most radical working force in Europe of the nineteenth century.\footnote{Guicheteau, \textit{Les Ouvriers}, 247.} While the working class that emerged in 1830 was small, it was also very aware, and the socialism that had grown up alongside it was far more sophisticated than anything England would produce until the end of the century.\footnote{Judt, \textit{Marxism}, 58-59.} The fact is that those who were investing, hiring, and manipulating the labor force for their own benefit had an oppressive control over most of those who worked for wages. On top of this, the unprecedented ideological and political dynamics of the Revolutionary and Post-Revolutionary period provided the framework and language for a solidarity based on manual labor and an opposition to the bourgeoisie. These social and political experiences catalyzed formation, and with the presence of an identifiable oppressing class, it quickly matured.

The kind of connection and historical evolution traced between nobility and bourgeoisie is different from what emerges between peasant and wageworker. In the case of nobility and
bourgeoisie, one is looking mostly at a parallel existence historically of two groups in which the psycho-social needs of society help transfer and adapt the characteristics of one to the other—characteristics that belonged to or functioned as a ruling or aristocratic force. In which case, while the bourgeoisie developed outside the strictures of Old Regime, it found itself in the nineteenth century captive to the old ideal of nobility and the demands of its masculinity. In the case of peasant to worker, one is looking at a singular group that morphed into another group, or that simply provided the material for their formation. One should expect a more complicated connection between them since something new was forming rather than a revisiting or repurposing of something old. While both the peasantry and the working class functioned on the same level in providing most of the labor for French society, workers operated without the protection of tradition or Feudal law—a different kind of formative pressure. Much different from the bourgeoisie, while the working class evolved directly from the material of Old Regime, it found itself eventually free from the ideals of the past but captive to the restrictions of proletarian life and the masculinity that emerged from those unique and relatively novel pressures.  

**Proto-Industrialization and the Beginnings of Working-Class Masculinity**

The results of merchants drawing on the rural population to manufacture in their homes were several. The opportunity for wage labor began a trend towards disconnecting a larger amount

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154 Guicheteau, *Ouvriers*, 234;
155 There were several reasons for merchants to look to the countryside for labor. One was that they could develop a new kind of employer/employee relationship, which did not have a guild system protecting it as it did in the urban areas. While some proto-industries eventually organized their own guilds, they were not as strong as the established ones in the urban areas. Further, there could be different wage rates between urban and rural workers. For example, rural workers, because of the supplemental nature of their participation, made less money. Merchants also had a problem in that some markets were extremely volatile due to warfare and political instabilities. The flexibility of a rural labor force made the investment of capital much less risky in these situations. Merchants, in these cases, by externalizing costs, were acting from capitalist logic. See Carlo Poni, *Proto-Industrialization, Rural and Urban* (Sage Publications, 1985), 312. Gay Gullickson, “Agriculture and Cottage Industry: Redefining the Causes of Proto-industrialization,” *The Journal of Economic History* 43 (1983). Gwynne Lewis, “Proto-industrialization in
of peasants from the land, both men and women. Access to income earlier in life encouraged earlier marriage and ownership of property through renting or purchase of a domicile. This provided a sense of freedom and autonomy from family and parents for subsequent generations. The most important element here is how the opportunity for wage labor affected family life. The option of wage labor changed the possibilities for marriage and the values attached to it. Distribution of land belonged to the oldest families in the clans, who in turn controlled “the preconditions of family formation.” If land became less of a factor, so did the influence of older generations and ways of life. The changeover to wage labor weakened the reliance on land and therefore connections to tradition.

As marriage patterns changed along with work life, so did gender relations. Under the old system, men controlled agricultural work and produced the subsistence wealth of a household. Women controlled and produced extra income. When proto-industrialization came to the countryside, these distinctions allowed women to engage in full-time and year-round wage work, restricting men to seasonal participation in wage labor. Early on, women participating in wage labor in the domicile was accepted and viewed positively, and there is no sign that this offended the psychological and social manifestations of patriarchy in this early stage—the connection to the domestic sphere possibly tempering the response. This changed, however, when wage labor started to become effeminized. With wage labor becoming more and more associated with

women, and agriculture remaining the domain of men, men engaging in wage labor during the agricultural off-season suggested a “loss of status.” This loss of status increased once proto-industrialization matured in a particular area and wage work became the primary source of income for many households. With an increased reliance on wage labor occurring, the transfer of male duty away from the independence of agricultural work to the dependence of wage labor represented a loss of place in the traditional patriarchy. In these circumstances, and when a more developed system of manufacturing was in place, men had to leave regularly their homestead to work for others as an increased reliance on male wages occurred. As proto-industrialization made its way successfully into a rural region, the characteristics of patriarchy and thus the identity and expectations of masculinity changed. Once this shift occurred, things like unemployment became a particular threat to a male’s social and psychological identity and status, giving labor and income a much greater degree of importance in the realization of a man’s place within the patriarchy, and sharpening the worker’s awareness of the bourgeoisie and its control over him.

The collective effect of all this change was a growing pool of male wageworkers for a labor market that was unregulated, underdeveloped, sporadic, and thus precarious. Adding to the naturally difficult life of the wageworker was the constant threat of unemployment and depressed

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162 “The daily exit of men from the household to go to work for others, wherever family members did not accompany them, was a far-reaching change in family relations, undermining tradition forms of patriarchal authority. Paradoxically, the same shift often increased the reliance of families on men as primary breadwinners, thus inaugurating a new, distinctly proletarian, form of patriarchal power.” Wally Seccombe, A Millenium of Family Change: Feudalism to Capitalism in Northwestern Europe (London: Verso, 1995), 178.
163 Seccombe, Millenium, 123 “Male househeadship had formerly been based on the ownership and control of family property; as households were divorced from the means of production, this source of domestic power was lost…patriarchal power was replanted in the soil of the wage system…” Seccombe, Millenium, 205.
wages, as well as the lack of protections that one would expect from an early capitalist system. 164

By the time one reaches the eighteenth century, the category of worker, taken from a modern perspective, was extremely diverse and increasingly impoverished overall. Old Regime structures and the differing origins of laborers kept barriers between groupings of crafts and types of skill. There was no broad sense yet that there was something holding them all together in a single class with common problems and needs.

Towards A Class Consciousness

The institutions of labor of the Old Regime were part of a system of privileges that sought to encourage perfection in a given craft and to increase the public good. The government gave these privileges to each unique craft. Each of these “corporations” was in solidarity unto themselves and religious rite and symbol accompanied them. When a man joined a particular corporation, it gave him a certain social identity that remained for life. 165 These labor organizations worked to control wages and employment amongst its members and for its particular trade. These corporations, in line with medieval notions of divine order, were hierarchical with masters having power over the journeyman. Over time, tensions formed between the masters and journeymen, and notions of fraternity all but disappeared, giving the relationship between masters and journeymen an exploitative character. Journeymen ended up

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164 This tension between bourgeoisie and worker heightens once the bourgeoisie comes to power in the nineteenth century. An agricultural economy solved the life problems that faced the male—marriage, raising children, elderly parents, old age. Once the male became dependant on wage labor, many of these things went outside of his control. Michael P. Hanagan, Nascent Proletarians : Class Formation in Post-Revolutionary France. (Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell, 1989), 95.

The breaking apart of age-old traditions combined with poverty and instability unleashed immense damage on this group of people. Male desertion of families occurred, and illegitimate children increased dramatically. Seccombe, Millenium, 180, 227.

forming organic, egalitarian, and often clandestine brotherhoods called Campagnnonage, with which masters fought to suppress for their own benefit. While the extreme disunity would suggest that broad solidarity was impossible, the influence of liberalism on French policy and ultimately the Revolution produced a reconceptualization of work, workers, and the place of laborers in the social order, putting everything in a different context.

The Enlightenment began this reconfiguration of the work world. The attending public sphere and republic of letters boosted the visibility of worker issues in a general sense. Since the problems facing workers ultimately belonged to the growing issues in French society that many came to criticize, the probing critique of the philosophe, exposing the irrationality and unfairness of French society, required giving special attention to the worker. In particular, worker conflicts forced the issue into popular discussion. As a result, the problems of working males became part of civic discourse and part of the greater discussion of justice and fairness. Further, as communication spread and this problem became part of public discourse, workers were able to engage in newer debates regarding civic order and political values. In this sense, worker opinions became a part of the growing voice of popular opinion.

More specifically, the Enlightenment, by attacking the roots of medieval society, attacked the foundations of Old Regime economic policy and labor. Labor had inherited from the medieval order the stigma of being the product of a fallen and cursed world, workers in a sense inheriting the curse placed on Adam, the first man, as recorded in the book of Genesis. By extension, this meant that those who labored did so under the notion of an unwanted duty, giving manual labor and the laborer negative connotations. In the minds of encyclopedists, the mechanical arts

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167 Guicheteau, Les Ouvriers, 98.
should share the same dignity with the liberal arts. ¹⁶⁸ Under the influence of Locke and Voltaire and their advocacy of the quality and value of labor, the way to this end was to set labor free from the restraints of the corporation, ¹⁶⁹ thus letting in more flexibility, efficiency, and dynamics into economic practice. By doing this, science and reason would govern the mechanical arts and give its artisans the encouragement to innovate. This sets the individual free to benefit humanity in his particular work. ¹⁷⁰ When Turgot put these values briefly into play in the 1770s, there was initial support from the journeymen but not the masters, but soon both began to fear the dismantling of their corporations. ¹⁷¹

Masters and journeymen both participated in the Revolution. When the Revolution began to destroy privileges by eliminating medieval corporations, each sought to make the changes work for them by trying to establishing new kinds of protections. The confusion caused by this elimination of tradition and the resulting improvisation of artisans to protect themselves made the organization of industry difficult to accomplish. In response, the government passed the Le Chapelier law, which outlawed worker organizations of any kind and gave some order to the new system. The artisan response to this law was to gravitate toward the sans-culottes, a radicalized faction of the Jacobin left made up of wageworkers and proprietors, along with Parisian masters and journeymen. ¹⁷²

The sans-culottes phenomenon became a vehicle for a new kind of worker identity. The Revolutionary situation called for a particular sans-culottes ideology that would make sense within republican discourse. Sans-cullottism therefore combined the language and concepts of

¹⁶⁸ Sewell, Language, 66.
¹⁶⁹ Sewell, Language, 65.
¹⁷⁰ Sewell, Language, 71.
the “artisanal world” with French republicanism.\textsuperscript{173} Their way to realize protection under this new system was to demand a version of republicanism that saw “…a single, unified popular will” as a necessity for the production of a just society.\textsuperscript{174} This served the cause of the worker well because Revolutionary criticism of French society from the very beginning, via Sieyès and others reformers, had championed those who labored usefully over those who did not. In fact, in this formulation, the laborer was essentially the foundation of the whole nation. And by extension, those who did not labor became enemies of the republic—a binary that the sans-culottes took very seriously in its vision of a just society.\textsuperscript{175} While the liberal bourgeoisie would posit property as the first principle of a just republic, the sans-culottes went in a different direction and chose labor.\textsuperscript{176} Artisan advocacy changed from a defense of corporations to the rigorous promotion of an egalitarian republic.

The old corporatist system where workers divided up by trade did not fit with this vision of a just republic. All the different trades and their accompanying identities had to collapse into one to be consistent. Sans-culottism catalyzed a singular cross-trade worker identity. Further, as moral language accompanied radical republican discourse, sans-cullotism attached distinctive moral qualities and character to the worker. In Sewell’s classic work on the language of labor, he notes that language from the crafts that spoke of honesty, honor, independence, and pride of work became the distinctive features of the laborer that the aristocratic idler did not possess.\textsuperscript{177} And in contrast to the upper class, in whom they saw hypocrisy, they advocated humility and loyalty to their families.\textsuperscript{178} The sans-culottes gendered these distinctions as well by making clear

\textsuperscript{173} Magraw, History, 25.
\textsuperscript{174} Sewell, Language, 103.
\textsuperscript{175} Sewell, Language, 111.
\textsuperscript{176} Sewell, Language, 111.
\textsuperscript{177} Magraw, History, 25.

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that true labor was with the hands and was physically demanding, unlike the work of the aristocrat or even the bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{179} They were also careful to distinguish themselves as the keepers of masculinity in contrast to the anti-revolutionaries. According to Quinlan, sans-cullottes’ discourse gendered the aristocratic anti-revolutionaries as effeminate. They further adopted a costume that symbolized their version of true masculinity.\textsuperscript{180}

The revolutionary experience produced the language and conceptualization for a singular culture of labor to realize itself. Not only did this in theory unify the otherwise fractured nature of the craft system, but it also allowed the characterization of workers in opposition to who it perceived as its natural oppressors. Samuel Guicheteau’s work goes further to suggest that this experience produced a larger grouping of common reference, practices, and values for workers. Along with these experiences, the workers lived with the hope of having their grievances met, of having discourses of liberty apply to them, which held out the hope for a better life.\textsuperscript{181} These were the building blocks of a self-conscious class.

The sans-culottes phenomenon was short lived, however, essentially disappearing once Robespierre’s enemies took him off the scene. As the radicalism of the Revolution cooled after the Terror, bourgeois liberalism had opportune time to develop and establish itself in France. Even with slowdowns during the Napoleonic period and with royalist-leaning governments during the Restoration, the individualistic and free market economic values of the bourgeoisie remained on the rise. Proto-industrialization continued to draw peasants into wage labor, and

\textsuperscript{179}Sewell, \textit{Language}, 110-111.
\textsuperscript{180}Sean Quinlan, “Men,” 40.
artisans scrambled to find their bearings in the brave new world of industrialization. This made the Restoration period vital in the formation of a self-aware class.

As questions of royal power, foreign policies, and the nature of government pressed the Restoration period, the French Monarchy failed to come to terms with greater, long-term changes taking place underneath. Internal contradictions had begun to show. In 1830, liberals overthrew Charles X and installed Louis Philippe. In a similar fashion as the first revolution, those who did the heavy lifting, the rioting and fighting that toppled Charles X, did not benefit from their efforts. It was the liberals, harnessing the revolutionary energy for their own gains, who benefited. And since this liberalism was infused with old aristocratic values regarding the poor and the rich, it was an incomplete ideology for what France was about to go through. Although the franchise almost doubled in 1830, still only a small percentage of the French population could vote. Those who represented a growing class-consciousness and the growing social question had no real mechanism for change. As Louis Blanc observed, the revolution made the “sufferings of the working class more acute.”

**Working Class Masculinity: The Burden of Oppression and Defiance of the Bourgeoisie**

1830 is the point at which many historians agree that one can begin to speak of a French working class. Sewell demonstrates this fact by noting the language that workers used to state their cases to the people and the government. Worker language at this time was devoid of Old

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182 For socialist Louis Blanc, these political factions were merely covers for bigger issues of economics. He wrote: “Under the denomination of liberals and royalists, interests were concealed that were in reality neither those of liberty nor those of monarchy…One party desired that the nation should be agricultural…The other party entertained diametrically opposite notions. The former class consisted in general of gentilshommes, emigrants, dignitaries of the church, and scions of ancient families…To the second class belonged sons of parliamentarians, bankers, manufacturers, traders, holders of national property, physicians, lawyers, the bourgeoisie.” The fact that either faction would modify its view of government when its interests were challenged showed to Louis Blanc that economic self-interest was ultimately at stake. This phenomenon became clearer when the parties matured. Louis Blanc also understood that it was the middle class that ultimately had the social strength, meaning that rule would ultimately go to liberals. Louis Blanc, *Histoire De Dix Ans, 1830 — 1840*, Vol. I (Paris: Pagnerre, 1844), 37.

Regime notions of trade distinctions, drew from revolutionary concepts, and aimed at a place within the present system.\textsuperscript{184} Arguments also focused on the rights and dignity of individual workers.\textsuperscript{185} The language of exploitation entered the discourse, defending the humanity of the worker and thus their right to have “property in labor” as well.\textsuperscript{186} The democratic conception of freedom of association solved the surface contradiction between individual rights and corporate protection, a formulation taken from St. Simonian doctrine.\textsuperscript{187} As workers began to modify their previous modes of solidarity towards this end, strikes in Lyon in 1831 triggered many more throughout France. This experience made the notion of a true association of all workers an obvious necessity. By 1834, worker discourse had done away with Old Regime conceptions of solidarity. A self-aware working class emerged angry and demanding justice from its oppressor, the bourgeoisie. And from this point on, \textit{classe ouvrière}, and \textit{prolétariat} became part of worker discourse.\textsuperscript{188}

But there is more subtly in this narrative, which concerns discursive modes of oppression and argument.\textsuperscript{189} One can see from looking closely at the transition from peasant to wage laborer that a proletarian existence had its own kind of patriarchy. As the individualism of economic practice infiltrated the family, family bonds weakened and this trend matured. While both male and female proletarians experienced the miseries of industrialization, they also found that each had to face pressures specific to how separate spheres ordered them.\textsuperscript{190} For men, proletarian existence wrapped the ego and sense of masculinity up with the ability to be the primary or sole provider

\textsuperscript{184} Sewell, \textit{Language}, 200.
\textsuperscript{186} Magraw, \textit{France}, 70. Sewell, \textit{Language}, 201.
\textsuperscript{188} Magraw, \textit{France}, 68.
\textsuperscript{190} Worker experience and sociability guided men into café’s and other men-only gatherings, which took women out of the discussions about worker issues and problems. Magraw, \textit{History}, 8.
for the family—a role statistically impossible to fulfill. It also placed the male under direct submission to the bourgeoisie. The maturing liberalism that came out of the Enlightenment shaped the broad discourse that subjected the male worker. In this milieu, reason, freedom, and independence became gendered masculine, with their opposites, emotion, slavery, and dependence as feminine. The result was what both Joan Scott and Judith Stone have identified: that the dominant class had gendered workers as feminine, because workers were weak, oppressed, and dependant like women. In the face of this, working-class masculinity took on a distinctive flavor. Up against the oppressive bourgeoisie, workers claimed certain attributes that set them apart: selflessness, fraternalism, engaging in hard physical labor, and patriotism. Socialists would exploit some of these characteristics in their gendered defense of the proletariat.

Conclusions

This chapter has demonstrated three important things necessary to proceed with the arguments in the rest of this work. One is that the male bourgeoisie became captive to a psychosocial need to have a special class provide a preserving and modeling element in French society. Along with the particular characteristics that came from being the dominant economic force, bourgeois masculinity wrapped itself up in the matrix of aristocracy. Drawing on the influence of the Revolution, this provided socialists with an easily exploitable narrative with

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which to emasculate them. Second is the role that direct contact with the oppressive group had in the shaping of working class masculinity, which inspired the need for an identity in contrast to the exploiters. Most important was that this phenomenon took place amongst the sans-culottes, whose aesthetics and physicality became a model for worker masculinity in socialist rhetoric.
Chapter Three: The Language and Logics of Masculinity

Hyacinthe Rigaud’s portrait of Louis XIV is puzzling when compared with the preferred aesthetics of masculinity that came to dominate discourse in the nineteenth century. Rigaud’s personification of absolute power appears in heels that seem too high to be functional for anything but walking. Tight leggings reveal thin limbs with very little muscle tone, bespeaking more of luxury and idleness than strength. Flowing robes bulge to betray an overweight torso, which a flabby and somewhat droopy face confirms. Further, there are no signs of dynamic energy, and a large wig protects his head and shoulders. The baroque ornamentation speaks here, the sign of a superior status that God had bestowed upon Louis and the French people. In the absolutist society of Louis XIV, individual accomplishment, muscularity, physicality, and austerity, things that would later become more important in the assessment of ruling masculinity, took a back seat as the status of royalty or aristocracy easily trumped them.

This chapter aims to explain the renegotiation of masculine ideals from the eighteenth into the nineteenth century. For this, it draws on the radical desacralization of the aristocratic system characteristic of the Enlightenment and Revolutionary periods. Along with this change of values, it cites the development of a public sphere that ultimately demanded a strong symbolic distinction between masculine and feminine. Both trends together required a renegotiation of patriarchy and, as such, a new picture of ruling masculinity. This chapter will also show that the Revolution produced a counter-hegemonic masculinity that remained useful to nineteenth-century socialists. The logics for this counter-hegemonic discourse emerged during the Terror and worked their way out in the tensions between the aristocracy, the civic republicanism of the radical bourgeoisie, and the demands of the sans-culottes. Further, these logics remained valid into the nineteenth century because the requirements and parameters for a meaningful counter-


197 "We are therefore born unjust, for each is out for himself. This goes against all order. We must tend to the general good, because the slope towards oneself is the beginning of all disorder in war, in police, in economics, in..."
traditional French thinking favored a tightly ordered society that, through religion, encouraged individuals to pursue virtue. However, the persuasiveness of human happiness as a final cause of government, the emergence of a public sphere encouraging democratic debate, and the development of a commercial economy strained this dominant political logic. Even so, any move towards individualism required a fair amount of justification. These tensions were therefore behind most of the debates on the future of France that took place during the eighteenth century.

The reasoning that shaped the procession of these debates was a combination of the Enlightenment’s emphasis on nature as a source of philosophical authority, and the reinvigoration of republicanism in the area of political theory. The deference towards nature, while revolutionizing thought and separating it from the theocentric thinking of the Middle Ages, also inspired a simplifying and rationalizing of ancien régime society, which many saw as artificial, needlessly complex, and hopelessly unjust. For most philosophes, the model of nature properly applied could move French civilization forward; it could bring about a sort of social streamlining to take France out of the irrational, unnatural, and thus inefficient past. A strong influence for this position came from British thinking, in particular the epistemology and political formulations of John Locke, which Voltaire had vigorously championed to his fellow Frenchmen. With the help of those like Voltaire, a liberal tradition emerged in France, one that favored a limit on the king’s power, a very restricted democratic will, and an economy opened up to the natural and rational workings of market forces. All of these reforms would allow individuals to amass wealth and power without the restrictions of traditional mores.

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While forward-looking, this Voltairian liberalism was elitist: it valued high culture and defended itself by asserting a half-hearted and undeveloped belief that everyone would eventually benefit from this system. While critical of the artifices of the ancien régime, it often retained sympathy for aristocratic aesthetics and ideals. For example, Voltaire, revealing an aristocratic state of mind, openly expressed his preference for the finery that modernity could provide.\textsuperscript{200} He also believed elegance of expression and the politeness inherited from court society was necessary for a proper social order.\textsuperscript{201} Many of the philosophes became models for a new honnête homme—a bit more authentic and natural than the aristocrats of the ancien régime, but still beholden to many of their aesthetics and prejudices.\textsuperscript{202}

Rousseau applied the cult of nature much differently. Instead of envisioning a nation of new honnêtes hommes—rational, elite, and engaged in a complex economy—Rousseau advocated a “natural man,” one much closer to nature and relatively untouched by the arts, leisure, and other “inauthenticities” of an advanced civilization.\textsuperscript{203} Going against the grain of the general Enlightenment by claiming that high culture and civilization were corrupting forces on humans, he earned the ire of leading philosophes and honnêtes hommes like Voltaire. In one sense, Rousseau did not see any difference between what Voltaire’s kind of Enlightenment thinking would produce and what aristocracy and the old hierarchy had produced. Because high culture and civilization destroyed the morality and virtue of individuals and society, according to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[202] Vila, “Elite,” 24-25.
\item[203] In Jacques Barzun’s classic work, From Dawn to Decadence, he mentions the concept of “primitivism” as an impulse that occurs when a social system becomes seemingly too complex. This is the desire to dismantle the artifice and replace it with something simpler or more primitive. Barzun sees Rousseau within this recurring historical pattern, his predecessor being the Reformation. Jacques Barzun, From Dawn to Decadence: 500 years of cultural life, 1500 to the present (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), 384.
\end{footnotes}
Rousseau, he idealized the austerity of something akin to a farmer or peasant. In formulating these ideas, Rousseau not only provided the ammunition against aristocratic pretense and artifice, he also supplied future opponents of liberal and bourgeois society with critical models and reasoning.

As the cult of nature was making its mark, the language and model of Republicanism was also showing its influence. Republicanism had provided the language of reform for centuries, going back to the Huguenot revolts as well as aristocratic tensions with the monarchy. Corresponding roughly to the different applications of nature the Enlightenment had forwarded, a few versions of Republicanism emerged during the eighteenth century. Republicanism for some was mostly about issues of governing. These Republicans advocated widespread democracy, radical decentralization of power, and proper representation in pursuit of these ends. This kind of Republicanism was forward-looking and modernist, advocating a liberal economy in line with the new science of economics and the commercialism that had been developing over the last century. The radically minded bourgeoisie and nobility—materialist, secularist, cosmopolitan, and consistently egalitarian and democratic—who wanted greater change than the emerging liberalism could stand, found common ground with this kind of Republicanism. Adherents were products of what Jonathan Israel called the radical

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205 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discours sur l’origine et les fondemens de l’inégalité parmi les hommes.* In *Collection complète des Œuvres de Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, Vol. I (Du Peyrou and Moutou in Geneva), 128. “…in the midst of so much philosophy, humanity, and politeness, and sublime maxims, we have only a deceitful and frivolous exterior, honor without virtue, reason without wisdom, and pleasure without happiness. It is enough for me that I have proved that this is not the original condition of man, and that it is merely the spirit of society, and the inequality which it engenders, that change and alter all our natural inclinations.


Enlightenment. Unlike the Voltarian or aristocratic liberalism that wished to conserve some of the *ancien régime*, those embracing radical Enlightenment wanted to eliminate as much of the hierarchy or elitism of the old system as they could. Condorcet emerged as a leader of this faction, and his *Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain*, which articulated the growth of science and individualism in the process of human progress, was a good expression of this ideology.²⁰⁹

While Condorcet’s kind of Republicanism avoided captivity to its ancient manifestations, other expressions kept central the ancient republican notion of civic virtue.²¹⁰ With this civic form, there was a much greater emphasis on patriotism and fraternity. Idealizing and mythologizing the austerity of the citizens of Republican Rome or Ancient Sparta, it stressed the necessity and content of virtue in individual citizens. The difference between the fraternity of this new civic republicanism and the collectivism advocated by the *ancien régime* was in the anthropological basis for each. For the new civic republicans, fraternity was natural to humans and could flourish under the correct kind of government. Humans in this formulation were malleable or even perfectible. In contrast, medieval notions of human imperfection dictated the old collectivism, helping to justify the civil and political order of the *ancien régime*. While there were several thinkers from whom one could draw to inform civic republicanism, Rousseau became a dominant influence. The sophistication of his writings held sway over his readers, and the intimate expression of his personal life as a model for virtue helped give this kind of republicanism a quasi-religious quality.²¹¹ In general, civic republicanism informed by Rousseau became the ideological matrix for leftwing expressions of Jacobinism.

The critique to which the Enlightenment had subjected the pretences of Absolute or divine-right monarchy guaranteed that the aesthetics and symbols of masculine power that accompanied Louis XIV would eventually lose their grip or influence. One could explain part of this change with the concept of desacralization. Loss of awe for the monarchy not only took away some of its power, its hegemony or influence over symbol would weaken as well. The other explanatory part comes from the ideas that took the place of or filled the vacuum left by this desacralization and loss of awe. These replacement ideas contained values that presented a new logic for power and masculinity. For ideologies like Voltaire’s and Condorcet’s, human beings were happier, and society was better off, if the laws encouraged and protected self-interested behavior. For ideologies that drew from civic republicanism and Rousseau’s assertions, people were happier (although Rousseau himself did not believe this) and society was better if the laws encouraged and inculcated fraternal virtue. This suggests that things like economic success or democratic simplicity and virtue could be convincing as symbols of power and masculinity.

**Emerging Logics of a New Masculinity**

Gendering groups of people or a particular type of social or political system was part of French political discourses. Montesquieu did this often in his works, which had profound effect on Revolutionaries. There was great appeal in gendering the *ancien régime* itself as effeminate.212 Dorinda Outram points out that many critics believed the aristocratic system had actually given women more power than a proper society should allow.213 Therefore, especially for those influenced by civic republicanism and Rousseau, and who saw a proper distinction

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between masculine and feminine as necessary for a proper society, the language of reform, critique, and revolution had to be gendered and decidedly masculine. More importantly, ridicule of the aristocracy and its pretences was by no means new, as it was easy to contrast the behavior and character of many from the nobility with the high ideals that the ancien régime had attached to them. Idleness, luxury, uselessness, and the pursuit of pleasure—qualities that could not be justified in a ruling elite once the Enlightenment had torn down the pretences of the old system—became the marks of weakness and social degeneration in the light of the ideas generated over the last century and the social accomplishments of the Third Estate. When Abbey Sieyès described the Third Estate as a “strong and robust man, whose arm is still chained,” it was more than creative use of metaphor. He was engaging in a gendering of sides that increasingly had meaning for the French people. Sieyès’ choice of words suggested that a new patriarchy was emerging.

Once the Jacobins began assuming power over the Revolution, Rousseauvian thought and civic republican ideals helped inform the gendering of sides. Robespierre produced a workable and Manichean narrative to the Revolution. “The people” and “enemies of the people” were all that existed politically. Determining the distinction was the possession of virtue, the opposite of which was egoism or selfishness. One lived for their country and its people, or they did not. In the earlier parts of the Revolution, “enemies of the people” was synonymous with “aristocracy.” While the aristocracy failed the test of usefulness and morality to critics, and as such appeared as the effeminate contrast to the masculine Third Estate, the ability to connect

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216 Emmanuel Sieyès, Qu’est-ce que le Tiers Etat? (Paris, Au siège de la Société, 1888), 30.
217 Forth, Masculinity, 128.
effeminacy with egoism took the discourse to a new level and made it applicable to a larger group of people. Rousseau had provided a logic that gendered the individualism-versus-collectivism issue. He had reasoned that masculinity and femininity were interdependent in an absolute sense—that is, one required full realization by the other for true harmony. Thus, real masculinity brought with it an awareness of social dependence, which was the prerequisite for true fraternity. Those who were truly or fully men, aware of the role of dependency in social relationships, would behave in a manner that took into account the greater good of the whole. Those who were self-interested or strove to be self-sufficient were in reality demonstrating their lack of full masculinity and thus their status as an unvirtuous mix of both genders, ultimately unfit for a properly ordered society. The accusation of being an egoist and thus effeminate could therefore apply to the idle, the contemplative, the celibate, men who opposed fraternal versions of republicanism, who lacked patriotism, and eventually who favored laissez-faire in economics. This allowed critics to gender coherently and consistently ideologies and their adherents, as well as life style, behavior, and even appearance.

The romantic and almost esoteric reasoning of Rousseau was not necessary for most to follow the dictates of its vision. The individual-versus-the-collective debate, and its corresponding gendering, manifested itself in a very concrete way through the issue of luxury and clothing. Perennial arguments about luxury became especially prominent in the eighteenth

century. The French had viewed luxury as a corrupting influence for centuries, and both the nobility and the bourgeoisie had accused one another of this moral failing. This concern, however, intensified and expanded with the growth of a commercial economy. For example, as demonstrated earlier, Voltaire and his part of the Enlightenment believed an emphasis on comfort was a healthy and necessary part of society. They argued that the production and consumption of extravagant items was good for the economy, thus serving a collective good. Even if one saw luxury as a personal vice, they could still argue for its inclusion by way of its public good. On the other hand, Rousseau saw opulence and its accompanying frivolity as corrupting. Idealizing ancient Sparta and its strict patriarchal structure, Rousseau advocated an authentic and austere existence that had no room for lavishness—another way rhetorically, by drawing on the mythology of female inferiority, to eliminate women from influence in his ideal republic. Further, Rousseau could not countenance the idea that something that was personally bad could be socially good. If opulence destroyed personal virtue, it also destroyed the state. Observation of the ancien régime demonstrated to Rousseau that the enjoyment of luxury by the nobility had enslaved the rest of the population. A virtuous Republic via Rousseau therefore demanded the elimination of luxury, which, in its modern manifestation, would mean controls on the economy or a retreat from laissez-faire.

By the eighteenth century, the expansion of markets and the commercial availability of clothing had given most of the population of Paris, regardless of social position, the ability to participate in popular fashion. Clothing, therefore, became the touchstone for discussions about

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224 Galliani, Rousseau, 9-16.
226 Higonnet, Goodness, 141.
luxury. A century earlier, the goal of the newly embourgeoised was to emulate nobility in manner and dress, something that was easily ridiculed by writers and social critics. Over the eighteenth century, however, along with the general Enlightenment and its cult of nature, bourgeois dress changed. It became simpler and more reflective of frugality. The black suit of the English bourgeoisie had become popular amongst its French counterpart. However, this trend did not occur in any significance among the nobility. Neither did it occur amongst the wives of the well-off bourgeoisie. According to Daniel Roche, outside of the nobility, wives, in general, spent twice the amount on their wardrobes as their husbands. It was pronounced enough that a stable fashion press aimed specifically at women grew rapidly during the eighteenth century.

This movement also complemented the growth of the public sphere and its domination by men. While this seeming simplification of male wardrobe fit with the general movement towards the natural, it also worked as a way in which men solidified their power by dramatically distinguishing themselves from women. J.C. Flugel’s conception of “the great masculine renunciation” articulates this element. At the time of Louis XIV, competition between men and women sartorially was more important than the need to distinguished one’s gender amongst the elite. The result was that men and women of the upper orders dressed with a similar aesthetic. A new patriarchy, however, eschewing the pretences and artifices of the ancien régime, required

228 Roche, Culture, 59.
229 Roche, Culture, 185-186. For a brief discussion on natural and unnatural clothing, see: Roche, Culture, 405.
230 Roche, Culture, 116.
232 Roche, Culture, 38.
men of power to distinguish themselves from women. Bourgeois men therefore adopted a more practical uniform as an expression of their masculinity and power. Outside of its symbolic function, it also worked to hide their body shape while exaggerating the secondary sexual characteristics of females, encouraging an essentialization of women. While the bourgeoisie took on the black suit, the luxury and aesthetic of the ancien régime stuck to women. The men could thus appear austere and dedicated to equality, while the wives, assuming a minor role in the public sphere on behalf of the husband, could legitimately demonstrate the man’s wealth and power.

Important implications for this revolution in dress appeared. One was that it complemented or legitimated Rousseau’s naturalization of female desire for luxury and ostentation—a weakness that should logically and properly be absent from men. The traditional and theological thinking that had informed the French medieval worldview blamed the desire for luxury and frivolity on the sinful nature of human beings. In theory, this negative desire belonged equally to both men and women. Under the influence of Rousseau, women would bear the guilt for this negative quality. Another was that this feminization of fashion and displays of finery helped reinforce the feminine quality of the nobility. The association of luxury as represented by certain dress with effeminacy helped Jacobins prove the egoism of the nobility and thus exclude them from masculinity. This certainly fed into the suspicions of Jacobins who believed that women were more inclined towards aristocracy, similar to the assertion by later radicals that there was a

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234 Lajer-Burcharth, "Muscadins," 139.
236 "…by the eve of the French Revolution a new hegemonic discourse on fashion, frivolity, and femininity had emerged that clearly supported the economic, aesthetic and political requirements of the new Enlightened 'society of taste.'” Jennifer Michelle Jones, Sexing La Mode: Gender, Fashion and Commercial Culture in Ancien Régime France (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2004), 5.
237 Jones, "Repackaging," 964.
connection between women and religion. ²³⁹ Dorinda Outram has suggested that women were more likely to be counter-revolutionary, perhaps helping to solidify this position. ²⁴⁰ Lastly, it also made wardrobe and appearance important symbols of inward dispositions or qualities defined by the Revolution.

The bulk of revolutionaries were from the bourgeoisie. Their aesthetic was therefore a mix of the plainer dress that many from that group had adopted, and a toned-down aristocratic look that would linger on into the radical stages of the Revolution. Those who kept their aristocratic look wore the traditional culottes. However, in line with the appeal of a more natural and authentic appearance, most jettisoned things like perfumes, powder, and the white wig. It was also possible to demonstrate an adherence to Republicanism by simply sporting short and unpowered hair in emulation of a Roman character in the story of Brutus. ²⁴¹ Ironically, the spokesperson for anti-aristocratic invective, Robespierre, kept his aristocratic look. Jacobins eventually passed a law that released everyone from mandatory uniforms, letting people, theoretically, dress the way they wanted. ²⁴² Certainly, that made sense if one was turning their back on the ancien régime with its pretences and its need for markers of status. Regardless, this did not prevent a certain aesthetic from emerging that bespoke not only of political allegiances, but also became a useful marker of virtue and masculinity.

Regeneration and Physicality

The rise of the sans-culottes forced Jacobin notions of equality and fraternity towards their logical conclusions. The result was that, temporarily at least, the Revolution pushed beyond the needs or desires of the revolutionary bourgeois Jacobins. This influence of the sans-culottes

²³⁹ Landes, Visualizing, 123.
²⁴⁰ Outram, “Langage,” 129.
²⁴² Higonnet, Goodness, 226.
affected revolutionary values mostly in the area of economic discourse and policy. Demands for legislation to benefit the unemployed, working poor, and destitute exposed the inherent tension that existed between civic republicanism and its virtuous fraternity, and bourgeois ideas of private property. Under the leadership of Robespierre, the incorporation of sans-culotte needs by a willingness to articulate and sometimes use economic restrictions or control was the element that separated Robespierrism from most of the revolutionaries by putting them to its political right.

The sans-culottes phenomenon came with accompanying aesthetics. This was important for pushing the values of austerity further, adding a physical or bodily element, and binding that almost incontroversiably with the Revolution. It also brought labor into the discourse, for the sans-culotte uniform was essentially the clothing of a worker. Even more important was that under the ancien régime, elite society ridiculed those who wore working clothes in public because it demonstrated one’s low status in society. Yet, in a convincing demonstration of their lack of vanity and frivolity, the sans-culottes wore them proudly. For example, in contrast to the expensive uniform that the aristocrat or wealthy bourgeoisie wore during military service, the sans-culottes, refusing this vanity and conspicuous consumption of the ancien régime, did their service to the patrie in working clothes. Once a humiliation, this clothing became a sign of virtue. And for some, those who were once despised became the representatives of true

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243 Higonnet, Goodness, 87.
245 Roche, Culture, 149.
247 Wrigley, Politics, 190-191.
248 Wrigley, Politics, 194.
249 Wrigley, Politics, 190.
republicanism. Rousseau’s ideal of rugged virtue found a good representative in the sans-culottes, and the noble savage myth no doubt colored the perception of them for many. The sans-culotte occurrence supported a discourse that not only further demonized aristocracy, but could also condemn moderate liberalism and even fellow republicans.

The sans-culotte phenomenon also placed an emphasis on the body in understanding masculinity. The loose-fitting pants of the sans-culottes not only defied the aesthetic of aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, it also worked to give them more bodily bulk. Paintings of sans-culottes reveal not only the ruggedness of the purposely-unkempt working male, it often portrayed the larger body of the worker. Physical strength of the manual laborer was certainly greater than that of the aristocrat and the aristocratic or rich bourgeoisie, and the Jacobin conception of virtue easily spilled over into issues of health and physical appearance. The notion of degeneration and the fear of depopulation had already presented itself by the middle of the eighteenth century, which gave a literal and physical meaning to Jacobin notions of regeneration. The perceived dwindling of the physical strength of the population due to idleness, luxury, and an effeminate education was not only part of the moral crusaders’ mantra, but also the medical community’s. Coinciding with the triumph of the “heroic male body” within republican art, a body that everyone agreed had superior physical strength was easier to claim as a manifestation of true republicanism. Jérôme Pétion, Girondin and future president of the National Convention, wrote in 1788 that liberty had “moral and physical benefits.”

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250 The connection between the Revolution and the look of the sans-culottes was strong. For example, their woolen working hats, identified during important Revolutionary events, became the famed liberty caps.
252 Sean Quinlan quotes Physician Pierre Nicolas from 1775: “Everyone complains constantly about the degeneration of the human species. We are weaker and less robust than our fathers…” Quinlan, Great Nation, 19-20. Pierre Nicolas, Le cri de la nature en faveur des enfans nouveau-nés (Grenoble, 1775), 112.
253 Quinlan, Great Nation, 20.
went on to say that men of a free nation, besides being more virtuous, “...will be physically larger, more beautiful, more courageous.” In the Socialist History of the French Revolution, written under direction by Jean Jaures, the author included a quotation that shows the importance of physicality for the Jacobin. The character in the selection revealed Hercules as an ideal for those trying to bring about the true Revolution. In it, the man regularly imagined himself becoming Hercules. He wrote that,

...whenever he passed by the statue of Hercules he grew several feet. All his limbs stiffened. His step became more serious, more certain, his voice more masculine, and the movement of all his arteries more sensible.

Sean Quinlan, focusing on J. L. Peree’s 1795 engraving, “L’homme regenere,” writes that Jacobins believed liberty had a physical effect on men as well as a moral one. According to the depiction, liberty struck men like lightening and revived their bodies, sick and effeminate because of aristocratic rule, with the energy and strength of ideal men. As such, ideal and virtuous republican men should be physically distinguishable—stronger, healthier, and more energetic.

The addition of physicality to the understanding of masculinity emerged as well with the significant choice by members of the Mountain who courted the sans-culottes during their power struggles with the relatively moderate Girondins, to challenged the female figure of Marianne as the dominate symbol of the republic. These radicals, having a vision of virtue that considered "petite et vain" men enemies of a true Republic, chose the hyper-masculine Hercules as their

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255 Jérôme Pétion, Avis aux Français sur le salut de la patrie (Publisher unknown, 1788), 73-74. See also François Lanthenas, De L’influence de l’image de la sante, la morale, la bonneheur (Pars: Cercle Social, 1792). Forth, Masculinity, 128.
257 Quinlan, “Men,” 34.
symbol. In the unattributed sketch, *Le Peuple mangeur des Rois*, Hercules lacks classical refinement and appears austere, wearing the clothes of a common wageworker. Written on his chest is, “The People,” and his particular labor is to kill royalty and privilege depicted here as baby-like pygmy dressed in kingly clothing easily held in his left hand. The herculean worker is unshaven with massive, muscular arms and legs, wearing his characteristic woolen hat. In his right hand, he holds his fabled club ready to swing at the pathetic creature. In one sense, this is the Louis XIV of Hyacinthe Rigaud, powerless and feeble without the pretense and artifice of the *ancien régime* to bolster him, easily defeated by a superior man. In the light of nature revealed by the Enlightenment, the insincerity of monarchy and aristocracy was no longer compelling. According to this sketch, nature had endorsed a new man, one for whom physicality, labor, and austerity had become the defining characteristics.

Helping to solidify this logic for later socialists who wished to see connections between austerity, masculinity, physical labor, and ideal masculinity was the backlash against Jacobin rule that occurred during and directly after the Terror. This backlash consisted of a phenomenon that represented the perfect antithesis and challenge to the sans-culottes. Young men from the bourgeoisie, who were able to use their influence proudly to avoid conscription and thus their service to the *patrie*, formed gangs to commit violence against the sans-culottes and the Jacobins. Labeled *muscadins* and *jeunesse dorée* (gilded youth), they dressed effeminately and in aristocratic clothing. Wearing extra-tight culottes and beardless chins, they powdered and

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perfumed themselves, even coloring their hands white to make them extra soft in appearance. One witness described them as “rich and effeminate…a species of man occupied with appearing elegant and ridiculous, who with the sound of a [military recruiter’s] drum turn into women”—this last phrase a reference to their refusal to join the army in defense of the Revolution. They also associated themselves with the theater, a frivolity that must have irritated the dedicated Rousseauvians. At the same time, like the sans-culottes, they carried clubs for street violence, which they took out on the sans-culottes and Jacobins in general. Persecuting the sans-culottes and eventually pushing their influence out of the Convention, they became heroes in the salon community as well as permanent fixtures. They would eventually help populate the bourgeoisie of the Restoration period.

