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Unequal Representation in Local Democracies: An Analysis of Public Opinion and Policy Outcomes in U.S. Cities

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UNEQUAL REPRESENTATION IN LOCAL DEMOCRACIES: AN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY OUTCOMES IN U.S. CITIES

by

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ABSTRACT

UNEQUAL REPRESENTATION IN LOCAL DEMOCRACIES: AN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY OUTCOMES IN U.S. CITIES

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The nature of the connection between what citizens want and what government does is a central consideration in evaluating the strengths and weakness of democratic governance. A large body of research in "mainstream" American politics literature examines the link between public opinion and responsiveness at the national, state, and district level, generally finding that outcomes reflect citizen preferences. However, much less is known about the relationship at the municipal level. Cities offer a distinctive opportunity to test for the presence of ideological representation as well as the presence of unequal representation and its consequences. Using data on both the aggregate ideological character of cities as well as disaggregated ideological preferences within cities, I am able to systematically examine representation at the municipal level. In doing so, my work bridges insights from scholarship in the fields of American political behavior, urban politics, and political methodology. In the analyses that follow, I find that public opinion is reflected in city politics, but the relationship is conditional on several elements, including policy type, constituent demographics, and institutional arrangements.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AL - At-large
D- District
ICMA - International City/County Management Association
Mngr. - Refers to an appointed manager.
Myr. - Refers to an elected mayor.
NP - Nonpartisan
P- Partisan

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My dissertation is rooted in the understanding that power–be it political or otherwise–is not equally distributed. All too often, those who benefit from a system that unequally distributes power and privilege fail to recognize how this advantage has facilitated their success. So, I think it is important to start by acknowledging the incredible privilege I have been granted. From the color of my skin to the quality of public education that I have received throughout my life, I am the fortunate recipient of a leg-up in a world where hard work and dedication alone do not determine a person's success. Instead, it is often privilege–and sheer luck–that allows some to succeed while blocking others from advancing. I cannot begin to thank all those individuals who have supported me along the way without acknowledging this fact first.

It goes without saying that completing a dissertation and achieving a PhD is not just the accomplishment of a single person. In moving towards the more traditional acknowledgements for which this space is dedicated, it feels necessary to begin by saying that no amount of space (or the ability to find the right words to fill that space) could ever adequately thank the many, many people who have helped me through my doctoral studies and this dissertation. But, I'll do my best.

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Introduction

> *"[Cities] are where the will is: The political will for change, the ability to respond to the peoples' needs; the willingness to take on the status quo and entrenched powers and assumptions; the possibility of innovation. All of that converges... on our cities." New York City Mayor Bill DeBlasio*

In the United States (and across the world) inequality is rising. Income disparities are so pronounced that America's top 10 percent now average more than nine times as much income as the bottom 90 percent. Even more stark are the gaps between the top one percent and everyone else: They average over 39 times more income than the bottom 90 percent (Saez 2020). These disparities are also compounded by race: while economic shifts have harmed almost everyone, they have also greatly increased income disparities between races. The average income gap between blacks and whites is particularly striking: The median white family has 41 times more wealth than the median black family. (Collins et al. 2019). Significant disparities also exist between white and latino families: According to Collins et al. (2019), the median white family has 22 times more wealth than the median latino family.

These disparities indicate that the United States is, on the whole, relatively unequal for a developed country (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). However, inequality is not uniformly distributed across the country: There are some areas within the United States that are a lot more (un)equal than others. These inequalities are perhaps the most stark at the city level, where those at the top and at the bottom live alongside each other. Inequality increased in over two-thirds of U.S. metropolitan areas between 2005 and 2012 (Florida 2015). Nowadays, New York City's Gini coefficient—the standard measure of income inequality—is now equal to Swaziland's (.504), and Chicago (.468) looks a lot like El Salvador (Florida 2012).

Economists have identified a number of factors that may contribute to rising inequality, many of which are beyond direct government control.[1] However, government

[1]These include changes in industrial structure, increased foreign trade, and skill-based technical

management of the economy and redistributive policymaking can also have important effects on inequality (Kelly 2005). While traditionally the responsibility of federal and state governments, decades of devolution have shifted the responsibility of policy solutions to address these ills to the local level, where local officials increasingly find themselves taking on issues like inequality and redistribution. For instance, some mayors are cognizant of racial inequality in their cities and cite concrete policy changes that they have implemented as part of an effort to make progress on this issue while others "perceive this issue in ways likely to inhibit meaningful action" (Einstein et al. 2020, 3). These findings are important because policy outcomes in the metropolis depend in part on the actions of mayors and also lend support to the view that mayors are willing to take on issues like inequality and policies like redistribution, which are often viewed as being the responsibility of the federal government.

With tools available to address growing inequality, why doesn't government do more to equalize outcomes? One answer is that the preferences of lower income groups are underrepresented in policymaking (Bartels, Gilens). At first glance, this conclusion seems at odds with much of the empirical literature on political representation in the United States, which suggests that policymaking is broadly democratic and that, at least in general terms, elected officials take account of the mass public's preferences when making policy (e.g., Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Page and Shapiro 1983; Wlezien 1996). However, not all preferences are created equal. Much of the work on political inequality in America finds economic elites and interest groups can shape U.S. government policy while Americans who are less well off have essentially no influence over what their government does (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page 2014).

These representative failures are often attributed to inequalities in political voice (American Political Science Assocation 2004). Whether expressed by individuals or through organizations, political voice is (and has been) skewed in the direction of the well-off and well-educated (Scholzman, Brady, and Verba 2017). In other words, unequal representation is a function of and a cause of a political system that allows people

changes (Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997).

to use their economic means/status to get what they want from "democratic" political processes. This is troubling, given that we teach our introduction courses about the fundamental values underlying democracy in the U.S: Responsiveness is often regarded as one (critical) component of representative democracy (Dahl 1961; Pitkin 1967). Instead, inequalities in the political process appear to be the norm rather than the exception.

The bulk of the research on inequality has focused on inequality at the national (and even state) level. However, at the same time, research on representation has paid little attention to America's 90,000 local governments, which make policies on a variety of important issues (Anzia 2015). As a result, we are left with only a partial understanding of political representation in the United States, and while it leaves us with a great deal of knowledge about the relationship between constituents and elected officials in national politics (e.g. Bartels 2008), it has "far less to say about other political actors or other levels of government" (Anzia 2015). Shifting the lens to the local level is important not only for our understanding of local politics, but also because our understanding of the quality and functioning of American democracy is limited without a more thorough examination of the link between public opinion and policy outcomes at the most decentralized levels of government. Additionally, while inequality may be the result of global economic forces, its consequences at the local level are immediate, affecting the quality of life for residents in ways that are often readily apparent. In a city where the rich are very rich, and the poor very poor, for instance, policymakers are likely to face many difficulties. For example, cities with high levels of inequality may struggle to maintain mixed-income school environments that produce better outcomes for low-income kids, or they may have too narrow a tax base from which to sustainably raise the revenues necessary for essential city services.

The question at the heart of this project is: Who has the power to make city policy? Work by scholars exploring representational deficiencies in the U.S. finds economic elites and interest groups can shape U.S. government policy, but Americans who are less well off have little to no influence over what their government does (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page 2014). While this work provides a good starting place, it is unclear if

these insights neatly map onto city politics as well. City policymaking is fundamentally different. For one, policymaking is constrained by a number of structural factors, leaving little room for public preferences in the policymaking process.[2] Further, it suggests politics are fundamentally non-ideological in nature. Thus, any study of inequality in local politics rests on answering first whether policies are responsive. Another layer to the puzzle involves important cross-sectional variation in institutional arrangements–designed for representation–that scholars at higher levels of government do not have to contend with.

Chapter Layout

Representation in city politics is important, but relatively little attention is paid to these questions. Who has the power to make policy? I argue that policy representation may exist in aggregate, but it doesn't exist everywhere and for everyone. It's a function of very intentional design/decisions to serve some interests and depress the influence of others. These effects are not always straightforward, but the general message is relatively simple: that contextual features—specifically, institutional configurations—can be used to enhance or take away political voice. Identifying and understanding these patterns is a crucial next step in thinking about representation in local politics. To answer the questions at the heart of this project, I draw on estimates of subnational opinion generated from large-scale national-level surveys as well as city-level financial/administrative data. In doing so, my work bridges insights from scholarship in political behavior, urban politics, and political methodology.

How we understand the processes of representation in local politics starts with a discussion of why city politics are fundamentally different from those in state and national governments. Chapter 1 begins with this discussion, drawing heavily on work by Peterson (1981). In addition to the marquee argument that city politics is limited politics,

[2]This is particularly relevant when considering the capacity for redistribution and policies to address inequalities. If the national government takes money from the rich and gives it to the poor, then inequality will fall. Localities, however, face a far more mobile tax base. When a city raises the local tax rate in order to pay for a local welfare state, then those with resources can relocate (e.g., see discussion in Peterson 1981).

Peterson (1981) also offers a way to classify different aspects of city policy as developmental, redistributive, or allocational. These insights are important because they help us understand when public opinion is or is not represented in policy outcomes.

Chapter 1 also outlines a theory of unequal representation in local politics. Up until now, explanations for unequal representation have largely centered around individual-level actions/explanations, including individual interest in and knowledge about politics, political participation in its various forms, and the election of descriptively-representative individuals. However, these explanations are, for the most part, not satisfactory (Bartels 2008). Perhaps more problematic is that applying theories from the "top" down to the local level ignores fundamental differences found in city politics. Not only are policymakers under very different constraints, but governing institutions themselves also vary in ways that are (potentially) consequential for representation in local policy outcomes.

Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive description/picture of the data and bivariate relationships, connecting each of the measures used to the theoretical concepts in the literature. Here, I also outline the method for analysis. Because much of the work conducted at the local level is limited to simple correlations, by incorporating a more rigorous empirical analysis that draws on work by scholars exploring representational inequality at other levels of government (e.g., Bartels 2008), my project also makes a methodological contribution.[3]

Chapter 3 addresses the first of two main questions regarding the quality of representation in local policy outcomes. Is local policy responsive to public preferences? I find public opinion is generally reflected in policy outcomes, but this relationship is conditional on policy type. These findings offer an important (and interesting) substantive contribution to our understanding of responsiveness at the local level. Chapter 3 also analyzes the impact of institutions when it comes to their conditional effect on the impact of public opinion on local policy outcomes. The results comport with those from similar studies and suggest that despite the emphasis we place on institutions (rightfully so, as this context provides a unique opportunity to leverage institutional variation in order to

[3]With several exceptions, of course. For example, recent work by Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014).

explore a variety of research questions related to the impact of institutions on a variety of outcomes), maybe they are not as consequential as we previously thought, at least not when it comes to direct translation of public opinion into policy outcomes.

Chapter 4 moves to explore inequalities in representation, starting with disparities according to economic status. In line with the literature, I do find some evidence of unequal representation in policy outcomes at the local level. However, the results of my analysis at the local level do not indicate the same striking inequalities as work generated by scholars at higher levels of government (e.g., Bartels, Gilens). Additionally, at the local level, the middle class is often most strongly associated with outcomes, not those in the top tier of the income bracket.

While much of the empirical work tends to focus on uneven responsiveness to citizens from different economic strata (e.g., Bartels 2008), Chapter 5 departs from work solely focused on differential responsiveness according to economic status by also asking whether responsiveness varies according to race. The findings suggest that the views of minority constituents are less well-represented than those of White citizens when it comes to policy decisions in municipal governments: Even when accounting for population proportions, policy generally reflects the preferences of white residents more than the preferences of minority residents. The findings in this chapter also have broader implications for our understanding of the divisions in local politics. Here, I present evidence that race is the far more consequential division when compared to the implications of class-based divisions presented in the previous chapter. These findings drive home the point that race is the key division in local politics, departing from much of the inequality work that tends to focus on economic status.

Chapter 6 builds on the findings from Chapter 5 and explores the influence of opinion congruence and coincidental representation on policy congruence at the local level. If there is a relatively strong correspondence between the preferences of the different racial groups, this may limit the number of issues where minority groups lose out because their preferences are not particularly different than the preferences of white residents. However, these gaps are consequential when it comes to representation of minority preferences.

Ultimately, the representation of minority interests is contingent upon the underlying structure/distribution of public opinion, raising important questions about the quality of representation in local politics.

Chapter 1

A Theory of Representation in Local Politics

Despite the importance of municipal policy decisions, there is still much to be understood about the quality of representation in local government. As discussed in the introduction, studies generally find public opinion is represented by legislative behavior and policy making at the national and state level (Erikson, Wright, McIver 1993; Miller and Stokes 1963; Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson, Mackuen, Erikson 1995). However, the question of representation from the perspective of ideological concurrence between the public and policy outputs remains relatively underexplored at the local level. While extant work addressing this question provides a good starting place, it is unclear if these insights neatly map onto city politics as well. Key to concurrence between the public and policy outputs is the freedom and incentive on the part of elected officials to adhere to citizen preferences (see Palus 2010). This insight is potentially problematic when applied to the local level: Urban scholarship has primarily drawn on a political economy paradigm, which raises doubts about whether city officials have the tools and ability to respond to constituent preferences and demands.

What Determines City Policy?

How we understand the processes of representation in local politics starts with a discussion of why city politics are fundamentally different from those in state and national governments. First of all, cities seek to maximize their economic position and adopt

policies to maximize their standing while at the same time operating within structural limits (Fainstein 1996; Peterson 1981; Soja 1987). In an era of increased economic dependency/competition among jurisdictions, city interest is that of economic growth, and policymaking is tightly constrained by the economic environment (Peterson 1981). The structuralist perspectives focus on the new relationship between business and government in an age of increased competition and capital mobility, in which cities cater to business through policies designed to minimize taxes, avoid redistributive policies, and offer public subsidies to businesses (Fainstein 1996; Peterson 1981; Soja 1987).

In addition to the marquee argument that city politics is limited politics, Peterson (1981) also offers a way to classify different aspects of city policy. According to Peterson, developmental policies are those that enhance a city's economic position and expand the economic pie. These policies are in contrast to those Peterson classifies as redistributive. Redistributive policies designed to help the poor and/or disadvantaged have a negative effect upon the economy. The third category, which Peterson refers to as allocational policies, are in the middle. They represent the routine, housekeeping functions of government and, according to Peterson, neither help nor hurt a city's economic position.[4]

These insights are important because they help us understand 1. Which policies cities pursue and 2. Why they pursue them (i.e. when capacity constraints, opinion, etc. drive policy decisions). Urban politics literature also illustrates why local policymaking is unlike national or state policymaking, an element that should be considered in any application of theories developed at other levels of government and then later applied to local politics. For example, local policy making is unlike national or state policy making because while national and state government can pursue redistributive policy agendas, local governments are more limited to developmental policy that will strengthen their economic position. Jurisdictional competition largely precludes cities from pursuing redistributive policies, which are the traditional locus of partisan competition. Instead, policy disagreement is confined to allocational (housekeeping) policies, which do not fall along traditional partisan lines. (Peterson 1981).

[4]One could argue that efficient services might serve as a way to *attract* taxpaying residents, potentially improving the city's economic position.

Is Policy Responsive to Public Opinion? Amending the Limited Politics Thesis

From the limited politics perspective, rather than engaging public opinion in the policy process, officials are motivated by competition and direct their efforts toward increasing land, labor, and capital availability (Peterson 1981). However, others seek to amend the "limited politics" thesis: Departing from the structuralist perspective are Kantor, Wong, and Swanstrom, all of whom seek to inject politics back into theories of urban political economy. From this perspective, structure is important, but so is agency.

Kantor (1987) explains that cities are still largely subject to the will of broader economic forces, but the business agenda is limited by political leaders' willingness to build supportive political coalitions. Similarly, Wong (1988) and Swanstrom (1988) also view urban policy as a product of structural constraint and political factors, but argue that the economic constraints on cities are not as tight as economic theories contend. Instead, there is some degree of 'slack' that allows for a wide range of political influences on policymaking. While still recognizing the privileged position of business, the focus turns to increased political complexity and the need for cooperation between governmental and nongovernmental actors. Outcomes are determined in part by economic pressures, but they are also determined in part by political leadership and values of a particular city. In other words, economic priorities and constraints are an important determinant of priorities, but they are not totally determinative when it comes to policy outputs. Politics matters, too (see Hwang and Gray 1991).

While these competing theoretical perspectives offer compelling puzzles for empirical analysis, much of the evidence has been limited to a handful of cases. More recently, however, scholars have started exploring the relationship between public opinion and local political outcomes in a more systematic way. For instance, Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014) show that city government is responsive to public opinion: When citizens express liberal policy preferences, local governments enact liberal (read: expansive) policies, while contexts in which public preferences are conservative, governments enact conservative policies. The results of their analysis bolster the findings of other studies of responsiveness

at the local level: For example, Einstein and Kogan (2015) and Hajnal and Trounstine (2010) find a correlation between the partisan preferences of local constituencies and the fiscal policy outputs of local governments. These findings are noteworthy because they fly in the face of conventional structuralist wisdom regarding the influence of public opinion on city policy outcomes. Instead, despite the multitude of constraints on city governments, they are generally responsive to the preferences of their citizens.

Overall, it appears as though policy outcomes generally reflect public opinion, even at the local level. However, it is important to note that in the existing literature, the outcome measures are generally broad indicators and fail to acknowledge the variation that might occur across issue areas because policy domain also affects the influence of mass preferences. For example, Miller and Stokes (1963) found MCs were more responsive to public opinion on the issue of race than on social welfare or foreign policy. This unequal influence across domains is probably even more likely to occur at the local level because different policy areas are dominated by different factors: According to Peterson (1981), developmental policy is driven by demand, redistribution is characterized by controversy and driven by capacity, and allocational driven by the cost of the service as well as capacity. Here, conflict occurs over location, not level.

Applying Peterson's developmental-allocational-redistributive schema provides a way to reinterpret existing analyses of representation in local politics. Peterson's typology, after all, allows us to return to the analysis a focus on some of the standard policy categories so often analyzed in the local politics literature (e.g., education, welfare, and highways), but are missing from analyses like Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014), who instead utilize coarse indicators of policy outputs. Thus, an empirical analysis embedded in Peterson's framework might shed new light on this question by informing different predictions for the role of public opinion across different policy areas. For instance, we might expect to find greater "slack" in developmental and redistributive policy decisions, areas that Peterson (1981) argues are characterized by demand and controversy. Taking "demand" and "controversy" at face value suggests room for representation of public

interests in these areas.[5]

Are All Preferences Created Equal?

That there is a distorted hierarchy of influence in local politics is not a novel idea. Insights from urban literature have long told us this very thing. For instance, a vast literature exists pointing to the influence of business interests (e.g., Fainstein 1996; Peterson 1981; Soja 1987). In addition to the importance of business and development interests, "traditional" urban scholarship also—perhaps unintentionally—points to a hierarchy of racial interests. For example, Trounstine (2019) points to the fact that in Stone's (1989) analysis of the Atlanta governing regime, minority leaders are consistently the junior partners in the coalition.

A handful of studies from the 1960s/1970s examine more systematically whether unequal influence in local politics is a consistent occurrence (Banfield and Wilson 1963; Hansen 1975). First, Banfield and Wilson (1963) find responsiveness varies under different institutional arrangements: they suggest municipal policy is responsive to immigrant preferences when machines were in power and responsive to native whites when reformers dominated.

In the decade following the Banfield and Wilson study, Hansen (1975), looking at the average concurrence scores for the three socioeconomic groups across all communities, finds persons of higher social status are more likely to find local leaders in agreement with them. Similarly, Schumaker and Getter (1977) find responsiveness is usually biased in favor of the advantaged (upper-SES, white) segments of the population, although a few cities exhibit bias in favor of the disadvantaged. An analysis of the environmental and political factors affecting responsiveness bias shows that larger, more wealthy cities, with well-organized interest groups having little minority representation, are most likely to bias their policies in ways preferred by the advantaged.

[5]Further, these issues also map on to a left/right ideological orientation, while issues pertaining to service delivery do not (Bucchianeri et al. 2019). This becomes important when considering how public opinion is measured (in this case, on a liberal-conservative scale), and is outlined in greater detail in Chapter 2.

With the exception of these (now dated) studies, much of what we know about unequal representation in local politics is far less direct. For example, Hajnal and Trounstine (2014) show black, Latino, and poor residents feel less well served by local governments than white and wealthier members of their communities. Additionally, Heideman (2020) finds minority residents are generally less trusting of local government than white residents. These gaps in trust satisfaction are probably an indicator that American democracy is far from equally responsive to all citizens.

Inequality in American Democracy

While the evidence at the local level is relatively sparse, there is a substantial amount of literature from other levels of government that suggests the relationship between public preferences and policy outputs is shaped by economic status. Overall, elected officials are most responsive to the opinions of their wealthiest constituents, often at the expense of the economically disadvantaged.

Much of what we know is based upon work by Bartels (2008), who provides one of the landmark studies of unequal representation (see also Bhatti and Erikson 2011). Both Bartels (2008) and Bhatti and Erikson (2011) use data from the ANES Senate Study, dividing responses from each state into low, middle, and high income groups (weighting by the proportion in each group). Their findings suggest high income groups have the largest impact on roll call behavior, followed by the middle income group (lesser, but still significant), while the low income group has no significant impact.

In another key study, Gilens (2012) takes a slightly different approach to examining whether responsiveness is unequal by income group. His analysis separates income groups into percentiles and focuses on areas where divergence between the 90th and 10th and 90th and 50th income percentiles diverge by more than 10 percentage points across four major policy domains: social welfare, foreign policy, economic/tax policy, and religious issues. Gilens finds that those in the 90th percentile are more influential than those in the 10th, but not in social welfare domains. The 90th percentile group is also more influential than the 50th percentile in economic/tax policy and foreign policy domains.

Ultimately, Gilens provides evidence that the highest income bracket is most influential across a variety of policy domains.

Unequal representation is also reflected in outcomes at the state level. For example, Rigby and Wright (2011) find the general ideological tone of state policy is most responsive to the opinion of the rich and less so to the poor. Similarly, Flavin (2012) shows citizens with low incomes receive less substantive representation than more affluent citizens. This pattern is also consistent across different outcome measures: Flavin (2012) finds unequal representation occurs in both general ideological tone of policy and on specific social issues like the death penalty and abortion.

While most of this literature focuses on differences according to economic status, a separate set of studies examine potential race and ethnic disparities. Griffin and Newman (2008) suggest that policy makers' positions are more proximate to those favored by non-Latino whites than by African Americans or Latinos, even controlling for any effect of income; however, on issues that are particularly salient to these minority groups, such as crime, education, and health care, their preferences are at least as or more influential than those of whites.[6]

Why Does Unequal Representation Occur?

Why would we expect policy representation and responsiveness to be unequal? Three main "mechanisms" are proposed by the existing literature. First, wealthier and better educated citizens are more likely to have clearly formulated preferences (Converse 1990; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). In addition to disparities in preference formulation (and preference expression: see Berinsky 2002), certain sociodemographic groups are more likely to participate in politics. For instance, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) find that people in the top income quartile account for almost 75 percent of total campaign contributions, while the bottom quintile account for only 2 percent of total contributions.

[6] Clifford (2012) points out that the results may be a product of African Americans and Latino/as being more likely to live in ideologically heterogeneous districts, where legislators' proximity to constituent preferences is lower. Once district heterogeneity is controlled for, representation does not differ between minorities and whites.

For these reasons, re-election seeking individuals are motivated to pay more attention to rich opinion than to poor opinion.

Beyond campaign activities, disparities in voter participation are also a source of unequal representation in politics. Extant literature informs us that certain types of people are more likely to abstain (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) and that the preferences of voters are more likely to be taken into account by policymakers than those of nonvoters (Griffin and Newman 2005). Participation matters because policy responsiveness is in part a function of who participates in the electoral process. Who votes and who does not has important implications for who gets elected and for the content of public policies (Lijphart 1999).

Up until now, explanations for unequal representation have largely centered around individual-level actions/explanations—individual interest and knowledge, participation in its various forms, the election of descriptively-representative individuals. These explanations are, for the most part, not satisfactory (Bartels 2008). Additionally, at the local level, Verba and Nie (1972) and Hansen (1975) find participation has little effect on concurrence in places where consensus is low.

Perhaps more problematic is that applying theories from the "top" down to the local level ignores fundamental differences found in city politics. Not only are policymakers under very different constraints, governing institutions themselves vary. This is an important feature that scholars of senate, congressional district, and even state representation don't have to contend with. With only a handful of exceptions (e.g. Ellis 2010), quantitative research on the underlying processes that produce unequal representation ignores the context in which it occurs. For instance, at the local level, the history of political battles over reform are crucial for understanding how and when white/wealthy preferences are disproportionately represented in policy outcomes.

Underlying the individual explanations (participation, information, etc) are the structures that shape the political process—features that are determined by those in power (North 1990). At the local level, this is reflected in the reform movement, which was premised on the notion that reform goals were equivalent to the city's interest (Bridges

1997). However, the proposed institutional changes (e.g. nonpartisan elections, city manager form of government, at-large elections) that were promoted by reformers aimed to amplify the power of those who supported reform while essentially silencing any opposition (Trounstine 2008). "It is no accident that "residents of Anglo, middle-class neighborhoods were both [reform's] beneficiaries and its strongest supporters," (Bridges 1997, p11)."

Institutions Matter

The impact of institutions and institutional variation on outcomes including, but not limited to, representation, is something that has long been explored by comparative politics scholars (who would be likely to eye-roll at a statement as seemingly obvious as "institutional arrangements might matter for representation"). This rich literature tells us that rules affect the number and type of political choices available to citizens (e.g., Cox 1997; Wright and Riker 1989) as well as the choices faced by policymakers—for instance, rules governing the concentration of power, the processes through which legislation is created, and the number of vetoes in the process (e.g., Lijphart 1999; March and Olsen 1989).

Institutions also affect other contextual factors like the strength of interest groups and the geographic structure of districts (see Ellis 2010), all of which affect who legislators hear from, what their constituency looks like, and the incentives to respond to that constituency. So, in a context where the poor represent an electorally valuable coalition, ignoring the views of the poor will have significant negative consequences. This is in contrast to situations in which policymakers can pay less attention to particular groups (i.e. the poor) with little potential for repercussions. In other words, where it's a concern, the poor (or minorities) will be better represented (Ellis 2010).

