University of Wisconsin Milwaukee
UWM Digital Commons

Theses and Dissertations

August 2022

The Road to Democratic Backsliding

Yunus Emre Orhan
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd

 Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Orhan, Yunus Emre, "The Road to Democratic Backsliding" (2022). *Theses and Dissertations*. 3054.
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/3054

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UWM Digital Commons. For more information, please contact scholarlycommunicationteam-group@uwm.edu.

THE ROAD TO DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING

by

Yunus Emre Orhan

A Dissertation Submitted in

Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in Political Science

at

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

August 2022

ABSTRACT

THE ROAD TO DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING

by

Yunus Emre Orhan

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2022
Under the Supervision of Professor Ora John Reuter

This dissertation uses three different papers to develop and empirically assess a theoretical framework to explain puzzling support for illiberal incumbents, highlighting the micro-level tradeoffs associated with punishing leaders. I mainly investigate whether affectively polarized regime supporters are more likely to tolerate incumbents who engage in undemocratic action and how affective polarization evolves and why it manifests itself worldwide today. The first paper explores the linkage between democratic backsliding and affective polarization at the country level. The second paper switches its unit of analysis to the individual level and provides direct evidence on the linkage ideological/affective polarization and voters' willingness to tolerate undemocratic actions. Finally, the third paper shows that affective polarization is also grounded in our social capital. By providing compelling evidence, I have offered new insights concerning the interplay between polarization, social networks, and political behavior on future of democracy with both substantial theoretical and empirical implications. This project is generously ($15,000) financed by the National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant.

© Copyright by Yunus Emre Orhan, 2022
All Rights Reserved

To
My wife

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMCE - Average Marginal Component Effects

CI - Confidence Interval

CSES - Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

EU - European Union

IBBS - Classification of Statistical Regional Units

M - Mean

MetroPOLL - MetroPOLL Strategic and Social Research Firm

OLS - Ordinary Least Squares

PPS - Probability Proportionate to Size

SD - Standard Deviation

TUIK - The Turkish Statistical Institute

UAE - United Arab Emirates

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I first and foremost want to express my gratitude to my supervisor Ora John Reuter. He has helped me with this dissertation and on the way towards it. He has always been a source of sophisticated guidance and support since I started at UWM. His curious but humble personality, critical but sincere comments, sharp but constructive mind are fascinating to be exposed to. Readers familiar with John's work will undoubtedly see his professional touches on my journey and dissertation.

I have also been very lucky to work intensively with Thomas Holbrook, Natasha Sugiyama, Patrick Kraft, and Murat Somer for almost three years. While my name sits at the top of this dissertation, this committee lent the ideas, wisdom, and encouragement I needed to complete this project. They regularly dedicated hours to discussing the work that makes up this dissertation, reading drafts, and providing detailed comments. They have regularly challenged me to reassess my assumptions and arguments. However, Patrick deserves special recognition for unwavering patience in helping me work through statistical and methodological concerns. Countless methodological conversations with him has incredibly sharpened my analyses.

Most of the empirical part of this dissertation looking at the impact of affective polarization could not be written without the generous grant financed by the American Political Science Association. I thank the NSF and Jessica James for their support and guidance. This grant made it possible to conduct nationally-representative survey in Turkey and allowed me to collect an original dataset.

More broadly, I am greatly indebted to the support of the Department of Political Science and our office manager Kathy Krueger. While at UWM I have learned a lot from my faculty members in our intellectually stimulating environment. I am thankful to Dave Armstrong, Ivan Ascher, Sara Benesh, Kennan Ferguson, Uk Heo, Shale Horowitz, Kristin Horowitz, Hong Min Park, Steven Redd, and Paru Shah. I have either taken some of their classes or worked as a teaching assistant for them. What I have learned in my department do push me ahead of the game.

A closer circle of friendships is usually the deepest ground of any achievement. First

and foremost, my oldest friend, my *kardo*, Muhammet Ali Asil, has been always there for me. His love, friendship, hospitality, good sense of humor, kind words about my journey, and attentive presence have always offered a welcome space of intellectual play and debate. Thanks to him for his comradeship throughout the many years. Although we do not live in the same region anymore, I believe we will always be remained close.

I was and still am blessed with the greatest friends ever. I am grateful to Osman Erenay, Emin Inan, Yakup Karasahan, Ceylan Morgul, Ismail Mutlu, Abdurresid Sahin, and Yavuz Sari for their love and support in good times and bad times. Without their continuous encouragement and solidarity, I could not overcome the motivational difficulties during the completion of this dissertation. Their presence has always been a safe haven for me.

So many sincere friends deserve my gratitude for making this dissertation a reality. Colak family in Chicago, Inan family in Pennsylvania, Ozdemir family in Ohio, Erenay and Ayasli families in Milwaukee have always graciously opened their homes to my family during my PhD education. I am greatly indebted to them all for their moral support.

I have also found several friends in graduate school. I am indebted to them. They have all, in many different ways, taught me a lot about academic life and political science. I will especially always miss each of the moments I spent with Enes Ayasli. Another special thanks goes to my friend Moohyung Cho, at the Ewha University, with whom I have worked on a number of projects and from whom I have learned a lot. You are my colleagues and friends that I am lucky to have.

I cannot thank enough to my beloved parents, Erdogan and Saadet Orhan, Cem and Guzide Akin, who have always have faith in me. I also thank them for all the sacrifices that they made on my behalf. I warmly thank my brothers Tarik Orhan, Necmettin Orhan, and Bilal Akin who always supported me throughout this venture. I owe more than I can repay to them.

Still, nobody has influenced this work more or been more important to its success than my wife, Busra. The words “help” or “support” are insufficient to express the kind of love she gave me during the long days and nights I worked on my study. It is true in

significant ways - life with Busra is godsend blessing, and that sustains me in everything I do. A deep debt of gratitude goes to our fourteen month daughter, Elif, whose charming arrival on the scene during my studies helped me feel the mystery of beginnings.

I Dissertation

'What is hell? I maintain that it is the suffering of being unable to love.'

Fyodor Dostoevsky

Over the past decade, perhaps no topic in comparative politics has received as much popular and scholarly attention as democratic backsliding. Although elected politicians (e.g., Chavez in Venezuela, Erdoğan in Turkey, Orbán in Hungary) have often been the authors of authoritarian reversals, it is still puzzling – given how obvious these violations are – why and under what conditions the regular voter is likely to tolerate undemocratic actions.

My dissertation develops and empirically assesses a theoretical framework to explain puzzling support for illiberal incumbents, highlighting the micro-level tradeoffs associated with punishing leaders. I study this puzzle in three separate papers. Each paper identifies a different aspect of the puzzle and provide either observational and experimental evidence. This project was generously financed ($15.000) by a Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant from the American Political Science Association / National Science Foundation. This project has been granted exempt status by the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee's Institutional Review Board (22.028) and has been granted approval to waive documentation of informed consent. All participants can stop participation at any time in the study and are debriefed at the end.

Throughout the dissertation, I develop two key arguments. First, my chief contention is that affective polarization has become a primary factor driving support for undemocratic politicians. Second, I argue that affective polarization is grounded in our social capital.

What is the relationship between polarization and democratic backsliding? The first paper attempts to provide a cross-country comparison that analyses and compares the relationship between ideological polarization, affective polarization, and democratic backsliding. My findings show how crucial the level of affective polarization is in the task of securing democracy. Given that affective polarization is increasing globally, results of the first paper provide a projection of the type of changes that may (continue to) occur in the future: an ongoing increase in democratic backsliding, less accountability, less freedom, fewer individual rights, greater corruption, and less deliberation in democracies. However, ideological polarization has shown no correlation.

The second paper switches its unit of analysis to the individual level and asks why and under what conditions the regular voter is likely to tolerate undemocratic actions. Recent literature expects rising polarization to provide electoral advantages to autocratic incumbents. However, few studies provide direct evidence on this linkage in deeply polarized developing countries. This paper focuses on the politically important differentiation between affective and ideological polarization, arguing that a critical obstacle to the viability of ideological mechanisms is affective, emotional, and identity-based polarization. In third-wave democracies, in which party structures are immature, and well-established issue-based competitions are relatively absent, affective attachments powerfully raise the stakes of losing elections and, in turn, the price of prioritizing ideological interests over losing the status of the winning group. Using a nationally representative survey and a preregistered conjoint experiment conducted in Turkey with 2500 respondents, I disentangle the effect of ideological and affective polarization on voters' willingness to tolerate incumbents' undermining democratic norms. The results reveal that high-level affective polarization generates 20% more support on undemocratic actions among voters than low-level affective polarization. When we look at the actual estimates, undemocratic candidates are 10 percentage points more likely to be supported by affectively polarized partisans than ideologically polarized ones. This provides evidence that most voters act affective first and ideological only second in developing countries.

The third paper deals more with how and why affective polarization evolve and manifest itself today. Students of political science have suggested that ideological polarization, negative campaigns, media consumption, social environment, and social sorting all exacerbate affective polarization. I present a new theory stating that affective polarization is grounded in our social capital. I argue that partisans lacking social capital are more likely to evaluate out-party members negatively, and different social capital types moderate this relationship (e.g., bonding and bridging social capital). To test these claims, I conducted an original survey in Turkey, a nationally representative survey that included 2500 eligible-voter respondents. My results suggest that partisans' levels of social capital are significantly correlated with affective evaluations of political out-groups. More importantly, I find that affective polarization does not occur when partisans have strong homogenous connections but when they lack a strong relationship with out-group members.

Contributions of my dissertation are multifold. The first paper makes an empirical contribution to the ongoing discussion over polarization by constructing a novel dataset incorporates cross-country data. My creation of extended version provides comparative evidence are complementary contribution not just in terms of the study of microfoundations of democratic backsliding but polarization in general. Existing empirical research on affective polarization has so far mainly been applied to what is arguably the most straightforward case: the American system, which is effectively a two-party environment. Although there have been several attempts to apply the concept of affective polarization to the research on democratic backsliding, comparative empirical evidence is still rare on the long-term trends in affective polarization.

The second paper builds on and contributes to the literature on the causes of democratic backsliding and the study of political consequences of polarization. Although recent work expects growing affective division among mutually distrustful political camps to increase the likelihood of democratic backsliding, few studies provide causal evidence in this linkage in deeply polarized and nondemocratic settings. By using six different measures, I provide direct evidence confirming how pernicious affective polarization is for democ-

racy. Second, I show that the relationship between affective polarization and backsliding could be more subtle than ideological polarization in developing countries. Finally, the proposed design in this paper is unique in its effort to manipulate affective polarization using an open-ended priming question.