During the aftermath of the Terror and into the Directory period, which brought some stability to government, the muscadins merged into an aristocratic sub-group called the “incroyables.” Their name came from their outrageous dress and appearance, and they brought muscadin hatred of republican austerity with them. They wore exaggerated muscadin clothing, choosing to don the style of glasses the muscadins used to get out of the military. They practiced affected gestures and speech, even removing the letter “r” from their pronunciations, a practice easily labeled as effeminate by their enemies. Like the muscadins, they heartlessly paraded their wealth and privilege before those suffering in poverty. Louis Mercier referred to them as “petits-maîtres,” an established term that referred to a phenomenon in the first part of the century.

264 Gendron, *Gilded*, 89.
267 Gendron, *Gilded*, 120.
of privileged young men shunning established notions of morality and virtue. Diderot in the Encyclopédie described the petits-maîtres as having self-love and being like those in ancient Rome who were “...children of the luxury, idleness, and softness of the Sybarites.” He also cited Voltaire as saying that “Our petits-maîtres ...are the most ridiculous species that creeps with pride on the surface of the earth.” The contrasts were clear as this civil war against the sans-culottes helped highlight particular features and presented a certain identity for later socialists to focus on. The Terror and its backlash helped put forward a masculinity of a wageworker as an alternative to not only aristocracy, but also to the developing bourgeoisie.

**Revolutionary Co-option of Language and a New Patriarchy**

France went into the eighteenth century with a distinct or identifiable phraseology that reflected and reinforced the patriarchy of the ancien régime. For example, it was common in the old system to use the adjectival form for a biological male (mâle) to ascribe qualities to things. In simplest form, asserting that something was mâle or manly reflected a masculine and feminine binary that corresponded to strength and weakness and its synonyms. However, writers were able to incorporate gendered language to convey more complex meanings or descriptions. For example, Rousseau, in his many writings on music, described a recommended style of a melody as mâle and grave. Voltaire, in his advice to journalists, advocated a masculine writing style, which was noble and avoided useless decoration. Elsewhere he defined this style as having

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clarity, precision, and elegance. In a similar vein, Montesquieu described a translation of the Bible as mâle and strong. Following the logic of patriarchy, one could meaningfully use feminine language to indicate a departure from these qualities. For example, Montesquieu described a work of scholarship as “effeminate” because it lacked depth and the serious and grand nature of the subject. The same went for Rousseau who described the theater in Ancient Greece in the same gendered way. Le Dictionnaire d l’Académie Française of 1798 explained that one could ascribe masculinity to things that seemed “expressive, energetic, or grave and imposing,” including speech, art, and poetry. One socialist, towards the end of the nineteenth century, recognized this manifestation of patriarchy when he wrote, “…in our [laws] the male retains the rights of a master, and in our grammar the masculine is qualified as the noblest.”

A different logic was at work when French writers aimed this language at people. In this patriarchy, ascribing masculinity to someone went beyond simple description: it also expressed a superlative. Something masculine was of a special kind that reflected the historically conditioned and socially defined perception that men and their attributes were superior. It therefore justified their social position. A good example of this comes from Montesquieu’s Persian Letters. Conveying the idea that a corruption of morals had taken place amongst certain women in his narrative, he wrote that their faces no longer reflected cette vertu mâle et severe.

In this example, Montesquieu did not describe these women as simply lacking virtue, or even lacking feminine virtue. Rather, they were absent of a more important kind of virtue as indicated by the masculine language. As such, the author’s language reinforced patriarchy. Further, when ascribing a positive character to men, a common formula was to claim that they possessed it in its masculine form. For example, Voltaire did not state that Corneille was a genius. Rather, in normal fashion, he stated that Corneille was in possession of a “masculine genius.” Rousseau used the same convention in conveying the elegance of Démosthène, claiming that Démosthène possessed mâle eloquence. In these cases, the writer described the person as being consistent with their status as a man, ultimately validating his masculinity and thus his superlative state.

Le Dictionnaire d l’Académie Française of 1798 explained that this phraseology and the attributes of masculinity could refer to morality, virtue, spirit, courageousness, and even physical appearance. The importance here is that this phraseology lasted into the nineteenth century. If this phraseology was reflective and reinforcing of patriarchy, use of it by revolutionaries and later socialists gave it a subversive quality. It, therefore, became a tool of counter-hegemonic masculinity.

Marisa Linton’s wonderful study on the different and evolving meanings of “virtue” in French society is helpful here. She identifies three types of virtue that existed from the ancien régime into the Enlightenment and Revolution. There was a virtue that belonged to royalty, and one that belonged to nobility. Thirdly, there was the civic virtue of classic republicanism. Drawing on François Furet’s understanding of the role of language in the Revolution, Linton is able to show...

281 Montesquieu commonly gendered cultures and groups of people this way. See Montesquieu, Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu, Vol. II (Librairie De L. Hachette: Paris, 1859), 94, 230,249,327.
282 Le Dictionnaire d l’Académie Française, 1798.
how “virtue” became the means to criticize the *ancien régime* and to legitimize a new vision.284 For Revolutionary discourse, true politics went wherever virtue went, and whoever was virtuous was where true political authority should be. In other words, to assert or champion virtue meant something subversive once the Revolution started because of its defiance of the kingly and noble kinds. Even more, “virtue” had gendered overtones. As Linton wrote, “kings appeared as the embodiment of masculine virtue, an image that served to emphasize and reinforce their claim to be the embodiment of sovereignty.”285 As such, defying older definitions of masculinity and virtue, the phrase *mâle vertu* and its multiple versions must have been counter hegemonic in the hands of revolutionaries. Indeed, the revolutionary project demanded such rhetoric. As in a dramatically expressed patriarchy, if men are the assumed possessors of power, morality, and leadership, a comparison of the *ancien régime* and its replacement become default comparisons of its men.286

The Revolution conceptualized the state in a similar way to its *ancien régime* precursor. In revolutionary logic, sovereignty passed to the people with the elimination of the king. In the absence of the king’s body, it is not hard to imagine that other symbolic functions would have passed along as well. Penny Robert’s work on the sixteenth-century monarchy adds more to the role of the king’s body in relation to the state. In her scholarship, the king and the state had “both a physical reality and symbolic status,” which allowed the understanding of interdependence regarding their health.287 In other words, a connection between the “health of the monarch and that of the realm,” one representing the other, existed. This served monarchy

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well because the logic emphasized the health and well-being of the king. The dramatic reliance of revolutionaries on the metaphors of body and health in discussions of the nation demonstrates that while sovereignty passed onto the people, the sovereign’s identity with the nation did as well. The result was that, similar to *ancien régime* kings, their health would become representative of the nation’s health. Ultimately, the ruling elites who became the possessors of sovereignty would inherit the role of masculine and national representation.

Linton also points out that the civic republican virtue championed by Jacobins was intensely male-centered. As Outram wrote, “the political culture of the middle class in the French Revolution was constituted by the construction of images of masculinity and femininity which served to exclude all women and validate some men.” Virtue, therefore, served two purposes. One was to exclude women from the public sphere. The other was to condemn the *ancien régime*, which necessitated criticism of its male adherents and defenders. Further, this two-pronged understanding of male virtue had a reinforcing logic to it. The use of a counter-hegemonic narrative would in effect be anti-feminist since it required a rededication to the mythology of female inferiority. The rhetoric that effeminizes an opposing party would tend to push in this direction. Outram therefore writes, “… the Revolution was committed to an anti-feminine rhetoric.” Revolutionary rhetoric therefore simultaneously championed its masculinity while excluding women from the public sphere. This attitude transferred to the

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289 One should also take into account, as evidence of this continuity, the demonstrated need for nobility in the psyche of the French of the nineteenth century. While the metaphoric and symbolic elements of the king and his sovereignty passed to the ruling elites, the functional elements of nobility also passed to them. For example, the attributing of nobility to workers developed in subsequent chapters, or the expectations of the bourgeoisie towards the end of the century as reflected in Nye’s work.
Republican socialists and remained so throughout the nineteenth century in significant quantity.  

Replacing one patriarchy with another required a compelling model of a new man to replace the old. As a partisan of Robespierre wrote to defend against a detractor, “[Robespierre has] that superiority which his male and republican virtue gives him over common or corrupt men.” The “corrupt men” here are the aristocrats and egoists. This, therefore, bespeaks a hierarchy of maleness not based on ancien régime criteria. The same thing emerged with Robespierre’s public condemnation of Lafayette. In this event, one sees a marriage of traditional patriarchal phraseology and Revolutionary political polemic, as well as a confrontation between old and new

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293 See also Wolfgang Schmale, "The Construction of Masculinity and the National," Wiener Zeitschrift Zur Geschichte Der Neuzeit 10 (2010): 164-172. Wolfgang Schmale takes a traditional intellectual history approach to explain the language of the first Revolutionaries. While using the term “hegemonic masculinity,” he sees it as a product of the interplay of ideas rather than the dynamics and interplay of gender. As such, it is a distinct feature of modernity, one influenced by the French experience in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Schmale sees hegemonic masculinity as a type of patriarchy rather than a feature of one. For Schmale, hegemonic masculinity is an outgrowth of the Enlightenment’s two-sex anthropological model, which allowed the conceptualization of men and women as different in kind rather than degree. Schmale, “Construction,” 166. The product of this new conceptualization, for him, produced and supported a separate-spheres ordering. Under the stress of revolution and warfare, these ideas encouraged a distinct male-centered nationalism. For one, the two-sex model justified the exclusion of women from the public sphere. Secondly, subsequent defensive military action dictated and demanded a certain and singular type of masculinity. Schmale, “Construction,” 166, 171. This started with the Jacobins of the first Revolution. Napoleon then brought it to maturity with his promotion of military culture and his remake of the law code. Under these conditions, military masculinity became “binding for all men,” producing a nation centered on a singular masculinity. Schmale, “Construction,” 166-167. This was new, since the pre-modern period, while patriarchal, tolerated more than one kind of masculinity. For Schmalle, therefore, “the nationalistic nation state and hegemonic masculinity are brethren.” Schmale, “Construction,” 166. Schmale’s narrative fits well in certain areas. It speaks to the huge influence of Rousseau on the Jacobins that historians have so thoroughly documented. It also takes into account the marshal nationalism that flourished during the Revolutionary wars with Europe and under Napoleon where it would have reached its height. These factors then explain the gendered language of the Jacobins: they were establishing a nationalistic nation state around a male identity in the face of a hostile Europe. This work has taken a different path in light of the evidence. The Jacobins were actually responding to gender dynamics already in play and producing a patriarchy favorable to them over an existing matrix. As demonstrated here, there were important conceptual and linguistic continuities between the Old Regime and the language of Revolutionary politics that require deference. The first was the continuation of the term “mâle,” which clearly reflected notions of male superiority. Regardless of a single or two-sex model of anthropology, the notion of the male as primary still existed. This is not to suggest that Schmale rejects that an understanding of male superiority existed prior to the two-sex model. Rather, it underscores how formative the two-sex model would have been on their language. It certainly fed into it; however, it could not have been its efficient cause. Indeed, the historic civic republicanism of French politics was male-focused before Rousseau got a hold of it, and a gender matrix would have existed outside of the two-sex model. The continuity here as evidenced by the language of health and nation indicates more complex identities for the nation and its representative males than ones solely marshal.

masculinity. Robespierre said to Lafayette:

Linked to our ancient oppressors, allied to a family celebrated in the courts, by the hereditary science of intrigue and adulation, devoid of the male virtues which characterize free men, your soul could not be sensitive to the glory of raising the human dignity and strength of the French people on the regenerating principles of justice and equality. You wanted only a measured revolution on your aristocratic prejudices and on your personal interest. Your means were worthy of your purpose, of the education you had received, in the most corrupt of all courts, from the vile passions and native falseness of which you had already given proof.  

Here, Robespierre implied that the masculinity defined by the ancien régime and so dramatically expressed by Lafayette was no longer valid. Rather, desirable masculinity was one related to the Revolution and that drew itself along newly formed political and ideological lines that the Jacobins had established. According to Robespierre, the problem with Lafayette was not his differing opinion concerning the direction that France must take, or even the actions that he took against the Jacobin revolution. Rather, it was his character, which he had simply demonstrated in his actions regarding his opposition to their version of a Republic. For Robespierre, Lafayette’s aristocratic background and upbringing made his actions predictable. He lacked the masculine virtues that free men possess, and his motivations were therefore selfish. The result was that he could not possibly understand or desire the emancipation of the French people within a Republic. Robespierre had rejected the masculinity that previously dominated as represented by the highly aristocratic Lafayette. In its place, he championed a masculinity centered on a male virtue as defined by his Rousseauvian-informed version of civic republicanism.  

Another term repurposed by the Revolution was “energy,” which became an indirect way to

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297 “…moral critics charged that personal character, not privilege or heredity, determined social status. In response, moral critics countered with new masculine ideals that moved beyond the aristocratic ideal of the honnête homme…” Quinlan, “Men,” 33-34.
ascribe masculinity to an individual or political position. The ancien régime, according to the Le Dictionnaire de l'Académie française, had already made a connection between masculinity and energy. That combination, however, had mainly an artistic application, functioning as a way to convey a certain characteristic of a painting or poem. In general usage, “energy” was essentially a synonym for “motivation” or “excitement.” While Revolutionaries did indeed use it in this manner, it is clear that it became part of republican Jacobin rhetoric to help distinguish or label true manifestations of virtue and thus masculinity. Therefore, in context this terminology was subversive and functioned in a counter-hegemonic fashion. Energy was the opposing quality of aristocratic idleness. Ascriptions of energy, indicating health and strength, made it easy to contrast true republicans with those they believed were sapped by luxury and weakened by immorality and selfishness. An intimate connection between energy and Jacobin ideology would serve the purpose of identifying the ideology and the type of male that France needed to replace to reverse the degeneration that was in the public consciousness.

Indeed, “energy” was an inseparable component of Jacobin Ideology. For example, Rousseauvian philosopher, François Louis Escherny, in his 1783 work, Les Lacunes de la philosophie, dedicated several pages to the problem of egoism. Escherny argued that there was a positive correlation between energy and love for others—more of one meant more of the other. His conclusion, therefore, was that the egoist, lacking love for others, had no energy. Detaching themselves from the rest of society, egoists become in a sense dead or lifeless towards justice and virtue and lived in a state of moral apathy. Their affections then become unnatural: they are envious and ambitious; they exalt money, luxury, and softness, and they have no feelings for those who suffer.

In Escherny’s reasoning, energy indicated a particular motivation towards

299 François Louis d'Escherny, Les lacunes de la philosophie (Amsterdam; Paris: Clousier, Imprimeur-Libraire, rue
fraternity and virtue, characteristics that belonged to true revolutionary men. While there was such a thing as “male energy,” its relationship to the issue of egoism is more useful here. Marat, for example, in criticizing France, claimed that it was a nation “…of vile egoists without morals, energy, or soul; men corrupted by luxury, slackness, and vices.” In another place, he wrote about “egoists without virtue or energy, incapable of undertaking anything for liberty.” He also characterized “Friends of the People” as having “…truth, justice, zeal for the public good, energy and constancy.” In all these cases, energy went beyond the notion of motivation or excitement to have a specialized meaning akin to fraternity, virtue, health, and thus ideal masculinity.

Robespierre added more to this use of energy in a Revolutionary context. In describing Robespierre’s condemnation of William Pitt, Louis Blanc claimed that Pitt was not “…moral enough to believe in the energy of republican virtues, nor philosophical enough to understand his age.” Informed by his particular version of civic republicanism, politics for Robespierre was about understanding and harnessing the enthusiasm and force of a free people rather than manipulating a parliament, which belonged to the unnatural art of despotism. If one instituted just or correct laws, in this view, individuals would develop proper dispositions and motivations, and old ways of governing would be less necessary. Robespierre wrote:

The energy of an elevated and pure soul is the main source of sound political ideas. When one deeply loves justice and humanity, one feels strongly about the rights of men and citizens. One defends them with courage.

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303 Marat, “Fin des observations de l’Ami du peuple sur l’indigne arrêté de la municipalité parisienne,” L’Ami du Peuple, January, 20, 1790, No. 103
305 Adresse de la Société des amis de la constitution, de Paris aux sociétés qui lui sont affiliées. (A Paris, de l’Imprimerie nationale, 1791), 4
A correctly constituted soul has strong feelings towards justice and courageously carries them out. In a Revolutionary context, energy may therefore indicate a strong attitude that came from the possession and love of virtue. It was ultimately a force for the accomplishment of virtue and fraternity since egoism produced nothing but selfishness, ruthless competition, and pursuit of wealth.

While energy implied correct dispositions and the drive to promote and defend them, it also had a particular source. In Blanc’s text, an argument for the possession of truth came from the claim of being “men of nature,” which meant having the “energy of all virtues.” In this case, the energy spoken of had a special source in nature and was thus of a special type. Indeed, in the works of Buonarroti, there are references to republican and democratic energy, popular energy, and energy in defense of the Revolution, all of which were products of the exposure to freedom. In these examples, the possession of fraternity and virtue, the qualities identified as masculine and in contrast to effeminate egoism by the new Revolutionary logic, came with an obvious ability or overwhelming desire to promote or defend them. In Buonarroti, there is an interesting account of a man named Amar who had taken part in bringing down Robespierre. He was a radical but had not yet understood that the individualist content of his bourgeois notions of private property were egoist. After hearing a speech on the necessity of the community of goods for truly equal society,

Amar seemed struck with a ray of light. At the first utterance of this [fraternal] system he became its enthusiastic defender. And, thinking only of justifying and propagating its principles, he carried the heat of his zeal so that in a short time he became a fiery apologist in public.

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309 Buonarroti, Babeuf, Vol. 1, 50.
Buonarrati’s account brings to mind the Peree engraving, *L’homme régénère*, which has the revolutionary man struck by lightning in a moment of dramatic regeneration of his person. In the trope of a religious conversion, Amar had received something that changed his being, physiognomy, motivations, and abilities. He had become a new and ideal man, virtuous, fraternal, healthy, and *énergétique*.\(^{310}\)

**Nineteenth-Century Perceptions of a Masculine Revolution**

The manner in which ideologies interacted and the history unfolded during that last decade of the eighteenth century was important because the people and events of the Revolution ended up serving nineteenth-century political goals. One way was that, if presented correctly, the Revolution could become an endorsement of a particular political vision for nineteenth-century France. Did it justify a Royalist and traditionalist position by showing the unworkability of anything that departs from it? Did it advocate liberalism by showing the success of its first part and the failure of its second part after ‘92? Or, did it reveal a Revolution cut short before reaching its true potential? Secondly, if understood correctly, the Revolution could provide an influential text for not only ideological formation and strategy, but also for inspiration and moral assurance. This last option required rehabilitation of the Terror and its advocates if the connection between Revolution and socialism was to succeed.\(^{311}\)

For many socialists, the Revolution as an incomplete event awaiting future fulfillment worked well. This narrative received its power from the period of the Terror, which presented a populist dictatorship dominated by the language of equality and followed by an aristocratic and bourgeois


backlash and triumph. Once these nineteenth-century French socialists began to engage in polemic by claiming ownership of the Revolution and interpreting it for their own purposes, the Terror not only demonstrated to them the historical importance and validity of their cause, but it also provided real-life applications of populist ideology within a Manichean narrative. The Revolution, going into this radical phase, heightened all of the ideological commitments. The Terror dramatically chose sides, separated the good and the bad, established heroes as well as saints and martyrs, and helped ascribe the characteristics that made them so. It also provided useful language and concepts to continue the “unfinished” Revolution into the nineteenth century. Also important here was that Robespierre’s rise to power was actually a product of several authoritarian populist groups, including Robespierist, Dantonist, and Hebertist, representing different philosophical assumptions as well as differing commitments, real and perceived, to the sans-culottes. The result was not only an anti-aristocratic narrative working itself out, but also a tension emerging between factions concerning the sans-culottes that later allowed for a socialist narrative apart from the foundational elements of Robespierre’s ideology, which were less applicable to the latter half of nineteenth-century France. Robespierre’s confrontation of Lafayette, therefore, was only part of what the Revolution had to say about masculinity. The larger picture would rely on the interpretation of socialists engaged in Revolutionary polemic.

Philip Buonarroti’s communication of the Revolution via Grachus Babeuf’s attempt at insurrection during the Directory was important in bringing this narrative to socialists.\(^{312}\)

\(^{312}\) After the death of Robespierre, though disheartened, Babeuf still believed that a spontaneous insurrection could occur. The intense misery left in society because the old social safety nets were gone, and the inability of the Directory to respond, inspired Babeuf to encourage this insurrection. His plan was to unite Jacobins, members of the military, and all the angry and starving people of Paris to overthrow the Directory government. The Constitution of 1793, because it guaranteed such things as a right to work and other socially leveling principles, was his rallying point and the blueprint for the new society he envisioned. However, the government had infiltrated the conspiracy
Befriending French radicals in 1830, he brought along this written drama to share with them. Buonarroti’s work presented the Revolution as a glorious movement, one with heroes and villains, “…an essential event for humanity.” 313 Buonarroti also had the present in mind. 314 The Revolution, as great as it was, required a further revolution. The Revolution, according to the text, was “…only the forerunner of another revolution far more grand, more solemn, and that will be the last…The days of general restitution are come.” 315 Buonarroti presented himself and Babeuf as disciples of Robespierre and the Terror. Buonarroti also made it clear that he followed Rousseau. 316 In this narrative, Robespierre became a hero, and the Committee of Public Safety and its subsequent Terror became a necessary and just action.

However, Robespierre was not a socialist in the nineteenth-century meaning of the term. 317 France was essentially in a pre-industrial and mostly pre-capitalist state during the Revolution. The economic issues that the Committee of Public Safety dealt with mostly concerned the development of commerce and the shape the agrarian economy should take going forward. However, like most Jacobins, he had essentially bourgeois understandings of property. Robespierre did speak of the poor, and emergencies like famine and war allowed him to stretch his understanding of property to institute command-economy regulations during the Terror.

with spies, and they brought Babeuf, among others, up on changes and executed him. See also Arthur Lehning “Buonarroti and his International Secret Societies,” International Review of Social History 1 (1956): 112-114.


315 Buonarroti, Babeuf, Vol. II, 131-132. See also Buonarroti, Babeuf, Vol. I, 151: “A holy anger seized upon all the sincere friends of liberty, and made them resolve to resist oppression. They said aloud that the time had come to take an oath to live free or die.”

316 See also Ulysses G. Weatherly, “Babeuf’s Place in the History of Socialism,” Publications of the American Economic Association, 3rd Series, Vol. 8, No. 1, Papers and Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Meeting, Providence, R. I., December 26-28, 1906 (Feb., 1907): 123. As Ulysses Weatherly writes: “…the Babouvists were the first of the moderns to perceive the economic basis of the social problem and to state the socialistic philosophy of society. Stripped of verbiage and the sentimental cant of Rousseavism, there remains in the teaching the essence of nearly every important dogma of the modern socialist party.” Weatherly, 121

317 Further, considering the makeup of the Third Estate, the critiques of society did not fall neatly along class lines, which really did not exist as the nineteenth century came to understand them.
Even with that, however, the discourse mostly concerned the problem of hoarding, which was especially damaging to the poorest in society. Regardless, it made it possible for Robespierre to speak powerfully for the sans-culottes and poor without changing Jacobin dogma concerning private property. Robespierre was able to hold on to the notion of virtue as a suppression of personal interest for the public good without giving up the principle of private property and the market orthodoxy of the Jacobins. 318 Ultimately, Robespierre’s references to the poor and rich, as well as to an aristocracy of wealth, allowed some to see Robespierre in proto-socialist terms despite his only temporary and incomplete reaching out to the sans-culottes. And Buonarroti’s narrative helped radicals see the nineteenth century through the proto-class tensions that arose during the Terror. 319 The economic problems expressed through civic republican language therefore became meaningful to socialist Louis Blanc who clearly absorbed the Rousseauvian/Robespierrist narrative of the first Revolution. The narrative was also important to August Blanqui, who helped inspire republican socialists throughout most of the nineteenth century.

Since Buonarroti and Babeuf were insurrectionists who wanted to see an overthrow of the present order, Buonarroti’s narrative was ultimately a blueprint to bring one about. While couched in Revolutionary concepts and language, the work fit the emerging class tensions that Buonarroti would have experienced over the last thirty years of exile. However, Blanqui became more radical in his leveling goals, which included the complete rejection of religion and the view that it was the major source of oppression for working people. As such, Blanqui had no use for Buonarroti’s Robespierre and what he saw as a religious corruption of radicalism. Robespierre’s Cult of the Supreme Being was a giveaway. Blanqui, instead, drew from the materialist Jacques

319 Pilbeam, “Insurrectionary,” 253-264.
Hebert who, while as leader of the ’93 Commune, spoke of insurrection against Robespierre and the Convention. Hebert’s Cult of Reason was much more Blanqui’s style. Further, Hebert could claim much closer ties with the sans-culottes, publishing Pere Duchesne, the dominant publication of the sans-culottes written in the language style of the sans-culottes. Blanc’s reformism and Blanqui’s tendencies toward overthrow of the government both drew from Buonarroti’s presentation of the Revolution.\footnote{Blanc’s decision to end his massive History of the French without major reference to Babeuf’s attempted insurrection is in no doubt due to his emphasis on reform.}

One of the questions that Buonarroti set himself up to answer in his book on Babeuf concerned the kind of men that should rule once the final insurrection to complete the Revolution took place. In this way, his narrative participated in the renegotiation of patriarchy that the Revolution had required. Buonarroti started his story by splitting the Revolution into two forces. At the most broad, there were those who wanted change to favor their own interests, and those who wanted change in favor of the people. The former wanted those with wealth and education to rule, as well as a society that manifested the riches, superfluities, and display of Athens. The latter group believed that all should participate in rule, which was the only way, they asserted, that any lasting peace or happiness could occur. Instead of Athens, they wanted the frugality, simplicity, and modesty of Sparta.\footnote{Buonarroti, \textit{Babeuf}, Vol. I, 6.} Going a bit deeper in his explanation, Buonarroti said that two sources informed these groups. One was the “English doctrine of the economists.” The other was Rousseau, a type of thinking that had advocates going back to Jesus and Lycurgus of Sparta.\footnote{Mehta, “Sparta,” 213.} This was a fairly common narrative for French radicals, who saw the Empiricism of Bacon and Locke as a source of social atomization, individuality, and ultimately of industrial production. Voltaire had forwarded this very narrative when he wrote his \textit{Letters on England} to
praise Locke and an economy based on individual interests. In line with other French social language, Buonarroti renamed the system of the economists, “the order of egoism,” or “the aristocratic system.” At the other end, Rousseau’s ideas produced the “Order of Equality.” Further, the adherents of these two systems had certain qualities. The Egoists were “perverted by corruption.” In contrast, those who wanted equality for all had pure hearts. There were some who started out with pretending to love equality, but showed themselves false when the time came to establish it. With this last distinction, he could explain the splits within the Jacobins over the issue of property, especially in the tensions between the Robespierrist Mountain and the Girondins.

Since his work advocated and modeled insurrection, Buonarroti jumped almost immediately to the insurrection instigated by Jacobins in 1792. Taking over the Commune in Paris in order to guide the Revolution, Republicans and the people, according to Buonarroti, toppled the monarchy and extended political rights to all citizens. He was careful to point out that it was the “working-class” and none other who had been producing virtue and devotion towards the regeneration of the nation. However, the Egoists and Aristocrats remained in control of the Convention. Buonarroti then moved to the insurrection on May 31, 1793, when the Mountain, with help from the sans-culottes, were able to eject the Girondists from power, whom they saw as being part of the egoist and aristocratic faction. The creation of the revolutionary government followed, along with the creation of the Constitution of 1793, which they never instituted because of the needs of wartime. In order to continue the regeneration of France, to bring about moral reform and the greater love of virtue, they introduced legislation justified by

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324 Higonnet, Goodness, 116.
its promotion of fraternity. The most important of these reforms concerned the confiscation of the counterrevolutionaries’ property and its redistribution among the populace. Buonarroti wrote that controlling commerce, “snapped the roots of avidity, and dried up the spring of factitious and artificial wants.” As he claimed, an enthusiasm within the people matured and happiness prevailed as a result.

The fall of Robespierre’s dictatorship and the subsequent reaction of Thermidor gave France back to the egoists, which, according to Buonarroti, predictably became a tyranny. He wrote, “[The return of the egoists] demoralized everything; it restored luxury; debauchery, effeminate manners, and brigandism…it denaturalized the principles of the Revolution.” A cry for the constitution of ‘93 ensued against the Thermidorian egoists, and the enemies of equality began to jail the “true friends of liberty.” This jailing, however, allowed for a mixing of individuals who were once enemies—most importantly Dantonists, Robesprierrists, and Hebertists, those to the right and left of Robespierre. Buonarroti wrote that, “The victims, whom the aristocracy had plunged into [jail] lived frugally in the most intimate fraternity, honored one another for their chains and poverty, devoted themselves to work and study, and conversed only on the sicknesses of the patrie, and on the means of bringing them to an end.” They sang songs and drew others to their cause, which was to institute the Constitution of 1793. The solidarity of the Dantonists, Hebertists, and Robespierrists resulted in the planned insurrection of Babeuf inspired by the shared desire to “diminish the ravages of avarice and ambition, to ameliorate morals, and to rescue the mass of people from the savage domination of the idle and ambitious rich.” But the old rich and the new rich bound together to solidify their rule, an ambitious pretention that

revealed their “hatred of work and desire of riches.” In reality, according to Buonarroti, all the actions of the old and new rich would be against the laboring class, to whom they made promises for equality—promises illusory in nature because of the corruption of a bad system. Nature, according to Buonarroti, dictated equality of goods and labor, and any other way was unchecked egoism. At that point, two factions controlled the government—upstart egoists and conservative egoists, by which he meant the bourgeois and the old aristocracy. Against this grouping, Babeuf and Buonarroti tried to form the Insurrectional Committee of Public Safety to overthrow the government, all with a seeming input from the previously factional groups.

The most important element here is the way in which Buonarroti gendered the opposing sides. An understanding of ego being feminine and virtue or fraternity being masculine came through. His description of the Thermidorian reaction and its subsequent unfolding matched well with the observation that it was a deeply gendered phenomenon. That he had the muscadin and incroyable phenomenon in mind with his references to luxury, effeminate manners, and brigandism is not difficult to imagine. If the Revolution had indeed destabilized hegemonic masculinity, the almost black and white nature of this event made it ideal for radicals to make their case. Since the necessity of austerity and manly virtues was a controlling element of Jacobin ideology, the chance to effeminize the opposition at this opportune time made perfect sense, and Buonarrati’s fans would not have missed it. Indeed, socialist Louis Blanc followed this interpretation in his massive history of the French Revolution, written from 1847 to 1862. He presented the muscadin and incroyable with terms like “frivolity” and described them as

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334 “Babeuf and the muscadins had clashed, muscadins burning Babeuf’s Journals, and Babeuf threatening them with a civil war with the sans-culottes.” R. B. Rose, Gracchus Babeuf: The First Revolutionary Communist (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1978), 174, 182.
having “effeminate morals.” Blanc’s characterization of the period after Robespierre’s downfall fit nicely with Buonarroti’s as well as reflecting the issues that helped bring about a renegotiation of masculinity. He wrote:

Meanwhile, the bands of unpleasant subjects referred to as golden youths, alluding to the softness and luxury of the ancien régime, suddenly replaced republican manners and continued to fill Paris with disorders. The era of gilded salons began. The austerity of republican manners and the virile enthusiasm which it had given rise gradually gave way to the tastes of refined elegance and boudoir influences, fashion raised thrones to beauty.

Blanc, with his use of the term “virile,” associated masculinity with Republicans, a term almost interchangeable with male. The use of “softness” and “fashion” effeminized the muscadins as well, and other references tapped into the debates concerning luxury, which carried meaning into the nineteenth century. Blanc made these gendered distinctions clear by again characterizing the acts of the revolutionaries as masculine. He wrote:

In other words, all these manly sacrifices, all those strong virtues, which had marked the last period with an imperishable stamp, were now nothing but a memory.

Reflected here was a characterization of the Revolution as a dichotomy and struggle between the manly, virtuous, and austere, and the soft, gilded, and effeminate. Since the Terror and its aftermath became primary in the shaping of perceptions of the Revolution, the examples of Buonarroti and Blanc became important in tracing these gendering schemes into the nineteenth century.

An emphasis on the body was an important element in Rousseau’s preferred state as well as in Jacobin ideology. One sees this reflected in Buonarroti’s recommendations for education in an ideal republic, which included an emphasis on “a strong and agile body.” For him, Republics

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depended on robust and hardy citizens. Therefore, one must “subject its men to laborious works of agriculture and mechanical arts and habituate their bodies to the most difficult maneuvers and strictest frugality.” Invigorating the body by fatigue, labor, and exercise, one could eliminate sloth, idleness, effeminacy, and love of voluptuous pleasures. Blanc’s account echoed the same thing by saying that a Republic required “austere souls and vigorous bodies.”

While this was part of it, an emphasis on the body included the notion of physicality and a certain kind of aesthetic. In other words, the inclusion of the sans-culottes in the modeling of revolutionary masculinity brought about more subtlety. This is apparent when one compares Robespierre’s condemnation of Lafayette with a later account. In Robespierre’s version, the emphasis was on Lafayette’s lack of male virtue as demonstrated by his turn against the Jacobin direction of the Revolution. In the account included in the Journal of Prudhomme, there was greater focus on physical elements as markers of his corruption perceptible before his betrayal. The selection relates how certain “clairvoyant patriots” were able to point out that Lafayette was not a revolutionary, but rather a courtier and charlatan even before he turned on the Jacobin revolution. The elements that gave Lafayette away according to this account were his soft (souple) muscles, the way he walked, and the way he talked. All of these things, it said, had been renounced or disowned (désavoués) by nature, lending suspicion to the idea that Lafayette was a proper patriot, lawgiver, and hero. Instead of being a product of nature, Lafayette was a product of art. That is, everything was show or artifice, thus the product of an unvirtuous or unnatural upbringing. Lafayette’s muscle tone or shape was unlike that of the average person of

the Third Estate, perhaps demonstrating a lack of physical labor or a certain kind of leisure inimical to an authentic life. His demeanor and walk were products of aristocratic aesthetics and sociability, and the way he talked—carefully considered speeches and frequent use of particular maxims—betrayed an ontology different from the ideal men of the Revolution. Rather than deferring to virtue, this criticism was more dependent on physiognomic reasoning or an idealization of physical prowess beyond what was achievable by the idle or those who did not work with their hands. At the same time, it was rooted in a deference to nature.

The Mountain used this same reasoning in their debates with the Girondins. Here, the Mountain tried to assert superior politics by painting the Girondins and their positions as more sophisticated. By doing so, they could assert the wisdom that came from authenticity and lack of artifice. They wrote:

Statesmen, you want to organize the republic for the rich; and we, who are not statesmen, but men of nature, we who have no art, but the energy of all virtues, seek laws which draw the poor from his misery, and make all the men, in a universal ease, the happy citizens and ardent defenders of a universally adored republic.

Again, art and nature were on opposite sides. Statesmen, in this case, had an art, which was something that had departed from or gone beyond nature. As such, their reasoning led to the kind of Republic that served the rich—again, something that does not correspond to nature. The

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345 Higonnet, *Goodness*, 225. “…Jacobins believed that signs might perfectly express “the signified,” as, for example, the physical appearance of their foes. The true Jacobin wore his heart on his sleeve and could be immediately recognized as virtuous by his fellow Jacobins, just as aristocrats could be judged by their conspiratorial physiognomy.” Further, “Physionomie,” the idea that character had an effect on the facial features or appearance of a person, which one could reasonably judge, was popular at this time. Condemned as pseudo science by the encyclopedists, this kind of “moral physionomie” was nonetheless embraced by individuals like Rousseau and later by Zola in the nineteenth century. As Rousseau wrote, “However, it is not uncommon to see men change their physiognomy at different ages. I have seen several of them in this case; And I have always found that those whom I had been able to observe and follow had also changed their habitual passions. This observation, which is well confirmed, would seem to me decisive, and is not displaced in a treatise on education, where it is important to learn to judge the movements of the soul by external signs.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile. Ou De L'Education: Collection complete des ouvrages de J.J. Rousseau, citoyen de Geneve*, ed, Peyrou et Moulton Vol. IV (A. Geneve, 1782), 397.

real revolutionaries had nature, and their version of the Republic was therefore the correct one. Returning to the arguments against Lafayette, the physical prowess of the body, as an indication of one’s connection to a natural life, could therefore demonstrate the quality of masculinity for the individual male—the vigorous, robust, and virile achieving greater respect in this logic, thus creating deference to the working male and inevitable suspicion towards Lafayette.  

With this logic, one’s view of the sans-culottes determined the severity of these ideal masculine characteristics. This view of the sans-culottes, in turn, correlated with one’s chosen heroes of the Terror. For example, while the Robespierrom of Buonarroti put some attention on the sans-culottes, Blanqui’s Hebertism made them central. During the first Revolution, Hebert, through *Pere Duchesne*, put significant focus on the muscadin phenomenon, heightening the characteristics of the sans-culottes as well as making a contrast with aristocratic manner more important. Indeed, Hebert thought the muscadins were reason enough to justify the terror, since their threat had been directly against the sans-culottes, which represented for him the heart of the Revolutionary aesthetic and value. Lumping the muscadins in with the hoarders and merchants that were so unpopular to the sans-culottes, Hebert poured out a relatively large amount of vitriol against them in Year II. As such, his ideal masculinity became significantly more severe and his focus on the body more important.

The Blanquist treatment of the Revolution came from dedicated Blanquist and future communard, August Tridon, who had some help from Blanqui himself. Tired of reading distorted histories of the Revolution that simply praised either Danton or Robespierre, they wrote a corrective to this tendency entitled the *Hebertists*, which they published in 1864 and again in

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349 Amann, *Dandyism*, 29, 101, 121.
1871 as a series in a periodical. For Hebert, the only revolutionary about whom Blanqui could write good things, the Revolution was not about the traditional politicians, leaders, and demagogues most had focused on in their work. The men of the Convention, for him, were “Constitutional bastards,” “liars of liberty,” and were “...small, petty, slaves of ambition, egoism, and fear. In other words, they were “always bourgeois.” Instead, the true Revolutionaries belonged to Hebert’s Commune of August 10,’93, which focused on the poverty and oppression as experienced by the sans-culottes. Tridon, in line with the Hebertist perspective, wrote:

The Revolution...resides in the entrails of the plebs, the pikes of the faubourgs...in those obscure or execrated men, always in action, who...everywhere sowed the hatred of tyrants and dogmas....The sublime pleading of the ragged crowd at the gates of the palaces...workers without work and without bread, emaciated faces, pale women with sickly children, displaying their scars and their wounds in the invaded assemblies...impetuous deputations, which swear that they have no other religion than equality, and no other worship than their country. For him, “...the people alone was the great revolutionary—heroic, generous of their own blood and heart.” These were the “energetic men” of the Revolution. And, unlike Robespierre, it was clear that Hebert was dedicated wholly to them. As Hebert wrote in Pere Duchesne:

As for me, if I had a hundred heads, I would rather lose them one after another than be useless. What I was at the beginning of the Revolution, I am still. If my enemies think themselves strong enough to overwhelm me, I will call the sans-culottes to my aid; they will be my judges. I will ask them to examine all my life. If I have ceased to be their defender, if they do not find my hands clear, they will condemn me.

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351 Spitzer, *Revolutionary*, 124.


355 Tridon, *Hébertistes*, 68.
Unlike Robespierre’s belief in a deistic and civic religion to hold everyone together in virtue, Hebert preached not only emancipation from the rich, but from superstition and religion as well, a position that the sans-culottes themselves in general had advocated. Separating himself from the other Revolutionaries who embraced a form of deism, Hebert saw “authoritarian metaphysics” as “the cornerstone of all oppression.” Only Hebert and the sans-culottes truly understood the Revolution according to Tridon.

The masculinity that came from these models and values was much more rugged and vulgar than those which emerged from the decidedly bourgeois part of the Revolution. Hercules was Tridon’s chosen classical reference, and his presentation of masculinity followed suit. His emphasis on appearance championed a worker aesthetic, dramatically in contrast with the bourgeois neatness and aristocratic countenance of the other Jacobins. For example, after explaining the injustice that the true revolutionaries were up against, he wrote:

That is why the appearance of these men is tormented. This is why their brow is contracted by fear or hope. That is why their gestures are feverish and convulsive…You cannot understand the men of 93.

These were the features and physionomie that not only defied the aristocrat, but also were in striking contrast to the bourgeois make up of the Jacobins. In some cases, the sans-culottes’ relatively disheveled look offended bourgeois sensibilities, and some of the Hebertist left actually considered many Jacobins to be aristocratic. A significant difference between Jacobin notions of moral behavior and those of the sans-culottes also existed, again offending some

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357 Tridon, *Hébertistes*, 20. The materialist critique that cited “authoritarian metaphysics” as “the cornerstone of all oppression” remained consistent throughout the nineteenth century and connected the Hebertists with the free-thinking socialists of the Third Republic. See chapter six.
358 Tridon, *Hébertistes*, 27.
360 Higonnet, *Goodness*, 186.
361 Higonnet, “Aristocrate,” 60.
Jacobins and putting an obvious wedge between the public behaviors of both groups.\(^{362}\)

Tridon capitalized on these differences by suggesting that because of the sans-culottism of Hebert, those seen as patriots, but who “require a footman to put on their boots,” would reject Hebert because of his low status and look.\(^{363}\) As Tridon proudly proclaimed, Hebert “was a rough player” with a long life of struggle.\(^{364}\) And yet, while Hebert was mean to the powerful, he was kind to his brothers in overalls.\(^{365}\) His words were praise only if a narrative if ideal masculinity counter to the bourgeoisie existed.

Another example of this difference came with the male performance of language. This is important because the Revolution politicized language and thus made it a marker of true or ideal masculinity. Louis Blanc’s account of the day preceding the meeting of the Estates General in 1789 betrays this Revolutionary criterion. For him, the most impressive elements of that day were not the pomp or solemnity that Paris had planned for the occasion. Rather,

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\text{…the real, the imposing novelty [of that day] was the language that was spoken in the whole town, and it was the meaning of the words that were exchanged when they came together. It was the alteration of faces, the pride of looks, the unusual pride of attitudes, the fever of souls. It was the virile and powerful anxiety of a people who were visited by liberty.}^{366}\]

Blanc associated notions of virility and power with the collective characteristics of the Third Estate, much like Sieyès’ metaphor of the chained robust man. He also suggested, besides physiognomy, attitude, and “fever of soul,” a distinction of communication to mark those “who were visited by liberty.”\(^{367}\) As such, style of communication could distinguish them from the

\(^{362}\) Higonnet, Goodness, 284.

\(^{363}\) Tridon, Hébertistes, 31.

\(^{364}\) Elsewhere he refers to Hebert’s “minimal and rugged life.” Tridon, Hébertistes, 47.