One of the greatest advantages of moving the lens of analysis to the local level is the extraordinary amount of variation available. Capitalizing on this, scholars have explored a variety of political outcomes, including the effect of institutional arrangements on who participates (Hajnal and Lewis 2003; Hajnal 2010; Holbrook and Weinschenk 2014) and

for who gets elected (Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2007). Despite the focus on institutions elsewhere in the local politics literature, we know less about their impact on systematic variation in representation. A handful of early studies explore representation across institutions (ex. Banfield and Wilson 1968; Hansen 1975). For example, Hansen (1975), examining response concurrence between elected officials and voters asked to identify the most important issues facing community, finds nonpartisan and city-manager systems have lower concurrence levels overall, and affected patterns of responsiveness more significantly for poor and working-class voters. Nonpartisan systems yield concurrence scores 10 points higher for high-class respondents than low-class. Under partisan systems, scores were the same. However, these studies are now quite dated and are often limited to communities with populations under 60,000 (Hansen 1975; Verba and Nie 1972).

Summary and Key Hypotheses

Public opinion is reflected in city politics, but the relationship is conditional on several elements, including policy type, constituent demographics, and institutional arrangements. First, policy domain affects the influence of mass preferences because different policy areas are dominated by different factors. Recall that according to Peterson (1981), developmental policy is driven by demand, redistribution is characterized by controversy and driven by capacity, and allocational policies are driven by the cost of the service as well as capacity. Further, there is a growing literature that explores the ideological underpinnings of local policy and service provision. For example, work by Bucchianeri et al. (2019) shows that across a range of important local policy issues, elite preferences in local politics can be characterized by two dimensions: a left/right ideological orientation that appears to parallel national politics and a market orientation toward the provision of government services. This typology, along with a growing body of literature that documents the nationalization (read: increasingly partisan nature) of urban and local politics (Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2014; Einstein and Kogan, 2015; Einstein and Glick, 2016; de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw, 2016; Hopkins, 2018), provides a

template for understanding how public opinion is (or is not) reflected in different policy areas. For instance, we might expect that ideology is not associated with the overall level of allocational (housekeeping) policy spending because these issues do not fall along traditional partisan lines (Bucchianeri et al. 2019). These insights lead to the following predictions:

H1a: Public opinion is not associated with allocational/housekeeping policy.

Peterson (1981) suggests that *demand* and *controversy* drive development and redistribution in cities, both of which suggest a process in which politics–and the public–have greater influence than in day-to-day housekeeping policy decisions. Further, while extant studies suggest that allocational (housekeeping) policy is not characterized by a liberal-conservative ideological dimension, a number of issues that fall under the developmental and redistributive policy categories *do* map on to a left/right ideological orientation that appears to parallel national politics (Buccharini et al. 2019).[7] As such, these areas likely reflect the ideological preferences of residents.[8]

H1b: Public opinion is associated with developmental policy spending.

H1c: Public opinion is associated with redistributive policy spending.

The second contribution made by my project is the application of an analysis of unequal representation at the local level. A vast literature documents a number of disparities at the local level, including disparities in participation (e.g., Hajnal 2010), and attitudes toward local government (e.g., Hajnal and Trounstine 2014). The results of these studies (among others) lead to my first point: Not all interests are reflected equally in policy outcomes. I argue that while the majority of the literature examining inequality in representation is focused on representation in the House and Senate, disparities exist at the local level, too, and are particularly salient among racial groups rather than economic class. It follows, then, that policy will be more responsive to middle and high income

[7]Among the issues that map onto a liberal-conservative dimension are questions about anti-discrimination laws, inequality, climate change, the minimum wage, support for underrepresented groups, and affordable housing (Buccharini et al. 2019).

[8]What is not particularly clear is the direction of these relationships. In other words, as public opinion becomes more conservative, does development policy spending increase? Or decrease? Without strong theoretical priors about the direction of the relationship between developmental policy, redistributive policy, and public preferences, these hypotheses are exploratory in nature.

groups than to low income opinion. Additionally, policy will be more responsive to white opinion than to black and/or latino/a opinion.

Finally, to date, many of the explanations for unequal representation focus on individual-level processes like participation in the political process (for example, see Bartels 2004, 2008). However, any analysis of local politics has to contend with the role of context. While previous studies of responsiveness (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014) uncover an interesting puzzle in that institutions do not mediate the effect of public opinion, scholars have yet to explore whether institutions affect different groups in the same manner. Pulling together a variety of literatures, I generate hypotheses about how institutions create unequal representation under different arrangements. First, in systems where broad support is needed to win (i.e. competitive elections, high participation) unequal representation is less likely to occur. However, in more 'insulated' arrangements, I expect responsiveness to vary. Recall that the strongest supporters of municipal reforms were often white, property-owning individuals who used these arrangements to amplify their own interests (e.g. Bridges 1997). With this in mind, I expect that in cities with non-partisan elections, appointed executives, and at-large elections, white, middle and high income opinion will be most strongly associated with policy outcomes.

Chapter 2

Data, Measurement, and Methods

To review, in this project, I explore whether the public policies implemented by local governments are: 1. Responsive to the public and 2. in general, more responsive to the opinions of some citizens as compared with others.[9] The hypotheses I present are very basic, but at the local level, they have not been tested empirically in a systematic, large scale analysis. In fact, as I explained earlier, the political science literature offers relatively little empirical research on representation varies across cities, as much of the existing work uses data from state and national politics. And yet, municipal governments are an excellent test: not only are there almost 20,000 of them (not including townships), but they also vary dramatically in important (and consequential) ways. Why, then, has there been so little empirical research on public opinion in local politics? The answer, it turns out, is simple: the relevant data are difficult to find. Testing my theoretical expectations therefore required me to collect data from a variety of different sources.[10]

Policy Outcomes

To review, on the response side, my project is concerned with policy outputs—policy responsiveness– and the stimuli which are of greatest concern are public policy preferences

[9]Note: I take as a starting point that the public has meaningful issue preferences, but acknowledge the debate regarding the extent to which aggregate opinion reflects informed and stable preferences.

[10]The resulting data set contains public opinion estimates and public policy outcomes for almost every U.S. city and town with a population above 20,000 people, the same threshold used in Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014). While the 2014 paper has a total sample of about 1600, my sample is just over 1400; this is due to the fact that my analysis relies on sub-city demographic group estimates of public opinion, which are not available in all 1600 cases. Of course, the number of observations also varies according to data availability for the dependent variable, which I discuss in the sections below.

of citizens. Following previous work that examines responsiveness at the city level, I adopt a mixed approach and measure city policy outcomes using several different sources. First, in order to capture the overall 'flavor' of city policy, I use a scaled measure of policy outcomes developed by Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014). Using data from the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) 2010 survey of government sustainability, the authors estimate a broad liberal-conservative policy score for each city (using a two parameter item response model).[11] The ICMA survey asks city officials a series of questions about policies enacted by their local governments. The survey emphasizes environmental policies, but includes other policies as well, including affordable housing and education funding. Table 1 contains a sample of the specific questions used to create the index of the overall conservativism of city policy.[12]

As a second measure of a city's overall policy conservativism I include the tax burden of each city. This measure captures the total potential for redistribution in a city while also tapping into an issue that is prominent both nationally and locally (taxation). I measure a city's overall tax burden as per capita local taxes paid, divided by per capita local income, or local taxes as a proportion of local income. The tax burden in my sample ranges from .001 (.1% of local per capita income) in Machesney Park, IL to 0.215 (21.5%) in Washington, D.C.[13]

In addition to the use of the tax burden measure as a way to capture city policy conservativism, I also add to previous research examining policy responsiveness in cities by utilizing Peterson's urban policy typology, which allows me to better assess how representation might vary across different policy areas as well as across cities with widely

[11] A few preliminary notes are in order. First, the number of observations in the models using this outcome measure is much smaller than the number of observations in other models due to the relatively small number of cities that respond to the ICMA policy survey. According to the ICMA website, the 2010 sustainability survey was sent to 8,569 local governments with a response rate of about 25% (2,176 responding). This number is made smaller by the population threshold of 20,000 people that I employed in my data generating efforts.

[12] According to Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014), each set of items is preceded by a prompt such as "Please indicate which of the following actions your locality has taken related to sustainability, energy conservation, resilience, climate change, emissions reductions, or similar concerns in your community" or "Please indicate which of the following programs your local government has." The authors code the item as 1 if the government implements a policy. If not, it is coded as 0.

[13] This measure is similar in nature to taxes per capita, an outcome used by Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014).

Table 1: Sample of Items from the ICMA Survey

To what extent are the following a priority in your jurisdiction? The environment
To what extent are the following a priority in your jurisdiction? The economy
To what extent are the following a priority in your jurisdiction? Social justice
To what extent are the following a priority in your jurisdiction? Climate change
To what extent are the following a priority in your jurisdiction? Green jobs
To what extent are the following a priority in your jurisdiction? Energy conservation
To what extent are the following a priority in your jurisdiction? Housing for all income groups
To what extent are the following a priority in your jurisdiction? Public transit
Adoption by the governing body of a resolution stating policy goals. (Regarding sustainability)
Adoption by the governing body a plan with specific targets or benchmarks.
Establishment of a sustainability policy and/or plan by the chief executive.
Appointment of a citizens committee & commission & or task force.
Provided a budget specifically for the sustainability effort
Dedicated staff to the sustainability effort
Provide housing within your community to homeless persons
Baseline greenhouse gas emissions of the local government
Baseline greenhouse gas emissions of the community
Greenhouse gas reduction targets for local government operations
Greenhouse gas reduction targets for businesses
Greenhouse gas reduction targets for multi-family residences
Greenhouse gas reduction targets for single-family residences
Provide access to information technology for persons without connection to the internet
Provide funding for pre-school education
Provide after-school programs for children
Provide tax incentives for sustainable development (such as energy efficiency, recycling of materials, etc.)
Reduce fees for environmentally friendly development
Fast track plan reviews and or inspections for environmentally friendly development
Residential zoning codes to permit solar installations, wind power, or other renewable energy production
Residential zoning codes to permit higher densities through ancillary dwellings units or apartments
Zoning codes encourage more mixed-use development
Take mass transit to work (government incentive?)
Carpool to work (government incentive?)
Walk to work (government incentive?)
Bike to work (government incentive?)
Expanded dedicated bike lanes on streets
Added biking and walking trails
Added bike parking facilities
Expanded bus routes
Requiring sidewalks in new development
Widened sidewalks

varying functional responsibilities not otherwise captured by broad, general measures of liberalism or conservativism.[14]

Recall Peterson (1981), who classifies policies as developmental, redistributive, and allocational (housekeeping) policies. In addition to the other measures described above,

[14]While arguably the use of total expenditures as an outcome measure captures general idea (city liberalism/conservativism), it is important to remember that not all cities have the same responsibilities. Some cities are responsible for not only routine housekeeping functions like police and fire protection, but also welfare and education systems. In others, states have only assigned housekeeping responsibilities and either controls responsibilities for hospitals, schools, etc itself or assigns these functions to counties or special districts (Peterson 1981).

I also incorporate expenditures in key spending categories, including police, fire, housing, healthcare, welfare, roads, parks, sanitation, etc. For each category, I compute the share of the total expenditures directed to that policy area, following others who use spending shares to measure policy priorities (Gerber and Hopkins 2011). Table 2 (below) provides a brief description of each outcome measure. In addition to the general policy 'flavor', captured using the scaled policy measure constructed by Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014), I also include two outcomes that capture development policy, four that capture redistributive policy, and four that fall under allocational (housekeeping) policy (Peterson 1981).

How government officials distribute public resources among service areas (welfare, education, transportation, etc.) serve as indicators of the policy priorities of governments (Schumaker and Getter 1977). However, while it can be argued that outcome measures using total expenditures indicate a general liberal/conservative nature of city policy (see Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014), individual issue spending itself does not necessarily equate to an ideological stance. This is a particularly salient point when considering that for decades, urban politics scholars have argued that local politics is subject to a distinct set of demands and considerations, which do not reflect the same ideological conflicts that characterize policy issues at higher levels of government (e.g., Peterson 1981). To address this point, I draw on literature that explores the ideological underpinnings of local policy and service provision. For example, work by Bucchianeri et al. (2019) shows that across a range of important local policy issues, elite preferences in local politics can be characterized by two dimensions: a left/right ideological orientation that appears to parallel national politics and a market orientation toward the provision of government services. Among the issues that map onto a liberal-conservative dimension are questions about anti-discrimination laws, inequality, climate change, the minimum wage, support for underrepresented groups, and affordable housing. Questions related to local service delivery were not well explained by this dimension, and instead are best explained by what the authors refer to as a market orientation. So, we should expect to find that where public opinion is liberal (conservative), development and redistributive policies

should also be liberal (conservative).[15]

Table 2: Outcome Measures

Outcome	Category	Source	Year(s)
Scaled Policy	General Flavor	Tausanovitch & Warshaw (2014)	2010
Tax Burden	General Flavor	Census of Governments	2013
Proportion general capital outlays	Development	Census of Governments	2013
Proportion highway capital outlays	Development	Census of Governments	2013
Proportion housing & community dev.	Redistributive	Census of Governments	2013
Proportion welfare	Redistributive	Census of Governments	2013
Proportion health	Redistributive	Census of Governments	2013
Proportion Education	Redistributive	Census of Governments	2013
Proportion parks & rec	Allocational	Census of Governments	2013
Proportion police	Allocational	Census of Governments	2013
Proportion fire	Allocational	Census of Governments	2013
Proportion sewerage	Allocational	Census of Governments	2013

Table 3 contains summary statistics for each of the policy outcomes used in my analysis.[16] Across the cities found in the data, we see a great deal of variation in and across policy outcomes. For instance, of the 839 observations, the greatest proportion of the city budget dedicated to highway expenditures occurs in La Quinta, CA, and the least in Sioux City, IA. The highest proportion of the budget dedicated to parks and recreation is spent in Wheeling, WV and the lowest is in Kankakee, IL. The greatest proportion spent on community development and housing occurs in Michigan City, Indiana, while the least is in Wichita, Kansas. In the area of education spending, which has the fewest observations available, the maximum amount found in the data occurs in Lawrence, MA while the minimum is in Port Huron, Michigan.

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the cities with the most conservative and most liberal values generated by the policy index (constructed by Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014). This measure is a broad liberal-conservative score where positive values indicate conservative policies, and negative values indicate liberal policies. Turning first to Figure 1, which illustrates the most liberal (negative values) cities found in the data, Palo Alto ranks the most liberal, with a policy conservativism index value of -2.391.[17] In Figure 2, which

[15]Expectations regarding the directionality of the relationship are discussed later in this chapter.

[16]Note that there are far fewer observations for the scaled policy. This is because of the way it is constructed: By estimating an item-response model using responses to the ICMA survey, which was not distributed to the entire universe of cities. A much larger sample is available for the spending outcomes (but again, this varies because of functional responsibilities).

[17]An important point to note is that in this figure, it is immediately apparent that a host of California

illustrates the most conservative index scores, Syracuse, NY and Maryland Heights, MO top the list.[18]

Table 3: Summary Statistics - Outcome Variables

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
policy	398	−0.025	0.955	−2.391	−0.687	0.608	3.728
tax burden	1,415	0.018	0.013	0.001	0.011	0.021	0.215
prop. outlays	988	0.141	0.092	0.0003	0.073	0.190	0.558
prop. highway	839	0.040	0.045	0.00001	0.009	0.054	0.353
prop. parks & rec	947	0.054	0.042	0.0003	0.021	0.073	0.380
prop. sewerage	911	0.081	0.063	0.0001	0.038	0.105	0.621
prop. fire	930	0.082	0.041	0.00003	0.050	0.109	0.263
prop. police	992	0.136	0.061	0.0004	0.093	0.170	0.363
prop. community dev & housing	812	0.036	0.053	0.00004	0.007	0.043	0.621
prop. health	619	0.013	0.017	0.00001	0.003	0.019	0.186
prop. welf	231	0.010	0.018	0.00001	0.001	0.008	0.124
prop. educ	135	0.343	0.201	0.00003	0.204	0.503	0.662

Additional City-Level Covariates

The cities in the sample vary a great deal not just in terms of the outcome variables discussed above, but there is variation in key city characteristics as well, which are potentially consequential for determining policy outcomes. First, the resources available to cities vary, and resource constraints might act as possible confounders in any analysis using policy outcomes as the dependent variable. Therefore, I also include in my analysis the population of the city, the median income, and the median housing value. It is important to include these variables in the analysis because large or rich cities can be expected to have greater capacity than smaller, poorer cities that may lack the resources to engage in as many public projects, or that may have lower expenditures or fewer environmental regulations (see Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014).

Table 4 contains summary statistics for key input variables. Turning first to overall

cities are present. In order to take into account the clustered nature of the data (cities within states), I estimate the models using robust clustered errors (clustered by state).

[18]An interesting thing to note here is that the overall conservativism of the public is not necessarily reflected in the policy conservativism values presented in the figures. For instance, the value of public ideology in Syracuse, NY is -0.53, a value that suggests the public is more left-leaning than the policy outcomes alone indicate. This lends confirmation to the argument that at the local level, there are a number of additional factors to consider when it comes to explaining policy outcomes.

Figure 1: Most Liberal Cities



population size (measured in 100,000's of people), it is clear that there is a great deal of variation when it comes to this variable, and the analysis is not limited to very large municipalities. The largest city in the data is New York City, with a population of over 8 million people. This stands in stark contrast to the least populated city in the data set, which is Hays, KS, which has a population of about 20,000 people. The average population size of the cities in the data is around 85,000 people. So, somewhere like Santa Monica, CA, Columbia, MO, or Rochester, MN.

There is also a great deal of variation when it comes to the racial makeup of the cities found in my data. For instance, the proportion of the population comprised of black residents ranges from about .1% of the population (San Juan, TX) to 90% in Dolton, IL (followed closely by Detroit, MI), averaging about 11% of the population. The proportion of Latino/a residents also varies a great deal, ranging from .6% in Selma, AL to 97% in Maywood, CA, with an average of about 18% of the population. The range

Figure 2: Most Conservative Cities



of the proportion of white residents has a similar range: 1.4% in Compton, CA to 96% in Ashland, OH (followed closely by our neighbor, Muskego, WI).

The sample of cities found in the data also vary when it comes to wealth: The median income (also measured in 100,000's) of the "wealthiest" city (in terms of the median income found in the population) is Saratoga, CA–population 29,843– while the poorest is Opelousas, LA (population size of 22,860). The highest median home value is found in Beverly Hills, CA–a surprise to no one–where the median home is worth over $900,000. This is considerably larger than the lowest median home value (about $35,000) in San Benito, TX.

The cities in the sample also exhibit variation in important institutional characteristics, which earlier on I discussed as being consequential for representation. Overall, of the entire sample, there are 262 cities with partisan elections and 1132 with nonpartisan elections. When it comes to different geographic constituencies, 247 cities have district-based

representatives, and 1209 have representatives selected at-large.[19] Finally, the of the two different forms of government–elected or appointed city executives–537 cities have elected mayors, while 896 cities have appointed managers.

Table 4: Summary Statistics - Key Covariates

Statistic	N	Median	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
City pop	1,457	0.402	0.846	2.717	0.200	0.266	0.698	80.083
Median income	1,457	0.408	0.459	0.173	0.147	0.336	0.552	1.399
Med. house value	1,456	1.166	1.458	1.005	0.355	0.841	1.718	9.936
pct. black	1,457	0.050	0.108	0.142	0.001	0.020	0.137	0.906
pct. white	1,457	0.679	0.628	0.234	0.014	0.478	0.821	0.961
pct. Latino/a	1,457	0.103	0.178	0.193	0.006	0.047	0.245	0.975

Public Opinion

One of the challenges faced by public opinion scholars is finding reliable and valid measures of subnational opinion. These measures–particularly at the city level–are hard to come by, as most national surveys sample far too few respondents to render reliable measures of subnational opinion and are designed to draw samples representative of the nation, not sub- geographic units. This problem is particularly relevant for local politics scholars: national-level surveys yield few respondents for each locality (leading to estimates that are less than reliable) and very few cross-city surveys exist. As a result, much of the extant research utilizing estimates of public opinion at the local level have relied on a number of proxies. For example, Einstein and Kogan (2016) measure voter attitudes through behavior in presidential elections. They make the case that national partisan affiliations predict voter attitudes on a number of other local policy issues—including taxes, charter school support, willingness to use public transportation, views about public employee compensation and collective bargaining rights. Similarly, Hajnal and Trounstine (2010) employ the two-party democratic presidential vote share at the county level, arguing that county-level presidential vote provides a reasonable approximation of city preferences. Demographic information can also be used as a proxy

[19]Following Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014), I include mixed (district and at-large seats) in the at-large category.

for preferences (Banfield and Wilson 1963; Craw 2010; Hajnal 2010).

Fortunately, recent advances in survey availability and estimation techniques have made it possible to derive more direct and accurate measures of subnational opinion. For example, the availability of online polls with large samples and many policy questions make it possible to derive more accurate measures of subnational opinion (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2013). Additionally, the use of modeling techniques that employ item-response theory (IRT), a statistical framework for dichotomous votes or survey responses that can be interpreted as an operationalization of the spatial utility model (Clinton, Jackman and Rivers 2004) have dramatically improved scholars' ability to measure public preferences.

Applying these new advances to the city level, Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014) pool data from the 2000 and 2004 ANES surveys and the 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2011 CCES surveys to estimate over 275,000 individual ideal points using a Bayesian Item-Response model (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004).[20] These individual-level estimates are then "weighted" using a multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) model to produce aggregated city-level estimates.[21] Using the weighted aggregate measures, Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014) show that city government is responsive to public opinion: When citizens express liberal (liberal) policy preferences, local governments enact more liberal (conservative) policies.

In this project, I employ the city-level estimates of public ideology described above, which are made available to the public by the authors.[22] However, in order to explore questions related to *unequal* representation, I need disaggregated group-level estimates in each city. In order to construct estimates for each demographic group of interest, I rely on a smaller subset of the individual-level ideal points estimated by Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014), which are made publicly available by the authors.[23] Using these

[20]Each of these surveys asks between 14 and 32 policy questions to 30,000-80,000 respondents.

[21]Tausanovtich and Warshaw (2014) suggest that one way of thinking about an MRP model is to compare it to weighted survey estimates, applying fine-tuned demographic-geographic weights based on Census data.

[22]In total, Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014) estimate aggregate public ideology in about 1400 cities across the United States.

[23]Of the original 275,000 individual ideal points, 88,000 are publicly available.

estimates and the corresponding survey responses about their demographic information, I aggregate the individual-level estimates into three racial groups (black, Latino/a, and white) and three income groups (low, middle, high).

To separate respondents into income categories, I chose a threshold similar to that of other work in this area (e.g., Tausanovitch 2019) and because these boundaries can be consistently matched across surveys. Respondents who report an income of less than 30,000 are classified as poor and respondents who report an income of greater than 100,000 are rich. This threshold puts a slightly higher number of poor people in each city (on average) in order to make sure a lower number of poor people is not driving the results. The final composition of income groups is consistent with the composition of an average congressional district (the geographic unit of analysis that dominates the literature) which is about 20% poor and 16% rich. Here, the average proportion of poor residents in each city is about 25% and the average proportion of high income ("rich") respondents is about 19%.

Before conducting the analysis, I illustrate the extent to which political ideology and policy opinions differ across groups within each city. These differences are central for the study of unequal political representation: Without them, there would be little reason to be concerned about a bias in policymaking (an idea I explore in later chapters). In Figure 3, we see the distribution of opinion for each income group. Generally speaking, the location of each group's mean preferences is what we might expect: low income is most liberal (-0.115) and high income is most conservative (0.036), with middle income somewhere in between (-0.002). While at first glance these differences do not appear significant, a difference of means test reveals there is a statistically significant difference between the mean low and mean high and between mean low and mean middle. The difference between middle and high only reaches significance at the 0.1 level.

More apparent is the variation in the distribution of group opinion by race, illustrated to the right. Like the locations of income groups in Figure 3, these distributions are in line with what we might expect about each group's location on the left-right continuum: white opinion tends to be more conservative (mean = 0.096) than black (mean



Figure 3: Group Opinion Distributions

= -0.447) or Latino/a (mean = -0.203) opinion, and black opinion is the most liberal of the three. Interestingly, there is significantly more divergence in the average group estimates presented here than in other studies of unequal representation. For example, Bhatti and Erikson (2010) find that the mean ideology for low, middle, and high income groups is substantively very similar (yet, the authors still find evidence of differential responsiveness). Here, a simple difference of means test confirms that the group means are substantively and statistically different from each other: Black is significantly different than white and Latino/a, and Latino/a is also significantly different than white. The following sections test whether these differences are reflected in city policy outcomes.

A First Glance at the Relationship Between Public Opinion and Local Policy Outcomes

Having established that group preferences are different, a necessary element for an analysis of unequal representation, we can take a look at the simple bivariate correlations between group preferences and each of the policy outcomes to get a sense of the patterns that appear in the data. To recap, I expect that the relationship between city-level aggregate opinion is reflected in local policy outcomes, but is strongest in redistributive and developmental, and weakest in the area of allocational spending, and we should expect to find that where public opinion is liberal (conservative), development and redistributive

Table 5: Bivariate Correlations

	White	Black	Latino/a	Low Income	Middle Income	High Income	City Opinion
Scale Policy	0.30**	0.11	0.03	0.18**	0.26**	0.21**	0.36**
Tax Burden	-0.15**	0.00	-0.04	-0.08**	-0.13**	-0.08**	-0.36**
Capital Outlays	0.11**	−0.01	0.07	0.04	0.11**	0.08*	0.22**
Highway	0.09**	0.00	0.09*	0.02	0.12**	0.04	0.19**
Parks & Rec	0.10**	−0.10**	0.01	0.07*	0.08*	0.03	0.26**
Sewerage	0.06	−0.03	0.01	0.09*	0.09**	0.08*	0.17**
Police	0.00	−0.01	−0.02	−0.08*	−0.04	−0.03	0.05
Fire	0.00	0.02	−0.01	−0.03	0.01	0.00	0.12**
Housing & Community Dev.	0.04	−0.01	0.04	−0.06	−0.01	−0.03	−0.14**
Welfare	−0.01	−0.05	0.12	−0.13	−0.04	−0.08	−0.07
Health	−0.08	−0.05	0.02	−0.03	−0.05	−0.02	−0.01
Education	−0.20**	−0.04	0.13	−0.01	−0.13	−0.22*	−0.42**

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05

policies should also be liberal (conservative).