The third paper contributes to the growing literature on the causes of affective polarization. Although social environment were linked to affective polarization by several scholars, I provide relatively more exogenous measures (e.g., social agency, memberships) to account for current growing trend in inter-party animosity. I find that partisans lacking social capital are more likely to evaluate out-party members negatively. As a minor contribution to the social network literature, I show that homogenous and heterogenous networks are not mutually exclusive. My findings indicate that having strong bridging social capital could moderate the effect of strong bonding social capital via inducing ambivalence or discouraging partisans from being extremely hostile toward out-party members. Contrary, I found that having strong bonding social capital could also moderate the effect of strong bridging social capital via sustaining more consistency and definiteness in partisan's orientation and worldview.

Chapter 1

The Relationship between Affective Polarization and Democratic Backsliding: Comparative Evidence

Abstract[1]

Why do voters vote for undemocratic politicians in a democracy? My chief contention is that affective polarization has become a primary factor driving support for undemocratic politicians. Once partisan identification turns into a salient identity in the hierarchy of group affiliations, it has the potential to widen inter-party distances. Such a political environment fosters positive beliefs of their preferred party and negative beliefs of the other party, which promote political cynicism, intolerance and increase partisan loyalty. As a result, crossing party lines becomes costly, even when incumbents violate democratic principles or incumbents' economic policies do not appeal to supporters' interests. This tradeoff enables undemocratic politicians to evade electoral sanctions for undemocratic behaviour. I created an extended version of Reiljan's affective polarization application. The new dataset covers affective polarization scores of 53 countries calculated over 170 national election surveys. I find that increasing affective polarization is highly correlated with democratic backsliding, less accountability, less freedom, fewer rights, and less deliberation in democracies. However, ideological polarization has shown no correlation.

[1]The online version of this paper has already been published at *Democratization* in 2022.

1.1 Introduction

There is ample evidence for concern for the future of liberal democracy. Although many countries have made considerable progress since the 1970s, the current quality of democratic governance (i.e., electoral competition, liberties, accountability) has been worsening worldwide (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). Even in advanced democracies - including the United States - parties and parliaments have performed poorly in protecting rights and dealing with hazardous corruption (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018), broadly identified as democratic backsliding - which refers to "a deterioration of qualities associated with democratic governance within any regime." (Lust and Waldner 2015) The more puzzling finding, however, is (Svolik 2020) that individuals who regularly acknowledge pro-democratic values may simultaneously continue to support leaders who subvert democracy (e.g., Erdogan in Turkey, Orbán in Hungary, Chávez in Venezuela, Thaksin in Thailand, Narendra Modi in India, and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil).

Why do voters vote for undemocratic[2] politicians in a democracy? Recent micro-level explanations attribute a central role to ideological polarization in shaping political behavior (see Svolik 2020, Graham and Svolik 2020). However, ideological differences are not the only driver of polarization. Indeed, many third-wave democracies have immature party systems and lack well-established programmatic policy-based competition (Ames 2001). Even in advanced democracies, most voters do not even think of themselves as holding a strong group identity with an ideological label (Kinder and Kalmoe 2017).

Another line of this debate argues that a new type of partisan division has emerged in recent years: affective polarization.[3] While ideological polarization refers to the extreme division between opponents over the issues, affective polarization reflects the degree to which members of opposing parties dislike and distrust each other. Polarization is more likely to become pernicious when it diffuses society and creates mutually distrustful "us"

[2]In my theoretical framework, any politician (whether from the liberal or illiberal party, whether populist or not populist) can be undemocratic and may seek to violate democratic norms and institutions. In my conceptualization, whichever politician starts taking undemocratic actions is the undemocratic politician. That could be people on the left or people on the right. That is why this paper is not about populism and does not place itself in the populist literature. The present article is entirely focusing on undemocratic actions. Indeed, at the moment we live in, it tends to be the case that many of these undemocratic politicians are also populist. Yet, that should not be the case in different historical contexts. Putin, for example, is not a populist at all.

[3]For an insightful discussion of the concept, see Iyengar et al. 2019

versus "them" political camps who gradually view other party members as an existential threat (Somer et al. 2021). In this sense, affective divisions appears as one of the major causal mechanisms that produce the harmful effects of pernicious polarization on democracy. In affectively polarized societies, so the argument goes, affectively attached individuals become less likely to prioritize safeguarding democratic institutions because crossing party lines to vote for the other party's candidate becomes costly, even when incumbents violate democratic principles or incumbents' economic policies do not appeal to supporters' interests. This tradeoff of voter rights for loyalty, as a result, creates electoral advantages for undemocratic politicians to evade electoral sanction for undemocratic behavior.

When there is a theoretical disagreement, empirical evidence plays a fundamental role. In this paper, I attempt to provide comparative cross-country comparison that analyses and compares the relationship between ideological polarization, affective polarization, and democratic backsliding. To test the hypothesis derived from my argument, I created an extended version of Reiljan's data that uses an original application (Reiljan 2019). The new version includes the affective polarization scores of 53 countries, calculated over the 170 national election surveys for these countries, conducted by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) between 1996 and 2020. This extended version allows me to conduct the first-ever cross-national study of affective polarization.

My findings show how crucial the level of affective polarization is in the task of securing democracy. Given that affective polarization is increasing globally, results of the present research provide a projection of the type of changes that may (continue to) occur in the future: an ongoing increase in democratic backsliding, less accountability, less freedom, fewer individual rights, greater corruption, and less deliberation in democracies. However, ideological polarization has shown no correlation.

This research makes an empirical contribution to the ongoing discussion by constructing a novel dataset incorporates cross-country data on affective polarization. My creation of extended version provides comparative evidence are complementary contribution not just in terms of the study of micro-foundations of democratic backsliding (Kronick et al.

2019, Gandhi and Ong 2019, Chiopris et al. 2021, Grossman et al. 2022, Albertus and Grossman 2021, Becher and Brouard 2020, Graham and Svolik 2020, Svolik 2020, 2021) but polarization in general. Existing empirical research on affective polarization has so far mainly been applied to what is arguably the most straightforward case: the American system, which is effectively a two-party environment. Although there have been several attempts to apply the concept of affective polarization to the research on democratic backsliding (McCoy et al. 2018, McCoy and Somer 2019, Somer et al. 2021, Haggard and Kaufman 2021), comparative empirical evidence is still rare on the long-term trends in affective polarization.

1.2 Democratic Backsliding and Polarization in the Literature

The last decade (e.g. in relation to the Trump presidency in the US and the rise of populist parties in Western Europe) demonstrated that not only third-wave democracies are vulnerable to democratic backsliding, but also developed and mature democracies are not invulnerable. While there are various factors of relevance, familiar agents of backsliding come to the fore: elected incumbents. So, what accounts for democratic backsliding?

At the macro level, there is a number of explanatory factors that are currently explored. These factors mainly include economic inequality (Przeworski et al. 2000, Boix 2003, Haggard and Kaufman 2016), collusion between economic and political elites (Mayer 2016), government weakness (Gibson 2012, Snyder 2019), defensive strategies (Capoccia 2005), international organizations (Meyerrose 2020), and executive aggrandizement (Bermeo 2016, Pérez-Liñán et al. 2019).

At the micro-level, the existing scholarship also highlights several dynamics central to accounting for citizen behaviour where elected incumbents attempt to violate democratic principles, such as uncertainty (Kronick et al. 2019, Chiopris et al. 2021), differing norms (Grossman et al. 2022), disbelief in democracy (Albertus and Grossman 2021), the trade-

off between policy and process (Becher and Brouard 2020), ideologically far oppositions (Gandhi and Ong 2019), and ideological polarization (Graham and Svolik 2020, Svolik 2020, 2021).

My research places itself into the micro-level literature and focuses on the polarization element. The idea that polarization makes democracies vulnerable to backsliding has a strong and convincing theoretical foundation (McCoy et al. 2018, McCoy and Somer 2019, Graham and Svolik 2020, Svolik 2020, Somer et al. 2021, Haggard and Kaufman 2021, Svolik 2021). This line of research concerns on partisanship and ideological issue considerations, which have substantial implications on voting decisions for undemocratic candidates (Graham and Svolik 2020, Svolik 2020). In ideologically polarized societies, so the argument goes, voting for the challenger becomes costly because ordinary citizens tend to prioritize their ideological convictions over defending democracy in their voting decisions.

This literature's main contribution is to indicate that democratic backsliding does not necessarily need to be grounded in a deep discontent with the democratic government experience. Democratic backsliding can occur even if voters are opposed to undemocratic positions and would not prefer to vote for a candidate they knew to be an autocrat. In their experiments, Graham and Svolik (2020) convincingly show how the vast majority of their respondents value democracy and correctly distinguish democratic violations from democratic practices. Despite that, however, majority of the respondents are not willing to punish undemocratic behaviour of an incumbent when the price of voting for a more democratic candidate is higher. Thus, they conclude that "most voters are partisans first and democrats on second".

Even if ideological polarization matters, issue positions do not tell the entire story of polarization in both developed and developing countries. Prior researchers have demonstrated that third-wave democracies have immature party-systems and lack well-established programmatic policy-based competition (Ames 2001, Keefer 2007). Even in advanced democracies, most voters do not even think of themselves as holding a strong group identity with an ideological label (Kinder and Kalmoe 2017).

Another line of this debate highlights another type of polarization as the primary causal mechanism leading to democratic backsliding: affective polarization (McCoy et al. 2018, McCoy and Somer 2019, Somer et al. 2021, Haggard and Kaufman 2021). Even though ideological polarization refers to the extreme division between opponents over the issues, affective polarization reflects the degree to which members of opposing parties dislike and distrust each other (Iyengar et al. 2012), which is theoretically and empirically distinct from a disagreement over policy. In other words, affective polarization is about *ad hominem* attitudes, and ideological polarization not. Although there are important connections between them (Mason 2015), ideological polarization is not a necessary condition for the emotional partisan divide (Mason 2015, Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018). Instead, affective polarization can escalate even as ideological polarization decreases (Levendusky and Malhotra 2016). Regardless of how divided the electorate might be on ideological issues (and this applies to several democracies), ordinary citizens increasingly dislike those from other parties (Iyengar et al. 2019). Recent empirical findings also confirm that an out-group bias based on partisan affiliations exceeds the bias based on various prominent ideological issues or issues related to race and religion (Iyengar and Westwood 2015).

1.3 Affective Polarization and Democratic Backsliding

The affective polarization approach mainly relies on the social identity theory. Social identity theory assumes that homo sapiens are a social species; group affiliation is essential to our sense of self (Baumeister and Leary 1995). Individuals instinctively think of themselves as representing broad socio-economic and cultural categories rather than as distinctive packages of traits (Tajfel and Turner 1979, Brewer and Pierce 2005). Individuals, however, typically attach themselves to multiple identity groups (e.g., ethnicity, gender, race, religion, profession) in a hierarchical manner. This hierarchy, in turn, leads to a host of behavioral consequences. Salient identities in these group identities' hierarchies tend to trigger positive sentiments for the group of which the individual feels they

are a member (the in-group) and negative attitudes toward other groups (the out-group) for no logical reason (Tajfel 1970). The more salient the identification, the more biased are the beliefs about the individual's group and members of opposing groups simply because they are in distinct therefore opposite groups (Oakes 1987). The students of affective polarization suggest that this mechanism of social identity theory can easily be applied to the political realm because partisan identity can also be seen as social identity (Iyengar et al. 2012, Mason 2015). The term affective polarization, hence, is a natural offshoot of change in identity affiliation and feelings. It mainly refers to inter-party animosity, dislike, and intolerance towards out-party members. It provides a new kind of polarization compared to a long tradition of studying polarization in political science as the difference between two parties' issue positions.

