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Peruvian Japanese: From Undesirables to Rightless Subjects

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PERUVIAN JAPANESE: FROM UNDESIRABLES TO
RIGHTLESS SUBJECTS

by

Nicolas Soto

A Thesis Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

PERUVIAN JAPANESE: FROM UNDESIRABLES TO RIGHTLESS SUBJECTS

by

Nicolas Soto

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2019
Under the Supervision of Professor Rachel Buff

The incarceration of the Japanese from Peru during World War II occurred due to the decades long establishment of a Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese rightlessness. The advent of war facilitated their displacement from Peru, but the Japanese existed as undesirables in the country since their first arrival to Latin America. At the executive level, the U.S and Peru coordinated Japanese removal from Peruvian territory, detaining them in special facilities operated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the United States. While their deportation and incarceration took place during wartime, the plan to cleanse Peru of the Japanese population was a response to decades of racial anxiety over the Asiatic race. Considered illegal aliens at the end of the war, the Peruvian Japanese endured a lengthy legal battle to assert their right to citizenship. To this day adequate redress continues to escape the Peruvian Japanese. This thesis adds to the growing scholarship on the violation of the Japanese Peruvian rights that occurred, and the rightlessness they endured.

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Preface

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the United States entered a wartime period where the powers of the State expanded to ensure national security, as the country formally entered the Second World War. These expanded powers, codified in legal protection by the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 and Executive Order 9066, fostered a program of institutionalized racism against the ethnic Japanese living in the U.S. As U.S officials worked to hastily force 120,000 Japanese out of their homes to war relocation camps, State officials involved with foreign affairs also acted to suppress any Japanese threats in the 'other' America, the Japanese residing in Latin American countries. Few U.S historians acknowledge this forgotten sub-category of Japanese incarceration: the deportation and incarceration of Latin-Japanese to the United States from 1942-1945. Around 80% of the Latin-Japanese incarcerated in these years were from Peru. The internees held varying citizenship status in Peru. Some had birthright or naturalized citizenship, while others maintained their residence on legal passports/visas and work contracts. Deported from Peru, stripped of their rights and documentation, and incarcerated in the United States, these ethnic Japanese from Peru were victimized by an unlawful entry process that relegated them to 'illegal' status. At the end of the war they were stateless and displaced, but in reality their statelessness and path to rightlessness began with their first arrival in Peru in 1899, continuing through the interwar period until World War II permitted their removal from society.

Introduction

The story of the incarcerated Japanese-Peruvians poses important questions about how undesirable subjects are displaced across national boundaries during wartime. This chapter is related to the incarceration of Japanese Americans, but it is a distinct and different aspect of this broader history. In it, the United States and Peru coordinated the deportation of these Japanese people from a country not at war, to a country at war. This movement of ‘undesirables’ from Peru to the United States violated principles of international law.¹

The term “rightlessness” appears throughout this thesis as a foundation for understanding the Japanese Peruvian incarceration in U.S concentration camps during World War II. Examining global history since the end of the war reveals an expanded consciousness of individual rights, a political, legal, and social discourse intertwined with the growth of the dominant democratic superpower, the United States. The story of the Peruvian Japanese is one of displaced subjects long before Hannah Arendt or other scholars evaluated rightlessness through the lens of the nation-state and post-war United Nations human rights system.²

Rightless subjects are confined to a particular space within the world system, a space existing outside the confines of law and order, both inherently possessing no rights, and facing physical containment in a rightless space, often under the coding of a “camp.” A person cannot be born into rightlessness, but become rightless through

¹ Natsu Taylor Saito, “Justice Held Hostage: U.S Disregard for International Law in the World War II Internment of Japanese Peruvians-A Case Study,” *Boston College Law Review* 40, (1998).

² Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (San Diego: Harcourt, 1968), 297.

social and political processes. A different conception of identity precedes rightlessness, a characterization as an undesirable subject within an imagined community and national body, *personae non-gratae*. Naomi Paik, explains that an important aspect of rightlessness is unworthy existence: a rightless subject becomes silenced, removed from space where they can contest their disappearance into a camp.³ As they become undesirable subjects, their voice disappears and their silence emphasized. This renders them, without testimony, unbelievable, beyond comprehension or understanding for those with rights.

No one moves swiftly from stable status to rightlessness without first undergoing the transformation into an undesirable subject. The Japanese migrated to Peru, where they underwent this process. Both the U.S and Peru denigrated their status until the advent of war led to a Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese rightlessness: displacing the Japanese from Peru into U.S camps.

Designated as undesirables in their decades long process to becoming rightless subjects, the Japanese from Peru and their story fits the definition of a rightless human history. The existence of rightless subjects does not necessarily result from the failure of our international or nation-state system, which provide rights under a legal apparatus. As Paik stated, deprivation of rights follows the necessary condition for rights to have meaning, and to be protected against threats that endanger this balanced system.⁴ Rightlessness cannot exist without establishing that rights carry meaning, and those rights cannot be protected without the forming of rightless subjects. Therefore, the era

³ Naomi Paik, *Rightlessness: Testimony and Redress in U.S Prison Camps since World War II* (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*

of higher consciousness of rights actually entailed a rise in rightlessness for particular populations across the globe. As Paik asserts, the ascension of rights undermined the legitimacy of rightlessness through camp imprisonment.⁵ The long history of the motion of Peruvian Japanese from undesirables to rightless subjects offers an example of the adaptability of the U.S rightless regime. The Japanese were displaced from Peru because of U.S policy and international action, despite the fact that their citizenship and status had been tied to Peru's system of rights.

The incarceration of the Japanese from Peru was different than the other Japanese incarcerations during the war because it operated under the same War Relocation Authority ideology. But jurisdiction over Peruvian Japanese resided with the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the State Department. The WRA operated as a federal agency under the executive branch, enacted through executive power and led by Roosevelt's trusted cabinet members. In contrast, Peruvian Japanese faced deportation and incarceration through the mechanisms of the State Department and U.S Embassy in Peru. The newly formed INS under the Department of Justice supervised their incarceration in the camps.

Peruvian Japanese history also illustrates that transnational anti-Japanese ideology in the western hemisphere was not solely an agenda desired by the United States. While the United States possessed the economic capacity, physical space, and legality operating under alien enemy laws in wartime to implement such a program, the Peruvian state and people were active agents in the process. The plan to deport and incarcerate the Japanese from Peru did not operate in a vacuum. It was a half-century

⁵ Ibid., 7.

progression of designating the Japanese as undesirable. It was a serious threat to contemporary Peruvian racial ideology, which was dominated by upper-class intellectuals, and widely supported by working-class Peruvians. Repressive actions taken by Peru against the Japanese helped facilitate their removal in wartime with little opposition. However, while Peru did follow direction from the United States, they also desired Japanese removal as a form of ethnic cleansing for the nation.

While incarceration of the Peruvian Japanese was represented at the time as a wartime necessity, their path to incarceration began much earlier than the 1941-1945 period. This parallels the argument against wartime hysteria as the direct cause of Japanese-American incarceration. Roger Daniels stated, "...This was neither a mistake nor an error in judgment nor an inadvertence. The wartime abuse of Japanese Americans...was merely a link in a chain of racism that stretched back to the earliest contacts between Asians and whites..."⁶ Daniels asked: "How did it come about that what had been a popular wartime action, which in the immediate post-war decades was written off as a wartime 'mistake,' is now viewed as a serious betrayal of democratic ideals...?"⁷ Responding to this pivotal question, Jasmine Alinder wrote, "Through the guise of providing protection, the exclusion movement sought to contain the racialized danger that the immigrant was presumed to present."⁸ These scholars explained the cause of incarceration as a racialized process rather than a preventative wartime

⁶ Roger Daniels, *Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 1.

⁷ Roger Daniels, "Incarceration of the Japanese Americans: A Sixty-Year Perspective," *The History Teacher* 35, no. 3 (2002): 299.

⁸ Jasmine Alinder, *Moving Images: Photography and the Japanese American Incarceration* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2009), 3.

measure. Erika Lee wrote, “Americans learned to define American-ness, by excluding, controlling and containing foreign-ness.”⁹

In Peru, racial destiny was a growing obsession during the interwar period. For many commentators, the Japanese embodied the degeneration of an imagined national identity premised on intermarriage between indigenous Peruvians and European-ethnic Peruvians. I argue that Peru, even more than the United States, desired the expulsion of the Japanese from their society on the grounds of preserving Peruvian racial harmony. When the advent of war inclined the U.S to begin coordinating deportations across the hemisphere, Peru was eager to invest in such a program. The Peruvian State desired the removal of the Japanese because of their threat to a presumed Peruvian racial destiny, and not because of alleged Axis security threat or fifth column sabotage. Blacklists of Japanese in the country were compiled by the Peru and the United States containing names of alleged Peruvian Japanese threats on the most vague fifth-columnist accusations. While the United States was at least partially concerned with suppressing Axis threat, Peru used the advent of war to advance its “Japanese-free Peru” dream. Their preoccupation with the Japanese threat permeated Peruvian consciousness differently than it did in America. More than any other country, Peru withheld an obsession over racial anxiety and the identity of the nation.¹⁰ As Nancy Leys Stepan wrote, “They wished they were white and feared they were not.”¹¹

⁹ Erika Lee, “The Chinese Exclusion Example: Race, Immigration, and American Gatekeeping, 1882-1924,” *Journal of American Ethnic History* (2002): 41.

¹⁰ Marisol de la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919-1991* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2000), 45.

¹¹ Nancy Leys Stepan, *The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), 45.

Central to this Japanese Peruvian history was the concept of hemispheric security, which underlined any justifications necessary for unlawful deportations and incarcerations. Pan-American ideology, coded under the positivity of the 'Good Neighbor Policy', in reality institutionalized the integration of Peru into U.S anti-Japanese discourse and security. The expression of American anti-Japanese ideology transnationally permeated Peruvian administration and inspired parallel legal action. As the unofficial leader of Pan America, the United States professed racist belief that the Japanese posed a threat to racial harmony under eugenic ideology. This was admired and supported in Peru. However, such an assertion does not absolve the Peruvian role, as being inspired did not connote blindly following American action. Even before Peruvian and American relations peaked in the 1920's and 1930's, Peru obsessed over stabilizing their own racial hierarchy, promoting nativist principles, and abusing the Japanese for labor benefits while simultaneously lamenting their threat to "whiteness" and racial destiny. This thesis aims to demonstrate that while the influence from the U.S was strong, and Peruvian anti-Japanese policy was enacted years after similar U.S decrees, Peru was also culpable for the Japanese Peruvian tragedy, and undoubtedly motivated to remove all Japanese from their society.

The international community, guided by the influence of the United States, remains incapable of offering absolute rights protections to the individual subject. the United States continues to both suppress the absolute rights concept and facilitate targeting undesirable subjects under the threat of security. Even as human rights awareness heightened across the globe, the US adapted the regime of rightlessness to

new trends of international law and rights.¹² Nothing demonstrates this more than U.S courts elongating the trauma of the Japanese from Peru, using their non-status as illegal aliens in 1945 to continue their displacement, and attempt to exile them when legally possible. American intrusion into Latin American affairs in the latter half of the 20th century evidenced the adaptability of America's rightless regime. Installing ruthless dictatorships like Augusto Pinochet in Chile and Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala demonstrated the capacity of the U.S to force rightlessness on undesirable subjects outside of war climate, and like the Japanese from Peru, influence subjects beyond the U.S national boundaries.

As Ayten Gundogdu noted, the management of borders, consequentially, the protection of those worthy of rights, always relies on creating rightlessness, primarily displacement and incarceration.¹³ The U.S regime of rightlessness relies on incarceration within the context of the nation-state system of security. As they became rightless, the Peruvian Japanese became unique subjects. Their deportation and incarceration was facilitated not by the nation-state of Peru, but by cohesive Pan-American efforts between the United States and Peru. This was not simply a post-war phenomenon, even though scholarship such as Gundogdu and Arendt responded to the post-war ascendance of the nation-state security regime. The removal of the Japanese from Peru complicates the assertion that the nation-state is always the foundation for rightlessness. Their story of incarceration existed because of a Pan American regime of rightlessness forged against the Japanese, which inspired parallel national agendas

¹² Paik, 7.

¹³ Ayten Gundogdu, *Rightlessness in an Age of Rights: Hannah Arendt and the Contemporary Struggles of Migrants* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 2.

from the U.S and Peruvian States. Rightlessness as a concept, an institutional system of order to protect borders and the security of those with rights, can exist transnationally, collectively communicated and endorsed between different States.

As Japanese migration to the Americas began in the late 19th century, Peru and the United States proceeded to exploit the cheap labor of Japanese workers while simultaneously using them to stabilize their racial hierarchies, which preferred a national body dominant with European ethnic whiteness. Their arrival to the Americas met extreme discrimination from the native populations as both countries worked to relegate the Japanese to the bottom of racial hierarchy. In both countries, the Japanese struggled to ascend economically, and by the 1920's and 1930's posed a significant threat to racial harmony in the Americas. In response, both Peru and the United States exercised power, vested in them as sovereign nations, to restrict Japanese rights and immigration. Although enacted in separate national policies, this response to a threat to each countries racial destiny was constructed on both national and transnational planes.

The United States, the unofficial leader of Pan-American ideology, set the standard for anti-Japanese action during the 1910's and 1920's. The ideology of Pan-America took on institutional formation with the creation of various Pan-American conferences and governing boards. As Pan-America combined with Franklin Roosevelt's 'good neighbor policy' gained support, and Peru descended into nationalist politics, the Peruvian State began to model the American anti-Japanese regime. The laws instituted by Peru and the U.S globalized the anti-Japanese marginalization,' reducing the Japanese to *personae non-gratae*, a precursor to their eventual

rightlessness.¹⁴ Therefore, the story of the Peruvian Japanese decenters the nation-state as the sole executer of rightless histories. Their story is a transnational history because of the fluidity which racial formation and exclusionary ideology streamed between the two nations through Pan-Americanism and an alliance of racial and security ideology against the Japanese. As Erika Lee asserted, these formations and politics do not necessarily form in the context of the nation-state, but have transnational origins also.¹⁵

Harvey Gardiner and Thomas Connell both wrote monographs on the Japanese Peruvian incarceration history. Gardiner became the first historian to focus on the Japanese from Peru within the abundant scholarship on Japanese American incarceration, establishing the field in the 1980's. The title of Connell's work offers insight into how academics center this incarceration history. Connell's book, *America's Japanese Hostages: The World War II Plan for a Japanese Free Latin America*, argues that incarceration of the Peruvian Japanese was a transnational directive, a planned hemispheric plot to displace the Japanese from the Americas during the war. This aligned with Gardiner's argument, that the Japanese from Peru, caught in a triangle of hate between three nation-states, succumbed to deportation and incarceration during the execution of a conjoined wartime plan. Both historians dedicate little space to the pre-war alliance of anti-Japanese ideology between Peru and the United States. Most of their writing concerns the period of the war, where from 1939-1945 abundant State

¹⁴ Erika Lee, "'Yellow Peril' and Asian Exclusion in the Americas," *Pacific Historical Review* 76, no. 4 (2007), 538.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 540.

Department communication between Peru and the United States clearly evidenced a united plan against the Japanese when wartime facilitated their expulsion.

I argue that the roots of the Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese rightlessness and relegating the Japanese to undesirable 'others' began as a conjoined effort much earlier in the 20th century. Reducing the Japanese to undesirable and unbelievable subjects must be examined by looking at the interwar period, and the origins of anti-Japanese racism in the Americas. During the interwar Pan-American meetings the Japanese were characterized as potential fifth columnists, and warnings were issued to the American Republics to heighten surveillance on their actions. At a Pan-American Children's Conference in 1935 centered in eugenic ideology, the Pan-Americanists called for defending racial integrity through restricting immigration, which Peru enacted the following year with their landmark immigration act.¹⁶ A Pan-American committee created in 1942 disseminated to all the American Republics that they should counteract the "abuse of naturalization" by annulling nationality of Japanese threats.¹⁷ Whether dictating economic discrimination against the Japanese, or proposing eugenic discourses deeming them a racial 'other,' the formation of the plan to eventually deport and incarcerate the Japanese came to fruition because of the foundation of Pan-American ideology created in the interwar period. Not just ideology, the administrative boards at the Pan-American conferences forged practical policy through their

¹⁶ Stephanie Carol Moore, *The Japanese in Multiracial Peru, 1899-1942* (San Diego: University of California, San Diego, 2009), 281.

¹⁷ As cited in Edward N. Barnhart, "Citizenship and Political Tests in Latin American Republics in World War II," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 42, no. 3 (1962): 298.

recommendations, and influenced the formation of exclusionary measures by the Peruvian State.

After World War I a climate of nationalism swept across the Latin republics, creating greater consciousness of border protection, and stabilized the Pan-American system as a necessary implementation to institute aggressive security policy.

Constantly perceived as an economic doctrine and anti-imperialistic at heart, Pan-America extended its influence to the sphere of eugenic discourse and racial destiny, evidencing how racial 'othering' by Pan-American leadership was also a core tenet of ideology, with crucial influence on U.S and Peruvian State action.

Whether through State Department correspondence between the two administrations, or official Pan-American conferences and recommendations, the proceedings against the Japanese by the U.S and Peru throughout the pre-war 20th century were symbiotic. In telling the history of the Japanese from Peru and their path from undesirable to rightlessness and statelessness, I place a greater emphasis on the decades before the deportation proceedings began.

I identify the aligning of a model of anti-Japanese discourse and action between the United States and Peru as part of a "Pan-American Regime of Rightlessness." Rightlessness is intertwined with the nation-state and sovereignty, and overshadows the influence of hemispheric anti-Japanese racial discourse existing in the Americas. But this transnational discourse inspired national processes. Too often these histories are told in nation-specific format. Even when histories aspire to be transnational, they often start and end at migrations across national boundaries, ignoring how ideologies of racial destiny also exist on a hemispheric scale. The anti-Japanese Pan-American Regime of

Rightlessness imposed in Peru interweaves racial exclusion discourse and policy at the national and regional levels.

I begin this thesis with a chapter on the earliest period of Japanese settlement in Peru, first examining some of the crucial factors forcing them out of Japan to Peru, and any rights and status that they carried with them. I analyze this early period in Chapter one, 1899-1923, focusing on the discrimination they faced as contract-laborers in a Peruvian climate rampant with anti-Asiatic sentiment. Examining how the Japanese who migrate to Peru and leave their homeland transform into a form of statelessness, this chapter explores the ways that their early settlement establishes their place at the bottom of Peru's racial hierarchy. From their early settlement the Japanese were positioned as an 'other' by the Peruvian State, as well as the intellectual and working-classes who were most vocal concerning the racial threat the Japanese posed.

Chapter Two demonstrates how the Pan-American regime of rightlessness established parallel discourse and policy between the United States and Peru to restrict Japanese rights and status. As border protection became a dominant discourse, Japanese immigration was specifically targeted. In Peru, nationalism swept through the nation during the 1930's, and the Peruvian State mirrored American exclusion policies. The intersections of American and Peruvian anti-Japanese actions existed first through economic discrimination, a reaction to Japanese ascendance to visible economic success in both countries, before turning to attack their legal citizenship status and mobility. These racist laws against the Japanese inextricably were a part of Pan-American ideology of "racial destiny," with Japanese influence an extreme anxiety for the perils of "racial suicide" which threatened white hegemony nationally and

transnationally.¹⁸ This is evidenced in the Pan-American security conferences discussed, as well as the Pan-American eugenic conferences, and consistent correspondence between the U.S and Peruvian State departments concerning Japanese influence.

In this period, anti-Japanese sentiment attained a biological and eugenic tone. Scientific racism infused and justified the move to Japanese incarceration. The few scholars examining the Japanese deported from Peru focus on their history as a product of hemispheric security after the Pearl Harbor attack. These arguments are valid, as the climate of wartime and the attack on Pearl Harbor undoubtedly facilitated a smooth, undisturbed legal process to deport the Japanese from Peru across national boundary and incarcerate them.

However, nothing forced anti-Japanese action more than the fear of increased Japanese presence, primarily, next-generation Japanese on American and Peruvian soil with birthrights. Offspring from Japanese born on American and Peruvian soil threatened concepts of racial destiny proliferated and substantiated by the eugenics movement, most directly because of the citizenship granted to them at birth. Japanese women in particular warranted intense scrutiny from both States, as reproduction, sexuality and the rights of Japanese children became political issues.

After examining the regime of rightlessness through the scope of economic and legal attacks on the Japanese and their citizenship status, I dedicate substantial space to demonstrate how eugenics and racial destiny intertwined to attack the Japanese

¹⁸ Term “Racial Destiny” defined by Moore, 259-294. “Racial Suicide” defined by Wendy Kline, *Building a Better Race: Gender, Sexuality, and Eugenics from the Turn of the Century to the Baby Boom* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 2.

presence in the Americas as a racial threat. The fear of the Japanese threat to Peruvian nationality via the mass reproduction of their race was a significant underlying rationale for Peru's desire to deport as many Japanese as possible, demonstrating the importance of eugenic perspective to this history.