Table 5 offers an initial glance at the relationship between each group mean and city policy outcomes. The first thing to note is that city opinion (aggregated) is correlated with a number of different policy outcomes, but this relationship varies in strength and direction across different policy areas. Two of the strongest correlations are between city-level opinion and both the scaled policy index and city tax burden measure, and each is in the expected direction: As city-level opinion becomes more conservative (positive values), the scaled policy measure also moves in a positive direction, while the tax burden decreases (in other words, it becomes more conservative).

City-level ideology also has a positive, statistically significant correlation with both development spending policy areas, which comports with my expectations regarding the role of the public in development spending outcomes. Recall that I also expected public opinion to be associated with redistributive policy areas. However, in this case, the evidence is mixed: The strongest correlation that emerges oin the table overall is the correlation between city ideology and the proportion of the city budget spent on education (-.42). This relationship is in the expected direction: As ideology becomes more conservative, education spending decreases. The correlation between city-level ideology and community development and housing is also statistically significant, but is only about one third the size of the coefficient for education. While both coefficients for welfare and health are in the expected direction (negative), the relationship itself is not statistically

significant.

Recall that since previous studies examining the dimensionality of local politics finds that service delivery does not map particularly well onto a left-right ideological dimension, I do not expect to find much of a relationship between public conservativism and allocational spending. Interestingly, this only appears to be the case in one policy area: spending on police protection. In the other three policy areas, there is a positive, significant correlation coefficients for sewerage, parks and recreation, and fire.

While the aggregate measure of city public opinion is significantly associated with most of the policy outcomes, the associations between individual groups and policy outcomes varies considerably. Table 5 also provides the correlations between each group opinion and each of the policy outcomes. Turning first to the three race groups, the results in the table indicate that the overall 'flavor' of city policy is most strongly correlated with white opinion: Both the scaled policy index and the city tax burden have statistically significant coefficients in the expected direction, but the relationship appears to be much stronger between white opinion and the policy index measure created by Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014). I also find statistically significant correlations between white opinion and both development policy areas, as well as education spending.

While white opinion has significant associations between several outcome variables, these relationship are not replicated for black and Latino/a residents. In only one instance does black opinion have a statistically significant association with *any* outcome variable. Interestingly, it is spending on parks and recreation. Why this relationship appears is not immediately clear. Similarly, Latino/a opinion is most strongly related to one policy outcome (highway spending), but this relationship is only statistically significant at 0.1 and does not reach the conventional (0.05) level of statistical significance.

When it comes to correlations between outcomes and income groups, across both general policy measures (the scaled policy outcome and the measure of a city's tax burden), each income group has a statistically significant correlation with city policy. However, the correlation coefficients are strongest for middle income opinion. Across different policy categories, there is also some initial evidence that unequal representation exists, and

aligns with the expectations presented in the previous chapter. For example, in the area of development spending, middle income has a positive, statistically significant correlation with development outcomes. Additionally, in both development policy and allocational policy outcomes, middle income opinion is the only group whose correlation coefficient reaches the conventional (0.05) level of statistical significance.

Overall, at first glance, public opinion is associated with city policy outcomes, and varies across policy areas. Additionally, the lack of significant bivariate relationships for black and Latino/a opinion in Table 5 is early evidence that unequal representation occurs for different races. Further, despite reaching statistical significance with a number of policy areas, the coefficients for low-income opinion tend to be smaller than those of middle and high income group opinion, which is also consistent with the differential responsiveness hypothesis. In the chapters that follow, I more rigorously test these relationships.

Chapter 3

Is Local Policy Responsive to Public Opinion?

In order to understand inequality in representation in cities, we first need to know something about the role of public opinion in local policymaking more generally. Despite the importance and sheer number of municipal policy decisions, there is still much to be understood about the quality of representation in local government. In this analysis, I ask: Is public opinion represented in city policy? Does this relationship vary across different policy domains? Do institutions enhance or diminish the effect of public opinion on policy outcomes?

Responsiveness in the Literature

How do we study something like representation? In general, responsiveness implies that government reacts to changes in citizens' views by moving policy in the direction of those views, and ensures that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy output. In other words, responsiveness refers to a stimulus/response relationship, and occurs when actors react positively to an external stimulus. Unresponsiveness, on the other hand, occurs when actors fail to react or react in a manner that is contrary to the information/preferences provided by the stimulus (Schumaker and Getter 1977). Cross-

sectionally, this means places where the public holds more conservative views should have more conservative policies (Erikson, Wright, McIver 1993).

One line of research finds a relationship between public opinion and policy outcomes in aggregate. Erikson et al. (2002) and Stimson et al. (1995) provide an extensive analysis of the relationship between policy outcomes and public opinion. Their perspective is one of dynamic representation—when opinion changes and policy responds. More specifically, the authors test the dynamic representation perspective by analyzing how change in the liberalism (conservatism) of the US general public corresponds to liberalism (conservatism) in policy activity. They find policy responds dynamically to public opinion change—change in the public mood (Stimson 1999) influences the ideological direction of policy decisions made by both legislative and executive officials.

Others find evidence of responsiveness at the level of individual issues. Page and Shapiro (1983) find considerable congruence between changes in public opinion and policies over time. The authors also suggest that it is policy opinions that affect policy outcomes, rather than the other way around. Similarly, Hartley and Russett (1992) and Wlezien (2004) find evidence that suggests public support for higher (lower) spending is associated with an increase (decrease) in spending on various policies (both domestic and defense). Additionally, public attitudes toward corporations appear to influence congressional law making on business-related policies (Smith 1999).

A related literature compares individual congressional members' behavior with variation in opinion across districts. In their seminal study of representation, Miller and Stokes (1963) find that Congressmen do vote strongly based on a combination of their own preferences and their perceptions of their constituents' preferences, but Congressmen have little information about their constituents' actual preferences and constituents have little information about their congressmen's preferences. The tend to vote like they had a mandate on civil rights, along party lines on social welfare, and with the president on foreign affairs.[24] Additionally, Bartels (1991) measures district-level support for defense spending using ANES data and finds constituency opinion as a significant impact on MC

[24]Echoed by Erikson (1978) who goes on to suggest Miller and Stokes actually underestimate the impact of constituent opinion on MC behavior.

support for defense buildup. Similarly, Erikson (1990) explores how state-level ideology corresponds to roll call voting in the Senate, and finds Senators are responsive to district opinion.

Studies of representation in cities are far more limited, especially when it comes to ideological representation. As discussed in the previous chapter, ideological representation requires three basic elements: First, citizens must either convey a political voice or be within a system where other actors and/or institutions are willing to speak in their silence. Second, elected officials must have some perception of what citizens generally want from their government. Finally, elected officials must have a basic incentive to adhere to citizen preferences.

These requirements for ideological representation can raise concerns when applied to the local level. Much of what we know about representation in local policymaking is premised on the idea that policymaking in cities is 1. constrained by structural and economic factors, and 2. not ideological in nature. However, recent studies have shed light on different findings: not only is public opinion reflected in local policies, but city policies are also increasingly ideological in nature.

What these studies do not take into account is whether or not the relationship varies across different policy domains. Previous research exploring policy representation in cities uses broad indicators of a city's general liberalism or conservativism, including taxes and expenditures per capita (Einstein and Kogan 2016; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014). However, there is reason to suspect that the influence of public opinion might vary across different policy domains. Recall that according to Peterson (1981), developmental policy is driven by demand, redistribution is characterized by controversy and driven by capacity, and allocational driven by the cost of the service as well as capacity. So, while some earlier insights by urban scholarship might not be relevant anymore, there are still useful insights to incorporate into our understanding of policy responsiveness in cities. These insights lead to the following predictions:

H1a: Public opinion is not associated with allocational/housekeeping policy.

H1b: Public opinion is reflected in development policy.

H1c: Public opinion is reflected in redistributive policy.

What is not particularly clear is the direction of the relationships between public opinion and developmental policy outcomes and public opinion and redistributive policy outcomes. In other words, as public opinion becomes more conservative, does development policy spending increase? Or decrease? We might suspect that support for redistribution, a more 'liberal' stance, results in a higher share of the city budget being allocated to redistributive policy spending, and as opinion becomes more conservative, the share of a city's budget allocated to redistributive policy areas will decrease. However, without strong theoretical priors about the direction of the relationship between developmental policy, redistributive policy, and public preferences, these hypotheses are exploratory in nature.

How are citizen preferences translated into policy outcomes? One of the greatest advantages of moving the lens of analysis to the local level is the extraordinary amount of variation available. Capitalizing on this, scholars have explored a variety of political outcomes, including the effect of institutional arrangements on who participates (Hajnal and Lewis 2003; Hajnal 2010; Holbrook and Weinschenk 2014) and for who gets elected (Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2007). Despite the focus on institutions elsewhere in the local politics literature, we know less about their impact on systematic variation in representation. In line with the existing literature, I examine the impact of three institutional structures: council-manager system vs. directly elected mayors; partisan and nonpartisan elections; at-large vs. district elections. These three are a good test because they were designed by reformers with representation in mind (ex. Banfield and Wilson 1968; Bridges 1997; Hansen 1975). [25]

[25] A handful of early studies explore representation across institutions (ex. Banfield and Wilson 1968; Hansen 1975). More recently, Tausanovtich and Warshaw (2014) analyze the conditional effect of institutional arrangements, and find that institutions have a null effect on the relationship between public opinion and policy outcomes.

Data and Measurement

In this chapter, I explore the question of whether or not public opinion represented in city policy, and how this relationship varies across policy areas and institutional contexts. The main independent variable of interest is city-level public opinion. For this measure, I draw on ideal point estimates constructed by Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014) and described in the previous chapter. To recap, pooling data from the 2000 and 2004 ANES surveys and the 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2011 CCES surveys, the authors estimate over 275,000 individual ideal points using a Bayesian Item-Response model (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004). These individual-level estimates are then "weighted" using an MRP model to produce aggregated city-level estimates.

As I discussed in Chapter 2, the main outcome of interest is public policy. Following previous work that examines responsiveness at the city level, I adopt a mixed approach and measure city policy outcomes using several different sources. First, in order to capture the overall 'flavor' of city policy, I use a scaled measure of policy outcomes developed by Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014) along with a measure that captures the overall local tax burden. I also incorporate expenditures in key spending categories, including police, fire, housing, healthcare, welfare, roads, parks, sanitation, etc. For each category, I compute the share of the total expenditures directed to that policy area, following others who use spending shares to measure policy priorities (Gerber and Hopkins 2011).

In line with other scholarship exploring the role of public opinion and ideology in policy outcomes, I expect that both measure of city policy conservativism–the scaled policy index and the local tax burden–will reflect the level of conservativism in the public. Additionally, recall that the literature exploring the ideological underpinnings of local policy and service provision finds elite preferences in local politics can be characterized by two dimensions: a left/right ideological orientation that appears to parallel national politics and a market orientation toward the provision of government services (Bucchianeri et al. 2019). Among the issues that map onto a liberal-conservative dimension are questions about anti-discrimination laws, inequality, climate change, the minimum wage, support for underrepresented groups, and affordable housing. Questions related to local service

delivery were not well explained by this dimension, and instead are best explained by what the authors refer to as a market orientation. Knowing this, I expect that areas that map onto a left-right dimension–developmental spending and redistributive spending–will reflect the ideological preferences of the public.

Results: Is Policy Responsive to Public Opinion?

I begin by regressing policy outcomes on aggregate public opinion (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014) across different policy domains in order to assess whether policy outcomes/priorities are responsive to overall city ideology.[26] Turning first to the relationship between city public opinion and each of the general policy outcome measures, the results indicate that the effect of public opinion is statistically significant in the expected direction, and this effect is consistent once the controls for city policymaking capacity are included into the models. In models 1 and 2 in Table 19, which contain the results for the bivariate and the full models using the scaled policy measure, as public opinion becomes more conservative, so do policy outcomes. In models 3 and 4, which use the overall tax burden as an outcome measure, as public opinion becomes more conservative, the overall tax burden decreases (a more 'conservative' response).

The effects of the control variables are also interesting. In the scaled policy model, both median income and median home value are statistically significant, but in opposite directions. As the median income in a city increases, policy outcomes tend to be more conservative (indicated by the positive coefficient). In The relationship between aggregate ideology and the scaled policy outcome is statistically significant in the bivariate and full models. In places with higher home values, however, policies are more liberal. This result is consistent with Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014). In the tax burden model, all three controls are statistically significant. The negative coefficient generated for the median

[26]Full results are available in Appendix A. Note that all models estimated using linear regression with robust standard errors clustered by state. The results of the models estimating spending proportions using OLS are identical to those using a tobit model bounded by 0 (lower) and 1 (upper).

income variable suggests that as incomes increase, the tax burden tends to decrease: a finding that intuitively makes sense. Additionally, cities with larger populations also have a larger overall tax burden. Finally, the median home value as a positive, statistically significant association with the overall tax burden: as home values increase, so does the tax burden. This finding makes a great deal of sense when thinking about the primary source of tax revenue in cities, which is often property taxes.

The results of the first two outcomes, which capture a city's general conservativism, suggest that public opinion is associated with policy outcomes. But does the relationship between public opinion and policy outcomes relationship vary across different policy domains? Turning first to the area of development policy, the results in Table 20, Appendix A, suggest that public opinion is associated with development priorities.[27] In cities where public opinion leans conservative, the proportion of expenditures devoted to development policy increases. Further, once we include controls, more "diverse" places (a higher proportion of the population is black/nonwhite), the proportion of spending on development decreases (both models). The proportion of highway outlays, specifically, increases in wealthier places.

The relationship between public opinion and redistributive policy areas is also present, but is also a function of capacity, as Peterson (1981) suggests.[28] Without including controls for capacity, Public opinion/preferences are reflected by city spending on housing and community development as well as education. In both instances, as public preferences become more conservative, the proportion of city spending in these areas decreases. However, once controls are introduced, there is no longer a statistically significant relationship between public opinion and community development/housing. Instead, as median income increases, the proportion of spending in this area decreases. In the education model, once controls are introduced, the coefficient for public opinion becomes larger. Additionally, both the proportion black population and city population have statistically significant negative effects on the proportion of spending on education.

[27]Recall that according to Peterson, developmental policies are those that enhance a city's economic position and expand the economic pie.

[28]Results available in Appendix A, Table 22

The results of the analysis of the relationship between public opinion and allocational (housekeeping) policy spending are somewhat surprising in that public opinion does appear to have a significant association in some cases, contrary to expectations. In Table 21,there are statistically significant bivariate relationships between opinion and spending on parks and recreation as well as sewerage. Once controls are introduced, only the former remains significant. Spending on parks and recreation also increases as income increases and as home values increase.

Summary of Findings

A summary of the results is available in Table 6. Overall, policy seems to reflect the preferences of city residents. This finding is important because until recently, much of the literature suggested cities were too constrained to incorporate public preferences into policy decisions. In other words, policy appears to be representative of the public.

The second important finding in this section is that the amount of "slack" (Swanstrom 1988) appears to vary across policy areas. Redistribution constrained by resources. Allocational spending not responsive to opinion with the exception of parks and recreation. Given the findings for development priorities, this maybe suggests that where there are opportunities for credit claiming (i.e. naming a park, for instance) policymakers take the public into consideration.

Table 6: Summary of Results - Effect of Public Opinion Across Policy Domains

Policy Domain	Outcome Measure	Coefficient Sign	Significant?	Any Change w/ Controls Included?
	Scaled Policy	Positive	Yes	No
	Tax Burden	Negative	Yes	No
Development	Capital Outlays	Positive	Yes	No
Development	Highway Outlays	Positive	Yes	Yes*
Redistributive	Community Development & Housing	Negative	Yes	Yes**
Redistributive	Welfare	Negative	No	No
Redistributive	Healthcare	Negative	No	No
Redistributive	Education	Negative	Yes	No
Allocational	Parks & Rec	Positive	Yes	No
Allocational	Sewerage	Positive	Yes	Yes*
Allocational	Police	Positive	No	No
Allocational	Fire	Positive	No	No

* Only significant at .1 once controls included.
** No longer significant once controls included.

Effects of Institutions

A strength of any cross-sectional study of municipalities is the degree of variation in institutional arrangements. Much of the local politics literature focuses on institutional arrangements as mediating policy outcomes (ex. Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014). The different institutional forms yield varying outcomes on different dimensions of representation and responsiveness (Trounstine 2010). For instance, systems with partisan selection are often thought to be more responsive (Hansen 1975; Schaffner, Streb, Wright 2001), as are systems with elected rather than appointed mayors (Hansen 1975).

But is this really the case? Among the many valuable findings in their 2014 paper, Tausanovitch and Warshaw also uncover in interesting—and somewhat unexpected—puzzle. The big takeaway from the article was a strong relationship between public ideological complexion and a city's public policy outputs, but the authors also find that the central institutional mechanisms through which we previously assumed preferences are transmitted into policymaking do not strengthen the relationship between opinion and policy. In other words, they find cities with elected mayors are just as responsive to public opinion as those with appointed executives, cities with partisan elections are just as responsive as those with nonpartisan elections, and responsiveness in cities with council members elected by district is not different than responsiveness in cities who elect their council

members at large. If we break it down by policy domain, does this finding change?

This next section analyzes the effect of institutions (as a 'treatment') on the impact of public opinion across policy outcomes. To answer these questions, I employ data that is preprocessed using entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012).[29] For each institution, weights are used to balance on all covariates in the model. In my analysis, I balance the covariates for cities with one institutions and cities with the other. The 'control' group can then be compared to the 'treatment' group relatively easily by comparing the slop of the relationship between outcomes and policy preferences for the two groups. For the models examining the conditional effect of institutions on aggregate city opinion, I balance on median income, median home values, population, the presence of each institution, and overall city conservativism.

In this analysis, the key model terms are the interactions between city ideology and each institution (form of government, election type, and geographic constituency). These interactions measure whether each institution is making cities more responsive to the preferences of their citizens.

Results: Form of Government

The dominant view among scholars is that cities with elected mayors are more responsive to the views of citizens than those with a council-manager system (ex. Sharp 1997), as directly-elected mayors are full-time politicians attuned to political credit claiming and symbolic policy making in an effort to garner the political support necessary for winning elections. As a result, we might expect cities with elected mayors to be more responsive than cities with a council-manager system. Turning first to the two general policy measures (scaled policy and tax burden), the results in Table 23 indicate that the form of government does not have a significant conditioning effect on the impact of public opinion, indicated by the lack of statistical significance in the interaction term

[29]This method is superior to one using coarsened exact matching because entropy balancing creates weights for each data point, while CEM first drops data points without a corresponding exact match, then weights the remaining data so the treatment and control have equally weighted observations in each cell. In my sample, this leads to a large number of dropped data points.

(ideology*mayor).[30]

The null conditioning effect of elected versus appointed city executives on the effect of city ideology is consistent across policy areas. The interaction term indicates no significant differences across developmental, allocational, and redistributive policy areas.[31] The only exception that occurs can be seen in Table 25, which contains the results of all four allocational policy models. In model two, public opinion appears to have a stronger association with the proportion of spending allocated to sewerage appears in cities with elected mayors than in cities with appointed managers.

Overall, when considering the consistency of the null finding across eleven out of twelve models, the results suggest that form of government has little impact on the relationship between public opinion and policy outcomes.

Results: Election Type

Next, I ask whether election type (partisan or nonpartisan) has a conditioning effect on the impact of public opinion. In nonpartisan elections, party affiliation generally does not appear on the ballot and parties do not officially nominate candidates. While Progressive reformers believed removing party from the ballot would decrease the power of party bosses, research surrounding the impact of nonpartisan elections suggests that participation is lower in nonpartisan contests, leaving more room for organized interests (Shaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001). As a result, I expect partisan elections to be more responsive than cities with nonpartisan elections.

Turning first to the results of the models estimating the effect of public opinion on general policy conservativism, I find mixed results when it comes to the conditional effect of election type.[32] n the scaled policy models, I find a statistically significant difference

[30]The results of model 1 (scaled policy) are a partial replication of Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014), with the only difference being the type of model used. In the original analysis, the authors use a mixture model with random effects for states, which controls for unobserved heterogeneity. Here, I use a standard linear regression model with robust standard errors clustered by state in order to correct for correlation in the error term at the state level. The results are nearly identical to those generated by a model using fixed and random effects.

[31]Full results available in Appendix A, Tables 24, 25, and 26.

[32]See Tables 27, 28, 29, and 30 in Appendix A for full results.

when it comes to the effect of public opinion in partisan and nonpartisan elections.[33] However, in the models using the tax burden outcome measure, the interaction term does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.[34]

When it comes to different policy domains, the results are generally null. In the models examining the interaction between public opinion and interactions on development policy outcomes, the interaction term does not reach conventional level of statistical significance in either model. This finding is also reflected across redistributive policy outcomes.

While the interaction effect is null across development and redistributive policy outcomes, this finding is not entirely replicated in the models using allocational spending outcomes. Like the models examining the effect of form of government, there appears to be a significant conditional effect in the sewerage model. Here, there appears to be a stronger effect in cities with partisan rather than nonpartisan elections. However, despite this one finding, the consistency of the null results across models indicates that election type is not a significant factor when it comes to enhancing (or diminishing) the relationship between public opinion and policy outcomes.

Results: Geographic Constituency

Finally, I explore whether responsiveness to public opinion varies in at-large vs. district systems. Some scholars argue that at-large systems should enhance responsiveness by "shift[ing] electoral power toward a single median voter and away from geographically concentrated interests" (Trounstine 2010). The results, however, suggest otherwise. Across all models, the interaction term does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.[35]

[33]However, this difference is not robust to an alternative model specification using a mixture model with random intercepts for states (see Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014).

[34]This interaction effect does reach statistical significant at the 0.1 level.

[35]Full results available in Appendix A, Tables 31, 32, 33, 34.

Discussion and Conclusion

In line with previous research, I find evidence that public opinion influences policy outcomes. Expanding upon work that analyzes the relationship between public opinion and policy outcomes, I incorporate additional outcome measures in order to uncover unique relationships across different policy domains. Overall, policy seems to reflect the preferences of city residents. Additionally, the effect of public opinion varies across policy areas. The results presented in this chapter suggest that public opinion is associated with development priorities, but in the area of redistributive policy, these outcomes are constrained by resources rather than the public. Allocational spending is also not responsive to opinion, with the exception of parks and recreation. Given the findings for development priorities, this maybe suggests that where there are opportunities for credit claiming (i.e. naming a park, for instance) policymakers take the public into consideration

When it comes to the impact of institutions, I find no evidence that any institution consistently affects representation in municipal government. Despite much attention to these institutions, whatever effect that they might have on policy responsiveness is too small for us to detect. The findings are consistently null in all three cases (form of government, geographic constituency, and election type) as well as across policy domains. The findings I present in this chapter are consistent with others who find similar null effects (e.g., Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014).

Interestingly, the only institutional differences that do manifest are in the models analyzing the effect on the proportion of spending on sewerage. This outcome falls under the category of allocational policy spending, a policy area in which public opinion (theoretically) has little impact. One explanation is that overlapping authority with federal and state actors is relatively low... local actors have room to maneuver. Public opinion has a stronger impact in places where mayors are elected and party labels are present. Findings comport with those of Gerber and Hopkins (2011) who find mayoral partisanship has a significant impact on spending on police and fire protection, and the results are strongest in cities where parties play a formal role in nominating candidates. "Under these conditions, the relationship between what decision makers want and the

outcomes they produce is much clearer" (Gerber and Hopkins 2011, 337).

Overall, the results of this analysis suggest policy is responsive, even though institutions themselves do not appear to exert a direct effect on this relationship. These findings comport with studies that find public opinion is represented by legislative behavior and policy making at the national and state level (Erikson, Wright, McIver 1993; Miller and Stokes 1963; Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson, Mackuen, Erikson 1995). However, despite this responsiveness to public opinion, inequality continues to grow. The joint observations of responsiveness and growing inequality create a puzzle: why has the national government failed to do more to equalize outcomes? One answer, provided by the APSA task force and others (e.g., Bartels 2004) is that government is not equally responsive. The following chapters address this question.

Chapter 4

Class Representation in Local Policy Outcomes

To recap, the previous chapter confirmed that policy is responsive, and this varies to some degree across policy areas. However, institutions do not seem to moderate this relationship. These findings comport with those from recent studies of ideological representation in local policy outcomes. Overall, it appears as though local policy is responsive to public preferences, regardless of institutional structures.

Yet, income inequality is growing. Over a ten year period, the Gini index for the U.S. overall has grown 0.0165.[36] This change is even larger across metropolitan areas. The table below shows the top 10 cities according to their 10-year growth in income inequality from 2007 to 2017.[37]

The joint observations of responsiveness and growing inequality create a puzzle: why have governments failed to do more to equalize outcomes? One answer, provided by the APSA task force and others (e.g., Bartels 2004) is that government is not equally responsive. Empirical investigations over the last decade or so reveal uneven responsiveness to citizens from different socioeconomic strata (e.g., Bartels 2008). The majority of this

[36]The Gini coefficient is an index of income inequality in which 0 is equivalent to total equality and 1 is equivalent to total inequality.

[37]These changes are calculated using data from the American Community Survey across all cities with populations of at least 100,000 and a change in their Gini index that is greater than that for the country overall (0.0165).

Table 7: 10 Year Changes in Income Inequality

City	State	Gini Index 2007	Gini Index 2017	10-Year Change
Boise	ID	0.427	0.4816	0.0546
Cleveland	OH	0.467	0.514	0.047
Las Cruces	NM	0.441	0.488	0.047
St. Louis	MO	0.476	0.5129	0.0369
Indianapolis	IN	0.449	0.4858	0.0368
Philadelphia	PA	0.487	0.5215	0.0345
Paterson	NJ	0.458	0.492	0.034
Norfolk	VA	0.453	0.4866	0.0336
Rochester	NY	0.468	0.5015	0.0335
Detroit	MI	0.473	0.5063	0.0333

Source: DePierto (2019)

extant work is conducted at the state (e.g., Flavin 2012) and congressional district (e.g., Bartels) level. Their findings suggests high income groups have the largest impact on roll call behavior, followed by the middle income group (lesser, but still significant), while the low income group has no significant impact.

Do these patterns also persist at the local level? Given what we know from previous studies at various levels of government, I hypothesize that policy is more responsive to middle and high income opinion than to low income opinion.