Recent findings confirm that party identification has become more salient in several democracies than it was in the past (Gidron et al. 2019). This is also true for immature democracies (Laebens and Öztürk 2020). The level of partisan animus in several democracies (e.g., the United States) exceeds even racial or religious hostility (Iyengar and Westwood 2015). That is why several scholars (Westwood et al. 2017, Huddy et al. 2018, Gidron et al. 2019, Iyengar et al. 2019, Reiljan 2019) warn that we need to take into account out-group affect to understand partisanship fully, i.e., how negatively voters feel about competitors. Given that increase in affective polarization in the last decade, however, the existing literature on affective polarization and democratic performance is still not clear about the precise role affective divisions play within democratic regimes. Some scholars claim that affective polarization may weaken electoral accountability (Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018) and diminish democratic norms (Gidron et al. 2020). Others argue that affective attachments result from adopting parties' policy positions (Iyengar et al. 2019, Druckman et al. 2021). Also, some scholars make the criticism that the consequences of affective polarization should only be related to interpersonal domains (Broockman et al. 2020).

No matter the origins of affective polarization (realignments in parties (Campbell 2016), elite polarization (Webster and Abramowitz 2017), negative campaigns (Iyengar

et al. 2012), sorting (Mason 2015), or economic crisis (Handlin 2017)), my argument stresses that we can exhibit common consequences of affective divisions across different political contexts. Once a society is severely affectively polarized, very diverse contexts encounter almost similar dynamics and engender similar consequences. I argue that affective polarization has become a primary factor driving democratic backsliding. When partisanship increasingly becomes salient, individuals start, consciously or unconsciously, to separate the world into us (our party) and them (the opposing party).[4] The more salient the partisan identification in the hierarchy of group affiliations, the larger the perceived inter-party distances (Gaertner et al. 1993). In other words, members of in-party see the out-party as much further from themselves.

This mechanism, in turn, fosters both positive beliefs of the in-party and negative beliefs concerning the out-party (see Billig and Tajfel 1973). Negative emotions directed toward oppositional party elites and members promote political cynicism, incivility, and intolerance (Layman et al. 2006). When their party appears threatened, they quickly start dehumanizing their opponents, questioning the legitimacy of other parties and their members, and losing trust in counter-majoritarian institutions (Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018). I raise doubt about this view (mentioned above) connecting ideological polarization to regime support and argue that this affective mechanism still works even when incumbents‘ policies do not appeal to partisans‘ economic or social interests. As a result, individuals holding such emotions are less likely to cross-party lines. Biased beliefs against opposing elites – that they are an existential threat, self-interested, stupid, etc. – make it psychologically costly to punish a co-partisan candidate by voting for a challenger (Iyengar et al. 2012). Thus, affective polarization leads to an increasing level of party loyalty, and straight-ticket voting and challengers would become unacceptable alternatives.

I am not the first to employ affective polarization as a predictor of democratic backsliding. By providing qualitative and quantitative evidence, previous articles[5] that first

[4]Partisanship does not necessarily be “bad” for democracy. That is why my theoretical framework focuses on the changes in identity hierarchy. To me, affective polarization reflects the increasing salience of partisan identities, but it is not the synonym of strong partisanship. Strong partisans do not necessarily be the affective partisans, although they are vulnerable to be. Thus, affective polarization mainly requires high levels of dislike of out-party but not necessarily relies on positive views of in-party.

[5]see footnote 13

underlined the importance of affective polarization mainly argue that affective polarization has a pernicious impact on the survival of democracy because it helps people endorse non-democratic actions. I build on this explanation and seek to make an empirical contribution to the ongoing discussion on pernicious consequences of affective polarization and highlight the relative importance of affective polarization over ideological polarization to account for the worldwide trend of democratic backsliding. This is a novel contribution not just in terms of the study of affective polarization but polarization in general.

Figure 1.1: The Causal Mechanism



My chief contention is that when all these dynamics occur in one place, then it is not surprising that we see the negative consequences of affective polarization on democratic backsliding. Once undemocratic incumbents receive greater support, I mean the electoral victory combined with control over the legislature[6]. This provides an incredible structural opportunity to undermine democratic institutions, weaken the rule of law, and extensive use of state resources by the governing party (Svolik 2019). In an affectively polarized political realm, partisans are inclined to engage highly in motivated reasoning. As the other party is perceived as an existential threat, the partisan become highly motivated to prevent the other side from taking incumbency. Consequently, this allows incumbents to escape electoral punishment for their undemocratic actions, which in turn disadvantages their opponents – because challenging parties begin to be perceived as enemies rather than merely opposition.

This framework yields a substantive expectation about the consequences of affective polarization and gives the following two hypotheses to be tested:

> Hypothesis 1: High levels of affective polarization is likely to increase countries' likelihood of experiencing democratic backsliding.

[6]See Haggard and Kaufman 2021. They convincingly draw the governing strategies of backsliding autocrats.

Hypothesis 2: Affective polarization will have a larger association with countries' likelihood of experiencing democratic backsliding than ideological polarization will.

1.4 Methodology

1.4.1 Measuring the Dependent Variable: Democratic Backsliding

My dependent variable is democratic backsliding. I do not consider the concept of democratic backsliding as the synonym for a democratic breakdown. Although democratic breakdown refers to the transition of a regime from democracy to autocracy, democratic backsliding refers to "a deterioration of qualities associated with democratic governance within any regime." (Lust and Waldner 2015) Thus, a decline in democratic principles of governance may occur in both autocratic and democratic contexts, even in the absence of regime change.

How then can we gauge democratic backsliding? Although there is a consensus over the multi-dimensionality of democracy, scholars have different views on how to operationalize it (see Croissant and Haynes 2021 and Skaaning 2020). While minimalist definitions are focused on institutional arrangements - typically elections - as the essential element of democracy, maximalist descriptions represent a broader view and extend the term to contain other components, such as social rights, economic inequality, or highly informed citizens. Following Lust and Waldner (2015), I seek a middle ground. I argue that democratic backsliding is best captured if it is conceived of as a change in a combination of democratic indicators. This is why I make use of the Liberal Democracy Index variable from the V-Dem. It consists of two crucial components, respectively (1) a systematic measure of the de facto existence of Robert Dahl's "polyarchy" (Dahl 1971) and (2) the liberal tradition of a country including the rule of law, civil liberties, and so on.

Democratic subversions through elected incumbents do not happen suddenly. Classifying country-years as backsliding simply by looking at one-year changes is less likely to grasp gradual change. Thus, pinpointing whether a regime is backsliding or not necessitates an incremental approach. To do so, I primarily rely on the comparison of each country's democratic scores (at time t) with its rating 5 years after (at time t+5). While negative values show a democratically advancing process, a positive value indicates a country that has experienced democratic backsliding in its last five years. The backsliding score of a country at time is therefore as follows:

$$Democratic\ Backsliding_{\ i,t} = LDI_{\ i,t} - LDI_{\ i,t+5} \qquad (1)$$

Figure 1.2 shows the global trend in the number of backsliders according to their intensity levels from 1965 to the present. It suggests that, at all levels, the number of countries experiencing democratic backsliding had been decreasing from the late 1960s until the 1990s. However, this decreasing trend has become an upward trend since 1995, and the ratio of high-level and very-high-level backsliders has increased dramatically, especially in the last two decades. In 2019, 49 countries experienced very-high-level democratic backsliding, while 41 countries had high-level democratic backsliding scores.[7]

1.4.2 Measuring the Key Independent Variable: Affective Polarization

The key independent variable of my research is affective polarization. Recent research on affective polarization has so far mainly been applied to the American two-party system, where gauging affective divisions is operationally quite simple. By using the feeling thermometer,[8] affective polarization scores in these works[9] typically refer to the average in-party and out party feeling differences among Democrats and Republicans. Yet, we

[7] Since my research mainly concerns the correlation between affective polarization and demo- cratic backsliding, it only includes 5-year differences of the years when the CSES surveys have been conducted.

[8] "Feeling thermometer" becomes the primary form to measure affective polarization. Typically, respondents are asked to rate their feelings for all of the political parties in their elections on a 101-point scale ranging from cold (0) to warm (100).

[9] See for a comprehensive review Iyengar et al. 2019.

Figure 1.2: The Distribution of Backsliders Worldwide, 1965-2020



usually have more than two political parties in a multiparty context and significant variation in parties' vote shares. Reiljan (2019) argues that "to conduct a valid cross-national comparison of AP, it is necessary to: (a) include the in-party and out-party evaluations of the supporters of all the relevant parties (and towards all the relevant parties); and (b) account for the size of the parties" (p.5).

To compare the impact of affective polarization cross-nationally, I have gathered data from 170 national election surveys of 53 countries conducted by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) between 1996 and 2020. Following previous scholars (Ward and Tavits 2019, Gidron et al. 2019, Wagner 2020), I have used the measurement method of Reiljan (2019). His measurement method has two steps. In the first step, I calculate the affective polarization score for each party group (i.e., individual supporters of a party) in a country for a given election by subtracting the average feelings toward other parties from the in-party feeling evaluations. This result is then weighted with the vote shares of the other parties. Next, I sum all these results. Hence, the affective polarization for each party in a country with political parties is as follows:

$$AP_n = \sum_{\substack{m=1 \\ m \neq n}}^{N} \left[(Like_n - Like_m) \text{ x } \left(\frac{Voteshare_m}{1 - Voteshare_n} \right) \right] \qquad (2)$$

'Like' represents a respondent's answer to feeling thermometer questions. The CSES survey includes a question to measure attitudes towards in-party and out-parties, e.g., "After I read the name of a political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party and 10 means that you strongly like that party." denotes the number of parties, m refers to the in-party, and signifies the out-party. I have added '1 - vote share' here to make the combined vote shares of the out-parties equal 100 percent. I then weight all these calculated scores with the respective party's vote shares and sum all them up, which gives the affective polarization score of a country at a given time. It is formulated as follows:

$$API = \sum_{n=1}^{N} (AP_n \text{ x } VoteShare_n) \qquad (3)$$

Thus, the complete formula for measuring affective polarization in multi-party contexts is:

$$API = \sum_{n=1}^{N} \left[\left(\sum_{m=1}^{N} (Like_i - Like_m) \text{ x } \left(\frac{Voteshare_m}{1 - Voteshare_n} \right) \right) \text{ x } Voteshare_n \right] \qquad (4)$$

Figure 1.3 shows how much affective polarization has increased and decreased over time among the 53 countries, calculated over 170 national election surveys conducted by the CSES between 1996 and 2020 for these countries. Each black dot indicates the mean score for a country averaged across the available scores. The bars show the range of variation in calculated affective polarization values of a given country. The scale ranges from 0 to 10, where 10 denotes maximum out-party dislike. In line with the recent evidence, the figure captures dramatic differences between countries regarding their mean scores and within-country variation in different election years in available cases.