\(^{365}\) Tridon, Hébertistes, 32. See also Wrigley’s treatment of the sans-culottes as symbol for the anti-aristocrat—unwashed, grubby and thus virtuous. Wrigley, “Formation,” 25-26.


\(^{367}\) Elsewhere, Blanc says that pride associated with the Revolution is male. “The freshness of the ornaments, the young girls throwing flowers into heaven, the young men bowed under the paternal blessing, then, raising themselves up with a male pride, waving their sabers, and swearing not to lay them down until they had saved
aristocrat and egoist and thus the masculine from the feminine. In the ancien régime, one could use “male” to describe speech that was strong, expressive, or energetic. This phraseology certainly reflected patriarchy in that social norms would have dictated differences in volume, aggressiveness of tone, and the level of directness between men and women. However, as France went into its seventeenth century, distinctions in speaking between the Third Estate and the nobility had also become apparent. And by the Revolution, the patois of the sans-culottes had entered the political discourse of France. A mixture of gender and class differences therefore participated in the politicization and gendering of speech.

A pronounced example came from Blanc’s account of the incroyable phenomenon. While the clash between the sans-culottes and the representatives of their aristocratic opposites already had a strong gendered element with regard to clothing and manners, the element of speech added another dimension. Not only did it reinforce a gender scheme coming out of the Revolution, it also added depth to the logics of masculinity and gendering. Louis Blanc described the incroyables as speaking in “ridiculously effeminate jargon.” He went on to write:

Not content with perfuming themselves in the manner of women, the "marvelous" being part of the gilded youth, dreamed up a way to debase, as it were, the language, as if speaking for them had been a strain. Careful to avoid speaking all the male touches of pronunciation, they scarcely consented to open their lips when they had something to say. And what escaped from it, according to the testimony of the Journal de Paris, was ‘a sort of confused noise like the pz, pz, pz, by which a little lady's dog is called.’ The pronunciation of the letter, demanding from them, no doubt, a too virile effort, they said: peale de honneu, supme, incoyable…Silly affectations, but an important thing to raise because it shows the state of abasement that mores had quickly moved towards.

France from the combined efforts of the whole earth.” Blanc, Histoire, Vol. 12, 384.
369 Burke, Social, 11.
372 Blanc here means both the Incroyables and Marveleux.
As the first line suggests, while the *incroyables* were effeminizing manners, they followed through by effeminizing language as well, a second form of debasement. Blanc saw them both as coming from the same source, that is, the return of luxury, inequality, and aristocratic mores. Eliminating the “r” in the pronunciations made their speech weak sounding and almost unintelligible. Blanc suggested that speaking for them was a strain and required an effort requiring virility, which they did not have. As such, all the things that gave language and expression a masculine distinction were absent. Blanc, here, seems to use two different logics to effeminize the incroyables’ speech. One, he related the abasement of language—that is, enough departure from a masculine form to warrant calling it feminine—to a lack of virtue or the abasement of mores. The other was that the inability to speak in a masculine way correlated with a lack of physical strength or virility. In either case, one could judge masculinity by speech, and masculinity had something to do with virtue and physical prowess.374

Jacobins clearly acknowledged a certain way of speaking as masculine and thus proper. Patrice Higgonot’s work points out the conscious effort of Jacobins to produce a speaking style proper to their philosophy. According to Jacobins, the speech of a new and virtuous man should be calm but filled with energy. A true revolutionary man should speak in a way that was distinct from aristocratic styles, which were insincere, obfuscative, and representative of their “icy evil.”375 Jacobins should speak with clarity and precision but with an enthusiasm in language and manner that was “emotionally expressive.”376 Robespierre early on could therefore write of a “masculine accent which befits republicans.”377 Further, in describing a fellow Jacobin he

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374 It is perhaps worth noting that neither of the contemporary liberal histories of the Revolution produced by Mignet and Thiers gender the accounts of the muscadins and *incroyables*. The implication is that, since they had no reason to condemn these groups, they had no reason to take away their masculinity.
376 Higonnet, *Goodness*, 221.
377 Robespierre also ascribed “male accents of outraged liberty” to those who were oppressed. Robespierre, *Œuvres*, vol. 10, 572.
asserted:

Saint-Andrew, with a pressing logic, discovers all the contradictions of the public opinion he is combating…with simplicity and truth…he opposes to the terrors of which the minds of men were to be filled, the male principles of free men…the language of good sense and liberty. \(^{378}\)

Aristocrats like Lafayette could not help but expose their lack of virtue and thus masculinity when speaking. And once the sans-culottes began to influence the discourse of masculinity, the weak pronunciations of the *incroyables* would not have failed to invite ascriptions of femininity.

Again, one’s take on what constituted masculine or ideal speech depended on one’s needs from the Revolution. The descriptions of ideal, masculine speech from the Robespierrist perspective fit the dominant bourgeois values of the Jacobins. In contrast, the sans-culotte or anti-bourgeois emphasis championed a different style. As in the Rousseauvian narrative, voice and manner of speech were important. But Tridon expanded the criteria for what constituted real Revolutionary speech. Criticizing graceful Republicans, he put the criticism in highly gendered language:

> Sweet talkers: you dazzle the people with your golden rhetoric and smother their virility by boasting of their aristocratic instincts…Yet, your feeble contralto (woman’s register) voice is but a tiny flail in contrast to the roar of Marat’s and Herbert. \(^{379}\)

Tridon accused them of having female voices, implicitly weak and tiny. As such, it was nothing compared to the roar of real revolutionaries, whose voices reflected their ideal masculinity. In this excerpt, the gendering that Robespierre and Blanc applied to the aristocrats, Tridon applied to the Jacobins themselves. To further make this point, he taped into a sympathy for the austere, natural, and authentic by “admitting” that Hebert had a low and hoarse voice that he peppered

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\(^{379}\) Tridon, *Hébertistes*, 39.
with curses, which, according to Tridon, was the natural product of Hebert’s working background. Tridon then went on to compare both styles of communication. Sure, he wrote, you might get wonderful speeches and literature from those in the Convention, “but on the other hand, what frankness! What verve! What a deep love of justice and equality!” Here, the lowly and rough are virtues because they allow for authenticity and love of justice. Even more important, this allowed Hebert to interpret the Revolution to the people. This kind of communication put Hebert “…within the reach of the less educated classes, incapable of understanding the political language of saloons and assemblies.” Ultimately, the Hebertist notion of *males accents* was significantly broader than what Robespierrists had idealized.

In a final excerpt, Tridon spoke of Hebert as if he were a force of nature or a deity. He gave him the attributes of power and violence and asked him to avenge the injustices to which the old system had subjected women. This drew on the idealization of an aggressive masculinity, one that depended purely on force. It also forwarded, in spite of its seeming defense of women, an oppressive narrative for women. Women appear here not only dependant, but also lacking any agency, mere objects from which the men derived their honor. He wrote:

> Come, Hebert! Take your bloody whip, arm yourself with your wildest roar. Do you see these naked women struggling in the midst of the missionary dragoons of Louis XIV, those virgins, those children desperate with grief and shame in the arms of fine officers and gallant lords? Do you hear on the wind of triumphal fanfares the sombre song of rape? Do you know Fontenelle, that Breton baron who, when he returned from hunting, liked to stick his feet into the entrails of the disemboweled girls? Hebert! Think of your mother, think of your sisters, think of the rags of the wretches. The measure is full, the hour has come; be vengeance, be punishment! ...

The battle required him to defeat not only the enemy, but also to protect and defend the sanctity of the women. Apart from the mythic physicality and the picture of an avenging and bloody god,

381 “Let us add that he had succeeded perfectly, and that his Father Duchesne was the most influential journal of the plebeian Paris.” Tridon, *Hébertistes*, 51-52.
382 Tridon, *Hébertistes*, 32.
the focus on women and children was important here. For one it helped make it a class-based vision. The women he was to avenge and protect belonged to his people, and their oppressors were the rich. Further, the means for this overthrow was not the state; it was the force of the sans-culottes, again marking a class distinction. Even more, the assumption here was that men had jurisdiction or responsibility over the women and children. Therefore, not only does this section assert a rule by the workers, its implied ending is a completely new power structure, a new patriarchy, a replacement for the one that was quickly losing its place. In this vision, sans-culottes became ideal men in a new patriarchy.

Summary and Conclusions

All of these examples follow a clear rhetorical pattern. Robespierre, Buonarroti, Blanc, and Tridon all applied the semantic field of “male” and the patriarchal phraseology in which those words sometimes appeared only to the good guys—the real republicans, the fraternally minded, the people, or anyone visited with freedom as they saw it. In these writings, the authors never gave masculine attributes to defined enemies, nor did they give the heroes feminine qualities. In other words, the gendered language lined up nicely with the new and developing logics for masculinity. Therefore, the notion that these examples might only reflect formal writing styles or convention does not hold up. In all, a coherent gendering, providing compelling symbols, precedents, and logics emerged from the Terror, one that remained consistent with the ejection of women from the public sphere that occurred after ‘93. Most important is the evidence that this had an effect on how socialists conceptualized their experience in the nineteenth century.

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The ideas that filled the vacuum left by a collapsing system affected the changing discourses of masculinity. The backlash against artifice and the simplifying of appearance corresponded
well with the values championed by the Enlightenment’s cult of nature. Just as important was that this deference to nature manifested itself within the emergence of a public sphere and the need for men to distinguish themselves symbolically from women and the aristocracy. The result helped produce new logics for masculinity, which became ideological and gained political force through civic republicanism. During the Terror, the new logics became dominant, but also more flexible. If one’s enemies were the old aristocracy, the ideal man took on one characteristic and look. If one’s enemies were the rich, ideal masculinity became something else. The latter narrative became meaningful to radicals once classes matured in the nineteenth century and socialism emerged.

Memories of the Terror and mass violence made an association of republicanism with the guillotine too easy to make during the Restoration. Therefore, Republicanism could not exist in any kind of organized or significant manner before 1830. The socialism that did develop at this time had a special relationship to the Revolution. For one, it gained energy from the notion that socialists were the true inheritors of the Revolution and its world-historical task to complete it. That made many of them apologists of the Terror and therefore particularly attached to the factions and clashes within. It also informed their present. The idea that the bourgeoisie had taken the place of the aristocracy, or was simply another version of them, an observation of the first Revolutionaries, remained into the nineteenth century. The continuity of narrative demonstrated to socialists that the bourgeoisie and the proletariat were historic enemies, showing in a compelling manner that, just as in the first Revolution, the bourgeoisie had used the proletariat for their own political gains in the July Revolution. The fact that concerns about luxury and its moral and economic effects on the French nation remained reinforced this view.

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384 Jennings, “Debate,” 96-105. Even though the male bourgeoisie in general had adopted a relatively toned down
Further, concepts such as egoism and fraternity stayed meaningful into and throughout the nineteenth century. In the eyes of socialists, the issue of class was only part of what separated these groups.

Several criteria therefore emerged from the Revolution that remained meaningful to the nineteenth century. Notions of virtue or of humble disposition were important. This meant that the proletariat possessed austerity, that is, a rejection of frivolity and artifice in appearance or speech. It also meant that socialists could idealize workers as having a dedication to fraternity or the greater good found in community or national identity—in other words, a rejection of egoism. Further, things like a proclivity towards justice, and the energy or motivation to defend or fight for it were part of this romanticizing. More important was physicality. This could be as simple as body size, strength, or health. For example, a true man was fit, muscular, and worked with his hands. It could also include ruggedness in appearance, manners, or speech, the potential for violence, righteous anger, and the ability to insurrect or overthrow.

Just as important in all this was the fear of physical degeneration and depopulation that existed during the Revolutionary period. The reason for its importance was that it had an effect on Revolutionary rhetoric by making physical health and its markers persuasive and relevant themes and concepts. The result was that in the renegotiation of patriarchy and thus masculinity that occurred, it helped shape discourse. Degeneration tied counter-hegemonic discourse to itself, dictating its conceptual and symbolic parameters and helping to make regeneration such a powerful and widely applicable concept. The radical Jacobin prejudice towards physicality dovetailed nicely into these public concerns and their counter-hegemonic rhetoric. Strong and uniform, they still practiced a conspicuous consumption. The bourgeoisie could spend up to five times more on clothing than wageworkers, and their wives some times were expected to display wealth for them. Roche, “Clothing,”102.

energetic male bodies therefore became credible markers of health up against the aristocracy and wealthy bourgeoisie, and manual laborers could theoretically function as the keepers of national or racial health.

This phenomenon also provides a model for understanding the dynamics of hegemonic masculinity particular to the French experience of the nineteenth century. Public concerns about individual and collective health that belonged to the Revolution helped forward metaphors that lived on in radical rhetoric. These metaphors were already in use by ‘89 as seen in Abbey Sieyès’ pamphlet on the Third Estate. According to Sieyès, the idea that the old system of aristocratic privilege should remain part of a new France going forward was like asking the sick person where he wants his malade to be in his body. Rather, writes Sieyès, one has to get rid of the sickness to “…restore the health and the play of all the organs well enough to prevent [those things]capable of invalidating the most essential principles of vitality.” Robespierre, in the same manner, referred to despotism and aristocracy, wealth and poverty, and royalism as diseases of the political body. France as a body that had a disease or a sick organ worked well in articulating the need for radical change in the nineteenth century. The fact that France had a severe outbreak of Cholera lasting throughout the July Monarchy, which some blamed on the working classes, heightened the effect of this language and the need for socialists to put forth an ideal male, healthy and vigorous, as its representative, and an ideology that promised healing and regeneration. In all, counter-hegemonic masculinity found a place in the logics and language of radical politics.

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386 This rhetoric goes back as far as the sixteenth century. “Thus, the state of the kingdom — an ailing body in need of succour — became a metaphor for the state of the monarchy.” Roberts, “Kingdom’s, 150.
387 Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, Qu'est-ce que le Tiers-État ? (S.I.,1789), 179-180.
388 Maximilien Robespierre, Oeuvres de Maximilien Robespierre Vol. 9 (Paris: chez l'éditeur, 1840), 190, 496.
Chapter 4: Masculinity in the Logic and Language of Socialist Politics  
1830-1852

I do not resemble in any way those effeminate democrats whose wishy-washy theories may make us fall back into a new decadence. My theories…are those of the people…If you are degenerate, reject this journal. If, on the contrary, you are the worthy sons of your fathers, read it…

First Issue of the Revived *Pere Duchene* April, 1848

…the response to material interests produced its greatest results, not for those whose faculties and forces it involves—the worker, the intelligent and robust man—but for the idle, cunning, half effeminate, half violent man who has appropriated [them] by oppression or exploitation…

*Paris Révolutionnaire*, 1848

From the beginning of the July Monarchy to the end of the Second Republic, republican socialists practiced a consistent gendering that raised the masculinity of the male proletariat over that of the bourgeoisie. The reasoning, language, and symbol they utilized to complete this gendering, however, were neither ends in themselves, nor were they always self-sufficient in their ability to compel others. This gendering worked with a particular structure of political logic to produce rhetoric aiming to satisfy a range of psychological and social needs. Republican socialists in this period did not theorize about society apart from French historical experience and thus political character. An acute sense of justice for the oppressed, therefore, could not be the only thing that compelled them. Like the French in general, these socialists desired a revived and flourishing *patrie*. In the republican socialist version, France, because of the freedom and equality socialism would help bring about amongst its citizens, would again become a great nation to lead the rest of Europe. The rhetorical possession of superior masculinity therefore

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went beyond class into issues of national, and even international, identity. This was true during the first Revolution and remained so throughout the nineteenth century.

Like radicals from the first Revolution, reflecting the general language of politics, republican socialists cast the French nation and its problems in terms of a human body, disease, and recovery. The picture of a malady destroying a physical body effectively conveyed that something was seriously wrong with France. For example, the infectious disease of gangrene, which caused the putrification and death of sections of the human body, was a favorite metaphor among socialists. They wrote generally of a social gangrene, but more specifically about the gangrene of absolutism or the gangrene of aristocracy, anything that polluted and rendered sick the French nation. It was also rhetorically effective to present one’s politics as a curative or as bringing about healing or physical revival. One socialist wrote of a republic that desired more than anything to use a scalpel and remove the “hideous gangrene that infects the social body.”

Another, writing about the enemies of the new republic of ’48, recalled the first Revolution when, “…in an instant the people pulverized everything in their powerful hands and Republican France rose like a new sun to flood the world with light…. Yes, it used bloodshed to rid France of aristocrats, he wrote, but “What would one think of a doctor who would let his patient perish rather than cut off a gangrenous finger?” Socialists, through the means of socialism were to regenerate the body of France. In this way, France could emerge as a healthy and flourishing

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392 See chapter three.
394 Unattributed, “Paris, 10 Avril.” Pere Duchene, April 10, 1848.
The health of the national body and the physical and psychological health of its individual citizens were complementary narratives. Claims there was something wrong with the state brought along assertions that something was wrong with the health of its individual citizens. For example, during the first Revolution, fear of depopulation and the physical degeneration of the French people were present amongst claims that the disease of aristocracy had infected the French national body. This pairing housed a certain kind of political logic. Along with appeals to justice, one could also criticize the physical and psychological qualities of its ruling class to back up one’s arguments for radical change. If one wanted a strong and healthy nation to lead Europe, it required a strong and healthy ruling class to achieve it. As such, the civic republicanism of the first Revolution expressed the criteria for a healthy republic in gendered terms, which resonated well in a dramatically expressed patriarchy. As chapter three has shown, the result was that radical republican rhetoric argued for a new republican masculinity to replace the old aristocratic effeminacy.

Nineteenth-century socialists were in a similar situation. Justice for workers was not simply about correcting a wrong; it was also about the health of the French nation and its role in Europe. The same logic therefore compelled, and rhetoric that judged the physical and psychological quality of the ruling class applied. One could not expect a healthy and virile France to come from an effeminate and unhealthy bourgeoisie. A flourishing France that took the lead in Europe required a truly masculine, healthy, and superior group of individuals as its guiding and

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397 According to Blanqui, “[the aristocracy] are for the social body what is cancer for the human body: the first condition of the return of the social body to the right state is the annihilation of the aristocracy.” Auguste Blanqui, “Formulaire de reception a la “société des saisons.”’(1837), Blanqui’s Oeuvres completes (Paris: Editions Gallilée,1977), 129. See also Penny Roberts, “The Kingdom’s Two Bodies? Corporeal Rhetoric and Royal Authority During the Religious Wars,” French History 21, 2 (2007), 147-164.

398 Quinlan, Crisis, 19-51.
representative element. The physically superior and, being fraternally minded, psychologically superior male worker fit perfectly in this gendered rhetoric, and the male sans-culottes’ phenomenon of the first Revolution provided a convincing model.

**The Restoration**

Attempting to put France back on the path of long-term industrialization and growth, Restoration governments (1814-1830) implemented, through top-down administration, a policy of unfettered competition among entrepreneurs and laborers. Though successful in developing the French economy, the degree to which the government forced this competition on an unprepared populace became problematic. Going beyond the capacity of laborers and entrepreneurs to adapt, the French state forced workers and entrepreneurs into “isolated individuals competing in the marketplace.” Workers responded by trying to organize themselves. The Campagnnonage actually survived the Revolution and became one way of achieving this end. While Restoration governments had outlawed worker associations, royalist rule allowed things that had connections to the *ancien régime*. However, these were not nearly enough to rescue workers from their lack of social power and their subsequent misery.

While the bourgeoisie had been forward-looking in their rejection of the *ancien régime*, their consciousness about labor and the relationship between rich and poor was retrograde. Though there was innovation in government and the economy during the Restoration, there was no real

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401 Horn, 249, 251.

402 See chapter two.
innovation in the governmental response or attitude toward the needy. Various bureaux of bienfaisance, originally organized in the Directory period (1795-1799), did exist to help the poor. However, these organizations worked out of local communities and received much of their funding from notables, many of whom were liberal. Not only did this system discourage rebellion amongst the poor, it also helped justify a paternalistic attitude towards the masses.

Jacques Rancière’s important study of workers from the 1820s to 1840s reveals how the nascent proletariat responded to these disparaging attitudes towards them. As explored in chapter two, Rancière shows the importance of their direct confrontation with the bourgeoisie in developing identity. Workers discovered that the bourgeoisie had characterized them as objects worthy of oppression, another layer of subjugation to add to their economic exploitation and social weakness. For the developing proletariat, the bourgeoisie had no right to determine worker identity, especially if it was to deny them a certain status consistent with independence and equality. As such, the response of the working class was to assert its status as “men.”

Donald Reid asserts that these working-class concerns were essentially about defending their humanness. This interpretation, however, does not do justice to all the political discourses going on at the time. No doubt, workers used the terminology of dehumanization, but the gendered universe of the rising liberal bourgeoisie had clearly begun to affect the language of

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403 The Revolution had eliminated the old system of aid to the poor with the promise of developing a rational and far more adequate one. With the radical turn in the Revolution and the need to fight external enemies, the Revolutionary government was unable to construct this new system, effectively annihilating charity in France for a short while. The Directory period saw some attempts at fixing the problem. Although Napoleon tweaked the system in an effort to streamline the economy, the laws that kept this system in place remained essentially the same until 1848. Michael Rapport, Nineteenth-Century Europe (Basingstoke, England; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 91.


406 Rancière, Night, xxii. See also Rancière, Ouvrier, 215. For example: “…car nous sommes aussi des hommes, et non point des machines.”
oppression. When the tailor, Alphonse Grignon, in 1833 complained that the ruling class viewed workers as different from other men, and that they were ultimately playthings for the idle rich who did not pay them enough to feed their families, it was as much, if not more, about the quality or status of “man” than it was of human being.\(^\text{407}\) Workers understood that bourgeois discourse towards them suggesting dependence or lack of freedom would count as a slight of masculinity.\(^\text{408}\)

More evidence for this interpretation comes from the fact that workers made coherent an alternative identity, one in direct contrast to the bourgeoisie. As Michelle Perot emphasized, the working class “defined itself by its enemies” and had a contrarian attitude towards the bourgeoisie.\(^\text{409}\) In other words, simply to defend their humanness would have required only a demand for similar or equal characterization. Instead, their response was more complex, ultimately condemning the characteristics of their oppressors, and asserting their own moral identity. For example, workers hated the “idle and useless,” and disliked what they perceived as fat and lazy.\(^\text{410}\) One can clearly see this in the proletarian artwork of Nicolas-Toussaint Charlet,
who focused on physicality and health in his criticisms of the bourgeoisie. His worker of the 1830s was bearded, and his metaphor for the proletariat was a muscular forearm stretched out in command of others. In contrast, he depicted the bourgeoisie as an arm “sapped by laxity and repose.”

Jill Harrison also asserts that the working-class rejected the ideas of “personal advancement and self enrichment” that characterized the values of the bourgeoisie. It therefore becomes reasonable to assert that a particular masculine identity accompanied the slow development of class awareness.

Labor and socialism, however, had different histories. Socialism was relatively unpopular amongst workers before 1830. The fact is that the theorizing of the earliest socialists was not perfectly relevant to the practical needs of workers during the Restoration. Early socialist ideology bore the marks of governmental issues pressing during the Restoration period, which did not always complement worker needs or speak from its perspective. According to Tony Judt, however, the development of socialism in relative isolation from the workers was the element that made socialism as important as it became at this time. For one, it theorized apart

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412 Working-class republicanism, “…represented a challenge to the hegemonic masculinity of the period: the spirit of the businessmen and the bosses, the middle class respectability that placed a new emphasis on personal advancement and self enrichment.” Jill Harsin, Barricades: The War of the Streets in Revolutionary Paris, 1830–1848. (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 10
415 Judt, Marxism, 58.
from republicanism, which, while eventually an alternative for some workers, accommodated bourgeoisie membership and needs in its moderate forms. Further, by developing separately from direct worker experience, socialism transcended older forms of protest that had lingered amongst workers. One of the most important elements that came out of this theorizing was the idea that workers were unique and thus had a prominent place in history, a feature that produced a wellspring of hope and moral inspiration for the proletariat and complemented a narrative that championed the general superiority of the male laborer over that of the bourgeoisie.

While labor and socialism originally came out of different gates, they achieved a symbiotic relationship during the crucial period of the 1830s. The Revolution of 1830 had much to do with this change. In 1830, liberals overthrew Charles X and installed Louis Philippe. Much like the first Revolution, those who did the heavy lifting, the rioting and fighting that toppled Charles X, did not benefit from their efforts. Instead, bourgeois liberals harnessed the revolutionary energy of the workers for their own gains. Once achieving their goals, they left the workers with nothing for their sacrifice. A compelling narrative, it helped justify a return of the radical

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417 Judt, *Marxism*, 74. "By the 1840’s in France a linkage began to develop not only between socialist theory and working-class activism but also between those two and the revolutionary mystique—the almost mystical feeling...that a political revolution could bring secular salvation, a total transformation of the human condition. Albert Lindeman, A History of European Socialism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 72.
418 David W. Lovell, “The French Revolution and the Origins of Socialism: The Case of Early French Socialism,” *French History* 6 (1992): 186. Romanticism also played a part. It was at its height of influence among intellectuals at this time: the reality of “the people” and of “France,” dotted the talk and work of the poets. Working class poetry became popular as the proletariat became a defined and provocative subject matter. During this time, many socialist works were published including Proudhon’s *What is Property?* Louis Blanc published a work on the failings of the July Monarchy in two huge volumes as well as his *The Organization of Work*, a condemnation of competitive and individualistic capitalism and the presentation of a realistic socialist system.
419 And since this liberalism was infused with old aristocratic values regarding the poor and the rich, it was an incomplete ideology for what France was about to go through. Although the franchise almost doubled in 1830, still only a small percentage of the French population could vote. Those who represented a growing class-consciousness and the growing social question had no real mechanism for change. As Louis Blanc observed, the revolution made the “sufferings of the working class more acute.” Louis Blanc, *Révolution française Histoire de dix ans*, (Pagnerre: Paris, 1841), 257.
tradition by echoing the power plays of the first Revolution.420 As such, the content and models of the Revolution began to inform the lived experience of male workers in a significant way.

After the Revolution in 1830, a republican-inspired socialism apart from the utopians became an important representative of French workers.421 Not all workers became republican socialists, but the nature of this socialism was that it claimed to be speaking for workers—at first just those in France, then eventually all workers once French socialism took on a more consistently universal character. The pretence, of course, was that the rhetoric was thoroughly class-based. The reality was that, like their radical precursors, their concern was only for the male element.422 The reasoning that republican socialists used in their gendered critique, reflecting the rejection of women from the public sphere during the first Revolution, completely erased or rendered invisible not only women as workers, but also women as socialists.

Superior Masculinity in the Logic and Language of the Revolutionary Tradition

Several elements supporting or facilitating the male gendered discourse of republican socialists had either survived or returned during the July Monarchy. One can credit some elements to the historians and activists who were able to produce a collective memory of the Revolution for socialists. For example, Hercules as a representation of the people would have

420 For socialist Louis Blanc, these political factions were merely covers for bigger issues of economics. He wrote: “Under the denomination of liberals and royalists, interests were concealed that were in reality neither those of liberty nor those of monarchy…One party desired that the nation should be agricultural…The other party entertained diametrically opposite notions. The former class consisted in general of gentilshommes, emigrants, dignitaries of the church, and scions of ancient families…To the second class belonged sons of parliamentarians, bankers, manufacturers, traders, holders of national property, physicians, lawyers, the bourgeoisie.” The fact that either faction would modify its view of government when its interests were challenged showed to Louis Blanc that economic self-interest was ultimately at stake. This phenomenon became clearer when the parties matured. Louis Blanc also understood that it was the middle class that ultimately had the social strength, meaning that rule would ultimately go to liberals. Blanc, *Histoire*, 37.


required some positive and polemical exposure to sans-culottes’ struggles during ‘93.423 One periodical cast Hercules as the representation of the sans-culottes of ’93 and his club as the force of the people, “…with which our fathers have shaken the old world.”424 The king as a pygmy in contrast also returned.425 Another cast the loss of the socialist element of the Second Republic as the revolutionary Hercules finishing off the “last convulsions of the hydra.”426 The people, it reassured, like Hercules, was still fighting for its ultimate triumph. A more involved and sophisticated application drew on Hercules’ encounter with Anteaus. In the original story, Anteaus was hard to kill because when he touched the ground he was able to regain strength. Hercules had to kill him by lifting him and crushing him with a bear hug. For this socialist, Anteaus represented property, and Hercules was the strength of the people.427 Hercules, therefore, remained a meaningful figure for French socialist self-awareness and propaganda well into the Third Republic.

More evidence of this socialist collective memory was that sans-culottism started to appear amongst the workers after 1830.428 *Bonnet Rouge: Drapeau de la Sans-Culottes* wrote that, “Sans culottism was a virtue that summarized all the revolutionary virtues of the [first Revolution]…” The periodical told its readers that they were the sans-culottes because, like those of the past, they were the underprivileged who worked with hands or head, “…with a poor family, without uniforms, and sometimes without bread.”429 The energy surrounding the original sans-culottes seems to have been high considering Louis Blanqui’s critique of a recent periodical. The editors had asked him to comment on its title and chosen frontispiece. Blanqui,

428 Jill Harsin, *Barricades*, 16.
fearing they might be fetishizing the red bonnet of the sans-culottes, obliged from prison:

…we are a new party, though connected with the revolutionary tradition; and it is a question of showing ourselves…the heir of the subversive mission of our predecessors. Let us leave the red cap, the Masonic triangles, and all the phantasmagoric baggage of illuminism. Freedom, Equality, Fraternity! This is good, it is sublime; it is clear, sharp, and above all, brief. This formula summarizes the future of humanity is ours.430

It is not hard to understand Blanqui’s concern when considering the number of periodicals with attachments to ‘93 that came out in the revolutionary year of 1848. Paris saw Pere Duchene, the formerly Herbertist periodical aimed at the sans-culottes, revived. The same year saw the birth of a periodical called the Journal des sans culottes along with others like the Le Vieux Cordelier de 1848: Gazette de la Révolution Sociale, to name only a few. This worked well for socialists since it was easy to see the bourgeoisie as ultimately an aristocracy of wealth, one hundred times worse than the aristocracy of birth, as one added, and more egoist and insolent than ever.431 As such, the antagonistic groups that produced the Revolutionary narrative from which the socialists drew meaning were easily represented in the nineteenth century.

Other elements supporting the male gendered discourse of the socialists more than likely remained meaningful throughout the intervening period. An example was the patriarchal terminology used in the first Revolutionary period. Like Jacobins before them, socialists used mâle to ascribe a superlative form to things like style, shape, experience, virtue, and liberty.432

As with the first Revolution, the importance, here, lay in the pattern of its usage. Socialists applied this adjective overwhelmingly to their side, which, when considered collectively, revealed a gendered rhetoric. The survival of this terminology suggests that similar attitudes of republican socialists towards women continued as well, with no evidence of modification. Indeed, the republican socialist desire to champion a new masculinity would have done little for socialist or proletarian women at this point, especially considering that their criticism of the bourgeoisie rested on an assumption of female inferiority. Socialists also used the concept of “energy” in a similar way. Energy, even though a very flexible concept, fell along political lines and thus carried a notion of masculinity or a quality of health. For example, socialists could explain the lack of French influence in Europe by its lack of energy.\footnote{Fredrick Degeorge, “Trois ans de règne,” l’Almanach du Pas-de-Calais, (Patriotic Publications of ‘bon sens’: Paris, 1833) 15. Republished in Les révolutions du XIXe siècle. Vol. 9, La propagande républicaine en province : 1830-1834 (EDHIS: Paris, 1974)} Another example would be the identification of ideal men by their possession of moral energy and intellectual vigor.\footnote{Bonnier, “Le Fédération des Mineurs,” Le socialiste, Jan 22, 1899.} In both cases, energy was a vital ingredient in the distinction between the healthy and unhealthy, and thus an indicator of true masculinity.\footnote{For example, ads for medications to promote health included Force, Énergie, Santé, and Vigour as their marks. Le socialiste, Sep 4 1898.}

Another element that would have remained meaningful was the centrality of egoism in the critique of aristocracy and its association with the effeminate.\footnote{Rancière, Night, xxii.} Using the metaphors of body and health, La Republique Rouge: Drapeau de la Démocratie wrote that egoism was “the chronic disease of the nineteenth century.” Reflecting the recent problems with cholera, and

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La Revue Socialiste observed this as a feature of patriarchy as well: “…in our [laws] the male retains the rights of a master, and in our grammar the masculine is qualified as the noblest.” J.D.A. “Coup D’Œil: Sur L’Histoire de l’avenir.” La Revue Socialiste, Vol. 22. (Libraire de La Revue Socialiste, 1895), 58.
\footnote{For example, ads for medications to promote health included Force, Énergie, Santé, and Vigour as their marks. Le socialiste, Sep 4 1898.}
matching the intensity of usage in the first Revolution, *La Republique Rouge* further called egoism the “cholera morbus of civilization,” stating that it “…eats away humanity and gangrenes societies.”\(^{437}\) Indeed, according to socialists, egoists were weak (*impuissant*) and cowardly.\(^{438}\) In socialist reasoning, egoism softened “…the resilience of [one’s] primitive energy.”\(^{439}\) As such, the bourgeois male could never be sure of his moral strength or physical courage. Ultimately, the bourgeois egoist, like his aristocratic counterpart in the previous century, was a different being from the worker.

The last important consistency was the French practice of physiognomy, that is, using physical appearance to judge one’s inward qualities or content. For example, like his counterpart of the previous century, the socialist had the ability to identify the egoist by his looks. *La Republique Rouge* wrote,

> Recognize an egoist by his smooth complexion, hypocritical language, the color of his skin, the shape of his face, and the inflection of his voice. He is absorbed in individuality and experiences neither pain nor pleasure. A little runt of the human species, he brings to society the stain of his slimy community and his hideous existence.\(^{440}\)

Along with this was the importance of the voice in the physiognomic identification of true masculinity. For example, a severe critic of Adolphe Thiers went after the voice in his takedown of this hated character of the right. Besides calling him a physical disgrace, he said that nature put all his virility in his voice and then, in mockery of his voice, claimed that Thiers had one so nasally that it “rips the ear,” and “his rhetoric soars like the fly.”\(^{441}\) This was unlike the truly masculine voice, the *mâle* accent, the kind reserved for crying “Vive Republic, democratic and


\(^{441}\) Cormenin Timon, “Portraits Contemporaines,” *La misérables*, February 28, 1870.
social,” praising the first martyrs of the Commune, or describing the eloquence of another socialist. This discourse, while advocating for the male worker, no doubt continued to fuel anti-woman attitudes amongst republican socialists.

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In 1831, Ulysse Trelat, a colleague of Buonarroti, reflected on the one-year anniversary of the July Revolution that overthrew Charles X. Here, he dramatically lamented the fact that the bourgeoisie had betrayed the people. Instead of eliminating the royalism they always claimed to hate, the bourgeoisie, loving wealth, chose instead to compromise and lay down on the “golden bed” of aristocracy. Embracing Monarchy and again enslaving the people, Trelat called the bourgeoisie the “eunuchs of our three days.” He understood that, “[a]t the dawn of a new era, a new brand of men would have been needed: men with manly (mâle) and generous thoughts.”

As Trelat conveyed, this occasion required real men, ones who possessed fraternity and not the self-interest and egoism of the bourgeoisie.

Louis Blanqui, another colleague of Buonarroti, agreed with Trelat’s assessment. Blanqui took part in the three glorious days that overthrew the reign of Charles X, which had a profound effect on him. The initial euphoria of victory accompanied by the crushing let down when an almost equally oppressive regime for the poor asserted its power over France encouraged in him the further work of insurrection. Blanqui therefore continued agitation along with a recently formed organization called the Friends of the People, which included Ulysse Trelat. This agitation got him into trouble with the authorities and led to his first of many imprisonments.

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444 Trelat, 5.
July of 1831, the state charged Blanqui and several members of the Society with activities against the state. He went on trial in January of 1832 and gave a prepared speech before his accusers. In this so-called “Trial of the Fifteen,” Blanqui presented a narrative that justified and threatened future insurrection.

Blanqui was careful with his terminology in his prepared monologue. A common practice amongst socialists in the nineteenth century, he used the terms “people” and “proletariat” interchangeably. For example, in one place he claimed the size of the proletariat as 30 million large.\textsuperscript{445} In another, he said “the people” consisted of twenty five million peasants and five million workers.\textsuperscript{446} Blanqui’s concern, here, was to represent the “laboring masses” and put them in opposition to the idlers and leaches. It also allowed Blanqui to connect the first Revolution with 1830, thus incorporating a powerful narrative into his argument. For example, at one point, in trying to explain the actions of the present insurrectionists, he said:

If the people [now], crying out their hunger, were to ask the privileged to abdicate their privileges, the monopolists to relinquish their monopolies, and all of them to renounce their idleness, they would be laughed at. What would the nobility have done in 1789 if they had been humbly begged to give up their feudal rights? They would have punished such insolence…So the people [then] went about things in a different way.\textsuperscript{447}

Blanqui, by collapsing the complexity of the Third Estate and its politics during the first Revolution, simplified the narrative to suit his needs. In other words, the use of “people” allowed the first Revolution, even ’89, ultimately to have been the work of the group he represented, which in his opening paragraph he proudly proclaimed were proletarians. Consistently, the bourgeoisie and aristocracy became essentially the same as well. Blanqui described the bourgeoisie in the above selection with the words “privilege,” “monopoly,” and

\textsuperscript{445} Auguste Blanqui, \textit{Défense du citoyen Louis Auguste Blanqui devant la Cour d'assises : 1832} (A. Mie: Paris, 1832), 5.
\textsuperscript{446} Blanqui, \textit{Défense}, 6.
\textsuperscript{447} Blanqui, \textit{Défense}, 9.
“idleness”—all terms commonly ascribed to the nobility. Further, the concept of bourgeois rule as an “aristocracy of wealth,” also allowed him to make that analogy between the first Revolution and 1830. Blanqui, by extending a pro-Mountain/Babeuvist understanding of the Revolution into the nineteenth century, articulated a dichotomous class-based struggle that drew its meaning from the great Revolution.

Also consistent with this pro-Mountain narrative was Blanqui’s reduction of the politics into two opposing positions. For him, “…there are and can only be royalists and republicans.” However, while there were only two positions according to Blanqui, he did acknowledge the presence of a temporary ideology that stood in between them. Emerging from this discussion, Blanqui proceeded in gendering these ideologies. He said:

With each passing day the division between these two principles (royalist and republican) becomes ever sharper; the good people who had believed in a third principle, a sort of neuter kind (espèce de genre neutre) called the juste milieu, are slowly but surely abandoning the absurdity, and they will all return to one flag or the other, according to the passions and their interest.

This third ideology is the position that avoids the extreme democracy possible in a republic and the extreme autocracy possible in a monarchy. This juste milieu was essentially a liberal monarchy, which became the governing position of the July Monarchy. Rendering Blanqui’s (espèce de genre neutre) as “a sort of neuter kind,” putting it in the realm of gender, is justified considering that espèce and genre both belonged to biological taxonomy, which would have reflected Blanqui’s medical school training and suggested that Blanqui was going for a biological metaphor. While the phrase espèce de grammatically takes away the taxonomical meaning of espèce, the play on words between espèce and genre would not have been lost on the

448 Blanqui, Défense, 8.
449 See chapter three.
450 Blanqui, Défense, 11.
451 Blanqui, Défense, 11.
listening audience or out of place in the rhetorically heightened atmosphere of a French courtroom. As such, casting this political ideology as an organism justifies an understanding of “neuter” rather than “neutral.” This understanding would have been consistent with the gendering of ideologies that the Jacobins had already accomplished: as republicanism was masculine, aristocracy was decidedly feminine. One could therefore conceive of an ideology neither republican nor monarchical as neuter.

This would not have been a unique bit of gendering or logic for a republican socialist. Trelat had done this with the application of “eunuch” to the bourgeoisie who compromised with royalty to establish eventually the juste milieu of the July Monarchy. Further, in the revolutionary year of ’48, a socialist wrote about the eunuchs in the Palais-Bourbon who wished to castrate the people so they no longer have to hear their grave and strong voice. 452 Another wrote about anger towards the “…political eunuchs who shout loudly to make their virility believable.” 453 Socialists used the same terminology during their discussions over Louis Napoleon’s 1859 amnesty. Some were against it because it helped bring sympathy to his reign. To them, Bonapartism was useless and did not deserve any good press. They gendered their critique similar to Blanqui’s critique of the juste milieu. They wrote,

There is no Bonapartist middle that holds. It is necessary that it be knocked from this mixed position, from eunuch, from hermaphrodite, that it has taken against the anvil of absolutism and the hammer of the revolution. 454

The terminology of eunuch and hermaphrodite, which indicated either sexlessness or one having both sexes and thus of indeterminate identity, matched the notion of a neuter being. The second


metaphor, that of anvil and hammer, justified this logic as well. The anvil is passive, the thing being struck. The hammer is active, the think striking. Since the sexuality brought up in the terminology of “eunuch” and “hermaphrodite” carries force into the second metaphor, there was an implied gendering of the position of which Bonapartism was the middle. Again, monarchy and republicanism emerge, like in the Jacobin formula, effeminate and masculine.

A final example comes in response to another loss for the workers in ‘52. Believing compromise with the status quo to be the problem, a socialist wrote:

To a breathless France, it is necessary, at the present moment, to chose the empire that oppresses or the liberty that emancipates. All neuter systems have become unbearable. [France] is tired of the eunuchs who, for sixty years, have spun in the narrow circle of their constitutional reforms. The people must either reign unreservedly or abdicate.455

As the metaphor dictated, one must be fully or truly masculine to be effective. To compromise with the effeminate (monarchy) was to lose one’s masculine identity, like a man who has been castrated or one who was born with indeterminate sex. Socialist gendering of political ideologies seems intact, and understanding Blanqui’s language in this part as gendered remains sound.

The final third of Blanqui’s monologue functioned as a direct challenge to the ruling elite. Blanqui warned, “…it will soon be necessary to choose between the monarchical monarchy and the republican republic; we will see whom the majority are for.”456 He then proceeded to compare the people and the bourgeoisie based on their dedication to la patrie. Citing the European invasion of France in 1814, which helped set up the disastrous Restoration period, and poking fun at the elites’ useless privilege, he facetiously said: “one might have assumed…that our privileged few would be easily roused by grand ideas of country and honor as a result of the

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456 Blanqui, Défense, 11.
exquisite sensitivity they acquire through opulence…” Yet, he said, they cheered the invasion and “applauded at the country’s dishonor.”

Blanqui continued the mocking tone, saying that they were the ones who were supposed to have “exclusive custody of our national dignity!” Instead, the bourgeoisie belonged with the royalists, running a “heartless aristocracy” and openly professing a “disgusting materialism, ignoble and brutal, where idlers plunder the working masses” and are rendered “bestial by corruption.” The people, however, were different: “Was it not the people who asked to die in 1814, rather than seeing foreign invaders in Paris?” Switching to their present, Blanqui said that the “highest morality” and service to country motivated the people. They knew that “…a nation does not have a future so long as its past is burdened with a shame of which it has not been cleansed.” Therefore, explained Blanqui, the workers took arms in 1830 to restore honor to France, usher in a new era, and bring renewal.