Applying the Peterson (1981) lens, I also expect that this relationship might vary across policy areas. Wong (1987) argues developmental policies are determined by territorial disputes among private interests. These private interests are also likely to form the tax base. Given the mobility of this tax base, if/when a city raises the local tax rate in order to pay for a local welfare state, characterized by redistributive policy spending, then the rich can flee. As a result, I expect the strongest associations to be between upper income strata in both development and redistributive policies. Finally, context also matters: Specifically, the institutional variation that occurs across cities matters for unequal representation. I expect disparities to be the strongest in "reformed" cities: cities with appointed executives, councilpersons elected at-large, and nonpartisan elections.

Assessing Unequal Representation

As I discussed in Chapter 2, I aggregate a sample of individual ideal points estimated by Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014) into three income groups: Low, middle, and high. In Figure 4, we see the distribution of opinion for each income group. Generally speaking, the location of each group's mean preferences is what we might expect: low income is most liberal (-0.115) and high income is most conservative (0.036), with middle income somewhere in between (-0.002). While at first glance these differences do not appear significant, a difference of means test reveals there is a statistically significant difference between the mean low and mean high and between mean low and mean middle. The difference between middle and high only reaches significance at the 0.1 level. These differences are important for a study of unequal representation because, logically, if two groups share the same preferences, even if policymakers only pay attention to one of those groups, both groups receive their preferred policy and my data do not allow me to disentangle the relationship any further.[38]



Figure 4: Income Group Opinion Distributions

[38]This concept, referred to as coincidental representation (Enns 2015, Gilens 2012) is explored further in Chapter 6.

Having established that group preferences are different, a necessary element for an analysis of unequal representation, we can take a look at the simple bivariate correlations between group preferences and each of the policy outcomes to get a sense of the patterns that appear in the data, presented in Table 8. Across both general policy measures (the scaled policy outcome and the measure of a city's tax burden), each income group has a statistically significant correlation with city policy. However, the correlation coefficients are strongest for middle income opinion. It also appears as though unequal representation occurs across different policy arenas: In both development policy and allocational policy outcomes, middle income opinion is the only group whose correlation coefficient reaches the conventional (0.05) level of statistical significance.

Table 8: Bivariate Correlations Between Income Groups and Policy Outcomes

	Low Income	Middle Income	High Income
Scale Policy	0.18**	0.26**	0.21**
Tax Burden	-0.08**	-0.13**	-0.08**
Capital Outlays	0.04	0.11**	0.08*
Highway	0.02	0.12**	0.04
Parks & Rec	0.07*	0.08*	0.03
Sewerage	0.09*	0.09**	0.08*
Police	−0.08*	−0.04	−0.03
Fire	−0.03	0.01	0.00
Housing & Community Dev.	−0.06	−0.01	−0.03
Welfare	−0.13	−0.04	−0.08
Health	−0.03	−0.05	−0.02
Education	−0.01	−0.13	−0.22*

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05

The associations presented in Table 8 offer some initial support of the differential responsiveness hypothesis. In order to more rigorously test for differential responsiveness, I begin by replicating the methodology used by Bartels (2008), Erikson and Bhatti (2010), and Tausanovitch (2019), regressing policy outcomes on weighted group means. We can think about policy outcomes as a function of weighted group opinon, where $\bar{X}_G$ is the mean ideology among group G within the city sample and P_G is the proportion of group G within the sample. Multiplying the proportion of the sample with raw group mean ideologies takes into account the different sizes of the groups in the electorate. Assuming there are three income groups, low, middle, and high, the mean policy position can be

represented in the form

$$Policy = \bar{X}_{Poor}P_{Poor} + \bar{X}_{Middle}P_{Middle} + \bar{X}_{High}P_{High} \tag{1}$$

Following previous scholarship, we can turn the formal model into a statistical model that allows the weights placed on the groups to vary. If mean preferences are represented without regard to group characteristics, then the coefficients in a regression of policy outcomes on the proportion weighted group means should all be equal in size and significance. If the coefficient of one group is larger than the others, this is consistent with the hypothesis that policy responds more to this group than to others. For income,

$$Policy = \beta_0 + \beta_1\bar{X}_{Poor}P_{Poor} + \beta_2\bar{X}_{Middle}P_{Middle} + \beta_3\bar{X}_{High}P_{High} + \varepsilon \tag{2}$$

In addition to the weighted group means, I also include the proportion of each group in the sample as controls, following Erikson and Bhatti (2010), who point out that the proportions may have independent effects of their own and thus should be controlled for. This leads to the following (final) linear specifications:[39]

$$\begin{aligned} Policy = \beta_0 + \beta_1\bar{X}_{Poor}P_{Poor} + \beta_2\bar{X}_{Middle}P_{Middle} + \beta_3\bar{X}_{High}P_{High} \\ +\beta_4P_{Poor} + \beta_5P_{High} + \varepsilon \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

Results

Overall, is public opinion reflected in policy outcomes (i.e. do any of the group coefficients have an effect significantly different than zero)? Yes, for the most part. This comports with findings in other studies. But, less attention has been paid to whether all opinions are represented equally at the local level. This is the fundamental question that drives the next section of analysis. Whose opinion is represented in policy outcomes?

First, I analyze the effects of income group preferences on the two general policy 'fla-

[39]In equation 5, P_{Middle} is excluded because P_{Middle} = 1 - P_{Poor} - P_{Rich}

vor' measures. The results of the models are presented in Appendix B. Turning first to the scaled policy measures (Table 35), models 1 and 2, the results indicate evidence of unequal representation. In both models, one with controls and one without, the effect of middle income opinion is positive and statistically significant, while both low and high income fail to reach statistical significance. In other words, as middle income preferences become more conservative, so does city policy (and vice versa). While at first glance it is relatively easy to say that because middle income preferences are the only significant predictor of the policy outcomes, this might be misinterpreting the findings. Significance does not necessarily equal significant differences (see Gelman article). The default hypothesis tests that software spits out when you run a regression model is the null that the coefficient equals zero. Instead, one should look at the statistical significance of the difference rather than the difference between their significance levels (by estimating the standard error of the difference using the formula Var(A-B) = Var(A) + Var(B) - 2*Cov(A,B).[40] The results of this additional test (presented at the end of this chapter), indicate that in this instance, these differences *are* statistically distinct from one another. This means that even after controlling for group proportions in the population, the effects of group opinion on policy outcomes differ from each other–evidence that unequal representation occurs.

In addition to the group opinion variables, the effects of the controls are also of interest. In Table 35, column 2, the reader can see that both median income and average home values have statistically significant associations with overall policy conservativism. In cities where the median income increases, policy becomes more conservative, while in cities where the home value increases, policy tends to become more liberal. Intuitively, this makes sense: Home values in large, liberal cities tend to be quite high.

The results of the tax burden models are not as intuitive: in models 3 and 4, the results in Table 35 suggest that *low* income preferences have the strongest association with the city's tax burden (an outcome, I argued earlier, that captures some element of

[40]I do this using the linear hypothesis function in R which computes either a finite-sample F statistic or asymptotic Chi-squared statistic for carrying out a Wald-test-based comparison between a model and a linearly restricted model.

a city's overall liberal/conservative outcomes). In model 3, which does not control for a city's policymaking capacity, the null hypothesis can be rejected. However, once the controls are included, these effects are no longer statistically different from each other. The effects of the controls themselves are also of interest: In more densely populated cities, the tax burden increases, while in wealthier cities, it decreases. In other words, in both smaller and wealthier communities, policy outcomes tend to be more conservative.

Does representation vary across policy domains? Recall that scholars have characterized development policy as a battle over territory among competing interests (Wong 1987). Assuming these interests are 1. city residents and 2. not low income, it can be argued that development policy is likely to be most responsive to high or middle income interests. The results in Table 36 confirm this intuition. In the models using total outlays and the proportion of spending on highways, the coefficient generated for middle income opinion is the largest, and this effect is statistically different from the other groups. This finding is consistent once controls are included.[41]. In other words, as middle income respondents become more conservative, spending increases.

The group proportions themselves are also of interest here: In Table 36, as the percent low income population increases, the proportion of spending on highway projects decreases. This makes sense because if the proportion of development spending decreases, this corresponds with a higher proportion of the budget beings spent in some other policy area. This result indicates an interesting (potential) asymmetry in which low income residents experience greater group interest representation, but less expressed preference representation.

When it comes to allocational, or housekeeping, policies, the results do not mirror the same patterns as general policy or development spending. Table 37 indicates that even though the model results indicate that both low income and middle income have statistically significant associations with spending on both parks and recreation and sewerage, these effects are not statistically distinct from the effects of other group preferences. These findings comport with the findings from the previous chapter, which suggest that

[41]Note that middle income only reaches significance at 0.1 in model 4 once controls are included.

public opinion is generally less of a factor determining housekeeping spending.

What does predict allocational policy spending are both population size and composition, as well as local resources. The results of the models including controls for city policymaking capacity are in Table 38. As the proportion of high income residents increases, police and fire spending decrease. We can think of a scenario that might explain this: If crime is associated with lower income areas and tends to decrease in high income areas, the need for police and fire protection is probably reduced. Also, as home values increase, there are more resources to devote to policy priorities.

Similar null results emerge for the models analyzing the relationship between group opinion and redistributive policy outcomes in Tables 39 and 40. Across the different spending categories, opinion of any group fails to have a statistically significant association with the outcomes. Only in the education spending model do low and middle income opinion reach statistical significance; however, these effects are not statistically distinct from each other.

Summary of Findings

Table 9 summarizes the results of the key hypothesis tests. Do the effects of each group differ from one another? Overall, there is some evidence of unequal representation is present, but this finding is not consistent across each of the outcome measures. In the models using the scaled policy measure as an indicator of a city's general policy conservativism, residents that fall into the middle class[42] have greater preference representation than low and high income residents. Middle class residents are also represented in development policy outcomes. However, in allocational and redistributive policy outcomes, the results suggest that unequal representation does not manifest in the same way.

[42]Middle class contains respondents whose self-reported income is above 30,000 and below 100,000 annually.

Table 9: Results of Key Hypothesis Tests - Income

Model	Reject?*
Scaled Policy	Yes
Tax Burden	Yes**
Capital Outlays	No
Highway Outlays	Yes
Community Development & Housing	Yes
Welfare	No
Healthcare	No
Education	No
Parks & Rec	No
Sewerage	No
Police	No
Fire	No

*Null: $\beta_{Low} = \beta_{Middle} = \beta_{High}$

**Once controls are included in the model, the difference is no longer statistically significant.

Institutions and Unequal Representation

Overall, the results suggest that representation varies according to economic status, even at the local level. These differences occur when it comes to a city's overall policy liberalism, but are not consistent across different policy arenas. Unequal representation does not occur in allocational or redistributive policies, but is most prevalent in the area of development spending.

In earlier chapters, I argue that an important element to consider in any study of representation at the local level is the great deal of institutional variation that occurs across contexts. In the previous chapter, I found that institutions had little effect on the relationship between city ideology and policy outcomes. However, scholars have yet to explore whether institutions affect different groups in the same manner. Do differences occur across income groups in cities with different institutional arrangements?

Drawing on a variety of literatures, I generated hypotheses about how different institutional arrangements create and/or enhance unequal representation. In systems where broad support is needed to win (i.e. competitive elections, high participation) we are likely to see more equal responsiveness—that is, we should not find different effects for

each group. On the other hand, in cities with more 'insulated' institutional arrangements, we might expect responsiveness to vary. Recall that the strongest supporters of municipal reforms were often white, property-owning individuals who used these arrangements to amplify their own interests (e.g. Bridges 1997). With this in mind, I expect that in cities with nonpartisan elections, appointed executives, and at-large elections, middle and high income opinion will be most strongly associated with policy outcomes, while in cities with partisan elections, elected executives, and district-based councils, unequal representation will not occur.

While the previous chapter employed pre-processed data and the key variable was an interaction term, this chapter takes a simpler approach. Rather than asking if institutions themselves exert some kind of a treatment effect on the impact of opinion, I ask whether patterns of (un)equal representation occur in cities with the aforementioned institutional arrangements. To answer this question, I simply subset the data according to the institution in question and replicate the models utilized in the first part of this chapter. Like the previous analyses, the key test is whether the differences between the effects of each group are statistically significant. The full results are available in Appendix B, Tables 41 to 52.

Form of Government

Turning first to the results of the models exploring representation in contexts with elected mayors and appointed managers, I find little evidence that patterns of unequal representation differ according to different institutional contexts. In the previous section, I found that unequal influence was present in the models using the scaled policy outcome, and in the models examining the effect of group opinion on development policy (specifically, highway) spending. Do these patterns differ in cities that have elected as opposed to appointed executives?

Beginning with overall policy conservativism, Table 41 contains the results of the models using the scaled policy and tax burden outcomes. The first set of models examining the effect of group opinions on overall policy conservativism indicate that once the

sample is split according to form of government, the differences that were present in the previous section are no longer detectable. In the tax burden models, however, significant differences between low and middle and low and high are present in the council-manager model, but not in cities with elected mayors. However, the findings uncovered in the council-manager model are not robust. Note that this initial analysis does not contain any controls for city policymaking capacity; Once controls are added into the models, these differences are no longer present.[43]

The previous section also uncovered differences in the area of development spending. Do these differences appear in one system vs the other? Table 42 contains the results of the analysis of unequal representation in elected vs appointed executives in the area of development policy spending. In council manager systems, unequal representation appears: residents of the middle class appear to have the strongest association with highway spending. This difference is consistent once controls are included.[44] However, in cities with elected mayors, the effects of group opinions do not differ when it comes to their association with the proportion of the city budget devoted to highway spending.[45]

Geographic Constituency

Next, in order to explore whether the geographic constituency of elected officials affects unequal representation, I subset my data into samples that contain data from cities that have district-based elections for councilmembers, and those with councilpersons elected at-large.[46] Turning first to the scaled policy measure, which captures the overall liberal/conservative tendency of local policy outcomes, there is some evidence that suggests unequal representation occurs, and this pattern is differs from one context to another. However, in this instance, it appears to benefit low income groups. The results of these models are in Table 46. When it comes to overall policy conservativism (columns 1-4), in cities with district systems, the coefficient for low income opinion is positive and

[43]See Table 45 in Appendix B for the results of the models with and without controls.

[44]The results of the models containing city policymaking capacity controls can be found in Appendix B, Table 45.

[45]I do not find any evidence of unequal representation across any of the models examining redistributive or allocational spending outcomes. These results are also available in Appendix B, Tables 43 and 44.

[46]The sample collapses mixed systems with those that have 100% of council seats elected at-large.

significant, while middle and high incomes are not significant. This effect is significantly different, and is robust once controls are included in the models (See Table 49). The same difference does not occur in at-large systems.[47] These relationships are shown in Figure 5. In the left hand panel, the strong, positive relationship between low income opinion and policy conservativism stands in contrast to the flatter slopes that represent the effect of high income and middle income opinion in district systems. In the right hand panel, which illustrates the group effects in at-large systems, the differences are much less dramatic.



Figure 5: Effect of Group Preferences on Policy Outcomes - District vs. At-Large

When it comes to different policy areas, I find few instances where patterns of unequal representation 1. occur, and 2. differ under different institutional arrangements with different geographic constituencies. While at first glance it appears as though the results in Table 47 indicate that development priorities are most responsive to middle income: In district and at large systems, spending increases as opinion of this group becomes more conservative. However, this effect is not statistically different than the effect of low or high income groups.

Similarly, when it comes to allocational/housekeeping policy, differences do not emerge. For the most part, public opinion of any group fails to reach statistical significance. Only parks and recreation spending appears to reflect public opinion—middle income, specif-

[47] I do not find the same effects in models using the taxburden outcome measure.

ically. However, F/Wald test fails to reject the null (that the difference is 0).[48] This is consistent with the findings from the first part of this chapter as well as those from the previous chapter.

Finally, I also find few differences are present in the models using redistributive spending categories as the outcomes. These results are displayed in Table 48. In only one instance does unequal representation occur: In cities with district systems, the proportion of spending dedicated to welfare appears to be most responsive to high income preferences—as residents in the top economic group become more conservative, spending on welfare decreases (and vice versa). The difference between effects are confirmed with an f/wald test and are robust once controls are included in the model (Table 49). This difference does not occur in the at-large model. So, in this instance, context might matter, but for reasons that are somewhat difficult to discern. It is entirely possible–and quite likely–that this relationship is driven by unmodeled covariates, given the lack of predictive power of the controls included in the model. In Table 49, note that of the controls included in the models, only city population size has a statistically significant association with welfare spending.[49]

Election Type

The final institutional arrangement I explore is election type. For this analysis, the data is separated into cities that hold elections with partisan labels on the ballot and those that are formally nonpartisan (partisan labels do not appear on the ballot). The full results of this analysis are presented in Appendix B in Tables 50, 51, and 52. Overall, the results suggest that election type is not the division that really matters. In no case do group opinions have significantly different effects that vary in different election contexts. This is somewhat unsurprising, given that many nonpartisan elections are effectively partisan. In many contexts, formally "nonpartisan" mayoral elections are effectively partisan, with varying degrees of party influence in between (Adrian 1959). Further, even in formally non-partisan elections, some scholars suggest voters are able to bring

[48]The results of the models are presented in Appendix B, Table 47.
[49]The coefficient itself is quite small: 0.00 once rounded.

partisan and/or ideological information to bear on voting decisions, rendering nonpartisan elections ineffective at removing the partisan element (Baum and Klein 2007; Bonneau and Cann 2015).

Summary of Findings

In this section, I ask whether or not differential representation occurs according to economic status in cities with different institutional arrangements. To answer this question, I simply subset the data according to the institution in question and replicate the models utilized in the first part of this chapter. Like the previous analyses, the key test is whether the differences between the effects of each group are statistically significant.

In sum, I find few instances where unequal representation appears to vary in contexts with different institutional arrangements. First, I find that development spending is most responsive to the middle class, and this varies in cities with elected and appointed executives. In cities with appointed city managers, this pattern emerges. However, in cities with elected mayors, the effects of group opinions do not differ when it comes to their association with the proportion of the city budget devoted to highway spending.

I also find some evidence that district systems enhance representation, but this varies according to the outcome measure used. I find that overall city policy conservativism is most responsive to low income opinion in district systems, while the same differences do not emerge in at-large systems. Interestingly, I also find that welfare spending is most strongly associated with high income opinion in district systems, while the same pattern is not present in cities using at-large systems.

Substantive Implications of Unequal Opinion Representation

The results of the analyses presented in this chapter suggest that policy is most responsive to the middle class–something that makes sense, given that they are the majority?

What does this mean in terms of policy outputs? Are there noticeable differences when it comes to policy conservativism? In Tables 10 and 11, I illustrate the range of predictions generated from the model output in the first part of the analysis.[50]

Table 10: Predicted Effects

Low Income Opinion	Predicted Policy Conservativism
-1.494	-1.106
-1.158	-0.859
-0.822	-0.613
-0.485	-0.366
-0.149	-0.120
0.187	0.126
0.523	0.372
0.859	0.619
1.196	0.866
1.532	1.112

Table 11: Predicted Effects

Middle Income Opinion	Predicted Policy Conservativism
-1.494	-1.504
-1.158	-1.174
-0.822	-0.843
-0.485	-0.513
-0.149	-0.183
0.187	0.147
0.523	0.478
0.859	0.808
1.196	1.138
1.532	1.468

In Table 10, the first column contains the ideology values used to predict city policy conservativism (column 2). For some context, actual cases found in the sample with similar policy conservativism values include Pasadena, CA (-1.12) or Chula Vista, CA (-1.14), examples of the most liberal predictions in Table 10, and Bullhead City, AZ (1.106) and Muncie, IN (1.115) as examples of the most conservative values predicted by the model. Table 11 illustrates the effect of middle class opinion, and contains the predictions generated by the same range of values found in Table 10. Here, an outcome of

[50]Predictions in Tables 10 and 11 generated using the results of the scaled policy model with controls included (Appendix B, Table 35).

-1.5 is similar to, say, Olympia, WA, which has a value of -1.4, while the most conservative outcomes predicted in the table might look like Yuma, AZ, which has a value of 1.469, or Waxahachie, TX, which has a value of 1.415.

The differences are quite apparent when looking at the predicted policy values generated by the same range of ideology values, but what do these differences look like in aggregate? How do they compare with the actual values found in the sample? Another way of thinking about the substantive implications of the findings presented above is to consider a hypothetical situation in which the effects of low and high income are equivalent to the effect as middle income. If these preferences carried the same weight, what does overall city policy conservativism look like? We can test this idea by setting the coefficients of low income and high income preferences to the value of the coefficient of middle income preferences generated in the scaled policy model presented in Table 35 in the earlier part of this chapter.

The distributions of the predicted policy outcome are presented in Figure 6. Overall, at the aggregate level, the distributions of predicted policy outcomes are remarkably similar to those that are actually observed in the data (the red line). While we might expect that the predicted distributions might be, for instance, more liberal if low income residents had the same impact as their middle class counterparts on policy outcomes, Figure 6 does not suggest this is the case. Instead, in aggregate, unequal preference representation does not necessarily result in severe bias.

Discussion and Conclusion

Empirical investigations over the last decade or so reveal uneven responsiveness to citizens from different socioeconomic strata (e.g., Bartels 2008). Motivated by research that uncovers skewed policy responsiveness at the state level (e.g., Bartels 2008; Erikson and Bhatti 2010; Tausanovitch 2019), this chapter asks whether biases also exist at the most decentralized levels of policy making.

How do my findings comport with the literature? In line with the literature, I do find



Figure 6: Predicted vs. Observed Policy Outcomes

some evidence of unequal representation in policy outcomes at the local level. However, the results of my analysis at the local level do not indicate the same striking inequalities as work generated by scholars at higher levels of government (e.g., Bartels, Gilens). Additionally, at the local level, the middle class is often most strongly associated with outcomes, not those in the top tier of the income bracket.

In addition to unequal representation in overall city policy conservativism, the results also point to interesting variation across policy domains. Unequal representation only occurs in development policy–not redistributive or allocational. This finding comports with expectations derived from the literature. This finding also confirms the argument that at the local level, a more nuanced approach is necessary.

When it comes to the role of institutional context, I find few instances in which representation varies under different institutional arrangements. The results point to weak evidence suggesting council-manager more responsive to middle income interests in the area of development policy. The results also suggest district arrangements are beneficial for representation of low income residents. This makes a great deal of sense. However, this result is not consistent across outcome measures.

So, what do we make of this? Overall, the evidence of unequal representation is somewhat shaky, and certainly not as overwhelmingly obvious as previous studies of unequal class representation uncover at higher levels of government. The results presented in this chapter do little to suggest a new gilded age (Bartels 2008). However, it is important to keep in mind that focusing too fully on the glass half full gives a very incomplete picture of our severely biased political system. It is entirely possible that economic status is not the primary division at the local level. In the next chapter, I explore an alternative (and more salient) division in local politics: race.

Chapter 5

Racial Representation in Local Policy Outcomes

In the previous chapter, I found that representation in local policy outcomes varies according to economic status, even at the local level. These differences occur when it comes to a city's overall policy liberalism, but are not consistent across different policy arenas. Unequal representation does not occur in allocational or redistributive policies, but is most prevalent in the area of development spending.

Until this point, much of the empirical work examining unequal representation has tended to focus on uneven responsiveness to citizens from different economic strata (e.g., Bartels 2008). Despite the findings in the previous chapter, there is an argument to be made that economic status is not the primary division in local politics. For example, local politics scholars find vote patterns and policy priorities are shaped by racial cleavages more so than any other demographic division (Hajnal and Trounstine 2013a, Hajnal and Trounstine 2013b, Hajnal and Trounstine 2014). Additionally, many studies present evidence that black, Latino/a, and Asian Americans are underrepresented at every level of political office (e.g. Hajnal 2010). Further, attitudes towards/about local government are shaped by race: For example, Hajnal and Trounstine (2014) show black, Latino/a, and poor residents feel less well served by local governments than white and wealthier members of their communities. These gaps are persistent even when controlling for

policy outcomes. Given the disparities found in the local politics literature, the analyses in this chapter depart from work solely focused on differential responsiveness according to economic status by also asking whether responsiveness varies according to race.

Assessing Unequal Representation



Figure 7: Racial Group Opinion Distributions

In order to assess whether unequal representation occurs across race as well as income, it is necessary to determine whether group preference divisions exist in the first place. Returning to the distributions (originally presented in Chapter 2, Figure 3), in Figure 7, we can see that these distributions 1. differ in meaningful ways, and 2. are in line with what we might expect about each group's location on the left-right continuum: white opinion tends to be more conservative (mean = 0.096) than black (mean = -0.447) or Latino/a (mean = -0.203) opinion, and black opinion is the most liberal of the three. Interestingly, there is significantly more divergence in the average group estimates presented here than in other studies of unequal representation. For example, Bhatti and Erikson (2010) find that the mean ideology for low, middle, and high income groups is substantively very

similar (yet, the authors still find evidence of differential responsiveness). Here, a simple difference of means test confirms that the group means are substantively and statistically different from each other: Black is significantly different than white and Latino/a, and Latino/a is also significantly different than white.

One thing to note is that there is generally more ideological distance between Black, White, and Latino/a than between the poor and rich (described in Chapter 4). In contrast, there is generally more ideological overlap (and less ideological distance) between the poor and the rich (in Figure 4) than between whites and minorities in Figure 7. The fact that low, mid- and high-wealth residents are relatively close ideologically in a large share of the communities in our sample suggests that the prospects for coincidental representation of low-wealth residents are quite good in many communities.[51] This is reflected in the relatively small differences in policy outcomes that occur when low and middle income groups are represented at the same level. However, in this instance, much greater differences occur right off the bat. Greater differences between white, black and Latino/a opinions suggest there is ample opportunity for unequal representation to occur.

Table 12: Bivariate Correlations

	White	Black	Latino/a
Scale Policy	0.30**	0.11	0.03
Tax Burden	-0.15**	0.00	-0.04
Capital Outlays	0.11**	−0.01	0.07
Highway	0.09**	0.00	0.09*
Parks & Rec	0.10**	−0.10**	0.01
Sewerage	0.06	−0.03	0.01
Police	0.00	−0.01	−0.02
Fire	0.00	0.02	−0.01
Housing & Community Dev.	0.04	−0.01	0.04
Welfare	−0.01	−0.05	0.12
Health	−0.08	−0.05	0.02
Education	−0.20**	−0.04	0.13

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05

Having established that group preferences are different, a necessary element for an analysis of unequal representation, we can take a look at the simple bivariate correlations between group preferences and each of the policy outcomes to get a sense of the

[51] At the same time, though, it is important to keep in mind that coincidental representation is inevitably a tentative form of representation because by definition it makes the beneficiary of coincidental representation dependent on a more influential group (Enns 2015; Gilens 2015). I explore this idea in greater detail in Chapter 6.

patterns that appear in the data. The first pattern that stands out in Table 12 is the statistically significant correlations that appear between white opinion and a number of policy outcomes, while the correlation coefficients for black and Latino/a opinion seldom reach statistical significance. In only one instance does black opinion have a statistically significant correlation coefficient. White opinion is most strongly correlated with both general policy outcome measures (the scaled policy and tax burden variables) and education spending. All three of these relationships suggest that as white opinion becomes more conservative, so do policy outcomes: the overall tax burden decreases, and education spending decreases as well. There are also statistically significant bivariate correlations between white opinion and both development policy measures: where opinion is more conservative, development spending increases. Finally, white opinion also has a statistically significant bivariate relationship with parks and recreation spending. The coefficient is positive, while the relationship between black opinion and parks and recreation spending is statistically significant in the opposite direction. The reason for these opposing directions is unclear.