Chapter Three details the administration of Japanese-Peruvian rightlessness, detailing the deportation and incarceration proceedings. After approximately fifty years of presence in Peru, the Japanese, already stripped of legal rights and protection under the Peruvian State, were deported to the United States after the attack on Pearl Harbor. As they set off from Peru on U.S ships their passports, identity cards, and any other documentation of their status were discarded and thrown overboard. They officially became rightless subjects, but in reality their life without proper human rights was a design over fifty years in the making, and they lived stateless and as *personae non-gratae* for decades. Communication between foreign officials in the United States and Peru concerning the Japanese reached a peak as they facilitated the deportation process.

State department records demonstrate how the two countries coordinated this plan, and also show what legal precedents were used to inform the decision to incarcerate non-U.S subjects from outside U.S territory. Transnational use of the Alien Enemy Act from 1798 was complicated, muddled territory, but successful precedent existed from an earlier situation with Axis nationals in Panamanian territory during the First World War. I detail this precedent to show how the State Department and Justice Department configured the incarceration of the Japanese from Peru legal and acceptable.

The incarceration of the Japanese from Peru in WRA camps fulfilled the Peruvian dream of eliminating the Japanese racial threat and maintaining control over spreading Japanese influence and militarism. I trace how the actions and results of the incarceration validate the assertion that Peru perceived the deportation as more than just a security necessity, but a desired racial cleansing. Even when the war ended, the Japanese from Peru found little reprieve, with fewer than 10% ever returning to Peru, and their journey in rightlessness and statelessness enduring into the next half of the 20th century. Peru accomplished their goal, removing as many Japanese as possible, and preventing their return even as wartime climate dissipated.

The incarceration of the Japanese from Peru occurred due to the decades long establishment of a Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese rightlessness. The advent of war facilitated their displacement from Peru, but they existed as undesirables since their earliest arrival at the beginning of the 20th century. At the executive level the U.S and Peru coordinated Japanese removal from Peruvian territory and quietly held them in special facilities operated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the United States. While their deportation and incarceration took place during wartime, the plan to cleanse Peru of the Japanese population was a response to decades of racial anxiety over their growing influence. At the conclusion of the war, the Peruvian Japanese were considered illegal aliens, enduring a lengthy legal battle to establish citizenship and rebuild their livelihood. To this day redress continues to escape the Peruvian Japanese, although historical analysis of World War II human histories now dedicates space to their story. John K. Emmerson, the American diplomat active in facilitating the deportation program, declared this episode of the war, "...a violation of human rights

and was not justified by any plausible threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere.”¹⁹ This thesis adds to the growing scholarship on the violation of the Japanese Peruvian rights that occurred, and the rightlessness they endured.

¹⁹ John K. Emmerson, *The Japanese Thread: A Life in the US Foreign Service* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978), 149.

Historiography

For original sources, commentary, and analysis, this thesis principally relies on documents and correspondence found in the State Department archives of the United States at the National Archives, and online records from the Japanese Foreign Ministry of Japan and Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores Records of Peru. Furthermore, published monographs and dissertations by Peruvian actors in the early 20th century, primarily intellectuals and eugenic and political leaders, help substantiate my assertions about anti-Japanese discourse and sentiment during the period. There is minimal use of primary legislation from the period, such as acts of congress and judicial decrees. Seiichi Higashide's memoir provides a more personal primary source from the Japanese Peruvian perspective.

Historical analysis specific to the Japanese Peruvian incarceration history and their path from undesirables to rightless subjects remains a developing sub-field of Japanese American incarceration. In 1975 historian Harvey Gardiner published *The Japanese in Peru, 1873-1973*, establishing the field of Japanese settlement and experience in Peru from their earliest arrival until the late 20th century. His century-long account blended thematic and chronological organization, and devoted space to themes such as migration, trade, and culture, while briefly addressing the actual incarceration period during World War II. Gardiner accentuated this field of study when he published *Pawns in a Triangle of Hate: The Peruvian Japanese and the United States*, reconstructing the diplomatic relations between the United States and Peru, which facilitated the incarceration of the Japanese subjects from Peru.

Thomas Connell published *America's Japanese Hostages: The World War II Plan for a Japanese Free Latin America* in 2002. Connell's work carried many of the themes found in Gardiner's analysis, although Connell offered more focus on American sentiment and the influence it had on Peruvian discourse. My thesis aims to accentuate this perception by more firmly linking the transnational capacity of anti-Japanese discourse across both Americas. Both incarceration histories focus almost exclusively on the incarceration period during the war, only briefly highlighting the foundation of anti-Japanese designation as undesirables in Peru during the first half of the 20th century. Due to this, I chose to focus the bulk of my thesis on the decades prior to the World War, attempting to show that the World War II "Plan" as Connell termed it did not occur solely as a response to wartime climate and paranoia, but was a progressive path throughout the first half of the 20th century.

This thesis also leaned on *The Japanese in Latin America*, a compilation work edited by Daniel Masterson and Sayaka Funada-Classen to help put the Japanese Peruvian situation within the context of other Japanese migrations and settlements throughout Latin America. Erika Lee's article titled "The 'Yellow Peril' an Asian Exclusion in the Americas" also provided evidence to the theory that anti-Asian sentiment, discourse, and policy transcended individual nation-state processes to become a hemispheric ideology, demonstrating the story of the Japanese from Peru as transnational beyond their physical crossing of national boundaries.

Since detailing the history of rightless subjects, I consulted Naomi Paik's brilliant work *Rightlessness: Testimony and Redress in U.S Prison Camps since World War II*. Paik delivered a crucial assertion for this thesis when she demonstrates how

rightlessness exists and survives in balance with the protection of those perceived to merit rights, an especially important argument considering the 'hemispheric security' at stake in this history. Ayten Gundogdu in *Rightlessness in an Age of Rights* affirmed my belief that the displacement of people remains an adaptable and necessary measure for protecting rights. This allows this thesis on Japanese Peruvian rightlessness and its Pan-American nature to permeate larger discussions of post-war U.S continued effort to impose rightlessness on countries in Latin America with undesirable subjects and regimes.

This thesis truly separates itself with its discussion of the incarceration history within the scope and context of scientific racism, racial destiny, and eugenic discourses. Few historians lay claim to the idea that eugenics played a part in initiating Japanese incarceration, but in line with Erika Lee's assertion, I argue that the dialogue and rhetoric fluidly proliferated transnationally between the United States and Peru indirectly facilitated the removal of Japanese from society. Always concerned with national identity and their racial destiny, the reproduction of Japanese in Peru caused more fear than any other component of Japanese influence, and was directly tied to growing fear of Japanese militarism. This caused heightened scrutiny of the Japanese woman and their reproductive capacity, and the rights possessed by Japanese offspring born in Peru. In a crucial dissertation, scholar Stephanie Carol Moore explored how eugenic policy gripped xenophobic discourses in Peru, and helped suppress Japanese rights. Since focusing on a Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese rightlessness, scholar Nancy Leys Stepan helped establish how such eugenic ideology also was a transnational product.

A serious gap exists in this field of study concerning the personal perspective of Japanese migrants to Peru. Seiichi Higashide published the only substantial monograph on his experience from his early upbringing in Japan to his path to rightless subject during World War II. A strong figure in the Japanese community in Peru with endless observation, Higashide's voice remains integral for any historian writing a history of the Japanese in Peru.

Chapter I: Establishing Japanese in Peru's Racial Hierarchy

Introduction to Chapter 1

Before the Japanese arrived in Peru and acquired status as *personae-non-gratae*, the lower-class, peasant caste of Japan that made up the majority of the future migrants to Latin America suffered as undesirables in their own homeland. As Japan began an era of modernization in the late 19th century period, their global influence expanded, but this also relegated a large portion of their lower-class population to significant economic and social struggle. The Japanese who embarked to Peru left Japan desperate for economic prosperity and familial stability after decades of torment under the Meiji era's abusive labor practices and substantial external violence with other Asian regions.²⁰ Important for understanding the complete story of the Japanese from Peru and their path from undesirable to rightless subjects is to recognize how their pre-Peru existence in Japan also was characterized by statelessness and discrimination. The Japanese migrants to Peru saw their voyage as a temporary measure to earn a wage, and return to Japan with improved prospects. Instead, once they left Japanese borders the majority failed to ever return, and suffered from a negligent homeland unmotivated to protect or support their nationals abroad.

When they arrived in Peru the Japanese served the crucial role as cheap labor contract workers in the Peruvian rural scene. Despite their strong work ethic the Japanese faced instant discrimination and racialization upon their arrival, posing a

²⁰ James Stanlaw, "Japanese Emigration and Immigration: From the Meiji to the Modern," in *Japanese Diasporas: Unsung Pasts, Conflicting Presents, and Uncertain Futures* edited by Nobuko Adachi (New York: Routledge, 2006), 36-46.

threat to Peru's stable racial hierarchy, which already assigned the Japanese as an undesirable group due to Peru's discriminatory history with Chinese coolie laborers. Even in this early period United States anti-Japanese sentiment and policy reinforced Peruvian perception toward the Japanese. From their first arrival in 1899 until the early 1920's, the Japanese suffered under an abusive Peruvian contract-labor system directed by emigration company sponsorship, with no protection or aid from their Japanese homeland. In this period the Peruvian State clearly marked the Japanese subjects in Peru undesirables through economic sanctions and racialization, responding to perceived Japanese infiltration of the Peruvian economy and racial hierarchy dominated by European-ethnic whiteness.

Brief Analysis Japanese-Peruvians Struggle pre-Migration

The beginning of the Meiji era in 1868 brought Japan visibility on the world scene, but debilitated the already shaky economic stability of rural, working-class Japan. The Meiji era that restored the system of the emperor progressively modernized Japan's foreign interests and implemented Japanese expansionist ideology, both which coincided with a period of rising global capitalism. Primarily a society defined by agrarian labor and village life, the Meiji era ushered in changes that redefined the existing feudal concepts of labor relations. The most important change for the Japanese peasants, who would later make up the majority of migrants to Peru, was the institutionalization of commercial farming and the establishment of agricultural wage labor.²¹ Freed from the constraints of feudal order, the Japanese peasantry harbored

²¹ Daniel M. Masterson and Sayaka Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America* (Illinois, University of Illinois Press, 2004), 9.

newfound individual freedom, but still faced significant economic struggle, making the Meiji transition problematic for this lower caste of Japanese society.

The ability to own or lease land led to taxation struggles for the rural peasantry. New land taxes placed great burden upon the peasants, as those who owned land often held less than 1 acre, and a significant proportion of the peasant farmers were still tenants, not landowners.²² By the 1880's nearly 10% of all independent peasant farmers lost their lands due to the rise in taxation, and by 1895 bankruptcy and loss reached a peak, with over 400,000 peasants losing their land and economic means to sustain stable family life.²³ The violence and turmoil caused by the Sino-Japanese war served as the culminating experience that motivated the Japanese to seek options abroad to secure better fortune and prosperity.

This same 19th century period was less fruitful for Peru, struggling with a depressed economy, bereft workforce, and internal and external security threats.²⁴ However, toward the end of the century, political stability and an economic surge changed the dynamics of Peruvian labor. Plantation agriculture grew rapidly on the coastal stretches of Peru, a result of industrialization, which increased economic opportunity, but required a significant labor force.

Peru first turned to the Chinese throughout most of the 19th century. This brought varying success, but by 1874 Peru abolished the Chinese Coolie trade and the

²² Ibid., 8.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Harvey C. Gardiner, *The Japanese and Peru 1873-1973* (Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1975). 2. Also Stanlaw, 36-46.

Chinese migrated to urban spaces.²⁵ These restrictions imposed echoed the Chinese Exclusion Act issued in the same period in the United States. Rather than attempt to lure the significant number of the indigenous population, Peru first attempted to draw European immigrants, before concentrating on establishing trade for cheap Japanese labor.²⁶ Prior to their arrival, plantation owners considered the Japanese a superior working race than both their Chinese predecessors in Peru, and the indigenous population. The Peruvian actors running plantation businesses assigned moral impurity to the Chinese and the indigenous, and consequently, perceived their moral impurity as an indication of their racial impurity.²⁷ Chinese desire for Peruvian women and perceived affinity for opium were just a few of the signs of moral impurity despised by the Peruvians. Concerning Chinese impurity, one Peruvian writer accused the Chinese of creating “Indecent houses of prostitutes, gambling parlors...and so many other iniquities in regard to private and public morality.”²⁸ The indigenous population was considered vulnerable to criminality and immorality because of their lack of education. These characteristics determined the Chinese an unfit race for Peruvian labor. The Japanese, willing to work for cheaper wages than the Chinese, and promoted by Japan as possessing a strong work ethic, were poised to fill Peru’s labor need. Japan, struggling with an overcrowding population causing a dearth of work, and Peru, needing

²⁵ Ayumi Takenaka, “The Japanese in Peru: History of Immigration, Settlement, and Racialization,” *Latin American Perspectives* 31, no. 3 (2004): 82.

²⁶ Thomas Connell, *America’s Japanese Hostages: The World War II Plan for a Japanese Free Latin America* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), 12; Masterson and Funyada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America*, 21.

²⁷ Marisol de la Cadena, 48.

²⁸ Felipe Boisset, *El Problema Racial en el Perú (o el Peligro de la raza amarilla)* (Lima, Peru: Empresa Tipografía Union, 1919), 20.

to locate a substantial work force outside the nation, began negotiating the first Japanese laborers to Peru.

The Japanese Passport and Absence of Rights Abroad

The majority of the Japanese migrants to Peru made voyage to Peru with a Japanese passport, a rather new concept during the late 19th century. The passport merits further historical analysis, as they served as the only documents of identity and status once they left Japanese boundaries. Furthermore, the Japanese, gradually deprived of their rights throughout the 20th century in Peru would have their passports and identification confiscated and discarded when they embarked on deportation ships during the incarceration era. Before looking at how their rights were deprived in Peru, what rights, if any, did the passport allocate to the transnational Japanese migrants?

The introduction of the modern passport during the 19th century coincided with the developing idea of the nation-state. John Torpey, a scholar on the history of passports, wrote, "The historical development of passport controls...a way of illuminating the institutionalization of the idea of the 'nation-state' as a prospectively homogeneous ethnocultural unit, a project that necessarily entailed efforts to regulate people's movements."²⁹ He further asserted that only through documentation of nationality, since nation-states are both territorial and ethnocentric, can boundaries be formed which separate nationals from non-nationals.³⁰ Passports represent a unique case of documentation, as they involve cooperation within an international system or

²⁹ John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 1

³⁰ Ibid.

society, as well as the maintenance of an attachment to the specific norms of different nation-states.

Now an accepted component of international movement, in the 19th century there was debate over just how integral a passport should be for restricting or allowing human transnational movement. In England, passport provisions were unenforced until 1906, with foreigners having largely unrestricted rights to enter foreign territory and hold residency.³¹ Germany passed an 1867 passport law that abolished passport and visa requirements for both the nationals of the State and foreigners.³² Most scholars ascribe this trend to the economic liberalism sweeping Europe and the globe. As Eric Hobsbawm claimed, the free movement in economic production required the free movement of people for labor production.³³ At the same time, widespread democratization required identification to become more important, as States became increasingly concerned with making distinction between their own citizens and non-nationals.

Therefore, by the late 19th century, passports in the West were characterized more as markers of identification, citizenship, and nationality, rather than necessary documentation for transnational movement. The course of discussion in the United States during the century designated authorization of passports as a State Department task meant primarily for only citizens, as the U.S passport trended toward functioning as

³¹ Richard Plender, *International Migration Law*, 2nd Edition (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 67.

³² Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, 2000. 82.

³³ Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital, 1848-1875* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975), 35.

a citizenship certification.³⁴ In Great Britain the passport was a method to counter detention abroad, a proof of their nationality.³⁵ These Western countries allowed transnational movement and passports to intersect with rights protection abroad. The Japanese State enforced less protection through passports for their Japanese citizens moving abroad. The Japanese to later migrate to Peru found little protection of their status and rights once they departed from Japanese boundary, constituting an early form of statelessness. As lower-class peasants already persecuted under Meiji reforms imposing severe economic hardship upon the future migrants, the Japanese clearly could not rely on a protective homeland state.

The Japanese Migrant vs. The Western Migrant

The Japanese passport was simple, containing name, addresses, occupation or trade, age, vague physical description, and purpose of travel.³⁶ They also did not include expiration dates, but stated the permitted length of stay, which was crucial for the future Japanese immigrants in Peru working labor contracts.³⁷ Unrestricted border crossing by the Japanese to neighboring Asian nations was prevalent throughout most of the pre-Meiji era before the institutionalization of passports.³⁸ By the 1860's Japan sought to emulate the Western system of passport and movement they perceived to be in place. In reality they established passport legislation in the 1870's while the rest of

³⁴ Takahiro Yamamoto, "Japan's Passport System and the Opening of Borders, 1866-1878," *The Historical Journal* 60, no. 4 (2017): 1014.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., 1005.

³⁷ Ibid., 1014.

³⁸ Ibid., 997.

Europe and the United States trended toward liberal movement and transforming the passport from a method of movement to an identifier of citizenship.³⁹

Most pertinent to the history of the Japanese in Peru was how the traveler and the Japanese State perceived the passports, and how the Japanese passport differed from those in the West. Takahiro Yamamoto found in his research that passports in Western nations were both documents for travel and proof of citizenship, as demonstrated, instrumental in protecting citizens abroad subject to unjust arrests or detention.⁴⁰ In this respect, the passports greatly served the traveler or migrant in addition to the State, and moving into the 20th century, the passport continued to identify more with citizenship in the West, especially as xenophobia increased and suppressed the liberal movement era.

While many of the Japanese did obtain official passports for their travel, they operated closer to work-labor contracts. The Japanese government did not in fact require passports in their initial 19th century commemoration of passport laws. Approximate figures of passports issued and census figures of the Japanese show about one-third of the Japanese in Peru in the first immigration period (1899-1907) possessed passports.⁴¹ For those who did, the Japanese passport held less significance than a Western passport, and did not assist travellers to prove identity, citizenship, or nationality, and provided no legal use or human rights protection.⁴² Japanese abroad bore the responsibility for their actions and were vulnerable to unjust

³⁹ Ibid., 1012.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 1013-1014.

⁴¹ Yamato Ichihashi, "International Migration of the Japanese," in *International Migrations, Volume II: Interpretations*, edited by Walter F. Willcox (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1931), 621.

⁴² Ibid.

action by the Peruvian State, as the Japanese government only concerned themselves with their nationals abroad when they crossed or re-entered national boundary. In addition to their movement to Peru, substantial number of Japanese also migrated to other areas during the late 19th century. Over 200,000 migrated to Hawaii and the U.S, 60,000 to Russia and Canada, and in all cases were vulnerable to discriminatory practices of the state. Yamamoto explained this while examining the fees paid for passports. He stated, "Whereas the European passport application fee could be understood as a price for receiving due privileges en route, the application fee for a Japanese passport was nothing more than a tax..."⁴³

The only protection or rights granted to the Japanese migrants came under the Emigrant Protection Act of 1896 in Japan. This act was intended to protect emigrants from dishonest emigration agents by only permitting emigration through emigrant companies and through their issuances of passports and work-contract visas. The act defined the labor contracts of emigrant workers as valid and enforced the obligation for honoring contract wages, and required the emigrant agencies to pay dues to the Japanese government.⁴⁴ However, this law was enacted more to protect the Japanese from corrupt, private emigration officials and exploitation by emigration companies. Emigration companies frequently engaged in fraudulent practices to make profits, such as charging emigrants high commissions and getting rebates from shipping companies

⁴³ Ibid., 1015.

⁴⁴ Mitziko Sawada, "Culprits and Gentlemen: Meiji Japan's Restrictions of Emigrants to the United States, 1891-1909," *Pacific Historical Review* 60, no. 3 (1991): 344-345.

for each passenger.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the Japanese government continued to serve as protection agents for the Japanese from the emigration companies themselves.

However, their interest in protecting immigrants in Peru was a long-term investment for further economic development and international prestige, not based in humanitarian grounds.⁴⁶ The well being of the individual immigrant was only of interest to the State for the sake of the nation.

Why was this significant for the Japanese who would embark to Peru at the turn of the century? The Japanese passport clearly did not serve the traveler, and likewise only served the Japanese State's interest in regulating illegal border crossing, leaving the Japanese passport to possess significance only at the discretion of the Peruvian State. Furthermore, the Emigrant Protection Law only provided vague protections for the Japanese emigrants, with the emigration companies finding exploitative loopholes.

Therefore, the Peruvian State possessed wide discretion to manipulate Japanese labor and their status. This context demonstrated how vulnerable the Japanese were to gross surveillance measures and the restriction Japanese rights to fit 'hemispheric' security dogma. Japanese documentation and legal protection, even earlier than the 20th century protectionist era, already relegated the Japanese to a form of 'stateless.' Japanese became rightless subjects during the mid-20th century after progressing from immigrant status to undesirable or *personae non-gratae* in Peru. As they left Japan and were isolated people beyond Japanese boundary, indicating outside of Japanese rights, they arrived in Peru unbounded to any state. As will be corroborated when discussing

⁴⁵ Hosok O, *Cultural Analysis of the Early Japanese Migration to the United States during Meiji to Taisho Era (1868-1926)* (Oklahoma, Oklahoma State University, 2010), 323.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 281

their racialization in Peru's social hierarchy upon their arrival, the Japanese struggle as undesirables in Peru began in part due to the circumstances, and rights, they left behind in Japan.