Blanqui continued his challenge to the elites by pointing out that after the peoples’ selfless sacrifice, they were starving, dying everywhere. In a tragic irony, those who had fought for the triumph of freedom and regeneration were now fighting hunger. Blanqui went on to paint a striking visual. Writing of the day of triumph against Charles X, he proclaimed:

Seeing these large (grande) workers, six-foot tall, whose rags the bourgeoisie willingly kissed as they came trembling from their cellars, and whose selflessness and courage they evoked with sobs of admiration…

Blanqui, here, made more explicit what he had been implying all along in his contrast of classes—that is, the superiority of workers over that of the members of the bourgeoisie. Blanqui

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457 Blanqui, Défense, 12.
458 Blanqui, Défense, 12.
459 Blanqui, Défense, 9, 11, 12.
460 Blanqui, Défense, 12.
461 Blanqui, Défense, 13.
462 Blanqui, Défense, 13.
463 Blanqui, Défense, 13.
had already talked about the selflessness and courage of the worker in his praise of their dedication to the nation. But he added more features: this superiority was also physical. Blanqui made it clear that these were large men, six-feet tall. Since the average soldier at this time was around five feet, this was a striking image. Blanqui could just as easily have written the poem produced the previous year that described the proletariat after the overthrow as “…citizens whose noble courage, in bold, masculine features, shines on their faces.” Blanqui also twice pointed out their rags. The second time, in a final rhapsodic praise of the worker, he said:

Noble souls! (ombres magnanimes) Glorious workers, whose dying hands I grasped in a final farewell on the battlefield, whose dying faces I covered with rags, you died happy in the midst of a victory that should have redeemed your race.

Certainly, Blanqui was highlighting their poverty, but the notion of austerity had been such an important concept that Blanqui must have been conveying more. The fact is that all these features made up a Republican masculinity drawn from the sans-culotte model, which Hebertists had proclaimed over the aristocrat and even some wealthy republicans during the first Revolution. In one sense, this was the herculean sans-culotte of radical republican propaganda, the physically superior, austere, and civically minded male. Indeed, Tridon and Blanqui had championed this model of republican masculinity in their interpretation of the Revolution.

The effect becomes even greater when one sees the picture of the bourgeoisie that Blanqui gave. While the worker was large and tall, standing firm and almost unmovable in the face of danger, the bourgeoisie had to crawl out of their hiding places, literally trembling out of their

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467 It is interesting to note that Blanqui would actually adopt this look. While he is only twenty-six here, too young to have come up with his famed look, he would eventually be known for his asceticism and his wearing of tattered clothing. Patrick H. Hutton. *The Cult of the Revolutionary Tradition: the Blanquists in French Politics, 1864-1893* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 22, 23.
cellars. Rags, which were once a social embarrassment but became signs of republican virtue under sans-culottes’ influence, were the points at which these cowards encountered the worker. The members of the bourgeoisie, in a dramatic sign of social inferiority, and perhaps a nod to the formalities and ceremony of aristocratic rule or religious obeisance, kissed the workers rags. They praised the selflessness and courage that the worker possessed, so moved by them and their sacrifice that they wept. The scene bordered on religious, with prostrate disciples before a glorified Lord who had just risen from the dead or had saved them from the certain death of a deadly storm. In Blanqui’s depiction, the roles of monarchical society reversed, and the privileged were now humiliated before the unprivileged.\textsuperscript{468}

Blanqui introduced other language that revealed a larger conceptualization of the proletariat and their relationship to the bourgeoisie. For one, Blanqui referred to the workers as a “race.”\textsuperscript{469} On its own, this would not have been remarkable and would have carried no real biological implication at this time. In fact, it was common to use “race” as an almost generic designation for any group of people with some kind of shared identity. Blanqui, however, also ascribed a metaphor of “pure blood” to the workers. In speaking about how the privileged sucked the workers dry, he said that the system was set up this way, “[i]n order to extract their purest blood and transfuse it into the veins of the privileged.”\textsuperscript{470} Again, Blanqui’s medical background could have been at use here, and there was the semantic field of human health for political metaphors that might have been feeding his thinking. Another plausible option is that Blanqui was reflecting the concept of an ancient nobility that prevented cultural and national decay. Chapter

\textsuperscript{468} Blanqui ends his speech by assuring his listeners that what the work started will continue. He reminds them in an aggressive and demeaning tone that it is “…easy to point the bayonet at the chests of men who surrendered their arms after victory.” He also points out that for eighteen months they have been trying to rebuild what was only an effort of forty-eight hours for the insurrectionists. In all, “[n]o human force can reduce to nothing what was achieved.” Blanqui, Défense, 14.

\textsuperscript{469} Blanqui, Défense, 14.

\textsuperscript{470} Blanqui, Défense, 6.
two shows the psycho-social grip this had on France, and it is not without corroborating
evidence. For example, after the overthrow of ’48, a socialist expressed his opposition to the
workshops set up by the provisional government based on his desire to preserve the purity of the
workers. He referred to them as a “noble race,” which demanded the preservation of its “purity”
and “virile dignity.” He wanted “…this noble race admired by everyone.” Socialists mocked
the idea of a pure-blooded nobility, so the idea of ascribing pure blood to a race of workers
would have fit with Blanqui’s inversion of society that he implied elsewhere in his monologue.

Even more, *Bonnet Rouge* of June 11, 1848 wrote:

Sans-cullotism was a virtue that summaries all the revolutionary virtues of the times.
Sans-culotterie became a species of nobility without parchment, obliged to love the
*patrie* and hate the king.

Further, it became part of the arsenal of metaphors used by socialists. For many, the workers of
Paris were special. They brought light to everyone. Besides being soldiers of labor, they were
also “soldiers of the idea.” The goal was that their ideas “…infuse into the veins of the social
body a new blood which…will renew the face of the world!” The upshot, here, is the awareness
that socialists conceptualized the proletariat as a different kind of person, a unique “brand of
men.” As a later socialist put it, the proletariat exists apart from priests, nobles, and the
bourgeoisie because they have “…all the greatness and simplicity of a human nature that the
classification in these cursed castes has not corrupted…” Further, they possess “…the eternal

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472 Unattributed “Aux de Sans Culottes,” *Bonnet Rouge* June 11, 1848. “…soldiers of France…your enemies, men
of country and honor, are the traitors and cowards…the men of privilege and aristocracy, the great lords of the
parchment or the note. Some, nobles of the race, pure-blooded, sons of warriors; they fought with the stranger
against you. They murdered your chiefs, who have borne so high the glory of the French name. Felix Peyat , “Aux
473 Mathieu, “9 Avril, 1848 - 16 Avril, 1848,” *La Montagne*. April 21, 1848.
474 *L’ Organisation du Travail, La vérité aux ouvriers*. June 3, 1848.
475 F. Cantegrel, “L’Association et le chômage. Discours du citoyen F. Cantegrel au banquet de l’Association des
patrons et ouvriers arçonniers et compte rendu de ce banquet.” *Democratic Pacific*, Nov. 13, 1848. Reprinted in *Les
energy infused in the blood of all that is truly the people…” In these particular examples, therefore, socialists were borrowing the cultural concept of a pureblooded nobility to express this part of their ideology.

In Blanqui’s testimony before his accusers, he rhetorically fought the bourgeoisie by posing a superior form of man. The physically large, and by implication, healthier and more virtuous worker, sold the superiority of socialism and its message that France needed regeneration. Within the logics of hegemonic masculinity present in this patriarchy, the model of a superior male gave socialism symbolic power, even though in reality the workers suffered oppression and socialism was a very small movement. Appeals to justice and fairness carried weight, but the picture of a prostrate bourgeoisie before a physically and morally superior worker brought its own force. In one sense, the virile worker was a virile France, what it—both its people and its nation—could look like under a social republic.

Less than three month after Blanqui’s dramatic stand in court, cholera had broached the French border and claimed its first victims. By the twenty-ninth of that month, it had reached Paris. Socialist Louis Blanc wrote extensively about this in his 1841-1846 work, the History of Ten Years, 1830-1840, a massive, five-volume account of the origin and direction of the July Monarchy with special regard to its political economy. The reason he spent so much time on this disease, even though this was a work of political economy, was that health played an intimate role in class politics. Blanc showed that the fears induced by cholera took on class qualities. The workers began to fear that cholera might have been part of a conspiracy by the bourgeoisie to kill them off. And the bourgeoisie blamed the workers for causing its outbreak because of

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their immorality and unhealthy living. In either case, Blanc was able to use the epidemic to moralize about capitalism and the rule of egoism. The epidemic, he wrote, gave rise to extra horrible behavior. The possibility of others dying did not create empathy or community.

Instead, in the reign of bourgeois egoism, people cared only about the effect competitors dying would have on profits rather than responding to them as fellow human beings. In other words, the rule of selfishness would not allow pity even during a devastating plague. Even amongst family members, widespread death only increased the desire for inheritance, poisoning the peace of families during this time when families should be strongest. In Blanc’s rhetoric, egoism did the same thing to society that cholera did.

His meta-narrative is more important, however. As one expects with a class-organized historicism, his work thoroughly justified his politics. In his view, 1815 was the continuation of ’89, which was the attempt of the bourgeoisie to come into full economic and political power. Further, his account claimed that the people had always fought for the bourgeoisie with the one exception being ’93. The July Revolution was a tragic continuation of this trend. However, for the first time, according to Blanc, the bourgeoisie and proletariat found themselves enemies in its wake.

Blanc’s presentation of the proletariat was romantic. Heroic, loyal, long-suffering, and possessing noble instincts, the people emerged as innocent victims of an opportunistic bourgeoisie. Naive in their generosity, they fought for a cause they did not understand, gladly

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477 Quinlan, Nation, 178, 180. See also Catherine Kudlick, Cholera in Post-Revolutionary France: A Cultural history (Berkeley, 1996), 213.
479 Blanc, Histoire, Vol. I, 620 Blanc characterized the Lyonnese insurrection as the symptom of a malady, which was the practice of unrestricted competition between economic actors, of which the workers suffer.
putting themselves under command of anyone they thought superior.\textsuperscript{483} “Noble hearts beating under rags,” they willingly guarded the property of their oppressors and manifested perfect honesty by returning what they felt was over pay for their efforts.\textsuperscript{484} Unfortunately for them, according to Blanc, the result of their virtuous effort was the creation of a social order characterized by competition, morally guided by philosophical skepticism, and politically run by anarchy. Blanc characterized it as a cruel system that “torments the rich man with insatiable desire and leaves the poor man to perish lonely and neglected.”\textsuperscript{485}

Blanc supported his meta-narrative with a historic and anthropologic explanation. The dynamics of the first Revolution, he stated, encouraged particular passions that animated and guided both groups. Blanc again presented continuity between the Revolution and the history unfolding in the nineteenth century. Also reflected was its gendering scheme. He wrote:

The French Revolution had stirred up two kinds of passions: One, the masculine and radiant, proud and devoted ones, the other, the selfish and business-oriented ones.\textsuperscript{486} Blanc’s conceptualization was clear. Based on motivation and character, readers should identify the people with masculinity. In contrast, the audience should identify the bourgeoisie, since they are selfish, with non-masculinity. With his use of “business-oriented,” Blanc was not adding another quality to the designation of non-masculine. Rather, business orientation functioned as a synonym of “selfish,” giving the descriptions of the two passions a parallel construction. As the masculine were devoted to the greater good, the others, the selfish, were concerned only with the pursuit of money. Blanc’s later restatement of these historical tensions as “egoism versus fraternity” suggests the same since the Revolution and later practice had already established the

gendering of these dispositions.\textsuperscript{487}

Blanc’s gendering remained significantly consistent throughout the rest of his work. For example, in trying to impress upon the reader the kind of fraternity that existed immediately after the fall of Charles X, what he described as the product of a society that had “all things in common,” his dramatic contrast was the “man of fashion” and the “man of the people.” In this incredible but short interval, he wrote, the man of fashion was not afraid to take the hand of the man of the people.\textsuperscript{488} This man of fashion wore the frock coat, was neatly dressed, and had elegant mores and manners (\textit{de mœurs et de manières élégantes}).\textsuperscript{489} The man of the people, then, was earthy and austere. Emerging here was a consistency with what the muscadin and sans-culotte phenomenon in ’93 had represented.\textsuperscript{490} In that case, clothing and manner pictured the opposing sides of the Revolution. As such, Blanc was drawing on the symbolism of these features as established in ’93 to make his point, revealing the compelling nature of this imagery and usefulness of this precedence.

The sans-culottes/muscadin phenomenon also represented the moral extremes of the Revolution, revealing a gender/class confluence. This element also remained compelling as evidenced by the May 7, 1848 edition of \textit{Pere Duchene}. Warning the aristocratic bourgeoisie, the writer also humiliated them by condemning their character and thus masculine identity. It wrote:

\begin{quote}
    The overalls, the calloused hands, the tattered jacket of the workers, all those are painful to see when compared with your wives’ trinkets, your fine leather gloves, and your \textit{Muscadin} or \textit{jeunese doree} [golden youth] appearance. But take heed, you will be broken and shattered, heartless aristocrats.\textsuperscript{491}
\end{quote}

Putting the fine leather gloves in the same category as the wives’ trinkets and describing their

\textsuperscript{487} Blanc, \textit{Histoire}, Vol. 4, 404.
\textsuperscript{488} Blanc, \textit{Histoire}, Vol. 1, 269.
\textsuperscript{490} See chapter three.
\textsuperscript{491} Unattributed, “Le Clubs à la Assemble Nationale,” \textit{Pere Duchene} May 7, 1848.
appearance as muscadin or *jeunesse doree* effectively condemned them in socialist symbolism and values. The author, here, was casting the present tensions as the sans-culottes/aristocratic conflict of the first Revolution, thus demonstrating a profound class/gender scheme that emasculated their opponents.

This pattern continued throughout Blanc’s work. For example, Blanc’s characterization of a particular bourgeois leader, a head banker and the eventual Prime minister during the July Monarchy, included not only the usual negative characteristics, but gendered ones as well. Blanc described him as having “...occasional firmness and elastic impulsiveness, like the female sex, which he resembled in habitual softness of character and nervous sensibility.”

However, Blanc’s focus seemed to be more on the superiority of the people. In that, he borrowed the language of Revolutionary Jacobinism to gender them masculine. In these instances, one sees descriptive phrases like, “energetic virtues of the republican,” or “the energy that characterizes freemen,” which, considering import from the first Revolution, had definitive masculine overtones.

In one case, Blanc described a journalist defender of democracy as, “full of manly elegance” with a “taste for bodily exercises.” He had a “ruggedness of temperament” with “strongly projecting lines on his face, and his look had energetic determination.” Blanc reserved these kinds of descriptions for the people on his side.

An important trope that appeared was the brave proletarian or defender of the people up against his accusers. These cases dramatized a clash of power and subsequent show of superiority by the antagonist to the bourgeois regime. Blanc conveyed one of these speeches before a court with commentary and description:

‘Yes, we protest before the parody of your indictments, as we did before the grape-
shot. We protest without fear, as men, faithful to their oaths, whose conduct puts you
to shame, you who have sworn oaths and violated them all!’ The tall figure of the
accused, his martial air, the pride of his countenance and gesture, all added to the
effect of this violent remark. On the orders of the president, several municipal guards
surrounded him and seized him. In a state of increasing exaltation he continued: ‘At
your ease, Gentlemen. You condemn us without understanding us! You send us to
death without having admitted a supporter of a hundred and fifty families of common
people. I condemn you to live, for our blood will not wash away the marks engraved
on your foreheads with the blood of the people, the brave of the brave.’ And, pressed
by the guards, he retreated, his eyes still fixed on his judges.495

The representative of the people commanded, intimidated, and demonstrated superiority by his
virtue and his physical presence. He manifested an “increasing exaltation” in Blanc’s narrative
and proceeded in trying to turn the role of judge to himself. He took over the narrative. He
condemned them, even in their place of power and under their physical coercion. Part of his
argument came from the assertion that the judges did not understand the criminals. “You
condemn us without understanding us!” he said, showing the illegitimacy of the justice because
of the lack of peer representation. It seems, however, that this argument was more than juridical.

A subsequent case developed this idea of difference more. In this case, the defendant said:

    Gentlemen, I am not defending myself. You are my political enemies, not my
judges. The judge and the accused must understand each other. It is necessary that
they can sympathize with one another. Here it is not possible. We do not feel the
same; we do not speak the same language. The country, humanity, its laws, its care,
duty, religion, science, the arts, industry, nothing of what constitutes a society ...
heaven and earth, nothing appears to us with the same characteristics. There is a
world between us. Condemn me, but you will not judge me, for you cannot
comprehend me.496

Again, his assertion was an attempt to achieve power in a powerless situation. With his words,
he tried to take away their power to judge. Blanqui applied the same argument when he was
before court in ‘32.497 And its seems to recall Tridon’s assertion, discussed in chapter three, that

495 Blanc, Histoire, Vol. IV, 381.
497 Blanqui, Défense, 1
one could not understand the men of '93.\textsuperscript{498} Considering the power relations, his claims were statements of defiance. Further, this was not an argument over the definition of “peer.” According to his argument, the inability to judge came from a lack of jurisdiction based on their difference of being. The argument he was making, therefore, was one of essence, reflecting the notion of profound difference between the people and the bourgeoisie.

Blanc ended this impressively detailed work with a plea. Consistent with his reformist socialism, Blanc did not advocate violent overthrow. Rather, he made an argument for the emancipation of the proletariat for its own sake and for the regeneration of France. In this explanation, his gendering sharpened. The bourgeois order was incomplete, he argued; its attributes only met part of France’s needs. To explain this more, he drew on a notion of separate spheres and its traditional gendering.\textsuperscript{499} For Blanc, the problem with the bourgeois order was that it contained only “…the content of domestic virtues,” which, for him, explained the bourgeois order’s “…inaptitude at public affairs.”\textsuperscript{500} Following through with Blanc’s household/public metaphor, one finds the assertion that missing in the French formulation were masculine qualities, ones that only the proletariat possessed.

This assertion made its way into his final appeal to the bourgeoisie. Blanc generously told them they had it within their means to regenerate France. It required them only to join with the people and receive the virtues they lacked:\textsuperscript{501}

For if [the bourgeoisie] has a lot to give to the people, it also has much to receive from them. It can give them education, true liberty, and the treasures that flow from them. It can receive from them energy, the strength and power of male instincts, the taste for greatness, the ability for loyalty. That precious exchange would save, would lift our people back up by the harmonious use of wills and of the virtues of all

\textsuperscript{499} See chapter one.
\textsuperscript{500} Blanc, Histoire, Vol. 5, 466.
\textsuperscript{501} Blanc, Histoire, Vol. 5, 507.
her children.\textsuperscript{502}

This “precious exchange,” made possible by a sort of marriage or indissoluble union between the bourgeoisie and proletariat had the bourgeoisie ultimately in a passive role.\textsuperscript{503} For Blanc, the bourgeoisie participated almost exclusively because of its present possession of wealth and power; all the animating virtues were dependent on the proletariat. For example, the reference to “education” was a reference to public education, something Blanc had earlier condemned the bourgeoisie for failing to provide properly.\textsuperscript{504} Blanc was therefore stating that the bourgeoisie, even though they had failed at creating a proper education system, were in a position to make one a reality for the benefit of the proletariat. He did the same thing with his reference to liberty. Blanc was clear that the bourgeoisie did not possess “\textit{la vraie liberté}.” Rather, according to Blanc, what they had was more along the lines of despotism.\textsuperscript{505} His reference to true liberty in this section was therefore only potential and based on their incorporation of the people’s virtue. It was also consistent with Blanc’s ascription of true masculinity to the proletariat. Recalling that the liberal bourgeois regime gendered liberty as masculine, Blanc had in this case denied them this characteristic, since those driven by “selfish and business-oriented” passions were the opposite of those driven by the “masculine and radiant.”\textsuperscript{506}

All of this heightens with the masculinity clearly ascribed to the proletariat in the second part of the paragraph. In Blanc’s view, the proletariat possessed energy, the strength and power of male instincts (\textit{la puissance des mâles instincts}), the appetite for greatness, as well as the ability for loyalty. As such, Blanc clearly used gender to complement his political polemic. Further, it was not only about justice for workers, but also about the European greatness of a regenerated

\textsuperscript{502} Blanc, \textit{Histoire}, Vol. 5, 474.
\textsuperscript{503} “...elle s’unisse à lui d’une manière indissoluble.” Blanc, \textit{Histoire}, Vol. 5, 474.
\textsuperscript{504} Blanc, \textit{Histoire}, Vol. 4, 85.
\textsuperscript{505} Blanc, \textit{Histoire}, Vol. 5, 468.
France that presently lacked its masculinity, of which the proletariat was in possession. Fraternity and thus true masculinity, found only in the proletariat, was what France had needed. Blanc therefore finished his work by articulating a “virile hope.” This hope, which kept them going during the unhappy work of describing all France’s evils, was “…that fraternity, the source of all sustainable strength and justice, would succeed our heartbreak, and that France will finally take back her influence over the affairs of the world, for the benefit of civilization, and for the salvation (salut) of oppressed peoples.” It would also produce, in turn, a greater world.

While the relationship of socialism to imperialism and empire was complicated, it nevertheless belonged to the early socialist outlook. Male socialists in general were on the side of empire, but it was a version they had formulated. In its ideal, it rejected colonization as ruthless invasion and aggressive conquering, which they viewed as an extension of capitalism and individualism. In contrast, as Louis Blanc understood, socialism was about solidarity and extending it “…to all the members of the human family.” Therefore, as the ideal male was fraternal, so was the ideal nation on the international stage. Indeed, “Egoism is a deceitful terrain for nations as it is for men.” And, as the family was patriarchal, so too was the relationship between France and its colonies. Naomi Andrews goes on:

By contrast to liberal ideals of individual rights, the family is a corporate body, and as the model for social relations, it encompasses both the ‘universal’ inclusion of all humanity and the differentiation of social roles, power, and authority that is inherent in the institution.

Their justification for colonization was therefore an extension of their notions of ideal

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masculinity and patriarchy.  

While Blanc was putting out his work on the July Monarchy, Theodore Dezamy published his *Code de la communauté* in 1842. A former follower of Lamennais and Cabet, he made his way towards a materialistic communism, complete enough to garner an honorable mention in Karl Marx’s *Holy Family*, and maintain a working relationship with Blanqui during his lifetime. For Dezamy, ‘93 could not finish its work because it did not understand the unity of all things. While Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity was good, it actually needed the concept of Unity to be complete and effective. *Code* was therefore Dezamy’s playbook for a proper society that demonstrated the manner in which France could achieve and maintain unity.

Like many other socialists, he believed that education was a key to a more just society and, as a result, a strong and dominant France. Dezamy grounded his ideology on the common dichotomy of egoism vs. fraternity and forwarded its corresponding gendering of egoism as feminine and fraternity as masculine. As such, the egoist bourgeoisie were effeminate and thus provided a “vicious and effeminate education.” This system produced and reinforced private property, monopoly, and ignorance, what Dezamy considered the “root of all evil.” Ultimately, it destroyed the unity of the people and thus France as a whole. To change this, Dezamy believed that education should do its best to keep laziness, idleness, softness, and the love of voluptuousness away from the youth.

Reflecting the Sparta vs. Athens debate that divided Jacobinism in ‘92 and ’93, Dezamy informed himself with Spartan values. He therefore modeled the education he advocated on the

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Spartan example and on Babeuf’s recommendations via Buonarroti. Believing that one could eliminate all discord among citizens with a mâle and fraternal education, the result was a system that reflected the physicality and psychological disposition of the male worker, a sort of sans-culotte program of reform. A proper education, he said, should produce a strong and agile body, a developed mind, and a good and energetic heart. This meant “exercise, sobriety, and temperance,” learning the ability to do physically difficult movements, and living “in the most salutary frugality.” Dezamy, labeling the present system as effeminate and thus inferior, offered instead a masculine one that would produce fraternity among the people and strengthen the nation as a whole.

The same year Constance Pecqueur published *Théorie nouvelle d'économie sociale et politique, ou Études sur l'organisation des sociétés*. Respected for his work in economics, he also received honorable mentions from Marx for his materialism and influenced Benoît Malon, who called him a precursor to collectivism. While the egoism vs. fraternity tension is in his work, his example represents a different way that class gendering could manifest itself within ideology and rhetoric. His critique of the present system was not too different from standard socialist understanding. A laissez-faire system of production and consumption eliminated unity and damaged society. Needed was a rational political and economic system to do away with inefficiencies and the morally damaging consequences. Ultimately, this would require the socialization of the means of production.

In arguing for this, he spent time analyzing the harmful features of the present system.

516 Dézamy, Code, 47, 79  
Taking sides in the problem of luxury debate, which had remained a point of contention between political factions since before the Revolution, Pecqueur came down hard for both moral and economic reasons against the production and consumption of luxury.\textsuperscript{520} He wrote: “Under the pretext of making the poor live…luxury impoverishes all the rest…the more the luxury and superfluity increases for the privileged, the more at the same time the distress and destitution are extreme for the disinherited multitude.”\textsuperscript{521} Demonstrating a stated Rousseauvian influence, the production of luxury goods has only negative consequences for society and should not exist.

The fact that a market existed for luxury goods was ultimately a product of privilege and hierarchy, which reproduced itself through the practice of inheritance. A related problem, therefore, was that of idleness. For Pecqueur, a social economy reflecting true equality and justice by rejecting privilege, would not produce or tolerate what he called “economic parasites.”\textsuperscript{522} One reason was that the law that ensconced privilege and heredity by birth was the cause of it, both for the privileged and non-privileged. For one group it gave them the means to be idle, for the other it disrupted the proper workings of the economy and caused unemployment. The second was that it was incredibly dangerous to the whole. Being a vice as he saw it, it had a general corrupting influence on others. He wrote, “Idleness and laziness are therefore more than vices: they are causes of weakness, misery, or privation for the whole social body.”\textsuperscript{523}

Pecqueur’s condemnation of idleness crossed class lines because both manifestations damaged society. However, he still made moral and thus gendering distinctions between the bourgeoisie and laborer. While all idlers in one sense deserved pity because of the harm it caused them, and ultimately both were victims of a bad system, he was careful to separate out the

\textsuperscript{520} Pecqueur, \textit{Théorie}, 416-417.
\textsuperscript{521} Pecqueur, \textit{Théorie}, 27.
\textsuperscript{522} Pecqueur, \textit{Théorie}, 512.
\textsuperscript{523} Pecqueur, \textit{Théorie}, 503-504.
laborers from the privileged. He divided them with the terms “miserable idlers” and “wealthy idlers” (*oisifs opulents*). The former, in their “idleness of despair and misery,” were worthy of all “pity and social concern.” The latter were a “social plague,” wallowing in softness, voluptuous effeminacy, and ennui.  

While Pecqueur’s critique was more in the shape of a social science, he still maintained a class-based gendering practiced by other socialists. In reality, by gendering labor and idleness he forwarded a rhetorical feature of the first Revolution, which appeared with the sans-culottes and helped condemn more completely the aristocracy. In one sense, Pecqueur reflected the sentiments found in proverbial form in *Pere Duchene* later in 48: “Work is the father of all the virtues; idleness is the mother of all the vices.” In this formula, one has the masculinization of work and the feminization of idleness. Even though his argument was that all able bodied idlers are bad for the economy, his careful language allowed members of the oppressed group that socialists represented to escape the designation of effeminate. In doing so, he preserved a distinction between laborer and owner necessary for the kinds of characterizations that socialists needed to make of them. In another sense, Pecqueur’s formula, by putting so much focus on idleness, helped forward a critique that encouraged the bourgeois crisis of masculinity of the latter part of the century. Ultimately, with Pecqueur’s formula, there was room to effeminize large chunks of the male bourgeoisie because of vocations that did not require much or any physical activity.

**Conclusion**

The July Monarchy and Second Republic are fruitful in the reconstruction of socialist rhetoric. One needs to consider several things in this process. For one, the influence of the first

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Revolution and the continuity of its language and concepts in the interpretation of the political present is by no means a new understanding. Historians have understood for a long time that the idea of picking up where the first Revolution left off or failed, in some way fulfilling its promises, or being the object of Babeuf’s prophecy concerning a latter day revolution was extremely compelling and widespread amongst French radicals. Less understood is the role that the sans-culottes and their actions in ’93 would have had on conceptions of masculinity for socialists. The male sans-culottes, by entering the Revolution in the way they did, provided a model for a much cleaner break with the aristocracy and the future bourgeoisie as well. Their aesthetic and their physicality resonated with those who wanted a greater contrast between elites and the people, guaranteeing their conceptual survival into the nineteenth century and making them eminently useful to socialists. For example, the influence of the clash between the sans-culottes and the muscadin/jeunesse dorée, representing two forms of contrasting and class-based masculinity based on physicality, aesthetic, and psychological disposition, seems clear. Socialists echoed or recreated this representation of class/gender conflict during this period and later. Whatever forms the “muscadin phenomenon” would take provided a convenient and concrete contrast to the worker and aided in the effeminizing of their opponents. In all, it worked well as a singular illustration of the political argument socialists were trying to make: that their ideology was superior because it possessed the truly masculine, which in turn would produce a truly great France.

A related tendency that complemented this gendered rhetoric was the historicism that the pro-mountain interpretation of the Revolution allowed for, which justified the Terror and put the sans-culottes at the center of the drama. As Tony Judt had pointed out, and what seems manifestly clear, was the perception of the male worker as a special person, making it easier to

526 See chapter three.
champion his superiority in every way, including his masculinity. For one, this historicism took root amongst a population who had a preformed conceptualization of society that included a place for a special group of people who set the standards for morality and acted as a bulwark against the slow dissolution of society. The first chapter treats this more completely, and this reality was behind Robert Nye’s work on the masculinity of the bourgeoisie. Indeed, some socialists did imagine the worker in the role of a nobility, or used the metaphors and semantic field of “nobility” to articulate their role. This, of course, did not apply to women. Despite the activity of feminists during ’48, Republican socialism remained significantly anti-feminist and beholden to a notion of separate spheres. While those who had earlier adhered to utopian socialism brought some ideas about feminine emancipation with them, the popularity of Proudhon and his misogyny shows the continued viability of antifeminist logic amongst republican socialists.

The Rousseavian influence on Jacobinism, which idealized those without artificial elements, the same impulse that made the sans-culottes such compelling ideals of Republican masculinity, could also have fed this view of the worker as a superior being. Even more was the romantic obsession with “the people,” a concept popular at this time and most dramatically expressed in the romantic work of Michelet. This romantic influence or tendency lasted until ‘48. For example, this socialist periodical heaped praise on the workers reminiscent of romantic excess:

O people of the amiable Foubourgs, thou who know how many generous hearts beat in the robust breasts of thy children, how many noble intelligences radiate under the burnished foreheads of thy children…O heroic people of the barricades…

In other words, culturally and politically, a logic was present that could easily support a narrative

527 James McMillian, France and Women, 1789-1914: Gender, Society and Politics (London: Taylor and Francis, 1999), 31, 90-92
championing the superior masculinity of the male worker. This worked well since a superior masculinity carried political weight in a France that had deep concerns for the health of its people and the strength of the nation. Like the male Jacobins of the first Revolution, labeling the ruling class as effeminate and thus inferior, and offering up superior men to take their place, was a legitimate political strategy. Indeed, this is what one sees manifested both in a sophisticated and fleshed out way, as well as more indirectly. For Blanc, Blanqui, Dezemy, and Pequéreur, this gendering was part of a larger treatment of justice and analysis of French social and political problems. Stated clearly or in support of a broader point, working its way through the arguments of the author, the consistency is impressive. This is even more so when one considers the consistent gendering of ideologies that favored and thus masculinized the proletariat and their cause, or that the general and seemingly meaningless ascriptions to political actors of energy, egoism, fraternity, quality of voice, look, or size had gendered implications and were consistent with the direct and fleshed-out presentations of others. In all, socialists during this time engaged in political rhetoric that emasculated the bourgeoisie male and his system, and masculinized the male proletariat and his system.
Chapter 5: Masculinity in the Logic and Language of Socialist Politics
1869-1905

This man is broad and hairy like Hercules,
A red lion furnishes him with a mantle.
In blue streams his blood of iron circulates.
His two naked arms raise a heavy hammer.

I am Labor, he said, my damp loins
preserve the sweat of the past.
I, block by block, have ascended the Pyramids,
The conquerors on my body have passed.

…You, comrade, take these tools called
Reason, Progress, Science, Equality,
Be more than a king, be your [own] master, be a man:
Oh, Worker, become humanity.\(530\)

Eugène Pottier, 1884

The Second Empire and Commune

For several years after '52, socialism in France had a much smaller presence. Napoleon III had exiled many of the socialists once he took over. And for those who remained, he repressed their activity and censored their publications. At the same time, the character of socialism altered along with the development of the Second Empire and the changing experience of the worker. Continued industrialization made a greater portion of the proletariat into factory workers. Mutualism informed by Proudhonian thinking became more popular as well, challenging the Jacobin-inspired legacy of the Revolution and thus the tendency to favor centralization as a solution. By '59, however, with the offer of amnesty by Louis Napoleon, exiled socialists began to return. And in 1864, the Empire modified some of its laws to allow for worker strikes. The same year saw internationalism come to the fore with the establishment of

the First International. In 1868, restrictions on political activity had lifted, with the first radical club meetings taking place in the summer, quickly increasing in number and frequency.

By the end of the Second Empire, language and concepts were becoming more sophisticated in their ability to assess problems and formulate political solutions. Public health approaches were also increasing in complexity, and the medical community developed and articulated the doctrine of *dégénérescence*, which, combing health and heredity, lent itself to a public and scientific discussion on the problem of national degeneration.531 It also, as a corollary, fueled debate over a class-based cause of national degeneration—the bourgeoisie accusing the proletariat, and socialists blaming the bourgeoisie.532 The result was that as public discourse about health increased in sophistication, so did socialist rhetoric in its assertion of the superiority of the male proletariat. Third Republic socialists found themselves using more authentically medical and scientific concepts in their defense and promotion of the proletariat as the hope for a healthy national body, and the pages of socialist periodicals became home to articles by scientists and doctors as well as fiery rhetoricians.

Despite these changes, however, the psychosocial needs of the French, at their base, remained fairly stable. Socialists also worked within essentially the same political logic and ordering patriarchy that had guided their rhetoric during the July monarchy and Second Republic. One, therefore, finds surprising consistency in the masculine rhetoric employed by republican socialists during the last third of the century, in spite of these significant political and intellectual changes. Evidence shows that the socialist rhetoric of the July Monarchy and Second Republic was still compelling in ’69 when socialism returned to an observable and analyzable state. For

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example, within a year of the lifting of restrictions on political activity, Jules Vallès, author of several state-repressed articles and soon-to-be communard, wrote an editorial in his newspaper to define “the people” for his reading audience.533 Vallès was a known quantity, somewhat famous for his depictions and connections to the bohemians of Paris, as well as his writings about the poor.534 The editorial consisted of five small paragraphs, each ending with the phrase “this is the people.”

The first representation of the people was a man with the skin of a beast who operated a locomotive. The second was of an animal straightening its spine with muscles stretched like ropes. Third was a bearded man with broad shoulders and a tar hat. There was also a miner, a roofer, glassmaker, machinist, painter, and even a journeyman baker.535 Vallès ended the piece with the phrase, “It is of this people that we will speak,” defining for his readership the subject of his publication. Noticeably absent from this list of representatives were women, and none of the jobs Vallès highlighted were ones readily associated with females.536 In this public proclamation of proletarian identity, women were not legitimate workers or representatives of the proletariat.537 Instead, Vallès’ presentation of working people was hyper-masculine, focusing on physically challenging labor. “Heroic and miserable” he called them—heroic in their character, but suffering because of their oppression and often dangerous work and long hours.

In the February 22, 1871 issue of his periodical, *Cri du Peuple*, Vallès wrote again about the people as a collective entity. In an article entitled “Betrayal of Paris,” meant to address the

surrender of Paris to Prussian troops after its long and bloody defense, he tried to put the betrayal in perspective for his readers. He told a story about the days in June of ’48 when the workers rose to protest the closing of the workshops. It ultimately ended in defeat, and Napoleon III went on to a successful election and eventually the coup that produced the Monarchy of the Second Empire. Vallès took the reader to a prison filled with despair, one where the guards took potshots at the prisoners. There was a defiant one, however, who was not afraid to spit in the face of the guards. Taking him out for questioning, the guards asked his name. “The People,” he said. Vallès described him as a giant (colosse) who smelled of gunpowder. Shot in the head by an enemy, he bled from the forehead only to form a red cockade. Vallès said that he manifested the pride of Hercules while shaking his body to reveal that he was full of bullets. Laughing, “the people” said: “I’m not dead yet, let’s go!” June, Vallès said, did not destroy the people. Rather, socialism emerged in defiance of the enemy’s bullets.

Returning to his present commentary on the surrender of Paris, Vallès said that the people “…have done their due.” “As soon as the people saw the nation in peril, the honor at stake, it rushed forth, asking for arms, a levee en masse, for the endless struggle: the sacred love of la patrie!” And what was this patrie for them, Vallès asked? “It opens under their feet to receive their sweat and tears and engulf them when work kills them before old age.” The people have nothing, but are “stopped as vagabonds when they want to lie down on her.” The patrie “…bristles with the factories where they are exploited, the prisons where they are locked up, the barracks where they are kept, or the darkness from which someone kills them.” Despite this, “they came to defend it, to offer their sons, to claim battle.” And it was they who wept when “Favre signed peace…”

The important part here is that Vallès was paralleling the bourgeois betrayal of the people in

‘48 with the bourgeois betrayal of France in ‘71. Undergirding this analogy was a logic that associated socialist justice with a flourishing patrie. Both betrayals required a herculean resistance to internal enemies, with the ultimate end being an emancipated proletariat and thus the restoration of France as a nation. Blanqui had argued from the same logic before the court in 1832. The people who betrayed the workers in 1830, he raged, were the same people who had been betraying France since the Revolution. Not only did it show the extreme injustice experienced by the people at the hands of the ruling class, but it also pointed to the bourgeoisie as the source of French humiliation and weakness in Europe. As such, Vallès was claiming that the hope of France rested on the superiority of socialism and the workers as a replacement for the bourgeoisie. As one socialist later wrote:

…bourgeois society, resting on selfish individualism…a cause of weakness that has already been suspected…[On the other hand, socialism]…is capable of inspiring the most absolute devotions, the most patriotic sentiments…which will give the most obstinate resistance to its external enemies.  

Further, it was relevant that the adjectival and symbolic content of Vallès’ description of the people came decidedly from the masculine world. The bourgeoisie and their system therefore remained effeminate. A few months after France declared war on Prussia, a socialist, in language that historically had overtones of weakness and effeminacy, wrote, “The reign of the bourgeois aristocracy, with all its vice, corruption, all its shame…is the decadence of humanity.”

For republican socialists, France had produced the true “regenerating doctrine” and would again “…raise its head and regain consciousness of its genius and mission.”

Reflecting the view of previous French socialists, the mechanism for this change was the

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workers, and the true hope for France was therefore in the proletariat. With the publically accepted and practiced patriarchy of France, this meant that a superior male worker was to replace the inferior bourgeois male.

A cartoon published during the Commune illustrates the presence of this gendering logic and political rhetoric. This particular cartoon placed a member of the bourgeoisie and proletariat side by side, each in his own space and ready for comparison. In the background of each is a rising sun that said “La Commune 1871.” The member of the bourgeoisie, whom Stewart Edwards identified as a financier, is running away from the sun holding what seem to be moneybags. Having his back to the sun, most of the financier’s body is dark and shadowy. He is grotesquely thin and gaunt, possessive of the physiognomy of an egoist and greedily grasping the bags of money as he escapes the scorching and disinfecting rays of the Commune sun. The worker, on the other hand, has a massive torso held up by sturdy legs. In his large hands, he holds only what is necessary for a good day’s work—a cloth tied to a stick over his shoulder, more than likely containing his food for the day, right next to the pickaxe he would use to build up the French nation. Bearded with a strong nose and serious look, he is also barrel-chested, indicating a strength that comes from hard labor and heredity rather than the occasional sport the bourgeoisie might practice to make up for their own physical inferiority. This worker is of strong genetic stock, the best France had to offer. He was a dramatic contrast to the financier and thus a good symbol of the kind of France that a Commune-based government would produce.

**Conservative Backlash to the Commune**

The political clubs that met after the government lifted restrictions in ’68 incubated the ideas

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and motivations that would eventually result in the Paris Commune.\textsuperscript{544} Among the content of these political clubs was a greater participation of women and renewed discussion of the woman question.\textsuperscript{545} While a few shifts in attitude may have occurred in the younger generation of socialist men, a significant change in ideology or male socialist rhetoric was not forthcoming.

Official proclamations from the Commune to the public did not deviate much from patriarchal assumptions, focusing rather on a condemnation of privileges and the need for the proletariat to have power.\textsuperscript{546} The Commune as hopelessly patriarchal, however, was not the reality in practice. While patriarchy did show through in its official statements, the Commune itself prevented patriarchy from having the last word. Carolyn Eichner, in her work on women and the Commune, characterized the Commune as “a short-lived overthrow of the patriarchal status quo.”\textsuperscript{547} The actions of women not only challenged bourgeois norms, they were also a dramatic challenge to socialism. Despite attitudes of male communards, the Commune experience allowed women to produce a world that ignored the traditional boundaries of gender.\textsuperscript{548} Within the closed system of the commune, significant challenges to the socialist assumptions of patriarchy took place. While the voices had been there before, situated within the revolutionary potentials of the Commune, they became louder, helping to render much of the patriarchal


\textsuperscript{547} Eichner, \textit{Surmounting}, 18.

discourse of male socialists almost irrelevant within the Commune itself.

Underneath this all, a revolution in biomedicine and public hygiene works had been maturing. Emerging from this revolution was the doctrine of *degenerescence* and its application to the politics of class. As seen in previous chapters, the understanding of degeneration as a force pushing a nation or lineage toward ultimate extinction was already in play by the Revolution. The important piece, however, was that theorists joined degeneration to a notion of heredity, essentially the “juridical concept of inheritance” repurposed for science. This formulation and its application arose mainly from two works. One was Arthur Gobineau’s infamous work on the notion of race and inferiority within France, *Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines*. For him, degeneration described a people who “…no longer have the same blood in its veins,” because they had become different from what they once were. The primary mechanism for this change was essentially “race mixing,” which placed an emphasis on the influx of foreign elements, especially those who came to look for work and populated the working classes after ‘48. The other work was Benedict Morel’s *Traits of Degenerescence* in 1857. Morel did not place *degenerescence* at the feet of “race mixing.” Rather, he saw it as coming from environmental factors. It was a sort of reverse evolution that resulted from the experiences and organization of modern life. However, he taught that sickness was biologically inheritable, and that present biological weaknesses would result in further degeneration, following a course from idiocy to sterilization to ultimate death of the race. This put a focus on the squalor of the proletariat,
helping to answer the perennial question why so much of it existed in that group. Lamarkian inheritance complemented these doctrines, which would gain even more traction once Darwin achieved some acceptance in France.