The bivariate correlations presented above provide some initial evidence that unequal representation occurs, but do these patterns persist once additional covariates are included? Following the same strategy employed in the previous chapter, I regress policy outcomes on weighted group means. If we assume there are three racial groups, White, Black, and Latino/a, then the mean policy position can be represented in the form

$$Policy = \bar{X}_{White}P_{White} + \bar{X}_{Black}P_{Black} + \bar{X}_{Latinx}P_{Latinx} \tag{4}$$

We then turn the formal model into a statistical model that allows the weights placed on the groups to vary. To review, if mean preferences are represented without regard to group characteristics, then the coefficients in a regression of policy outcomes on the proportion weighted group means should all be equal in size and significance. If the coefficient of one group is larger than the others, this is consistent with the hypothesis

that policy responds more to this group than to others. The equation looks like this:

$$Policy = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \bar{X}_{White} P_{White} + \beta_2 \bar{X}_{Black} P_{Black} + \beta_3 \bar{X}_{Latinx} P_{Latinx} + \varepsilon \tag{5}$$

Finally, just as I did in the previous chapter, I also include the proportion of each group in the sample as controls, following Erikson and Bhatti (2010), who point out that the proportions may have independent effects of their own and thus should be controlled for. This leads to the following (final) linear specification:

$$\begin{aligned} Policy = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \bar{X}_{White} P_{White} + \beta_2 \bar{X}_{Black} P_{Black} + \beta_3 \bar{X}_{Latinx} P_{Latinx} \\ + \beta_4 P_{White} + \beta_5 P_{Black} + \beta_6 P_{Latinx} + \varepsilon \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

Results

Does unequal representation occur across different groups according to race? Overall, the results of the models estimating differential group effects by race point to some evidence that suggests unequal representation in local policy outcomes occurs. The results appear to suggest that local policy is more responsive to white citizens than to other racial groups, but unequal representation does not occur consistently across all of the outcome measures.

First, I examine whether unequal representation occurs in either of the two policy conservativism models, the results of which are presented in Appendix C, Table 53. With controls for the proportion in each category, white preferences are statistically significant predictors of city policy conservativism using the scaled policy measure, while neither black nor Latino/a opinion is predictive of policy conservativism. A test of the difference between group effects confirms that we can reject the null hypothesis that all three groups are the same (white = black = latino/a) and indicates that the preferences of white residents are better represented than those of minorities. [52]

[52]Once again, I do this using the linear hypothesis function in R which computes either a finite-sample F statistic or asymptotic Chi-squared statistic for carrying out a Wald-test-based comparison between a model and a linearly restricted model.

In the model without the controls for city policymaking capacity, the results of the tax burden model mirror those of the scaled policy outcome measure. However, once the controls are introduced, the statistically significant group effects found in column 3 disappear. This result comports with results from previous chapters that also indicate once these capacity controls are included, public opinion no longer has a statistically significant association with policy outcomes.

In addition to the two policy conservativism outcome measures, I also ask whether group representation differs across various policy areas. Turning first to representation in developmental policy priorities, the results indicate that group opinion is reflected in these outcomes, but these group effects do not always differ from one another. Turning first to the results of the models examining the effect of group opinion on development policy outcomes, the results, presented in Table 54, are mixed. When it comes to the proportion of spending on general outlays (columns 1 and 2), the effects of each group opinion are not statistically distinct from one another. However, in the case of the proportion of capital outlays devoted specifically for highways (columns 3 and 4), the effect of black opinion and white opinion are statistically distinct from each other, and in opposite directions. Here, in line with the expectations, as white opinion becomes more conservative (liberal), the proportion of highway spending increases (decreases). Interestingly, as black opinion becomes more conservative, the opposite occurs: highway spending decreases in places where opinion is conservative, and increases as black opinion becomes increasingly liberal.

When it comes to representation in redistributive policy priorities, it also appears as though white opinion is a more powerful determinant of outcomes than the preferences of minority residents. The results in Table 55 indicate that only community development and healthcare are responsive to public opinion at all, and it's only white and latino/a opinion. Black opinion never has an effect statistically significant from zero. In these two models, the effect of white opinion is also in the expected direction: as opinion becomes more conservative, spending decreases (and vice versa). However, for Latino/a, the proportion of spending on healthcare increases as opinion becomes more conservative, and decreases as it becomes more liberal. In both cases, these effects are statistically

different from each other.

While differences emerge in both developmental and redistributive spending categories, I do not find statistically robust evidence of unequal representation in allocational spending categories. Across all four models in Table 57, in only once instance does any group opinion have a statistically significant association with allocational policy outcomes. In column 1, spending on parks and recreation, white opinion is reflected in spending on parks and recreation.[53]

Summary of Findings

In sum, the results of the analysis thus far indicate that unequal representation occurs, and it is white residents who appear to be most advantaged when it comes to representation in local policy outcomes. However, this finding varies across the range of policy areas included in the analysis. Table 13 summarizes the results of the key hypothesis tests: whether the effects of each group's opinion are statistically different from each other. In both of the city policy conservativism outcomes (the scaled policy measure and the measure of local tax burden), unequal representation occurs, but is only robust to city policymaking controls in the former instance. Once controls were included in the tax burden model, differential group effects were no longer detectable. In addition to overall city policy conservativism, I also find robust evidence of differential group effects in the areas of developmental (highway) and redistributive (welfare) spending.

Institutions

In earlier chapters, I argue that an important element to consider in any study of representation at the local level is the great deal of institutional variation that occurs across contexts. However, scholars have yet to explore whether institutions affect different groups in the same manner. Do differences occur across income groups in cities with

[53]The difference between black/white approaches conventional levels of significance, but only reaches significance at 0.1. Once controls are introduced in Table 58, any differential effects that initially appeared are washed out.

Table 13: Results of Key Hypothesis Tests - Race

Model	Reject?*
Scaled Policy	Yes
Tax Burden	Yes***
Capital Outlays	No
Highway Outlays	Yes
Community Development & Housing	Yes
Welfare	No
Healthcare	Yes
Education	No
Parks & Rec	Yes**
Sewerage	No
Police	No
Fire	No

*Null: $\beta_{Black} = \beta_{White} = \beta_{Latino/a}$
** does not reach conventional ($p<0.05$) level. Reaches $p<0.1$.
*** once controls introduced, no longer significant.

different institutional arrangements? In the previous chapter, I find few differences from the perspective of unequal representation in different institutional contexts. There is some evidence that cities with appointed managers (vs. elected mayors) and those with district systems might enhance the voices of some groups over others, but these findings are not consistent across outcome measures.

To review, in earlier chapters, I generated hypotheses about how different institutional arrangements create and/or enhance unequal representation. In systems where broad support is needed to win (i.e. competitive elections, high participation) we are likely to see more equal responsiveness—that is, we should not find different effects for each group. On the other hand, in cities with more 'insulated' institutional arrangements, we might expect responsiveness to vary. Recall that the strongest supporters of municipal reforms were often white, property-owning individuals who used these arrangements to amplify their own interests (e.g. Bridges 1997). With this in mind, I expect that in cities with nonpartisan elections, appointed executives, and at-large elections, white opinion will be most strongly associated with policy outcomes, while in cities with partisan elections, elected executives, and district-based councils, unequal representation will not occur.

Following the same process for analysis as the previous chapter, I ask whether patterns of (un)equal representation occur in cities with the aforementioned institutional arrangements. To answer this question, I simply subset the data according to the insti-

tution in question and replicate the models utilized in the first part of this chapter. Like the previous analyses, the key test is whether the differences between the effects of each group are statistically significant. The full results are available in Appendix C, Tables 59-70.

Form of Government

First, I analyze whether unequal responsiveness occurs for different groups according to race in cities with elected mayors and in cities with appointed managers. When it comes to the overall 'flavor' of local policy, there does not appear to be any evidence of unequal preference representation in mayor-council systems. None of the opinion variables reach conventional levels of statistical significance, and an F-test confirms that there are no significant differences between the effects of each group opinion. This finding confirms the conventional wisdom regarding responsiveness of directly elected mayors, who are seen as more responsive to the views of citizens because directly-elected mayors are full-time politicians attuned to political credit claiming and symbolic policy making in an effort to garner the political support necessary for winning elections (cite). Because turnout is higher in cities with directly elected mayors (cites), this results in needing to cater to a broader base of the population, which is likely more diverse, rather than pandering to a very narrow electoral coalition.

In Figure 8, this relationship is illustrated in the left panel: the slopes for both black and latino/a opinion are nearly identical, and the slope for white opinion, while somewhat 'flatter', does not deviate from the others in a statistically detectable way. The results of the model for council-manager systems, on the other hand, do point to some evidence of unequal representation—which, again, comports well with the theory of credit-claiming mentioned above. Here, only white opinion reaches statistical significance, an F-test reveals that this effect is significantly different than that of the effect of minority opinion. Even after including capacity controls (see discussion in previous chapter) these differences remain significant. In the right panel of Figure 8, the difference between slopes is more easily seen than in the left panel. In the right hand panel, which illustrates the

effect of each group's opinion in cities with appointed managers, the different slopes are more easily visible. Here, there is a clear linear relationship between white policy conservativism and city policy conservativism: as opinion becomes increasingly conservative (positive values), so does the overall value of city policy conservativism. The slope of white opinion is steeper than the slopes of black and latino/a opinion, the latter being nearly flat.



Figure 8: Effect of Group Preferences on City Policy Outcomes - Elected vs. Appointed Executive

Next, I turn to the question of whether representation varies under different institutional arrangements across specific expenditure priorities. Turning first to allocational (housekeeping) policies, the results indicate that in cities with elected mayors, none of the opinion variables are significant across any of the housekeeping policy areas. In cities with an appointed manager, however, some initial evidence of unequal representation appears. Parks spending: significant differences between minority groups and white. Note that even though white opinion is significant in the sewerage and police models, an F test reveals these effects are not statistically distinct from each other. Parks. Once constraints included, the differences initially found in council manager systems are no longer significant. Instead, median income is the primary driver of the proportion spent on parks and recreation—as it increases, so does the proportion of parks spending. This can be seen in Figure 9, where there appears to be very little difference in the steepness of each slope in across both panels.



Figure 9: Effect of Group Preferences on Allocational Policy Outcomes - Elected vs. Appointed Executive

While the results of the models examining group opinion associations with allocational spending categories are consistent in terms of the null findings, the findings are mixed across redistributive policy areas. In Table 61, across all four redistributive policy models no differences emerge in cities with elected mayors. In cities with appointed managers, however, there is some evidence that education spending responds to white preferences and, interestingly, health and education spending are associated with Latino/a opinion. In the model examining group associations with healthcare spending, both white and latino/a opinion have a statistically significant association with the outcome, and these effects are in the opposite directions. The coefficient for white preferences is what we would expect: As opinion becomes more conservative, the proportion of healthcare spending decreases. However, when Latino/a opinion moves in the conservative direction, healthcare spending appears to increase.

Finally, unequal representation also varies under elected and appointed city executives in the area of development spending. In cities with elected mayors, all three opinion variables have a statistically significant relationship with general development spending (total capital outlays) in the same direction. No differences emerge in highway spending, specifically. In cities with appointed managers, both white and latino/a opinion are statistically significant and in the expected direction in both development models, while black opinion is in the opposite direction. While the effect of white and latino/a opinion

are not statistically distinct from each other, the difference between the effect of white opinion and black opinion is statistically significant. For General outlays, the difference between black/white effects remains significant (.1) once controls are included. However, once controls are included in the models examining highway spending, specifically, the differences that initially appeared in the highway spending model are no longer significant. Instead, as income increases, highway spending increases.[54]

Geographic Constituency

Turning first to the general 'flavor' of local policy (the scaled policy measure), the results indicate some evidence that suggests the impact of different group preferences is unequal.[55] In at large systems, white opinion has a positive, significant effect. This effect is statistically distinct from the others. The same difference is not reflected in cities with district systems. This can be seen when comparing each panel in Figure 10. In the left panel, which illustrates the group effects in cities with district systems, the steepness of the slopes differs to some degree, but these differences are not statistically distinct from one another, and all three relationships with policy outcomes are in the expected direction (as opinion grows more conservative, so do policy outcomes. In the right hand panel, which illustrates the predicted outcomes in cities with at-large systems, there is greater variation when it comes to group effects. While the slope for white opinion is similar to the effect in the left hand panel, the relationship between black opinion and policy outcomes is reversed: The predicted outcomes suggest that as black opinion becomes more conservative (liberal) policy outcomes become more liberal (conservative). Finally, the slope for Latino/a opinion is almost completely flat.

Next, I turn to specific policy areas. Across allocational (housekeeping) policy spending in Table 64, the only differences that occur are in at-large systems (parks and recreation spending). However, once controls are included, the differences that initially appeared in the models using parks and recreation spending are no longer present.[56] A

[54]Results of the models including controls are available in Appendix C, Table 62.
[55]Full results available in Appendix C, Table 63.
[56]Results available in Appendix C, Table 66.



Figure 10: Effect of Group Preferences on Policy Outcomes - District vs. At-Large

similar finding emerges for redistributive policy areas. Across redistributive policy areas, unequal representation occurs in both district and at large systems (housing and community development spending). After including controls, spending on housing and community development is only unequal in district systems.

Finally, does development spending respond unequally? In at large systems, white preferences are (statistically) significantly better represented in highway development spending. This finding is robust once controls are introduced into the model.

Election Type

The final institutional arrangement I explore is election type. For this analysis, I apply the same method as in the previous chapter, separating the data into cities that hold elections with partisan labels on the ballot and those that are formally nonpartisan (partisan labels do not appear on the ballot). The full results of this analysis are presented in Appendix C in Tables 67, 68, 69, and 70.

In the previous chapter, I found that election type is not particularly consequential when it comes to unequal representation of different economic classes. In this analysis, which shifts focus to differential representation of the preferences of different races, the results do point to some evidence that election type might matter when it comes to group preference representation. First, when it comes to overall city policy conservativism, the

presence of unequal representation occurs in contexts with nonpartisan elections, but not in contexts with partisan elections. In Table 67, which contains the results of the models using the scaled policy outcome, the results suggest that in cities with partisan elections, none of the opinion variables have statistically significant effects. In cities that have nonpartisan elections, only white opinion has a statistically significant effect, and this effect is significantly distinct from that of minority opinion.[57]

The evidence for unequal representation/responsiveness across allocational/housekeeping policy areas is somewhat weaker. Here, public opinion variables have no significant relationship with sewerage, police or fire spending in either system, and no effect on parks partisan systems. In nonpartisan systems, white opinion reaches significance at the .1 level, and this is significantly different (.1) from the effect of black opinion.

Election type might mediate the effect of opinion on local redistribution priorities. First, none of the opinion variables are significant in any of the models in partisan systems. In nonpartisan systems, white opinion is statistically significant in its relationship to community development and housing spending. As white opinion becomes more conservative, city spending on community development and housing decreases. When it comes to the relationship between group opinion and development policies, no differences emerge when it comes to overall capital spending in both nonpartisan and partisan systems. When it comes to highway spending, specifically, significant differences emerge. These differences do not occur in partisan systems.

Summary of Findings

Does representation vary for different groups under different arrangements? In line with theoretical expectations, white residents seem to be better represented in policy outcomes than their black and Latino/a neighbors in cities with appointed managers. Specifically, this occurs in development spending (whites better represented in proportion spent on general outlays), and the general 'flavor' of local policy (whites better represented in models using the scaled policy measure). These differences do not occur under systems

[57]In the models using the tax burden outcome, none of the opinion variables reach statistical significance.

with elected mayors and are robust once capacity controls are included.

Similarly, in at-large systems, policy appears to be most responsive to white residents. The general 'flavor' of policy (scaled policy measure) is most responsive to white opinion in at-large systems. The same differences do not emerge in district systems.

Finally, when examining patterns of responsiveness in cities using partisan and nonpartisan elections, policy representation also differs along racial dimensions. The overall flavor of policy decisions is most responsive to white opinion in nonpartisan systems, while the same differences do not occur in partisan systems. When it comes to more specific policy priorities, white opinion is still better represented—community development is most responsive to white opinion in both partisan and nonpartisan systems, while highway spending is most responsive to white opinion in partisan systems (but the same differences are not present in nonpartisan systems).

Substantive Implications of Unequal Opinion Representation

In the previous chapter, I suggested that one way to think about the substantive implications of the findings is to consider a hypothetical situation in which the effect of under-represented groups is equivalent to that of the group whose preferences are strongly associated with policy outcomes. If these preferences carried the same weight, what do the outcomes look like? How do they compare with the actual outcomes observed in the data? We can test this idea by setting the coefficients of Black and Latino/a preferences to the value of the coefficient of White preferences and plotting the predicted outcomes.

The distributions of the predicted policy outcome are presented in Figure 11. Turning first to the predicted distribution of the scaled policy measure (top left), there is not much difference between the predicted white distribution and the distribution of observed policy outcomes. However, if we create a hypothetical situation in which black and Latino/a opinion are represented as well as white opinion, we see there is less variation (spread) than white preferences and for the observed outcomes. These differences are



Figure 11: Predicted vs. Observed Policy Outcomes

not reflected in the predictions for income groups. Overall, this exercise illustrates that unequal representation can be consequential for local policy outcomes. Policy outcomes might look noticeably different if minority groups received the same representation in policy outcomes as white residents.

In addition to changes in the overall distribution of policy outcomes (shown above), the tables highlight in greater detail the differential effects of minorities and white residents. In Table 14, the first column, Black Opinion, represents a range of ideology scores used to predict column 2, labeled 'Predicted Policy Conservativism'.[58] To provide some context, actual cases found in my sample with similar outcome values include Framingham, MA (-0.242) and New York, NY (-0.264) at the most liberal end of the predicted values, and Columbia, MO (0.0603) and Palm Bay FL (0.0677) at the conservative end of the predicted values in Table 14. This range of predicted values is far more constrained than the range of values predicted in Table 15, which shows the predicted policy values based on white opinion across the *same range of ideology scores*. For some context, cases found

[58]Predictions in Tables 14 and 15 generated using the results of the scaled policy model with controls included (Appendix C, Table 53).

in the actual data that have policy values that correspond with the predicted values in Table 15 include Palo Alto, CA (-2.39) and Santa Barbara (-2.13) at the most liberal end of the table, and Wheat Ridge, CO (1.781) and Garden City, MI (1.779) at the most conservative values.

Table 14: Predicted Effects

Black Opinion	Predicted Policy Conservativism
-1.542	-0.255
-1.200	-0.219
-0.858	-0.184
-0.516	-0.148
-0.174	-0.113
0.168	-0.078
0.510	-0.042
0.853	-0.007
1.195	0.028
1.534	0.064

Table 15: Predicted Effects

White Opinion	Predicted Policy Conservativism
-1.542	-2.047
-1.200	-1.629
-0.858	-1.211
-0.516	-0.793
-0.174	-0.375
0.168	0.426
0.510	0.461
0.853	0.878
1.195	1.296
1.534	1.714

The predictions in Tables 14 and 15 illustrate the disparate effects of different groups on local policy outcomes. They also bolster the argument that race, not income, is the more significant division in local politics. Recall that in Chapter 4, I found some evidence of differential group effects, and these differences *are* consequential for policy outcomes.[59] One way of thinking about the cumulative effect of these changes is to consider the changes in the range of predicted outcomes. In Chapter 4, across the same set of ideology values, the policy range predicted by middle income opinion is about 1.35 times larger than the range of predicted values for low income opinion. In other words, where middle income opinion take on liberal (conservative) values, policies take on values that are farther left

[59]Tables 10 and 11 illustrated the differential effects of low and middle income opinion on policy outcomes.

(right) on the ideological scale than the policy values predicted by the same range of low income ideology values. In this chapter, across a similar range of group ideology values (-1.542 to 1.534, compared to -1.494 to 1.532 in Chapter 4), the corresponding changes in the predicted outcome values are much larger. In Table 14, the cumulative change in policy conservativism is about 0.32 points. In Table 15, this change is about 3.75 points, which is nearly *twelve times* the size of the overall change in Table 14.

Discussion and Conclusion

While much of the empirical work tends to focus on uneven responsiveness to citizens from different economic strata (e.g., Bartels 2008), this chapter departs from work solely focused on differential responsiveness according to economic status by asking whether responsiveness varies according to race. While much of the literature to date considers inequality between the poor and the increasingly rich elite, race remains a dominant division in local politics and warrants attention.

The findings presented in this chapter suggest that the views of minority constituents are, in some instances, less well-represented than those of white constituents when it comes to policy decisions in municipal governments. So, while city policy does appear to be responsive to public opinion, some opinions appear to count more than others. Further, these patterns appear to vary according to contexts. The results suggest that uneven representation occurs in cities with appointed managers, where councilpersons are elected at-large, and where party labels do not appear on the ballot. While the underlying mechanisms that drive these relationships are not tested directly, the consistency of uneven representation in particular contexts suggests something is going on. The findings presented in this chapter also have consequential policy implications: Policy outcomes in cities would be more liberal if black preferences were represented at the same level as white preferences, all else equal.

The findings in this chapter also have broader implications for our understanding of the divisions in local politics. Here, I present evidence that race is the far more consequential

division when compared to the implications of class-based divisions presented in the previous chapter.

In the next chapter, I build on the findings presented in this chapter and assess the influence of coincidental representation (Enns 2015)– the dynamic in which disadvantaged groups receive representation because their views overlap with those from more advantaged populations – on the amount of ideological congruence representation enjoyed by each group.

Chapter 6

Coincidental Representation

In the previous chapters, I examined patterns of policy representation across economic and race groups in communities throughout the United States. The findings revealed under-representation of low income and minority groups. Importantly, Chapters 4 and 5 focused largely on general patterns of (un)equal representation and the resulting policy consequences, which reveal that race is the far more consequential division when compared to the implications of class-based divisions.

What the findings do not reveal are the non-trivial number of instances in which a great deal of overlap between groups occurs. In this chapter, I explore another important contextual feature that underlies the process of representation: the underlying structure of public opinion. Without preference divergence, there are few opportunities for unequal representation. But where preferences diverge, who wins and who loses? Accounting for the proximity of group preferences allows us to assess the influence of coincidental representation (Enns 2015)– the dynamic in which disadvantaged groups receive representation because their views overlap with those from more advantaged populations – on the amount of ideological congruence representation enjoyed by each group. In other words, it provides a slightly different method for analyzing unequal group influence on policy outcomes.

Theory of Coincidental Representation

According to the theory of coincidental representation, when the preferences of the median and affluent align, even if politicians only follow the affluent, policy will reflect the median's interest. In other words, if two groups share the same preferences, even if policymakers only pay attention to one of those groups, both receive their preferred policy. (Enns 2015; Gilens 2012).

What happens when groups do not align? If we want to understand who gets represented when coincidental representation does not occur, it is necessary to focus on what happens where a preference gap exists. Previous research exploring this question quantifies this 'gap' as the percent of one group who support a particular policy minus the percent of another group who support that policy (ex. Gilens 2012). If the gap is zero, this implies that both groups express equal support. However, if the gap between groups is larger, this is indicative of more distinct policy preferences and, importantly, more opportunity for unequal representation.

In this analysis, I draw on this concept in order to further analyze representation at the municipal level. Here, the preference gap represents the mean group position of one group minus the mean opinion of another. If the gap between groups is zero (or very close to zero) there is opportunity for coincidental representation. That is, even if policymakers only pay attention to one of those groups, both still receive policy representation. On the other hand, where the gap is larger, there is more opportunity for unequal representation, as policy preferences are more distinct. In this scenario, who wins and who loses?

Do Gaps Matter?

In the previous chapters, I find evidence that public opinion influences policy outcomes, but some opinions appear to count more than others. Even after controlling for the policy making constraints that are faced by cities, the analyses reveal that white preferences are better reflected in local policy outcomes, while black and Latino/a preferences are not.

The theory of coincidental representation suggests that when (and where) group interests align, they do not lose out because their interests are still represented via coincidental representation. While Enns (2015) argues that even places with gaps can still have coincidental representation because of relative policy support, I argue that these gaps are consequential when it comes to representation in local politics because there is a distorted hierarchy of influence in local politics. Unequal influence means that the further minority interests are from the 'dominant' group, the farther policy outcomes are from their preferred position (or something close to it). If it were the case that you could still have coincidental representation when gaps exist, we would not see this pattern. Instead, where gaps exist, policy is substantially different than the preferred outcome.

Hypotheses

I hypothesize that the greater the distance between white opinion and minority opinion, the greater the distance between policy outcomes and the preferred outcomes of minority residents will be.[60] In a cross-sectional analysis with three race groups (white, black and Latino/a), this should look like the following: the underlying opinion structure should have no impact on congruence between white opinion and policy outcomes. However, because minority representation is coincidental—that is, it occurs because there is overlap—where differences between groups exist, unequal representation occurs. As the gap between black and white opinion widens, policy outcomes should also become increasingly incongruent with black opinion. In general, we should expect the same relationships for the distance between white and latino/a opinion and group congruence with policy outcomes.

Data & Measurement

In this analysis, I rely on the same group-level ideology measures that I used in previous chapters. Unlike the previous chapters, I am limited to one outcome variable–

[60] y=distance between policy outcome and group x, x=difference between group 1 and group 2.

the scaled policy index. Additionally, the method of analysis differs from the method used in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Here, I am interested in the congruence–proximity–between the preferences of citizens and city policy conservatism (Achen 1978; Matsusaka 2001).