Figure 1.3: The Distribution of Backsliders Worldwide, 1965-2020



Notes: This figure shows how affective polarization varies among the 53 countries, calculated over the 170 national election surveys for these countries conducted by the CSES between 1996 and 2020. Each black dot displays the mean score for a country averaged across the available scores. The bars show the range of variation in calculated affective polarization values of a given country. The scale ranges from 0 to 10, while 10 denotes maximum out-party dislike.

1.4.3 Control Variables

Prior research argues that ideological polarization makes democracies vulnerable to backsliding (McCoy et al. 2018, McCoy and Somer 2019, Svolik 2020, Graham and Svolik 2020). Following previous scholars (Ezrow 2007, Dalton 2008, Lupu 2015, Reiljan 2019),

I measure the ideological polarization index (IPI) in multi-party systems as follows:

$$IPI = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{N}(Voteshare_i) \text{ x } \left(\frac{\text{Party LR Score }_i - \text{Party System Average LR score}}{5}\right)^2} \quad (5)$$

I also control for a series of other potentially relevant factors that could impact democratic backsliding and could also be correlated with other indicators of democratic performance. First, I control for economic variables. It is well-established that democratic breakdowns are more likely to occur at higher economic inequality levels (Boix 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Additionally, short-term economic performances (i.e., growth rate and GDP per capita) is significantly correlated with authoritarian reversion (Kapstein and Converse 2008). Although growth rate and GDP per capita (logged) are taken from the World Bank dataset, economic inequality data is taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). Second, existing theories still look at the judicial indicators to assess democratic performance (Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008, Gibler and Randazzo 2011). I may expect that democratic backsliding would be more likely in the absence of a strong judiciary, which inhibits the accumulation of power on the incumbent's hands and secures minority rights. Judicial independence scores are taken from the V-DEM dataset. Finally, I have included a number of lagged liberal democracy index scores, past democratic breakdowns, and average regional democracy scores for each country as predictors of democratic survival. Previous breakdowns are calculated as any democratic breakdowns from 1900 to the present. All calculations are made relying on the V-DEM dataset.

1.5 Analysis and Results

I compiled both OLS and multilevel models with varying intercepts by region and country. Since my research dataset is very small (the maximum number of observations per country is 6), using a fixed-effects model as an alternative approach might be prob-

lematic here because it generates coefficient estimates with higher levels of error as there is a small number of observations per unit (Gelman and Hill 2007, Clark and Linzer 2015). Table 1.1 presents standard errors and coefficient estimates of six models of democratic backsliding (Models 1-3 are OLS models, Models 4-6 represent the results from multilevel models). Model 1 supported my hypothesis: when affective polarization went high, countries were more likely to experience intense changes in their democratic quality. Coefficients for affective polarization are significantly substantial and positive at the p ¡ 0.001 level.

I could not find any correlation between ideological polarization and democratic backsliding, as shown in Model 2. When I tested affective polarization and ideological polarization together, my results for affective polarization remained significant, while ideological polarization is still insignificant. This is unsurprising because the dataset also contained a number of third Wave democracies in which party- systems are relatively immature. Instead, most of the parties in those countries are more likely to lack well-established programmatic policy-based competition (Ames 2001, Keefer 2007). In this context, my theoretical framework expects that affective polarization entails a strong emotional component and this may be more important than "rational" ideological convictions.

Since these models use ordinary least squares estimates, coefficients can be interpreted as the magnitude of movement along the 5-year democratic performance chance associated with affective polarization. The coefficients on the affective polarization in Table 1 are between 0.014 to 0.016. At first glance, this number would seem very low. To put such an impact size into context, the change of LDI score of the US was 0.017 in 2019 compared to 2015. This implies that the correlation between affective polarization and democratic backsliding should not be underestimated. There is no support to be found for other control variables, except regional democracy scores. However, it receives high support across different models. This contradiction is most likely due to the small sample size. If such prominent variables fail to show significant correlations in such a small sample and the affective polarization still indicates a significant coefficient, these cross-national statistical patterns are still informative of a relationship. Since there is very

little empirical research on affective polarization and its political consequences related to democracy, my findings still show there is a room for suspect. It should be seen as a first step in tracking how affective polarization is correlated with democratic backsliding.

Table 1.1: Relationships between Affective Polarization on Democratic Backsliding

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Affective Polarization	.014*		.016*	.014*		.016*
	(.007)		(.007)	(.007)		(.007)
Ideological Polarization		−.002	−.005		−.002	−.005
		(.005)	(.005)		(.005)	(.005)
Liberal Democracy Index$_{t-1}$	.073	.092*	.079	.073	.092*	.079
	(.044)	(.045)	(.044)	(.044)	(.045)	(.044)
Regional Democracy	−.111**	−.128**	−.116**	−.111**	−.128**	−.116**
	(.040)	(.041)	(.040)	(.040)	(.041)	(.040)
Previous Democratic Breakdowns	−.005	−.002	−.004	−.005	−.002	−.004
	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)
Judicial Independence	.001	.004	.001	.001	.004	.001
	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)
Logged GDP Per Capita	.012	.006	.012	.012	.006	.012
	(.008)	(.007)	(.008)	(.008)	(.007)	(.008)
Economic Inequality	.001	.0005	.001	.001	.0005	.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Economic Growth	−.002	−.002	−.002	−.002	−.002	−.002
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
(*Intercept*)	−.178*	−.059	−.159	−.178*	−.059	−.159
	(.089)	(.080)	(.091)	(.089)	(.080)	(.091)
Num. countries	53	53	53	53	53	53
Num. regions	14	14	14	14	14	14
N	170	170	170	170	170	170
R^2	.119	.093	.125			
Adjusted R^2	.067	.040	.067			
AIC				-318.161	-313.520	-308.334
BIC				-282.440	-277.799	-269.636

Notes: Dependent variable is 5-year change in Liberal Democracy Index score "t" to "t+5". These results represent the OLS and multi-level models of democratic backsliding. That is, an increase in affective polarization now shows an increase in backsliding score as well. Models 1-3 are OLS models, while models 4-6 are multilevel models with varying intercepts by country and region. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

1.5.1 Robustness Checks

These findings are still robust to alternative specifications. First, I estimated models that calculate democratic backsliding scores relying on Polity IV and Freedom house scores. Model 7 and 8 in Table 1.2 show that although affective polarization is still positive and significant in the Freedom House scores model, it loses its significance for

the Polity IV specification. The main reason behind this loss might be related to less variance in Polity IV data and the sample size of my data (N=159).

Second, I have also tested different backsliding years. As the time over which democratic backsliding takes place may vary, Model 9-11 estimate three other models that analyze the 3-, 7-, and 10-year changes in a country's level of democracy; Model 12 also looks at the 5-year difference from the past; results remain significant.

As a nature of observational research design, there could be concerns related to endogeneity as well. As I showed in the theoretical framework, there are good reasons to think that the direction of causality does run from affective polarization to democratic backsliding.[10] However, it is possible that there could be feedback mechanisms between the endpoints of the causality chain. This is why my central hypothesis posits a statistical - not a causal - relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding. Although affective polarization may allow undemocratic incumbents to violate democratic norms, the environment in which undemocratic politicians use negative discourse may also push people to have more negative feelings towards other partisans over time as well. There is no simple way to rule out that potential endogeneity for several reasons. On the one hand, a large number of variables that lead to affective polarization are also correlated with the democratic backsliding itself. On the other hand, it is still challenging to construct accurate measures of democratic backsliding and affective polarization cross-sectionally. Nevertheless, my findings in the Model 1-6, which looks at the correlation between the affective polarization at time t and democratic backsliding at time t+5, are still promising and lessens concerns related to endogeneity.

The estimates of the control variables are a bit different. The lagged liberal performance scores becomes significant across different model specifications, while the regional democracy score lost its significance. This implies that I should not be too strong in my conclusions regarding these dynamics. Economic factors are positively associated with the dependent variable. There is no support to be found for other control variables.

[10] See Somer et al. 2021. They convincingly explain how backsliders both thrive and fuel it.

Table 1.2: Robustness Tests

	Δ Polity IV Model 7	Δ Freedom House Model 8	Δ 3-Years Model 9	Δ 7-Years Model 10	Δ 10-Years Model 11	Δ +5-Years Model 12
Affective Polarization	.204	.086*	.010*	.035***	.032*	.018**
	(.164)	(.043)	(.004)	(.007)	(.013)	(.006)
Ideological Polarization	.212	−.013	.003	−.011*	−.012	.006
	(.109)	(.030)	(.003)	(.005)	(.009)	(.004)
Polity IV$_{t-1}$	.078***					
	(.016)					
Freedom House$_{t-1}$		.719***				
		(.051)				
Liberal Democracy Index$_{t-1}$			−.018	−.002	−.245**	−.056
			(.029)	(.046)	(.083)	(.039)
Regional Democracy	3.870***	.054	−.052	−.108*	−.146	−.081*
	(.930)	(.271)	(.028)	(.043)	(.080)	(.038)
Past Democratic Breakdowns	−.069	.078*	.005	.008	.020	.002
	(.134)	(.037)	(.004)	(.007)	(.011)	(.005)
Judicial Independence	.299	.084	−.012	.004	−.016	−.016
	(.228)	(.065)	(.007)	(.011)	(.020)	(.010)
Logged GDP Per Capita	.580**	.209***	.017***	.029***	.097***	.032***
	(.180)	(.049)	(.005)	(.008)	(.015)	(.007)
Economic Inequality	.020	−.003	.0003	.0001	−.002	−.0004
	(.022)	(.006)	(.001)	(.001)	(.002)	(.001)
Economic Growth	.039	.0005	.001	.001	−.002	.001
	(.045)	(.011)	(.001)	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)
(*Intercept*)	−3.020	−.880	−.151*	−.345***	−.720***	−.260**
	(2.112)	(.592)	(.061)	(.093)	(.180)	(.082)
N	159	170	170	129	168	170
R^2	.512	.825	.142	.260	.265	.210
Adjusted R^2	.482	.816	.094	.204	.223	.166

Notes: Dependent variable is 5-year change in Liberal Democracy Index score "t" to "t-years". For tabling purposes, I have multiplied my dependent variable measurement by "-1". *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

The impact of affective polarization may also be observed by looking at the related subcomponents of democracy. I may expect that, as salient affective attachment to the party increases, citizens become less committed to hold their incumbents accountable. Since affectively polarized partisans tend to see oppositional parties as a threat to their existence, their main goal is typically to keep their incumbents in power - even when economic policies do not appeal to their interests or incumbents violate democratic principles. Accountability requires the punishment capability of the electorate to impose sanctions on incumbents who violate central principles. Yet, affective polarization diminishes two inter-dependent expectations, which in turn critically eliminates a key control on incumbents with undemocratic ambitions (see Svolik 2013). First, since affective polarization exacerbates partisan loyalty, this inevitably lessens the fears of incumbents that citizens will punish them for their violations of rules of conduct or poor performance in office. Second, deeply biased beliefs toward challengers among affective partisans decrease their belief that oppositional parties will respond to their incentives. I may therefore expect that affectively polarized partisans are more likely to tolerate weak economic performance or other violations from their incumbents.