These ideas met with another kind of reasoning that floated around during the second Empire, one that gave it political import. For example, Raudot Claude Marie’s 1850 work, *De la decadence de la france*, demonstrated that France had fallen behind in almost every measure of health and greatness.\(^{555}\) His explanation for this was political and came from his liberal convictions. For Marie, the source of French strength was private property protected by the rule of law and transferrable to offspring.\(^{556}\) The progress of communism, for him, was therefore the cause of the France’s dramatic decline from previous centuries. Condemning the radical challenge to French liberalism, he predicted, using the metaphors of bodily health, that communism would sterilize French strength and ultimately “kill the patient.”\(^{557}\) Auguste Romieu followed up Marie’s thinking in 1852 by publishing *Le Specter Rouge*.\(^{558}\) In this work, Romieu claimed that the upheaval of ‘48, despite the fact that the Revolutionary elements technically lost, signaled the triumph of radical socialism. In reality, he argued, the bourgeoisie no longer ruled, and it was just a matter of time before the barbarians were ultimately going to triumph.\(^{559}\) While referring to workers as “barbarians,” Romieu was drawing on the classical reference that spoke of the Roman Empire being overrun by the non-Roman tribes that surrounded them. At the same time, this language matched the terminology that colonialists used for indigenous peoples.\(^{560}\) Asserting that nothing was really left of the French nation, he could no longer take

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556 Stuart, 79.
558 Stuart, 78.
comfort in an imagined inexorable progress towards liberalism and freedom.\textsuperscript{561} These ideas would help inform the conservative backlash to the Paris Commune.

The anti-patriarchal voices and actions emerging from the Commune were hard to ignore, especially for those who hated the radicals and their revolutions. As Gay Gullickson remarked in her work on Commune, women became popular vehicles for representing and judging the Commune.\textsuperscript{562} This worked well for conservative critics. As the defeat by Prussia and the subsequent revolutionary upheaval in the Commune helped complete the application of biomedicine to politics, conservatives began to produce accounts of France’s tendency for revolution, disorder, and bloodshed through the explanatory lens of degenerescence.\textsuperscript{563} Like socialists, conservatives relied on physiognomic reasoning to determine the level of degeneration of workers, the indicators of which included alcoholism, insubordination, anger, and a desire for domination. In their imbecility and social inferiority, according to critics, some workers became “docile instruments” for the revolutionaries.\textsuperscript{564} Hyppolyte Taine wrote that Revolutions were a mass expression of insanity, which caused reversion of the people to a less evolved species. This allowed critics to speak of workers, although French, in the same way they spoke of colonized peoples. As such, criminality, alcoholism, and revolt belonged together, and revolutionary history became a biological history of the degenerate class.\textsuperscript{565} Ultimately, these critics gendered the crowd as feminine because of its irrationality and cruelty, giving reason to see feminism as

\textsuperscript{561} Romieu, rouge, 63.
\textsuperscript{563} Pick, Faces, 40.
\textsuperscript{564} J.V. Laborde, Les Hommes et les actes de l’insurrection de paris devant la psychologie morbide (Germer Bailliere: Paris,1872), 11, 28, 62, 74, 75, 66, 67, 90, 91. Books and Brochures, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, Netherlands. “They are easily manipulated by intelligent and perverted men…They are generally timid, cowardly and obedient…[creating] an ‘armed mob of criminals, looters and arsonists…The weakness of their intelligence and character, combined with an excessive infatuation, makes them an instrument of the most docile and blind of resolutions, even if they are the most infamous among their colleagues.”
\textsuperscript{565} Pick, Faces, 70, 72. See especially Stahuljak, “History,” 140-159.
an expression of regressive tendencies as well.\textsuperscript{566} As the \textit{tricoteuses} had become the conservative rhetorical symbol of the first Revolution, the \textit{pétroleuses} became that for the Commune, indicating the ultimate in degeneration according to conservative critics.\textsuperscript{567}

The caricature of Louise Michel on the cover of \textit{Les Contemporains} in 1880 demonstrates the logic of this anti-radical gendering. The picture plays on her nickname as the “red virgin” by presenting her in a nun’s habit. Behind her are barricades and a canon, clearly invoking the Commune. The more interesting elements are less noticeable. Michel is holding a gun that is reminiscent of a shepherd holding a staff. In her other arm is an injured male communard. He is unable to stand on his own. Thus, her strength keeps him from falling. At the end of her cincture, where one usually finds a crucifix or rosary, is a Masonic plumb line, a symbol representing equality and seen on Revolutionary iconography.\textsuperscript{568} This makes greater play on the religious habit, making her religion that of revolution. Intimately tying her to revolution, it associated radical notions of equality and its inevitable tendency to produce political revolt with the notion of women having power over men—a horror for many in France’s patriarchy. For socialism in general, it was bad enough that the nasally voiced Theirs and his bourgeois system would subject the Communard men to trial, death, and destruction. Further humiliation was that the \textit{pétroleuse}, according to Gullickson, became the most popular image used by male critics to condemn the Commune, in essence gendering it female and making it an “unruly woman.”\textsuperscript{569} As such, the Commune lost the “war of representation,” by appearing effeminate.\textsuperscript{570}

After the Commune, fears of depopulation and degeneration took on more urgent and

\textsuperscript{566} Pick, \textit{Faces}, 92-93. Anti-revolutionaries during the first Revolution, to emasculate the radicals, associated them with the \textit{tricoteuses} (knitting women) who appeared at executions. This parallels the conservative focus on the \textit{pétroleuses} of the Commune.
\textsuperscript{567} Pick, \textit{Faces}, 92.
\textsuperscript{568} Gullickson, \textit{Unruly}, 155.
\textsuperscript{569} Gullickson, \textit{Unruly}, 225.
\textsuperscript{570} Gullickson , \textit{Unruly}, 218.
concrete manifestations as science authoritatively pronounced on France’s problems. Regardless of one’s assumptions concerning the origins of human diversity, the belief in a “racial hierarchy” and the fear of racial degeneration remained widespread among the French, which the contact with colonized people exacerbated.\textsuperscript{571} The political logic that associated the health of the ruling male elite with the health of the nation helped inform the cultural response to these fears during the Third Republic. For example, Robert Nye and Christopher Forth have described in detail how these fears led to a greater focus on the identity and responsibilities of the male bourgeoisie, especially in the area of sexual hygiene.\textsuperscript{572} This political logic also informed how the male bourgeois itself responded to these fears. According to historians, a “new imperialism” took off after 1870, indicating the perception of national and thus masculine weakness.\textsuperscript{573} Depopulation, health, feminism, the dramatic loss to the Germans, and the possibility of racial inferiority all exacerbated male insecurity as representations of the nation, informing the discourse of empire and imperialism and giving the drive for empire a gendered quality.\textsuperscript{574} Using Berenson’s language, imperialist warfare was essentially a “duel,” something that allowed the slighted male to defend his honor.\textsuperscript{575}

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\textsuperscript{573} For example, see John Tosh, \textit{Manliness and Masculinities in Nineteenth-Century Britain} (Harlow, England; New York: Pearson Longman, 2005). 208. According to Anne McClintock, quoting Cynthia Enloe, Nationalisms come from, “masculine memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope.” Therefore, “…the needs of the nation [are] identified with the frustrations and aspirations of men.” The result is that the cultural values of hegemonic masculinity become national, and the state takes on the burdens of masculine insecurity, casting the dominant male conscience into foreign policy. Further, in nationalistic thought, women are the conservation principle, the “authentic body,” men are the “progressive agent of national modernity,” “forward thrusting” and “potent.” Anne McClintock, “‘No longer in a Future Heaven’: Nationalism, Gender, and Race,” in \textit{Becoming National}, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Suny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 260, 261, 263.
\textsuperscript{574} R. Gordon, \textit{Dances with Darwin, 1875-1910: Vernacular modernity in France} (Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 87. A marked decline in fertility registered at this time, and French men and women were now declining in numbers.
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In one sense, imperialism was bourgeois male anxiety focused outward, toward the “other” and outside French borders. There was also an inward focus for this anxiety. This was class based and consisted of the bourgeois male taking the offensive against their socialist and proletarian challengers. This came together, as Alice Bullard points out, in the exiling of the Communards to New Caledonia. The French government viewed both the Communards and the Kanak of New Caledonia similarly as savages, residing on the lowest rungs of civilization. In this context, the doctrine of degenerescence became scientific justification to blame the proletariat for the failure of France to stabilize politically and for the shortcomings of liberalism in general. Indeed, Pick ascribes the popularity of degenerescence to this liberal fear that progress was not inexorable in the face of revolution. And Quinlan, citing Gaston Richard, argues that reformers used hygiene policy to control radicalism, writing that, “...social science will play the biggest role in the struggle against socialism.” Under these conditions, biomedical science took over the language of health, redefined the terms, and ultimately took sides against the proletariat and socialist rhetoric. The metaphors of body, health, and recovery therefore made room for bio-medically informed discussions of concrete maladies and class politics. Ultimately participating first hand in the imperial project because of their exile, those deported because of their involvement in the Commune returned to a much different Paris and a much different political discourse from the exiles of ’48.


578 Pick, Faces, 67.


580 See Émile Pouget, “Le bourgeoisie, le vrai choléra, (1894),” in Le Père peinard where it depicts “La Bourgeoisie” as a rat sitting on a chair on top of dead people.
Superior Masculinity in the Logic and Language of Biomedicine

The anarchism and mutualism of Proudhon, the reformism of Blanc, and the insurrectionism of Blanqui all retained adherents throughout most of the century.\textsuperscript{581} Artisans favored internal control and organization and were thus more Proudhonian in their approach. Industrial factory workers preferred strikes and were generally Jacobin and Blanquist in outlook. Proudhonianism, however, lost some credibility in France after the Commune and for its early support of the Boulangists. Its mutualism, however, would remain an important element within French socialism. The Blanquists, burnt by their support for Boulanger, and whose insurrectionism pointed them in a Marxist direction, eventually absorbed themselves into the POF. By 1880, an integral socialism, embracing the diversity of French experience and wisdom within its Republican tradition, came into being through Benôit Malon and his periodical, \textit{La Revue Socialiste}. \textit{La Revue Socialiste} published articles representing several French socialist perspectives. It even included articles from the newly established, and ultimately non-French, Marxist perspective, which had its own popular voices in Jules Geusdes and Paul Lafargue, whose primary vehicles were the periodicals, \textit{La Socialiste} and \textit{L’Egalite}.\textsuperscript{582}

The narrative of degeneration and its application to class-based politics fit well with the character of French politics and its intimate connection between individual and national health. The bourgeoisie had science to say that socialism made the nation sick. They also had proof with the squalor of the workers and their legacy of destruction. In the face of this, socialists

\textsuperscript{581}Forth, \textit{Dreyfus}, 2. Tony Judt’s scholarship associates the division between artisans and industrial factory workers with the popularity of Proudhonian and Blanquist ideologies—both of which dominated the French section of the International Working Men’s Association, which came into being in 1864. This uniquely French mix, Judt writes, explains why French radicalism retained the strange character of having both “social militancy and political weakness.”Tony Judt, \textit{Marxism and the French Left}, (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 91-97.

\textsuperscript{582}Marxism made its mark in 1879 with the launching of the \textit{Parti Ouvrier Français}. Donald Sassoon, in his magisterial work, characterized the kind of Marxism that would become dominant in France by the end of the century as combining revolution, libertarianism, direct democracy, and anti-clericalism. Donald Sassoon, \textit{One hundred years of socialism: The West European left in the twentieth century} (New York : New Press,1996), 12.
proceeded in almost the same manner as they had before. They maintained that socialism was
the fix for French weakness. As *Le Socialiste* wrote in 1899, “…in the presence of such
overwhelming findings, it is impossible for any person in good faith not to regard socialism as
the benefactor and regenerator of mankind.”\(^{583}\) They also continued to present the superiority of
the male proletariat in order to sell the arguments for socialism. Two things differed after the
Commune: one was that they had to adapt to the logic and terminology of the new science.
Second, they were often on the defensive against bio-medical assertions when doing this.\(^{584}\)

The pressure of *degenerescence* against the socialist narrative seems to have emerged around
1880.\(^{585}\) In 1880, *L’Egalite* published a particularly ruthless criticism of the bourgeoisie. As their
pretences aimed at the classic nobility, having a member of that order denounce them as inferior
was especially strong. The element that gave away the influence of *degenerescence* on rhetoric
was the conspicuous inclusion of the male offspring that emerged in this article, indicated the
concern with heredity. In the story, this old man of the true nobility, the authoritative
representative, was reflecting on his ancestors. He recalled how hard that ancient nobility
pushed their serfs and how much they demanded from them. However, the fact that the nobility
offered something in return balanced this out. The system expected it, and the serfs could at
least hope for something in return for their service. As the old man said, the nobility “sweated
under heavy armor to defend them,” even to the point of death.

In contrast, according to the old man, those with the pretence to aristocracy now push their
proletarian serfs just as hard. The dramatic difference was that this aristocracy, rather than
enduring the horrors of warfare in return, only suffer gout and syphilis. And while their

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\(^{583}\) L., “Collectivisme and Production,” *Le Socialiste* June 8, 1899.

\(^{584}\) According to Stahuljak, some elites used *degenerescence* to argue against the return of hereditary rule as well.

\(^{585}\) Stahuljak “History,” 144. With the bourgeoisie as the analogy in the socialist mind to a hereditary aristocracy, this is
very similar to what socialists were doing.

descendants might inherit their fortunes, they also inherit scrofula and dilapidated organs. The old man, while remembering the once greatness of his race, hated the capitalists who, while discussing “labor, virtue, individual and social superiority,” had “bones and muscles…lost in molten fat.” In his opinion, spiritually they were only parasites, and they would all disappear when asked to prove their social utility. The article reminded its readers to continue working to prove that the offspring of the bourgeoisie were nothing but “imbeciles full of smugness,” “imbeciles” being one of the terms Morel used to indicate the onset of degeneration. Further, their aristocracy, real, natural or artificial, was of rubbish, of which a revolution would easily dispose.

In 1885, *La Revue Socialiste* published a book review by a socialist writer. The portion of interest for the reviewer concerned the “carousing” of privileged students who would eventually take the seats of power. Again, one sees an emphasis on the offspring of the bourgeoisie. The protagonist, a “lean and sober proletarian,” observed the students the day after an orgy, “[d]isheveled, scruffy, though mostly beardless, and debilitated already by debauchery….” He said they were “…strangely disguised as boys.” He wrote, “The young males indeed had lost all manly character, [they were] men-girls, if you like, with the slang and walk of female residents of a brothel.” Witnessing the debauchery, weakness, and thus effeminate character of these enervated sons of the bourgeoisie, the protagonist came to understand the politics of Napoleon III and the Second Empire. For him, as the bourgeoisie continued the degeneration into weakness and femininity, so, too, did the quality of their rule.

In the same year, *La Revue Socialiste* took on the arguments against them built on biological

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evolution and the “clash for life” as applied to the human species. The struggle for life seemed to fit well with the beliefs and practice of capitalism. The closer a society was to the mechanisms that provided a sort of “survival of the fittest” environment would, by the logic of evolution, make the nation stronger by promoting the best and holding back the worst, a manifestation of something akin to social Darwinism. Therefore, socialism interfered in this natural process, helping the weak survive and thus debilitation the French people. The article responded by forwarding a few reasons why this logic was incorrect and that socialism would actually strengthen the French nation. For one, socialism would produce less war. The value of this was that war killed off the strongest and, when soldiers visited prostitutes, gave them venereal diseases. The result was that French women had to choose the left over, inferior, men in order to reproduce.

Another reason, the reviewer argued, was that socialism actually worked to perfect the species. The present system, the author reasoned, in reality only favored the survival of those who were wealthy. The problem, of course, was that the wealthy were not the healthiest, most intelligent, or virtuous. Rather, they were often the most debased. Therefore, taking away these advantages would take away the influence of the worst of society. In reality, according to the author, if one wanted the species to follow an evolutionary logic, it would have required an equality of starting point, leaving only physical strength and intelligence as the factors in play. In fact, only the worst of organisms fight against others and try to devour them. The more developed ones chose association and cooperation and thus improved the race, a conviction that complemented the position socialists took on colonialism.\textsuperscript{589} The transfer from competition to

\textsuperscript{589} Since male socialists had an interest in the continuation of patriarchy, it is not surprising that imperialism found a place within their thinking about the larger world. Similar to the socialists of the July Monarchy, Third Republic socialists could condemn the imperialism carried out by the French state and assert its own version. As Julia Nicholls characterizes the general view of male socialists, “French imperialism was bad not because imperialism
cooperation would therefore be true evolution. If one wanted real evolution of the species to occur, they would take care to make sure that privilege and wealth did not crush those of physical and moral superiority. If everyone was free from the fear of starvation, he argued, one could prove superiority only by better “labor, science, the arts, and wisdom.” Only in this way does evolution become a “powerful engine of perfection and progress.” Socialists, by wanting to restore social equilibrium in favor of the disinherited, advocated an intelligent selection in place of the ruthlessness of the natural one.

The argument continued by pointing out that those who had risen to greatness in the past, and whose descendants now enjoyed it by heredity, accomplished it themselves. As the argument went, “If you give to their children a distinct education, if you elevate them in luxury and idleness, if you remove from them all emulation by placing them in advance above their fellows, the good qualities they possessed in germs would not develop, and they would inevitably be inferior to their parents.” If one was truly to follow the logic of evolution, offspring needed to develop under the same conditions as the father without the benefit of already completed work. Privilege only destroys inherited qualities. Science therefore confirmed what socialists had

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always asserted, that is, “…the fatal influence of inheritance on the physical and moral
development of human beings...”\textsuperscript{591}

Another “confirmation” came a few years later in 1889 when egoism got a scientific
makeover, placing its arguments within the purview of this new bio-medical discourse. Citing
the “the celebrated psychologist Maudsley,” in fact a non-socialist by their account, greed dries
up, “…all the forces of life, [and] predisposes [one] to a moral and intellectual decadence.”
Even more important for the argument was that he claimed the offspring of those who had lived
a life of greed, “are almost always physically and morally degenerate, egoist, without morality,
and instinctively deceitful.\textsuperscript{592} Therefore, the central critique of the bourgeoisie and its values
became more than a metaphoric cholera with gangrenous effects. Instead, the effeminate quality
of the enemy, which socialists had previously insisted was observable in their physical manner
and appearance, fit itself well into a counter-narrative of degeneration.

\textit{Le socialiste} participated with their 1894 article, “The bourgeoisie condemned by science.”
Their argument was that evidence of bourgeois degeneration showed in their inability,
progressively worsening, to govern France. The mechanism they cited was the unnatural
distinction between classes given by the notion of privilege. In fact, it argued, every privilege
accepted worked towards degeneration and the “death of his race.” As such, the bourgeoisie
were well on their way to the final stages of degenerescence. Paul LaFargue echoed this
reasoning later on in a cleverly written pamphlet that used the form of a religious catechism to

revue, 1885), 33-37. “…any monopoly of wealth or power is an inevitable source of physical and mental
degeneration. The hereditary transmission of an economic or political privilege in fact uses or atrophies in the
descendants any vital energy, and, by adding to it the inevitable abuse of free force, condemns all aristocracies of
blood, gold, or power to a succession of physical weakness and physical degeneracy until extinction by sterility.”
socialiste revue, 1895), 529-530.
\textsuperscript{592} B. Malon, “La Civilization Bourgeoisie et ses aboutissants,”\textit{La Revue Socialiste}, Vol. 10 (Paris: Libraire De La
Revue Socialiste, 1889), 516-517.
explain what he called the “religion of capital.” In the catechetical process, he presented capital as a deity, with its chosen followers being the bourgeoisie. In the language of degeneration, he wrote in the *Ultimat verba* portion: “The god of Capital speaks: ‘I gorge the capitalists with a fattening, rich, and disease-ridden comfort. I emasculate bodily and intellectually my chosen ones: their race is extinguished in imbecility and impotence.’”\(^593\) Again, the terminology of degenerescence was present in the use of “imbecility” and “impotence.” In the science of the socialists, struggles and labor had kept the workers from degeneration and gave them an increase in intellect and morality. As the argument filled out, therefore, they were prepared to govern in the place of the degenerated bourgeoisie.\(^594\)

Socialists also made dedicated responses to the problem of sterility and depopulation. In one article, the author used the problem of technology replacing the worker to articulate this. In his metaphor, the effect of technology ultimately sterilized capital because the “sperm of labor” no longer fertilized it. Labor was therefore male with the capitalist providing the female part of the process. More important was that he continued this gendering by mocking the products of capitalism and their effects on society. Junk, the poising of consumers, bad advertising—all spoke the opposite of what the classical economists predicted a system reliant purely on supply and demand would accomplish. The most important phrase in his diatribe was a reference to the “regenerating drops for the lost vigor of our degenerate eunuchs of the bourgeoisie,” an excellent example of how socialists used the fear of degeneration and depopulation to take away the

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\(^{593}\) Paul Lafargue, “La Religion du Capital,” *Pamphlets socialistes* (Paris: V. Giard et E. Brière, 1900), 107. Or consider: ” But when the means of production, torn from the idle and impotent (impuissance) hands of the capitalist class, have become the common property of the nation, peace and happiness will flourish on earth, for society will tame the economic forces, as they have already tamed the natural forces: then, and only then, will man be free, because he will become the master of his social destinies.”Paul Lafargue, *Idéalisme et matérialisme dans la conception de l'histoire : conférence de Jean Jaurès et réponse de Paul Lafargue* (Paris: Impr. Special,1895), 35.

masculinity of the bourgeoisie.” Advertisements for sexual health were common, and doctors sold these to the public. One ad explained:

Dr. Thompson’s regenerating drops… in cases where the disease originates from venereal excesses or general weakness…diseases which arise from the abuse of venereal pleasures at any age, whether impotence, spermatorrhoea, weakness of the kidneys, nervous spasms, palpitations, general weakness, nocturnal pollution, melancholia, or a state of weakness.

The author, mocking the productions of capitalism, took away bourgeois masculinity by making these regenerating drops the product of male bourgeois need. The language of degenerescence was clear as the drops were for the “…lost vigor of our degenerate eunuchs of the bourgeoisie.” For one, the vigor was presently lost, suggesting the past possession of it. Even more, as degeneration went in stages, sterility being one of the last ones, it would have been proper to call them degenerate. Further, the bio-medical context changes “eunuch” from its common use as a metaphor indicating the ideological weakness of the bourgeoisie to a literal one. The rhetoric said the bourgeoisie were sterile; they lacked the ability to function as men and produce offspring for the health of the French nation. By extension, under bourgeois rule, France could not function as a virile force that reproduced itself in Europe or elsewhere in the world. As Anne McLintock characterized the connections between patriarchy and nationalism, men are the “progressive agent of national modernity,” “forward thrusting” and “potent,” something, according to socialist rhetoric, that required the true masculinity of the working male.

The most thorough treatment and socialist apology came from Dr. A. Delon writing in La Revue Socialiste of 1890. His article focused on neuropathy and moral pessimism as signs or stages of degenerescence. He was thus able to focus specifically on the offspring of the

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597 McLintock “Heaven,” 260, 261, 263.
bourgeoisie and argue for their eventual and complete degradation under the laws of degeneration. He was also able to identify concrete manifestations of his argument by pointing to real people and real culture. The result was an indictment of the bourgeoisie and an argument for the primacy of the proletariat in France.\textsuperscript{598}

His interest was with those who had a “sadness of character and of ideas.” For Delon, they lacked the strength and will to act on anything; they were the “pessimistic idle and worldly.” Highly sensitive and impressionable, they were incapable of having their own ideas to guide themselves through life. Instead, they went along with popular notions and attached themselves to fleeting cultural phenomena. They had strange ideas and, with the tendency to become suddenly agitated and violent, had the capacity to be dangerous and engage in criminal activity. They could not hold down jobs, becoming dissatisfied with the regular and acceptable pleasures of life. Their tastes might become morbid, he wrote, and the outrageous in art and literature drew them in.\textsuperscript{599} Not able to handle the real world, they sought something else, producing “the reign of instincts, of vague feelings, and of the superstitious fears of childhood.” They were therefore attracted to “neo-mysticism,” which included, “madness, mysticism, Catholic or Protestant religiosity, Buddhism, spiritualism, fakirism, magic, all these speculations of weak imaginations and deplorable intellects that express the mental debacle of the so-called governing classes.”\textsuperscript{600}

The presence of these elements was therefore evidence for him of the “intellectual degradation” of the bourgeoisie and its transfer to its male offspring, proof that as a class they

\textsuperscript{598} La Revue Socialiste also took on moral Pessimism from a non-medical perspective in another issue. “To the morality of asceticism we can, without fear, oppose the morality of altruism, which is based on goodness enlightened by righteousness to oblige the unceasing struggle against social iniquities, and to sanction the satisfaction of duty accomplished and the esteem of one’s peers. This is the morality of the robust, the other of the emasculated.” E. Raiga, “Schopenhauer,” La Revue Socialiste, Vol. 14 (Paris: Libraire De La Revue Socialiste, 1891), 663.


\textsuperscript{600} Snell, “Proudhon,” 682.
were “emptied and finished,” leaving room for the superior proletariat. 601

Delon went on to explain why the idle and rich were in the process of degeneration. He gave two reasons. One was that whatever ancestor made it out of the countryside and into the modern bourgeoisie did it at the expense of their moral and physical health, that is, by “intellectual over-exertion, violent emotions, incompetence, and fever.” The result was that this person interrupted the proper balance between mental and physical labor necessary to continue the health that he inherited from his peasant ancestors. With the assumptions of Lamarckian inheritance, the article asserted that the children of this person who made it into the bourgeoisie would be physically inferior, nervous, sensitive, and have less store of moral and physical energy. Logically, therefore, it is possible that their children in turn would be neuropathic or even degenerate, which at this point would be irreversible. 602 In the larger picture, therefore, France suffered because the present economic system promoted the sick and immoral, those presently or well on the road of degeneration. 603

The second way, Delon argued, that the bourgeoisie was on the road of degeneration, was through the institutional training of its young. Going to college wealthy and privileged allowed for indulgence and “venereal excesses.” Already neuropathic, and lacking proper physical activity, the moral instincts of the college-aged male waned and excessive pleasure encouraged egoism. Sensitivity increased in a deformed way, and the need for more and different pleasures accelerated. The result was, “…the incessant pursuit of strange refinements in drinking, in eating, in clothes, in festivals, in shows, and in love.” It required, “morbid oddities to shake the

601 Snell, “Proudhon,” 682.
602 “Any excessive development of a function impairs the whole being and, as we have already pointed out, certain nervous refinements, a contemporary acuteness of intelligence and sensations, do not constitute desirable advantages or real progress of the species, for these acquisitions, accompanied by a weakening of physical vigor and greater unfitness to the self, indicate a lesser adaptation to the environment, a decrease in vital resistance, and consequently a shift towards degeneration and death.” A. Delon, “Pessimisme and Socialisme,” La Revue Socialiste, Vol. 12 (Paris, Libraire de La Revue Socialiste, 1890), 684.
603 Delon, “Pessimisme,” 685.
profound boredom and stupid torpor of society…a theater, a literature, a poetry of hysterics and convulses.” Eventually, excitement would take up all the energy of the degenerate. All other faculties would “vegetate and die.” Some existed in an even worse state, even more “delicate and feminine” as he described them. They were so sensitive that the slightest difficulties were too hard for them to bear. Citing characters in a novel by the degenerate author, Paul Bourget, this kind of person, over the simple issue of infidelity, would “…proclaim the bitter vanity of everything, and throw curses to woman, to society, to human nature, to life.” In their ultimate inability to deal with existence, they would commit suicide.

The article went on to offer a solution. The only way to save France, it argued, was to have these idle ones share in physical labor so that they experienced the proper balance of mental and physical work. Once the physical activity allowed for the proper mental attitude towards sensations within the formerly sick and weak, the French as a whole could proceed towards perfection. This, however, would be messier than it sounded. It required the workers to take control and introduce labor to the “social waste.” He listed this social waste and identified them by name. The first were the petits-crèves (little bangs). Regarding this group, Le Courrier de Vaugelas wrote: “At several epochs it has been observed that a certain part of youth affected the air of exhaustion, [and] were effeminate in language and in costume…” In the case of petits-crèves, their walk showed the symptom of alcoholism by absinthe and vermouth. Even more,”Their voice is nasally and their mucous membranes are pale, a sign of an exhausted constitution redone by iodine.” In the explanation of the etymology of the term, the writer said, “…his name (petits-crèves), in perfect harmony with the ruin of his body and soul, is none other than the participle of the verb “se crever,” in the popular sense of ‘fatigue, to burst into excesses,  

605 Delon, “Pessimisme,” 688.
to crumble in every way.” The second on his list were the Gommeux (literally “gummies”), which were pretentious young élégants, men of fashion, not unlike the muscadin of an earlier time.

Third, he mentioned the Pschutteux (chic), which were another category of young and well-dressed elegant. He summed them up by calling them deliquescent, which literally meant, “decaying ones.” Continuing with his argument, he wrote that more than likely, these “useless, disdainful, effeminate, and melancholy” ones would not do well with the new physical labor. They would either get better or die. In either case, once these people, who were like syphilis on a face to society, were gone, “the evolution towards human happiness can continue. With “…a more perfect consciousness and mastery of his person, [the human being] will govern himself by himself for his greater good and for the greater good of his offspring.”

Contrasting the worker with the well dressed, weak, and thus effeminate remained a meaningful cultural touchstone for depicting the rhetoric of socialists.

Making Sense of the Proudhonian Influence

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon did not take part in the class-based gendering this work has been analyzing. In other words, he did not divide masculinity and femininity along class lines in his rhetoric. While noted for his patriarchal militancy, Proudhon seemed uninterested in the particular ordering of men shared by his fellow socialists. Certainly, his republican socialist credentials were sound. His ideology was moralistic at base, respectful of ‘93, and interested in

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608 Delon, “Pessimisme,” 691.
the emancipation of the suffering workers.⁶⁰⁹ Even subject to the needs and pressures that shaped French political discourse, Proudhon did not show any consistent pattern of feminizing the bourgeoisie or stating that true masculinity only existed in the workers. This makes Proudhon an outlier, one that requires explanation.

Proudhon drew on a strict physiological explanation for his understanding of masculinity. Something he termed “virile energy” was its source, which he associated with the production of semen. This formula strictly excluded women, making them hopelessly inferior in body, temperament, and morality. It also allowed him consistency with French physiognomy, in particular one that supported republican morality. For Proudhon, a proper balance between the virile energy one has and what one’s particular body needs was the key. If the virile energy was insufficient, the body and temperament would be soft and weak. He called men like this *femmelins*, which was a combination of male and female—the ultimate insult considering the intensity of his misogyny. Since virile energy had something to do with the possession of semen, too many “amorous pleasures and seminal losses” can “deprive man of his strength…agility, ardor, courage.”⁶¹⁰ This connected Proudhon’s theory with the popular notion that those who frequented orgies or masturbated excessively were physically degenerate. It also made a lack of virile energy detectable and thus gave masculinity a particular look and assumed psychology.

In theory, therefore, Proudhon had the freedom to make distinctions between men central in his patriarchy and to produce a class-based distinction like his peers. He seemed to have come close to this in his analysis of the first Revolution. Proudhon agreed with other socialists that an elite portion of the bourgeoisie made up the Girondist faction. They had an “elegant and artistic nature,” admired the eloquence of the literature of antiquity, and were the idealists of the

Revolution. As such, he said, they were the feminine part. Their opponents, the Robespierrists, were hopelessly mediocre, having “stiffness without power, [and] dogmatism without reach.” Both being inferior, he labeled the Girondins the “femmelins of the Revolution,” and the Robespierrists the castrates. 611 Ultimately, Proudhon rejected Jacobinism because of its tendency towards the centralization of power, and actually drew on conservative gendering of the Revolution by referring to them as the “Jacobins et leurs tricoteuses.”612

Not surprisingly, Proudhon had respect for the male sans-culottes. He believed that the people viewed them as “the judiciary of the Revolution,” and he identified them as having “austere manners, defiant faces, and uncultivated beards.” They were therefore, according to Proudhon, the male element of the Revolution.613 Proudhon’s connection to the peasantry no doubt steered him towards the more rugged of the revolutionary characters as ideals or masculine examples. Also not surprising, considering Proudhon’s high view of himself, was that he claimed the sans-culottes as his historical antecedents because they were poor, critical of society, and loved reason, morality and justice. He also fancied the most radical in politics and philosophy produced during the Revolution, including Marat, Clootz, Roux, and Hebert, as his intellectual ancestors.614

Nevertheless, Proudhon, while conceding masculinity to the sans-culottes, and admitting that ’89 produced a few real men, did not believe like his fellow socialists that the present state of things contained any of this type.615 Since the Republic of 1848 had strong Jacobin elements, he

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611 Proudhon, Révolution, 401-402.  
612 Proudhon, Révolution, 404. Anti-revolutionaries during the first Revolution, to emasculate the radicals, associated them with the tricoteuses (knitting women) who appeared at executions. This parallels the conservative focus on the pétroleuses of the Commune discussed in the previous section.  
613 Proudhon, Révolution, 401-402.  
614 Proudhon, Révolution, 490-491.  
615 Proudhon, Révolution, 490-491
saw it as merely a continuation of the *femmelins* and *castrates* of the first Revolution.  
616 By the early 50s, Proudhon, disgusted with the losses of ’48, saw all of France as corrupt, every level and class, describing it in popular parlance as “gangrenous.”  
617 If France ever became free, he wrote, it would be because the rest of Europe did it first and left it no choice.  
618 Instead of blaming this weakness on the bourgeoisie, he applied the degeneracy to everyone. And instead of gendering the nation through its ruling class, he gendered the whole nation without distinction of class. For Proudhon, the difference between men was much less, and thus less important, than the difference between men and women, which, he believed, was more dramatic and its effect on society more deadly.  
619 He labeled France a woman: it had some good qualities, he wrote, like sensitivity to beauty and avariciousness, which allowed it to produce “superior geniuses, writers, thinkers, scientists, inventors, scholars…” But, it did not understand or desire things like freedom or justice, and was easily duped by a flattering man. In reality for Proudhon, France belonged to mediocrity, and its leaders lack virility and “bear false beards.”  
620 Proudhon could do this for several reasons. One was that his ideology did not require the conceptual survival of any of the heroes from the first Revolution. For him, the first Revolution consisted of political change, which was only half of France’s need. In a sense, it ran its course. Social revolution was the present need. For this, he did not need Jacobinism or Jacobins worked into his reasoning. Instead of building society around the notion of fraternity emanating from the workers, Proudhon focused on justice, which, for him, could only exist in free associations and mutually agreed on contracts, eliminating the kind of government structure most Jacobin

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619 Proudhon, *Révolution*, 341. Moral natures between men and women were too different according to Proudhon. “It is through men’s own consciousness that they become to know the hatred of falsehood and enslavement of others—that they come to respect others and desire justice. Women are naturally desirous of privileges and, as such, desire aristocracy. The feudal age is the age of the woman.” Proudhon, *Révolution*, 365-366.
republicans sought. Justice defined by free association mattered, not the domination of a proletarian ethic. Secondly, Proudhon’s anthropology was essentially classless. More Hobbes than Rousseau, Proudhon saw everyone as moved by baser and anti-social motivations, muting the distinctions between worker and owner that other socialists had built their systems on. Along with this, he rejected the emotion and voluptuousness of romanticism, for which he blamed the *femme* Rousseau, “the first of the femmalians of intelligence.” Proudhon was interested more in working with the realities of humans than building society on a romantic view of workers. In fact, part of his rejection of democracy as the mechanism for worker emancipation came from his perception of worker incompetence: they did not know what they needed or how to rule; they simply defaulted into Jacobinism and a centralization of power. This complemented the important inclusion of the bourgeoisie in the social revolution—not in a supporting capacity, but in an equal or even guiding role. Ultimately, his ideology did not rely on the superiority of the worker for it to succeed.

These features made his response to the failure of ’48 acute. While some liberals had lost faith in progress, some socialists like Proudhon lost faith in the people to bring about change. Requiring authoritarian rule by the first Napoleon, he said, France was no more ready to be free in 1814, 1830, 1848, or in 1860. “It will never mature”, he wrote. Unlike other socialists, he

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626 Another example of this came from a Blanquist who had, for similar reasons as Proudhon, given up on the leadership of the people, calling them “effeminate rabble” in frustration. A. Claris, “Le Peuple,” *La Patrie in Danger*, October 26, 1870.
did not view France as the leading light of Revolution in Europe. Betraying the influence of patriarchy and hegemonic masculinity in the conceptualizations of foreign policy, Proudhon believed that if France was female, it therefore required fertilization by the male nations. What other socialists saw as the role of the proletariat, by the time Proudhon’s ideology matured he saw as the role of other nations. France was too decadent, too effeminate. Ultimately, without a superior worker to champion, or the assertion of a deficiency in the owner class, he had to convince by reason and flattery that a revolution can and should occur. His dedication to the bourgeoisie in his work on revolution did this well.

Proudhon’s mutualism became an important part of the French republican socialist tradition during the 50s and 60s. Further, it went on to become a permanent feature of French socialism, especially as an alternative to the Jacobinism that had previously dominated. This did not mean that his pan-class gendering competed with the cross-class gendering of socialist rhetoric. For one, Proudhon’s formulation had parts that could have easily adapted to the narrative of a superior worker, thus providing the room for cross-class gendering. Revolution, according to Proudhon, had to come from the bottom rather than the top with the workers carrying out a social revolution via mutualism. Theoretically, one could put the workers back at the center of things, allowing for a notion of the physical and psychological superiority of the worker, especially if popular rhetoric about health or national superiority called for it. Benôit Malon took a similar route with his anti-Jacobin mutualism. One could also argue that free association, taking away the need for a centralized government, would make sure that things ran according to a worker

ethic, again making room for the superiority of workers in socialist rhetoric. Even more, in spite
of his general rejection of Rousseau, his notion of morality remained very similar to the Jacobin-
inspired socialism from which he parted, in theory making room for judgments and distinctions
between people or groups of people, a prerequisite for a cross-class gendering.

As Steven Vincent’s scholarship on Proudhon, Malon, and republican socialism attests, a
definable Republican socialism in France remained despite the mixing of ideologies and
perspectives that occurred.\(^{632}\) This was due to the relative flexibility of the republican ideal. A
good example that illustrates the flexibility was the departure from patriarchy that it could
countenance. Proudhon’s misogyny, for example, was concrete or strict, rooting the inferiority
of women in their “non-masculinity,” that is, the production of “seed,” connecting it irrevocably
with secondary sexual characteristics and leaving very little room for the play of language to take
place.\(^{633}\) On the other hand, the memory of the first Revolution, which informed republican
socialism, had remained diverse enough to inform and conceptualize feminist activity during the
Commune, as well as develop multiple feminist socialisms both during and after the
Commune.\(^{634}\) Further, the patriarchal language of republicanism was abstracted enough from
biology or sex to manifest flexibility.\(^{635}\) One sees this amongst the Guesdists in the infamous
eulogy of Aline Valette. Acknowledging her as a true comrade and socialist, intelligent with


\(^{634}\) Phillip Martin Johnson, *The paradise of association: Political culture and popular organizations in the Paris

\(^{635}\) It is difficult to establish whether the revived periodical, *Mère Duchene*, which published its first issue in 1869,
reflected a female socialist perspective or was simply written by men under the pseudonym. If its editor was female,
the January of 1870 edition demonstrates a flexibility of gendered language in its condemnation of a male socialist,
stating, “From the point of view of virility, he is not a man, he is lascivious, an effeminate, and a coward…he
refused serious duels and only accepted literary meetings…” Unattributed, “Les Ami du Peuple,” *Mère Duchene*,
Jan 30, 1870. Clearly, “male” and “female” indicated “good” and “bad,” in this case, reflecting ingrained
patriarchy. If these had remained purely moral categories, however, as indicated by a women condemning a man for
being effeminate, women could theoretically possess the character of male and be recognized as a worker.
simple devotion, the speaker said, “She was very balanced, very calm, of a grave and serious temperament, rather male.” La Revue Socialiste, the publication of Benoît Malon and integral socialism, which drew on Proudhonian mutualism, demonstrated an understanding of feminine oppression. For example, one author reflected the awareness of patriarchy and the effects of language. In this example, he understood that the culture used “man” as a universal, which reflected patriarchy:

…moral and juridical servitude, under the domination of males, is necessarily reflected in language. The upshot here is to show that Proudhon and his mutualism could feed republican socialism without steering its gendering patterns. The value is that it isolates his example and leaves room for a gendered rhetoric based on broader needs and influences that remained stable and relevant across decades as this work has articulated.

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639 This work focuses on republican socialism. However, anarchist critique of society by way of art was particularly robust, since it was a way for an individual to be politically or revolutionarily active without having to participate in a hierarchical institution. See Alexander Varias, Paris and the Anarchists (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 135. That makes an investigation into the work of anarchist artists useful in the search for gendered rhetoric. Indeed, one finds this socialist gendering there. See John Hutton, “Camile Pissarro’s Turpitudes Sociales and Late Nineteenth-Century Anarchist Anti-Feminism,” History Workshop 24, (1987): 32–61. Hutton’s work on depictions of women in anarchist press shows that there was really no difference in iconography from other Neo-impressionist work. According to Hutton, Pissarro’s Turpitudes, which, on the surface, seems to have feminist inspiration, is actually quite anti-feminist in its portrayals. His observations reveal a view of women only as helpless victims. The only thing they can do is to wait upon the male anarchist to help them. One witnesses the same phenomenon the Théophile-Alexandre Steinlen work commission by Le Chambard Socialiste. It is clear that the artist uses a more realistic style when trying to evoke sympathy for the proletariat. Otherwise, the iconography of patriarchy and of proletarian superiority remains, even consistent with a counter-hegemonic theme. For example, the March 17 and April 28 editions of Le Chambard Socialiste have illustrations invoking the Paris Commune. Both pictures of the Commune have a crowd of workers lead by a strong and beautiful Marianne, but there are no women in the crowd. And while Marianne is present, she seems to be a separate kind of entity not belonging to the crowd. On the other
Women Socialists and Hegemonic Masculinity

These rhetorical characteristics and patterns do not make their way into feminist socialist strategy in any significant way. The general lack of female voices participating in counter-hegemonic masculine rhetoric actually flows logically from an intellectual and conceptual separation from patriarchal convictions. The rhetoric that came from the male socialist rested firmly on a mythology of female inferiority, which was itself bolstered by weak social and psychological theory. An effective and logical rhetoric aiming to emancipate the female proletariat along with the male proletariat therefore would require a modification of foundational concepts if it was to avoid the reinforcement of female inferiority and thus patriarchy. This modification would have precluded the kind of cross-class gendering practiced by male socialists that aimed at the hegemonic masculinity of the bourgeoisie.

hand, the artists illustrated the Republic with a female in red, one who interacted with others in the scene, leaving room for expressions of patriarchy and worker superiority. For example, in the July 21, 1894 edition, the Republic was a woman seeking protection from a large man. The woman has a thin and delicate waist, and she rests her head on a large worker’s chest looking frightened while his face is stern and emotionless. Her hands are small with long, thin fingers—not likely the hands of a peasant women—pressed against his chest, while his large fingers clench around her shoulders. The March 24 edition contrasts a massive worker with a helpless and frail feminine republic. Another depiction had the Republic as a little girl who seemed to be the daughter of a rough-looking worker. Her bag reads “social republic.” A fat and creepy looking member of the bourgeoisie leans over to talk to her. The little girl, looking angry, holds the arm of the defiant worker who, shirtless, sticks out his chest. In the Jan 6, 1894 edition, a worker protects the republic like a man protects his wife and family, who willingly seek his authority. The inclusion of the peasantry, consistent with Anarchism, is noticeable as well. In back-to-back issues—March 31, 1894 and April 7, 1894—an illustration entitled “Today” is on one cover, and an illustration entitled “Tomorrow” is on the other. “Today” depicted a husband next to his wife, who was holding a small child, wearing yolks and pulling a plow. A fat owner watches proudly and smiles. With the family hunched over in labor, the owner is a similar height. The next issue, “Tomorrow,” has the husband and wife next to the yolk broken on the ground. The massive man with his right hand pushes the owner into the ground, reducing the owner’s height to just slightly above his waist. His left hand grasps his wife around the shoulder. A similar theme, the male fights against and defeats oppression while protecting his family. The Dec 30, 1893 edition of Le Chambard Socialiste depicts a sturdy male worker watching the sun rise, reinforcing the masculine identity of work. An issue of Pere Peinard from 1897 depicts a worker, shirtless and muscular with the sun behind him, bursting out of the ground with his broken chains and pickaxe. See L’Almanach du Pere Peinard (S.P.A.G Papyrus editions: Paris), 1984. Emile Pouget 65.