Personal Perspective-Introducing Seiichi Higashide

Seiichi Higashide, an ethnic Japanese who later migrated to Peru in the 20th century, published a memoir on his turbulent upbringing in Japan, his path to undesirable in Peru, and his eventual rightlessness experience during World War II. Like many Japanese at the time, Higashide's early years in Japan were fraught with economic and labor hardship. He detailed how he saw irrigation labor workers forced to work shirtless in the freezing winter, a method used by project supervisors to increase work ethic.⁴⁷ Higashide himself worked numerous hard labor jobs in Japan, from farming to factory work, and struggled to find means to advance his education.⁴⁸ When he finally was able to continue his education, he increasingly hoped to use his connections in academia to leave Japan for a better opportunity abroad.

Higashide wrote, "The biggest obstacle to my plan was obtaining a passport."⁴⁹ Attempting to travel to Peru in the late 1920's, he was not wrong according to the legislation active in both countries at the time. Mirroring the 1924 Immigration Act in the U.S that halted Asian immigration, Peru at the time prohibited free immigration, and the Japanese government stopped issuing passports to Peru. Higashide, with help from a university professor, was able to obtain a passport illegally on the grounds of being

⁴⁷ Seiichi Higashide, *Adios to Tears: The Memoirs of a Japanese-Peruvian Internee in U.S Concentration Camps* (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 2000), 18.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 40.

'called for employment,' faking his connection to an employer in Lima, one of the few ways a Japanese national could bypass strict passport prohibition.⁵⁰

How Higashide obtained his passport is crucial for multiple reasons. It further evidenced the disjointed nature of the process for issuing Japanese passports to Peru. Potential Japanese migrants increasingly found their situations determined by the discretion of the Peruvian State. Peru permitted issuance of Japanese passports only through family relations or by Japanese companies in Peru requiring migrant Japanese labor. Higashide arrived in Peru in 1930, a year after Peru reformed the immigration system by officially placing Japanese migration under State jurisdiction, allowing the Peruvian Director of Immigration final approval over mandating Japanese entry.⁵¹ Previously Peru approved Japanese passports through the Japanese Association in Tokyo with assistance from the Peruvian foreign ministry. This further demonstrated disconnect between the Japanese government and officials in Peru, a gap that had tragic effects for unprotected Japanese citizens in Peru. Lastly, it highlighted the extreme conditions present in Japan, as Higashide, a law-abiding citizen, would do anything to escape his hardships for an unknown life abroad.

Some with Japanese passports and others with temporary labor contracts, the Japanese embarked to Peru starting in 1899, continuing into the 1920's. Their settlement and initial experience prior to the Peruvian turn to extreme nationalism in the 1920's and 1930's was still marked by discrimination and deprivation. Their passports provided them means for their travel, and defined their contract work and length, but

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Elias Bonnemaïson, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, July 15, 1929, Numero de Oficio 57, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

offered little stability in their settling experience. The restriction on their mobility and status gradually increased during their settlement throughout the 20th century. They left Japan undesirable components of Japan's envisioned Meiji nation, with documentation providing no rights or protections abroad, leaving them vulnerable to the consequences of Peruvian discrimination and racial hierarchy. Their early settlement period in the first two decades of the 20th century provided insight into their ongoing path to becoming 'statusless' subjects.

Early Settlement Experience in Peru 1899-1920- Placing the Japanese in Peru's Racial Hierarchy

The Morioka Emigration Company first promoted the idea of Japanese migration to Peru in 1898. Two figures, Teikichi Tanaka, and Augusto B. Leguía, Leguía a future president who became an entrenched figure in Japanese-Peruvian relations, established tentative terms for a shipment of Japanese workers.⁵² The initial Japanese labor shipments from 1899-1908 were authorized through non-government, emigration agencies, rather than government-contract emigrants. This system of emigration would increasingly be detrimental to the situation of the Japanese in Peru, although the 'free' emigration period that followed in the 1920's and 1930's would continue the pattern of labor discrimination.

When Leguía and Tanaka agreed to terms on the first shipment of Japanese workers on the ship *Sakaru Mara*, the Japanese government sold the workers on stable earning, respectable working conditions, and a beautiful climate devoid of disease.⁵³ Japanese laborers immediately found that the propaganda put forth by the Japanese

⁵² Gardiner, *The Japanese in Peru*, 23.

⁵³ Connell, 14.

State was distorted. Exposed to diseases unheard of in Japan, such as beriberi, malaria, yellow fever and dysentery, approximately 143 of the 790 original Japanese laborers succumbed to various diseases and died.⁵⁴ As more Japanese died, and others suffered from illness and were unable to work, tension between the emigration companies and the various plantations magnates increased. From the perspective of the plantation owners, the contractual arrangement calling for able-bodied men ages 20-45 was not met, since such large proportions of the migrants befell serious illness and disease. Emigration companies struggled to improve the health conditions for the Japanese.

Anti-Japanese sentiment among the Peruvians, from both the plantation employers and the general Peruvian population exposed to the Japanese laborers, fostered a dangerous environment for the Japanese. The language barrier between the Japanese and the Peruvians compounded relations and mistrust between the two demographics. Peruvian workers viewed the Japanese as thieves, invading their landscape and stealing jobs from native Peruvians still recovering from the economic struggles of the late 19th century.⁵⁵ Furthermore, the language issue allowed suspicion and destructive rumors to circulate concerning the Japanese, which led to early instances of violence. The primary emigration agent, Teikishi Tanaka, within three months of the first shipment wrote, "Feelings against immigrants strong...have been clashes with Peruvians. Situation out of control."⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Masterson, 36.

⁵⁵ Takenaka, 88-91

⁵⁶ Gardiner, *The Japanese in Peru*, 25.

One story in particular emphasized the plight of the Japanese situation in Peru in the early 20th century. Michitaro Shindo, a representative of the Meiji Emigration Company, traveled to Peru to negotiate a migrant labor contract with the Inca Rubber Company. The two parties settled on 5,000 workers to Peru within the next five-year period. Within the first year, it became clear such a high number of workers were not required, and a mere 500 men sufficed. Between the Inca Rubber Company and Shindo representing the Meiji Emigration company communication over how to settle this problem failed to reach the agents facilitating the shipment of the next laborers to Peru. 754 workers arrived in Peru and quickly learned there was no work or contract for their services, and no other region currently provided equal-pay agricultural work.⁵⁷ The Meiji Company and Inca Rubber Company pointed the blame at each other, and the infuriated Japanese workers were forced to settle for overwhelmingly unfavorable contracts. They complained that this constituted a violation of the Emigrants' Protection Law, but their situation remained unchanged.⁵⁸

Such exploitation of the Japanese laborers for the purpose of economic profit on behalf of either the Japanese companies or the Peruvian corporations was common. It further illustrates the lack of voice provided to the Japanese to protest their own discrimination and situation. Without adequate Spanish language skills, and primarily an uneducated workforce, the Japanese were easily manipulated by agents from their own country, and also the landowners and managers of their employment in Peru.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 29.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

Racial Anxiety: Legacy of Slavery, Afro-Peruvians and Chinese

Perhaps no other nation in Latin America possessed such powerful racial anxiety over national identity than Peru. The abundance of intermixed races between European, Indian, and Black races in Peru led Peruvians to accept social discrimination as widespread due to cultural differences rather than biological ones. Intellectuals in Peruvian society widely denied the existence of any pure white race, even if the desire for “whitening” was a popular concept.⁵⁹ Marisol de la Cadena stated, “Peruvian modern discourses that acquit racist practices and even legitimize them by appealing to culture are integral to the political process through which in Peru...race was culturally constructed...culture was racially defined.”⁶⁰ However, a belief that acquired characteristics were inherited demonstrated how Peru’s conceptualization of race remained intersected with biological notions. Belief in inherited traits suited the intellectual class of Peru who relied on education as the premier path to racial redemption. Describing the intellectuals, Marisol de la Cadena argued, “Because race manifested social experiences in process, its popularity among turn-of-the-century Peruvian elites...derived from its ability to express feelings of superiority while scientifically legitimating these emotions.”⁶¹ The tension between cultural and biological aspects of race dominated discourse over the subject in 20th century Peru. The Japanese combined racism of both aspects to form a distinct threat to Peru’s racial destiny, as they were of yellow skin tone biologically inferior, while also culturally unfit for the nation’s identity.

⁵⁹ Marisol de la Cadena, 17.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 1-2.

⁶¹ Ibid., 13.

Legacies of slavery and the precedent set by the Chinese laborers before them formed two pillars of Peruvian society that worked against the Japanese attempt to comfortably settle in Peru. Before the Japanese contract workers the Peruvian plantation system depended exclusively on labor from African slaves or Chinese coolie labor.⁶² Despite the abolition of slavery several decades before, plantation employers perceived the Japanese as non-human bodies of labor, undeserving of organized wage structure or contractual agreements promised to them by the emigration company contracts. They were, in fact, deeply offended that the Japanese even presupposed such negotiations of terms possible. The Chinese Coolies were vehemently disliked by the Peruvians for their cheap labor services that supplanted Peruvian jobs, and for the perception that they transported infectious diseases to Peru.⁶³ Even as early as the mid-19th century anti-Asian and anti-African sentiment coalitions in government moved against colored laborers ascendance in the Peruvian workforce. The term “Asiatica” became a derogatory insult for the Chinese, and this was transplanted onto the new Japanese arrivals at the turn of the century.⁶⁴ The industrious nature of the Japanese migrants, with a strong work ethic and desire to earn equal compensation to the Peruvians angered the Peruvian natives, and led to physical attacks and attempts to manipulate Japanese contracts.

Intellectual elite in Peru set the tone for racial discourse throughout the entire Asian migration period. Discussed later as the primary instigators of anti-Japanese legislation justified on racial destiny discourse, their attacks on the Chinese became

⁶² Masterson, 36.

⁶³ Connell, 13.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

transplanted onto the Japanese upon arrival. Manuel Gonzalez Prada termed the Chinese “degenerate,” “feeble,” and a “vicious germ and decrepit.”⁶⁵ Clemente Palma wrote the Chinese were “degenerate and dirty,” and lamented that the Chinese sent to Peru were the most inferior within Chinese caste system.⁶⁶ This was echoed later with the Japanese, as the migrants mostly came from the peasant class of rural Japan. It was easy for intellectuals to lump the Chinese and Japanese derogatory sentiments together. Writer Felipe M. Boisset recommended Asians not “bother the countries that are superior to you ethically and ethnically, and do not degenerate those who teach you an evolution more in concordance with the destiny of men.”⁶⁷

The perceived inferiority of the Afro-Peruvians further stabilized Peru’s racial hierarchy and the placement of the Japanese at the bottom. The term *mestizaje* generally refers to racial mixture of African, indigenous, and European (Spanish) descent in Peru and throughout Latin America. Scholar of gendered Afro-Peruvian racism Sylvanna M. Falcón asserted that in Peru common conceptualization of *mestizaje* explicitly condenses this plurality, relegating the African heritage mostly invisible.⁶⁸ Little consensus on Peru’s national identity crisis ever existed due to the conflict between Peruvian desire for “whitening” and the opposition to this posed by a sizeable indigenous population. Concerning racial hierarchy, the Afro-Peruvian and Japanese existed on the same level simply because of color. On the racial hierarchy,

⁶⁵ Rodríguez Pastor, *Hijos Del Celeste Imperio En El Perú (1850-1900): Migración, Agricultura, Mentalidad Y Explotación* (Lima, Perú: Instituto de Apoyo Agrario, 1989), 235.

⁶⁶ Palma, *Dos Tesis*, 30, 36.

⁶⁷ Felipe M. Boisset, 22.

⁶⁸ Sylvanna M. Falcón, “Mestiza Double Consciousness: The Voices of Afro-Peruvian Women on Gendered Racism,” *Gender and Society* Vol. 22, no. 5 *Gendered Borderlands* (2008): 664.

however, Afro-Peruvian sentiment aligned and influenced with anti-Japanese simply because of color. As all groups of Peruvian society sought to lay claim to their whiteness, Afro-Peruvians and Japanese were limited because of their skin. Similarly, the Japanese found it impossible to identify with a claim to whiteness, and therefore, discrimination and racialization levied at Afro-Peruvians similarly was imposed on the Japanese.

Restricting Japanese Mobility

The discrimination in the Japanese contracts severely limited the mobility and agency of the Japanese, as their Japanese passports were tied to the terms of their contractual agreement and length of stay, offering no security. The key components of the terms agreed upon in the first contracts were as follows: 4 year contracts, 25 yen per month, and deducting yen per month to the emigration companies to cover the expense of their eventual return to Japan (and this money stayed with the companies when the majority of the immigrants were forced to settle permanently).⁶⁹

Unsurprisingly, disputes arose as the Peruvian plantation owners failed to adhere to the strict regulations. Despite no binding regulations, the Japanese were forced to buy supplies from high-end Peruvian merchants instead of at low-cost Chinese shops, causing expense that decreased their net income.⁷⁰ At the largest plantation at Casa Blanca, Japanese workers were not compensated for the occasions where they doubled their workload and hours.⁷¹ Some reports were issued stating that the Casa Blanca

⁶⁹ Masterson, 35; Gardiner, *The Japanese in Peru*, 24.

⁷⁰ Gardiner, *The Japanese in Peru*, 25.

⁷¹ Ibid.

managers refused to pay the full original contract rate.⁷² A bilingual mediator was sent from Japan to help alleviate the distrust, and while he succeeded in tentatively stabilizing wages, he did so now at 20 yen per month.

This brief interlude of stability ended with the next shipments of Japanese workers and the shift by Peruvian sugar planters from wage labor to the *tarea*, a piecework system where earnings differentiated by the type of work.⁷³ This infuriated the Japanese, who often struggled to work more than one ‘piece’ at a time, significantly lowering their net profit. Whereas the rigidity of a wage system prevented wholesale manipulation, the *tarea* system fostered abuse from the landowners who possessed wider discretion to individualize each Japanese laborer’s earnings in the interest of the employer.⁷⁴

Relating to the issue of passports and Japanese mobility, the subsequent contingents of Japanese contract worker cohorts after 1905 faced a significant change as the four-year contract period was replaced by a six-month period, a drastic shift for the Japanese experience in Peru.⁷⁵ The Japanese who wished to remain in Peru beyond the six-month period had to fight to preserve their passports. The Japanese struggled to assimilate into Peruvian culture and earn the respect of the Peruvian natives, and the six-month contract further hindered assimilation initiatives such as learning Spanish.⁷⁶ While the Japanese were ‘free’ after six months, the widespread dislike they faced combined with their limited skill beyond farming forced some into work

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Toraji Irie and William Himel, “History of Japanese Migration to Peru,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 31, no. 4 (1951): 450.

⁷⁴ Masterson, 26.

⁷⁵ Gardiner, *The Japanese in Peru*, 27.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

as household servants.⁷⁷ Peruvian employers actually disliked the six-month contract system also, as it forced them to constantly search for new workers, and lessened their authority over their Japanese laborers.

Despite the forthcoming period of a restrictive State defined by repudiation of the Japanese in favor of nationalism, the period from 1906-1923 actually facilitated increased mobility for the Japanese.⁷⁸ Rather than succumb to the discriminatory factors confronted in Peru during the first years of emigration, the Japanese demonstrated great adaptability to their conditions. Their identity as a source of cheap labor allowed them to find new opportunities beyond the plantations. The blatant alterations of their contracts and wages, the diseases they faced, and the manipulation of their remitted savings for returning to Japan frustrated the Japanese, but only spurred their motivation to succeed. Their work ethic and adaptability, combined with Peruvian employers favor towards their labor over others for economic reasons pushed the Japanese to move to urban settings. Their demonstration of mobility and achieving economic well-being in urban settings show how they overcame Peruvian hostility to carve their own success. Contract labor through the medium of emigration companies was abolished in 1923, beginning a new phase of Japanese migration directed by Japanese-State facilitation and 'free' emigration labor.⁷⁹

As the Japanese demonstrated transnational mobility when they abandoned their sufferings in Japan, they also navigated their settlement in Peru during the first two decades since the first emigration in 1899. Finding economic stability required stages

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 27.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 33.

of mobility: leaving their homeland, finding temporary livelihood in rural Peru, and lastly, attempting to establish permanence in urban Peru.⁸⁰ By the 1910's high proportions of the Japanese Issei had moved to Lima and other urban sites and started other trades, such as retail, barber shops, grocery stores, and restaurants.⁸¹ The industrious nature of their economic pursuits brought these successes, but also won them even greater hostility through their increased exposure in the urban setting. Newspapers began to publish disgruntled stories about the Japanese threat economically and militarily. The 'clannish' nature of the Japanese who assembled together in business ventures was met with suspicion and resentment.

Content with the Japanese as subordinate to Peruvians through the contract labor system, Peruvian intellectuals and the working class grew increasingly weary of their influence and mobility. New Japanese arrivals on the shores of Peru were met with immediate repudiation in the Peruvian press, which was a major force in proliferating the anti-Japanese climate in the 1920's and 1930's, bridging the sentiment of the people to the policies of the State. In the newspaper *La Tradición*, one writer exclaimed that Japanese and Asiatic immigration was a cancer to the body of Peru.⁸² The leader in anti-Japanese newspapers, *El Tiempo*, falsely reported that the Japanese monopolized 99% of small businesses in Peru, calling for an end to the 'yellow plague.'⁸³ Letters written from the Peruvian public and published in newspapers begged for restricting Japanese immigration and 'Peruvianizing' the economy. These economic

⁸⁰ Ibid., 34.

⁸¹ James Tigner, *The Okinawans in Latin America* (Pacific Science Board/National Research Counsel, 1954), 591.

⁸² *La Tradición* (Lima, Peru), February 21, 1927.

⁸³ *El Tiempo* Lima, Peru), July 1, 1927.

grievances under false premises, combined with the apparent threat of Japanese militarism, led to a second period of Japanese settlement in Peru characterized by limiting their mobility and restricting their identity and legal status in Peru. Suddenly, the mobility of the Japanese came under the surveillance of Peruvian authorities who now attempted to regulate their means of travel back to Japan for visits or studying, restricting their passports, and threatening that they would lose their jobs and homes if their movement was suspicious.

Early Pan-American Regime of Discourse and Policy against Japanese

Japanese migration patterns to Peru generally developed just a few years or decades after Japanese migration to the United States. As the Japanese left Japan in the late 19th century and embarked for settlement in the Americas, it became clear that precedents set by the United States against the Japanese often shaped Japanese racialization and their path to personae non-grate in Peru. Even before the 1920-1945 period when the United States and Peru diplomatically aligned to 'other' the Japanese, anti-Japanese developments in the U.S were reflective on Japanese Peruvian settlement.

Chinese coolie systems dominated agricultural labor in both countries in the aftermath of slavery, until the Page Act of 1875 and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 prohibited further Chinese immigration to the U.S and barred the Chinese from naturalized citizenship.⁸⁴ These measures were justified racially by the belief in Chinese in-assimilability, while also perceiving their bodies as disease-ridden and weak.

⁸⁴ Act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat. 477); Act of May 6, 1882 (22 Stat. 58).

Surveillance and scrutiny of the Chinese was heightened unlike any other demographic and established precedent for perception of the Japanese. In the same period as the U.S anti-Asian policies, Peru created special labor recruitment programs specifically targeting the Irish and Spanish respectively.⁸⁵ The Criollos, the South American born descendants of Europeans in Peru, constituted only ten percent of the population, but always strived to incorporate more European whiteness into the nation. The Peruvian government twice subsidized European and U.S immigrants exclusively, in 1873 and 1906, intending to curtail Asian immigrant growth.⁸⁶

No facet of their racialization evidenced this more than the implementation of stringent identification and documentation requirements. Anna Pegler-Gordon discussed how Chinese laborers were required to register their presence and document their registration in the States before any other race.⁸⁷ By 1909, all people of Chinese ethnicity were obligated to possess photographic documentation upon entry, and could be demanded to show photo identification at any time while within U.S boundary.⁸⁸ Not only were the documentation measures also imposed on future Japanese arrivals in the Americas, but also the hyper inspection of the Asiatic body became a staple feature of immigration measures. As discussed in Chapter 2, associating the Japanese body, and particularly the Japanese female body, with weakness and hyper-sexualization, arose as an integral discourse for promoting anti-Japanese sentiment and spreading fear of Japanese reproduction.

⁸⁵ Takenaka, 83.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Anna Pegler-Gordon, *In Sight in America: Photography and the Development of U.S Immigration Policy* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2009), 24.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

In 1907 and 1908 U.S president Theodore Roosevelt conducted secret negotiations with Japan now known as the 'Gentlemen's Agreement,' which had a profound effect on the Japanese situation in Peru. This unofficial policy was an agreement with Japan to no longer supply Japanese laborers with legal passports to the United States.⁸⁹ The influence of this measure on Peru led to two contradictory results. Peru, allowing Japanese labor migrants since 1899, specifically exploited and solicited expanded Japanese immigration, something likely economically motivated as emigration companies sought expanded profits. At the same time, the surge in Japanese agricultural workers in Peru led many of the initial Issei immigrants to seek farming opportunities beyond contract plantation work, increasing their mobility within Peru. This caused great alarm for the Peruvian State who followed American example and searched for methods to curtail increased Japanese influence.