Another crucial sign of the decline in a country's democratic qualities is the level of individual liberty in a that country. Democratic backsliding is more likely to occur if a society lives in a status-quo in which it lacks political and civil rights. As affective polarization fosters negative beliefs towards the members of out-partisans, that may provide a priceless opportunity for the incumbent to silence oppositional voices and violate various rights of citizens. However, as famously suggested (see Dahl 1971, individuals' participation in political processes is meaningful only if they enjoy several liberties such as access to justice, freedom from forced labor, freedom of religion, or secure property rights. As affective polarization provides an incredible advantage to the incumbent, greater affective polarization therefore effectively may limit individual liberties.

Finally, the democratic theory has started increasingly to emphasize deliberation in democracies (Dryzek 2010). This approach places public discourse at the forefront of democratic politics and questions the form of decision-making processes. When delibera-

tion occurs, people can easily monitor the government's actions, which in turn increases accountability (Strickler 2018). However, affective polarization generates biased beliefs against opposing elites, such as they are an existential threat, self-interested, or stupid, which exaggerates inter-party distances and degrades the oppositional arguments (McCoy et al. 2018). It is also empirically confirmed that affectively attached partisans are less satisfied with policies that are intended as a response to the popular will (Iyengar et al. 2012). Thus, heightened dislike of other parties may lower inter-party dialogues and weaken respect for counter-arguments.

All these expectations are confirmed in Table 1.3, which comprises an examination of the 5-year change in the related variables. Model 13 looks at accountability in general, while Model 14 focuses on vertical accountability, documenting a relationship between unequal partners (i.e., the masses and the government). The influence of affective polarization is substantial and significant in both models. The capacity of political accountability is more likely to decrease in affectively polarized societies. The support for individual liberty expectation is also promising. Model 15 demonstrates that individuals in highly affectively polarized societies enjoy fewer liberties compared to societies that have less affective polarization. Finally, my findings in Model 16 confirm that the elites in a country are more likely to have a low range of consultation when affective polarization grows.

These results do reinforce how crucial the level of affective polarization is to the task of securing democracy. In affectively polarized contexts, some voters begin to see their adversaries as worthless and a threat to the nation. Members from different parties start dehumanizing their opponents, believe coexistence in the same country is not possible, question the legitimacy of the out-parties and their members, and want to eliminate their opponents. Given that affective polarization is on the rise globally, my findings provide a projection of what kind of changes may take place in the future: the continuous rise of democratic backsliding, less accountability, less freedom, fewer rights, and less deliberation in democracies.

Table 1.3: Analysis of Democratic Indicators

	Δ Accountability Model 13	Δ Vertical Accountability Model 14	Δ Individual Liberty Model 15	Δ Respect for CA Model 16
Affective Polarization	$-.039^{*}$	$-.046^{**}$	$-.009^{*}$	$.201^{**}$
	(.018)	(.015)	(.004)	(.068)
Ideological Polarization	−.015	−.003	−.005	−.041
	(.013)	(.011)	(.003)	(.048)
Liberal Democracy Index$_{t-1}$	.097	.169	.002	.521
	(.118)	(.100)	(.029)	(.442)
Regional Democracy	$.251^{*}$	.131	$.074^{**}$	.804
	(.114)	(.096)	(.028)	(.425)
Past Democratic Breakdowns	−.014	−.019	−.002	−.069
	(.016)	(.013)	(.004)	(.059)
Judicial Independence	.055	.044	.012	−.074
	(.029)	(.024)	(.007)	(.107)
Logged GDP Per Capita	$-.089^{***}$	$-.075^{***}$	$-.024^{***}$	−.027
	(.020)	(.017)	(.005)	(.076)
Economic Inequality	.001	−.0001	−.0001	.010
	(.003)	(.002)	(.001)	(.010)
Economic Growth	−.005	−.002	−.001	.002
	(.005)	(.004)	(.001)	(.018)
(*Intercept*)	$.694^{**}$	$.638^{**}$	$.208^{***}$	−1.508
	(.248)	(.210)	(.060)	(.929)
N	170	170	170	170
R^2	.171	.175	.188	.092
Adjusted R^2	.124	.128	.143	.041

Notes: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

However, my preliminary findings should be considered impressionistic and one of the first steps that empirically track the comparative political consequences of affective polarization over democratic quality. Although they are informative, they still suffer from several limitations. First, the sample size is too small. Further research is needed.[11] Importantly, the direction of causality is still unclear. Democratic backsliding might increase the level of polarization or support for undemocratic incumbents may make democratic backsliding more likely. Additionally, a mere correlation does not tell us whether this causal mechanism works under individual-level experimental manipulations. To address such limitations, previous researchers have conducted various experimental designs (Svolik 2020, Graham and Svolik 2020). Yet, to be sure that the observed consequences are due to affective polarization simply by comparing individuals who are less or more polarized might be problematic. The sample of people is more likely to be different in other confounding variables (see Broockman et al. 2020), and we still do not know how to manipulate partisan identity exogenously.

1.6 Conclusion

In this paper I have explored the impact of affective polarization on democratic backsliding. I argued that affective polarization has become a primary factor driving support for undemocratic positions. Affectively attached individuals become less likely to cross party lines, even if incumbents violate democratic principles or if their economic policies do not appeal to their supporters‘ interests.

I find strong support for this argument across 170 elections in 53 countries. By providing a new extended cross-national time-series data of affective polarization, mine is the first empirical analysis of the impact of affective polarization over a number of democratic indicators. My findings indicate that increase in affective polarization and experiencing democratic backsliding are highly correlated. However, ideological polarization has shown

[11] A recent measurement from V-Dem seeks to provide panel data on polarization. Since they look at how opposing political camps are reluctant to engage in friendly interactions only, their data have several theoretical problems. Despite these limitations, a recent article written by Somer et al. published in this journal has found significant relationships between pernicious polarization and democratic backsliding – which reinforces this research's findings. See Somer et al. 2021.

no correlation. According to my theoretical framework, this is unsurprising because the dataset mainly covers a number of third Wave democracies in which party-systems are relatively immature. These findings were still robust to alternative specifications (e.g., using other democracy measurements or different backsliding years).

Canonical works in political science have long emphasized that deep social divisions and polarization may threaten democracy (Lipset 1959, Dahl 1971, Sartori 1976, Linz and Stepan 1978, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Yet, as Svolik (2019) points out, the prior scholarship has focused primarily on democratic breakdowns instead of democratic backsliding. As previously mentioned, democratic backsliding is a decline in democratic principles of governance, which may occur in both autocratic and democratic contexts in the absence of regime change. As democratic backsliding is driven primarily by elected incumbents, our understanding of the role of regular citizens in democratic backsliding is still limited. Societies can prevent incumbents who violate democratic principles by voting for the challenger at the election. However, even individuals who regularly acknowledge pro-democratic values may simultaneously continue to support leaders subverting democracy. What explains this failure?

I claim that when affective polarization increases, democratic backsliding becomes more likely. When affective attachments increasingly take place, partisans are less likely to cross-party lines even if incumbents violate democratic principles because the partisans' biased beliefs against opposing elites – that they are an existential threat, self-interested, stupid, etc. – makes it psychologically costly for them to punish a co-partisan candidate by voting for a challenger. In line with the canonical works of the comparative politics literature mentioned above, my argument implies that incumbents with undemocratic goals succeed in violating democratic principles only when they are provided with that kind of opportunity by a polarized society. In other words, expecting ordinary citizens to punish incumbents violating democratic institutions becomes realistic only when we understand the underlying dynamics of affective attachments. Thus, I conclude that we need to reassess the role of ordinary people in a democracy.

Chapter 2

Affect, or Issue? A Conjoint Analysis of the Relationship between Polarization and Mass Support for Undemocratic Politicians

Abstract

Recent literature expects rising polarization to provide electoral advantages to autocratic incumbents. However, few studies provide direct evidence on this linkage in deeply polarized developing countries. This article focuses on the politically important differentiation between affective and ideological polarization, arguing that the former is just as, if not more, relevant to the study of democratic backsliding in developing countries. In third-wave democracies, in which party structures are immature, and well-established issue-based competitions are relatively absent, affective attachments powerfully raise the stakes of losing elections and, in turn, the price of prioritizing ideological interests over losing the status of the winning group. Using a nationally representative survey and a preregistered conjoint experiment conducted in Turkey with 2500 respondents, I disentangle the effect of ideological and affective polarization on voters' willingness to tolerate incumbents' undermining democratic norms. The results reveal that high-level affective polarization generates 20% more support on undemocratic actions among voters than low-level affective polarization. When we look at the actual estimates, undemocratic candidates are 10 percentage points more likely to be supported by affectively polarized partisans than ideologically polarized ones. This provides evidence that most voters act affective first and ideological only second in developing countries.

2.1 Introduction

Over the past decade, perhaps no topic in comparative politics has received as much popular and scholarly attention as democratic backsliding. Although elected politicians (e.g., Chavez in Venezuela, Erdoğan in Turkey, Orbán in Hungary) have often been the authors of authoritarian reversals (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2014, Bermeo 2016, Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, Haggard and Kaufman 2021), it is still puzzling – given how obvious these violations are – why and under what conditions the regular voter is likely to tolerate undemocratic actions.

Recent explanations attribute a significant role to polarization in accounting for this puzzle, suggesting that polarized contexts provide critical advantages for incumbents to achieve fundamental changes in democratic institutions and norms (McCoy et al. 2018, Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, Lieberman et al. 2019, Svolik 2019, Haggard and Kaufman 2021). So far, existing experimental research on this linkage has been mainly applied to advanced democracies (Graham and Svolik 2020, Kingzette et al. 2021, Gidengil et al. 2021). Although polarization is not a peculiarly Western phenomenon (Gidron et al. 2020, Orhan 2022), few studies (excluding Şaşmaz et al. 2022) provide causal evidence on the impact of polarization on backsliding in developing countries.