However, due to the fact that the policy preferences measures and policy outcomes measures are not in the same space, in order to explore the impact of the distance between group preferences on a group's policy congruence (the distance between their preferred outcome and the actual policy outcome in a city), the public opinion measures and the outcome measures need to be scaled appropriately.[61] There are three principle approaches to dealing with this problem. The first is to rescale the ideological identifier and roll call measures to the same range (Achen 1978). The second is to standardize both measures in some way (Wright 1978) and the third is to rescale MC ideology to a narrower range than citizens because of the paucity of extreme legislators (Powell 1982).[62]

My approach relies on a combination of the first and second approaches (Achen 1978; Wright 1978) and involves standardizing both measures using a z score standardization where the mean is zero and the standard deviation is 1. After standardizing both the policy outcome and the public opinion variables, I construct the dependent variables (distance between policy outcomes and group preferences) by taking the absolute value of the distance between them. The main independent variables– the distance between black-white, latino-white—are constructed in a similar manner (taking the absolute value of the difference). Lower values indicate closer proximity (congruence), while larger values indicate greater distance.

In addition to the group distance variables, I also include several other independent variables in the analysis. First, I include the proportion of the population (black or Latino/a) as predictor of group policy congruence. Here, I expect that as the size of the minority population increases, the distance between minority preferences and policy

[61] Scaling problems stem from the fact that there is not an obvious way to relate a citizen's ideological leanings to the ideological leaning of policy outcomes (or MC voting behavior in other research). In this case, the batteries of policy questions used to construct citizen ideology (CCES surveys) and city-level policy conservativism (ICMA survey) do not overlap.

[62] Fortunately, the empirical consequences of choosing one method of the other are relatively minor (Ellis 2010).

outcomes (the dependent variable) will also decrease.[63] As the proportion of minority residents increases, the distance between *white* preferences and policy outcomes should *increase* as a result of the white population decreasing proportionally.

Finally, I also include the same controls found in the previous chapters, including overall city population size, the median income of a city, and the median home value. Summary statistics are available in Table 16.

Table 16: Summary Statistics - Chapter 6

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Black-Policy Dist.	295	0.996	0.802	0.001	0.429	1.344	4.363
White-Policy Dist.	398	0.882	0.740	0.002	0.338	1.200	4.474
Latino/a-Policy Dist.	308	1.047	0.873	0.012	0.387	1.534	4.413
Black-White Dist.	995	0.674	0.437	0.002	0.339	0.952	2.571
Latino/a-White Dist.	976	0.580	0.449	0.0005	0.224	0.865	2.368
Median Income	1,457	0.459	0.173	0.147	0.336	0.552	1.399
City Population	1,457	0.846	2.717	0.200	0.266	0.698	80.083
Median Home Val.	1,456	1.458	1.005	0.355	0.841	1.718	9.936

Results

The results for the models examining the effect of the distance between black and white opinion can be found in Table 17. Columns 1 and 2 indicate the effect of the difference between white and black opinion on the distance between white opinion and policy outcomes, while columns 3 and 4 indicate the effect of the difference between group opinion on the distance between black opinion and policy outcomes. Recall that since policy outcomes are generally most responsive to white preferences, we should find that the gap between white and black opinion is not associated with the distance of white opinion from policy outcomes. However, the gap between black opinion and white opinion should matter when it comes to the representation of black opinion in policy outcomes. Where there is overlap, black opinion should be closer to the outcome. However, as the gap between black and white opinion grows, because policy is most responsive to white opinion, the distance between black opinion and the actual outcomes should also increase.

[63]This is essentially the same logic behind weighting the opinion variables in earlier analyses: group size matters for representation.

Table 17: Association Between Group Opinion Distance and Distance from Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:			
	White-Policy Distance		*Black-Policy Distance*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.781**	0.596**	0.777**	0.947**
	(0.104)	(0.181)	(0.104)	(0.145)
Black-White Difference	0.066	0.064	0.327**	0.328**
	(0.089)	(0.098)	(0.108)	(0.102)
Pct. Black		-0.118		-1.290**
		(0.542)		(0.354)
Median Income		0.363		−0.293
		(0.293)		(0.487)
City Population		0.002		−0.016**
		(0.006)		(0.006)
Home Value		0.019		0.087*
		(0.040)		(0.049)
Observations	295	295	295	295
R2	0.002	0.016	0.032	0.097
Adjusted R2	−0.002	−0.001	0.028	0.082
Residual Std. Error	0.717	0.717	0.791	0.769
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05

Table 18: Association Between Group Opinion Distance and Distance from Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:			
	White-Policy Distance		*Latino/a-Policy Distance*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.718**	0.377**	0.588**	0.538**
	(0.084)	(0.172)	(0.112)	(0.184)
Latino/a-White Difference	0.245**	0.272**	0.772**	0.744**
	(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.159)	(0.165)
Pct. Latino/a		0.590**		−0.530*
		(0.217)		(0.280)
Median Income		0.368		0.253
		(0.292)		(0.503)
City Population		0.002		−0.014**
		(0.006)		(0.005)
Home Value		0.009		0.046
		(0.045)		(0.051)
Observations	308	307	308	307
R2	0.024	0.053	0.156	0.189
Adjusted R2	0.021	0.037	0.153	0.176
Residual Std. Error	0.701	0.689	0.803	0.793
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05

As hypothesized, the gap between white and black opinion has no impact on policy congruence for white constituents. This can be seen in columns 1 and 2, where there is no statistically significant association present. Interestingly, black population proportion also has no significant impact on white congruence. It is not the case that as the size of the black population increases (or the size of white population decreases) white-policy congruence also changes.

In line with the coincidental representation hypothesis, the underlying opinion structure does have a significant impact on black policy representation. In columns 3 and 4, we observe that as the distance between black and white opinion increases, so too does the distance between black opinion and observed policy outcomes. That is, as black opinion moves farther from white opinion, policy outcomes do not appear to follow suit. However, as black population increases, this distance shrinks.

While the coefficients themselves are not particularly interpretable on their own, Figure 12 illustrates the differential effects. Here, I predict group congruence for each model using the same set of values for black-white difference (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1) and plot them together. For whites, the distance from policy outcomes is 0.78 where the gap is 0 and 0.85 where the gap is 1, an overall difference of only 0.07. The effect of the distance is far more dramatic when it comes to congruence with black opinion: where the black-white gap is 0, the value is 0.78 but when the gap is 1, the value is 1.1—an overall difference of 0.32. This effect is nearly 5 times the size!

Does the same effect occur for Latino/a congruence? Table 18 contains the results for models exploring the effect of the distance between Latino/a and white opinion on policy congruence for whites and Latinos/as. Here, the coincidental representation hypothesis also appears to be supported. The effect of the distance from white opinion is statistically significant in the expected direction—as Latino/a preferences move farther from preferences of white residents, congruence with observed policy outcomes also decreases. However, as their population size increases, this distance decreases. Interestingly, the distance between groups does appear to impact white representation—as this distance increases, so too does the distance between white opinion and observed outcomes.

Figure 12: Effect of Black-White Distance on Group Distance from Policy Outcomes



This effect can be seen in Figure 13. While the association is statistically significant in the model, the effect size itself is still much smaller than it is for Latino/a policy congruence. When the gap is equal to 0 (complete overlap), the outcome is 0.7. When the distance is equal to 1, the predicted outcome is 0.97 (an overall difference of about 0.27). For the distance between Latino/a and policy, when set to 0, outcome is 0.6 but at 1, it's 1.35 (overall impact of 0.75). Cumulatively, the effect is about 2.75 times that of effect for white congruence. This is still a significant impact, but not quite as powerful as the effect seen in Figure 12.

Discussion & Conclusion

In this chapter, I offer another method for analyzing the unequal influence of different groups at the local level that focuses on the difference between groups and its effect

Figure 13: Effect of Latino/a-White Distance on Group Distance from Policy Outcomes



on policy congruence at the local level. Without preference divergence, there are few opportunities for unequal representation. But where preferences diverge, who wins and who loses? First, the gap between groups has no impact on policy congruence for white constituents. This comports with the findings from previous chapters that suggest 1. White constituents are better represented in local policy outcomes, and 2. race is an important division in local politics.

In line with the coincidental representation hypothesis, the underlying opinion structure does have a significant impact on black policy representation. The results indicate that as the distance between black and white opinion increases, so too does the distance between black opinion and observed policy outcomes. I find a similar relationship when it comes to the gap between the preferences of white residents and the preferences of Latino/a residents. Ultimately, the representation of minority interests is contingent upon the underlying structure/distribution of public opinion.

The results of this analysis raise important questions about the quality of representation—not all preference representation is equivalent. Congruence without influence is coincidental (Enns 2015). While coincidental representation might occur in some contexts, in places where significant differences exist between groups, non-white residents lose out.

Conclusion

(Unequal) Representation in U.S. Cities

What happens to democracy when wealth and income concentrate? A half century ago that question was far less relevant, and perhaps not even worth asking, as the years from the end of World War II into the 1970s were ones of substantial economic growth and broadly shared prosperity (Stone et al. 2020). The question is far more relevant now, as inequalities become increasingly stark.

In a context where "society is marked by glaring economic inequalities" (Bartels 2008, 22), is political equality even approximated? Work by scholars exploring representational deficiencies in the United States finds economic elites and interest groups can shape U.S. government policy, but Americans who are less well off have little to no influence over what their government does (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page 2014). The findings suggest the dawn of what some refer to as "a new gilded age" (Bartels 2008).

The bulk of the research on inequality has focused on inequality at the national (and even state) level. However, at the same time, research on representation has paid little attention to America's 90,000 local governments, which make policies on a variety of important issues (Anzia 2015). As a result, we are left with only a partial understanding of political representation in the United States. Additionally, while inequality may be the result of global economic forces, its consequences at the local level are immediate, affecting the quality of life for residents in ways that are often readily apparent. At the local level, who has the power to make city policy?

Summary of Findings

In order to understand inequality in representation in cities, I argued that first, we need to know something about the role of public opinion in local policymaking more generally. Building on recent scholarship, Chapter 3 addresses this concern and explores questions related to the quality of representation in local politics. Expanding upon work that analyzes the relationship between public opinion and policy outcomes, I incorporate additional outcome measures in order to uncover unique relationships across different policy domains. To assess the opinion–policy linkage, I use a "responsiveness" method that uses spatial variation across political units. This method examines whether as public opinion becomes more liberal across cities, public policies also become more liberal (and, of course, whether as opinion becomes more conservative, policy also becomes more conservative). Overall, policy seems to reflect the preferences of city residents. This finding is important because until recently, much of the literature suggested cities were too constrained to incorporate public preferences into policy decisions. In other words, policy appears to be representative of the public. Additionally, the effect of public opinion varies across policy areas. The results in chapter 3 suggest that public opinion is associated with development priorities. In cities where public opinion leans conservative, the proportion of expenditures devoted to development policy increases. In the area of redistributive policy, these outcomes are constrained by resources rather than the public. Allocational spending is also not responsive to opinion, with the exception of parks and recreation. Given the findings for development priorities, this maybe suggests that where there are opportunities for credit claiming (i.e. naming a park, for instance) policymakers take the public into consideration

The results of the analysis in Chapter 3 confirm that policy is responsive to public opinion, and this relationship varies to some degree across policy areas. These findings comport with studies that find public opinion is represented by legislative behavior and policy making at the national and state level (Erikson, Wright, McIver 1993; Miller and Stokes 1963; Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson, Mackuen, Erikson 1995). However, despite this responsiveness to public opinion, inequality continues to grow.

Chapter 4 begins the exploration of one explanation for the underlying the puzzle created by observations of responsiveness in the political science literature and growing inequality in and across cities: Unequal political representation. Chapter 4 analyzes the patterns and consequences of unequal representation according to economic status. In line with the literature, I do find some evidence of unequal representation in policy outcomes at the local level. However, the results of my analysis at the local level do not indicate the same striking inequalities as work generated by scholars at higher levels of government (e.g., Bartels, Gilens). Additionally, at the local level, the middle class is often most strongly associated with outcomes, not those in the top tier of the income bracket.

Expanding on work examining inequality that tends to focus on class-based differences, I also depart from the literature by examining racial disparities. In Chapter 5, I find that minority constituents are generally less well-represented than those of white constituents when it comes to policy decisions in municipal governments. The findings in this chapter also have broader implications for our understanding of the divisions in local politics. Here, I present evidence that race is the far more consequential division when compared to the implications of class-based divisions presented in the previous chapter.

Building on the findings in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 assesses the influence of coincidental representation (Enns 2015)– the dynamic in which disadvantaged groups receive representation because their views overlap with those from more advantaged populations – on the amount of ideological congruence representation enjoyed by each group. This chapter is informed by the debates in other studies of representation between those that find that the preferences of low-income voters receive lower weights than high-income counterparts (e.g., Bartels/Gilens) and scholars who counter by arguing that high and income voters do not differ on very many issues (e.g., Enns). If there is a relatively strong correspondence between the preferences of the different racial groups, this may limit the number of issues where minority groups lose out because their preferences are not particularly different than the preferences of white residents. However, these gaps are consequential when it comes to representation of minority preferences. In line with the coincidental represen-

tation hypothesis, I find that the underlying opinion structure does have a significant impact on black policy representation. While coincidental representation might occur in some contexts where little differences in opinion occur, the results also indicate that as the distance between black and white opinion increases, so too does the distance between black opinion and observed policy outcomes. I find a similar relationship when it comes to the gap between the preferences of white residents and the preferences of latino/a residents. Ultimately, the representation of minority interests is contingent upon the underlying structure/distribution of public opinion, raising important questions about the quality of representation in local politics. Actual influence matters, both because there are many important issues on which residents diverge, and because "democracy by coincidence" is a pale imitation of real democracy.

In sum, what these findings tell us is that while city policy does appear to be responsive to public opinion, some opinions appear to count more than others. Further, while much of the literature views economic status as the primary division in American politics, at the local level, this does not map neatly onto the most decentralized contexts. Instead, race is a more salient division in local politics.

In addition to asking whether unequal representation occurs and how it varies across policy domains, I also make an argument that context is key in our understanding of representation of local politics. Specific internal institutional configurations may serve as a sort of mechanism for this linkage. In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I explore the institutional processes through which representation occurs. In Chapter 3, contrary to theoretical expectations, I find that institutional arrangements–designed with representation in mind–exert no direct effect when it comes to translating public opinion into policy outcomes. The results in Chapter 3 comport with those from similar studies and suggest that despite the emphasis we place on institutions (rightfully so, as this context provides a unique opportunity to leverage institutional variation in order to explore a variety of research questions related to the impact of institutions on a variety of outcomes), maybe they are not as consequential as we previously thought, at least not when it comes to direct translation of public opinion into policy outcomes.

Does representation vary for different groups under different arrangements? In Chapters 4 and 5, I take a more nuanced look at representation in different contexts, the results of which presents a slightly different picture. In line with theoretical expectations, unequal representation tends to occur in contexts with more 'insulated' arrangements. For example, both white and middle class residents seem to be better represented in policy outcomes than low income and minority residents in cities with appointed managers. These differences do not occur under systems with elected mayors and are robust once capacity controls are included. Similarly, in at-large systems, policy appears to be most responsive to white and middle class residents.

Going Forward

Ultimately, my work suggests that representation in local politics is far from equal, and race, not class, is the most salient division at this level of analysis. While they provide insights into questions not often explored by extant scholarship, the findings I have presented in this document represent a small piece of a much larger puzzle. Going forward, there are a number of potential avenues that would be fruitful in terms of continuing to explore the quality and process of representation in local policy outcomes. Perhaps most pressing is the need to examine the influence of important cross-sectional political variation in addition to institutional variation. In my dissertation, I limit the analysis to the effects of institutional variation on representation in municipalities. However, political variation might matter as well: From the perspective of Stone (1989), a core feature of an urban governing machine is an identifiable policy agenda that can be related to the composition of the participants in the coalition. Work that explores the impact of descriptive representation also points to the importance of political variation (e.g., Grose 2011; Marschall and Shah 2007). While it is beyond the scope of this project, a future extension of the analyses presented in this dissertation would be an additional analysis of the effect of mayoral race on the representation of minority interests: For example, black mayors might might be more likely to pursue redistributive policies than white mayors.

Additionally, more work is needed to reconcile some of the inconsistencies across mea-

sures and to provide robustness to the findings presented here. Really, the hypotheses and empirical analysis I have presented here are just the tip of the iceberg. These findings illustrate the need for a renewed research agenda on ideology, representation, and policy responsiveness in municipalities. Creative applications of methodological techniques to generate public opinion estimates have made it possible to begin to explore these questions. However, what researchers do not have are comparable indicators of *local* policy specific opinion measures. Efforts to generate information at the most decentralized levels of government should be (and probably are) a priority for those interested in numerous questions about local politics, opinion, and representation.

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Appendix A - Chapter 3 Regression Results

This section contains the regression tables from chapter 3.

Table 19: Association Between City Liberalism and Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:			
	Scaled Policy		Tax Burden	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.008	0.010	0.017**	0.024**
	(0.128)	(0.154)	(0.001)	(0.001)
City Ideology	1.317**	0.984**	−0.018**	−0.013**
	(0.221)	(0.251)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Pct. Black		0.434		0.010
		(0.450)		(0.007)
Median Income		0.812**		−0.026**
		(0.377)		(0.006)
City Population		0.000		0.001**
		(0.007)		(0.000)
Med. Home Value		−0.272**		0.002**
		(0.067)		(0.001)
Observations	398	397	1,415	1,414
R^2	0.127	0.191	0.129	0.238
Adjusted R^2	0.125	0.181	0.129	0.236
Residual Std. Error	0.893	0.864	0.012	0.012
Note:				**p<0.05

Table 20: Association Between City Liberalism and Development Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:			
	Prop. Outlays		Prop. Highway	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.14**	0.15**	0.04**	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)
City Ideology	0.07**	0.07**	0.03**	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pct. Black		−0.05		−0.03**
		(0.03)		(0.01)
Median Income		0.02		0.08**
		(0.05)		(0.02)
City Population		0.00**		−0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)
Med. Home Value		−0.00		−0.01
		(0.01)		(0.00)
Observations	988	988	839	839
R^2	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.09
Adjusted R^2	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.08
Residual Std. Error	0.09	0.09	0.04	0.04
Note:				**p<0.05

Table 21: Association Between City Liberalism and Housekeeping Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:							
	Prop. Parks & Rec		Prop. Sewerage		Prop. Police		Prop. Fire	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.06**	0.03**	0.08**	0.11**	0.14**	0.10**	0.08**	0.08**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
City Ideology	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pct. Black		−0.00		−0.05**		0.04		0.01
		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)
Median Income		0.04**		−0.03		0.04		−0.02
		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.03)
City Population		−0.00		−0.00		−0.00**		−0.00**
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Med. Home Value		0.01**		−0.01		0.01		0.01
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.00)
Observations	947	947	911	911	992	992	930	930
R^2	0.07	0.14	0.03	0.05	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.02
Adjusted R^2	0.07	0.13	0.03	0.05	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.02
Residual Std. Error	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.04

Note: **p<0.05

Table 22: Association Between City Liberalism and Redistributive Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:							
	Prop. Comm Dev		Prop. Welfare		Prop. Healthcare		Prop. Educ	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.03**	0.04**	0.01**	0.00	0.01**	0.01**	0.28**	0.26**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.04)	(0.07)
City Ideology	−0.03**	−0.02	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.28**	−0.38**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Pct. Black		0.02		0.01		−0.00		−0.31**
		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.14)
Median Income		−0.05**		0.00		−0.01		0.36
		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.29)
City Population		−0.00		0.00**		0.00		−0.01**
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Med. Home Value		0.01		0.00		0.00		−0.07
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.06)
Observations	812	812	231	231	619	619	135	135
R^2	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.17	0.00	0.01	0.18	0.29
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.15	−0.00	0.00	0.17	0.26
Residual Std. Error	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.18	0.17

Note: **p<0.05

Chapter 3 Institutions Results

Table 23: Association Between City Liberalism, Institutions and Policy Outcomes - Form of Government

	Dependent variable:	
	Scaled Policy	Tax Burden
	(1)	(2)
Constant	−0.20	0.02**
	(0.15)	(0.00)
City Ideology	1.03**	−0.01
	(0.21)	(0.01)
Elect. Mayor	0.55**	0.00
	(0.12)	(0.00)
Pct. Black	0.31	0.01
	(0.40)	(0.01)
Median Income	1.50**	−0.03**
	(0.58)	(0.01)
City Pop.	−0.01	0.00**
	(0.01)	(0.00)
Med. Home Value	−0.43**	0.00
	(0.12)	(0.00)
City Ideology*Mayor	−0.22	−0.01
	(0.65)	(0.01)
Observations	393	1,345
R^2	0.28	0.24
Adjusted R^2	0.27	0.23
Residual Std. Error	0.62 (df = 385)	0.01 (df = 1337)
Note:		**p<0.05

Table 24: Association Between City Liberalism, Institutions, and Development Policy Outcomes - Form of Government

	Dependent variable:	
	Prop. Outlays	Prop. Highway
	(1)	(2)
Constant	0.16**	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)
City Ideology	0.07**	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Elect. Mayor	−0.02**	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.00)
Pct. Black	−0.04	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Median Income	0.04	0.11**
	(0.06)	(0.04)
City Pop	0.00**	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Med. Home Value	−0.02	−0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
City Ideology*Mayor	−0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Observations	957	815
R^2	0.11	0.11
Adjusted R^2	0.10	0.10
Residual Std. Error	0.08 (df = 949)	0.03 (df = 807)
Note:		**p<0.05

Table 25: Association Between City Liberalism, Institutions, and Allocational Policy Outcomes - Form of Government

	Dependent variable:			
	Prop. Parks & Rec	Prop. Sewerage	Prop. Police	Prop. Fire
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.03**	0.11**	0.10**	0.08**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
City Ideology	0.04**	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Elect. Mayor	−0.01**	0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Pct. Black	−0.00	−0.03	0.05	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Median Income	0.04	−0.00	0.07	−0.01
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
City Pop	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Med. Home Value	0.01	−0.02	0.00	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
City Ideology*Mayor	−0.00	0.04**	0.03	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Observations	917	882	961	900
R^2	0.16	0.07	0.05	0.03
Adjusted R^2	0.15	0.07	0.04	0.03
Residual Std. Error	0.03 (df = 909)	0.06 (df = 874)	0.05 (df = 953)	0.03 (df = 892)

Note: **p<0.05

Table 26: Association Between City Liberalism, Institutions, and Redistributive Policy Outcomes - Form of Government

	Dependent variable:			
	Prop. Comm Dev	Prop. Welfare	Prop. Healthcare	Prop. Education
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.06**	0.01**	0.01**	0.25**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.08)
City Ideology	−0.03**	0.01	−0.00	−0.35
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.19)
Elect. Mayor	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.10
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.09)
Pct. Black	0.00	0.01	0.00	−0.23
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.16)
Median Income	−0.07**	−0.02	0.01	0.09
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.32)
City Pop	−0.00	0.00**	0.00	−0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Med. Home Value	0.00	0.01	−0.00	−0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.07)
City Ideology*Mayor	−0.01	−0.01	0.01	0.07
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.22)
Observations	793	220	601	134
R^2	0.06	0.17	0.01	0.37
Adjusted R^2	0.05	0.15	0.00	0.33
Residual Std. Error	0.04 (df = 785)	0.02 (df = 212)	0.01 (df = 593)	0.17 (df = 126)

Note: **p<0.05

Table 27: Association Between City Liberalism, Institutions, and Policy Outcomes - Election Type

	Dependent variable:	
	Scaled Policy	Tax Burden
	(1)	(2)
Constant	0.22	0.02**
	(0.18)	(0.00)
City Ideology	1.35**	−0.01
	(0.30)	(0.00)
Partisan Elec.	0.02	0.00
	(0.25)	(0.00)
Pct. Black	0.50	0.02
	(0.57)	(0.01)
Median Income	0.48	−0.03**
	(0.67)	(0.01)
City Pop	−0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.00)
Med. Home Value	−0.29**	0.00**
	(0.11)	(0.00)
City Ideology*Partisan	−0.76**	−0.02
	(0.38)	(0.01)
Observations	393	1,345
R^2	0.27	0.27
Adjusted R^2	0.25	0.26
Residual Std. Error	0.48 (df = 385)	0.01 (df = 1337)
Note:		**p<0.05

Table 28: Association Between City Liberalism, Institutions, and Development Policy Outcomes - Election Type

	Dependent variable:	
	Prop. Outlays	Prop. Highway
	(1)	(2)
Constant	0.17**	0.03**
	(0.02)	(0.01)
City Ideology	0.06**	0.03**
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Partisan Elect.	−0.01	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pct. Black	−0.06	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Median Income	−0.05	0.07**
	(0.06)	(0.03)
City Pop	0.00**	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Med. Home Value	0.00	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
City Ideology*Partisan	−0.00	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Observations	957	815
R^2	0.05	0.08
Adjusted R^2	0.04	0.08
Residual Std. Error	0.05 (df = 949)	0.03 (df = 807)
Note:		**p<0.05

Table 29: Association Between City Liberalism, Institutions, and Allocational Policy Outcomes - Election Type

	Dependent variable:			
	Prop. Parks & Rec	Prop. Sewerage	Prop. Police	Prop. Fire
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.03**	0.09**	0.11**	0.09**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
City Ideology	0.04**	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Partisan Elect.	−0.01	0.02	−0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pct. Black	0.00	−0.04**	0.02	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Median Income	0.04	0.01	0.06	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
City Pop	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00	−0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Med. Home Value	0.01	−0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
City Ideology*Partisan	−0.01	0.07**	−0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Observations	917	882	961	900
R^2	0.16	0.06	0.04	0.05
Adjusted R^2	0.15	0.06	0.03	0.05
Residual Std. Error	0.02 (df = 909)	0.04 (df = 874)	0.04 (df = 953)	0.02 (df = 892)

Note: **p<0.05

Table 30: Association Between City Liberalism, Institutions, and Redistributive Policy Outcomes - Election Type

	Dependent variable:			
	Prop. Comm Dev	Prop. Welfare	Prop. Healthcare	Prop. Education
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.04**	0.00	0.01**	0.11
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.10)
City Ideology	−0.03	−0.00	−0.00	−0.43**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.12)
Partisan Elect.	0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.15
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.12)
Pct. Black	0.01	0.00	−0.00	−0.15
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.14)
Median Income	−0.03	0.01	0.01	0.59
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.34)
City Pop	−0.00	0.00**	0.00	−0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Med. Home Value	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.08
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.07)
City Ideology*Partisan	−0.01	0.02	0.00	0.16
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.22)
Observations	793	220	601	134
R^2	0.06	0.16	0.02	0.46
Adjusted R^2	0.05	0.14	0.01	0.43
Residual Std. Error	0.03 (df = 785)	0.01 (df = 212)	0.01 (df = 593)	0.09 (df = 126)
Note:				**p<0.05

Table 31: Association Between City Liberalism, Institutions, and Policy Outcomes - District vs. At Large

	Dependent variable:	
	Scaled Policy	Tax Burden
	(1)	(2)
Constant	−0.00	0.03**
	(0.26)	(0.00)
City Ideology	0.81	−0.01**
	(0.60)	(0.00)
District	0.18	−0.00
	(0.13)	(0.00)
Pct. Black	0.23	0.01
	(0.55)	(0.01)
Median Income	1.70	−0.04**
	(1.00)	(0.01)
City Pop	0.01**	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Med. Home Value	−0.52**	0.01**
	(0.17)	(0.00)
City Ideology*District	0.24	0.01
	(0.67)	(0.00)
Observations	393	1,345
R^2	0.17	0.33
Adjusted R^2	0.15	0.32
Residual Std. Error	0.46 (df = 385)	0.01 (df = 1337)
Note:		**p<0.05

Table 32: Association Between City Liberalism, Institutions, and Development Policy Outcomes - District vs. At Large

	Dependent variable:	
	Prop. Outlays	Prop. Highway
	(1)	(2)
Constant	0.16**	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)
City Ideology	0.08**	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)
District	−0.00	0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.00)
Pct. Black	−0.05	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Median Income	−0.00	0.12**
	(0.06)	(0.03)
City Pop	0.00**	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Med. Home Value	−0.01	−0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
City Ideology*District	−0.02	−0.01
	(0.03)	(0.01)
Observations	957	815
R^2	0.07	0.10
Adjusted R^2	0.06	0.10
Residual Std. Error	0.05 (df = 949)	0.03 (df = 807)
Note:		**p<0.05

Table 33: Association Between City Liberalism, Institutions, and Allocational Policy Outcomes - District vs. At Large

	Dependent variable:			
	Prop. Parks & Rec	Prop. Sewerage	Prop. Police	Prop. Fire
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.03**	0.11**	0.10**	0.09**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
City Ideology	0.05**	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
District	0.00	−0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pct. Black	0.00	−0.04**	0.03	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Median Income	0.03	0.01	0.11**	−0.02
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)
City Pop	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Med. Home Value	0.01	−0.02**	−0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
City Ideology*District	−0.02	0.03	−0.03	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	917	882	961	900
R^2	0.16	0.08	0.05	0.04
Adjusted R^2	0.15	0.07	0.04	0.03
Residual Std. Error	0.02 (df = 909)	0.04 (df = 874)	0.04 (df = 953)	0.02 (df = 892)
Note:				**p<0.05

Table 34: Association Between City Liberalism, Institutions, and Redistributive Policy Outcomes - District vs. At Large

	Dependent variable:			
	Prop. Comm Dev	Prop. Welfare	Prop. Healthcare	Prop. Education
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.05**	0.01**	0.01	0.19
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.10)
City Ideology	−0.03	−0.00	−0.01	−0.34**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.11)
District	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.06
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.05)
Pct. Black	0.01	0.00	−0.00	−0.30**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.14)
Median Income	−0.04	0.01	0.02	0.29
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.40)
City Pop	−0.00	0.00**	0.00	−0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Med. Home Value	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.07)
City Ideology*District	−0.02	0.01	0.00	−0.10
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.11)
Observations	793	220	601	134
R^2	0.06	0.49	0.01	0.45
Adjusted R^2	0.05	0.47	0.00	0.42
Residual Std. Error	0.03 (df = 785)	0.01 (df = 212)	0.01 (df = 593)	0.10 (df = 126)

Note: **p<0.05

Appendix B - Chapter 4 Regression Results

This section contains the regression tables from chapter 4.