In 1910 the Peruvian State enacted a decree stipulating that colonists in the Sierra mountain regions, the most heavily Japanese populated area of Peru, could only be of Peruvian or European origin.⁹⁰ Starved for adequate labor and settlement possibilities, the Japanese in both the U.S and Peru began using their mobility to challenge the measures imposed upon them. The Japanese in the United States used a loophole in the 1907 'Gentlemen's Agreement' to legally 'call' for Japanese women migrants to the States, helping to balance their population, establish family communities, multiplying their population despite restricted labor immigration.⁹¹ In Peru, the land laws forced the Japanese to move toward urban areas of Peru, primarily the

⁸⁹ Roger Daniels, *Asian America: Chinese and Japanese in the United States since 1850* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988), 125.

⁹⁰ Takenaka, 83.

⁹¹ Roger Daniels, *Asian America*, 126.

Lima/Callao region, and expand their labor skill into new successes such as retail and business. Japanese responses to State restrictions in both countries showed the resilience and adaptability of the Japanese abroad, but also brought even greater visibility to their settlement. Moving into the 1920's and 1930's, both Peru and the United States reacted by imposing even stricter regulations on Japanese status, designating them undoubtedly as undesirable subjects, and suppressing their rights through any means possible.

Nationalism swept across Peru in subsequent decades prior to World War II, and the Peruvian State began implementing these rigid legal measures upon the Japanese in response to anti-Japanese sentiment in Peruvian intellectual circles and the working class. The measures put in place would significantly influence and facilitate the ability of the United States and Peru to later deport and incarcerate the Japanese from Peru under the veiled concept of 'hemispheric security' when war broke out in the 1940's. From 1899 to the 1920's anti-Japanese action in Peru derived inspiration and influence from the United States, and this trend accelerated further in the interwar period. The concept of anti-Japanese discourse and policy became a staple program of Pan-American security agenda declaring the Japanese *personae non-gratae* in the Americas. The rights of the Japanese in Peru were now firmly vulnerable to the discretion of the Peruvian State working fluidly within American anti-Japanese ideology. A Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese discourse and rightlessness was founded in the early 20th century, and transformed into practical measures during the interwar period.

Chapter II: Undesirables: Aligning anti-Japanese Exclusion and Rights Restriction between the U.S and Peru

The Japanese in Peruvian Politics

In 1919 Augusto Leguía ascended to the Presidency and held the position from 1919-1930, a transformative decade for the Japanese in Peru. Leguía came to power after a violent coup d'état, installing a conservative regime marked as a dictatorship by most Peruvian historians.⁹² Two legacies of his reign had profound influence on the Japanese from Peru: his rampant pro-American ideology, and the robust xenophobia that his actions produced among the Peruvian populace. His eleven-year dictatorship, known as the *Oncenio*, at times benefited the Japanese situation, but ultimately created a foundation for nationalist ideology to plague Peruvian politics in the subsequent administrations. Although publicly a Japanese sympathizer, Leguía's presidency played a crucial role in relegating the Japanese to the firm status of 'menace,' both by the State and the Peruvian people.

Recalling him from chapter one, President Leguía was the primary Peruvian business figure conducting the first negotiations for Japanese migrant workers to arrive in Peru. In the late 1890's as manager of a prominent sugar company, Leguía led

⁹² Roger Atwood, "Democratic Dictators: Authoritarian Politics in Peru from Leguía to Fujimori," *SAIS Review* 21, no. 2 (2001): 156; John T Johnson, "Foreign Factors in Dictatorship in Latin America," *Pacific Historical Review* 20, no. 2 (1951): 127; Metcalfe, Arthur V, *The Dictatorship of President Leguía of Peru* (Unpublished Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1934): 15

negotiations with the Morioko Emigration Company to secure Peru's first Japanese laborers. Leguía never shed his pro-Japanese inclinations when he assumed the presidency at the onset of the 1920's. His detractors consistently used his historical association with Japanese immigration to their advantage in attempts to usurp his influence and turn public opinion against him. The Japanese in Peru referred to him warmly as 'Regia san,' and a further 9,000 Japanese newcomers arrived in Peru during his eleven-year reign.⁹³ Statistics show between 1918 and 1930, the Japanese population grew from 9,890 to 20,385 persons, by 1925 becoming the largest minority in Peru.⁹⁴ Leguía's legacy firmly stabilized the Pan-American nature of anti-Japanese exclusion and restriction in Peru. Before looking at administrative policy, it is important to understand where anti-Japanese sentiment in Peru was strongest.

Racial Nativism in Peru-Where did Japanese attacks come from?

Sometimes referred to as a golden age of Japanese experience in Peru, the Leguía period coincided with reinforced notions of racial identity and nativism in Peru, which further proliferated the idea of the Japanese as undesirable subjects. Anti-Japanese sentiment extended across the Peruvian landscape, but can be specifically narrowed to two factions of Peru: the upper-class intellectual right which dominated the Peruvian State, and urban working-class European-ethnic native Peruvians. These two factions organized their racialization of the Japanese differently. The intellectuals levied a scientific political discourse against the Japanese concentrated on eugenic concepts of morality and nation building, while working-class Peru was predominantly upset with

⁹³ Toake Endoh, *Exporting Japan: Politics of Emigration to Latin America* (Illinois, University of Illinois Press, 2010), 23.

⁹⁴ Takenaka, 90.

the perception that the Japanese drained the Peruvian economy. Nonetheless, I argue the economic competition between the native working-class and the urban Japanese did not create anti-Japanese sentiment, but was a product of already structured racist ideology where the Japanese threatened Peru's hierarchy.

Right-wing politics in Peru was dominated by a generation of intellectuals who identified race within the scope of scientific politics. Race became a crucial component of nation building and the concept of Idealism rampant among Peruvian intellectual circles. Idealismo sought to construct the best version of leadership and authority in Peru for nation building, attributing an importance to education and an enhancement the morality of the Peruvian body. Intellectuals in Peru intertwined scientific construction of race while also accepting racial hierarchy as partly established by intellectual and moral difference.⁹⁵ Separating undesirable from model Peruvian came to be termed as constructing "gente decente."⁹⁶ Intellectual Vega Centeno described these perfect persons as, "those that have reached a greater physical as well as psychic development, those who have completed their total evolution, thus possessing the culture required to promote social happiness."⁹⁷ More discussion of intellectual anti-Japanese sentiment comes later in this chapter, with more concentrated attention on the connection between eugenics, 'yellow peril' reproduction, and militarism.

The working-class in Peru eschewed the Japanese primarily because they were viewed as working in the informal sector, mostly retail vendors, and not the industrial or artisan jobs in Lima. Framed as vicious capitalists replacing Peruvian workers with

⁹⁵ Marisol de la Cadena, 19.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 47.

⁹⁷ Vega Centeno, "La personalidad juridical," (Unpublished Manuscript: Archivo Departmental del Cusco, Book 17, 1925): 9-12.

Japanese, in reality the Japanese operated their businesses with the similar proportions of native Peruvian workers as Peruvian businesses employed foreigners. Significant to the discussion of Japanese women and the fear they brought to the Peruvian population, Peru's labor unions were alarmed that Japanese employed women in their workforce, considered an emphatic insult to the Peruvian working-class male population being replaced by a foreigner, and a female.⁹⁸

The organized working class in Peru used the exclusionary sentiment directed at the Japanese as a method to earn nationalist credentials from the ruling Unión Revolucionaria fascist party under president Luis Sánchez Cerro's leadership.⁹⁹ With a Peruvian economy dominated by alliances with foreign capital, they intersected their nationalist economic policy with nationalist xenophobic sentiment. After decades of marginalization by the Peruvian oligarchy, the working class movement used xenophobia to assert their claim on Peru as their country. Accusing the Asian population of blame for unemployment and being a "bought" workforce became commonplace, as one newspaper derided them as "the murderers of our people, the thieves of our bread."¹⁰⁰

In response to Japanese success in economic circles, various Peruvian labor unions attacked the Japanese financially, but also were conditioned by racist ideologies motivating the intellectual sector of Peruvian society. They cast down many reformed labels and derogatory sentiments previously attributed to the Chinese unto the Japanese. The labor union Estrella del Peru exemplified how their economic

⁹⁸ Moore, 138.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ *La Prensa*, 10 May 1909, 1.

grievances against the Japanese were underlined by racist and eugenic ideology rampant at the time. Positing the Japanese bakeries against Italian bakeries, whom were the true monopolizers of the bakery industry, Estrella del Peru accused the Japanese of exploitation while defending the Italian bakeries for treating the Peruvian public with greater respect.¹⁰¹ Estrella del Peru accused the Japanese of “monopolizing all the work” and were an “all-absorbing and despotic race,” despite the fact that the Peruvians owned 19 bakeries in Lima while foreigners owned 11.¹⁰² They ignored the fact that other races owned the 11 bakeries also, primarily the Italians, focusing their assault specifically on the Japanese.

Even the middle-class contributed to anti-Japanese action and policy, as demonstrated by the activity of Ernesto Clermont, a small business owner of a car dealership. He produced and widely dispersed the first published copies of the infamous *Anti-Asia* newspaper, believing the newspaper’s purpose was to protect “the racial rights and integrity of the Peruvian nation.”¹⁰³ Clermont feared how the Japanese ascended social hierarchies in Peru to come to occupy the same status on the social ladder as other middle-class Peruvians like himself.¹⁰⁴ He even instigated boycotts of Asian stores, and chastised working-class Peruvians who did not adhere to such a policy as committing criminal treason.¹⁰⁵

Whether in economic working class or intellectual circles, or even the middle-class of Peru, factions of Peru separated widely on social and class hierarchy,

¹⁰¹ Moore, 163.

¹⁰² Expediente Pampa Lara, 10 February 1921, Legajo 1, Ministerio de Fomento, Expedientes Laborales, Case #13, AGN. As cited in Moore, 163.

¹⁰³ *Anti-Asia*, December 1, 1930, 19.

¹⁰⁴ Moore, 221.

¹⁰⁵ *Anti-Asia* December 1, 1930, 8, 13.

Peruvians united against the Japanese through discourse on their threat to racial destiny. A threat to Peru's racial hierarchy and Peruvianization of their population hoping to identify as a dominant European-ethnic white nation, all Japanese discrimination was underlined by such racialization.

American Policy informs Leguía

On the surface the 1920's period in Peru offered some general protection for Japanese status in Peru. Even while eugenic and racial discourse permeated intellectual circles, the dominant makeup of the Peruvian State during this period, President Leguía still fostered some policy in favor of the Japanese. In 1921, Leguía instituted the first resident minister in Peru from Tokyo, Seisaburo Shimzu, in theory assisting communication between Japan and their nationals in Peru.¹⁰⁶ After the termination of immigrant work-contract system in 1923, Leguía pursued a renegotiated treaty between Japan and Peru, containing two articles relevant to the Japanese. The first outlined that peace and amity between Japan and Peru extended beyond the nation-states to the subjects and citizens residing in both countries, something never formally declared in any Peruvian law.¹⁰⁷ The other article declared that all pursuits in every sector of the Peruvian workforce were required to equate Japanese with any other subjects or citizens from European or North American nations.¹⁰⁸ These simplistic declarations provided hope, but no practical usage to the Japanese, as the treaty was not ratified until 1930, the year that Leguía lost power, and the Japanese lost their biggest political proponent.

¹⁰⁶ Alberto Ulloa, *Perú y Japón* (Lima, Perú: Impr. Torres Aguirre, 1943), 16.

¹⁰⁷ Gardiner, *The Japanese in Peru*, 46.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

Leguía's admiration for the Japanese became increasingly hollow as his strong relationship with the United States developed into the defining element preceding his downfall. In many ways, his preference for U.S relations over his position as 'regia san' to the Japanese community stabilized the Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese action and rightlessness. Obsessive over the United States' aggressive capitalist model and ascending military, Leguía sought to Americanize Peru, embracing American business interests, which he viewed as mutually beneficial to both nations.¹⁰⁹ He was committed to allying Peru with America's exploding 1920's economy, generating astronomical foreign debt and placing Peru's economy at the mercy of United States' interests.

The most weighing contradiction of the Leguía era was how his pro-American alliance forced him into a complicated position concerning his pro-Japanese identity. After the 1924 Immigration Act in the United States, Leguía found it increasingly difficult to support the Japanese in Peru, wavering in many assertions he delivered to his Japanese supporters and business partners. Immediately following the passage of the Immigration Act he lamented to the U.S State department that the Japanese were unwelcome and unpopular, but internally reassured his restless Japanese resident minister and other Japanese business connections that the act did not influence Peru.¹¹⁰ For the rest of his dictatorship he consistently leaned toward his new American ally, slowly breaking down diplomacy with Japan and tempering his support of the Japanese community in Peru. His ousting in 1930 by the military was unopposed, as

¹⁰⁹ Lawrence A. Clayton, *Peru and the United States: The Condor and the Eagle*, (Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1999), 105-106.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 48-49.

the Peruvian public was hopeful for a return to Peruvian interests over foreign exploitation, but the established ties to the United States proved impossible to break.

His role in beginning Japanese emigration and his perceived identity as '*regia san*' was overshadowed by the legacy he left behind after his 1930 ousting. The Japanese were now in their most vulnerable position since their 1899 arrival, undesired by the dominant caste groups in Peru and at the mercy of an oppressive nationalist State. Leguía began the trend of Pan-Americanism specific to Peru, commencing the era of an authoritative American presence over Peruvian Japanese policies, primarily immigration and citizenship status regulations. An alleged fighter for working-class and middle-class Peru, his deference to American capital interests and perceived pro-Japanese inclinations angered his support base. As stated, the working-class in Peru viewed the Japanese as perpetrators of Peruvian failure to nationalize the working-class economy.

Leguía's successors and opponents latched onto his pro-Japanese platform to advance their nationalist interests as they sought to consolidate power in another military coup d'état in 1930. The attempts at reforming the treaty with the Japan, initially constructed to offer the first legislative protections for the Japanese residents in Peru, failed, relegating Japanese 'status' malleable for the oppressive administrations to follow. The benevolent ruler had ushered in a new era for the Japanese in Peru, as one Washington official working in Lima noted in State records in 1924, "The question of further Asiatic immigration to...Peru will depend largely on the action taken by the Government of the United States."¹¹¹ This assertion extended not just to immigration,

¹¹¹ Pabst to Hughes, Lima, June 2, 1924, 823.00/456, PIA (M-746), roll 4.

but also to restricting the status of the Peruvian-born Japanese with Peruvian citizenship, the Nisei generation which caused the most anxiety for the Peruvian State.

Restricting mobility, therefore, returned as the dominant marker of Japanese-Peruvian relations. During the 1930's period Japanese mobility within Peru was defined by containment policies hoping to curtail Japanese ascension in business and naturalization of citizenship, as Japan's increasing imperial and militaristic presence threatened all Japanese nationals abroad. Intertwining the Japanese in Peru with the aggression of their home nation became an influential intersection proliferated in propaganda issued by both the United States and Peru, justifying the need for restricting Japanese status and unimpeded surveillance. Even as Japan started to take interest in their people abroad, legal measures halted the issuing of Japanese passports in attempts to end immigration and restrict Japanese rights to status and citizenship. This reconfiguring of Japanese identity through a legal approach to fit the illusionary climate of 'hemispheric security' was a direct response by the Peruvian State to policies imposed by the United States in the 1920's. as Peru's Pan-American containment policy against the Japanese modeled U.S measures.

Modeling American Exclusion- Transferring U.S Measures into the Peruvian System

Just before his removal from political power, President Leguía decreed in 1930, "Confraternity among the American nations must be estimated as permanent basis of their development and greatness."¹¹² Even earlier, before the Immigration Act of 1924, sectors of the Peruvian Congress exhibited the desire to end Japanese immigration. In

¹¹² *The Japan Advertiser* Article, 1930, Document Not Numbered Collection 5-18, ACMRE

the early 1920's a Peruvian anti-Asian immigration bill was proposed, but met with tentative support and failed to pass. Minister Shichita Tatsuke, a double-duty diplomat primarily serving Chile but also a figure in Peru, staunchly addressed the Peruvian Foreign Office, repudiating many of the accusations directed at the Japanese, one of few administrators to disprove the concept of Japanese 'degeneration'.¹¹³ While the proposal failed to pass, this early crusade against the Japanese showed how Peru desired to restrict Japanese immigration even before the passing of the American Immigration Act in 1924. Peruvian State records show that the foreign office was hesitant in it's response to the letter, acknowledging receipt but failing to concur or adopt official opinion toward the bill, illuminating the anti-Japanese discourse existing in the foreign office, the most significant branch of the State pertaining to Japanese status in Peru.¹¹⁴

The inspiration from the United States on Peru's growing anti-Japanese climate, already rampant among the public and growing in government, almost led to an abrupt analogous bill to the 1924 U.S Act as U.S-Japanese relations completely deteriorated. The Peruvian and American consuls in Japan exchanged copies of the American legislation restricting Japanese immigration to the United States on instructions from Lima.¹¹⁵ Peru was curious as to the response of the U.S in the event that Peru banned

¹¹³ Minister Shichita Tatsuke to Foreign Minister César A. Elguera, Santiago, October 22, 1918, Gaimusho mf, roll 735

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Gardiner, *The Japanese in Peru*, 46.

Japanese immigration as well, hoping to gauge U.S willingness to ally should Japan threaten Peru, citing the Monroe Doctrine as a justification for U.S interest.¹¹⁶

The *regia san*, Leguía, behind closed doors, exemplified his leaning to U.S interests against his public pro-Japanese stance. State records show Leguía first responded the passage of the 1924 Act by asking the United States to revise the new exclusion law. When they refused, it was here Leguía stated the Japanese “unpopular and unwelcome” despite his statements to Japan’s legation over the course of his presidency, and his influential role in founding Japanese immigration.¹¹⁷ Leguía then lamented the fact that Peru could not develop an exclusion law against the Japanese, citing that excluding them without U.S support could mean war. He further pledged his allegiance to the U.S model, hinting that a pledge from the United States could lead to joint action by the Latin governments against the Japanese, even dropping suspicion that his resident Japanese minister Shimizu visited Chile to explore Japanese naval base expansion.¹¹⁸ That suspicion was unfounded, and cast doubt on Leguía’s assertions, and while the U.S did not pledge full support, it did deliver the infamous declaration already noted, “The question of further Asiatic immigration to...Peru will depend largely on the action taken by the Government of the United States.”¹¹⁹

Following the pattern of discrimination in the settlement and labor-contract era from 1899-1923, practical anti-Japanese policy in Peru in the late 1920’s and 1930’s

¹¹⁶ Consul E.A Dicover to Secretary of State, Kobe, February 26, 1924, 823.5594/3; Wilbur J. Garr to Dickover, Washington, April 12, 1924, 823.4494/3; Charles E. Hughes to Miles Poindexter, Washington, April 11, 1924, 823.5594/3, PIA (M-746), roll 23.

¹¹⁷ Gardiner, *The Japanese in Peru*, 47.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ Pabst to Hughes, Lima, June 2, 1924, 823.00/456, PIA (M-746), roll 4.

began with economic targeting of Japanese influence. In 1928, Peruvians failed to enforce an Article of the Cabotage Law which permitted Japanese cargo boats to operate under equal export rights and fees as Peruvian import ships.¹²⁰ When it came to Japanese-produced and imported medicine, a necessity for the Peruvian population as a whole, the Peruvian government placed higher taxes on the Japanese import than those sanctioned on European imports.¹²¹ At the time Japan-Peru diplomatic relations were starting to deteriorate as Peru's administration increasingly leaned toward the United States as a more stable ally. However, social animosity between the Japanese migrants in Peru and the native Peruvians was also heightened during this period, as the worldwide depression devastated the Peruvian working class. The Japanese remained relatively unscathed, which fostered strong animosity toward the Japanese because of their economic insularity. The Peruvian government responded with economic action against the nation of Japan as a retaliatory response for the mounting hostilities perceived to be instigated by the Japanese at the ground level of Peru. Economic legislation quickly was replaced with widespread racialized containment policies to resist Japanese influence in Peru.

Connecting United States Model to Peru-Pan America

The Peruvian administration's national processes did not grow in isolation, and were always influenced by the mounting presence of American ideology in their own racial affairs. During the interwar period, American relations across both nation-states became obsessive over the concept of Pan-American or hemispheric unity. Beginning

¹²⁰ Keiichi Yamasaki, Letter to Dr. D. Pedro José Rada y Gamio, October 22, 1928, Número de Oficio 19, Collection 6-18, ACMRE

¹²¹ Saburo Kurusu, Letter to Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, October 31, 1930, Document Not Numbered, Collection 6-18, ACMRE

by forging relationships based on economic commonalities in trade, soon Pan-American ideology was defined by a united perspective of security against threats posed by un-American others. Looking at some of the Pan-American conferences, and general correspondence between the United States and Peru, evidenced how the measures implemented in America against the Japanese began to trickle into Peruvian consciousness, and eventually, Peruvian legislation restricting the rights of the threatening, growing Japanese population.