The polarization hypothesis, on the other hand, is not uniform. Scholars typically focus one of two different types of polarization: ideological or affective (also known social polarization). Conceptually, while ideological polarization implies disagreement over policy issues, affective polarization typically refers to an identity-based polarization, which manifests itself through increasing dislike and animosity towards out-party members (Iyengar et al. 2019). Theoretically, ideological approach tend to evaluate to what extent partisan interests predict voters' (undemocratic) preferences (Svolik 2020, Chiopris et al. 2021, Graham and Svolik 2020, Grillo and Prato 2021). Affective approach, on the other hand, concludes that voters are reluctant to punish undemocratic incumbents when they hate and distrust out-party members/politicians (Laebens and Öztürk 2020, Gidengil et al. 2021, Kingzette et al. 2021, Orhan 2022, Şaşmaz et al. 2022). Although both lines of research suggest that hyperpolarization makes punishing undemocratic lead-

ers costly, strikingly, we still do not know how those two mechanisms interact and which one will marginally have a more substantial effect on voting behavior – especially in a developing country where citizens are both affectively and ideologically polarized.

This article addresses both gaps by focusing on Turkey. The Turkish case offers an invaluable and timely context to study the interaction effect between ideological and affective polarization on support for undemocratic leaders in developing world for two reasons. On the one hand, it typifies a developing country where the society is both affectively and ideologically polarized (McCoy et al. 2018, Laebens and Öztürk 2020, Orhan 2022, Şaşmaz et al. 2022). On the other hand, it is one of the prominent examples of an incumbent-driven subversion of democracy (Esen and Gumuscu 2016, Laebens and Öztürk 2020). As detailed in the following sections, the present research focus on support for various electoral, redistributive, and repressive strategies undertaken by autocratic elected leaders. There is extensive literature on the prevalence of various undemocratic actions (e.g., vote-buying, censorship, repression, banning parties) in Turkish politics that dates back to the 1970s (Heper and Keyman 1998, Kemahlıoğlu 2012, Çarkoglu and Aytaç 2015, Somer 2016, Aytaç and Çarkoglu 2018).

With that aim, I argue that a critical obstacle to the viability of ideological mechanisms is affective, emotional, and identity-based polarization – especially in the developing world for two key reasons. First, ideological reasoning necessitates the cognitive element of awareness (Bougher 2016). However, prior research confirms that party structures in third-wave democracies tend to be immature and well-established issue-based competitions are relatively absent (Ames 2001). Second, identity – by its nature – does not necessitate ideological values. It only requires emotional attachment (Achen and Bartels 2017) and a sense of inclusion/exclusion (Brewer and Pierce 2005) – which deeply transcend ideological evaluations. This aspect implies that even if ideology may have an impact on electoral choices, high-level affective voters tend to continue support their party even if incumbents' economic or social policies do not appeal to their interests.

To test hypotheses derived from this argument, I field a preregistered conjoint experiment among a nationally representative sample in Turkey (N = 2500) in 2022. A key

advantage of using choice-based conjoint design is that it allows me to hold irrespective of the heterogeneity of voters' preferences (Bansak et al. 2021) and to investigate respondents' willingness to trade off democratic norms for affective goals – without alerting them to it – by putting them in one of the real-world experiences they regularly perform (Hainmueller et al. 2015). Although my design was broadly similar to that used in many studies focusing on voting behavior (e.g., Bakker et al. 2020, Graham and Svolik 2020, Carey et al. 2020, Becher and Brouard 2020, Gidengil et al. 2021), I innovatively adopt an approach that isolates the causal effect of affective polarization on respondents' choices of candidates in hypothetical election scenarios – rather than doing estimations merely by comparing more or less polarized respondents.

I find strong evidence that affectively polarized voters 20% more likely to continue to support candidates engaging in undemocratic actions. This pattern systematically operates across all different measures even after priming the affective polarization. Consistent with my expectations, affective polarization have a larger (10%) effect on voters' willingness to tolerate undemocratic in-party candidates that ideological polarization.

Strikingly, my further analysis provides an interesting pattern. Compared to ideologically polarized voters, high-level affective polarization generates only a 1.7% additional impact on undemocratic tolerance in main-out party contests. However, this gap becomes 7 percentage points in the general out-party contest. This challenging gap tells us that ideological and affective measures provide different manifestations of polarization.

Consistent with my expectation, I also find that polarization (affective or ideological) has a more significant effect on undemocratic tolerance for gerrymandering, banning protests, repression, and vote-buying – especially in main out-party contests. It is evident that this pattern is more apparent in the main out-party contests.

2.2 Contributions to Existing Research

This comprehensive analyses of the relationship between polarization and voting behavior build on and contribute to the literature on the causes of democratic backsliding

and the study of political consequences of polarization.

The present research places itself into the micro-level literature[12] on democratic backsliding and focuses on the polarization element.[13] Although recent work expects growing affective division among mutually distrustful political camps to increase the likelihood of democratic backsliding (McCoy et al. 2018, McCoy and Somer 2019, Somer et al. 2021, Orhan 2022, Gidengil et al. 2021), few studies provide causal evidence in this linkage in deeply polarized and nondemocratic settings.[14] By using six different measures, I provide direct evidence confirming how pernicious affective polarization is for democracy.[15]

Another line of literature experimentally and formally show how high-level polarization generates more willingness to tolerate incumbents undermining democratic norms and institutions (Carey et al. 2020, Chiopris et al. 2021, Graham and Svolik 2020, Luo and Przeworski 2019). The common premise of these works is that regular voters have ideological ambitions in pursuit of which they are willing to sacrifice democratic norms. This paper, however, shows that democratic backsliding can occur even when in-party incumbents' policy choices in-party politicians' policy choices do not appeal to supporters' interests. I also suggest that the relationship between affective polarization and backsliding could be more subtle than ideological polarization in developing countries. That is, most voters can act affective first and ideological only second.

Finally, as Broockman et al. 2020 review, "previous research has had difficulty rigorously investigating the political consequences of affective polarization because of the potential for reverse causality and omitted variable bias" (p.3). The proposed design is unique in its effort to manipulate affective polarization using an open-ended priming question. Respondents in the treatment condition were asked to read a short introduction about loving Turkey,[16] and then wrote two or three sentences explaining what they like

[12] At the macro-level, scholars have provided systematic evidence showing how unfavorable economic conditions (Kapstein and Converse 2008, Gibler and Randazzo 2011), weak institutions (Reynolds 2011, Kapstein and Converse 2008, Lust and Waldner 2013), populist leaders (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, Vachudova 2021) cause reversal toward authoritarianism.

[13] At the micro-level, regime perceptions (Simonovits et al. 2022, Wunsch et al. 2022), state dependency of the middle class (Rosenfeld 2021), genuine uncertainty (Chiopris et al. 2021), ex-ante beliefs that elections are free and fair (Reuter and Szakonyi 2021), and dissatisfaction with currently practiced democracy (Albertus and Grossman 2021, Grossman et al. 2022) are most often identified as potential drivers of backsliding.

[14] Exceptions include the study by Şaşmaz et al. 2022, though they do not directly examine the impact of affective polarization.

[15] To my knowledge, my study is first to use all these measures simultaneously in comparative research.

[16] As for the manipulation strategy, I mainly build upon Levendusky's (2018) strategy (priming national identity) by making minor revisions.

best about Turkey and why they are proud to live in Turkey. Respondents in the control condition, however, proceeded to the second-stage treatment without first answering questions about loving Turkey. This design is intended to reinforce cross-cutting ties and produces considerably large effects on affective polarization. I exploit this exogenous decrease in affective polarization to capture its downstream causal consequences.

2.3 How Polarization Drives Democratic Backsliding

Over the last decade, a large volume of work has emerged on democratic backsliding – an incremental erosion of democratic norms, rules, and institutions, typically driven by an elected leader (Lust and Waldner 2015, Bermeo 2016, Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). The substantive literature began in the 2000s as political scientists attempted to explain authoritarian reversals in such countries as Bolivia, Georgia, Russia, and Venezuela. However, the breach of traditionally respected norms and incremental – but systematic – erosion in rules of the democratic game reached a new acme in the 2010s.

The gradual erosion may take several forms. To give provide some instances, term limits might be eliminated to weaken horizontal accountability (e.g., Bolivia, Turkey), press freedom might be stifled to limit dissent (e.g., Nicaragua, Czech Republic), or opposition politics might be invalidated (e.g., El Salvador, Russia). The common pattern is, however, that backsliders tend to use legal apparatus to exploit democratic procedures for partisan gains, which is called – in Levistky and Ziblatt's (2018) terms – constitutional hardball.

Recently, some scholars have attributed democratic backsliding to the propensity of voters to continue to support candidates – even when those candidates engage in undemocratic actions. While regular voters rarely directly cause breakdown of the democratic system, prior findings show that they do provide critical advantages to leaders with autocratic ambitions. Drawing on various experimental and formal evidence, it is suggested that even if voters are opposed to undemocratic positions and would not vote for a can-

didate they knew to be an autocrat, democratic backsliding can still occur (see Graham and Svolik 2020). Those scholars shifted their focus to polarization and argue that punishing undemocratic leaders becomes costly in highly polarized contexts (McCoy et al. 2018, Luo and Przeworski 2019, McCoy and Somer 2019, Carey et al. 2020, Chiopris et al. 2021, Graham and Svolik 2020, Somer et al. 2021, Orhan 2022, Gidengil et al. 2021, Şaşmaz et al. 2022). Yet, the polarization hypothesis is twofold. Scholars typically focus either on ideological or affective polarization.

I start with a simple individual-level theory of ideological polarization and support of undemocratic leaders. According to the ideological polarization hypothesis, deepening policy disagreements among politicians – not partisanship *per se* – lead citizens to prioritize their ideological agenda and disregard the need for punishing undemocratic in-party incumbents. Political entrepreneurs anticipate that electoral contests in polarized contexts put voters in the position to choose between two valid but possibly opposing concerns: democratic norms versus partisan interests (Svolik 2019). More specifically, regular voters understand that punishing the candidate who is ideologically closest to them for undermining democratic norms by voting for an opposition candidate amounts to supporting a party campaign planning to implement policies that they detest (Graham and Svolik 2020).

Under these conditions, even voters who appreciate democracy will be willing to compromise free and fair democratic contests in order to elect officials who champion their interests (Svolik 2020). Ideologically polarized voters, therefore, are inclined to view power grabs as a reasonable price to pay for blocking the opposition parties' unfavorable policies (Grossman et al. 2022). In a nutshell, ideological polarization presents invaluable advantages to autocratic leaders, and "they can undermine democracy and get away with it" (Svolik 2019, p.24). This framework yields the following prediction: the more ideologically polarized society is, the more ideologically polarized partisans will likely tolerate in-party candidates engaging in undemocratic actions.

> Hypothesis 1: High (low) level ideological polarization should increase (decrease) individuals' willingness to tolerate in-party politicians violating demo-

cratic norms.