Table 35: Association Between Income Group Opinion and Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:			
	Scaled Policy		Tax Burden	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	1.250**	0.279	−0.006	0.023**
	(0.350)	(0.428)	(0.004)	(0.006)
$\bar{X}_{Low}$	0.782	0.733	−0.010**	−0.008**
	(0.516)	(0.558)	(0.002)	(0.003)
$\bar{X}_{Middle}$	1.110**	0.982**	−0.005**	−0.003
	(0.269)	(0.276)	(0.002)	(0.002)
$\bar{X}_{High}$	0.741	0.393	−0.005	−0.001
	(0.468)	(0.467)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Pct. Low	−2.528**	−0.675	0.069**	0.025**
	(0.883)	(0.953)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Pct. High	−3.349**	−1.526	0.034**	0.065**
	(0.819)	(1.064)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Median Income		1.371**		−0.057**
		(0.571)		(0.009)
City Pop		0.001		0.001**
		(0.007)		(0.000)
Home Value		−0.304**		0.001
		(0.076)		(0.001)
Observations	364	364	1,215	1,215
R^2	0.163	0.210	0.127	0.263
Adjusted R^2	0.151	0.192	0.123	0.258
Residual Std. Error	0.876 (df = 358)	0.854 (df = 355)	0.012 (df = 1209)	0.011 (df = 1206)
Note:				**p<0.05

Table 36: Association Between Economic Status and Development Policy Outcomes (with controls)

	Dependent variable:			
	prop. outlays		prop. highway	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.18**	0.20**	0.08**	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)
$\bar{X}_{Low}$	0.02	0.02	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
$\bar{X}_{Middle}$	0.06**	0.05**	0.03**	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
$\bar{X}_{High}$	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pct. Low	−0.11	−0.15	−0.14**	−0.11**
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Pct. High	−0.01	0.10	0.05	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Median Income		−0.05		0.03
		(0.07)		(0.03)
City Population		0.00		−0.00**
		(0.00)		(0.00)
Med. Home Value		−0.02		−0.01
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Observations	880	880	750	750
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.09	0.11
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.03	0.09	0.10
Note:		**p<0.05		

Table 37: Association Between Economic Status and Housekeeping Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:			
	Prop. Parks & Rec	Prop. Sewerage	Prop. Police	Prop. Fire
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.06**	0.12**	0.20**	0.11**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
$\bar{X}_{Low}$	0.03	0.05**	−0.03	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
$\bar{X}_{Middle}$	0.02**	0.02	−0.02	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
$\bar{X}_{High}$	−0.00	0.02	0.00	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pct. Low	−0.07**	−0.06	−0.19**	−0.05**
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Pct. High	0.07**	−0.11**	−0.09**	−0.07**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	847	814	883	828
R^2	0.11	0.03	0.04	0.01
Adjusted R^2	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.01
Residual Std. Error	0.04 (df = 841)	0.06 (df = 808)	0.06 (df = 877)	0.04 (df = 822)
Note:				**p<0.05

Table 38: Association Between Economic Status and Housekeeping Policy Outcomes (with controls)

	Dependent variable:			
	Prop. Parks & Rec	Prop. Sewerage	Prop. Police	Prop. Fire
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.06**	0.14**	0.15**	0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
$\bar{X}_{Low}$	0.03	0.05**	−0.03	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
$\bar{X}_{Middle}$	0.02**	0.01	−0.02	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
$\bar{X}_{High}$	−0.00	0.02	0.01	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pct. Low	−0.06	−0.09	−0.12	−0.01
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Pct. High	0.08**	−0.05	−0.25**	−0.14**
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Median Income	0.00	−0.05	0.10	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)
City Population	−0.00**	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Med. Home Value	−0.00	−0.00	0.02**	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	847	814	883	828
R^2	0.12	0.04	0.08	0.04
Adjusted R^2	0.11	0.03	0.07	0.03
Residual Std. Error	0.04 (df = 838)	0.06 (df = 805)	0.06 (df = 874)	0.04 (df = 819)
Note:				**p<0.05

Table 39: Association Between Economic Status and Redistributive Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:			
	Prop. Comm Dev	Prop. Welfare	Prop. Healthcare	Prop. Education
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	−0.00	0.01	0.01	0.37
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.22)
$\bar{X}_{Low}$	−0.03	−0.02	−0.01	−0.21**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.09)
$\bar{X}_{Middle}$	−0.01	−0.00	−0.00	−0.12**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.06)
$\bar{X}_{High}$	−0.02	−0.01	−0.00	−0.22
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.15)
Pct. Low	0.10	−0.01	−0.01	−0.24
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.54)
Pct. High	0.04	0.02	0.00	−0.09
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.47)
Observations	735	198	546	104
R^2	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.06
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.01	−0.00	0.01
Residual Std. Error	0.05 (df = 729)	0.02 (df = 192)	0.02 (df = 540)	0.20 (df = 98)
Note:				**p<0.05

Table 40: Association Between Economic Status and Redistributive Policy Outcomes (with controls)

	Dependent variable:			
	Prop. Comm Dev	Prop. Welfare	Prop. Healthcare	Prop. Education
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.00	0.03	0.02**	0.41
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.36)
$\bar{X}_{Low}$	−0.03	−0.02	−0.01	−0.21**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.09)
$\bar{X}_{Middle}$	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.14**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.06)
$\bar{X}_{High}$	−0.02	0.00	−0.00	−0.15
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.12)
Pct. Low	0.10	−0.06	−0.02	−0.20
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.70)
Pct. High	0.03	−0.00	−0.01	0.22
	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.90)
Median Income	−0.01	−0.03	−0.01	−0.35
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.73)
City Population	−0.00	0.00**	0.00	−0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Med. Home Value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.06)
Observations	735	198	546	104
R^2	0.02	0.19	0.01	0.10
Adjusted R^2	0.01	0.16	−0.00	0.02
Residual Std. Error	0.05 (df = 726)	0.02 (df = 189)	0.02 (df = 537)	0.20 (df = 95)
Note:				**p<0.05

Unequal Representation in Cities with Elected vs. Appointed Executives

Table 41: Association Between Income Group Opinion and Policy Outcomes Elected vs. Appointed Executives

	Dependent variable:			
	Scaled Policy		Tax Burden	
	(Myr)	(Mngr)	(Myr)	(Mngr)
Intercept	1.78**	1.26**	−0.02**	−0.00
	(0.64)	(0.42)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Low Income Opinion	1.19	0.68	−0.01**	−0.01
	(1.16)	(0.56)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Middle Income Opinion	0.38	1.18**	−0.01	−0.00**
	(0.84)	(0.31)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High Income Opinion	−0.37	0.91	−0.01	−0.00
	(1.40)	(0.55)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Pct. Low	−3.06**	−2.87**	0.09**	0.06**
	(1.42)	(1.10)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Pct. High	−2.78	−3.57**	0.08**	0.02**
	(1.95)	(0.78)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Observations	71	293	437	771
R^2	0.07	0.21	0.17	0.12
Adjusted R^2	−0.00	0.20	0.16	0.11
Residual Std. Error	0.98 (df = 65)	0.81 (df = 287)	0.01 (df = 431)	0.01 (df = 765)
Note:				**p<0.05

Table 42: Association Between Economic Status and Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:					
	Scaled Policy		prop. Outlays		prop. Highway	
	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)
Intercept	1.78**	1.26**	0.12**	0.19**	0.07**	0.07**
	(0.64)	(0.42)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)
low	1.19	0.68	0.06	−0.01	0.02	−0.03
	(1.16)	(0.56)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
middle	0.38	1.18**	0.05**	0.06**	0.02	0.03
	(0.84)	(0.31)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
high	−0.37	0.91	0.02	0.03	−0.00	0.03
	(1.40)	(0.55)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Pct. low	−3.06**	−2.87**	−0.02	−0.11	−0.13**	−0.14**
	(1.42)	(1.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Pct. high	−2.78	−3.57**	0.09	−0.04	0.02	0.01
	(1.95)	(0.78)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.03)
Observations	71	293	353	525	281	468
R^2	0.07	0.21	0.04	0.02	0.11	0.09
Adjusted R^2	−0.00	0.20	0.02	0.01	0.10	0.08
Note:						**p<0.05

Table 43: Association Between Economic Status and Housekeeping Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:							
	prop. parks & rec		prop. sewerage		prop. police		prop. fire	
	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)
Intercept	0.07**	0.05**	0.13**	0.11**	0.19**	0.22**	0.10**	0.13**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
low	0.02	0.03	0.09**	0.01	−0.01	−0.05	0.02	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
middle	0.03**	0.02	0.05	−0.00	0.01	−0.04**	0.02	−0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
high	0.01	−0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Pct. low	−0.10**	−0.03	−0.09	−0.04	−0.14**	−0.26**	−0.01	−0.12**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Pct. high	0.02	0.10**	−0.15	−0.09**	−0.15**	−0.10**	−0.11**	−0.09**
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Observations	337	508	333	480	355	526	343	483
R^2	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.08	0.05	0.03
Adjusted R^2	0.12	0.08	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.04	0.02
Note:								**p<0.05

Table 44: Association Between Economic Status and Redistributive Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:							
	Prop. Comm Dev		Prop. Welfare		Prop. Healthcare		Prop. Educ	
	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)
Intercept	−0.04	0.03**	−0.03	0.04**	0.02	0.01	0.83**	0.32
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.21)	(0.38)
low	−0.04	−0.01	0.01	−0.04	−0.00	−0.02	−0.14	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.17)	(0.17)
middle	0.01	−0.02	−0.01	0.02	−0.00	−0.00	0.08	−0.37**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.10)	(0.11)
high	−0.05	−0.01	−0.01	−0.02	0.01	−0.01	−0.14	0.09
	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.19)	(0.30)
Pct. low	0.21**	0.00	0.09	−0.09**	−0.01	−0.00	−1.06	−0.30
	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.60)	(0.90)
Pct. high	0.11	−0.01	0.12	−0.05	−0.01	0.01	−0.91	−0.25
	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.48)	(0.63)
Observations	283	451	102	96	239	306	61	43
R^2	0.06	0.01	0.17	0.08	0.00	0.03	0.07	0.11
Adjusted R^2	0.05	−0.00	0.13	0.03	−0.02	0.01	−0.02	−0.01

Note: **p<0.05

Table 45: Association Between Income Group Opinion and Policy Outcomes Elected vs. Appointed Executives (With Controls)

	Dependent variable:							
	Tax Burden				prop. Highway			
	(Myr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Mngr.)
Intercept	−0.02**	0.01	−0.00	0.03**	0.07**	0.07**	0.07**	0.05**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Low Income Opinion	−0.01**	−0.01**	−0.01	−0.00	0.02	−0.00	−0.03	−0.04
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Middle Income Opinion	−0.01	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.03
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High Income Opinion	−0.01	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.01	0.03	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pct. Low	0.09**	0.05**	0.06**	0.01	−0.13**	−0.10	−0.14**	−0.09
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Pct. High	0.08**	0.09**	0.02**	0.05**	0.02	0.18**	0.01	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Median Inc.		−0.06**		−0.06**		0.04		0.05
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.05)		(0.03)
City Pop		0.00**		0.00		−0.00		−0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
House Value		0.00		0.00**		−0.04**		−0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.00)
Observations	437	437	771	771	281	281	468	468
R^2	0.17	0.30	0.12	0.23	0.11	0.18	0.09	0.10
Adjusted R^2	0.16	0.29	0.11	0.23	0.10	0.16	0.08	0.08
Note:								**p<0.05

Unequal Representation in Cities with District vs. At-Large Systems

Table 46: Association Between Economic Status and Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:					
	Scaled Policy		prop. Outlays		prop. Highway	
	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)
Intercept	2.65*	1.18**	0.21**	0.17**	0.09**	0.08**
	(1.40)	(0.32)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)
low	3.39**	0.26	0.02	0.02	−0.01	−0.00
	(0.68)	(0.56)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
middle	−0.35	1.24**	0.09**	0.05**	0.04	0.03**
	(0.85)	(0.27)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)
high	−2.04	0.93*	−0.08	0.05	−0.06	0.03
	(1.48)	(0.54)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Pct. low	−4.04	−2.64**	−0.16	−0.11	−0.15**	−0.15**
	(3.32)	(0.85)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Pct. high	−7.77**	−3.14**	−0.17	0.00	−0.05	0.01
	(3.04)	(0.79)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)
Observations	52	312	170	710	145	605
R^2	0.24	0.17	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.11
Adjusted R^2	0.15	0.16	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.11
Note:						**p<0.05

Table 47: Association Between Economic Status and Housekeeping Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:							
	prop. parks & rec		prop. sewerage		prop. police		prop. fire	
	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)
Intercept	0.09**	0.06**	0.11**	0.11**	0.20**	0.20**	0.08**	0.12**
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
low	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.04	0.00	−0.04	0.02	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
middle	0.04**	0.02**	0.03	0.01	−0.02	−0.02	0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
high	−0.02	0.00	0.09	0.00	−0.03	0.01	−0.03	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Pct. low	−0.13	−0.06	−0.08	−0.04	−0.16	−0.21**	0.02	−0.08**
	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Pct. high	0.00	0.09**	−0.07	−0.11**	−0.12	−0.09**	−0.02	−0.09**
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Observations	163	684	160	654	172	711	165	663
R^2	0.14	0.11	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.02
Adjusted R^2	0.11	0.10	0.06	0.02	−0.00	0.04	−0.01	0.01

Note: **p<0.05

Table 48: Association Between Economic Status and Redistributive Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:							
	Prop. Comm Dev		Prop. Welfare		Prop. Healthcare		Prop. Educ	
	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)
Intercept	−0.06	0.01	0.04**	0.00	0.02	0.01	−0.31	0.48**
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.41)	(0.20)
low	−0.03	−0.03	−0.01	−0.02	−0.01	−0.01	−0.48	−0.20**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.30)	(0.09)
middle	−0.02	−0.00	0.02**	−0.01	−0.01	−0.00	−0.65**	−0.09
	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.29)	(0.08)
high	−0.01	−0.02	−0.06**	−0.00	0.01	−0.01	−0.88**	−0.14
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.42)	(0.19)
Pct. low	0.22	0.08	−0.08**	0.01	−0.02	−0.00	0.80	−0.44
	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(1.01)	(0.52)
Pct. high	0.21	0.02	−0.09	0.03	−0.01	0.00	2.17**	−0.38
	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(1.02)	(0.39)
Observations	136	599	41	157	104	442	18	86
R^2	0.11	0.02	0.19	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.65	0.04
Adjusted R^2	0.07	0.01	0.07	0.00	−0.03	−0.00	0.50	−0.02

Note: **p<0.05

Table 49: Association Between Economic Status and Policy Outcomes (with controls)

	Dependent variable:							
	scaled policy				prop. welfare			
	(D)	(D)	(AL)	(AL)	(D)	(D)	(AL)	(AL)
Intercept	2.65*	1.81	1.18**	0.22	0.04**	0.03	0.00	0.04
	(1.40)	(1.50)	(0.32)	(0.45)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Low Income Opinion	3.39**	3.31**	0.26	0.22	−0.01	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.68)	(0.75)	(0.56)	(0.62)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Middle Income Opinion	−0.35	−1.29	1.24**	1.16**	0.02**	0.03**	−0.01	−0.00
	(0.85)	(1.04)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
High Income Opinion	−2.04	−2.68**	0.93	0.54	−0.06**	−0.08**	−0.00	0.00
	(1.48)	(1.33)	(0.54)	(0.52)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Pct. Low	−4.04	−2.10	−2.64**	−0.79	−0.08**	−0.05	0.01	−0.06
	(3.32)	(3.13)	(0.85)	(1.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Pct. High	−7.77**	−3.56	−3.14**	−1.38	−0.09	−0.05	0.03	0.01
	(3.04)	(3.25)	(0.79)	(1.09)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Median Income		2.92		1.30**		0.05		−0.04
		(1.72)		(0.56)		(0.05)		(0.05)
City Population		0.05		0.00		0.00		0.00**
		(0.04)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Med. Home Value		−1.32**		−0.28**		−0.02		0.00
		(0.59)		(0.07)		(0.01)		(0.00)
Observations	52	52	312	312	41	41	157	157
R^2	0.24	0.37	0.17	0.22	0.19	0.29	0.03	0.21
Adjusted R^2	0.15	0.25	0.16	0.20	0.07	0.11	0.00	0.17

Note: **p<0.05

Unequal Representation in Cities with Partisan vs. Nonpartisan Elections

Table 50: Association Between Economic Status and Policy Outcomes in Partisan vs. Nonpartisan Elections

	Dependent variable:					
	scaled policy		prop. outlays		prop. highway	
	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)
Intercept	1.32	1.37**	0.05	0.19**	−0.00	0.09**
	(1.05)	(0.35)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
low	0.75	1.00	0.08	0.01	0.02	−0.01
	(1.03)	(0.59)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
middle	2.56**	0.95**	0.03	0.06**	0.02	0.03
	(0.93)	(0.29)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
high	1.39	0.66	0.12	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(1.90)	(0.50)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Pct. low	−1.59	−3.02**	0.21	−0.15**	0.08	−0.18**
	(2.50)	(0.92)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Pct. high	−3.41	−3.50**	0.06	−0.03	0.06	−0.00
	(2.00)	(0.84)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Observations	38	322	150	705	107	624
R^2	0.28	0.16	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.11
Adjusted R^2	0.17	0.15	0.04	0.02	−0.01	0.11
Note:						**p<0.05

Table 51: Association Between Economic Status and Housekeeping Policy Outcomes in Partisan vs. Nonpartisan Elections

	Dependent variable:							
	prop. parks & rec		prop. sewerage		prop. police		prop. fire	
	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)
Intercept	0.02	0.06**	0.20**	0.11**	0.25**	0.20**	0.12**	0.11**
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)
low	0.01	0.03	0.08	0.03	0.02	−0.04	0.02	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
middle	0.03	0.02**	0.11**	−0.00	−0.05	−0.02	0.03	−0.01
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
high	−0.03	0.01	−0.06	0.04**	−0.04	0.00	−0.01	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Pct. low	−0.00	−0.06	−0.18	−0.07	−0.29**	−0.21**	−0.03	−0.08**
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Pct. high	0.13	0.07**	−0.36**	−0.08**	−0.24**	−0.09**	−0.13	−0.07**
	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.18)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.03)
Observations	136	686	135	655	149	709	144	660
R^2	0.10	0.10	0.16	0.02	0.09	0.04	0.06	0.01
Adjusted R^2	0.07	0.09	0.13	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.01
Note:								**p<0.05

Table 52: Association Between Economic Status and Redistributive Policy Outcomes in Partisan vs. Nonpartisan Elections

	Dependent variable:							
	Prop. Comm Dev		Prop. Welfare		Prop. Healthcare		Prop. Educ	
	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)
Intercept	−0.00	0.01	−0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.71	0.36
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.52)	(0.23)
low	0.00	−0.03	−0.03	−0.01	0.00	−0.01	0.42**	−0.25**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.19)	(0.08)
middle	0.00	−0.01	0.08**	−0.01	−0.01	0.00	0.16	−0.14**
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.15)	(0.07)
high	0.03	−0.03	−0.14**	0.00	−0.02	−0.00	0.35	−0.29
	(0.10)	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.36)	(0.15)
Pct. low	0.14	0.06	0.09	−0.04	−0.01	−0.01	−0.47	−0.35
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(1.25)	(0.62)
Pct. high	0.03	0.03	0.24**	−0.03	−0.01	0.00	−0.50	−0.12
	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(1.02)	(0.46)
Observations	122	596	32	157	98	433	22	81
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.36	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.25	0.11
Adjusted R^2	−0.02	0.01	0.24	−0.01	−0.04	0.00	0.01	0.05
Note:								**p<0.05

Appendix C - Chapter 5 Regression Results

Table 53: Association Between Race Group Opinion and Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:			
	Scaled Policy		Tax Burden	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	−1.865**	−1.460**	0.008**	0.024**
	(0.425)	(0.350)	(0.003)	(0.005)
$\bar{X}_{Black}$	0.085	0.103	0.009	0.004
	(1.289)	(1.363)	(0.015)	(0.012)
$\bar{X}_{White}$	1.584**	1.222**	−0.015**	−0.005
	(0.167)	(0.179)	(0.004)	(0.003)
$\bar{X}_{Latino/a}$	−0.109	−0.268	−0.002	0.001
	(0.374)	(0.346)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Pct. White	1.932**	1.422**	0.009**	0.004
	(0.484)	(0.418)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Pct. Black	2.034**	1.333	0.041**	0.027**
	(0.678)	(0.733)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Pct. Latino/a	1.627**	1.062**	0.007	−0.002
	(0.469)	(0.528)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Median Income		1.125**		−0.042**
		(0.517)		(0.005)
City Population		0.002		0.001**
		(0.006)		(0.000)
Med. Home Value		−0.279**		0.005**
		(0.087)		(0.001)
Observations	236	236	722	722
R^2	0.183	0.240	0.114	0.287
Adjusted R^2	0.162	0.210	0.107	0.278
Residual Std. Error	0.842 (df = 229)	0.818 (df = 226)	0.013 (df = 715)	0.012 (df = 712)

Note: **p<0.05

Table 54: Association Between Demographic Group Opinion (Race) and Development Policy Outcomes (with controls)

	Dependent variable:			
	prop. outlays		prop. highway	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.23**	0.27**	0.09**	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)
$\bar{X}_{Black}$	−0.02	−0.02	−0.09**	−0.07**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)
$\bar{X}_{White}$	0.07**	0.04	0.02**	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
$\bar{X}_{Latino/a}$	0.07**	0.06*	0.04**	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pct. White	−0.10	−0.16**	−0.05	−0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Pct. Black	−0.16**	−0.22**	−0.15**	−0.10**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Pct. Latino/a	−0.09	−0.14	−0.05	−0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Median Income		0.12**		0.11**
		(0.05)		(0.03)
City Population		0.00**		−0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)
Med. Home Value		−0.03**		−0.01**
		(0.01)		(0.00)
Observations	549	549	479	479
R^2	0.04	0.08	0.07	0.13
Adjusted R^2	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.12
Note:	**p<0.05			

Table 55: Association Between Demographic Group Opinion (Race) and Redistributive Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:			
	Prop. Comm Dev	Prop. Welfare	Prop. Healthcare	Prop. Education
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.04	0.00	0.02**	0.84**
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.41)
$\bar{X}_{Black}$	−0.02	0.01	−0.02	−0.46
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.37)
$\bar{X}_{White}$	−0.03**	−0.00	−0.01	−0.12
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.15)
$\bar{X}_{Latino/a}$	0.02	0.02	0.02**	0.17
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.43)
Pct. White	−0.02	0.01	−0.01	−0.63
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.47)
Pct. Black	0.00	0.02	−0.01	−0.74
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.49)
Pct. Latino/a	0.02	0.00	−0.00	−0.60
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.50)
Observations	488	115	330	69
R^2	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.07
Adjusted R^2	0.04	−0.03	0.02	−0.02
Residual Std. Error	0.05 (df = 481)	0.02 (df = 108)	0.02 (df = 323)	0.22 (df = 62)

Note: **p<0.05

Table 56: Association Between Demographic Group Opinion (Race) and Redistributive Policy Outcomes (with controls)

	Dependent variable:			
	Prop. Comm Dev	Prop. Welfare	Prop. Healthcare	Prop. Education
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.09**	−0.03	0.01	1.20**
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.52)
$\bar{X}_{Black}$	−0.03	0.02	−0.02	−0.50
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.36)
$\bar{X}_{White}$	−0.03**	0.01	−0.01	−0.08
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.17)
$\bar{X}_{Latino/a}$	0.02	0.01	0.02**	0.13
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.42)
Pct. White	−0.05	0.04	0.00	−0.84
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.53)
Pct. Black	−0.04	0.05	−0.00	−0.98
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.53)
Pct. Latino/a	−0.01	0.02	0.00	−0.80
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.62)
Median Income	−0.06**	0.00	−0.01	−0.60**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.28)
City Population	−0.00	0.00**	0.00	−0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Med. Home Value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.09)
Observations	488	115	330	69
R^2	0.07	0.30	0.04	0.14
Adjusted R^2	0.05	0.24	0.02	0.01
Residual Std. Error	0.05 (df = 478)	0.02 (df = 105)	0.02 (df = 320)	0.21 (df = 59)

Note: **p<0.05

Table 57: Association Between Demographic Group Opinion (Race) and Housekeeping Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:			
	prop. parks & rec	prop. sewerage	prop. police	prop. fire
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.12**	0.04	0.22**	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
$\bar{X}_{Black}$	−0.02	−0.03	−0.04	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)
$\bar{X}_{White}$	0.03**	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
$\bar{X}_{Latino/a}$	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pct. White	−0.06	0.07	−0.11**	−0.00
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Pct. Black	−0.13**	−0.04	−0.13**	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Pct. Latino/a	−0.07**	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Observations	522	499	549	514
R^2	0.08	0.08	0.12	0.02
Adjusted R^2	0.07	0.07	0.12	0.01
Residual Std. Error	0.04 (df = 515)	0.06 (df = 492)	0.06 (df = 542)	0.04 (df = 507)
Note:				**p<0.05

Table 58: Association Between Demographic Group Opinion (Race) and Housekeeping Policy Outcomes (with controls)

	Dependent variable:			
	prop. parks & rec	prop. sewerage	prop. police	prop. fire
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.01	0.15**	0.14**	0.07
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
$\bar{X}_{Black}$	−0.01	−0.05	−0.02	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)
$\bar{X}_{White}$	0.01	−0.01	−0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
$\bar{X}_{Latino/a}$	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pct. White	0.01	−0.02	−0.06	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Pct. Black	−0.03	−0.15**	−0.05	−0.01
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Pct. Latino/a	0.00	−0.07	0.06	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Median Income	0.09**	−0.03	0.07	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
City Population	−0.00**	−0.00**	−0.00**	−0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Med. Home Value	0.00	−0.01**	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Observations	522	499	549	514
R^2	0.15	0.11	0.16	0.04
Adjusted R^2	0.14	0.09	0.15	0.02
Residual Std. Error	0.04 (df = 512)	0.06 (df = 489)	0.06 (df = 539)	0.04 (df = 504)
Note:				**p<0.05

Institutions Regression Results

This section contains the regression results from Chapter 5, which explores whether unequal representation occurs under various institutional arrangements. In line with the existing literature, I examine the impact of three institutional structures: council-manager system vs. directly elected mayors; partisan and nonpartisan elections; at-large vs. district elections. These three are a good test because they were designed by reformers with representation in mind.