The concept of an Inter-American conference to discuss and stimulate cooperation and collective interests between nations of the two American continents dated back to the era of revolution in South America. Simón Bolívar, in particular, voiced his approval of creating a regional system of cooperation in the Americas to protect against any future European imperialism. This is important solely because it shows how the concept of PanAmericanism from its initial creation until the World War II period was predominantly based in protecting against threats. While a few conferences occurred, the late 19th century and early 20th primarily pitted the United States and its Latin counterparts against each other, in constant tension over territory, as the United States acted imperially in coordination with the tenets of the Monroe Doctrine. This led to widespread mistrust of the American menace, and tempered any progression towards unified inter-American ideology for most of the century until after the First World War.

In the interwar period the Pan-American conferences served as a medium for the United States to impose their ideology on national and hemispheric security, and foreigners, upon the American Republics. By establishing the 'good neighbor' policy in

the early conferences, when wartime approached in the late 1930's, the U.S created the platform to align security interests, which helped facilitate the conjoined effort between Peru and the United States to eradicate Japanese influence from their respective territories.

Between 1920 and 1945 five official conferences between the American Republics took place, along with three special conventions responding to wartime. The first conference in 1923 (Chile) recognized a Pan-American treaty, codified in the League of Nations Treaty Series, which obliged all the American States to refrain from conflict with one another.¹²² In 1933 at Uruguay, Secretary of State and head of the American delegation Cordell Hull announced the new era of good neighbor policy. He stated the 1930's to be, "...The beginning of a great new era of great renaissance in American cooperative effort to promote our entire material, moral, and spiritual affairs and to erect an edifice of peace that will endure forever."¹²³ Roosevelt's 'good neighbor policy' went into full effect, interlocking Latin American policy to the United States for the foreseeable future, and eventual wartime period. This early proclamation by Cordell Hull remains vague, but anti-Japanese sentiment and action certainly qualified as part of the promotion of a united Pan-American moral concept and the idea to secure peace from Japanese threat.

In 1936, the United States orchestrated an emergency conference with growing tensions escalating across the globe. Until this conference, security interests at the conferences predominantly centered on inter-American relations and conflict. The

¹²² *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 33, 26-45.

¹²³ Seventh International Conference of American States, *Minutes of the First, Second and Eighth Committees* (Montevideo, 1933), 1-25.

emergency conference in Buenos Aires became the first time in the Pan-American conference era where the delegates from Latin America were called upon to consider security against non-American States.

In the preamble of a United States treaty proposed by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the U.S outlined interdependence between the continents in the event of emergencies that affect their common interests. When the common interest later involved the repudiation and deprivation of Japanese and their rights, deemed security threats in their respective continents, the United States reverted to the hemispheric security platform that began formally at this emergency Pan-American conference. The Consultation Pact, the signature legislation adopted at the Buenos Aires Peace Conference, included one set of contingencies that stated, “In the event that the peace of the Americas is menaced from *any* source,” using a term, menace, infamously and widely associated with the Japanese during the period.¹²⁴ As John Mecham, historian of inter-American relations, asserted, while a spokesman for the U.S delegation claimed this statement only covered threats of catastrophic war, it was certainly phrased in terms to provide consultation for *any* substantial threat to hemispheric security.¹²⁵ The Lima conference in 1938 offered few changes to instituted measures, but did widen the scope of the Consultation from Buenos Aires, adding, “the security and territorial integrity of any American Republic.”¹²⁶ Broadening the scope allowed future manipulation of the Pan-American concepts to enable action against threats from foreigners in Latin American lands.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 129.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 127.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 143.

While the principal declarations of the conferences addressed unilateral response to war aggression, a few ‘minor’ resolutions adopted in Lima in 1938 more poignantly concerned the Japanese in Latin America. The Lima Declaration included a tenet calling for common action against subversive activities.¹²⁷ Brazil, along with Peru home to the highest percentage of Japanese and other axis nationals, brought forth a resolution on ‘foreign minorities,’ declaring, “Residents who, according to domestic law are considered aliens, cannot claim collectively, the condition of minorities.”¹²⁸ Another resolution adopted, titled “Political Activities of Foreigners,” endorsed the governments of the American Republics to prohibit aliens from exercising political rights conferred by the laws of their respective countries.¹²⁹ Overshadowed by the fears of crisis in Europe and the Pacific, the Pan American conferences maintained an awareness of the potential threat posed by immigrants from the fascist nations residing within their own boundaries. This also demonstrated that future Peruvian and American restrictions imposed on their Japanese populations did not operate in a vacuum, but were part of the Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese security policy and deprivation of rights.

Pan-America provided the foundation aligning security ideology, but the American legal model appropriated and modeled in Peru most clearly paved the way toward facilitating Japanese deportation and incarceration. The next section discusses the ramifications of the Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese ideology on the Japanese in Peru. American exclusionary policies in the 1920’s led to a parallel system of restrictions levied against the Japanese in Peru in the 1930’s, as the country went

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Eighth International Conference of American States, *Final Act* (Lima, 1938), No. XXVII, 46-47.

¹²⁹ Ibid., No. XXVIII, 47.

through a phase of sweeping nationalism after 1930. Without the precedents from the United States eagerly followed by Peruvian administration as they imagined a nation without their Japanese demographic, the expulsion and incarceration of the Japanese in the Americas might not have extended to Peru, and remained confined to the boundary of the United States.

The 1930's-Peru's Anti-Japanese Escalation

When Luis Sánchez Cerro toppled Leguía and came to power, the revolutionary upheaval led to permissible incidents of violence and pillage against the Japanese in Lima. Acts of violence and property damage occurred, with Japanese shops specifically targeted and looted. The Japanese minister at the time, Saburo Kurusu, appointed by Leguía, asked for the approval of Japanese armed vigilance groups to help protect the Japanese communities.¹³⁰ While they succeeded in ending upheaval in the revolution aftermath, they helped foster a growing fear already proliferating throughout Peru: that the Japanese in Peru and militarism were deeply intertwined. Already a subject of journalistic attack, media transitioned to align firmly with the Peruvian State and public in their anti-Japanese stance. This served as a precursor to fomenting anti-Japanese legislation, intimately connecting anti-Japanese sentiment from the people to State policy through the newspaper medium. In addition, the Great Depression facilitated further anti-Japanese sentiment, as the native Peruvians branded the Japanese as both instigators of Peru's economic problems, and also mysteriously coping well with it.

¹³⁰ Gardiner, *The Japanese In Peru*, 49.

State department correspondence actually indicated that Peru's economy was one of the least affected by the Great Depression.¹³¹ Peruvians unfairly displaced their malcontent onto the Japanese, who they perceived as coping well with the depression effects due to Japanese government assistance.¹³² In reality, Japan always maintained a laissez-faire approach to the Japanese in Peru, and the devastating effects of the depression meant Japan was in no position to divert resources to the Japanese in Latin America. Overreacting to Peruvian accusations, the Peruvian government restricted ownership and operation of businesses by foreigners in Peru in 1932 and 1933. John K. Emmerson, American diplomat and later leading figure in the deportation process, described this as the beginning of the infamous 80% law that ravaged the Japanese communities organically built economy of small local retail business.¹³³ The law declared that 80% of all Peruvian businesses be owned by native Peruvians. When confronted with Japanese presence intensifying in the nation-state economy, like land tax reforms aimed at the Japanese in the U.S, Peru attacked Japanese economic stability. Blaming the Japanese for economic problems, while simultaneously stipulating policy to restrict their economic growth, were defining pillars of the Pan-American anti-Japanese regime.

The same year the Immigration Act of 1924 passed in the United States, the Japanese-Peruvian treaty in 1924 was negotiated. Already mentioned, this treaty professed for "perpetual peace and amity between their respective subjects in

¹³¹ Francis M. Sullivan, American Legion officer, to Secretary Cordell Hull, 20 October 1942, 740.00115 EW 1939/7518, RG 59, National Archives.

¹³² Connell, 22.

¹³³ Emmerson, 127.

citizens.”¹³⁴ However, the treaty was not ratified and officially enacted until 1930, when the impending regime change signified the start of a darker period for the Japanese in Peru. Annulled in 1934, the treaty operated for just under four years. In justifying the condemnation of the treaty, Peruvian foreign officials cited Japanese espionage in high proportions of their involvement in Peru’s economy, rigidity in Japanese orders from their mysterious and secluded community organizations, secret mobilizations of people, and channeling funds illegally from Peru to Japan.¹³⁵ Just a few years earlier, at the beginning of President Oscar Benavides reign, the Peruvian constitution was modified concerning naturalization by adding the phrase “that they renounce their nationality.”¹³⁶ Long concerned with the concept of dual citizenship, as Japanese militarism spread globally, the Peruvian State aspired for stronger loyalty to Peru.

Peru viewed State policy as far too lenient on Japanese naturalization and dual citizenship process. Even without proper evidence, just requesting naturalization itself was met with immediate suspicion, and the laws considered too vague. One congressman stated,

The idea of awarding nationality to a foreigner, so that person exercises the same rights that the Peruvians do, especially those who are from a race that does not tend to better our hygiene or our population, I think is a little dangerous...Peru needs to invigorate its race, transform it and have a perfectly healthy people, something that is not going to happen with other races which are congenitally degenerated.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ Gardiner, *The Japanese in Peru*, 46.

¹³⁵ *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores 1934-1936*, 99-102, in Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. *Boletín del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, Lima, Peru.

¹³⁶ Gardiner, *The Japanese in Peru*, 49.

¹³⁷ *Diario De Los Debates Del Congreso Constituyente De 1931, 1931-1936*, vol. 1 (Lima: 1931), 381-382. Full Text from Spanish: *Yo creo que es demasiado estrecha la palabra extranjeros. En el Perú, ya sabemos, que hay una fuerte corriente con respecto a la inmigración; y al respecto, parece que hay la tendencia a limitarla respecto de*

He further feared that allowing naturalization after just two years of residence, as permitted in the Peruvian Constitution, was far too short a span to establish firm allegiances.¹³⁸

The Japanese faced scrutiny for their interest in naturalization, while other races found their motives never questioned. Chuhei Kato Kawai's naturalization story supported this notion. He applied for naturalization after more than twenty years of living in Peru, owning a drugstore, and with children born in Peru. In his application he added the necessary note that he was also naturalizing because of the affection he maintained for Peru.¹³⁹ The chief of the Social Affairs Brigade charged with investigating applications in his region refused to offer Kato a good conduct report, stating he was not naturalizing out of love for Peru, but simply out of fear for anti-foreigner laws. This occurred despite the fact this particular chief wielded little absolute power, representing how almost any official in authority could deter naturalizations largely at his discretion.¹⁴⁰ This evidenced the extreme obstacles faced by the

ciertas razas. Vemos también que en el Perú las razas asiáticas, tienen la tendencia de abordar a este país con gran intensidad. Por consiguiente, yo creo, que debe especificarse este artículo a los extranjeros que reúnan las condiciones necesarias para vigorizar al país. Posiblemente, mi idea es un poco vaga, porque yo soy muy respetuoso al derecho que asiste a todos los extranjeros, pero eso de dar la nacionalidad a un extranjero, para que venga a ejercer los mismos derechos que los nacionales especialmente a los de una raza que no tiende a mejorar nuestro estado higiénico ni a mejorar nuestra población, yo creo que es un poco peligroso...presento este punto de vista, que lo tomo en homenaje a que el Perú tiene necesidad de vigorizar su raza, transformarla y tener un pueblo perfectamente sano, cosa que no sucede con otras razas congénitamente degeneradas

¹³⁸ Moore, 261.

¹³⁹ Memorandum on Naturalization Application of Chuhei Kato Kawai, 5 April, 1938, Ministerio del Interior, Prefectura de Lima, Particulares, 3.9.5.1.15.1.11.16, AGN.

¹⁴⁰ Moore, 261.

Japanese seeking naturalization in the few times it was legally permitted during the 1930's.

Influence of Brazil

Pan-American influences on Peru also came from neighboring countries in Latin America. Aside from the United States, the legislation that most affected Peru was from Brazil, the other Latin country with a high population of Japanese. The Brazilian Constitution, enacted on July 16, 1934, stipulated that the number of immigrants entering from a given country would be restricted to a yearly maximum of 2% the total number that such country sent to Brazil from the last fifty years.¹⁴¹ The parameters set by the Brazilian Constitution echoed those found in the U.S 1924 Act. Since the United States established immigration quotas all but abolishing Japanese immigration, most of these Japanese pivoted their interest to Brazil and Peru as prospective destinations. In the year following the 1924 Act, Brazil saw a 137% increase in Japanese immigration.¹⁴² The Immigration Act of 1924 undoubtedly pushed more Japanese to Latin America, creating heightened anti-Japanese paranoia in both countries. Peru especially feared the quota set by Brazil, knowing that with the United States and Brazil imposing bans, Peru became the premier target for Japanese migrants, dreading a substantial increase in their immigration flow.

Peruvian Immigration Law and Final Status Restrictions before War

All these matters culminated in the Peruvian Immigration Law of 1936, the most severe of all anti-Japanese measures to date. The decree posed many significant issues, many of them mirror policies of the immigration laws compromising the

¹⁴¹ Gardiner, *The Japanese in Peru*, 37.

¹⁴² Ibid.

Japanese populations in the United States and Brazil. Annual immigration could not exceed sixteen thousand or about two-tenths of one percent of population or two per 1,000, and foreign residents who returned to Japan and then hoped to reenter Peru were now included in the quotas.¹⁴³ When they returned they had to record their departure for Japan on their passports, which became a hallmark of presumed militancy and Japanese education and a red flag in naturalization processes.¹⁴⁴ Surveillance on the movement of the Japanese via their passports served as feasible justifications to deny or remove citizenship. Only Japanese who reported they were already married at the time of passport examination could send for their wives from Japan, predicated with proof they could financially support them, before Peru permitted their entry under the restrictive quota. The infamous 80% law, when first imposed only affected small businesses, but now expanded to include all enterprises in any profession run by foreigners. Regulations were imposed on selling or transferring business operations to another foreigner, a direct response to Issei Japanese hoping to transfer their business ventures to Peruvian-born Nisei Japanese. The law went into effect in June of 1936, leading to many Japanese in Peru to hastily attempt to quickly process naturalization, at the time legal. Upset with this loophole, the Peruvian State authorized a new decree in July of 1936 suspending authorization of naturalizations.¹⁴⁵ Further follow up legislation extended the reentry provision to include the Japanese who were born in Peru,

¹⁴³ Full Text of Decree originally in *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores 1936*, 142-146. Gardiner also cites in *The Japanese in Peru*, 38.

¹⁴⁴ Connell, 23.

¹⁴⁵ Lisa Miyake, "Forsaken and Forgotten: The U.S. Internment of Japanese Peruvians during World War II," *Asian Law Journal* 9, (2002): 167.

removing the stability offered by birthright citizenship, as the growing Nisei population posed a significant threat to Peru's racial hegemony.¹⁴⁶

The *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* concepts, meaning citizenship through place of birth and through descent from parents respectively, greatly disturbed the ruling nationalist and intellectual leaders in the Peruvian State. As evidenced by later discussion of eugenic influences on Peru's concept of racial destiny, nothing worried the Peruvian State and public more than an unregulated Nisei population. From their perspective, double nationality or dual citizenship merely acted as a smokescreen for hidden allegiance to Japan, even if no concrete evidence ever existed to justify such beliefs. Fed up with the growing population, Peru decreed further legislation stating, "persons born in Peru of foreign parents...who during their minority, leave Peru for their parent's homeland...automatically lose their Peruvian citizenship, and, must be considered as alien immigrants."¹⁴⁷ A few months later the Peruvian State accentuated their attack on dual citizenship and birthright, passing a law that stated, "the sons of foreigners, even if born in Peru, are during their minority to be considered as being the same nationality as their fathers."¹⁴⁸

From the fall of the Leguía presidency and the nationalism phase until the brink of the Pearl Harbor attack on the United States, Peru elected to measure its legislative response to a growing Japanese population correspondent to the United States model. The Pan-American model of exclusion culminated in wide-scale immigration restriction,

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ J.F. Normano and Gerbi Antonello. *The Japanese in South America: An Introductory Survey with Special Reference to Peru*. (New York: John Day Company, 1943), 76-77.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

while also limiting the Japanese role in the economy and Japanese rights for both Japanese nationals and Nisei citizens born in Peru. While the incarceration period forthcoming from 1941-1945 can feasibly be attributed to wartime paranoia, both countries preoccupation with Japanese exclusionary policy predated the expansion of Japan as a wartime threat. Perceiving the Japanese as an 'other' was a dominant theme of Pan-American model of hemispheric security. While legislative and economic restrictions were enacted separately in Peru and the United States, the forces that motivated them did not exist independently, but as a cohesive program to institute a regime of rightlessness across the Americas. Before facilitating their move to a rightless space, the Peruvian and American regime designated the Japanese as *personae non-gratae*, undesirables in the Western hemisphere. As will be seen, this regime was deemed necessary for security, but it's underlying justification was defined by protecting "racial destiny" from a Japanese race that posed the threat of potential "racial suicide" in Peru.

Pan-American Eugenics Conferences.

As eugenics grew nationally in Peru and the United States, it was also becoming a Pan American affair. Two conferences were held during the interwar period, called the Pan American Conferences of Eugenics and Homiculture, the first held in 1927, and the second in 1934. Even before the Pan American eugenics era, an international forum was held in London in 1912, and New York in 1921. The central debate for the American conferences centered on a unifying proposal between all the Pan-American nations concerning eugenics policy, the Pan American Code of Eugenics. As scholar Leys Stepan correctly claimed, "Eugenics...was more than a set of national programs

embedded in national debates; it was also part of international relations.¹⁴⁹ As Pan Americanism was primarily the idea of the United States, so too was Pan American eugenics.

Stepan noted that American eugenics possessed more extremities in terms of reductive and racial-reproductive positions, deeming U.S eugenics inherently more intransigently racist than the Latins.¹⁵⁰ This demonstrated further evidence of the U.S imposing ideology on the Latin countries, and how it was of great importance for the United States to both stimulate the development of eugenics in Latin America, and to incorporate it into their system of eugenic influence. As the Pan American Conference on eugenics first opened in 1927, it became clear that immigration was the centerpiece for debates, as the 1924 immigration law and its eugenic aspects provoked considerable discussion.¹⁵¹ The coda proposed by the United States was extreme, calling for free migration only for individuals classified as germinally good and somatically responsible, and proposed the right for each nation to establish social measures to conserve racial purity.¹⁵² Dr. Domingo y Ramos, delegate leader from Cuba and the most American aligned Latin counterpart, classified the white race as superior, and called for the Latin Americans to imitate the United States on issue of immigration and race linked to eugenic policies. He even went as far as threatening the Latin Americans if they did not take action, stating the United States would set eugenic

¹⁴⁹ Stepan, 171.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 173.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 177.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 178.

and other quotas for Latin Americans trying to enter the U.S, something previously reassured as unfavorable by the Americans after the 1924 Act passed.¹⁵³

While a revised and compromised coda passed during the two Pan American Eugenic conferences, overall a unified ideology on eugenics was deterred by disagreements over the intricacies of the proposal. However, the forcefulness and imposing figure of the United States on Latin American racial and immigration policies was on full display. For the purpose of this thesis argument, the Pan American conferences served as a bridge between the scientific sphere of United States and Peruvian racial ideology. As extreme nationalism swept Peru during the 1930's and led to imposing restrictive measures on Japanese rights, the designation of the Japanese as unfit for Peru's racial destiny was already infused into Peruvian consciousness in part because of shared eugenic ideology through these conferences. A realistic fear of Japanese hypersexuality, their reproductive capacity, and therefore, the proliferation of a new generation of Japanese children underlined anti-Japanese restrictive measures. Their economic exploits and perceived attentiveness to Japanese growing militarism established fear of the 'yellow peril.' Nevertheless, no Japanese-related fear permeated the consciousness of United States and Peru more than the fear of white racial destiny corrupted by uncontrollable reproduction of Japanese on their soil, with those Japanese undeservedly receiving American and Peruvian citizenship status. This terror of an increased Japanese body greatly influenced their path to rightlessness during the interwar period, partly contributed to the decision to incarcerate them, and can only be understood with the backdrop of Pan-American eugenic ideology.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 181.

The Underlying Discourse Stimulating Anti-Japanese Sentiment- Eugenic Ideology and Sexualization

Establishing racial ideology parallel to United States ideology during the interwar period was integral for a Peru hopeful for a strong western ally, and meant that eugenics played a role in this regime of rightlessness against the Japanese in Peru. Integral to solidifying the racial hierarchy desired by the Peruvian elite was the construction of *indigenismo* counter posed against the Japanese menace. President Leguía's ruling period from 1919-1930 glorified the indigenous population of Peru in official rhetoric, representing them as the foundation of the nation and the hallmark of the mixed-race body that dominated Peruvian society.¹⁵⁴ The rhetoric only carried so far, as scholars noted that this did not translate into providing the indigenous Peruvians equal political and economic rights.¹⁵⁵ Nonetheless, the eugenics movement in Peru did accommodate a space for the indigenous population, praising their cultural heritage while deeming them redeemable if they assimilated to modern Peruvian society.¹⁵⁶ This positivist approach, albeit still marred in white supremacist racism, was never afforded to the Japanese, considered inassimilable and degenerative.