Jenny d’Hericourt had accused both Michelet and Proudhon of forwarding the dogma of the Middle Ages and sharing the same argumentation as the theocrats who wish to subdue women. Jenny D’Héricourt, La Femme Affranchie, Réponse À Mm. Michelet, Proudhon, É. De Girardin, A. Comte Et Aux Autres Novateurs Modernes, Vol. I (Bruxelles: A. Lacroix, Van Meenen Et Cie, 1860), 149,161.
Jenny d’Hericourt’s (1809-1874) feminism provides an example. Her feminism, while maintaining an essentialism, backed away from the hierarchical gender essentialism that the counter-hegemonic masculinity advocated by male socialists required. She rejected the notion that distinguishing characteristics between men and women were “...laws established by sexuality.” In other words, there was no basis to say that character, intelligence, or morals were based on sex. As proof she stated the obvious: that there are plenty of men who manifest traditionally feminine characteristics, and women who posses those of the masculine. Males and females were of course physically different because of the needs of reproduction, but their psychological and moral particulars were products more of social construction. Freedom and education were the key for her, since only with equal education and the space to exercise political and economic freedom could one’s actual nature develop.

Her difference feminism saw men and women equally necessary for society and for each other. At the same time she considered the notion of one sex being superior to the other as “absurd.” Ultimately, she rejected the tendency to classify human beings along the lines of caste, class, or sex, stating that these categories were “illusions of the mind.” She wrote:

…let us respect the human species which will escape all classification, however reasonable the process may be, because every human being is changeable, progressive…

These convictions were not compatible with the conceptualizations of the social world that underpinned the cross-class gendering practiced by patriarchal male socialists.

This does necessarily mean that feminist socialists could not use gendered language. Rather,
the referent or content of that language would have to be modified. Paule Mink (1839-1901) does this very thing in her analysis of the first Revolution. In conveying an ideal future for male and female socialists, she wrote:

…so will be the Republic of tomorrow where all will have the same rights and duties, this Republic will not be the effeminate and lascivious Athenian, but the proud proletarian of 93, the strong and beautiful Marianne carrying in her arms the destinies of the world, the freedom of peoples.648

Here, Mink drew on traditional male socialist gendering of the first Revolution with the reference to Athens, which represented the aristocratic-bourgeois, and thus effeminate, manifestation of Republicanism. The logical result was that ‘93 was the Spartan version, which was the proletarian and thus masculine manifestation of Republicanism. What is interesting is that with the sans-culottes element, ‘93 was intensely patriarchal and hyper-masculine in real life, easily co-opted and praised by patriarchal republican socialists. In her version, however, this proud proletarian ’93 was a republic of equality and female emancipation, “a strong and beautiful Marianne carrying in her arms the destinies of the world and the freedom of peoples.”

Elsewhere she referred to male workers as “brothers,” making women equal to men in their proletarian identity. Considering her logic, patriarchy belonged to the category of effeminate, which was a manipulation of patriarchal male socialist logic.

Noticeable is the fact that the biological referent for “effeminate” was completely gone in Mink’s usage, which means that her choice of terms, as one would expect, was not informed by a mythology of female inferiority. Mink was perhaps reappropriating language. Her disregard for the patriarchal logic and accompanying terminology of her fellow socialists is evident in her descriptions of Benôit Malon at his funeral. Benôit Malon was forward looking in his socialism and sharp in his understanding of oppression. Being married at one time to André Leo probably

helped him develop this way. According to Mink, Malon himself “..was one of the first to understand that social renewal could only be complete if women were also emancipated.” She said that Malon’s view of the worker’s Republic was that it could not exist if there was a “category of human beings,” still enslaved. Continuing on, she wrote:

With gentleness, kindness, great benevolence and deep sense of equality, he raised the woman and, like all sincere socialists, called her to share the struggles of their worker brothers for rights and equality for all. 649

She called him the ”gentle philosopher (le doux philosophe),” and said he was “soft-hearted, tender and timid.” Further, “he was socialist not only by science but also by feeling,” and the mothers loved him for his idea of justice. 650 These descriptions of Benoît Malon do not fit the republican socialist gender binary. Influenced by feeling, accessible to mothers, and receiving the attribute of “softness”—Mink praised and defined a different kind of masculinity for French Republican socialism, one that disregarded the traditional and rigid ordering of gender characteristics part and parcel of patriarchal socialism.

The feminism of Hubertine Auclert (1848-1914) highlights another complication to a cross-class gendering by feminists. Like d’Hericourt, Auclert did not posit a hierarchy amongst male and female characteristics or dispositions. Reflecting her aversion to hierarchy amongst French citizens, she scolded male socialists for their inconsistency: “How can you reproach the rulers who dominate you and exploit you if you are in favor of leaving in the human race categories of superiors and inferiors?” 651 For her, “moral and intellectual qualities are independent of the sex of the individual who possesses them.” 652 Embracing difference, she viewed the ideal society as

650 Jaures, “Mort,” 408.
one of harmony between genders where there is “…equality of rights for all and the equitable
distribution of functions among all men and women…according to their particular aptitudes.”

She further complicated the possibility of a cross-class gendering by equating class privilege
and sex privilege. In one context, this places male socialists alongside the bourgeois as
oppressors. “Whether you are rich or poor, you exploit women,” she accused, “…[you do] the
same work with regard to women as the ruling classes.” Cross-class gendering would not
meet any socialist rhetorical needs here since male workers and owners were mixed. One the
other hand, male socialists were also “companions in misfortune,” “victims of oppression” just
like women. Auclert, here, stated that male workers were “women by heart” and brothers. As
such, they should help women emancipate themselves. While the association of workers with
women was taxonomical and not moral or psychological, it shows the difficulty in attempting a
meaningful cross-class gendering in this case as well. One could not argue for the emancipation
of the proletariat without rejecting gender egalitarianism and claiming the superiority of
femininity over that of masculinity, ultimately an inversion of patriarchal reasoning.

The advocacy of a matriarchy as a solution to class and gender oppression found expression
within the Guesdist camp. A product of the bio-medical challenge, fear of depopulation, and the
pressures of feminism, Aline Valette and Dr. Pierre Bonnier produced a socialist-feminism
bolstered by the reasoning of evolution and with the promise of greater health and fertility for the
French. Appearing in the pages of La Socialiste, the doctrine of “sexualism” held that there
was a natural and determinist flow towards socialism in society, an argument already part of

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653 La Citoyenne, February 19, 1882.
654 Auclert, Égalité, 3, 13. See also, Joan Scott, Only paradoxes to offer : French feminists and the rights of man.
655 Auclert, Égalité, 2, 15.
656 M. Boxer, “Linking Socialism, Feminism, and Social Darwinism in Belle Epoque France: the maternalist politics
and journalism of Aline Valette” Women’s History Review 1 (2012):1-19. Bonnier signed his name Dr. Z.
socialist retorts to depopulation and degeneration. It further criticized the socialist belief that collectivism would produce an equilibrium between the individual and society, and the physical and mental, thus being the solution to the present reign of individualism. Sterilization was a more likely outcome according to this idea.

According to sexualism, collectivism would not work this way because of the dispositions of the male. Demonstrated by the fact that the development of capitalism and technology had made male physicality essentially irrelevant, Bonnier argued that evolution had led men in the wrong direction. Men, over time, had developed the back part of their brain, making them fine for force but leaving them inadequate for what a socialist society needs. The result was that collectivism in production was not natural to men and thus poorly developed as a practice and attitude. On the other hand, female experience had caused the development of the front part of the brain, which produced intellectual and moral speculation, feelings, and creativity. In this case, Dr. Bonnier concluded, “…the woman is essentially socialist.” Through motherhood and the care of family, women are the only ones who know how to work for the species rather than self…” Holding back the socialist revolution, therefore, was France’s masculine morality, the “…absolute predominance of the strong sex over the useful and beautiful sex…” For Bonnier, the masculine brain would have to evolve from its parietal emphasis to a frontal one, giving men the feminine qualities necessary for socialist society and to put his “big fists back into his pockets.”

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657 Charles Bonnier, “Referendum,” Le Socialiste, Feb 18, 1900.
658 Dr. Z “Le Nationale Adoption.” Le socialiste, Sept 8, 1895.
659 Boxer, “Socialisme,” 5. Dr. Z “Le Juif et la femme,” Le Socialiste, July 10, 1892. “The machine which has driven out the man of labor…has made a place for the woman, rendering his animal form more and more useless. It emancipates the woman individually by making her, individually also, acquainted with industrial slavery beside conjugal slavery...The faculties which have made the strength of man are constantly losing their value. The parietal development, already sterilized by mechanization to give place to the intellectual and speculative faculties, leave men inferior to women, even the uneducated women.”
anarchical values, but also on an anti-masculine as well.\footnote{Dr. Z, “A pres le question sociale,” \textit{Le Socialiste}, June 3, 1891. Typical of the POF’s failure at understanding and adopting feminist ideology, they never implemented it, and its effect on rhetoric never developed. And by this time, the Dreyfus affair had appeared and was in the process of confusing traditional socialist rhetoric.}

\textbf{The Cult of Force and the Muting of Socialist Rhetoric}

At the end of the eighteenth century, a section of the Third Estate distinguished itself from the aristocracy by donning a uniform and manner that reflected their differing values. In turn, the sans-culottes separated themselves from these members of the Third Estate by championing a look and physicality that came from their lives as laborers. For those on the left who dreamt of a republic based on Sparta rather than Athens, the sans-culottes, with their austerity and physicality, represented an ideal, one that declassed political enemies because their masculinity did not partake in that ideal. The sans-culottes, therefore, became a compelling model for socialists who wanted to replace the idle male ruling class in nineteenth-century France. By the end of the nineteenth century, physicality as a defining element of masculinity won out. Socialists and workers did not win, but the ideal of masculinity relating in some way to physical attributes did.

By the last decade of the century, the bourgeoisie, plagued by a crisis of masculinity because of their sedentary vocations, had taken more direct and compromising solutions to their perceived inferiority. According to Christopher Forth, a “culture of force” centering on the male body developed around the turn of the century, which had its catalyst in the Dreyfus affair.\footnote{Christopher Forth, \textit{The Dreyfus affair the crisis of French manhood} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).} The reason for this was that the coalition that formed the anti-Dreyfusard right had to be careful with its propaganda. Like many others in French society, they respected the military and looked to the soldier as a model of masculinity and representative of France.\footnote{Forth, \textit{Dreyfus}, 63, 83.} The preservation of this
position remained necessary for their politics, leaving them the rationalization that even though Dreyfus was a soldier, he was Jewish and therefore dramatically flawed as a man. The focus on Dreyfus’ Jewish background gave them the freedom to condemn someone who was actually a respected French soldier while keeping their nationalism intact. It also gave them access to the anti-Jewish stereotypes present in French popular culture and, more importantly, a useful gendering scheme. Jews were in the effeminate category, and making Dreyfus effeminate and thus degenerate became a prominent critique.\(^{663}\)

Part of the cultural gendering of Jews as effeminate was the association with the sedentary intellectual. Critics pegged Jews as nervous, sensitive, and infected with neurasthenia, similar to the criticisms socialists aimed at the bourgeoisie. The focus on Dreyfus, therefore, increased the tensions between cultural perceptions of the inactive and physical life. Dreyfus rallied the right, and their gendered criticism was strong enough that the pro-Dreyfus crowd found themselves having to defend their own masculinity simply because of their support of him.\(^{664}\) According to Forth, the effect of the right’s strategy was the increased focus on the bourgeois lifestyle, which heightened the crisis of masculinity already occurring in male bourgeoisie society.\(^{665}\)

The extra focus on perceived shortcomings of the male bourgeoisie worked its way out in society as force and physicality become an obsession for French males.\(^{666}\) Health as represented by a muscular and agile body became popular, and the means to attaining this state became popular as well. According to Forth, by 1905 the idea of exercise for its own sake and not military training, and an essential role for sport in daily life, had become part of French values.\(^{667}\)


\(^{664}\) Forth, Dreyfus, 84, 152.

\(^{665}\) Forth, Dreyfus, 103.

\(^{666}\) Forth, Dreyfus, 205.

\(^{667}\) Forth, Dreyfus, 206-207.
Indeed, the old attempts by the bourgeoisie to achieve masculine respectability gave way, and men could spare themselves from the fear of accusations of effeminacy by the appearance of health and physical power.

With the implementation of universal education, both Catholic and, after 1905, secular, pedagogy made room for this new emphasis on the body with its incorporation into their programs.\textsuperscript{668} This was ironic in that socialists had been advocating a virile education since their beginnings.\textsuperscript{669} In a sense, whether they knew it, bourgeois males were now chasing Babeuf’s and Dezamian’s ideal for workers. The result, however, was the muting of the socialist rhetoric of superior physicality and health. One writer, trying to demonstrate the strangeness of French culture brought about by capitalism, pointed to the fact that a wealthy man who could remain idle because of his wealth in actuality participated in a multitude of sporty, athletic, and social occupations. He joked that a laborer would require a lot of pay before he agreed to work as hard “as this man who does nothing.”\textsuperscript{670}

In this new milieu, Hercules resonated in popular culture as a masculine ideal.\textsuperscript{671} Pictures of non-workers with physically large and fit bodies appeared in periodicals dedicated to the muscular male.\textsuperscript{672} Forth points out that even Jaurès began to advocate the adoption of bourgeois sport for workers, and in 1908, a union dedicated to worker sports formed.\textsuperscript{673} It was much more difficult in this setting to maintain that physicality and health was the sole possession of workers; anyone could have it. The loss of perceived worker superiority over the idle undercut the kind of gendered rhetoric utilized prior by socialists.

\textsuperscript{668} Forth, \textit{Dreyfus}, 212. \\
\textsuperscript{669} Forth, \textit{Dreyfus}, 231. \\
\textsuperscript{670} Émile Faguet, \textit{Questions politiques}, (Paris, 1899), 130. \\
The Dreyfus affair did even more to confuse the socialist message. Since political blocs had not formed with things like nationalism and race as prominent as they would become with the Dreyfus affair, and even a bit earlier with the Boulanger crisis, greater faction and realignment of ideology occurred. Not only would socialism have to deal with these issues, confrontation with the racial “other” would affect the discourse of masculinity as well. It shifted political blocs, created new ones, and produced new discourses of power. The change was great enough to shake up the way power would be represented and challenged via gender and its masculine-feminine binary. Through the moral prodding of Jaurès, the Dreyfus affair aligned socialists with part of the bourgeoisie in the cause against a new right, militant and nationalistic with claims to muscular and powerful masculinity. The affair allowed the moderate left to bring socialists to the support of the Third Republic, weakening any prior subversive rhetoric. In one sense, socialism became more international as France gave itself to a new nationalism. And socialism tried to become more pacifist as the nation ramped up its militancy in the build up to the war. Even more, the philosophical materialism of the Guesdists found itself challenged by an intellectually reinvigorated Catholicism, Ultramontanist and anti-modern. A reformist and pragmatic spirit came to a head with the declared and dramatic support of Dreyfus by Jean Jaurès and the subsequent formation of the Parti Socialiste Français in 1902. Responding to international pressure, both parties came together to form the Section Française de l’International Ouvrier (SFIO) in 1905. By 1905, the way socialists had previously used masculinity could not be effective.

675 Sternhell, “Roots,” 121.
676 Stuart, Marxism, 40.
677 See chapter six.
Consistency Around Gendered Rhetoric

Four narratives, consistent over the nineteenth century, belonged to the socialist assertion that workingmen were superior to the men of the bourgeoisie. The first falls under the heading of national concern. This was the fear of physical degeneration and depopulation. Sean Quinlan and Robert Nye have demonstrated this reality in the consciousness of the French people stretching from the first Revolution into the Third Republic. This national concern and its role in shaping political rhetoric is indeed present in the sources. Modeled clearly during the first Revolution, the health of the ruling class reflected the health of the nation. In which case, if one wanted to replace the ruling class, the new class had to be of superior health. During the first Revolution, republicanism and a republic produced better men. For socialists starting in 1830, workers were already better men who could produce a better republic. The consistent use of the metaphors of health, sickness, and healing helped highlight this practice during the first half of the century. With the bio-medical revolution of the Second Empire, it continued into the Third Republic, where the discourse of empire and imperialism incorporated the language of health and degeneration. While the bourgeoisie used the new language and science to condemn the working classes and socialism, socialists retorted that labor and fraternity had protected them from degeneration and allowed them to remain superior to their idle oppressors, who were in actuality the ones degenerating morally and physically. The intelligence of the proletariat therefore increased as that of the bourgeoisie decreased and dilapidated.\textsuperscript{679} Even superior poetic skill and genius passed into their hands.\textsuperscript{680} As such, the proletariat was “the rock on which the new

\textsuperscript{679} There was concern that as more of the sons of the proletariat made it into higher education that the bourgeoisie would try to emasculate them. Louis Revelin, “Le liberté de l’enseignement” (Paris, 1899), 150.

Church [of socialism] is to be built.” The proletariat, therefore, was ready to take over for the decaying bourgeoisie. During both halves of the century, socialist rhetoric in essence was the same: male workers were superior to the male bourgeoisie and could therefore produce a superior France to take the lead Europe, despite profoundly different contexts.

Second was the ordering influence of gender. More specifically this refers to patriarchy. This can manifest itself as a tendency to assume power to males and to have them represent the superlative forms of any reality—including the state. The use of “male” that this work has tracked reflects this well and acts as a marker of patriarchal assumptions, conscious or not. Therefore, patriarchy is not necessarily or solely the product of a particular political ideology. While some ideologies may embrace patriarchy more obviously or easily, it is more proper to see it as a pre-existing ordering force, one that produces, informs, and supports patriarchal laws—for example, the Napoleonic Code. As such, if men are the assumed possessors of power, morality, and leadership, general comparisons between the proletariat and bourgeoisie are default comparisons of its men. A clash between masculinities based on class, as Connell would argue, therefore becomes an almost given feature of French patriarchy. Once the physical, psychological, and aesthetic attributes of workers became valid and compelling models for masculinity, especially within the context of health fears, male workers ended up on the front lines of socialist rhetoric. In a dramatically expressed patriarchy, therefore, this meant that male workers were superior to the men of the bourgeoisie.

The third falls under the heading of collective memory. This collective memory developed among socialists through the foundational work of Buonarroti in his accounting of Babeuf and his Conspiracy of Equals. The pro-Mountain narrative, highlighting the drama and tensions of ’93, provided a model for Republican socialist identity and action, one flexible enough to support

more than one ideological strain. For example, Blanc saw Robespierre as the point of contact and representation of the Revolution. Blanqui, on the other hand, looked to Hebert and his atheism as the proper letting off point for republican socialists. In either case, a common history providing a common set of references helped order republican socialist formation over the nineteenth century, most importantly allowing the sans-culottes to play a role in the socialist idealization of masculinity and thus the identity of the French male worker.

A fourth constant was the idealist character of French Republican socialism. This appears more clearly with the challenging presence of German Marxism. In *Marxism and the French Left*, Tony Judt criticizes the popular scholarship that says France could not countenance the acceptance of Marxism because it was too different from French socialism. Judt’s argument is that there were several similarities between pre-‘48 French socialism and Marxism to suggest, instead, a rather easy fit.682 One of these similarities he called a “historicist reading of the French Revolution.” Indeed, the notion of historical pattern and the special role of the workers in this pattern was already part of French thought before Marx. The most clear was the developed historicism of Blanc drawn from the patterns suggested by Buonarroti. When Marxism does find its place on French soil, Judt’s argument goes, its historical materialism complemented this understanding. The problem with Judt’s interpretation is that there were indeed important distinctions between French socialism and Marxism that kept the two apart for so long. Benôit Malon’s construction of an inclusive but distinctively French socialism, which rejected important elements of the Marxist formula because they were incompatible, articulated this quality of French republican socialism.683

683 Steven Vincent, *Between Marxism and Anarchism: Benoît Malon and French reformist socialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press: 1992), 100-101. According to Vincent, Malon’s goal with *La Revue Socialiste* was to
Malon reacted to the Marxism championed in France by Lafargue and Geusde, which was happily reductionist and adamant about the relations of production being the efficient cause of social and historical phenomena. Drawing on a caricature of Marxism, Malon deemed this view thoroughly and unforgivingly deterministic, its logical conclusions making criminal actions guiltless and claims of injustice void. For Malon, the job of the Marxist was simply, “…to make the proletarians conscious of their class interests, and to make these interests the motive of all their efforts in the struggle for emancipation,” a sort of insular response that mimicked the dynamic of the bourgeoisie in society. In Malon’s French mind, this made Marxism incomplete in methods, goals, and inspiration. The motor of history, for Malon, included “religious, philosophical, political, sentimental, [and] aesthetic’ factors beside economic ones. The social world was therefore much more complex and could move in any direction. Preserving the idealist character of French Republicanism, Malon felt the complexity and contingent nature of social reality required the guidance of ideas, ones that promoted the common good. A reductionist materialism was therefore out of place in this intellectual milieu. Returning to Judt’s assertion of historicist compatibility between Marx and, for example, Blanc, a profound contrast actually emerges. As Marxism looked to the relationship of production as the key to history, Louis Blanc’s historicism, while also having a developed dialectic, focused on the relationship between ideas, which associated the proletariat with

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685 Malon, Précis, 147.
686 Vincent, Between, 94.
687 Malon, Précis, 143.
688 Malon, Précis, 142-143. Quoting George Renard.
fraternity. Even an atheist materialist like Blanqui rejected determinism and kept his French idealism, believing that Liberty, Equality, Fraternity “...contained all the developments of future society in germ form. Marxism had no use for that sacred formula and, at its most cynical, rejected it as an ideology meant to disguise and help justify bourgeois rule.

This works out as an expanded explanation for the previous chapter’s assertion that French Republican socialists had an extremely high view of the proletariat. Idealism allowed morality to have a dominant role in socialist ideology. For Malon, socialism should have a “regenerative scope” and “…simultaneously pursue mental renewal, moral regeneration, political emancipation, and economic transformations,” like it did in the earlier part of the century. By doing so, it made it easier and even more necessary to make judgments between men concerning virtue and masculinity. It also allowed socialists to place the locus and efficient cause of morality in the proletariat. Again, a brief contrast with Marxism should demonstrate this.

According to the Marxist La Socialiste, the “new man” will emerge from the correct economic conditions. Le Socialiste later reiterates this materialism:

From a moral point of view, as well as an economic one, the human species is in great need of regeneration; and this [moral] regeneration, the logical consequence of

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689 Blanc saw history guided by the interaction of three principles—Authority, Individualism, and Fraternity—that corresponded to three major periods of history. Authority defined the Middle Ages up until the time of the Reformation. After the Reformation, the rise of the bourgeoisie represented individualism and the emancipation of the individual. After this, Fraternity should triumph with democratic socialism and the realization of liberty for all through union and love. These three periods correspond to three different economic systems—Feudalism, capitalism, and socialism—and show the slow evolution away from slavery. Blanc, and those who listened to him, believed that they were taking part in an amazing display of providence, one in which they were the good guys, the chosen ones. Similar to Marx, each system had a class that represented its period. As such, the proletariat became a special group of people embodying Fraternity, which also contained the elements of historical change and the regeneration of France. This fit very well with radical logic and language and the idea that a group with superior health and masculinity was to represent and organize France and then lead Europe into total regeneration. This is one reason why this logic remained consistent into the Marxist period of the Third Republic. Blanqui, Révolution, 208.


692 Vincent, Between, 129.

693 Unattributed, “Pas de Robinsonaide!” Le Socialiste, June 12, 1892.
the [economic], will be the work of triumphant socialism.  

Malon’s idealist predisposition allowed for the opposite formulation. Moral regeneration came first, and it came from the people. This was because, amongst the people, one finds the desire for “fraternity, moral excellence, and happiness for all in the cities of the future,” indicating the morality for a just society. Further, the proletariat ultimately leads history. Malon wrote, “…while the idle minority, debauched and listless, falls asleep skeptical and unhappy under the poisonous…tree of decadence, [laboring humanity] conquers the future.” The idle minority up to this point had merely responded to and regulated what the people had been doing. He argued precedent in the fact that the multitude spread Protestantism and made the Roman Empire Christian, not the minority at the top. As such, the “success of all thought” depended on the part taken by the base majority. Being socialist and fraternal, the people will also remake its leaders in its image.

For Malon, class hatreds, an increase in superstitions, uncontrolled egoism and immorality all pointed to the inadequacy of the bourgeois system. Regeneration was coming, however, from the laboring classes. Echoing Blanc, Malon’s advice was for the bourgeoisie to merge into the “[worker] class” in order to, “…bring about a more powerful regeneration, equality and solidarity through freedom.” Unlike the Marxist version that ultimately looked to changes in the relations of production, the workers, Malon wrote, will “…take the moral hegemony

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696 Vincent, Between, 132.
697 Malon, intégral, 59.
698 Malon, intégral, 59.
699 Malon uses the phrase “young class” here. However, he elsewhere makes it clear that that the working class is a relatively recent arrival, and the immediate context suggests a contrast between the class on the way out and the one coming up, that is, the old vs. the new. His implied meaning is the working class.
(l’hégémonie morale) from humanity and lead it to a higher civilization…”

This kind of historicism made it much easier to claim the superiority of the worker, especially since there was some cultural room or need for a nobility that preserved and modeled morality.

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These four narratives help foreground logics that remained constant over the nineteenth century through which one can understand, and thus categorize, socialist statements concerning gender. In the light of these logics, Trelat and his “…men with manly (male) and generous thoughts,” and Dezamy’s men with strong and agile bodies and good and energetic hearts, were of the same masculine ideal and served the same rhetorical function.

The reference point was the male worker, either the romanticized sans-culottes of the first Revolution, or an idealized version of the present. These masculine ideals symbolized an alternative to a corrupt, sick, and degenerate ruling class that reproduced its values through effeminate education—a physically and psychologically superior male to picture and guarantee a robust, healthy, and masculine France.

Their concrete referents clashed with a particularly foppish and often voluptuous manifestation of bourgeois rule in the form of the muscadin/jeunesse dorée of the Revolutionary and mid-century period, and the petits-crèves of the Third Republic, a perfect picturing of the contrast between masculine and feminine broken down along class lines. The male worker ideal manifested the masculine quality of fraternity, and rejected the effeminate quality of egoism, in turn representing a masculine Republic as the bourgeoisie represented an effeminate monarchy.

701 This is not to say that Guesdist never moralized. As Stuart wrote, “polemical efficacy” demanded departures from strict applications of materialism. French Marxists taking part in the bi-o-medical debates, defending the superiority of the proletariat in and of itself, shows this, as well as the pull that these logics of health, class, and gender had. Stuart, Marxism at Work, 85-94.
702 Ulysse Trelat, Anniversaire des 27, 28, 29 juillet 1830 (Paris, chez les marchands de nouveautés, 1831), 15.
or a hermaphroditic juste milieu. One can find them in Blanqui’s massive six-foot fearless and patriotic worker whom the weak and cowardly bourgeoisie approached weeping with awe. They appeared in Vallèt’s bearded, broad, and herculean representative of the people, and in Eugène Pottier’s ironworker, who should represent and rule all of humanity.\(^703\) For Blanc, they possessed the missing masculinity and virtues of bourgeois rule needed for France. Only with their incorporation into French rule, would France regenerate and “…resume her influence over the affairs of the world.”\(^704\) In harsher form, they appeared as the workers who would either heal or kill the “useless, disdainful, effeminate, and melancholy” with their institution of universal labor.\(^705\)

Chapter 6: Masculinity and Belief: French Catholicism vs. Socialism

It is not by developing egoistic sentiments…like religions do…that one can reach this goal (of teaching people a morality that aims to benefit society). What is necessary, rather, is a virile education freed from all metaphysical teaching.  

*Petite Catéchisme du Libre Penseur*, 1875

… all religion is the resignation and acceptance of the existing order of things established by God…Religion prolongs the enslavement of the proletariat; socialism gives him his complete emancipation, both material and intellectual.  

*Le Socialiste* July 12, 1903

A second way that socialists used masculinity to discredit its political enemies in nineteenth-century France came from its confrontations with the Catholic Church. Unlike the bourgeoisie, the church was a non-class entity and had criteria for masculinity different from both socialists and the bourgeoisie. Even more, its markers for masculinity did not center on physicality, but rather the male’s response to religion. The point of contention, therefore, belonged to the realm of belief and ran parallel to the dominant clash of class taking place. Despite the differences, these discourses of class and belief did not remain perfectly separate in the mind of socialists. French labor had long conceptualized the church as being “in step” with capitalism in its practices, allowing French socialists to see the church as an ally of the bourgeoisie. Guesdist, as well, had the Marxist conception of superstructure, making the church a sort of epiphenomenon of capitalism and turning its clerics into gendarme for the oppressive economic system. Like others, it was therefore easy for Marxists to determine that the bourgeoisie had

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used the church to keep order, or that the church simply kept the present system in place. Radicals saw the church and its power as antagonistic, allowing socialists to understand religion as a threat to its interests. Since patriarchy and anxiety about health were in play, political rhetoric required the content of gender. One socialist summarized this relationship to the church by accusing priests of being “emasculators of our energies in favor of our oppressors.” In other words, they were not the primary enemy, but in the socialist mind, they worked for that enemy. The church, therefore, represented a second front in the socialist battle for overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

Catholic masculinity is less obvious than class as a category of analysis within the gendered power dynamics of nineteenth-century France. First, as a non-class institution, Catholic masculinity did not have the potentials that came with being part of a volatile substructure that was quickly remaking France in its own image. Secondly, since race and class are so useful in establishing identity, religion does not present an obvious or intuitive path of inquiry. The experience of the French church in the nineteenth century, however, requires it. As a religious institution, its resistance to Revolutionary change was not simply political. Rather, its dominant form of activism aimed at moral and spiritual renewal. Indeed, the church in the years after Napoleon tried to win back converts through missionary activity amongst the French population. This pushed piety to the front line in the conflict between counter-modern Catholics and the modernisms of an evolving France. While the challenge of modernity would go on to produce varying responses amongst the faithful, this chapter will argue that a

reactionary piety made its way into and throughout the French nineteenth century to inform a militant and anti-modern brand of Catholicism, one that socialists would find antagonistic and, as such, become subject to their gendered rhetoric.

The socialist gendering of the church had more complexity to it than that aimed at the bourgeoisie. The feminization thesis, which demonstrates that the spirituality and participation of the French Catholic church over the nineteenth century became decidedly more feminine, does not predict in this area.\footnote{Patrick Pasture, ed., \textit{Gender and Christianity: Beyond the Feminization Thesis and Gender Christianity in Modern Europe} (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2012). See also Roger Macgraw for an application of the feminization thesis. Roger Magraw, \textit{France 1800-1914: A Social History} (Taylor and Francis, 2002), 170.} In other words, one does not find socialists taking away the masculinity of religious antagonists with direct ascriptions of effeminacy. In fact, they incorporated terminology different from that used to emasculate the bourgeoisie. Two factors may account for this. For one, there was more than one referent available to critics of religion that belonged to the category of “\textit{esprit de faibles},” a term materialists from both the first Revolution and the Third Republic used to criticize the religious.\footnote{This develops later on in the chapter.} Labeling a religious male as “weak of mind” put him in a category that included not only women but also children, both groups popularly associated with adherence to religion. The implication would be that one could criticize the masculinity of religious men by ascribing to them childishness. Indeed, according to Ralph Gibson, the anticlerical bourgeoisie viewed Catholicism as infantilizing.\footnote{Ralph Gibson, \textit{A Social History of French Catholicism, 1789-1914} (London: Routledge, 1989), 266. See also, Thomas Buerman, "Lions and Lambs at the Same Time!: Belgian Zouave Stories and Examples of Religious Masculinity," in \textit{Gender and Christianity: Beyond the Feminization Thesis: Gender and Christianity in Modern Europe}, ed. Pasture, Patrick. (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2012), 107-119.} This also fits well with the fact that Ultramontanism had informed the anti-modern, clerical, and theocratic force socialists were up against, as well as the piety of its activists. This older religiosity, rejecting whatever evolution of theology and practice had taken place over the nineteenth century, was decidedly more mystical, deferential, and anti-humanist. It was also less attached to
the rigid male-female binary the cult of nature of the Enlightenment had produced. Socialists, therefore, might have seen the piety of their religious antagonists as something ambiguous, untethering them from the overtly anti-women terminology historically used against the bourgeoisie. Complementary to this is the evidence that some materialists believed Catholic women to be good candidates for proselytization to their cause because of the church’s misogyny. As one source advocated, “All that is outrageously offensive to women in religion must be used for the benefit of free thought. Set feminist free thinking up against the misogynistic church, and all those on the fence will come to us…that is to say, the immense majority of women.” This strategy required them to downplay rhetoric that drew on the mythology of female inferiority. Considering these two factors, socialists rhetorically emasculated the religious male without the use of anti-female language, and some had reason to do so.

A Political Piety

Despite the challenges of the Enlightenment, which had a slightly modernizing effect on Catholic theology, and moderate attempts at the council of Trent to rid the faith of overtly superstitious elements, the Revolution helped preserve catholicism’s pre-modern quality in France. One way was by catalyzing a unique combination of theology and piety that

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716 The anachronistic potential in the modern world of a pre-modern piety showed itself during the Oxford Movement and Anglo-Catholic renewal in England. Starting in 1830s, some in the Anglican Church pushed to revive and renew its Catholic roots. This meant an emphasis on High Church worship—aesthetically complex and emotional—and a Catholic approach to piety, which included monasticism, veneration of saints and the Virgin Mary, confession before a priest, celibacy, and other ascetic disciplines. In essence, Anglo-Catholicism was a renewal of pre-modern piety. This growing popularity of Catholic piety in nineteenth century England brought forth a highly gendered discourse, pitting an “effeminate” Catholic Christianity against what some termed a Protestant “muscular” kind. Cardinal Newman, an Anglo-Catholic apologist and eventual convert to Roman Catholicism, whom critics accused of effeminacy and perversion because of his celibate life, in an attempt to show England in a Catholic light, commissioned and published a six-volume hagiography of English saints presenting the origins and preservation of the English church *via* its sainted men and women. The hagiographies glorified medieval...
developed during the seventeenth century in the form of the Sacred Heart cult. This piety gave resistance to Revolutionary change a cosmic and redemptive significance, producing a sense of urgency and inspiring many Catholics to the counter-revolution cause. The other way the Revolution shaped piety was by giving credence to Ultramontanism, which in France would represent and popularize a “tradition-minded” version of Catholicism.\textsuperscript{717} Seen as necessary to order in a post-Congress of Vienna Europe, Ultramontanism took off after 1848 once the reality of Papal independence helped broaden the political concerns of French Catholics.\textsuperscript{718} Its focus on sacrifice and suffering was a good complement to the Sacred Heart, and by mid-century, both informed counter-revolutionary Catholicism.

After the Wars of Religion, an important set of emphases and practices coalesced into the 
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\textsuperscript{717} Burton, 11.


\textsuperscript{719} Ivan Strenski, \textit{Contesting Sacrifice: Religion, Nationalism, and Social Thought in France} (Chicago: University of
school was in response to the Protestant critique of the Catholic mass as a sacrifice. Developing and amplifying the understanding of the Eucharist as effecting for the participant a participation in the “real physical passion, suffering, and death of Jesus,” the Tridentine reform that placed the Eucharist at the center of Catholic spiritual life helped forward a piety defined by the notion of sacrifice. The particular theology of sacrifice came from Pierre de Berulle whose reflections on the Incarnation brought him to the conclusion that Jesus’ act of becoming human was an act of self-annihilation. As Ivan Strenski observed, Berullian sacrifice was in contrast to bourgeois understandings of sacrifice that were partial, merely a “giving up of” something. Berullian sacrifice was complete, “a total annihilating surrender of the self,” which, by participating in Christ’s sacrifice, allowed for the forgiveness of one’s sins. In this kind of spiritual practice, imitating Christ was a life of “self-effacing self-sacrifice” to God.

For Berulle, this piety flowed from the natural order of things, a cosmic model that required influence beyond personal piety. In this sense, Berulle’s theology was also political in that it bolstered by analogy a royalist religion. The same kind of hierarchical relationship that his notion of sacrifice suggested between believers and Christ should inform the French monarchy. In Christian theology, as Christ was both the servant of God and God, so should the King be both the servant of God and the image of God for his subjects. Sacrificial piety in this sense, which requires the annihilation of oneself for perfect devotion to Christ, also informs

720 Strenski, 17.
722 Strenski, 4.
723 Strenski, 17.
one’s attitude toward the monarchy or the nation. This kind of relationship between king and subject, if achieved, would let France participate in the cosmic restoration inaugurated by the incarnation and sacrifice of Christ, setting France apart for God and the world.\textsuperscript{727} This co-development of theology and Absolutism strengthened the idea that piety, in particular the notion of sacrifice, had political connotations.

Berulle had more to offer in this integration of religious and royalist fervor. Berulle had developed a “psychology of the heart” in spiritual practice. For him, by focusing on the heart of Christ and seeing his action as annihilation, the believer could “enter into Jesus’ cosmic action” by his own spiritual emptying or annihilation. In this sense, the heart became the place where the Catholic and Jesus could meet in a redemptive manner.\textsuperscript{728} This teaching fit well with the separate but contemporary cult of the Sacred Heart, whose primary informer claimed to have a vision of Jesus’ heart on fire with love for humanity, but at the same time suffering sacrificially,\textsuperscript{729} which ultimately became the Sacred Heart emblem. The visions went on to claim that if Louis XIV dedicated France to the Sacred Heart, built a church in its name, and added the emblem to the Royal colors, France could take its place in history as a people specially set apart by God and with special protection.\textsuperscript{730} This never occurred under the Sun King, but the narrative worked well for Jesuits who helped spread its devotion. By the eighteenth century, the French court had adopted devotion to the Sacred Heart, and the cult became widespread in France.

When the church and king came under pressure from the Revolution, the sacred heart became the symbol and piety of counter-revolution. After the persecutions started, new visions from

\textsuperscript{727} Durand, “Regard,”716.
\textsuperscript{728} Strenski, 25. “The devotee not only meditated on Christ’s expiating death and of himself before the Father, but also took the occasion to enter into Jesus’ Cosmic action by seeking a total identification with the suffering lord.”
\textsuperscript{729} Strenski, 26.
\textsuperscript{730} Anthony Raymond, France and the Cult of the Sacred Heart: An Epic Tale for Modern Times (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 2.
Sacred Heart devotees promised protection for those who wore the emblem. A rumor that the king and his family had taken an oath to the Sacred Heart increased the connections between sacred heart and counter-revolution, giving the king’s execution cosmic implications. And famously, counter-revolution forces wore the sacred heart emblem into battle in the Vendee. As revolutionaries adopted symbols to unite and virtues to define them, so, too, did counter-revolution Catholics emerge with their own symbols and virtues.

A powerful feature presented itself in the historiosophy of Joseph de Maistre, who brought together all the persecutions against the church over the previous few centuries into a coherent and meaningful whole. Maistre’s work, Considerations on France, published to condemn the Revolution and help push France back into the arms of throne and altar, came out in 1797. Maistre formulated that history was a “record of divine activity,” something to be studied as “divine revelation” to show God’s will for humans. Maistre’s conclusion was that the Revolution was punishment from God for sins committed by France. The first kind was the acceptance of individualism. This, according to Maistre, was the direct result of the

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731 Jonas, 84.
732 Strenski, 16. Strenski explains the violence of the counter-revolution forces as a manifestation of the Catholic psychology of sacrifice that attended the sacred heart cult. He notes the differences between Protestant and Catholic warfare—Catholics aiming violence more often towards others, Goldhammer says essentially the same thing, but ascribes it to both sides as the Catholic notion of sacrifice was in the general psychology of the French. Jesse Goldhammer, The Headless Republic: Sacrificial Violence in Modern French Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
735 The root of this sin was Bacon and Locke, whose immoral thinking produced empiricism, democratic individualism, and social-contract theory. A complete list consists of “Gallicanism, atheism, Protestantism, illuminism, philosophism, Calvinism, Jansenism, Rousseau, the fronde, together with Bacon, Locke, Helvetius, Kant, and materialism and sensationalism.” Elisha Greifer, “Joseph Maistre and the Reaction Against the Eighteenth Century,” American Political Science Review 55 (1961): 595. “…the general character of this philosophy…has produced in the end the despicable generation which has done or allowed what we see before our eyes…” Maistre, Works, 236.
736 For Maistre, in contrast to the Enlightenment’s emphasis on individualism, history revealed that humans were social beings. There was no social contract introduced by pre-social and rational creatures since outside of society they cease to be human. Maistre, Works, 114
Reformation, where the first major rebellion against proper authority occurred and democratic individualism was born. The second kind was France’s part in the Enlightenment, which produced ideas that came from a spirit of rebellion against God. The Revolution, however, was another matter. While Maistre agreed that bloody upheavals were commonplace in history, the violence of the Revolution distinguished itself by its extreme level of evil and corruption. This, for Maistre, was a sign that God was involved in a special way.

In Maistre’s religio-political formulation, he applied Christianity’s model of religious regeneration by bloody sacrifice to the political realm, asserting that political regeneration required bloody sacrifice as well. Asserting a mirror of Christ, Maistre made much of Louis’ claim of innocence and his willing demeanor at the scaffold. In this sense, Louis’ execution became an innocent sacrifice to expiate the sins of France. Further, for Maistre, God had also demonstrated his will by chastising France in the bloody terror, which was to prepare them morally for a future king to retake the French throne. Deeper reflection on the Revolution as

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737 Jean-Yves Pranchère, “The Social Bond According to the Catholic Counter-Revolution: Maistre and Bonald” in *Joseph de Maistre’s Life, Thought and Influence: Selected Studies*, ed. Richard A. Lebrun (Montreal; Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 140-141. Maistre’s whole view of political authority was one of centralized strength in order to hold society together from its enemy of individualism. For Maistre, a precarious social order cannot countenance the championing of individual wills, and the Revolution and its talk of contract and natural rights is the example of this.