Unequal Representation in Cities with Elected vs. Appointed Executives

Table 59: Association Between Demographic Group Opinion (Race) and Development Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:					
	scaled policy		prop. outlays		prop. highway	
	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)
Intercept	−0.53	−1.70**	0.44**	0.18**	0.14*	0.09**
	(2.99)	(0.40)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.02)
$\bar{X}_{Black}$	−0.06	0.37	0.07	−0.17	−0.04*	−0.16**
	(1.88)	(1.45)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.07)
$\bar{X}_{White}$	0.72	1.73**	0.04	0.08**	0.03	0.03**
	(0.76)	(0.22)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
$\bar{X}_{Latino/a}$	−0.54	0.23	−0.02	0.11**	0.03	0.06**
	(3.09)	(0.29)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Pct. White	1.61	1.50**	−0.32**	−0.05	−0.09	−0.06**
	(3.13)	(0.43)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.02)
Pct. Black	−0.29	2.14**	−0.35**	−0.13	−0.19**	−0.15**
	(3.25)	(0.74)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.03)
Pct. Latino/a	0.18	1.56**	−0.38**	0.01	−0.12	−0.04
	(3.30)	(0.48)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.02)
Observations	42	194	210	338	168	310
R^2	0.12	0.25	0.09	0.05	0.13	0.07
Adjusted R^2	−0.03	0.22	0.06	0.03	0.10	0.05
Note:						**p<0.05

Table 60: Association Between Demographic Group Opinion (Race) and Housekeeping Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:							
	prop. parks & rec		prop. sewerage		prop. police		prop. fire	
	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)
Intercept	0.09	0.11**	0.04	0.03**	0.07	0.25**	−0.04	0.11**
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
$\bar{X}_{Black}$	0.02	−0.07**	−0.03	−0.02	−0.02	−0.05	0.02	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
$\bar{X}_{White}$	0.03	0.02	0.03	−0.02	0.04	−0.02**	0.02	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
$\bar{X}_{Latino/a}$	0.02	−0.01	0.02	0.03	0.09	−0.00	0.04	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Pct. White	−0.05	−0.04	0.08	0.06**	0.05	−0.14**	0.14**	−0.03
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Pct. Black	−0.08	−0.13**	−0.07	0.00	0.02	−0.16**	0.11**	−0.05
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Pct. Latino/a	−0.05	−0.07	−0.01	0.04	0.18**	−0.03	0.16**	−0.01
	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.13)	(0.02)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Observations	197	324	194	305	210	338	204	309
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.18	0.03	0.13	0.16	0.07	0.03
Adjusted R^2	0.04	0.05	0.16	0.01	0.11	0.15	0.04	0.01
Note:								**p<0.05

Table 61: Association Between Demographic Group Opinion (Race) and Redistributive Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:							
	Prop. Comm Dev		Prop. Welfare		Prop. Healthcare		Prop. Educ	
	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)
Intercept	0.16	0.02	0.04	−0.01	0.02	0.02**	1.05	1.68**
	(0.12)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.60)	(0.54)
$\bar{X}_{Black}$	−0.02	−0.01	−0.01	0.03	−0.02	−0.01	−0.42	−0.42
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.44)	(0.67)
$\bar{X}_{White}$	−0.02	−0.03	−0.01	0.01	−0.01	−0.02**	0.10	0.17
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.23)	(0.21)
$\bar{X}_{Latino/a}$	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02**	0.08	1.80**
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.24)	(0.30)
Pct. White	−0.14	−0.00	−0.02	0.02	−0.00	−0.01	−0.83	−1.68**
	(0.14)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.69)	(0.59)
Pct. Black	−0.13	0.04	−0.03	0.05	−0.01	−0.01	−1.13	−1.42**
	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.59)	(0.63)
Pct. Latino/a	−0.09	0.04	−0.02	0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.30	−1.68**
	(0.13)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.83)	(0.60)
Observations	180	307	57	58	132	197	38	31
R^2	0.07	0.05	0.01	0.09	0.02	0.07	0.19	0.44
Adjusted R^2	0.04	0.03	−0.10	−0.02	−0.03	0.04	0.03	0.30
Note:								**p<0.05

Table 62: Association Between Demographic Group Opinion (Race) and Policy Outcomes (with controls)

	Dependent variable:							
	scaled policy		prop. parks & rec		prop. outlays		prop. highway	
	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)	(Myr.)	(Mngr.)
Intercept	3.66	−1.57**	0.05	−0.00	0.43**	0.23**	0.12	0.02
	(2.85)	(0.31)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.02)
Black Opinion	−0.86	0.60	0.01	−0.02	0.07	−0.19**	−0.04	−0.11
	(1.79)	(1.53)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.07)
White Opinion	−0.26	1.37**	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.01
	(0.89)	(0.22)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Latino/a Opinion	−0.82	0.10	0.02	−0.01	−0.02	0.10**	0.02	0.05**
	(2.54)	(0.26)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Pct. White	−3.25	1.30**	−0.03	0.04	−0.33**	−0.11	−0.12	−0.02
	(2.77)	(0.33)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.02)
Pct. Black	−5.07	2.05**	−0.05	−0.01	−0.35**	−0.23**	−0.20**	−0.07
	(3.32)	(0.85)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.04)
Pct. Latino/a	−4.87	1.52**	−0.02	0.02	−0.39**	−0.07	−0.13	0.01
	(3.30)	(0.69)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.02)
Med. Income	4.43**	0.97	0.08**	0.08**	0.08	0.12**	0.16**	0.10**
	(1.69)	(0.51)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.02)
City Pop.	0.00	−0.08**	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.01**	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Home Val.	−1.32**	−0.22**	−0.00	0.00	−0.01	−0.04**	−0.02**	−0.01**
	(0.39)	(0.08)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Observations	42	194	197	324	210	338	168	310
R^2	0.29	0.31	0.13	0.13	0.10	0.12	0.22	0.13
Adjusted R^2	0.10	0.27	0.08	0.11	0.06	0.10	0.17	0.11
Note:								**p<0.05

Unequal Representation in District vs. At Large Systems

Table 63: Association Between Demographic Group Opinion (Race) and Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:					
	scaled policy		prop. outlays		prop. highway	
	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)
Intercept	−0.88	−2.05**	0.28**	0.23**	0.12	0.10**
	(2.45)	(0.36)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.03)
$\bar{X}_{Black}$	4.94	−1.70	0.08	−0.03	−0.28	−0.05**
	(2.78)	(1.29)	(0.21)	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.02)
$\bar{X}_{White}$	1.24**	1.70**	0.04	0.07**	0.03	0.02**
	(0.61)	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)
$\bar{X}_{Latino/a}$	0.35	0.04	0.13	0.07**	0.13	0.03
	(1.60)	(0.33)	(0.14)	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.02)
Pct. White	0.46	2.18**	−0.15	−0.10	−0.06	−0.06
	(2.77)	(0.41)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.03)
Pct. Black	4.04	1.25	−0.17	−0.16**	−0.24	−0.14**
	(3.07)	(0.72)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.03)
Pct. Latino/a	2.24	1.77**	−0.09	−0.09	−0.08	−0.06
	(2.44)	(0.52)	(0.18)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.03)
Observations	28	208	94	455	81	398
R^2	0.34	0.19	0.06	0.04	0.17	0.07
Adjusted R^2	0.15	0.17	−0.01	0.03	0.10	0.06
Note:						**p<0.05

Table 64: Association Between Demographic Group Opinion (Race) and Housekeeping Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:							
	prop. parks & rec		prop. sewerage		prop. police		prop. fire	
	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)
Intercept	0.10	0.11**	−0.09	0.05	−0.06	0.24**	−0.05	0.10**
	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
$\bar{X}_{Black}$	0.08**	−0.05	−0.09	−0.03	0.08	−0.05	−0.03	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
$\bar{X}_{White}$	0.05	0.02	0.02	−0.01	−0.02	0.00	0.03	−0.00
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
$\bar{X}_{Latino/a}$	0.09	0.00	0.08	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.08	−0.00
	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Pct. White	−0.05	−0.06	0.18	0.07	0.19**	−0.13**	0.16**	−0.02
	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Pct. Black	−0.06	−0.14**	0.09	−0.05	0.19**	−0.15**	0.08**	−0.03
	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Pct. Latino/a	−0.05	−0.07**	0.17	0.01	0.32**	−0.02	0.18**	−0.00
	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Observations	87	435	85	414	94	455	92	422
R^2	0.20	0.07	0.11	0.09	0.16	0.13	0.19	0.02
Adjusted R^2	0.14	0.06	0.04	0.07	0.10	0.12	0.13	0.00
Note:								**p<0.05

Table 65: Association Between Demographic Group Opinion (Race) and Redistributive Policy Outcomes

	Dependent variable:							
	Prop. Comm Dev		Prop. Welfare		Prop. Healthcare		Prop. Educ	
	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)
Intercept	0.13**	0.04	−0.03	−0.00	−0.04	0.02**	1.49**	0.96
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.56)	(0.50)
$\bar{X}_{Black}$	−0.09	−0.01	−0.08	0.02	0.04	−0.02	−0.58	−0.33
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.34)	(0.43)
$\bar{X}_{White}$	−0.07	−0.03**	0.02	−0.01	−0.03	−0.01	−1.22**	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.60)	(0.17)
$\bar{X}_{Latino/a}$	0.16	0.01	−0.06	0.02	−0.05	0.02**	0.65	0.20
	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(2.78)	(0.48)
Pct. White	−0.10	−0.02	0.04	0.02	0.06	−0.01	−1.39**	−0.76
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.71)	(0.56)
Pct. Black	−0.10	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.06	−0.01	−1.21**	−0.83
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.56)	(0.61)
Pct. Latino/a	−0.07	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.04	−0.00	−1.19**	−0.71
	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.57)	(0.56)
Observations	82	406	23	92	50	280	13	56
R^2	0.14	0.05	0.13	0.04	0.12	0.03	0.79	0.05
Adjusted R^2	0.07	0.04	−0.20	−0.03	0.00	0.01	0.57	−0.07
Note:								**p<0.05

Table 66: Association Between Demographic Group Opinion (Race) and Policy Outcomes (with controls)

	Dependent variable:									
	scaled policy		prop. parks		prop. healthcare		prop. comm dev		prop. highway	
	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)	(D)	(AL)
Intercept	3.51	−1.63**	−0.04	0.02	−0.05	0.02**	0.25**	0.08**	0.15	0.04
	(3.37)	(0.34)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.19)	(0.04)
Black	3.77	−1.58	0.10**	−0.04	0.05	−0.02	−0.09	−0.02	−0.26	−0.03
	(3.06)	(1.23)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.16)	(0.02)
White	0.89**	1.30**	0.05**	0.00	−0.03	−0.01	−0.05	−0.02	−0.01	0.01
	(0.42)	(0.20)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Latino/a	2.31	−0.15	0.09	0.00	−0.05	0.02**	0.19**	0.01	0.09	0.03
	(1.36)	(0.35)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.02)
Pct. White	−4.64	1.68**	0.07	0.01	0.05	−0.01	−0.16	−0.04	−0.16	−0.03
	(3.29)	(0.35)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.19)	(0.03)
Pct. Black	−0.94	0.53	0.09	−0.05	0.06	−0.01	−0.18**	−0.02	−0.28	−0.09
	(3.11)	(0.75)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.20)	(0.05)
Pct. Latino/a	−1.81	1.21**	0.07	0.00	0.04	−0.00	−0.12	0.00	−0.16	−0.02
	(3.72)	(0.58)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.21)	(0.04)
Med. Inc.	3.21	1.05**	0.03	0.09**	0.05		−0.21**	−0.04**	0.25**	0.10**
	(2.03)	(0.50)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.03)
City Pop.	−0.04	0.00	−0.00	−0.00**	0.00		−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Home Val.	−0.90**	−0.27**	0.02	−0.00	−0.01		0.01	0.00	−0.04	−0.01**
	(0.31)	(0.08)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.00)
Observations	28	208	87	435	50	280	82	406	81	398
R^2	0.51	0.25	0.28	0.15	0.15	0.03	0.27	0.06	0.28	0.13
Adjusted R^2	0.27	0.22	0.20	0.13	−0.04	0.01	0.18	0.04	0.19	0.11

Note: **p<0.05

Unequal Representation in Partisan vs. Nonpartisan Elections

Table 67: Association Between Demographic Group Opinion (Race) and Policy Outcomes in Partisan vs. Nonpartisan Elections

	Dependent variable:					
	scaled policy		prop. outlays		prop. highway	
	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)
Intercept	−4.63**	−1.72**	0.25	0.21**	0.21	0.09**
	(1.33)	(0.49)	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.03)
$\bar{X}_{Black}$	−3.48	0.49	0.04	−0.07	−0.01	−0.14**
	(3.81)	(1.31)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.01)	(0.07)
$\bar{X}_{White}$	1.64**	1.60**	0.09	0.04	0.04	0.02
	(0.83)	(0.18)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)
$\bar{X}_{Latino/a}$	−3.55**	0.03	−0.06	0.10**	−0.00	0.05**
	(1.30)	(0.31)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Pct. White	5.10**	1.75**	−0.15	−0.07	−0.19	−0.04
	(1.88)	(0.53)	(0.19)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.03)
Pct. Black	2.80	2.04**	−0.06	−0.16**	−0.19	−0.17**
	(1.90)	(0.75)	(0.17)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.04)
Pct. Latino/a	3.84**	1.52**	−0.27	−0.04	−0.22	−0.04
	(1.93)	(0.47)	(0.19)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.04)
Observations	26	207	109	430	80	391
R^2	0.21	0.19	0.14	0.04	0.15	0.07
Adjusted R^2	−0.04	0.17	0.08	0.02	0.08	0.06
Note:						**p<0.05

Table 68: Association Between Demographic Group Opinion (Race) and Housekeeping Policy Outcomes in Partisan vs. Nonpartisan Elections

	Dependent variable:							
	prop. parks		prop. sewerage		prop. police		prop. fire	
	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)
Intercept	0.32	0.09**	−0.10	0.05	−0.01	0.24**	−0.01	0.10**
	(0.23)	(0.02)	(0.16)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.16)	(0.03)
$\bar{X}_{Black}$	0.02	−0.06	−0.08	0.01	−0.10	0.00	−0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.04)
$\bar{X}_{White}$	0.04	0.02	0.05	−0.01	−0.02	0.00	0.04	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)
$\bar{X}_{Latino/a}$	−0.04	0.02	−0.02	0.05	−0.00	0.05**	−0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Pct. White	−0.31	−0.02	0.27	0.04	0.15	−0.14**	0.12	−0.03
	(0.24)	(0.03)	(0.18)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.17)	(0.03)
Pct. Black	−0.28	−0.12**	0.05	−0.03	0.10	−0.14**	0.05	−0.04
	(0.24)	(0.02)	(0.18)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.17)	(0.04)
Pct. Latino/a	−0.34	−0.04	0.07	0.02	0.17**	−0.00	0.09	0.01
	(0.25)	(0.03)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.17)	(0.05)
Observations	98	415	95	396	109	430	104	400
R^2	0.16	0.08	0.27	0.05	0.04	0.17	0.09	0.03
Adjusted R^2	0.11	0.07	0.22	0.04	−0.02	0.16	0.03	0.01
Note:								**p<0.05

Table 69: Association Between Demographic Group Opinion (Race) and Redistributive Policy Outcomes in Partisan vs. Nonpartisan Elections

	Dependent variable:							
	Prop. Comm Dev		Prop. Welfare		Prop. Healthcare		Prop. Educ	
	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)
Intercept	−0.07	0.06**	0.16	−0.01	0.03	0.02**	−0.69	0.89**
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.17)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(1.28)	(0.34)
$\bar{X}_{Black}$	0.04	−0.07	0.01	0.00	−0.02	−0.01	−0.88**	0.26
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.30)	(0.96)
$\bar{X}_{White}$	−0.06	−0.03**	−0.06	−0.00	−0.00	−0.02	0.12	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.13)	(0.13)
$\bar{X}_{Latino/a}$	−0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03	−0.01	0.02**	0.20	−0.96
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.15)	(0.57)
Pct. White	0.13	−0.04	−0.13	0.02	−0.02	−0.01	1.19	−0.71
	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.18)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(1.38)	(0.37)
Pct. Black	0.13	−0.03	−0.15	0.04	−0.01	−0.01	0.41	−0.47
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.20)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(1.20)	(0.71)
Pct. Latino/a	0.10	0.02	−0.17	0.02	−0.02	−0.00	1.59	−1.33**
	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.18)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(1.45)	(0.41)
Observations	91	390	24	89	73	251	21	48
R^2	0.05	0.07	0.19	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.51	0.20
Adjusted R^2	−0.02	0.06	−0.09	−0.01	−0.06	0.03	0.29	0.08
Note:								**p<0.05

Table 70: Association Between Group Opinion and Policy Outcomes (with controls)

	Dependent variable:							
	scaled policy		prop. parks		prop. comm dev		prop. highway	
	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)	(P)	(NP)
Intercept	−6.08**	−1.58**	0.26	−0.01	0.13	0.06*	0.27**	0.00
	(1.61)	(0.32)	(0.18)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.04)
Black Opinion	−0.69	0.56	0.02	−0.03	0.07**	−0.07	−0.01	−0.10
	(3.17)	(1.44)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.06)
White Opinion	−0.69	1.15**	0.03	0.01	−0.05	−0.03	0.05	−0.01
	(1.52)	(0.22)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Latino/a Opinion	6.48	−0.13	−0.04	0.01	−0.02	0.03	−0.01	0.04
	(7.89)	(0.29)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pct. White	7.33**	1.41**	−0.26	0.04	−0.03	−0.04	−0.23**	−0.00
	(2.47)	(0.39)	(0.20)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.03)
Pct. Black	5.08	1.75**	−0.23	−0.02	−0.00	−0.03	−0.23**	−0.08
	(2.72)	(0.81)	(0.20)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.05)
Pct. Latino/a	9.67**	1.32**	−0.30	0.03	−0.02	0.02	−0.26**	0.01
	(3.89)	(0.67)	(0.20)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.03)
Median Income	5.26**	1.36**	0.06	0.07**	−0.18**	−0.03	−0.10**	0.14**
	(2.14)	(0.64)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
City Population	0.02**	−0.06	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00**	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Med. Home Value	−2.02**	−0.27**	−0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	−0.01**
	(1.01)	(0.08)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Observations	26	207	98	415	91	390	80	391
R^2	0.41	0.27	0.20	0.14	0.17	0.08	0.22	0.17
Adjusted R^2	0.08	0.23	0.12	0.12	0.07	0.06	0.12	0.15

Note: **p<0.05

Curriculum Vitae

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Education

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee **Milwaukee, WI**
Ph.D., Political Science *May 2020*
Exam Fields: American Politics, Public Administration & Policy
Dissertation: Unequal Representation in Local Democracies: An Analysis of Public Opinion and Policy Outcomes in U.S. Cities
Committee: Paru Shah (chair), Tom Holbrook, Joel Rast, Kathy Dolan

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee **Milwaukee, WI**
M.A., Political Science *May 2016*

Indiana University South Bend **South Bend, IN**
B.A., Political Science *May 2014*

Publications

Heideman, Amanda J. *Forthcoming.* "Race, Place, and Descriptive Representation: What Shapes Trust Toward Local Government?" *Representation.*

Heideman, Amanda J. 2019. "Is It All About the Money? How Campaigns Spur Participation in State Court Elections." *Justice System Journal* 40(3): 221-237.

Under Review

"The Promise of E-Gov? City Hall's Responsiveness to Neighborhood Interests." *Revise & Resubmit* (with Paru Shah, Amber Wichowsky, & Branden DuPont)

"Contextual and Individual-Level Determinants of Attitudes Toward Local Taxes." (with Tom Holbrook)

"Candidate Diversity and Ranked Choice Voting in Minneapolis, Minnesota." (with Andrea Benjamin & Paru Shah)

Manuscripts in Preparation

"Reliable Sources? Correcting Misinformation in Polarized Media Environments" (with Nick Davis, Taraleigh Davis, Patrick Kraft, Jason Neumeyer, & Shin Young Park)

Teaching Experience

University of Wisconsin-Stout **Menomonie, WI**
Instructor *Fall 2019*
POLSCI 210 American Politics (Online)

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee **Milwaukee, WI**
Teaching Assistant *Fall 2014 - Current*
GLOBAL 101 Introduction to Global Studies
POL SCI 104 Introduction to American Government
POL SCI 105 State and Local Politics
POL SCI 203 Introduction to Political Science Research
POL SCI 215 Ethnicity, Religion, and Race in American Politics
POL SCI 213 Urban Politics
POL SCI 335 Comparative Political Systems
POL SCI 415 The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Immigration

Additional Relevant Work Experience

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee **Milwaukee, WI**
Wilder Crane Project Assistant *Spring 2015 - Current*
Supervisor: Tom Holbrook
Responsibilities included assisting with the management of an original local elections database, including collecting and organizing data as well as managing data collection efforts by undergraduate students working on the project. I also tracked and collected state-level polling data during election seasons.

The Argosy Foundation **Milwaukee, WI**
Graduate Research Intern *June 2017 - Oct. 2018*
As a research intern, I generated multiple program evaluation and grant portfolio analysis reports, regularly reviewed partner reports and engaged in follow up correspondence with partner organizations, and assisted with grant application reviews and funding decisions.

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee **Milwaukee, WI**
Research Assistant *Summer 2015*
Supervisor: Paru Shah
Tasks included: collecting state voter files, collecting data on candidates running for state-level offices, data cleaning, and creating new variables for analysis.

Conference Presentations

Midwest Political Science Association	**Chicago, IL**
	*2017, 2018, 2019, 2020**
International Society for Political Psychology	**Berlin, Germany**
	*2020**
Society for Political Methodology	**Boston, MA**
	2019
Urban Affairs Association	**Los Angeles, CA**
	*2019***

Note: * Cancelled due to Covid19.
** Presented by co-author.

Grants and Awards

2019	PolMeth Travel Grant	National Science Foundation
2019	Graduate Student Travel Support Award	University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
2017	Graduate Student Travel Support Award	University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
2016	Wilder Crane Memorial Scholarship Award	University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
2016	Chancellor's Graduate Student Award	University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
2015	Wilder Crane Memorial Scholarship Award	University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
2014	Chancellor's Graduate Student Award	University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Skills

Programming & Software: ArcGIS, LaTeX, Qualtrics, R, Stata, SPSS, SQL (basic)
Languages: Spanish (intermediate)

Memberships

Midwest Political Science Association
The Society for Political Methodology
Urban Affairs Association