The link between affect and support, on the other hand, is grounded in the basic concept of group loyalty. Relying on social identity theory, scholars assume that when partisans feel an emotional attachment to their political party, their political identities become more salient. This mechanism gradually causes individuals to develop favorable feelings toward their party (the in-group) and negative feelings toward other parties (the out-group) for no apparent reason (see Tajfel and Turner 1979). Over time, negative sentiments and cynicism (see Layman et al. 2006) against oppositional party members/executives exacerbate inter-party divide (Iyengar et al. 2012). Growing partisan devotion then pushes individuals to maintain and promote their party's standing (Brewer and Pierce 2005) and internalize in-party losses and accomplishments as personal failures and victories (Mason 2015), which in turn makes partisans strongly loyal. As a result, affectively polarized environment makes crossing party lines psychologically costly.

In a backsliding context, this emotional mechanism translates into reluctance to punish in-party politicians engaging in undemocratic behavior. Critically, once incumbents violate democratic norms to avoid constraints, that would naturally lead to normative divisions between in-party and out-party elites in democracies (Kingzette et al. 2021). However, when affective voters evaluate people and politicians – negatively or positively – relying on their party identification, motivated reasoning and partisan cue-taking play a vital role (Lelkes 2018). As normative complaints grows, affective partisans quickly become angry and eager to help resolve this threat (Mason 2015) – even at the expense of previously supported democratic norms and institutions. By implication, democratic backsliding is based, at least in part, on a simple affective evaluation. Therefore, my expectation is formulated as follows:

> Hypothesis 2: High (low) affective polarization should increase (decrease) individuals' willingness to tolerate in-party politicians violating democratic norms.

2.4 Same Wine in Different Bottles?

Even though both aspects (i.e., issue or affect) of my argument suggest that hyper-polarization makes punishing undemocratic leaders costly, it is still puzzling how those two mechanisms interact and which one will marginally have a more substantial effect on voting behavior – especially in a developing country where citizens are both affectively and ideologically polarized.

Currently, evidence of the relationship has been mixed. Some early studies argue that, at its root, affective polarization is ideological. In other words, affective polarization is simply a reflection of strong disagreement with the opposing party's policies (**?**Rogowski and Sutherland 2016, Webster and Abramowitz 2017, Lelkes 2019, Abramowitz 2021). When partisan identities – as the argument goes – have become increasingly aligned with ideological positions, this, in turn, increases disagreement over issues (Webster and Abramowitz 2017). As increasing issue disagreement becomes visible to regular voters, negative feelings toward out-party members and their leaders become a natural outcome (Bougher 2016).

On the other side, although students of affective polarization acknowledge that affective evaluations may parallel some major ideological cleavages, they still consider both approaches as different conceptual and empirical movements (see Iyengar et al. 2019 for a detailed review]. According to this perspective, affective polarization is rooted in partisan identities. Once partisan identities become salient, individuals behave more like bowling fans than entrepreneurs choosing an investment, and elections become to be seen through the lens of inter-group conflict over group status (Mason 2015). Since electoral contests as status competitions (i.e., instead of issue competitions) turn opposition parties into existential threats, this environment gradually increases negative out-party evaluations (Mason 2018).

So far, it is still debated whether the relationship between ideological and affective polarization is a causal one or rather a result of other dynamics that jointly lead to both polarizations. The present study stakes out a middle position on the question of polarization by remaining to distinguish affective and ideological polarization. While

I cannot resolve the debate here, there are reasonable theoretical reasons and robust empirical evidence to expect that affective polarization should be more influential on electoral behavior in the developing world.

Theoretically, the ideological mechanism may play a significant role in political behavior only when the parties' positions on a policy are well-known (Dias and Lelkes 2021). In other words, since ideological reasoning necessitates the cognitive element of awareness (Bougher 2016), the marginal impact of ideological polarization could be moderated by the level of issue-based competition in a country. Nevertheless, prior research confirms that many third-wave democracies, in practice, have immature party structures and lack well-established policy-based programmatic competition (Ames 2001).

Second, affective polarization should be dominant in shaping electoral behavior because, by its nature, identity does not necessitate ideological values, issue orientations, or adherence to a group creed. Instead, it only requires emotional attachment (Achen and Bartels 2017) and a sense of inclusion/exclusion (Brewer and Pierce 2005) – which deeply transcend ideological evaluations. Prior studies found that even if ideology may have a moderate impact on electoral choices in some parts of the electorate, affective voters tend to take (contradictory, if necessary) positions on issues differing from the out-party (Layman et al. 2006, Ward and Tavits 2019, Druckman et al. 2020).[17]

Empirically, on the other hand, there is considerable evidence indicating how these two polarization types differ. Recent research found that the affective mechanism is more robust in the developing world as affective polarization interacts with weak state institutions and economic crisis (Mehlhaff 2021, Rudolph and Hetherington 2021). More strikingly, Orhan (2022) demonstrated that while rising affective polarization in democracies is strongly linked to democratic backsliding, ideological polarization has demonstrated no link. Lelkes (2018) also concluded that the two polarization types are only weakly linked: both the ideologically sorted and unsorted may become more affectively polarized. Finally, regardless of how divided individuals are on the policies, they frequently show hostility toward opposition party members (Iyengar et al. 2012, Mason 2015).[18]

[17] This is not so surprising because even in modern democracies, most voters do not consider themselves members of a solid ideological group (Kinder and Kalmoe 2017).

[18] In the next parts, I also calculated correlations among all polarization measures to address concerns about the possible

Consequently, I argue that the affective mechanism should have more explanatory power in explaining continuous support for undemocratic leaders. I expect affective polarization – especially in immature democracies – should be more influential on individuals' willingness to support undemocratic candidates than ideological polarization.

> Hypothesis 3: Affective polarization levels will have a larger effect on voters' willingness to tolerate in-party candidates' undemocratic actions than ideological polarization levels.

However, there is no question that ideological divisions still matter. The theory that ideological divisions make democracies vulnerable to backsliding is also well-founded and persuasive. Although third-wave democracies lack well-established policy-based programmatic competition (Ames 2001), disagreement over some specific issues (e.g., disagreement over conservative policies in Erdoğan's Turkey, distributive policies in Chávez's Venezuela, and anti-immigrant policies in Orbán's Hungary) may maximize partisans' choices on issue preferences and get them to focus more on the programmatic outlook of parties (Svolik 2020). Given the veracity of group-based elements of partisanship, high-level polarization on specific issues may still increase the ideological distance among partisans (Webster and Abramowitz 2017).

2.5 Case Selection: Turkey

The Turkish case offers an opportune context to study the dynamics of democratic commitment in both affectively and ideologically polarized elections with illiberal candidates. The 17-year period prior to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's last election encompassed substantial changes in democratic accountability and representation. Political scientists and international observers agree that the new regime departs from democratic norms in several essential aspects. Checks and balance mechanism had been weakened (e.g., the legislature does not have any power in influencing the president's cabinet and bureaucratic appointment process), electoral rules of the game have been changed (i.e.,

correlation between ideological and affective polarization. However, I could only find a very weak correlation in the survey results conducted in Turkey.

transition from parliamentary regime to the presidential regime), the judicial system has been politicized (i.e., control over the appointment of supreme court judge), oppositional actors (e.g., elites, media, academics, journalists) have been systematically silenced, and state sources have been largely exploited (see Esen and Gumuscu 2016 for a review of the AKP's authoritarian period].

By many accounts, a gradual shift to executive aggrandizement began in 2007 when Erdoğan's conservative Development and Justice Party (AKP after its Turkish initials) transformed the presidency into a popularly elected office. A series of democratic crises began in 2013: first, corruption scandals and Gezi Park protests in 2013; second, the attempted coup d'etat in 2016, followed by a growing executive agrendizement through declared state of emergency and deep economic recession, have made the future of the political system in Turkey substantially uncertain.

Quantitative indices reflect that Turkey is currently one of the prominent examples of an incumbent-driven subversion of democracy. Whereas Turkey's score on the V-Dem project's Liberal Democracy Index was around .53 (on a 0 to 1 scale, where 1 means "most democratic") during Erdoğan's initial terms, following consecutive crises, it dropped substantially to .24 in 2015 and .12 in 2021.[19]

Finally, Turkey typifies a developing country where the society is both affectively and ideologically polarized (McCoy et al. 2018, Laebens and Öztürk 2020, Orhan 2022, Şaşmaz et al. 2022). More strikingly, recent comparative research confirms that Turkey is currently the most polarized country globally (Orhan 2022). The political environment of Turkey in 2022 thus represents an invaluable and timely context to study the interaction effect between ideological and affective polarization on support for undemocratic leaders in the developing world.

[19] As detailed in the following sections, the present research also focuses on support for various electoral, redistributive, and repressive strategies undertaken by autocratic elected leaders. There is extensive literature on the prevalence of various undemocratic actions (e.g., vote-buying, censorship, repression, banning parties) in Turkish politics that dates back to the 1970s (Heper and Keyman 1998, Kemahlıoğlu 2012, Çarkoglu and Aytaç 2015, Somer 2016, Aytaç and Çarkoglu 2018).

2.6 The Candidate-Choice Experiment

To test my hypotheses, I employ a pre-registered choice-based conjoint design that is broadly similar to that used in many studies focusing on voting behavior (e.g., Bakker et al. 2020, Graham and Svolik 2020, Carey et al. 2020, Becher and Brouard 2020, Gidengil et al. 2021). I embedded my conjoint experiment in a nationally representative face-to-face survey in Turkey. The survey was fielded by the *MetroPOLL Strategic and Social Research*[20] between February and March 2022 and included eligible-voter 2500 respondents.[21]

2.6.1 Isolating Causal Impact of Affective Polarization

A distinct feature of my design is that it allows me to analyze the unique causal impact of affective polarization on undemocratic support. Experimental research on the relationship between polarization and support for illiberal incumbents (Graham and Svolik 2020, Svolik 2020, Şaşmaz et al. 2022, Gidengil et al. 2021) provided informative evidence but still suffered from methodological limitations (see Broockman et al. 2020 for their criticisms]. It is well-known that researchers cannot estimate the causal impacts of affective polarization simply by comparing respondents who are more or less polarized because of the possible impact of other confounding variables.

To address such shortcomings, I plan to manipulate affective polarization first, which facilitates isolating the causal impact of affective polarization on voting behavior. Although manipulating attitudes experimentally towards social groups is quite difficult because of the long-standing nature of their orientation, recent researchers confirmed that correcting misperceptions (Ahler and Sood 2018), priming greater identity (Levendusky 2018a), or using trust games (Broockman et al. 2020) would be able to manipulate feelings

[20] *MetroPOLL* is one of Turkey's leading non-partisan survey research firms with significant 16-years experience conducting opinion polling, demographic research, content analysis, and other data-driven social science research. They do not take any policy positions. They are committed to meeting the highest methodological standards.