738 For Maistre, history revealed that humans were unable to produce any sort of political system on their own. Therefore, the use of human reason in this area is only destructive. Political ideas and structures must participate in Divinity if they are going to be legitimate and stable. Everything else will fail, according to Maistre; indeed, deviations from this formula will be punished. “Institutions are strong and durable to the degree that they partake of the Divinity. Not only is human reason, or what is ignorantly called philosophy, unable to replace those foundations ignorantly called superstitions, but philosophy is, on the contrary, an essentially destructive force.” Maistre, *Considerations*, 71

739 Maistre, *Considerations*, 73, 70.

740 Goldhammer, 9.

741 Goldhammer, 59.


743 Maistre, *Considerations*, 38. “...the French Revolution leads men more than men lead it...The very rascals who appear to lead the Revolution are involved only as simple instruments, and as soon as they aspire to dominate it they fall ignobly. Those who established the Republic did it without wanting to and without knowing what they were doing. They were led to it by events; a prior design would not have succeeded. Robespierre [and other members of
having cosmic implications helped bring to the surface another important part of sacrificial piety, that of its ability to cleanse vicariously. Maistre asserted the notion that the imitation of Christ by regular followers in the way of sacrifice could help purify others. In this notion of vicarious sacrifice, divine justice demanded that extra merit performed in conscious sacrifice could apply to others. By extension, sacrificial piety by Catholics could apply to the misdeeds of France. Individuals, therefore, by self-sacrificial suffering for the Church and monarchy, could help redeem France. These ideas provided not only an intense motivation toward counter-revolution, coupled with sacred heart theology, they also proscribed or solidified a certain kind of pre-modern piety for that movement. Experiencing a revival in the 50s, one could find Maistre’s descendents in Papal audiences as guests to legitimize the movement.

Sacred Heart and Counter-Modern Piety in Nineteenth-Century France

Sacred Heart piety, whether through special societies or the Jesuits, went on to inform a significant portion of the impressive missionary movement the church undertook in the Restoration. The mystical and emotional elements of Sacred Heart spirituality worked well for instigating renewal in France, which relied on drama and ubiquitous ceremony. In this milieu,
many claimed to witness miraculous events such as prophecies and healing, demonstrating the psychological hold that this narrative had on Catholics. In one case, in a scene reminiscent of the Emperor Constantine’s experience at the Milvian bridge, witnesses claimed that a cross appeared in the sky following a mission sermon in the town of Migne in 1827, which caused “a violent emotional reaction” by the spectators. Like most of these kinds of events occurring at this time, the church sanctioned it and interpreted it as a sign that God was on their side.

Sacred heart piety remained an important part of French Catholic spiritually after 1830, with many cities around France dedicating themselves to the cult over the rest of the century. As the complexities of modernity increased, the ability of the church to make enemies did as well. After ’48, the church’s initial friendship with the bourgeoisie helped dissolve the uneasy relationship that existed between the church and socialism. In 1856, Pius IX dedicated the whole church to the sacred heart to protect it against modernity. In 1864, he published the syllabus of errors, condemning socialism and other forms of modernity, including liberalism. The same year he beatified Marguerite Marie Alacoque, whose visions shaped the Sacred Heart cult.

The Sacred Heart narrative was again useful during the Italian Risorgimento. France’s failure to defend properly the pope during Italy’s emergence as a unified nation again stoked the idea of a national sin against God. The fact that the pope lost his independence in the same year that France lost to Protestant Prussia seemed providential and a sign of divine judgment.

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752 Kselman, 76.
753 Kselman sums up how the Church understood and promoted the message of the prophetic movement. “France had sinned in the Enlightenment, had been chastised by the Revolution, and was now able to reassume its role as the leader of the Christian world. In the future, France was destined to play a decisive role in the providential events that would culminate in the Christian millennium.” Kselman, 77.
more, the experience of the Commune was sufficiently bloody to make an easy connection between 1793 and 1871. In response, Catholics constructed the Sacre Cœur basilica in Montmartre. The basilica was to function as a pilgrimage destination, allowing individuals to participate in the redemption of France. It also functioned as retribution and a symbol of dominance. Working with the state, the church destroyed several working-class neighborhoods to assemble the basilica. For Catholics, it was a symbol of dedication, an “ex-voto” for the return of Christianity and the redemption of France. To socialists and other advocates of modernity, it was an antagonistic and brutal symbol that represented retrograde and oppressive forces—in other words, “l’ennemi!”

Sacred Heart piety fit well with the growing popularity of Ultramontanism in the nineteenth century. Its emphasis on sacrifice and passive suffering was a complement to the growing influence of traditional Roman Catholicism. The descent of Gallicanism and the triumph of Rome over the spiritual lives of many French Catholics was a relatively smooth progression once politics asserted a separation between church and state during the Revolution. Since the Monarchy was the only institution that could protect the First Estate, a weakened or discredited monarchy meant a church subject to legitimate state intervention. The church was therefore vulnerable and unable to protect itself from the legal persecutions that took place during the

758 Jonas, 215.
760 Burton, 182.
761 Burton, 179.
While the Directory period saw some decrease in persecution, Napoleon’s Concordat with Rome brought some stability to the Church’s situation. The double-edged sword was that the deal struck between Napoleon and Pius VII occurred without input from French clergy or bishops. The Pope, therefore, had de facto authority over dealings with the French church, and their helplessness gave them no choice but to look to Rome. Further, Pius VII remained strong during Napoleon’s annexation of the Papal States, and his subsequent imprisonment proved that the pope could be the leader and arbiter of order. Indeed, many began to see the Papacy as necessary for European order after the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

Gallicanism continued after this, but it was on its way out. Ultramontanism grew with the support of romantics who found appealing the image of a medieval past unified by a single faith centered in Rome. By ’48, Ultramontanism had begun a dramatic climb in France. The Roman church began more forcefully condemning elements of modernity and engaging in the confrontation on a larger stage. French Catholic desires for the return of a proper king mixed with the issue of papal independence once the possibility of revolution unseating him in Italy became reality. The Roman Question within the drama of Italian unification made the freedom of the church take a larger position in the political piety of Catholics. Ultramontanism, therefore, increased in popularity in the 50s, and by the 1860’s more and more saw the papacy as the center

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765 Collected article in police dossier, “Le Ministère Clérical,” Series BA, Box 8, *Mouvement religieux mai, juin, juillet 1877,* Archive of the Prefecture of police, Paris. Many bishops had adopted the Roman liturgy by the 40s.
of spiritual authority and the bulwark against modernity.\textsuperscript{767}

The importance of this growing influence from Rome was the effect it had on French Catholicism.\textsuperscript{768} The Romanization of religious practice would act as a reinforcement of pre-modern piety as well as providing another mechanism for politicizing it.\textsuperscript{769} Indeed, critics perceived Ultramontane piety as pagan because it was so old.\textsuperscript{770} It was, at the very least, a reincarnation of the church of the Middle Ages.\textsuperscript{771} After 1800, Rome had begun excavations on the city and uncovered catacombs where ancient and medieval Christians had buried their martyrs. Just in time for the missionary movement in France, the Roman church, shipping the relics all around Europe, gave France the second largest supply of them.\textsuperscript{772} Understanding the counter-modern posture of this move, Ultramontane clerics used these new relics to re-sacralize areas that the Revolution had destroyed and to encourage a renewal of the cult of the saints.\textsuperscript{773} In this sense, and by associating them with the martyrs of September 1792,\textsuperscript{774} regional cults could work as resistance to the forces unleashed by the Revolution.\textsuperscript{775} The cult of the saints as an ancient piety stood in defiance of an enlightened and Revolutionary France, which tried so hard

\textsuperscript{767} Burton, 177.
\textsuperscript{770} Article in police dossier, ”Le Paganisme Chrétien,” Le Siècle, Aug. 7, 1877, Series BA, Box 9, Mouvement religieux août, septembre, octobre 1877, Archive of the Prefecture of Police, Paris.
\textsuperscript{771} Article in police dossier, ”Le Clericalism, “ Le 19\textsuperscript{th} Century, 1878, Series BA, Box 11 mouvements religieux janvier, février 1878, Archive of the Prefecture of Police, Paris. More moderate and careful commentators made a distinction between traditional French Catholicism and Ultramontane Catholicism. The view of ultramontanism was that it was clerical, theocratic, and medieval. Article in police dossier, ”Catholiques & Ultramontains,” Le 19\textsuperscript{th} century, 1877, Series BA, Box 8, Mouvement religieux mai, juin, juillet 1877, Archive of the Prefecture of Police, Paris. Article in police dossier, ”Les Doléances Cléricales,” Le 19th Century, 1877. Series BA, Box 8, Mouvement religieux mai, juin, juillet 1877. Archive of the Prefecture of Police, Paris.
\textsuperscript{772} Boutry, “Saints” 887.
\textsuperscript{773} Ford, “Female,” 124.
\textsuperscript{774} Boutry, “Saints,” 917.
to destroy this superstition. Further, the cult of saints worked well as an alternative to the secular pantheon, where revolutionaries had taken over a church in Paris to house and honor all the dead heroes of France, including Voltaire and other enemies of the church. Related to this renewal, visions of the Virgin Mary abounded, encouraging a reinvigoration of this medieval cultic veneration. Considered superior to regular saint veneration, and promoted as a means to redeem France, Marian veneration became a distinguishing feature of French Catholicism, reaching an intensity in France not matched elsewhere in Europe.

Encouraged by the spread of railways after 1830, pilgrimages to holy sites and saints dramatically increased as well. While French destinations dominated at first, the broadening politics of the mid-century changed this, and Rome became the chief destination. Instead of Paris, Rome became the center in a rejection of Paris as “a new Babylon,” giving Rome the status of the biblical “new Jerusalem.” Like Louis before him, French Catholics compared the pope and his situation to Christ and his passion, and Roman pilgrimages incorporated both issues of the pope and the French king. Promoting ancient piety and drawing more to the side of the church, pilgrimages were counter-revolutionary. While Roman pilgrimages allowed one to atone for France’s sins, the pope used increasingly military language to indicate a war between the forces of modernity and the church—a practice well established in both religious and

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778 Brennan, “Piety,” 74.
779 Burton, xxiv.
socialist discourse. This “petite guerre,” according to enemies of the church, went back to the publication of the syllabus and was against not only the Revolution, but also liberty and progress. One socialist reprinted the words of the pope to make clear to others the goal of Ultramontanism in France: “The faithful are called to the crusade. Every Christian is called ‘reverend’ and born a soldier. Women, even children, are called to the combat. I proclaim them Knights of the Sacred Heart…” He went on to list their weapons: “The crucifix is the symbol. The image of Jesus' heart is the shield. The scapulature is the armor, the medal of the immaculate conception is decoration, and the rosary is the artillery.” Indeed, Raymond Jonas called the pilgrimage “…a sacred instrument in a holy war for the future of France.” Pilgrimages could include marching in public space while wearing the sacred heart emblem and singing. Rosary beads were visible and the Pope encouraged the pilgrims to confront and silence their enemies. Later on, the Assumptionist order formed to organize and promote pilgrimages to holy sites. They also began an aggressive publishing campaign including a popular distribution of the lives of medieval saints. The ultimate goal was to educate the French nation regarding its medieval

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785 Article in police dossier, “Visiting,” Le National, Sept. 16, 1876, Series BA, Box 7, Mouvement religieux septembre 1876, Archive of the Prefecture of Police, Paris.
786 Article in police dossier, Union Républicaine, 1877, Series BA, Box 8, Mouvement religieux mai, juin, juillet 1877, Archive of the Prefecture of Police, Paris. Article in police dossier, Chronique, 1877, Series BA, Box 9, Mouvement religieux août, septembre, octobre 1877, Archive of the Prefecture of Police, Paris. Article in police dossier, “Lettres a tous,” La Tribune, 1876. Series BA, Box 7, Mouvement religieux septembre 1876, Archive of the Prefecture of Police, Paris.
790 Pilgrimages were regularly reported on in the press. Article in police dossier, “Les Doléances Cléricales,” Le 19th Century, 1877, Series BA, Box 8, Mouvement religieux mai, juin, juillet 1877, Archive of the Prefecture of Police, Paris.
roots and its authentic piety in the face of growing secularization. Rome eventually took the offensive and tried to bring workers to the pilgrimage, which showed fruit by the 1880s. In 1891, the year of *Rerum Novarum*, 20,000 workers visited Rome via pilgrimage.

**What Socialists Perceived: The Conceptualization of Pre-Modern Piety**

Modernity in general was hostile to the pre-modern values that had influenced the nineteenth century church. Perhaps the most controversial issue was celibacy, which came under attack in France from secular sources as early as the Enlightenment. The so-called “cult of nature” that held most philosophers in thrall gave authority to perceived patterns or precedents in nature. Through this lens, a notion of a natural sexuality with a strict binary of gender gained popularity, giving any deviance the stigma of being “unnatural.” Eventually this became a social model for a new France, and any deviation from it made one an enemy of France and a threat to good order. During the radical parts of the Revolution, the state outlawed celibacy and increasingly blamed clerics as emboldening counter-revolutionary forces. Further, since they did not participate fully in citizenship, they were dangerous to the Republic. In essence, progressively minded activists, asserting that family life was a higher kind of life than the contemplative and celibate one, turned the medieval world on its head.

The cultural battle reignited during the Restoration, and the same incompatibility between celibacy and the forces of modernity took place. This, however, did not necessarily manifest itself in the ascription of effeminacy to male celibates. Critics viewed this kind of piety in a

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792 Emery, 145.
796 Cage, *Unnatural*, 89.
797 Cage, *Unnatural*, 98.
798 Cage, *Unnatural*, 32.
more complex or confused way. For example, Jesuits puzzled their critics who saw them as an odd and subversive combination of male and female. On one hand, one could see them as effeminate because of their submissiveness, dependence, emotiveness, and their ability to persuade or seduce others. On the other, they also manifested elements seen as masculine, such as courageousness in the face of difficult odds, tremendous discipline, and ambitiousness. In fact, according to the mythology, some saw them bent on world domination, believing that since they were not tied down by things like property and family, they could “beat men at their own game,” implying their threat to the masculine order. 799 An analysis of male celibate priests developed amongst anti-clericals as well. Neither worker, nor peasant, nor soldier, they were physically different from other men. 800 As such, reflecting the ambiguousness that socialists would have perceived, the use of the term “hermaphrodite” in reference to male celibate clerics made sense. 801

During the Italian Risorgimento, volunteers called Zouaves made up of French and other European Catholics went to fight on the side of Pius IX. It was a righteous cause for them because Pius, author of the Syllabus, which outlined and condemned much of modernity, was suffering for the sovereignty of the papacy. While these papal Zouaves never reached beyond

800 Further, celibacy exempted them from humanness, a subversive quality because they were not participating in the building up of the French race. Airiau cites Zola who argued that sex was necessary for true male and female identity and for the status of human. Paul Airiau, “Le Prêtre Catholique: Masculin, Neutre, Autre?” in Hommes et masculinités de 1789 à nos jours: contributions à l’histoire du genre et de la sexualité en France, ed. Régis Revenin, (Paris: Éd. Autrement, 2007), 192-206. Even more subversive was that the cleric had access to women via confession, which the working class and bourgeoisie both perceived as challenging to their power. Airiau, “Le Prêtre,” 206. Into the Third Republic, socialists believed that celibacy caused hysteria in women and turned them into “furious beasts,” a shocking image because of its transgression of traditional notions of effeminacy. The broader implication was that celibacy caused women to depart from “womaness,” bespeaking of the moral failings of Catholic celibacy and of its danger to society in a modern France. Article in police dossier, L’Excommunie : Organe de La Libre Pensée, April 3, 1881, Series BA, Box 1493, La Libre Pensée : 1879 à 1891 et 1880 à 1897, Archive of the Préfecture of Police, Paris. See also Gay Gullickson’s work on the perception of women as unruly or mad. Gullickson, Gay L., Unruly Women of Paris: Images of the Commune (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996). 801 Anonymous, “La Bienfaisance Official, ” L’Egalite, Feb. 24, 1878.
three thousand in number, they became legendary, and stories about them became incredibly popular throughout France during the Second Empire. These stories established their own kind of devotional literature, finding their way into nationally distributed Catholic periodicals and appearing in heroic form in Catholic fiction. Ultimately, Zouaves became important symbolic fixtures in the fight for France. At a papal audience in Angiers in 1877, authorities were careful to include costumed Zouaves next to regular pilgrims. The gathering also celebrated the memory of a Zouave general.

Zouave soldiers, like the esthetes, martyrs, and mystics of the Middle Ages, were in line to become saints. Similar to medieval piety, the Zouave’s higher form of spirituality attracted many who analyzed their deaths for evidence of their special calling to sainthood. And like their holy predecessors, followers viewed martyred Zouaves as intercessors between humans and God and prayed to them for protection. Some of the pious even collected relics of dead Zouaves and associated miraculous healings with them. Zouaves therefore became ideal expressions of the confluence of piety and politics, and their stories became models for how others could participate in the battle for France’s soul.

Like their medieval counterparts, Zouaves renounced privilege and success. They rejected social norms by choosing celibacy and suffering in order to live for God. Demonstrating the influence of Sacred Heart piety, the Zouave was a profound expression of the notion of personal

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804 Harrison, “Zouave,” 298.
805 Harrison, “Zouave,” 280. Harrison, “Zouave,” 239 “…the Zouaves and their supporters promoted an ethic of sacrifice that called on all Catholics, male and female, to relinquish ego and suspend autonomous judgment so that their experience might be fully absorbed into the pope’s suffering.”
sacrifice for political redemption. The role of sacrifice and suffering, therefore, along with its vicarious redemptive quality, was at the heart of Zouave story and legend. In Servais Dominique Daems’ account, the author placed the Zouave in prayer before the graves of martyrs, believing that the “glorious sufferers” had risen to infuse the Zouave with courage to defend the church. Mothers suffered by sacrificing their innocent and virginal sons to war. Sons willingly suffered in battle and sacrificed themselves for the cause of the papacy and the redemption of the world. In one account, the mere decision of a young man to leave home and fight as a Zouave caused an immediate change in countenance, as a cheerful young man soon turned into a “…mournful sufferer, for whom the grave seemed already open.”

The important element here is the Zouave’s complex place in the realm of gender. Like their models, the medieval saints, their violation of gender norms was not necessarily an adoption of effeminacy—to strive for superior piety was to transcend, not merely exchange. Zouaves therefore reflected an ambiguous identity as far as a male-female binary was concerned. One sees the hermaphroditic element in the fact that while the Zouaves were gentle, emotive, and obsequious, they were also soldiers who had volunteered to fight for a cause. As in Sacred Heart piety, militancy and submission came together, as “angles of piety and holiness” put on the “garb of soldiers” and “cast terror into their enemies.” Since the Zouaves did not fit neatly into a male-female binary, socialists could have seen the character of this behavior as much child-like as effeminate. In concordance with two-tiered spiritually, Zouaves, along with the newly disseminated martyrs of Ultramontane propaganda, were necessarily virginal and would remain

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808 Harrison, Romantic, 282.
809 Servais Dominique Daems, The Double Sacrifice: Or, the Pontifical Zouaves: A Tale of Castelfidardo. (Baltimore: Kelly, Piet, 1870), 60.
810 Daems, Double, 51.
811 Harrison, Romantic, 260.
812 Daems, Double, 41.
813 Daems, Double, 107, 108.
so until death, not a default characteristic of adult women acknowledged by socialists. 814 And the Zouave in Servais Daem’s story went from his mother’s protection not to adulthood, but to the care of the Virgin Mary, dying on a day set aside to honor her. 815 The emphasis here is the perpetual youth of the Zouave.

Zouave legends were on par with hagiography. They contained embellishments, exaggerations, and presented an impossible ideal for piety and spiritual life. Nonetheless, they had value as discursive expressions of Catholic masculinity. One can glean a more grounded discourse of Catholic masculinity, however, from a famous instruction manual of piety published in Paris in 1856, prior to the Zouave phenomenon. The value of this particular source is that, geared to the soldier, it wrote clearly of male piety. Further, it wrote of it in the context of a definitively masculine institution that produced and disseminated models of secular manhood.

Stripped of the heightened spirituality and exaggerated drama that accompanied the Zouave stories, there were very similar expectations for the regular Catholic male. In actuality, some of the manual draws from general writings of Catholic spirituality published in the previous century. In part one of the work, the author dealt with the question of whether a Catholic can be a good soldier, which below the surface was a question of proper masculinity. The author not only answered in the affirmative, but also went on to say that the dedicated Catholic can actually be the best. 816 The reason was that good soldiering required self-denial and sacrifice for the whole. The potential for these things are inherent in the Catholic soldier’s faith. Not fearing death allowed for self-denial, and giving one’s life for others was a virtue. The author went on to

suggest that there is a correlation between the completeness of one’s piety and his ability to excel at being a soldier. Piety therefore took on the metaphor of warfare, as the Catholic was to become a soldier in the war against his soul. The rest of the book laid out the means for this perfection of piety. Ultimately, however, the faithful Catholic emerged as superior to the regular soldier because an action done for God, no matter how small, was greater than the exploits of heroes.  

In line with the two-tiered quality of nineteenth-century French Catholicism, there were differences between the Zouaves and the audience of this manual. These teachings were for regular Catholic men, for whom sainthood was very unlikely. In contrast to the lifelong celibacy of the Zouave and the higher possibility of martyrdom, the manual assumed marriage and a fairly regular life for most men. At the same time, the piety was similar. While marriage was fine, until that time the male was to practice strict chastity. It expected the Catholic male to honor the sacred heart of Jesus, and to seek protection from the Virgin Mary. Further, it expected the Catholic male to pray to saints and ask for their intersession. His Catholicism taught him to have contempt of the world and to avoid seeking power and wealth. He viewed life as one of suffering in order to gain entrance into heaven, and to forgive one’s enemies.  

It was also a contemplative piety that encouraged meditation. An intense focus on Mary, the Catholic male was to ponder the virtues of the Virgin, seek her out as protector, and prostrate before her picture. Further, imitation of Christ was necessary. Christ as a model of masculinity was one that gave himself to little children, the ignorant, and the poor. He was without pride and spoke to others with gentleness and simplicity. He was humble and considered himself below others. At meals, “…he is sober, temperate, [and] attentive to the needs of others.” Finally, the Catholic

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817 Manual, 5-6, 204.
819 Daems, Double, 92.
male obeyed his superiors and those put above him. Since God has ordered everything, he should view them as God himself, a strong assertion of hierarchy in an increasingly democratic world.\textsuperscript{820}

The non-masculine characteristics here do not necessarily fit into the mythology of female weakness. Elements like submission to a father in the church and state, and to a mother in the form of the Virgin Mary, were as much child-like as they were effeminate.

The development of French society in the nineteenth century helped make socialism and Catholicism enemies. For one, as the century progressed, the church became useful to the bourgeoisie as a stabilizing force on society. Bourgeois fears of organized workers, socialists, feminists, and rabble-rousers pushed many into seeing the church as the source of social stability. As such, the bourgeoisie wanted the church on their side in the fight against radicalism.\textsuperscript{821}

Marx’s son-in-law, Paul LaFargue, seeing this maneuver, wrote:

\begin{quote}
The bourgeoisie, when it was struggling against the nobility sustained by the clergy, hoisted the flag of free thought and atheism; but once triumphant, it changed its tone and manner and today it uses religion to support its economic and political supremacy.\textsuperscript{822}
\end{quote}

During the debates surrounding the Falloux Law of 1850, which aimed at a return of the education system to the church, Adolph Thiers remarked: “I want to make the influence of the clergy all-powerful.”\textsuperscript{823} His reasoning was that the church was good at teaching those at the bottom to expect suffering and accept their place. This would aid in stabilizing the status quo and work against the notion, so forcefully inspired by the Revolution, that people can and should change things for the increase of happiness—a popular idea if one is suffering under the hand of a ruling class. Further, by the end of the century, Catholicism was able to make some peace with

\textsuperscript{820} Manual, 112, 207.
\textsuperscript{821} Ralph Gibson, \textit{A Social History of French Catholicism, 1789-1914} (London ; New York : Routledge,1989), 200.
\textsuperscript{822} Paul Lafargue, \textit{Le Droit à la Paresse: Réfutation du Droit au Travail, de 1848} (J. Maheu: Bruxelles, 1890), 1.
\textsuperscript{823} Gibson, \textit{Social}, 199.
capitalism.\textsuperscript{824} Catholic social teaching, based on the writings of Thomas Aquinas, who believed private property was natural, made it easier for the church to cautiously side with the bourgeois capitalist in some instances.

The Church and bourgeoisie sharing a similar attitude toward socialism did not help the already uneasy relationship between the church and socialism that had existed under the July Monarchy. As the church and socialists began competing for members and allegiance amongst the male proletariat after ’48, this relationship quickly dissolved. Montalembert commented in 1850 that “…there is no middle ground…one must choose between Catholicism and socialism.\textsuperscript{825} The church, however, was at a disadvantage because all of its political support was going toward reactionary conservatism and thus against help for the proletariat. The fact is that the church, until much later in the century, had no visible supportive connection with the working class. Further, socialism could exist as an alternative ideology or even a replacement for religion. Rational and modern, it had the benefit of promised help in the present, rather than an acceptance of suffering that one hoped would result in a blissful afterlife it could not prove.

A more difficult element that disadvantaged the church in its desire to win the allegiance of French workingmen was the strain that the practice of Catholicism would have on proletarian masculinity. Various elements of French Catholicism did not sit well with the male proletariat. Working class masculinity demanded that men have total control over their women. If one was Catholic, however, this power could be negotiated and challenged by appeals to the authority of the priest. Further problems surrounded the practice of confession in which men saw priests as having power over them. Seeing one’s power taken away or challenged by a celibate priest

\textsuperscript{824} Stuart, “Sans-Culotte,” 722.
would not sit well with the male proletariat.\(^{826}\)

The church dedicated a whole encyclical to the issue of Socialism in 1878. *On Socialism* criticized socialists for desiring the, “overthrow of all civil society,” and refusing “obedience to the higher powers.” They faulted them for proclaiming, “the absolute equality of all men in rights and duties,” and debasing the “union of man and woman” by their criticism of marriage and the refusal by some to submit to it. They claimed that socialists restricted happiness to the “bounds of the present,” and called on faithful Catholics to keep other Catholics from joining. It stated, “Let them show, on the contrary, by noble deeds and right dealing in all things, how well and happily human society would hold together were each member to shine as an example of right doing and of virtue.” The church saw socialism as lawless and rebellious. It taught that for socialists there was no law above the individual’s conscience—a conviction that, if adopted and carried out, would destroy all the pillars of society.\(^{827}\) The struggle between socialism and Catholicism that erupted in ‘48 continued until the end of the century. Millerand commented in 1892: “the republic will be socialist or it will be clerical.”\(^{828}\) Echoing these sentiments, Paul Dramas wrote in *Le Socialiste* of 1896 that, “It’s simply a matter of deciding if the worker will become master of nature and of his destiny, or if he will remain the slave of God and of the Boss, who has become the representative of God on earth.”\(^{829}\)

**What Many Socialists Believed: Reason and Religion**

These political tensions, however, were secondary phenomena to what was essentially an ideological battle. The June, 1877 issue of *Le Travailleur: Revue Révolutionnaire Socialiste*


\(^{827}\) *Quod Apostolici Muneris (On Socialism)*, December 28, 1878. *On Socialism*. “…it is no matter for surprise that men of the lowest class, weary of their wretched home or workshop, are eager to attack the homes and fortunes of the rich; it is no matter for surprise that already there exists no sense of security either in public or private life, and that the human race should have advanced to the very verge of final dissolution.”


contained commentary on an ongoing crisis that began on May sixteenth of that year and that threatened to bring back monarchical rule. This was a reality at this time because the Third Republic was still young and had not yet stabilized. This treatment revealed that, while a socialist society was the goal, socialists viewed the church’s teaching as one of the primary obstacles. As the problem the author commented on was a constitutional one involving a power grab of the president to increase a monarchist majority, his focus was not on the possibility that what was occurring was “coup of state.” In fact, he denied such a thing was happening. While he certainly feared the despotism of a monarchy, his focus went to the effects of church teaching, which he saw as a conservateur of despotism:

...he who knows how to stifle the spirit is the natural ally of the one who proposes to bind the will. If servitude results, as has been said, in narrowing the mind, how much more disastrous will be the effects of a religion, which attacks the very center of life, to the soul of our soul, that is, reason!

For radicals, the centralizing principle of a modern France was reason, and the future of France was dependant on a populace that relied on it. This was especially true for French leadership, for if they did not reject the spirit of abdication and resignation consistent with Catholic teaching, the church would be able to rule as it did in the Middle Ages. Trying to make his case, the author described the crisis and the type of Catholicism he feared.

...innumerable swarms of black (clothed) men, like a swarm of locusts, fell upon France. It darkened the day and infected the air. The country crisscrossed with pilgrims, was covered with monasteries, brotherhoods, Jesuits, seminaries, Ignorantine universities, and religious orders of every color, possessing a fifth of the territory as in '88. It was a new invasion, even worse because it was an installation. We walk on church rats...sanctity runs the streets, theocracy flows to the fullest, and the Syllabus triumphs. It is the old monarchical and religious barbarism that escapes from its grave; the Middle Ages revives, and the black specter returns...[The events of] May 16 evoked these ghosts and gave the signal for the party. The Sabbath is open and the ball of sorcerers begins, to follow the great orgy of the Second Empire.

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830 Le Travailier: Revue Révolutionnaire Socialiste, June, 1877, 8.
831 Le Travailier, 7-8
The author feared the Ultramontane church, the church whose authority in Rome carried into France and made the Syllabus a threat.\textsuperscript{832} It was the church whose medievalism, characterized by religious barbarism, had revived in France through the work of Jesuits, a church particularly hostile to modernity and the Revolution in France. He continued:

[May 16]…is above all an attack against civilization, against progress, science and the modern spirit, an attack on common sense. It is the offensive return of darkness against light. It is the principle of evil that tries its revenge, and offers again to battle the victorious…Revolution.

The writer went on to make claims on the present tense by appealing to history. Since religion vs. reason was his controlling narrative, he referenced intellectual history instead of political history to make his case. He wrote:

The crime [against modernity] is so great that it was no longer thought possible…No one supposed that there were men in France to commit it…Modern reason had four centuries…[collecting] the treasures of ancient reason, and [renewing] the tradition of the human mind,[which had been] interrupted for a thousand years. [Reason] had learned in France to doubt with Montaigne, to mock with Rabelais, and to discuss with Bayle. [She learned] to reason with Descartes and Gassendi, to criticize with Pascal, to laugh with Molière, and to observe with Fontenelle. [She learned] to deny with Diderot, to assert with Condillac, to persuade with Rousseau, to demonstrate with d’Alembert; to demolish with d’Holbach, to explain the moral world with Montesquieu, and nature with Buffon, to fight with the Encyclopedia and to conquer with Voltaire, to understand his law with Condorcet, and to establish [modern reason’s] reign with the Revolution.\textsuperscript{833}

This quick history of the French development of modern reason makes religion the foreign or intruding element. In his narrative, the church’s place was to stop “this sublime intellectual movement,” and to end progress and science. Its ultimate goal was to eliminate human knowledge and put religion back in its place. Not only was the church trying to upend the flow of history and progress, it was also committing a “crime against humanity.”\textsuperscript{834}

\textsuperscript{832} \textit{Le Travailler}, 6.
\textsuperscript{833} \textit{Le Travailler}, 7-8.
\textsuperscript{834} \textit{Le Travailler}, 7-8.
The author continued the articulation of this historicism. The very idea of a Catholic France, he wrote, would produce a certain reaction. It would “provoke the explosion of free thought,” renewing and reinvigorating the support of reason in the fight against the influence of the church. Indeed, the celebration of Voltaire’s centenary was coming up the next year. Voltaire, a symbol of the use of reason against the church, would function as a direct challenge to the renewed public processions of the church. The purpose for reminding his socialist readers of the historic war between reason and religion was that, “…if the gods do not return, they will not be able to bring back the kings.”

Another socialist periodical echoed the same tensions and the same role for socialists in this part of the battle for France. It wrote:

The ruling class needs a horde, unconscious and without will, and that is why it resists socialism, which wants to deliver men from ignorance. The enemy we hate the most is ignorance. The Church and the army join hands to make men stupid, and this is why the State supports the Church as the Church supports the State.

Since socialism and free thought were inseparable, an intellectual fight against the church was therefore another battle in the historic fight against despotism and for socialism.

Women, Children, and the Gendering of Epistemology

The gendering logic that went on to inform socialist rhetoric against the church came out of the social critique of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The need for broader conceptions and applications of justice required modifications of the restrictive metaphysics that permeated the church and the hierarchy of the ancien régime. Jonathan Israel demonstrates this in his monumental work on the Enlightenment and Revolution. In his scholarship, the Enlightenment

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835 *Le Travailleur*, 7-8.
produced two dominant strains of Old Regime critique. One was moderate. It combined tradition with new ideas, often justifying something like a constitutional monarchy. Its intellectual or metaphysical base was dualist, a mix of reason and theology often manifested in deist or theist form. The other critique was radical. It rejected the past and any compromise with tradition, desiring some form of radical democracy. Its intellectual base was materialist. This pattern showed itself during the Terror when the desire to extend justice to a greater number of people broke along these philosophical lines. Robespierre, following Rousseau, maintained a deism and asserted that some sort of religion was necessary for social cohesion—ultimately a philosophical compromise with the Old Regime and Christianity.\footnote{Jonathan I. Israel, \textit{A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy} (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), 157.} While Robespierre’s religion was more rational, it still ordered society in some way. Hebert, on the other hand, vehemently rejected this position. He believed that as long as there was a trace of medieval metaphysics in the way people conceptualized society, there would always be some sort of hierarchy or morality that allowed for the suppression of some members of society. He therefore asserted that only materialism, by completely pushing out the influence of religious revelation in the way people conceptualized society, could emancipate the poorest in society. Hebert, identifying and anticipating the future struggle, wrote, “…war is declared between the future and the past, liberty and despotism, the modern age and the middle age, reason and superstition.”\footnote{Gustave Tridon, \textit{Les Hébertistes: plainte contre une calomnie de l'histoire} (Paris: L'auteur, 1864), 37.}

This becomes more meaningful taking into account the masculinization of reason in the face of religion that grew out of the Enlightenment and Revolution as well. When materialist Condorcet set to explain Robespierre’s dramatic popularity amongst women in 1792, he used the
opportunity to discredit Robespierre’s political abilities. Drawing on the notion that women were more likely to be religious, he said that Robespierre was actually the priest of a religious sect within the Revolution, and instead of leadership and political abilities, his mimicry of a religious leader was the real reason women followed him. To prove his point that Robespierre was essentially a priest, Condorcet listed several similarities between Robespierre’s political life and that of a religious leader. Like a priest, Robespierre preached. He also, like a priest, censured. One of the last comparisons was that, just as a religious leader, “he is followed by women and the “faibles d’esprit.” The connection between women and religion was already understood here, and his argument about Robespierre had been made prior to this phrase. As such, this comment reflects Condorcet’s observation of religion and his materialist view of religiosity. In other words, religious belief, in the mind of a materialist, represented something weak or effeminate in character and intelligence. And if religious belief implied non-masculinity, then the rejection of religion and its philosophical underpinnings implied virility, a critique that remained amongst materialists and free thinkers throughout the nineteenth century. Not surprisingly, therefore, freethinking socialists from the Third Republic could

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842 There was a version of this going on amongst the bourgeoisie as well. As a part of what historians have called the “crisis of masculinity,” bourgeois men embraced science and reason as a performance of masculinity. Along with the development of what historians call “learned societies” among the bourgeoisie, science clubs, where men practiced, discussed, and shared science and discovery also became extremely popular. A practice that acts to conquer and tame nature, bourgeois males adopted science as an element of both class and masculine identity. Science became a “…field of masculine endeavor...” as it gendered masculine and attached to the bourgeois male. Carol E. Harrison, “The Bourgeois Citizen in Nineteenth-Century France: Gender, Sociability, and the Uses of Emulation” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 64. See also Harrison, “Bourgeoisie,” 51. “Through these rituals of learned society sociability, bourgeois Frenchmen established and performed class and gender identities.” While the bourgeoisie experienced a crisis of masculinity, the church was experiencing a crisis of modernity. In 1864, in response to the challenges that new thought and discovery were making to the very existence of the church, the church officially condemned liberalism, rationalism, and the notion that human reason could be as valuable as religious revelation. While the bourgeois male was bolstering his status as a power-wielding male by adopting science and relegating his religion to the private realm, the church was fighting this very trend. Appendix to Quanta Cura December 8, 1864
refer to freethinkers from the first Revolution as “our fathers of 93,” who were “so masculine (male) and so virile.”843 And once socialism and the church became permanent enemies after ’48, it is not surprising that the definition of a “virile education” as a fix for French ills expanded to include instruction “…freed from all metaphysical teaching.”844 The conviction that associated virility with free thought complemented the continued socialist rejection of female suffrage. The effeminacy of religious belief would indicate a tendency of women to side with the church, the socialists’ sworn enemy. As the mythology went, women were “…so priest-ridden that they would reflexively vote the clergy’s wishes.”845 In which case, female suffrage would only produce resistance to socialist goals.

It is important, however, to notice the possibilities or potentials of this critique of religious belief. Condorcet had used two terms to categorize the religious—women and the faible d’esprit. Both Voltaire and Diderot wrote entries for the Encyclopédie that commented on this last term. Voltaire wrote that the faible d’esprit “…receives impressions without resisting them, embraces opinions without examination, gets scared without cause, and falls naturally into superstition.”846 Reflecting a dramatically expressed patriarchy, writers used this term to designate the natural or general state of women.847 Diderot’s entry reflected a similar understanding of weakness but asserted that women were more susceptible because they were less likely to be educated, which had left them with more prejudice.848 This was consistent with the language and values that associated women with religion. Condorcet, however, by citing both “women” and the “faible

844 Claude Constant, Cathédisme, 64.
846 See Encyclopedia entry for moral foible, 7:27.
847 For example, “…weak of mind like a woman.” Edgar Quinet, Oeuvres complètes d’Edgar Quinet, Vol. 28 (Hachette: Paris, 1912), 121.
848 Later socialists shared this viewpoint. Benjamin Gastineau, Les Crimes des prêtres et de l’église (Imprimerie du petit parisien, 1880), 69, 71.
"d'esprit," clearly meant a larger constituency of people. The complete group obviously included men, whose religiosity, implied by Condorcet’s language, betrayed a shared quality with women centering on a lack of critical thinking. In essence, he was effeminizing the religious male. However, popular notions also included children in this category, which would have fit with this conception of the weak minded. Socialist rhetoric of the nineteenth century reflected this understanding. For example, Guesdists believed the primary targets for church proselytizing were “unconscious men,” women, and children. The perception was that religion connected with the mental weakness they perceived not only in women, but in children as well. For them, men lacking class-consciousness, and who were therefore religious in their reasoning, shared the same intellectual character as women and children. Guesdists followed through with this understanding by advocating socialist proselytizing by way of reason for men, and sentiment and excitement for women and children, again putting women and children in the same category—a legal reality for married women based on the Napoleonic Code—and suggesting that reason was the thing keeping men from this category. In which case, religious men could share qualities with both women and children.

In the emasculization of religion and religious men, socialist terminology existed that did not overtly degrade women. In those cases, the language was either ambiguous or drew on the semantic field of “childishness,” something indicative of a neuter being. This may have been the result of a desire on the part of some socialists to bring women to the materialist cause. It may

853 This may also indicate a desire by socialists to use a feminist line when coming from a free thought perspective.
have also reflected the diminishing value of hegemonic masculine discourse as previously practiced in the face of socialist feminisms. Since the logic of this strategy banked on a robust mythology of feminine inferiority, any discursive success of certain feminisms might have made problematic overtly anti-feminist rhetoric by some socialists.\textsuperscript{854} Demonstrating this tendency, one socialist wrote that the result of religious households was that intellectually, “…most men and almost all women remain children their whole lives.”\textsuperscript{855} In this excerpt, childishness was a greater offence than effeminacy in the realm of intelligence. As such, it was not out of place to refer to belief in the main tenets of Christianity as “childish ignorance,” or religious education as “childish, narrow, and scholastic.”\textsuperscript{856} Another wrote that it was “…astonishingly ridiculous and childish” to conclude that things one does not understand are automatically the product of miracles.”\textsuperscript{857} Lending support to this rhetoric was the widespread acceptance in some form of

against the church. While the socialist track record in this area was poor, it was easy to look good in the comparison with the church. As such, one finds a lack of language that assumes female inferiority. “Our adversaries have furnished us with arms…All that is said in religious doctrines, which is grossly insulting to women, must be used for the benefit of free thought. In place of the misogynist church, let us set up feminist free thought! All the hesitant ones will come to us…that is, the immense majority of women, those for whom religion no longer fascinates, but free-thinking still frightens.” \textit{Almanach de La Libre Pensée} (Depot General, 1903), 29. Books and Brochures, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam, Netherlands. There was also an obsession with the susceptibility of children to religion, which socialists understood would guarantee the survival of religion. Along with this, was the heated debate on education. Article in police dossier, \textit{L’Intransigeant}, 1881, Series BA, Box 1493, \textit{La Libre Pensée} : 1879 à 1891 et 1880 à 1897, Archive of the prefecture of Police, Paris. See also J. Martin, “Cléricalisme et Propriété,” \textit{La Socialiste}, July 21-29, 1901. “The clergy…shape the brains of children by preaching to them humility, resignation to misery, the uninterestedness of earthly enjoyments.” See also, Gabrielle Deville, “Le Question Religieuse,” \textit{L’Égalité}, Dec. 11, 1881 “To authorize, by religious practices, the cerebral education of children, is a disturbing violation of that liberty of conscience which is claimed…What will be needed is to prevent the spread of the virus to younger generations. It will be easy when this religious feeling [will reduce] to the state of intimate superstition and no longer be able to arise spontaneously from the surrounding circumstances. Nothing will come to thwart the scientific instruction they have called to receive. Thus, in spite of the uncompromising and liberating shams, the religious question will be solved only by violence: all progress has been revolutionary and this will be no exception.”

\textsuperscript{854} See chapter five.
recapitulation theory, which posited that, “...the biological development of the individual retraced the evolutionary history of the human race.” 858 In other words, one could see traces of the psychology of less evolved humans in children, the most important feature of which was fear and superstition. 859 This fit the Enlightenment understanding of the faible d'esprit, as Voltaire had written gets “...scared without cause, and falls naturally into superstition.” 860 In this manner, many saw the period before reason and science had arrived to lead humanity into a virile existence metaphorically as a childhood:

In its ignorance, primitive humanity could not give into the virile and salutary thought [that there is no afterlife], and the infantile ideas of [soul] survival, advocated and exploited by the priests, evolved…”861

And another freethinking socialist observed that, “The Catholic religion corresponds to a lower state of man, to a barbaric period of societies...the degradation of the human species in childhood.”862 Again, one sees similarity in the descriptions of Catholicism and indigenous people being colonized.863 In this light, using the child as a referent to neuter the religious male would have made sense.

Religion as Weakness and Reason as Strength in the Logic and Language of Politics

As seen in the previous chapters, the particulars of French political discourse required one’s arguments to address the health and virility of both the individual and the nation. Since the referent that socialists used to take away the masculinity of the religious was ambiguous, the concept of weakness (faiblesse) remained important for the larger narrative into which this

859 Fallace, “Recapitualtion,” 518.
860 See Encyclopedia entry for moral foible . 7:27.
862 Gastineau, Crimes, 69.
critique of religion had to fit. For example, there was such a thing as the “weakness (faiblesse) to believe in God.” Or, belief in God and the immortality of the soul was a mark of weakness (faiblesse). The Almanac of Free Thought went further by contrasting belief with science and by placing them on a weak vs. strong continuum.