Still, as *indigenismo* became an accepted current for the modern Peruvian race during the 1920's, everyone from intellectuals to the officials in Peruvian State remained inclined to European-ethnic immigration. Prominent intellectual Mario E. del Rio wrote, "It is imperative then, given the indications of a true emergency, that a million white immigrants come as soon as possible to serve as the foundation for crossing with our

¹⁵⁴ Moore, 207.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Stepan, 146-147.

race...”¹⁵⁷ He forcefully argued that Peru’s economic, social, and cultural progress and ascent to modernism depended on such crossing. Stephanie Carol Moore cited how Del Rio’s popular dissertation gained publication support from more than eleven prominent congressmen, including the brother of President Leguía.¹⁵⁸

Just as the Japanese filled the role of the antagonist when the worldwide depression flattened Peru’s working-class, they also quickly filled the gap left by the *indigenismo* movement as the absolute problem related to Peru’s racial order. With such a large percentage of mestizos in Peru during the interwar period, heightening focus on the differences between Japanese and Peruvians became more feasible than attributing blame to the indigenous who, uncomfortably, possessed native Peruvian background. As nationalism swept the nation after Leguía’s fall in 1930, the concept of Peruvian culture and the Peruvian “man” became prominent race debates. Military and Fascist president Óscar R. Benavides (1933-1939) and his Foreign Minister Alberto Ulloa y Sotomayor were known eugenic supporters, who in their infamous 1936 anti-Japanese immigration decree noted favoritism toward the physical, moral, and social perfection of the population.¹⁵⁹ Cited in an article from mainstream Lima newspaper *La Prensa*, a congressmen wrote, “...Our aborigine should not mix with the yellow race because this cross does not better us, either physically or morally...”¹⁶⁰ As frequently common in nationalism across the globe, affirming the perfect race and aligning it with

¹⁵⁷ Mario E. del Rio, *La Inmigración Y Su Desarrollo En El Perú. Prologo Del Doctor Luis Varela Orbegoso Clovis* (Lima: Sanmarti y cia, 1929), 109.

¹⁵⁸ Moore, 208

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 211.

¹⁶⁰ *La Prensa*, October 2, 1937, as cited in Guevara, Víctor. *Las Grandes Cuestiones Nacionales; El Petróleo, Los Ferrocarriles, La Inmigración Japonesa, El Problema Moral* (Cuzco, Perú: Talleres tipográficos de H.G Rozas sucesores, 1939), 154. Translated from Spanish

the national customs and traditions of a culture could only be stable and ingrained in society with the presence of a racial 'other.' To protect and stabilize nationalism and a rightful population, there must always exist a presence of those undeserving of rights.

Always a thorn to Peruvian hegemony, the eugenics era and the veiled *indigenismo* movement combined in the 1930's to stabilize the Japanese firmly at the bottom of racial social hierarchy in Peru. As always, while operating under nation-state rhetoric and movement, this rising crisis of degeneration on the part of the Japanese was influenced by similar movements existing in the United States, and delivered to Latin America through the Pan-American system of racial rightlessness, justified with a eugenic and scientific tone. A crucial factor of the regime of rightlessness gaining political support in Peru throughout the interwar period was how eugenics positioned Japanese women. Disseminating the threat posed by Japanese women and reproduction gained support in Peru and became an integral factor in creating a wider gap between the rights the native Peruvians should possess versus those given by birth to Nisei Peruvian Japanese. The wider this gap extended between the Japanese and the native Peruvians concerning rights, the easier it would be to remove them from society when wartime period arrived and helped facilitate such deportations.

A hypersexualized view of the Japanese women in Peru dated back decades. Males constituted more than 90% of the first Issei settling period in Peru from 1899-1923.¹⁶¹ The Peruvian State's response to this phenomenon was colored in contradiction. The State, press, and Peruvian masses first latched onto the disproportioned rate of sex for the Japanese as another instance of their inability to

¹⁶¹ Irie and Himel, 651-654.

assimilate, or their isolationist nature. This placed the Japanese in a difficult space, for immigration regulations during the period stymied the capacity to bring additional family members smoothly at affordable cost, but the Peruvians despised the image of a Japanese man with a Peruvian woman. Early in this plantation settlement era, plantation supervisors were quick to placate blame on Japanese women, and how their shortage drove the Japanese males into recklessness. They attributed any relations between Japanese men and Peruvian women as 'evils' and started to make concerted efforts with emigration companies to intently focus on bringing more married men.¹⁶² The Japanese Issei men intended their first voyages to Peru to be temporary, but soon discovered their low wages and a corrupted system of deductions to pay for eventual return passage to Japan forced extended stays. They were stuck in an isolation cycle, able to work and earn enough to maintain their life in Peru, but unable to save enough to return to Japan with better fortunes and find wives. When emigration companies and plantation managers wished for more married, stable lives for their Japanese men, the Issei faced limited options. Cultural racism disallowed them from engaging in relations with Peruvians, forcing them to increasingly turn to the "Picture Bride" system moving into the 1920's.

The "Picture Bride" system meant marrying Japanese women while residing in Peru, and the Japanese government ratified 'calling' for them once the marriage was approved. It served as one of the only solutions for the Japanese men due to Peruvian hostile reaction to their isolation; ironic since Peru's corrupt labor system was to blame for the Japanese inability to nurture families in Peru. However, as soon as the "Picture

¹⁶² Ibid., 81.

Bride” system was enacted, the Peruvian State attacked the Japanese for such an ‘unnatural’ marriage practice. One Peruvian writer exclaimed it evidenced Japanese “obscure cultural practices” and “strange Japanese marriage practices.”¹⁶³ He continued, “When there are no marriageable Japanese women available, young Japanese bachelors find their wives through ‘sweet-heart ships’ which bring Japanese girls in groups of 50 to 100 smilingly greet their husbands even without having met them before.”¹⁶⁴ Wrought with ignorance of the Peruvian liability in restricting the Japanese settlers to such a method, this statement also provided insight into the Peruvian objectification of Japanese women, perceived as lacking any human character and simply sexual bodies for the Japanese males. This objectification became integral to affirming Japanese women’s role in spreading the Japanese threat, attacking the Japanese women for their role in degenerating the Peruvian race because of the perceived nature of their sexuality and reproductive capacity.

How the Peruvian State, press, and public viewed Japanese women was parallel to their perspective toward the “Picture Brides.” Census figures show, albeit prone to statistical misrepresentations, that the majority of Japanese female immigrants to Peru between 1923 and 1940 were “Picture Brides.” Knowing this, we can infer that the “Picture Bride” stereotype and negative image was the premier perception of any Japanese woman by the Peruvian public and State. Worth observation, in the United States, the infamous Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907 and 1908, unofficially restricting Japanese labor immigration, left an opening for the Japanese men to ‘call’ for wives in

¹⁶³ Manuel Seoane, “The Japanese are still in Peru,” *Inter-American Economic Affairs* 3, no. 1 (1943): 674-675.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

Japan. Backfiring on the desire of American administration, this greatly balanced the Japanese population in the United States, and changed Japanese structure in the America from labor factions to full-fledged family communities. A similar trajectory occurred in Peru, where when the labor contract era ended in 1923, an influx of women balanced the Japanese Peruvian population. At first distraught over the isolated nature of the Japanese men from 1899-1923, the Peruvian State now shifted perspective, deterred by the growth of the Japanese community and the birth of next generation Japanese within Peruvian boundaries. Peru's State realized the greatest threat to the solidity of their regime against the 'yellow peril': the birth of second-generation Japanese children in Peru. Demonized from their arrival in Peru as characterless wives prone to disease and hypersexual, the Japanese women now proceeded to embody an even greater menace to Peru's desired white hegemony. Through their reproduction capacity they were the living embodiment of potential "racial suicide" in Peru.

In 1927 the Peruvian government put forth legislation requiring all Asian migrants to be processed into the country through the "Sanitary Station of Callao."¹⁶⁵ This racist provision marked the beginning of heightened surveillance policies directed at the Japanese, preoccupied not just with their economic influence, but their physical threat to Peru's concept of "racial degeneration." No other ethnicity besides Asians was forced to adhere to this racial policy. It mirrored racial policies in existence for decades in the United States that exhibited an obsession with the Asiatic body. The Asian body, and particularly the female body, was denoted in the Americas as dirty, unhealthy, weak, and hypersexual. Visual scrutiny of Chinese, and eventually the Japanese, was an

¹⁶⁵ Japanese Ministry, Memorandum to Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Relations, November 8, 1927, Documents 60-63, Collection 5-18, ACMRE.

ingrained approach in the United States through most of the first half of the 20th century.¹⁶⁶ As the United States moved from a system of visual regulation to extreme photographic documentation and surveillance, they ensured that all arriving immigrants were inserted into existing racial hierarchy, which protected European white ethnicity.¹⁶⁷ Almost all immigrant groups besides those from the Asiatic sphere were screened loosely upon arrival, and moved without surveillance on their documentation or identity once they entered the United States.

In Peru, the sanitary station served as an “Ellis Island” type screening station for the Japanese immigrants, but was just a starting point for monitoring their movement, influence, and identity out of fear that their inferior race and bodies would degenerate the existing populations whom deserved protection of their rights. This further exposed race as a core tenet and rationale for the policies against the Japanese moving into the 1930’s, moving beyond how Asians contributed to economic misery toward how they threatened racial destiny.

The early beginnings of Japanese settlement in Peru focused the narrative on men who made up the overwhelming majority of the immigrants. Other facets of the history further relegate gender to the periphery. Peruvian tradition greatly barred women from visual spaces in the general politic of the nation, reinforced by the dominance of male writers and perspectives in the media. Political positions were reserved for men, and women did not gain the right to vote until after World War II. From the Japanese side, the patriarchal structure was similarly rigid, although Japanese women were more privy to public workspaces than Peruvian women. A huge space

¹⁶⁶ Pegler-Gordon, 25.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 228.

exists in this history for an analysis of Japanese women during the 1930's and 1940's, particularly, the plight of family life as Japanese rights were continually restricted building toward the war, and the stories of those left behind in Peru when the incarceration period saw majority males deported and held in the United States. Nonetheless, their role in this thesis, in analyzing the regime of anti-Japanese rightlessness forged between the United States and Peru during the interwar period, is crucial. Something that scholar Stephanie Carol Moore poignantly declared, "Imperialism of the Womb," in her work on race in Peru, Japanese women and offspring became central figures for the Peruvian State affirming a stable racial destiny before moving the Japanese to rightless space.

Japanese Women and Racial Destiny

Between 1923 and 1940 the proportion of women in Japanese communities grew from 12% to 33% according to official Peruvian census.¹⁶⁸ As stated, when the women balanced the Japanese population of Peru, family communities replaced male labor conglomerates as the place for home life for the Japanese. As a result women became more visible in Peru, and heavily scrutinized by first, Peruvian eugenicists, and subsequently the Peruvian State swayed by the scientific approach to race, rights, and citizenship. Nancy Leys Stepan wrote about the history of eugenic policies in Latin America, and asserted that women ascended to the forefront of rights politics in the 1930's because of reproduction, always analyzed by women as their social role, and not a factor in men's social role under patriarchal Peruvian society.¹⁶⁹ Already synonymous

¹⁶⁸ Departamento de Censos, *Censo Nacional De 1940; Resultados Generales* (Lima: 1941).

¹⁶⁹ Stepan, 12.

with promiscuity and sexuality from their identity as predominantly “Picture Brides” devoid of romantic intimacy or character beyond their bodies, Peruvian eugenics viably associated Japanese women with reproductive capacity. The concept of a return to “Peruvianizing” the nation originated as a term of ethnic deterioration concerning the economic depression, which the Peruvians judged the Japanese liable for. More clearly, “Peruvianizing” was also the aim for rebuilding the foundation of the Peru’s next generation with a majority of racially pure children, placing Japanese women and their reproduction under the microscope of the Peruvian State.

Before analyzing the imperialism of the womb, it remains important to comprehend how Peru contradictorily associated women with weakness and sexual lust. Peruvian women were encouraged to embrace any white race immigrants, but the Japanese women and ‘yellow race’ in general was tied to weakness and considered repulsive.¹⁷⁰ Peru feared Japanese men intermingling with Peruvian women and sought to regulate sexual access to them. However, they also symbolized the Japanese women as objects to be desired, exotic and eroticized, but with a darkness and weakness more fitting for Japanese men who similarly embodied such traits.¹⁷¹ Two popular songs in Peru, “El Tonkin” and “La Japonesa” term the Japanese women as objects of “frenzied” sexual desire, but still dark, with “ugly heart.” These characteristics were widely endorsed in Peru, and defined Japanese female identity from their earliest arrival. Therefore, as will be evidenced, weakness and eroticization of Japanese women became key justifications of the peril Japanese women reproduction presented to Peru’s desired racial dream. Already ingrained in the cultural understanding of the

¹⁷⁰ Palma, *Dos Tesis*, 6.

¹⁷¹ Moore, 52.

Japanese, the eugenics movement swiftly proliferated such discourses to further the regime of rightlessness aimed at the 'yellow peril,' demonstrating the need for legal action to suppress mass reproduction of Peruvian Japanese

Peruvian Eugenics

Paz Soldan, a Peruvian man commonly figured as the father of the eugenics movement in Peru, as early as 1919 launched continuous attacks on the Japanese immigrants. Never one to mince words, Soldan was a mainstay in Peruvian newspapers. In an article from *El Comercio* in 1919, Soldan pleaded with Peruvians to, "Avoid these human dregs, that this scum comes as immigrants and an extraordinary step will have been taken in defending the national race."¹⁷² In the same newspaper he termed the Japanese "human waste."¹⁷³ From the viewpoint of Soldan and other eugenicists, such "human waste" was being reproduced at catastrophic rates. From 1932 to 1936 Japanese births rose from 3.91% of all Lima births to 4.34%, far from astronomically figures, but nonetheless worthy of reaction by the eugenics leaders and the political administration.¹⁷⁴ Soldan further asserted the following year that the birth rate of the Japanese caused a 4% increase in the city of Lima alone.¹⁷⁵ Remembering the discourse on Japanese women that they were promiscuous bodies of sexual lust, this rhetoric was translated into the perception that Japanese women were more fertile than Peruvian women. Previously associated with exotic sexuality, they now were synonymous with abnormal reproductive capacity. Combining this designation with the

¹⁷² *El Comercio* 1919

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Paz Soldán, "La Penetración Japonesa En El Perú," *La Prensa*, October 3, 1937, 2. Also Cited in Moore, 278.

¹⁷⁵ Gardiner, *The Japanese in Peru*, 71.

conceptualization of Japanese women and the Japanese race as weak, “human waste,” and barbaric, led eugenicists to easily latch on to such discourse and raise awareness to the threat posed to racial destiny.

In a vehement article on the Japanese in Peru, Soldan spearheaded the movement. He bemoaned, “Under such conditions a mutation can be predicted in the not so distant future for the race which populates Lima,” and that the number of unfit children “gushed from the womb of the imported race.”¹⁷⁶ Newspapers quickly replicated his belief. The paper *El Oriente* noted that Japanese mothers could multiply in a way that “mothers of that nationality know how to,” which could create Japanese colonies in Peru.¹⁷⁷ Reaction to such assertions did not escape Peruvian administration and the legal policy changes enacted during the 1930’s advancing Japanese rightlessness. Where decades prior Peru begged for an infusion of Japanese women into Peru to help stabilize alleged Japanese savagery, now official policy reversed. The infamous 1936 Immigration Act to abolish Japanese immigration also took aim to curtail the influence of Japanese women. While previously Peru encouraged Japanese men “calling” for their wives legally and often exempted them from quota numbers, now any Japanese women married to men in Peru were included in the quota limits placed on Japanese immigration. What Stephanie Carol Moore termed “Imperialism of the Womb” became arguably the greatest fear of the Peruvian public and government. While Japanese men were the target of economic and militaristic rhetoric restricting their mobility and rights, Japanese women posed a direct threat to racial destiny via their body. Their bodies

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ From *La Prensa*, October 26, 1937, cited in Guevara, 158.

sourced the threat of expanded Japanese militarism in Peru and across the South American continent.

Eugenics attack on the Japanese occurred forcefully in Peru during the 1920's and 1930's, and particularly found home in the anti-Japanese Peruvian media willing to attack the Japanese from any angle. Like the legislative and economic restrictive laws put in place, the eugenics movement in Peru did not originate or permeate Peruvian consciousness in a vacuum. The United States eugenics movement was far-reaching and the symbolic head of the Pan-American scientific movement to define race, rights and citizenship. Furthermore, the United States had a long history of anxiety over the Asiatic body, from the earliest Chinese immigrants to the Japanese exclusion era. Like any economic or legal measure taken in Peru, the eugenics movement, and particularly the designation of Japanese women and children as a racial threat, aligned significantly with the American model of eugenics and racial ideology.

Eugenics in America during Interwar Period

A fear of "race suicide" encapsulated Americans during the interwar period, which coincided with the codification of eugenics in law. Fear of birthrates dropping in the white and upper middle classes, combined with the sexualized stereotype that immigrant groups were hypersexed with heightened reproductive tendencies, brought fear of racial, and therefore moral, decay in America. As one eugenicist angrily lamented, the unfit were "multiplying like rabbits."¹⁷⁸ Like in Peru, the central figure of eugenics in America became the mother and the child. However, in America, the

¹⁷⁸ Charles Goethe to Lewis Terman, 19 September 1947, Lewis Terman Papers, SC 38, 4-12, Stanford University Library, Department of Special Collections, Stanford, California.

eugenics movement also focused on “positive eugenics,” meaning the racial vision of the model American mother, and therefore, offspring. Promoting procreation became essential agenda because of multiple factors, and not all of them racial degeneracy.

The emphasis on sexual depravity as a justification for monitoring and regulating motherhood and reproduction served as the primary link between genetics and the rightlessness imposed upon Japanese, both in the United States and in Peru. As eugenics took on the attributes of a fad during the interwar period, anti-miscegenation hysteria also gripped the public body. Eugenicists not only asserted that pure Japanese relations drastically increased immoral offspring (Japanese ethnic children), but also that the offspring of mixed-race marriages were more susceptible to diseases and less moral, a biological sin. The sexual aggressiveness stereotype attributed to the Japanese in Peru was also major factor in the fear of ‘racial suicide’ in America.

The sexual aggressiveness stereotype posed two significant patterns that significantly influenced exclusionist policies leading up to eventual incarceration. First, the depiction of the Japanese man as a hypersexed threat to the White woman was a common thread in anti-Japanese discrimination. Roger Daniels cited a headline in a California newspaper, “Japanese a Menace to American Women.”¹⁷⁹ Scholar Dennis Ogawa agreed with this common theme in anti-Japanese ethnic stereotyping, explaining, “Driven by a beastly sexual urge, the Jap would endanger the white female and the purity of the Anglo American stock.”¹⁸⁰ The hypersexed Japanese male was

¹⁷⁹ Roger Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 25.

¹⁸⁰ Dennis M. Ogawa, *From Japs to Japanese: The Evolution of Japanese-American Stereotypes* (California: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1971), 58.

supplemented by the representation of the Japanese woman possessing extraordinary reproductive capacity. Ogawa cited an influential exclusionist business magnate, Valentine McClatchy, who declared, “The biological fecundity of the Japanese is so great that in a limited time, I think 64 years, the entire state will be Japanese.”¹⁸¹ When the incarceration period began, a common worry was that the camps would become “breeding farms,” and that the Japanese “breed like rabbits.”¹⁸² These sentiments were widespread in the United States, a direct reaction to the powerful eugenics movement, and echoed declarations made in Peru about Japanese sexuality and reproduction.

Concepts of racial purity, especially concerning offspring and future generations, greatly dictated major historical events levied against the Japanese during the period, such as the Immigration Act of 1924 and the programs to restrict reproduction and Japanese-born offspring rights in Peru during the 1930’s. Other scholars do agree with this assessment. James Tyner wrote, “...Eugenically informed geopolitical discourse- and not solely a racist ideology- greatly informed the decision to incarcerate 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry when the opportunity presented itself.”¹⁸³ He also later remarked, “The liberties and human rights of these people were violated because, according to eugenical-geopolitical doctrine, sacrifices were necessary for the preservation of race and nation.” Scholar Allison Renteln also supported this notion. She claimed, “I argue that a deeply rooted fear of sexual congress between the races...motivated some of the actions which led to the internment of 120,000 Japanese

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 14.

¹⁸² Morton Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 61.

¹⁸³ James A. Tyner, “The Geopolitics of Eugenics and the Incarceration of Japanese Americans,” *Antipode* 30, no. 3 (1998): 265.

Americans.”¹⁸⁴ Assessing the psychological concept of projection, where anxieties of one group are displaced onto another, Renteln affirmed sexuality as a key underlying fear and component of the incarceration history.