Science...examines controls, confronts, manipulates, shakes, and discusses. Science does not lower the eyes; it raises them, exercises them, strengthens them, and emboldens them. Science requires the courage of judgment, to which faith breathes weakness (faiblesse).

Diderot did the same thing with his commentary on the notion of faible d’esprit. By stating that the extreme opposite of this state was l’esprit fort (strong mind), he also placed religion vs. critical thinking on a weak vs. strong continuum.

Socialist rhetoric also reflected the popularity of degenerescence and the bio-medical revolution taking place in the Third Republic. Socialists referred to the religious as “imbeciles.” Some also ascribed cretinism to those who imagined “everything was created by

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864 This logic, however, was not likely to be meaningful to socialists until much later in the century. For one, adherence to materialist philosophies did not fall along class lines, at least not enough to create a meaningful narrative from it. Secondly, affinity for religion was more common amongst workers in the earlier part of the century. The only way the gendering of materialism would become useful was in the face of an antagonist religious worldview, similar to the Hebertist struggle against the Robespierists. This challenge occurred in the last third of the century when the church and the socialists began to compete with one another for adherents among the workers.


866 Article in polic dossier, La Libre Pensée : Journal antireligieux, August 15, 1880. Series BA, Box 1493 La Libre Pensée : 1879 à 1891 et 1880 à 1897, Archives of the Prefecture of Police, Paris.


868 See chapter five.

869 Le Cri de la Travailleur, Sept. 18, 1887. Le Cri de la Travailleur, April 5, 1891. Article in police dossier, “Les Doléances Clericaux,” Le 19th Siècle, 1877, Series BA, Box 8 Mouvement religieux mai, juin, juillet 1877, Archive of the Prefecture of Police, Paris. Note also how conservatives used the language of weakness and imbecility. In this example, these descriptions refer to workers who get used by revolutionaries: “...they are the weak-minded (faibles d’esprit), instinctive, properly called, that is, those individuals, originally tainted with an intellectual, moral, and affective defect, more or less without education because they ordinarily resist it...and in whom the noble inclinations and the dignified and legitimate aspirations are as stifled by the predominance of gross and purely instinctive appetites. It is in a word, the imbeciles, and, to a lesser degree, the idiots.” J.V. Laborde, Les Hommes et les actes de l’insurrection de paris Devant la psychologie morbide (Germier Bailliere:Paris,1872) 76. Books and Brochures, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
God.” Religiosity therefore signaled “intellectual degradation” and was the product of the “speculations of weak imaginations and deplorable intellects.” And those who willfully participated were “backward and degenerate.” For most, religion itself was a product of human imbecility. Further, they used health metaphors in their rhetoric. For example, religious belief was a contagion. It was to France as syphilis was to the bourgeoisie, an ingrained sickness. Indeed, Catholicism contained the “germ of decadence.” Reflecting the logic of political rhetoric, religion was a sickness, and materialists were the physicians. One wrote:

Religious faith is a neurosis of human intelligence, a mental malady that is easily transmitted to young minds…It is up to the freethinkers to be their doctors, to find and apply the antidote that can destroy this moral virus, and to stop this contagion which, because the lack of light, has been ravaging anemic brains for so long, thus generating the error of superstition and fantasy.

Further, being able to state that the church had no ability or virtue to do anything about the needs of modern society added to the larger argument about the present and future failure of bourgeois rule. For example, anti-clericals used the concept of egoism in their condemnation of religious belief and practice. For Le people, Catholic discipline was individualistic and egoist, and those who rejected the world in extreme ways like renunciation and celibacy were actually sensualists, reflecting “the spirit of age which is soft and voluptuous.” Therefore, socialists

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872 Giard, “Variete.” Le Socialiste, Jan 22, 1895.
877 Borsendorf, Libre, 10.
878 Gaston Carle, “Pretres” in Le Peuple, Feb 16, 1869; see also Henri Aime, “Le Politique Positive”in La Revue
could challenge the religious by claiming that, “The advent of socialism will be the sovereign remedy against exaggerated selfishness.”

The ultimate end of this rhetoric was to present the inability of the church to increase French strength, either personally or collectively. For socialist critique, Catholic discipline was radically impotent (impuissance) to make people better.\textsuperscript{880} For \textit{La Revue Socialiste}, Catholicism worked fine “eighteen centuries ago,” but since humanity has moved on, “the Catholic idea is powerless (impuissante) to embody the ideals of modern thought.”\textsuperscript{881} For \textit{Le Socialiste}, the impotence (impuissance) of Catholicism showed itself clearly in its inability even to understand “the ills that plague the modern world.”\textsuperscript{882} As one socialist contended, if you looked at all the countries in Europe, you would see that all the dominantly Catholic ones are weak.\textsuperscript{883} In fact, the “…the material, intellectual and moral prosperity of a country is in inverse ratio to the preponderance of Catholic influence…[and the] future is for those countries that will succeed in snatching away the quickest and most completely the pernicious influence of the Church.”\textsuperscript{884} If one wanted a strong France again to lead Europe, one must follow the masculine socialists in rejecting clericalism and religious faith.

Along these same lines, being able to point to human representations of ideologies as evidence

\textsuperscript{879} Le Prêtre, May 10, 1902. Books and Brochures, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam, Netherlands.; Beauquier, Catechisme, 81 Books and Brochures, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam, Netherlands. For some, saints suffered from imbecility and were thorough egoists. “Scientific materialism thus establishes, with irrefutable conviction, the complete reversal of the conception of good and evil admitted to this day.” C. Novel, \textit{Matérialisme scientifique et ses Conséquences : Socialisme et lutte de classe} (no publisher,1904), 31. Books and Brochures, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam, Netherlands.\textsuperscript{880} Gaston Carle, “Pretres” in \textit{Le Peuple}, Feb 16, 1869


\textsuperscript{882} Unattributed, “Socialisme Chrétien Socialisme Scientifique,” in \textit{Le Socialiste} Jan. 31, 1892. “The theoretical impotence of the Church, the moral decadence of the bourgeoisie are the definite symptoms of a social crisis.” Berth, “Crises,”151.

\textsuperscript{883} Ch. Brunellier, ” Le Nations Catholique” in \textit{Le socialiste}, Dec. 4, 1898. ”Cléricalisme,” in \textit{Le Socialiste}, Nov. 12, 1899.

of their inferiority was key. The presence and mythology of papal Zouaves worked well for this part of political logic and activism. Even more, religiosity, especially the Ultramontane brand, produced an observable performance that socialists could exploit in their rhetoric. A socialist wrote:

…preaching has contributed greatly to maintaining its prestige over the fanatical masses, which [the church] has fashioned for submission, obedience, and self-denial, thereby stifling from the heart of men the natural feeling of their independence, and presenting to them their intellectual and social abasement as a virtue, as a title of merit and honor.

The theologically infused metaphysics that supported the church held up “obedience, resignation, and humility” as ideals, characteristics of the feeble. Further, as pathetic members of society, submission to God-ordained authorities completed their obligations to themselves and to France. This produced the “most passive of resignations,” since any happiness or comfort was for “the future world.” These were the poor, timid, credulous, fearful and groveling, degenerated (abâtardis) by ignorance, superstitions, and passive obedience…” They could never lead France to dominance in Europe.

For socialists, escape from this weakness ultimately centered on epistemology and consisted of trading theologically infused metaphysics for reason and critical inquiry. Put another way:

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885 See chapter three.
887 The author criticizes a French protestant pamphlet that encourages the simple Christian life: “…to believe in god, to trust, to accept pain, to ask for only a minimum of material satisfaction…to judge oneself humbly, to respect another, to faithfully keep good traditions, to be ready to die for his country, and to tear away constantly from the heart the bad herbs of the pride…teach them to be satisfied with their fate, and…to be encouraged by the spirit of humility, modesty, and resignation…” Maussa, “Trop Simples” in *Le Socialiste*, August 18, 1895. See also Harlor, “L’éducation de la Volonté Chez La Femme” in *La Revue Socialiste* Vol. 31 (Paris: Libraire de La Revue Socialiste, 1900), 457. “Resignation is a perpetual admission of impuissance. And as soon as we recognize his defeat and we seem to accept it, any possibility of victory goes away.”
The modern mind is rational intelligence. Belief in a revelation, in a supernatural order, is the negation of criticism, a remnant of the old anthropomorphic conception of the world formed at a time when man had not yet successfully arrived at the clear idea of the laws of nature…

Even further, “Between faith and science the duel is to death. It is only possible to conceive of high science…apart from all supernatural belief…” Philosophically undercutting the medieval foundations of society was the necessary element in the emancipation of France from the church. In this context, materialist philosophy became emancipatory in several ways and representative of strength. For one, it allowed socialists to produce a doctrine of human dignity, which served as the basis for an effective socialist morality, only possible if “man himself [is] judge and master of his actions...and does not sacrifice them to some god.” Secondly, it allowed for individualism of the intellect, permitting people to place themselves outside of the systems or institutions that dictated thinking. As one socialist wrote, “Once in possession of the truth, the mind no longer belongs either to the prince, to society, or to humanity.” The result was a self-sufficient and defiant intellect. All of this added up to encourage the opposite attitude towards the status quo from that of the church. As one explained, scientific enquiry has no respect for “prestige or mystery; it breaks all the charms and removes all the veils.” Or another, “Free thought is the right to revolt and the right to change things.” It was easy to transfer this lack of respect for “prestige or mystery” to the social realm—for example, the socialist party’s “virility

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892 Science is the "great emancipator.” Unattributed, “Le Socialism et le Intellectuals” in Le Socialiste, May 13, 1900.
896 Almanach, 26.
of attitude” that caused a governmental minister to declare a “relentless war on socialism.”

Indeed, Hebert had already demonstrated this connection during the first Revolution as Blanqui did with the insurrectionary socialism coming out of the July Monarchy.

While the religious were weak and submissive, adherents to materialism were strong and defiant. Within this logic, the choice between Catholicism and socialism determined one’s level of emancipation and thus the status of male. Frederick Engels’ reflected this understanding when he articulated the ideal attitude of workers. Engels wrote:

…in our present society, [the worker] can save his manhood only in hatred and rebellion against the bourgeoisie…no single field for the exercise of his manhood is left him, save his opposition to the whole conditions of his life, it is natural that exactly in this opposition he should be most manly, noblest, most worthy of sympathy.

On a larger level, speaking to a populace desiring a virile France and a return to French greatness in Europe, the kind of government France had in relation to the church determined whether it was emancipated and strong or dependent and weak.

**Reason as Virility**

In the earlier part of the century, mâle, reflecting the particular patriarchal milieu functioned as an indicator of a superlative characteristic. Brought into a political context, its meaning expanded to indicate the physical and psychological manifestations of masculinity, the pattern of its usage betraying its rhetorical function. In these last two decades and in the context of going after religion, virility seems to have taken over this function, indicating a superlative within the

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898 “…religious belief is the psychological product of the impotence of human labor that is isolated or associated in conditions such that man is no more than an unconscious machine…[With the increase] of man's power over nature, the feeling of the supernatural weakens, and religion becomes more and more rationalistic. The feeling of his impotence and his subjection to hidden and invincible forces…, the impotence of man on matter, his ignorance of the economic relations in which he lives, his perpetual terror in front of their mysterious processes—this constitutes the basis on which religion is set. Until that goes away, humans will seek religious explanations.” Pierre Myrans, “Croyance Religieuses” in *Le Socialiste*, Sept. 8, 1901.
semantic field of reason, the rejection of religion, and a reliance on intelligence. As one socialist
drew, “…science, by eliminating nonsense, absurd fears, and the illusion of religions, produces
a virile man, one without God, master, or priest.”\textsuperscript{900} Considering this masculinization of reason, it
was the job of the socialist to engage in the “the virile search for truth and the altruistic practice
of justice and goodness, [to] enlighten all minds and warm all hearts…”\textsuperscript{901} Another criticized the
bourgeoisie for failing to rid France of “the insufficient precepts of theology,” which prevented it
from producing a social morality to overtake its egoism. The diagnosis was that human thought
had lacked, “…the virility and altruism necessary to come out of the old and tumbling building
of religion.”\textsuperscript{902}

Considering the goal of socialists in the face of an antagonistic church, this epistemological
encouragement made sense. The search for truth should not only occur, but it should take place
with strength and the characteristic of an adult male. In a review of an anti-religious book, the
socialist reviewer praised the scholarship of the author by writing that he went beyond those who
“…made the methods of analysis and the concern for the truth triumph, even if it were low and
ugly.” He went past what had tired them out because he wanted to go further. This rigorous
striving for truth, he said, produced “…one of the noblest manifestations of intellectual virility
that has been given to the men of this century to contemplate.”\textsuperscript{903} As touched on before, inherent
in the notion of intellectual virility was a self-reliance or independence of thought. In another
book review, the socialist reviewer praised the author for his profound scholarship by ascribing
to him “…a virile independence and a constant concern for the historical, religious, scientific and

\textsuperscript{900} Borsendorff, \textit{Libre}, 21.
\textsuperscript{902} Benoit Malon, “La Civilization Bourgeoise,” \textit{La Revue Socialiste} Vol. 10 (Paris: Libraire de la Socialiste Revue,
1889), 516.
296.
social truth.” And in one instance, discussing the status of Heinrich Heine’s socialism, the author pointed to Heine’s consistent criticism of anti-socialists as evidence of his “intellectual virility.” In this case, “intellectual virility” functioned as a synonym for “socialist.”

The details of this gendering logic came together clearly in the socialist confrontation with dueling, the so-called “virile resolution.” Both Robert Nye and Edward Berensen have written about the revival and predominance of the duel in Third Republic France and its relation to masculinity and honor. Both, however, focused mainly on the bourgeoisie and the way in which this practice helped establish and order manhood. Dueling, however, worked a different way for socialists in its attribution of masculinity. For them, the rejection of dueling demonstrated the possession of reason and thus a virile intellect.

Lafargue’s open letter in 1880 in the pages of L’Egalite demonstrated that the revival and practice of the duel had affected socialists. In the article, Lafargue, writing in support of a larger movement that was in condemnation of the practice, addressed the question of whether socialists and workers should duel. Lafargue’s reasoning was fairly straightforward. He wrote, “The class for which we are fighting, the proletariat, does not have in its mores a duel, whose origin is feudal and religious.” Further, why impose upon the worker habits that belong to those of the wealthy who sail and ride horses for fun. Finally, dueling had actually become a farce, and it ultimately had no place in the goals of socialism.

In another treatment of the duel, Louis Durieu focused on the medieval and ultimately

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mystical beliefs behind it. He argued that the church had trained the French populace to believe the notion of Papal infallibility. The army sanctioned this notion, and while the church was losing its power, this idea of infallibility transferred to the council of war. According to the author, this was a natural evolution since an ancient Roman superstition had made war decisions and God’s decisions synonymous. For Durieu, this reasoning informed the practice of the duel. As such, the duel was ultimately an appeal to the judgment of God, whose will revealed itself in the outcome. While the learned in France criticized this belief, he wrote, there was no doubt that the belief was still strong in society.

Robert Nye points out that after 1860, with the loosening of censorship, there was a dramatic increase in press output and thus the number of reporters writing stories for them. Rather than honored men of letters, they were often regular young men (and some women) trying to make a living. The rough competition between newspapers pushed editors to publish the more outrageous stories to attract readership. However, in order to protect themselves, the editors required the journalists to sign their names at the end of each story. If someone felt their honor damaged by one of these stories, they could track down the journalist and challenge them to a duel. The problem was that if a particular journalist was a good duelist, he could write whatever he wanted. If he was not, his choice of facts diminished. Ultimately, the duel determined truth in this practice.

Another socialist treatment analyzed the practice of the journalistic duel from this epistemological perspective. Criticizing the journalistic duel, Gustave Cluseret was able to

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911 Nye, Masculinity, 187-190.
make judgments about proper intellectual dispositions. And since dueling revolved around honor and masculinity, he was able to make judgments about what constituted masculinity. The first problem he pointed out was that this journalistic dueling was just a bad copy of military duels, which, he argued, was not very encouraging for those who made a living using their minds. In other words, having to borrow ideas from others was not a mark of strength. The second thing he pointed out was that usually the duelist did not know how to fight, nor did he understand the principle behind it. This produced absurdity: even though the act itself was ridiculously flawed and incoherent, somehow everyone agreed that when it was over, honor had been satisfied. His conclusion was that there was only one real reason to participate, that is, fear of the opinions of others—*the* (emphasis in original) fear, of each one and of everyone.

Cluseret went on to cite the hard truth that was involved: “…opinion and prejudice refuses to listen to a man whose virility is put in doubt.” He responded to the criteria for virility this represented. Criticizing the duel as a marker of virility, he wrote,

> [It is a] sad virility that consists of sacrificing one's opinion to that of others and bowing before the majority instead of resisting. What substance of character can the people assume of a man weak enough intellectually to accept a sword stroke for an argument, and morally to bend instead of resist? 913

In the logic of the journalistic duel, the unwillingness to back up one’s words with a duel cast doubt on virility. For the socialist critic, however, submitting to the duel, and thus one’s opinions to others, was actually the act of weakness. Cluseret further derided participation in the duel by mockingly referring to it as “this high proof of intellectual virility.” 914 As such, socialist masculinity cast itself in terms of intellectual integrity. Further, not only were those who submitted to the duel intellectually weak, but they were also morally weak as well, lacking substance of character. Dueling was therefore a sign

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that a civilization was decadent, “…the delirium tremens of the social classes ready to disappear.” 915

A good socialist, Cluseret appealed to the character of the people in his argument, making this a contrast of class as well. Holding up their behavior as an ideal, he confronted his readers with the rhetorical question of whether the people took part in these duels. Suggesting their superiority of character by contrasting the size of the confrontations in which each group partook, he stated that the people do not engage in “little skirmishes,” but rather, the duels he takes part in are “his size,” like the one in June of ’48. These are the only ones worth the spilling of blood, Cluseret wrote. He further pointed to the Communards as ideals since the duel did not distract or keep them from their duty. They ignored the ceremonies and traditions of society to produce overthrow and revolution. In his final comments, the writer told his readers that they will do the same because, like the Communards, they have “the real moral energy,” which, he said, “consists in defying prejudice to submit to the truth.” 916

Two criteria emerged as markers of virility from this treatment of dueling. One was the rejection of tradition and ultimately theological authority in the determination of one’s actions.917 In place of superstition, the truly virile asserted his reason and intellect as a guide. The other was the insolent rejection of popular opinion in the search for truth. In the face of public opinion and prejudice, the truly virile was defiant, refusing to submit to anything but truth. In this case, “moral energy” refers to intellectual virility, a mental self-

917 In 1864, in response to the challenges that new thought and discovery were making to the very existence of the church, the church officially condemned liberalism, rationalism, and the notion that human reason could be as valuable as religious revelation. While the bourgeois male was bolstering his status as a power-wielding man by adopting science and relegating his religion to the private realm, the church was fighting this very trend. Appendix to Quanta Cura December 8, 1864. Socialists embraced and promoted the radical elements from the Enlightenment.
reliance that, because of the way it defied all of the constraints of French society, ultimately led to the triumph of socialism. 918

**Reason and Action: Masculinity and Materialism between Socialisms**

In the late nineteenth century, the distinguishing feature of Marxism was its scientific pretense. Asserting a purely materialist base, it could claim an accurate understanding of history and therefore know the future of the working class. At that time, in order to gain adherents, it had to convince others of its superiority, which often meant engaging in philosophical arguments about its epistemological make up. When Jules Guesdes brought Marxism to France in the early 1880s, the result was an ongoing debate with French integralists—those who united differing schools of socialist thought—concerning the nature and necessity of materialism. Most important was that this debate between socialists about materialism took on the language of masculinity, suggesting the role of masculinity in not only the exclusion of an enemy but also in ordering amongst those on the same side.

As seen in the previous section, a metaphysics supporting and justifying the medieval world stood in the way of a truly emancipatory and humanist socialism. The way around this was to reject this metaphysical system and replace it with a new one built around reason. 919 The integralist version of this modernity drew from the Kantian synthesis, which had brought together materialism and idealism into a robust whole. 920 This formulation allowed integralists to continue with the language and concepts of liberty, equality, and fraternity as inspiration and guidance while at the same time maintain adherence to whatever patterns the social sciences might uncover as determinative for history—even those supporting or produced by a Marxist

918 See also Bonner, “Le Federation des Mineurs” in Le Socialiste, Jan 22, 1899. Here, “Moral energy” and “intellectual vigor” go together. See chapter three.


outlook. As *La Revue Socialiste* defined it:

> History offers us not only a necessary evolution, but also an intelligible direction in a sense of progress. We must therefore reconcile the idealist conception and the materialist conception, which merge in a single and indissoluble development... history is at the same time a manifestation of mechanical laws and the realization of an ideal law.  

For Guesdists, however, their rejection of the old system and its replacement built around reason looked different. In order to produce true socialism and thus emancipation, they held, one must remove “…all the barriers of old metaphysics and idealism to remain in the realm of facts.”

It was not enough to jettison the church; idealism stood in the way as well and needed to go. The reason for this rejection of idealism was that when one introduced an idea such as *liberty* or *fraternity* into the process of making sense of historical change and guiding the proletariat, one essentially stopped observing the real world. Ideas were non-observable abstractions and therefore required their imposition on the information. They took on the character of absolutes, adding a metaphysical element to the data and thus distorting one’s perception of reality. The result, according to the Guesdist, was a metaphysical dualism—ultimately bourgeois, decidedly the philosophical base for a deist worldview, and unfortunately unable to destroy the foundations of the old society.

To highlight the departure from science and “mathematical rigor” that Guesdists believed occurred with that approach, they labeled all idealist socialisms as “sentimentalist,” asserting that there is no place for “sentimentalism or ideology” in the struggle for socialism. Certainly,

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925 In Guesdist critique, all socialisms that drew from idealism were “soaked with sentimentalism.” Unattributed,
accusations of sentimentalism carried with them effeminizing overtones, demoting all non-Marxist socialisms by way of gender. However, socialist gendering went deeper. Explored in the previous section, socialists assumed a relationship between quality of reason and quality of action. In other words, the more masculine the reason, the more masculine the actions produced by it would be.

Geusdist critique, while stating that the presence of ideas in one’s epistemology would confuse and subvert one’s understanding of reality, also asserted that ideas were time bound and mere reflections of the “tendencies of the age.” Like their French opponents, those who added ideas to their epistemology were submitting and restricting themselves to parochial French paradigms and values. Not only were these ideas therefore incapable of guiding the proletariat into the future, they guaranteed that the derivative socialisms would always share values and morality with the status quo and with the source culture. The result was that idealists could never be truly militant, which Marxists, according to Robert Stuart’s work, associated with masculinity. Therefore, the addition of idealism to materialism “emasculates” socialism by morally tethering it to present society.

Having themselves thoroughly jettisoned metaphysics, and leaving room only for conclusions drawn from pure materialism, Guesdists believed that they were not only free from the influence of the church, but also from the restrictive sentimentalism of French history and experience. Marxist materialism freed them from all of that, justifying actions more militant, extreme, and

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“Un Fantaisiste,” _Le Socialist_, Sept. 29, 1894. Guesdists praised Lafarge for analyzing the social world with the exclusion of “all sentimentalism and idealism” from the process. “Le Parti Ouvrier,” in _Le socialiste_, July 29, 1891.  
926 The Guesdist characterization of socialisms that draw from idealism as sentimentalist becomes a universal feminization of all competing socialisms.  
useful because they did not have to make sense to the present. Marxists could therefore revel in non-conformity, intellectual self-sufficiency, and defiance toward authority—elements associated with a virile reason. In this way, their unadulterated reason and the pure materialism that came from it gave way to a masculinity superior to that born of an intellectual system corrupted by idealism.

The integralists, following the same assumptions concerning reason and action, believed that with this kind of socialism there was “…at the same time an ideological error and a cause of practical inferiority.” On the defensive, they could assert the soundness of their philosophical approach:

There is no contradiction between the ideal and science. On the contrary, these two indispensable factors of all progress harmonize and complement one another. To know is to foresee, to desire the best, because it is to know what is good and beautiful. Science does not shrink the ideal; it constantly enlarges it.

They would also make clear, in contrast to Geusdist accusations, that the source of their idealism was reason and science. Another wrote:

…our idealism starts from an affirmation—not an affirmation based on an indemonstrable postulate, but on facts: we go from the known to the unknown, from a conquered good to a good to conquer. Moreover, we have for ourselves the reason and the science on which we rely and which serve as a pedestal to our desires for justice and fraternity.

They could therefore assert that their idealism came from “loyal and virile intellects.”

In the face of the Guesdist, who believed that only their brand of materialism could produce a masculine militancy, integralists asserted that no “virile undertakings” could occur without

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idealism.\textsuperscript{933} Regarding the action it produced, integralists believed that in alliance with science, this idealism would “conquer the world.”\textsuperscript{934} Indeed, it was “Only the struggle for an ideal, a distant star that should guide us, that will give us the necessary strength to overcome…”\textsuperscript{935} Even more, integralists could back this up by claiming a Revolutionary pedigree for their inclusions of idealism:

…the passion for the public good, the vision of an ideal accepted and caressed, the deep feeling that one devotes oneself to something high and good, are (apart from religious fanaticism) the only great coaches of the crowds. It is through these, by the irresistible enthusiasm they kindled in souls, that the world saw the marvels of the year II and the triumph of the French Revolution.\textsuperscript{936}

Idealism had a track record of producing virile action, demonstrating the virility of their epistemology. That challenge went to the Geusdists, who had no such proof for their claims of masculinity. Integralists further asserted that if Marxism would have been the socialism in ‘48, the lack of “a social conception of life and human duties” would have “sterilized” socialist doctrines.\textsuperscript{937} Materialism, integralists claimed, was therefore inadequate to produce any actions on par with those witnessed in the previous French Revolutions.\textsuperscript{938} Indeed, “…the whole history, ancient and contemporary, protest against the rigorous absolutism of theory…[and] the

\textsuperscript{934} Menos, “Revues,” 369-370.
\textsuperscript{935} “It is only when we direct our efforts on this side that the torch of enthusiasm will illuminate our path, that the nascent dawn of socialism will bring us back on the right road to a better society.” H. Van Kol, “Arrêter le Dogmes,” \textit{La Revue Socialiste}, Vol. 28 (Libraire de La Revue Socialiste, 1898), 425.
\textsuperscript{937} “…human thought sometimes proceeds by intuitions brilliant in some specially gifted men, the part of the future which she suddenly shows to them is still confused; its conception requires a long process of revision, of secondary elaboration which verifies, completes, perfects, before it can be adopted as a general truth. The materialist theories, for example, which, even today, incur in some respects the grave reproach of not having formulated a social conception of life and human duties, would have sterilized in 1848 the socialist doctrines….” Gustave Rouanet, “Le Matérialisme Economique de Marx,” \textit{La Revue Socialiste}, Vol. 6 (Paris: Librairie de La Revue Socialiste, 1887), 508, 531.
\textsuperscript{938} Integralists called Guesdism the “party of the belly,” stating that the singular focus on material interest, similar to simple economic egoism, could not draw in workers or guide them. In fact, those who might be drawn to socialism for reasons of feeling would be pushed away by this singular focus on the material. Rouanet, “\textit{Matérialisme},” 530- 531. Vanderveld, “\textit{L'idéalisme},” 163.
history lived by us belies this materialism.”939 Ultimately, if militantism was a marker of masculinity, certainly Marxists had to give way to idealists. Integralists could therefore write, “We must fight, not in the name of materialism, but in the name of a well-conceived idealism.”940

Conclusions

While French Catholic piety changed along with the nineteenth century,941 there was still a pre-modern character to it. Developing during the Middle Ages, it is not surprising that it would possess values and practices that did not fit well into the post-Revolutionary period. One can see the anachronistic quality early on in how radicals during the first Revolution conceptualized and treated the piety of the male clergy. Outlawing clerical celibacy, critics saw this practice as dangerous to society and a departure from nature, which had become a philosophical and social authority since clerical celibacy had developed in the medieval period. The pre-modern quality remained with the average lay male as well. Instructional manuals for male Catholic piety emphasized not only sacrificial humility, but childlike submission to God, the state, and the Virgin Mary. And the Christ presented to them as a model was the Christ who served the weak and not, for example, the one who with anger physically cleared the merchants from the temple.

More important to the formation and perception of Catholic masculinity was the rise of Ultramontanism and the sacrificial piety of the Sacred Heart cult. Informing a particularly reactionary form of Catholicism, it provided the heart of male piety and its political energy, guaranteeing that counter-revolutionary male expressions of Catholicism would draw attention from its socialist enemies. Intensifying the already pre-modern bent of Catholic practice, it

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939 Rouanet, “Matérialisme,”530-531.
941 Gibson, Social, 267.
maintained the medieval economy of sainthood and its gender-transcending ideals, as well as a two-tiered spirituality. The Zouave phenomenon became especially important here in the socialist perception of male Catholics. Their raison d’être being the font line in the papal battle against modernity, they had a hand in the discursive presentation of reactionary Catholic masculinity. The pre-modern, and thus anachronistic, quality of this masculinity would have made this Catholic male difficult to fit into the male-female binary the nineteenth century had endorsed. Indeed, the Zouave’s intense devotion to their mothers, their ideal state as virginal, and their perpetual youth helped encourage an association of religion with childhood or childishness as well as effeminacy.\footnote{Gibson, Social, 266. Gibson shows that the bourgeoisie viewed Catholicism as infantilizing.} In another sense, they perhaps occupied the position of a third gender, a position yet without the vocabulary to make proper sense of it.\footnote{D. M. Hadley, “Angels incarnate: clergy and Masculinity From Gregorian Reform to Reformation,” in Masculinity in Medieval Europe (London: Longman, 1999), 160-177. Jaqueline Murray, “One Flesh, Two sexes, Three Genders? in Gender and Christianity in Medieval Europe : New Perspectives, ed. Lisa M. Bitel and Felice Lifshitz (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 34-51.} In either case, Catholic masculinity, in the politics of the time, was antagonistic to the radical rebellion and materialism of the socialist.

This chapter therefore demonstrates a creative way that nineteenth-century French socialists included masculinity in their rhetorical battles against the church and each other. Since a masculinization of reason and science was taking place amongst the bourgeoisie at this time, it is not difficult to imagine that the gendered rhetoric that socialists were using was taking part in this general or established logic. However, since socialists had particular needs, one should also take seriously a unique source for their version of the connection between masculinity and reason. Two elements are important here. One is the intellectual strength vs. weakness narrative that emerged from the Enlightenment and attached itself to the phenomenon of belief and non-belief, easily adapting itself to the logics of masculinity. There seems to be a clear continuation
from the materialists of the first Revolution all the way to the anti-clerical socialists of the Third Republic. With that base, further development occurred because of the need to speak to the issue of French leadership in Europe. Thus, a relationship between one’s reliance on reason and masculine performance solidified among socialists along with the role of the church in politics. The correlation between lack of reason and the obeisance of the religious male worked well to tie religion to personal and national weakness. The presence of reason and the defiance of the socialist worked well to tie socialism to personal and national strength. This logic was compelling enough that socialists could utilize the connection between reason and masculinity in their disagreements with one another and their assertions of superiority. For this, the argument sharpened to focus on the quality of materialism used to replace the old system. In this rhetorical logic, it mattered since it would determine how effective the socialism would be in changing France and thus the world for the better. In all of these cases, socialists found ways to argue that their particular epistemological replacement signified true masculinity and thus the superiority of their ideology and methods for change.  

944 Regardless of the seeming advantage that socialism had over the church in the long and short terms, socialism could never deal religion a deadly blow. Part of it was a backlash in the Third Republic against the kind of rationalism that bolstered the socialist worldview and empowered its members against the superstitions of the church. Perhaps more important is that, according to Gibson, “The vast majority of Frenchmen, throughout the nineteenth century, retained at least…minimal contact with the church.” One could be anti-clerical and even a non-believer, and still participate in religious ceremony, which was prominent. By the middle of the century, according to Gibson, “…religious baptism, marriage, and burial were effectively universal.” He also suggests that some need for the sacralization of life, regardless of religious belief or attitude toward the church, kept the need for Catholic ritual present. As Connell suggests, collective practice is hugely influential in maintaining or developing power, and ritual remained widespread and almost a constant. Gibson, 163, 165.
Conclusions

This work has demonstrated that French socialists engaged in a necessary manipulation of masculine ideals in order to forward their political agenda. This occurred in two ways. One was by claiming that the bourgeoisie lacked masculinity and thus a right to rule by ascribing to them an effeminacy based on a lack of physical health and the possession of egoism. The second was by arguing for the elevation of the proletariat to power based on their possession of a masculinity consisting of physical prowess and the psychological disposition towards fraternity. This reveals the presence of a dominant class-conditioned masculinity that functioned to order men as well as exclude women, and that took on the symbolic and gendered identity of the French nation. Socialist rhetoric, therefore, in its advocacy for the emancipation of the proletariat, aimed to change the criteria for hegemonic masculine identity to coincide with an idealized worker. Further evidence for this interpretation comes from the similarity of rhetorical strategy that socialists took against the church. In their perception of the church’s antagonism towards them as support for the bourgeoisie, they gendered religion and the religious, excluding them from masculine identity and reinforcing their argument for proletarian dominance based on their possession of true masculinity.

Undergirding these arguments is that ancien régime conceptualizations of the state and the ruling elite made their way through the Revolution and into the nineteenth century. With this backdrop, the language and logic of politics required deference to a symbolical merging of the sovereign’s identity with national identity that sought health and vigor as its highest good. As the king’s bodily health represented the health of the nation, the male elites who took over sovereignty after his death collectively inherited that role. The language of politics therefore relied heavily on metaphors of body and health, and a deep-seated fear of degeneration remained
behind much of French political discourse. If one wanted dramatically to change French rule, convincing others of the superior health and masculinity of their constituency was necessary. Since the males of the ruling elite were to carry the conceptualization and representation of the French nation, a feature of deeply ingrained French patriarchy, this political complexity could reduce itself to a debate about superior masculinity and a complementary ideology. Ultimately, one could not possess the nation without possessing the masculinity.

One witnesses this dynamic during the first Revolution in the confrontation between Third Estate elites and the aristocracy. Joan Landes and Dorinda Outram have shown how the language of politics, established by Montesquieu, encouraged a gendering of the aristocracy.945 Abbey Sieyès description of the Third Estate as a “strong and robust man, whose arm is still chained,” therefore becomes an extension of this logic indicating that a new patriarchy was emerging.946 The addition of sans-culottes’ needs to the politics of the Revolution brought a worker aesthetic to the debate concerning the identity of “the people” as true inheritors of national identity. Hercules temporarily became a popular symbol for this faction of the people, and the austere ruggedness of the worker as an ideal type of masculinity to rule and represent France came forward. Giving the sans-culottes phenomenon more legitimacy was the uprising of the muscadins, jeuneuse dorée, and incroyables, who, dressed in aristocratic and decidedly effeminate clothing became a contrast to the look of the worker. Their literal clash was meaningful to radicals and therefore became a useful reference for the contrast of masculinity between workers and elites.


946 Emmanuel Sieyès, Qu’est-ce que le Tiers Etat? (Paris, Au siège de la Société, 1888), 30.
Even though the evolution in economic structures changed relationships between people, making those relationships increasingly class-based, the metaphoric and symbolic content that informed ancien régime relationships remained and adapted to the new capitalist and class-based order. This dynamic remained in play and appeared again during the July Monarchy in the confrontations between the socialists and the bourgeoisie, which ordered rhetoric into the Third Republic. No doubt, the primary motivating force for socialist activism was justice in the form of worker emancipation. The influence from the ancien régime, however, required more than simply an appeal to justice; things were “in the way” of this being compelling on its own. Advocacy of justice for the worker therefore included the assurance of a healthy ruling order and thus a healthy nation that could again be dominant in Europe. Like the revolutionaries’ advocacy of the people over the aristocracy in the first Revolution, socialists put forward a worker masculinity as superior to the bourgeois form to convince others of superior health, but also to present a potentially superior national body. Socialists did this with the utilization of body and health metaphors, very similar to the first revolutionaries.

The upheaval of 1830 mimicked the first Revolution in that the people did the heavy lifting while the elites received all the benefit. In this disappointing aftermath, the narrative of a corrupt elite versus a superior worker easily took hold. The old gendering was therefore immediately valid: aristocracy was effeminate, republican socialism was masculine, and those who wanted a middle way were eunuchs, hermaphrodites, or neuter. As August Blanqui described before court, the physically overwhelming worker towered above the groveling bourgeoisie. In a scene resembling the content of Christian art, the elite bourgeoisie became beggars before the potentially divine worker, who appeared selfless and majestic in his stature. Reinforcing this

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was that some socialists conceived of the worker as a kind of nobility.  

Louis Blanc followed a Manichean narrative of the Revolution, seeing it controlled by the qualities of egoism and fraternity, which, continuing the gendering from the first Revolution, were feminine and masculine. Blanc twice echoed the kind of gendered contrast that occurred between the muscadins and sans-culottes. In one place, he presented the “man of fashion” and the “man of the people” as representatives of the extremes of French society. In another place, he gave a dramatically gendered interpretation of the muscadin and sans-culotte phenomenon from the first Revolution. Blanc continued his gendered narrative throughout his massive work on the July Monarchy. He ended with a plea showing that his concern was not only about justice for workers, but also about the European greatness of a regenerated France, one that presently lacked its masculinity, of which the proletariat was in possession. Theodore Dezamy and Constance Pecqueur, mentioned by Karl Marx as worthy precursors, forwarded this narrative as well from more social science perspectives.

The second half of the nineteenth century changed the nature of how French political reasoning would manifest itself. Public health and a biomedical revolution gave way to public and scientific discussions on the issue of national degeneration. This fueled debate over a class-based cause of national degeneration—the bourgeoisie accusing the proletariat, and socialists blaming the bourgeoisie. Socialist rhetoric therefore increased in sophistication,

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953 Quinlan, Great Nation, 177-207.
954 Daniel Pick, Faces of degeneration: A European Disorder, 1848-1918 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 70, 72. See also Christopher Forth, The Dreyfus Affair and the Crisis of French Manhood
often using scientific concepts in their praise of the male proletariat and their ability to bring about a healthy national body. Regardless of this change, the psychosocial needs of the French remained stable. The result was that, in spite of these significant political and intellectual changes, the masculine rhetoric of republican socialists showed surprising consistency.

Under this influence, the ideas that debauchery and sexual excess could drain one’s masculinity gained steam, which placed focus on the male offspring of the bourgeoisie, since degeneration should have been manifesting itself in that generation most dramatically. The behavior of those at private schools came under scrutiny. Social critics manipulated the logic of evolution since it became an important analogy to justify particular characteristics of social classes. Like the imperial project going on around them, they ultimately used the model of biological evolution to promote or condemn individualism or collectivism in economic and social life. Egoism got a scientific makeover as well in the pages of La Revue Socialiste, arguing that the offspring of those who had lived a life of greed were “...physically and morally degenerate, egoist, without morality, and instinctively deceitful.” Reflecting their ultimate goal, socialists claimed that the bourgeoisie, imbecile and impotent, had degenerated enough to detect it in their inability to govern France, which the proletariat was ready to take over. Ultimately, socialist adoption of biomedicine allowed for the argument that all manifestations of dandyism, pessimism, bohemianism, and depression—in other words, effeminacy—were the result of degeneration and normally the product of a bourgeoisie father or grandfather. A life of labor was the only thing that could fix them and thus France—curing or killing them in the process.

Socialist response to the antagonistic elements of the Catholic Church represented an

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
extension and adaptation of this strategy towards the bourgeoisie. A sort of “second front” in the battle against the bourgeoisie, it was significant that socialists adopted a gendered critique and response to them. The choice of masculine markers, however, was different. The reason for this was that the confrontation with Catholic masculinity was more complex. Male Catholics shaped by Ultramontanism, and thus militant against modernity, were visible to socialists. This kind of piety had a pre-modern character, which drew from a non-binary notion of gender, making the behavior harder to characterize. Secondly, a focus on the body and physicality would have been meaningless as masculine critique for this group, since its makeup would have been cross-class and cross-cultural. Socialists, therefore, went to the heart of Catholic identity, making the locus of masculinity between them the intellectual disposition towards belief and materialism. The language indeed lined up this way, and the logics of politics that formed their gendered discourse against the bourgeoisie were present. As in their direct challenges to the bourgeoisie, this gendered critique made the connection between masculinity, health, and the nation, which the patriarchy reduced to comparisons amongst males. Further evidence of this interpretation was that, in competition between socialists, the point of contention was materialism. Even more interesting was that socialists did not use the same language of effeminization they had used against the bourgeoisie. Instead, “virility” and “weakness” became the prominent concepts. One possible explanation for this was the perception that overt anti-feminist language might not serve well the goals of socialists against Catholics, since some socialists thought drawing women away from the Church might be possible if they point out its misogyny. The upshot here is further evidence for the gendered understanding of socialist rhetoric.

Certain changes occurring at the end of the century help explain why this gendered rhetoric would eventually become ineffective or powerless. Drawing on the work of Christopher Forth,
the Dreyfus Affair, shining a brighter light on the sedentary life of the bourgeoisie, helped popularize a culture of force. Physicality as a marker of masculinity spreading into popular culture undermined the narrative of the socialist. Further, political blocs had not formed with things like nationalism and race as prominent as they became during the Dreyfus Affair, and the second wave of imperialism fed into this confusion by promoting nationalism at the same time socialists were becoming more international in outlook. The representation and challenge of power via gender and its masculine-feminine binary would therefore change in this climate. And with the entrance into electoral politics, requiring a much different rhetorical approach, this kind of counter-hegemonic masculine rhetoric would either dissolve or significantly shift.

The internal logic of attacking a hegemonic masculinity required a rededication to the mythology of female inferiority, making room for the misogyny of early radicals and republican socialists. The discursive system uncovered in this work fit the deep-seated anti-female attitudes of French socialism and culture and the mechanisms for its continuation and recreation. Political logic and its accompanying gendered rhetoric also complemented the gendered nature of imperialism. The reasoning that connected the health of France to the health of the male sovereign culturally placed the responsibility of degenerescence on the shoulders of the male bourgeoisie. Challenging the already vulnerable status of dominant masculinity of the bourgeoisie, they could deflect this by shifting focus on the proletariat with the weapons of science and biomedicine. They also could respond through empire building and imperialism, a sort of dueling on the international scale, not unlike the dueling that Robert Nye describes taking place during the Third Republic as a way for bourgeois males to defend their slighted honor.

This work has uncovered and charted out the phenomenon of hegemonic masculinity in nineteenth-century France. In the process, it has exposed the formable values, events, and ideas,

956 Forth, Dreyfus, 205.
from the *ancien régime* through the Revolution, that led to its particular manifestation. It has also given form and reason to the masculinity that socialists championed as a replacement for the bourgeoisie. Even more, it provides greater understanding of the intellectual and social elements that challenged socialist vision and activism in the nineteenth century, and the way in which socialists handled them. In this case, the masculine gendered order was a bulwark against proletarian emancipation and socialist advocacy. Appeals to justice therefore were not rhetorically adequate, requiring engagement with the dominant cultural ideals of masculinity. Lastly, this work has fleshed out a gendered condemnation of Catholicism by socialists and placed it in a broader context, one that connects it to the larger engagement with the hegemonic masculinity of the bourgeoisie.
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