Tying Eugenic Ideology to Fear of Reproduction and Militarism

The fear of a new generation of Japanese children intimately connected to the growing fear of militarism and espionage. At emergency Pan-American special committee meetings between 1936 and 1942 related specifically to security, the committees acknowledged that Japanese immigrant children in Peru and other Latin nations were potential agents of the Japanese government.¹⁸⁵ In fact, the Emergency Advisory Committee for the American Republics commended Peru on their late 1930’s legislation restricting the citizenship rights of Japanese born in Peru. The 1940 decree disallowing Peruvian citizenship if young Japanese went to study in Japan during their youth was pronounced by the Pan American committee as legislation which prevented what, “probably could have become the most serious abuse of American nationality...”¹⁸⁶ The Peruvian State determined that Peruvian-born Japanese were of “Japanese soul” and not “Peruvian soul” because their culture strongly encouraged education in Japan. Foreign Minister of Peru Alberto Ulloa y Sotomayor exclaimed, “They will return under the protection of their nationality of origin...in the control of the Japanese State; or acting in response to mysterious movements or orders...to carry out

¹⁸⁴ Renteln, 618.

¹⁸⁵ Moore, 270.

¹⁸⁶ “Memorandum Prepared by the Chief of the Section of Congresses and International Organizations of the Ministry of Foreign Relation and Culture of Peru for the Emergency Advisory Committee,” as quoted in “Legislación,” 1, 537.

a mysterious objective.”¹⁸⁷ The leader in Peruvian eugenics, Paz Soldán, also protested the rights of Peruvian-born Japanese and their education travels to Japan, and simultaneously derided the children for possessing little health or strength.¹⁸⁸ Connecting Japanese militarism to eugenics and the ills of reproducing Peruvian-born Japanese stabilized anti-Japanese sentiment and protected legislative actions such as the decrees to limit their birthright citizenship. Benefiting off of the robust anxiety of Japanese militarism while linking it to the Peruvian-born Japanese children created a significant tool to wield for the Peruvian State as they moved to suppress, and eventually remove, Japanese influence in Peru.

At the VII Pan American Children’s Conference held in Mexico in 1935, Soldan took a lead role in associating fear of Japanese empire with Japanese women and children in Peru. After generally calling for curtailing Japanese immigration and influence to defend the proper racial characteristics of the New World, he further chastised Japanese women’s prolific production of children as an attempt to create an “ethnic empire” to advice political and imperial interests of Japan.¹⁸⁹ Japanese exclusionist and campaign leader V.S McClatchey supported this focus on women and expanding militarism, recalling that all Japanese brides possess loyal duty to the Emperor to have as many children as possible for imperial purposes.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ Ulloa y Sotomayor, *Posición Internacional Del Perú*, (Lima, Perú: Gondo Editorial del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, [1941], 1997), 342.

¹⁸⁸ Moore, 279,

¹⁸⁹ Paz Soldán, “La Penetración Japonesa En El Perú” *La Prensa*.

¹⁹⁰ V.S. McClatchy, “Japanese Immigration and Colonization: Brief Prepared for Consideration by the State Department, “ 1921. In V.S. McClatchey, ed, *Four Anti-Japanese Pamphlets* (New York: Arno Press, 1978), 65.

The quick reaction of Japanese parents to protect their Nisei offspring rights concretely demonstrated the problem Japanese reproduction posed for the Peruvian State and public fearful of racial degeneration. Japanese parents who did not register their children within a regulatory period after their birth could only submit a petition to local judicial authorities to have the births registered via court order.¹⁹¹ After the 1936 decree was enacted Japanese parents hastily issued thousands of petitions within the subsequent year. When mass notices of the judicial announcements and certificates granted appeared in the newspaper *La Prensa*, the Peruvian populace started violent riots and protests in Lima.¹⁹² The aftermath of the 1936 decree led to the Peruvian public becoming more visible actors in the anti-Japanese regime, no longer relying on the State and media to provide their voice, but more frequently organizing protests and demonstrations in public. Attempting to quell this hostility, the Peruvian administration enacted another decree in 1937 which annulled even birth certificates issued via court order petition after the 1936 immigration decree, and suspended the right to register any Japanese born before the 1936 decree.¹⁹³ This meant nearly 2,500 Nisei Japanese were stripped of their citizenship rights. As Stepahnie Carol Moore asserted, the ramifications of their inability to prove citizenship became even more devastating when the deportation era began.¹⁹⁴ Another decree in 1940, titled “Peruvian-born Children of Foreigners,” established that studying in Japan warranted a loss of citizenship, a

¹⁹¹ Article 33, Civil Code of June 2, 1933, *Compilación de Legislación Peruana*, Chamber of Deputies, 1955, 3.

¹⁹² Luis and Ricardo Goya Ito, *Inmigración Japonesa Al Perú*, translated Ch. Saito (Lima: Editorial Perú Shimpō S.A., 1974), 37.

¹⁹³ Moore, 269.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

response to the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee's recommendation that Japanese children could be potential agents.¹⁹⁵

This connection between militarism anxiety, Japanese reproduction, and Nisei rights gained more importance when considering that the period for Japanese in Peru between 1939-1945 was defined by alleged military espionage and fifth column activity. Under the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, the United States proceeded to use the suspicion of Japanese subversive activity under any vague accusations to deport and incarcerate them out of Peru and into United States war camps. They did so indirectly, supposedly not assisting Peru in apprehending their alien nationals, and only asserting control over them once they reached U.S soil.¹⁹⁶ However, the Alien Enemies Act also loosely allowed transnational use so long as the alien threat was directed at the United States, something feasible to establish after the Pearl Harbor attack. Any uncorroborated evidence could be used against the Japanese, and as will be seen during in the analysis of this period, most of the evidence was deemed valid based off of falsities and unsubstantiated rumors.

In analyzing the period of Japanese deportation and incarceration from Peru, it remains crucial to remember how intertwined militarism, racial destiny, and Japanese reproduction and sexuality was. The slightest piece of evidence or association could be used to deport a Japanese from Peru, regardless of citizenship status. For an underlying motivation to remove them from Peruvian society, one can turn focus away from the accusations levied against them, and understand that removing them was necessary for racial destiny. With this perception, we can understand that a great

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Miyake, 188-190.

percentage of the deportations from Peru were not a part of wartime hysteria concerned with subversion, but a direct response to growing Japanese influence interfering with desired racial hegemony.

Concluding Chapter 2

As Japanese poured into Peru and other areas of Latin America at the start of the century, it became explicitly essential to stabilize the existing racial hierarchy dominated by European-Latins, and to place the Japanese in a position to pose little threat. The discrimination they faced upon arrival in Peru compounded their initial goal to find prosperity in Peru after years and decades of economic and violent hardship in Japan. Problematic for the Peruvian State and people, the Japanese overcame many societal obstacles during the period from 1899-1923, and because of their incredible will to succeed found economic success and forged intimate Japanese communities through their own mobility. Coinciding with the end of World War I, the rise of the nation-state, and the concept of border protection, Peru was dismayed over increasing Japanese influence, beginning a new phase where restricting rights and exclusion were necessary to protect Peru's desired racial hegemony.

Rather than attack Japanese rights alone, Peru found a motivated partner in the United States, a nation Peru saw as a model for economic and racial success. The United States, increasingly concerned with their neighbors to the South, sought to ingrain their racial and security ideologies into the Peruvian fabric. The Japanese, despised in both countries as parasites living off of the white racial dream, became the direct target of legislation to restrict their rights and mobility, which they had used to facilitate economic success and community stability. The United States, in response to

both populist sentiment and the racial prejudice of the State, first attempted to weaken Japanese economic prosperity, before using legislative action to close borders to Japanese migrants and weaken the growth of the Japanese community. In the next decade, Peru modeled the United States immigration act and delivered its own set of restrictive legislation to limit Japanese rights and close immigration and naturalization proceedings. Discussions to foment this hemispheric plan to dispossess the Japanese of human rights transpired between State communications, and also Pan-American conferences aimed to unite anti-Japanese ideology. Placing the Japanese in such a position of vulnerability pertaining to their human rights existed and flourished because of this transnational effort.

Understanding the racial component of the incarcerations can only be understood through realizing how the dimensions were intimately linked to Japanese sexuality and reproduction, and Japanese women and children. The combination of eugenic principles and racism merit some responsibility for the incarceration period in which the Japanese from Peruvian society were removed and placed into rightless space. Our understanding of the incarceration must be removed from its direct historical context, in this case wartime, and expanded to the discourses and action from earlier. To deprive the Japanese from Peru of their rights and move them to rightless space occurred as part of a eugenically informed process to preserve white racial destiny and the idealized vision of Peru as a nation. Depriving them of their rights was not just a method to protect the present security of the nation, but great evidence exists which demonstrated how it was also a hopeful method for race improvement. Perhaps nothing evidenced this more than the fact that Peru, after wartime ended and the

security threat from Japanese militarism eradicated, pleaded with the United States to not allow any of the Japanese-Peruvians to return to Peru. Fewer than 100 of the 18,000 deported were allowed back to Peru, validating the argument that Peru desired to preserve its racial destiny by removing as many Japanese as possible through the Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese alliance.

Chapter III: Executing Pan-American Regime of Rightlessness

Introduction to Chapter 3

After decades of discourse and policy attacking the Japanese influence and status in Peru to make them undesirable subjects, the Pan-American Regime of Rightlessness used the advent of war during the 1940's to facilitate removal of Japanese from Peru. Although the laws and policies enacted in Peru during the previous decades made their removal more feasible, the status of any such Japanese at the time of detainment hardly affected their fate. Citizens and non-citizens, as well as Nisei (second-generation) born Peruvians, were all subject to the detainment and deportation program if sufficient suspicion was provided to project them as a threat to hemispheric security. This section analyzes the U.S-Peruvian correspondence between the State Departments and other foreign administrative bodies concerning Japanese deportation and incarceration moving into wartime, the culminating episode of the Japanese path in Peru from undesirables to rightless subject.

Pre-Pearl Harbor U.S-Peru Discussions over Wartime and Japanese

The United States Department of State's concern over the Japanese influential presence in Peru began years before the attack on Pearl Harbor, and even before the series of legislative restrictions in Peru in the mid-1930's. U.S ambassador Henry Norweb sent warning to the United States in 1932 that possibly 15,000 Japanese soldiers were available in Peru and might consider an attack on the Panama Canal.¹⁹⁷ The susceptibility of the Panama became a crucial early focal point for American

¹⁹⁷ U.S Department of State, 894.20235/10, RG 59, National Archives.

concern over Japanese presence. Secretary of State Sumner Wells wrote in his memoir that as early as the mid 1930's President Roosevelt was concerned with the territorial proximity of Japanese in Peru to the Panama Canal, and this motivated the forming of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in 1936 in Buenos Aires.¹⁹⁸ The preoccupation with the security of the Panama Canal heightened during World War I, and also created a security precedent for detaining enemy alien threats beyond U.S borders (discussed later). The same year of the 1936 Inter-American Conference the Roosevelt administration authorized investigations into threatening organizations in Latin America, leading to FBI involvement in the Japanese situation in Peru.

FBI in Peru

Additional presidential directives and congressional acts reinforced FBI authority to conduct an infiltrative investigation into potential Japanese sabotage in Peru. A specific contingent, called the Special Intelligence Service in Latin America, was tasked with a unique agenda to observe Japanese nationals in Peru, collecting data through surveillance on movement and perceived irrational behaviors.¹⁹⁹ John Emmerson, U.S diplomat in Peru at the time, also corroborated that the Collateral U.S Army and Navy intelligence programs worked to gather intelligence on the Japanese in Peru.²⁰⁰ The major problem with the FBI intelligence workings in Peru was their inclination for sources networked through U.S affiliated organizations and figures whom already

¹⁹⁸ Sumner Welles, *Seven Decisions That Shaped History* (New York: Harper, 1949), 67.

¹⁹⁹ Don Whitehead, *The FBI Story: A Report to the People* (New York: Random House, 1956), 210-230. Whitehead, an American Medal of Honor recipient and Journalist detailed the formation of the Special Intelligence Service.

²⁰⁰ Emmerson, 127.

supported anti-Japanese sentiments. With Peruvian government anti-Japanese actions in the context of this FBI period, such as the annulment of dual citizenship, reflective of American actions, predetermined discourses on Japanese dominated the intelligence gathering.

J. Edgar Hoover delighted in absorbing recommendations from the non-ruling opposition American Popular Revolutionary Alliance party and their charismatic leader Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, a party whose platform centered on xenophobia, racism and anti-indigenous emotionality with little factual evidence. In a memo to Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Adolf A. Berle Jr., Hoover relished Haya de la Torre's proclamation that the Japanese community was overwhelmingly male with all of its members already serving in the Japanese army.²⁰¹ Census numbers and other figures greatly contradicted both assertions, but Hoover was enamored with Haya de la Torre's denouncing of the Axis alliance while the rest of Peru remained rather cautiously impartial. The same Hoover memos cited how Peruvian rumors of Japanese control over important Amazon basin points and suspicious fifth columnist activity concerning Peruvian Indians were abundant, unsubstantiated rumors likely proliferated by the APRA who delighted in anti-indigenous propaganda.²⁰²

Scholars of the incarceration program acknowledge language as a difficult obstacle for FBI intelligence accuracy, causing misinterpretations of translated documents intercepted.²⁰³ While the Special Intelligence Service obtained many Japanese documents, the lack of any representative in the U.S embassy with strong

²⁰¹ J. Edgar Hoover to Adolf A. Berle Jr., August 6, 1941, 862.20223/181 RG 59, National Archives.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Connell, 39.

Japanese skills forced the FBI to rely on face value intelligence gathered orally from agencies, informants, and anti-Japanese politicians. Those brought in for questioning possessed no ability to protest their detainment or accurately rationalize the suspicions levied against them. Even before the incarceration period, this method of interrogation and detainment became the theme for confronting Japanese threats. For example, informants notified the FBI that the alleged fifth column activity within the Amazon basin was supported by a possible alliance between the Peruvian Indians present there and the Japanese.²⁰⁴ This unsupported allegation was highly unlikely due to general animosity between the Peruvian Indians and the Japanese, and the allegation was understood at face value without any further investigation or appearance of credible evidence. Any consideration perceived as ‘dangerous’ permitted action, based solely on the perpetuation of recommendations sourced from firm anti-Japanese informants.²⁰⁵

Panama Precedent

Despite popular belief, Roosevelt’s Executive Order did not serve as the only precedent for Japanese incarceration, as a World War I plan outlined and directed in Panama illustrated the legal course necessary for transnational incarceration of alien enemies. American fear over the vulnerability of the Panama Canal and its importance to American interests was evident in the Pan American conferences. At the First Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics in 1939, a resolution was recommended that the governments of the Latin republics “take the necessary measures to eradicate from the Americas the spread of doctrines that

²⁰⁴ J. Edgar Hoover to Adolf A. Berle Jr., August 6, 1941, 862.20223/181, RG 59, National Archives.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

tend to place in jeopardy inter-American ideal.”²⁰⁶ The most prominent space for this fear was the Panama Canal, so after the Nazi invasion of Poland, Pan-America hastily forged the Declaration of Panama, which proclaimed a neutrality zone around the Canal area.²⁰⁷ Anxiety over potential Axis sabotage of the Panama Canal area guided much of Pan-American response to Axis efforts in Latin America. A precedent with the Canal also existed and was linked to the actual legal loophole allowing the detainment of potential sabotage threats transnationally from the last World War. The Panamanian government was tasked with protecting the Panama Canal during World War I, and swiftly apprehended German enemy aliens in close proximity and interned them on Taboga Island before transporting them to the United States.

This was the first 20th century transnational use in the American Republics by the United States of the authority granted by the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, permitting the removal of any “native, citizens, denizens, or subjects” of a foreign nation which perpetuates, attempts, or threatens any incursion against the United States.²⁰⁸ U.S courts validated the internments connected to Panama from the World War I era as legal. U.S courts also consistently ruled that action taken under the Alien Enemy Act was unreviewable.²⁰⁹ The Panama precedent outlined the vast authority over designating and detaining alien enemies granted to the sitting U.S president during wartime. Court decisions from the Woodrow Wilson era consistently upheld presidential

²⁰⁶ Res. II-VII, Pan American Union, *Report of the Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Habana, July 21-30, 1940* (Washington, 1940), 28-32.

²⁰⁷ Meham, 183.

²⁰⁸ An Act Respecting Alien Enemies 50 U.S.C 21-24.

²⁰⁹ *Citizens Protective League et al. v. Clark*, 155 F. 2d 290 (U.S. App. D.C. 1946).

authority over aliens.²¹⁰ A case which arose from World War I internment, *Minotto v Bradley*, rejected procedural rights for aliens, leaving determination over alien internment to the president.²¹¹ The Japanese from Peru unfortunately fell victim to a consistent theme in U.S foreign policy. The U.S remains hesitant to protect individual rights abroad because of the fear over impeding the powers of sovereignty deemed so integral to U.S foreign affairs.²¹²

When Panama and the United States began discussing potential plans for handling Panamanian Axis enemy aliens during the late 1930's, records show U.S officials and Panama agreed to incarcerate "as was done in the last war."²¹³ Even earlier, in April of 1941, seven months before Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt wrote to his Secretary of State Cordell Hull proffering the establishment of a detention camp on Galapagos Island for the Latin American countries to use for Axis sympathizers.²¹⁴

The pre-Pearl Harbor discussions between U.S administration and intelligence agencies with Peruvian and other Latin governments further indicate the unified, cohesive Pan-American effort against undesirable aliens before war conflict. Potential threat of militaristic action against the United States or integral zones such as the Panama Canal permeated the consciousness of the Pan-American security system. This system, responding to unsubstantiated allegations of fifth-columnist activity, latched onto the greatest anxiety of all these nations during wartime, a fear of Japanese

²¹⁰ Miyake, 187.

²¹¹ *Minotto v. Bradley*, 252 F. 600 (Ill. 1918). Cited in Miyake, 187.

²¹² Miyake, 187.

²¹³ Edwin C. Wilson to Secretary of State, October 20, 1941, 740.00115 PW/1. Also cited in Harvey Gardiner, "The Panamanian Japanese and World War II," *Iberoamericana* 4 (Jan, 1982): 37.

²¹⁴ Franklin D. Roosevelt to Secretary of State, 24 April 1942, 740.00115 EW 1939/1024 ½. RG 59, National Archives.

controlled American territory. This concern of Japanese espionage developed from the phobia of a multiplying Japanese race, a fear with roots in the eugenic concepts of racial destiny and concern over high rates of Japanese reproduction in Pan-American lands. The process to rid Peru of their Japanese presence clearly was fomented prior to Pearl Harbor and the official beginning of the Latin wartime period.

Pan-America Agenda on Japanese Foreign Subversive Activity

The Second Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics was held in 1940 in Havana and more concretely realized the grave threat that menacing foreign subversive actions by Japanese nationals posed to American stability. Afraid of potential Western Europe's imminent collapse, public and State tone against Japanese presence in Latin America transformed into uncontrollable paranoia, and Pan-American directives consequently were more specific. The foreign ministers urged their Latin governments to: prevent political activity by foreign diplomatic or consular agents, use precautionary measures taken in granting passports, and extend effective police supervision of the activities of foreign extracontinental groups.²¹⁵ They encouraged the Latin republics to adopt measures to prevent and suppress any activities directed, assisted, or abetted by foreign governments, groups, or individuals.²¹⁶ Later in 1940, Peru and other Latin nations agreed in exchange for U.S defense assistance they would maintain efficient surveillance of aliens and subversive groups and also work to eliminate the proliferation of anti-United States propaganda

²¹⁵ Res. II-VII, Pan American Union, *Report of the Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Habana, July 21-30, 1940* (Washington, 1940), 28-32

²¹⁶ Ibid.

from such groups.²¹⁷ Although Peru and other nations for decades conducted surveillance of the Japanese via their own national process measures under transnational anti-Japanese ideology, now a new direction from Pan-America was formed and it too led to practical action. Transnational anti-Japanese ideology now transitioned to anti-Japanese practical exclusion and detainment actions.

Pearl Harbor Effect on Peru

The attack on Pearl Harbor spurred drastic action on the Japanese in Peru as early as the following day. Japanese newspapers, businesses, and schools closed, and Peru quickly moved to pass legislation cancelling all land leases to the Japanese.²¹⁸ Another decree forbade the gathering of more than three Japanese persons in public spaces without special permission, revoked possession of arms licenses, and confiscated 355 telephones from Japanese community buildings.²¹⁹ Peru's eagerness to address the Japanese problem was on full display, with a Lima Military attaché sent to the U.S War Department pondering the distribution of American military presence into Peru in the interest of security.²²⁰ Peru broke relations with Japan in late January, affirming their solidarity with U.S war interests, ending Japanese-Peruvian relations already deteriorating for decades.

President of Peru Manuel Prado y Ugarteche's administration saw the Pearl Harbor attack as a perfect opportunity to rid itself of the Japanese population. In early

²¹⁷ Ibid., 194.

²¹⁸ Gardiner, *Pawns in a Triangle of Hate: The Peruvian Japanese and the United States* (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1981), 18. *New York Times*, 30 June 1942.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Military Attaché to War Department, December 7, 1941, 894.20223/111, RG 59, National Archives.

1942 initial discussions between the U.S and Peru over deportation processes concerned mostly disposition of Axis diplomatic and official personnel. In reality, when Peru accepted the American proposal for Axis officials to be repatriated via the United States, Peru was granted an opening for repatriating nonofficial Axis suspects as well, as the United States would conduct the dirty work and alleviate Peru's concern over detaining, incarcerating, and deporting within their own territory.

The Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense

The third foreign minister's conference took place after the attack on Pearl Harbor in Rio in early 1942. Axis alien enemies and subversive action took were the conference's biggest issue and the American delegation led the fight to incorporate a more detailed resolution on dealing with the Japanese in Latin territory. The prevention of subversive activities was based in four recognized categories of anti-Japanese defense: The control of dangerous aliens, prevention of abuse of citizenship, control of international travel, and prevention of acts of espionage, sabotage, and subversive propaganda.²²¹ The Final Act of this January 1942 conference formed a seven-country body in charge of the 21 programs of action based off the four categories.

It remained difficult for the U.S to attain hemispheric unified enforcement of all the programs, forced to rely on the individual national governments to adopt and implement the proposals at their discretion, fluctuating widely. By all accounts, Peru was an enthusiastic participant with some difficulty directly identifying with all the proposals, but certainly aligned on the subject of detainment. Resolution 20 of the Committee's proposals, titled "Detention and Expulsion of Dangerous Nationals,"

²²¹ Gardiner, *Pawns in a Triangle of Hate*, 17.

claimed only two procedures existed for safeguarding the Japanese threat: incarcerating dangerous Axis nationals for the duration of the war, or repatriation of them to their country of origin.²²² Crucially, while the resolution specified the Latin Republics to incarcerate within their boundary, it did state that if they are unable to adopt such a detention program, the resolution permitted a complementary program of expulsion for the duration of the war.²²³ Impermissibly, by the point of the ratification of the Resolution 20 in June 1943 the United States and Peru already operated their own detainment, deportation, and incarceration program. So what relevance does the EACPD possess pertaining to the legality of the process? It provided critical diplomatic screening and veiled legal shielding for the actions taken.²²⁴ Within the context of wartime, the incarceration and deportations imposed faced little immediate legal backlash, feeding off heightened Japanese paranoia within the U.S and Peruvian State departments. However, the air of legitimacy it created provided justification against potential legal interruptions during the latter half of the war and at its conclusion.

Deportation Setup-State Department, U.S Embassy in Peru, and the Peruvian Foreign Ministry

The Pearl Harbor attack immediately obliged the United States and Peru to add Japanese nationals to a Peruvian blacklist already containing German and Italian nationals from earlier in 1941. By early 1941, in accordance with Resolution 20 permitting U.S relief assistance to take charge in the incarceration process, the

²²² Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense, *Annual Report* (July 1943), 10, 24-35, 73-77; also in *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942*, vol. 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 74-107.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Connell, 68.

assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long corresponded with Henry Norweb, U.S. ambassador in Peru. Long assured Norweb, concerned with Peru's inability to financial fund such action, that the U.S would be glad to assume the expenses of bringing Axis officials to the U.S on a path to repatriation.²²⁵ Key here was the initial objective to remove and repatriate officials, justified under the pretense of exchange for American or Latin officials in Japan. Instead, nonofficials were soon included. Jefferson Hull, first secretary of the U.S embassy in Lima, met with the chief minister in the Ministry of Peruvian Foreign Affairs, and in this meeting authorized a compilation of lists of Japanese, at this point still only officials, who allegedly desired to leave Peru.²²⁶ At this meeting a crucial turning point in the incarceration history took place. Patterson warned that many of the Axis officials desired to take considerable number of persons along with them not on the officials list, several who the embassy had surveillance evidence of as active agents in Axis subversion.²²⁷ Just a few weeks after the meeting, Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote to Norweb that the State Department finalized plans to also handle nonofficial Axis personnel. He stated, "Any such non-officials brought to this country will be maintained here in protective custody at the expense of this government pending negotiations looking to an ultimate general exchange with the Axis powers...."²²⁸ Norweb responded expressing the Lima foreign office's concern over whether the such nonofficial deportations could also include women and children, but

²²⁵ Breckinridge Long to R. Henry Norweb, 24 January 1942, 701.0023/23A, RG 59, National Archives.

²²⁶ Jefferson Patterson to Secretary of State, 11 February 1942, 701.0023/23, RG 59, National Archives.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Cordell Hull to R. Henry Norweb, 10 February 1942, 701.0023/23, RG 59, National Archives.

the United States wrote on the telegram margins, "...endeavor to ignore this paragraph in replying."²²⁹ While the U.S showed hesitancy fully committing to nonofficial Japanese removal, Peru clearly anticipated the potential to deport as many Japanese as possible, regardless of gender or official status.

Henry Norweb

The central link between the United States and Peruvian governments, Norweb was the key player for the entire Peruvian deportation program. He viewed the situation as a "win-win," where Peru could aid U.S war efforts and endeavor itself to the U.S, while also simultaneously ridding Peru of the disliked Japanese who long proved a thorn in Peru's racial destiny.²³⁰ In his rigorous pursuit of creating Japanese official and nonofficial lists, Norweb showed disregard for factual analysis of the Japanese subjects regarding their background or potential for fifth column activity.²³¹ His strict confidential dispatches back to the U.S highlight his motivations and disregard. In April of 1942 he wrote to the Military Intelligence Division and the FBI that nonofficial personnel would be on the same ships as many of the diplomatic officers deported, and that the Peruvian government wanted them gone, with no care about their final destination.²³² He prophesized that many of them would eventually take up arms in the U.S if not placed immediately into concentration camps.²³³ Regardless if an immigrant or born in Peru, the Japanese official legal status in Peru was compounded by the fact that they were

²²⁹ R. Henry Norweb to Secretary of State, 11 February 1942, 701.0023/24, RG 59, National Archives. Response direction dated 12 February 1942.

²³⁰ Connell, 45.

²³¹ Ibid., 43.

²³² R. Henry Norweb to Secretary of State, 11 February 1942, 701.00115 EW 1939/2023, RG 59, National Archives.

²³³ Ibid.

considered transient under Peruvian official decrees during the early 1940's. Under international law, their transient status and the wartime statutes on public order and security allowed the Peruvian government to act with total impunity, easily authorizing Japanese expulsion.

However, even Norweb admitted that the danger that the Japanese nonofficial posed to the country was "potential rather than an active one."²³⁴ Therefore, to rationalize his recommended strategy for listing the Japanese, Norweb turned to the WRA paradigm in effect in the U.S. He saw how the WRA formula advised removing leaders of prominent Japanese communities in the absence of tangible evidence of subversion. To break any potential factions forming, Norweb explained that removing journalists, teachers, officers in clubs and organizations, and business leaders would render the entire Japanese population in Peru without leadership or direction.²³⁵ He was proud to project the American system of detainment in operation at the time unto the Peruvian project, considering it his most important problem to confront and "Americanize." The Pan-American ideology of security proliferated for decades was exemplified in the core actions and beliefs of Norweb during the early 1942 assembling of a deportation plan in Peru, as he forged the bridge between WRA policy and the Peruvian program commencing.

What Evidence Instigated Peruvian Fear?

In general, Peruvian paranoia over the Japanese potential for subversive action stemmed from the discourses discussed in Chapter 2. Fear over their reproduction

²³⁴ R. Henry Norweb to Secretary of State, 21 April 1942, 894.20223/124, RG 59, National Archives.

²³⁵ Ibid.

capacity, their degeneration and potential for “racial suicide,” along with their inclusiveness nature created profound anxieties in the Peruvian government and public. On this basis alone the deportation program might have formed, but some Japanese wartime rhetoric directed at Peru also influenced the escalation of Japanese removal. A letter intercepted by the FBI in California from a deported Axis National disclosed a military colonel threatening action against Peru if they broke relations after Pearl Harbor.²³⁶ However, both Emmerson and Norweb discounted the seriousness of the letter as a hollow, symbolic attempt to prevent deteriorating relations. The U.S reacted more seriously to a meeting between a former Peruvian minister in Tokyo with Japan’s foreign office, where the officials reminded the Peruvian officer of the 40,000 Japanese in Peru, how this placed Peru “face to face with Japan” unique from any other Latin country.²³⁷ While the FBI opinioned that this was a legitimate threat, Emmerson, perhaps the most connected American official to the Japanese situation in Peru, greatly questioned the potential for any Japanese attack on Peru, or any Japanese mass uprising.²³⁸ In rational terms, no military threat from Japan ever possessed enough concrete direction or momentum to coalesce into legitimate military defense response.

Nonetheless, as Executive Order 9066 exemplified, U.S officials responded to any threat with concern and belief in the negative. Rational interpretation of threats and potential action was usurped by overwhelming fear, xenophobia, racism and the

²³⁶ J. Edgar Hoover to Adolf A. Berle Jr., Personal and Confidential by Special Messenger of Japanese Legation in Peru, 27 June 1942, 894.20223/124, RG 59, National Archives.

²³⁷ U.S State Department Strictly Confidential Instruction no. 1537, 29 July 1942, 820.02 Utida, RG 59, National Archives.

²³⁸ Emmerson, 77.

perception of possessing moral justification.²³⁹ In many ways, Japan may have been simply manipulating U.S and Peru. Scholar Thomas Connell theorized that Japan exploited U.S officials in a psychological game to try to keep Peru neutral.²⁴⁰ Japan was clinging to hopes that Peru, one of the few Latin nations to not declare war officially, would not completely break relations, and would remain within the Japanese sphere of influence. The inability of U.S intelligence to accurately and rationally interpret their veiled threats permitted the expunging of thousands of innocent Japanese men, women and children from Peru.

Blacklist

Following Norweb's recommendations, approximately 160 businesses were included on the Proclaimed List of Certain blocked Nationals in the months after Pearl Harbor.²⁴¹ This not only hurt the Japanese business sectors within the communities, but also the Peruvian society in Lima as a whole, as major services such as bus companies and cotton trade nearly collapsed. The attack on Japanese business figures was an attempt to decapitate the top of the Japanese hierarchy within their communities. Seiichi Higashide, a blacklisted Japanese business owner and community leader, recounted how the psychological effect of being blacklisted was devastating. He wrote, "In a single night, we had become 'enemy aliens.'"²⁴² He lamented how the fear in communities dramatically grew with every month as more Peruvian Japanese "disappeared," as the Japanese slowly began to understand their fate was deportation. As previously stated, protecting business investments was impossible as the Peruvian

²³⁹ Connell, 47.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 46.

²⁴¹ Ibid., 51.

²⁴² Higashide, 113-114.

State already enacted legislation to prevent Japanese from transferring rights and property to their Nisei offspring, meaning listing on the Blacklist led to immediate poverty and economic struggle. Criteria for inclusion on the blacklist were full of corruption, miscalculation, and speculation. In his research Harvey Gardiner found that many of the addresses of those named were completely wrong, and sometimes not even listed, and that the Peruvian Japanese names were jumbled.²⁴³ One man, Pedro Tomio Nabeta was listed under three versions of his name. Japanese with Spanish names, instead of being viewed as possessing Peruvian roots and acculturation, were viewed as extra suspicious use of aliases.

By summer of 1942 Peru mandated programs of expropriation of all Japanese owned businesses, leaving the Japanese communities in complete economic despair. By early 1943 nearly 2,000 Japanese were unemployed.²⁴⁴ The U.S latched onto their despair by spreading the false assertion that the Japanese in Peru desired deportation and incarceration in the U.S as opposed to their horrible situation in Peru. This paradoxical theme was grasped by the U.S State Department to stabilize moral justification of their actions, choosing to overlook their culpability for the Japanese deterioration in Peru. A story from Norweb evidenced the contradictions the U.S exhibited. Norweb discussed a suspicious sawmill owned by Japanese man Tingo Maria that was a possible site of fifth columnist activity. However, when the State Department thought to act on the sawmill, Norweb responded that an American

²⁴³ Connell, 54.

²⁴⁴ U.S Department of State, 894.20223/196, RG 59. National Archives.

economic “takeover” of the site was in progress and that in doing so the site would no longer offer suspicion and the owners would likely be deported.²⁴⁵

Peru again sought U.S approval of women and children and other nonofficial personnel after the first denial by Long immediately after Pearl Harbor, seeing Resolution 20 and the wartime climate as an exceptional opportunity to rid the country of many Japanese. After discussions between Cordell Hull and the U.S attorney’s office concluded in late Spring of 1942 that, based off the successful Panamanian deportations during World War I, the deportation of Peruvian Japanese of any citizen or non-citizen status was legal, the U.S relented to nonofficial inclusions.²⁴⁶ The State Department began proceedings, but only after expressing reservations about the adequate number of facilities available in 1942. Consequently, the State Department reminded Peru that the U.S government found it necessary as a temporary measure to separate families, something to which Peru offered no response or objection.²⁴⁷ While Peruvian-U.S relations maintained fluidity throughout the incarceration process, it was not without discord. Emmerson and Norweb, the chief players in charge of the ground-level detaining, blacklisting, and deportation process in Peru, grew weary of differing agendas between meeting blacklist criteria.

From Japanese Leaders to “Japs a Jap” Policy

In his memoirs, Emmerson wrote, “...despite efforts to deport dangerous Japanese aliens, passengers who embarked were not the ones carefully identified by

²⁴⁵ R. Henry Norweb to Secretary of State, 12 July 1942, 894.20223/162, RG 59, National Archives.

²⁴⁶ U.S Department of State Memorandum, 19 March 1942, 740.00115 EW 1939/2439, RG 59, National Archives.

²⁴⁷ U.S Department of State to Lima Embassy, 21 February 1942, 701.0023/26, RG 59, National Archives.

United States.²⁴⁸ Although Emmerson pointed the blame at the Peruvian officials, his preference for a system based on nebulous criteria as opposed to formal evidence was a major factor why his compiled lists were not fulfilled by the Peruvian deportation task forces. He bemoaned that when lists were presented to Peruvian officials they were treated lightly because of the commitment of Peru to deport as many Japanese as possible rather than ones who fit criteria. As discord continued and the State Department began questioning the real accomplishment of Emmerson and Norweb targeting Japanese leaders exclusively, Norweb relented to a new formation of deportation planning. Writing to Secretary Hull, Norweb now asserted “The most satisfactory solution would be the removal to the U.S of all persons in Peru of Japanese race,” and that this action would greatly please the Peruvian government as well.²⁴⁹ Unsurprisingly, Norweb disclosed that President Prado from Peru was very much interested in getting rid of the Japanese permanently, and would like to arrange the program such that the Japanese would not be returned to Peru later on.”²⁵⁰ The State Department, despite the unrealistic factors prohibiting the removal of nearly 30,000 Japanese from the country, offered no immediate objection.

The decision to now seek to incarcerate all Japanese stemmed in part from a trip undertaken by Emerson with Chinese embassy officer George Woo. Emmerson, distraught over the failure of his plan to incarcerate Japanese leaders, hoped to investigate Japanese activities firsthand to see the effects of the anti-Japanese actions levied. He chose the Chinese because of the perceived similarities between Chinese

²⁴⁸ Emmerson, 144.

²⁴⁹ R. Henry Norweb to Secretary of State, 9 October 1943.

²⁵⁰ U.S Department of State, 740.00115/PW/1002/2/6, RG 59, National Archives.

and Japanese, and felt they would be willing to help the investigation because of their loyalty to the allied cause.²⁵¹ He found that Japanese were active in negating their blacklisting and detainment by using financial means to effectively buy and bribe their status to immunity.²⁵² This revelation escalated frustration in the program and likely tipped Emmerson and Norweb to broaden the scope of the deportation program to match what the Peruvian State admittedly desired: detaining any Japanese under with any slight appearance of threat. Relying on Woo and the local Chinese likely yielded a bias opinion of the Japanese due to the extreme and historic animosity between the Chinese and Japanese in Peru. It is unlikely that Emmerson overlooked this by accident, knowing the history of Asians in Peru as well as anyone, as he turned to the Chinese to help facilitate further sanctions against the Japanese communities.

Concluding Chapter 3: Peru's Racial Destiny against the America's Racial Nightmare

As evidenced, Peru was relentless in pursuit of eradicating the Japanese presence from its boundaries entirely, something the State Department was initially hesitant to engage in, before beginning to change direction during 1943. The evidence of Peru ignoring blacklist criteria requirements designating Japanese leaders as primary suspects for deportation substantiates their ideology toward the process. Similarly, rhetoric from President Prado in his discussions with the United States affirmed the desire to not only remove as many Japanese as possible, but also his consideration that such action must be permanent if the U.S desired full Peruvian support. As the State Department relented to Peru's ideology, a third party entered the foray, as beginning in

²⁵¹ Emmerson, 141.

²⁵² Ibid.

1943 the Department of Justice proceeded to investigate the Peruvian deportation process with extreme skepticism over its legality. Although mentioned by Peru, the State Department chose to ignore any discussions of post-war policy concerning the Japanese removed from Peru to the United States. For the most part, this can be attributed to the State Department's unrealistic desire to both repatriate most of the Peruvian Japanese to Japan, and also their aspiration to use the Japanese from Peru to exchange for American prisoners in Japan. While this was a reasonable belief in the early years of the war, by 1943 it became clear that very few Japanese in Peru were going to be used for such processes.

When considering by 1943 that both countries had largely agreed that they hoped to remove as many Japanese from Peru as possible, the two country's anti-Japanese racial ideology met at an impasse. In many ways, Peru's path to place their Japanese population in rightless spaces was enormously successful. Beginning with their unsettling of their legal status throughout the 1920's, and enforced and rationalized under their influential eugenic ideology which portrayed the Japanese a supreme threat to Peru's national race, the deportation met two important goals for the country. It severely dented Japanese influence in the country and removed a large proportion of the population, and it also exiled them permanently, as after the war less than 5% of those deported ever returned to Peru.

In contrast, the United States, the official instigators of Japanese American incarceration and the model of Pan-American regime of rightlessness against the Japanese, found themselves in an ironic situation. The program they also relentlessly engendered materialized into an imminent post-war disaster, where not only were

thousands of Japanese from Peru displaced within U.S boundary, but the Japanese as a whole were now even a greater threat to America's racial destiny. Operating under wartime paranoia, the United States failed to address the issue of Japanese Peruvian legal status within their country during incarceration until it was much too late to overturn thousands of completed deportations. After proliferating a Pan American model of rightlessness, also rationalized by eugenic ideology which labeled the Japanese a menace to the model American nation with a dominant white race, the United States paradoxically post-war now confronted an even greater Japanese presence. The majority of the Japanese from Peru deported and incarcerated during the war remained in the United States after it's conclusion, enduring a difficult process to attain status as U.S citizens.

Conclusion

Approximately 2,264 Latin Japanese were deported from the various American Republics to the United States between 1941-1945. Peru produced approximately 1,771 of these Latin Japanese, incarcerated in INS camp across the United States. When the global war receded, despite countless U.S political and legal machinations, Peru refused to allow the return of the Japanese to Peru.²⁵³ Although the majority remained in the United States, America was still relentless in its attempts to deport or repatriate the Peruvian Japanese to Japan, despite the fact that many of them had never previously residing in the country. The immeasurable devastation of millions of ethnic minorities across the globe during the World War unfortunately relegates the injustices of the Japanese from Peru to the peripheral of World War II human histories. This thesis offers a historical analysis of their situation in hopes of greater recognition of this transnational human history.

Furthermore, this thesis establishes how subjects become rightless even transnationally, but more importantly, how a path to rightlessness requires a designation of undesirable prior to the rightless period. In the few histories on the subject of the Japanese from Peru and their incarceration, few scholars demonstrate how the foundation of Japanese rightlessness was formed and gradually progressed throughout their entire settlement process. Their life as stateless humans with restricted mobility and status began even in their home country of Japan, as departing Japan meant abandoning any rights as Japanese citizens once they crossed the ocean to Latin America. Peru and the United States, through a combined Pan American ideology of

²⁵³ Connell, xxii.

anti-Japanese discourse and policy, marginalized the Japanese in Peru to the bottom of the country's racial and social hierarchy, economically depriving them of stability, and hindering any effort to ascend the social scale. Constantly attributed as a transnational history because of the migration across borders and their deportation, this story is fundamentally transnational because of how the terminus of anti-Japanese sentiment was threaded between the two countries. The transnational nature of this history insulated their undesirable and rightless path, making it impenetrable to break from until the cessation of world conflict forced a reevaluation of their status.

Throughout the entire history, the plight of the Japanese in Peru was underlined by the discourse of racial destiny extremely pertinent to a Peruvian society rampant with nationalism and nativism. Coinciding with a period of greater eugenic ideology consciousness, which relegated the Japanese biologically, morally, and culturally undesirable, paranoia of militarism and Japanese reproduction on Peruvian soil fomented endless hatred toward the Japanese subjects. This discourse not only possessed an integral role in their path to undesirable, but also the facilitation of their rightlessness, as ridding Peru of the Japanese menace became a crucial component of Peru's ideal racial destiny.

Although not discussed in this thesis, the trauma caused by Peru and U.S for the Japanese subjects lasted generationally into the latter 20th century. Attempts to reconstruct the social bonds of their communities, specifically in Peru, were hindered by the continuation of a flawed legal process which prevented the Japanese from Peru to decide their own mobility post-1945. Demonized by a hemispheric agenda of anti-Japanese rightlessness, the Japanese from Peru epitomize how ethnic Japanese

across the world continued to confront racism after the war, as their struggle for stable status became a generational story, still not adequately redressed to the present day.

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