[21] The survey was conducted face-to-face, and probability proportionate to size (PPS) stratified sampling method was used by administrative units as per census (district, neighborhood). A random selection of sampling points was made from each stratum (no more than ten interviews per sampling point). Random route household selection within each sampling point (no more than one household per building). The provinces was determined in accordance with the Classification of Statistical Regional Units (İstatistiki Bölge Birimleri Sınıflandırması - IBBS) established by the Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu - TUIK). This nomenclature, which was put into effect in 2002, was defined according to the NUTS criteria, the territorial nomenclature of the EU, in order to produce data comparable to that of the European Union (EU) and to create possible solutions for the developmental differences between the various regions of the country.

toward out-group members.

As for the manipulation strategy, I mainly build upon Levendusky's (2018) national identity priming strategy by making minor revisions.[22] In his original online experiment, he asks respondents first to read a long article about the strengths of America and Americans. Respondents then write a brief paragraph explaining why they are proud to identify as American. However, this is not feasible in a face-to-face context. Instead of giving a long article, my treatment stimulus will ask respondents to read the following short introduction about loving Turkey, modeled on actual responses I gathered from various newspapers:

> *When we ask people living in Turkey why they love this country and find it beautiful, they express reasons such as its cultural diversity, being home to many civilizations, the splendor of its historical buildings, natural beauties, food, hospitality, generosity, helpfulness, love or romance of its people.*
>
> *What is the most important reason for you to love Turkey? For example, if you were to talk about the beauties that make this country different to someone who has never been to Turkey, what would be the most important features you would say?*

Respondents then write one or two sentences explaining what they like best about Turkey and why they are proud to live in Turkey. This design is intended to reinforce the open-ended prime. Respondents in the control condition proceed to the second-stage treatment (i.e., choice-based experiment) without first answering questions about loving Turkey.

If affective polarization can be manipulated by priming greater attachments, I should expect that after being exposed to the Loving Turkey prime, respondents will demonstrate lower levels of affective polarization.[23] Consequently, they would evaluate the undemocratic actions more negatively. Consequently, I expect that receiving prime should

[22] While American national identity is based on the principle of territory, Turkish national identity is historically based on ethnicity and still a contested concept. Instead of priming "Turkishness," I sought to prime cross-cutting ties that bind all people upon Turkey's territory together.

[23] Levendusky's (2018) results from three different experiments provide strong support that increasing national identity makes individuals more positive toward the out-party by approximately 5 degrees (on the thermometer question). However, such effects might be weaker among those who are sorted (i.e., those whose ideological orientation matches their partisan outlook).

decrease the support for undemocratic actions - especially among highly affective partisans.

2.6.2 Candidate-Choice Design

Following a short introduction explaining the exercise, I show respondents a screen with two candidate profiles as displayed in Figure 2.1. The instructions asked respondents to "please indicate which candidate you prefer."[24] Each respondent evaluates ten comparisons between pairs of hypothetical candidates running in the 2022 Turkey Municipal elections. Each pair were displayed on a new screen. The total number of observations was, therefore, 50,000.

Below the candidate profiles, I measure the outcome in two ways. The first question, my primary outcome of interest, asks respondents to report a forced preference for one candidate. This variable was coded as binary, *Candidate Preferred*, which is 1 if the candidate is chosen and 0 otherwise. Such an outcome question has a critical advantage because it forces individuals to make trade-offs, as someone must be chosen and someone else punished. Requiring a forced decision also neutralizes attitudes about overall levels of out-party candidates, enabling me to hone in on the attributes that make candidates more or less attractive to individuals. On the other hand, the second outcome question asks respondents to rate each candidate on a 5-point scale. I also use those responses, *Candidate Supported*, as a robustness check.

The use of choice-based conjoint design provides three key advantages. First, by putting respondents in one of the real-world experiences they regularly perform (e.g., voting), my design allows me to investigate their willingness to trade off democratic norms for affective goals without alerting them to it (Hainmueller et al. 2015). Second, it allows me to reduce the social desirability bias that limits my ability to draw conclusions about Turkish public opinion with conventional survey questions (Horiuchi et al. 2020). Finally, it enables me to evaluate the relative influence of each theoretically relevant attribute value in the assessment of one profile to another (Hainmueller et al. 2014).

[24] Prior research shows that (Hainmueller et al. 2015, Graham and Svolik 2020) the results are not sensitive to this particular framing of the task.

Figure 2.1: Conjoint Table Sample



	Candidate 1	Candidate 2
Age	52 years old	44 years old
Gender	Male	Female
Ethnicity	Turkish	Kurdish
Profession	Business Executive	Academics
Party	AKP	CHP
Positions	Will cut government spending in districts that did not vote for them	Served on a city committee that establishes the committee's schedule for each session
	Will facilitate the allocation of land to Middle Eastern investors who will establish factories.	Will make it difficult to allocate land to foreign investors who will buy Turkish companies.
	Will support the cultural activities of Syrians	Will cut financial aid to Syrian refugees.

Which candidate do you prefer? | o Candidate 1 | o Candidate 2 |

On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates that you would never support this candidate, and 7 indicates you would always support this candidate, where would you place CANDIDATE 1?

Never Support				Definitely Support
1	2	3	4	5
o	o	o	o	o

On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates that you would never support this candidate, and 7 indicates you would always support this candidate, where would you place CANDIDATE 2?

Never Support				Definitely Support
1	2	3	4	5
o	o	o	o	o

Therefore, if properly implemented, conjoint experiments can obtain reliable measures of multidimensional preferences and estimate average marginal component effects (AMCE) and interaction effects (IE) of multiple attributes on hypothetical choices or evaluations.

In order to avoid the *primacy effect* and preserve a smooth survey-taking experience, the order in which attributes were presented was held fixed across all ten tables for each respondent, though the order was randomized across respondents.

In conjoint experiments, we assume *stability* and no *carry-over effects* for the potential outcomes. This means that the potential outcomes remain stable across the choice tasks (i.e., no period effect) and that treatments given to a respondent in her other choice tasks do not affect her response in the current task. This assumption allows us to increase the

efficiency of a given study by pooling information across choice tasks when estimating the average causal effects of interest.[25]

In conjoint experiments, we also presume that there are no *profile-order effects*; simply shuffling the order in which profiles are presented on the questionnaire or computer screen must not alter the choice respondents would make, as long as all the attributes are kept the same. This assumption makes it possible to ignore the order in which the profiles are presented and pool information across profiles when estimating causal quantities of interest.[26]

Finally, in order to guarantee that potential outcomes are statistically independent of the profiles, I randomly vary the two candidates' profiles on eight attributes that prior inquiries identify as potentially important (see Graham and Svolik 2020). The attributes include each candidate's age, gender, profession, ethnicity, political party, globalization, refugee policy positions, and undemocratic/generic actions. Each attribute can take on multiple levels.

The supplementary document contains the full list of attribute levels. Since I primarily focus on the undemocratic attribute, I fully describe it here. Each candidate in the experiment was assigned a position that was either democratically neutral (i.e., generic) or undemocratic – an action violating democratic norms. All undemocratic positions are listed in Table 2.1. Figure 2.1, for example, displays one possible "Undemocratic vs. Generic" realization. While AKP candidate says he "will cut government spending in districts that did not vote for them," the CHP candidate "served on a city committee that establishes the committee's schedule for each session." I do not claim this is an exhaustive list of all relevant undemocratic actions. However, those are the most salient, realistic, and sufficient to test whether support for undemocratic candidates is driven by affective polarization. The justification of each attribute is discussed below.

Electoral Strategies: Treatments are capturing positions that aim to undermine

[25]This assumption may not be plausible if respondents use the information given in earlier choice tasks as a reference point in evaluating candidates later in the experiment. After receiving the data, I tested this assumption by controlling for effect heterogeneity between different candidate scenarios. The p-value of the F-Test for this analysis is 0.2209, indicating no carry-over effects. Therefore, I cannot reject the null.

[26]Given the fully randomized design, I would expect each profile in a given scenario to have a 50% chance of being preferred. Being on the left or right should not provide any advantage. I could not find a significant bias favoring the candidate on the left or right. While the candidate on the left was selected 50.31% of the time, the ratio for the candidate on the right was 49.69%. This distribution indicates there was no profile-order-effect.

Table 2.1: Positions Endorsed by Candidates Assigned to the Undemocratic Condition

No	Undemocratic Position	Strategy
1	Supported a redistricting that gives his/her party extra seats in the provincial administrative council	Gerrymander
2	Hand out charcoal to voters for giving vote for himself	Vote Buying
3	Will cut government spending in districts that did not vote for them	Partisan Redistribution
4	Will fire LGBT member municipal employees	Firing LGBT Employees
5	Will give priority to those who support him when recruiting employees for the municipality	Nepotism
6	Will launch a campaign to close YouTube accounts that criticize his/her actions	Censorship
7	Will pressure police forces to detain journalists who accuse the municipality of fraud without revealing sources	Ban Media
8	Will not allow some opposition groups to organize protests after elections	Ban Protests

the fairness of elections focused on two issues: i) gerrymandering and ii) vote-buying (items 1 and 2 in Table 2.1). From the very first elections in Turkey that opposition parties could enter in the Republican Period until the present, gerrymanderers diversified several strategies with a special focus on local elections as well as on metropolitan areas. I designed my treatment to communicate this type of manipulation unambiguously without using a loaded term like gerrymandering. While the identification of a workable standard for judging when a partisan bias in redistricting is extreme enough to be "unfair" is the subject of active research (Chen and Rodden 2013, Cho and Liu 2016), recent studies show that upgrading and downgrading the status of towns and provinces, manipulation of voter eligibility via redistricting, as well as retributive penalization or clientelism/patronage based on election results are all characteristic of gerrymandering in Turkey (Osmanbaşoğlu 2021). On the other hand, the prevalence of vote-buying is one of the other significant weaknesses in the democratic processes of developing countries (Schaffer and Schedler 2007). When individuals exchange their votes in return for cash or minor rewards, the equality of the ballot is undermined, a level and competitive political playing field ceases to exist, and elections are deprived of their policy content (Stokes

2007). There is a voluminous literature on the prevalence and significance of clientelism and patronage in Turkish politics that dates back to the 1970s (Heper and Keyman 1998, Kemahlıoğlu 2012). The general disposition of the literature is that with the establishment of a competitive party system in 1946, the historical dependency of the periphery on the center in Turkish politics has resulted in enduring patron-client relationships.

Redistribution Strategies: Undemocratic leaders are often sustained through a system of specialized patronage relationships and through a series of strategic transfers (redistributive policies, public employment strategies) to regime supporters. In some cases, those strategies may also be justified by claiming to defend their culture from "dangerous" minorities (e.g., LGBT). I included various treatments that capture undemocratic redistribution strategies (items 3, 4, and 5 in Table 2.1), which are by far the most common type of strategies in Turkey (see Esen and Gumuscu 2021 for their detailed review) and are likely familiar to respondents. Turkey's political parties have always unprecedentedly used economically coercive state apparatuses to suppress their opponents and purge them from the governmental labor market. In other words, political nepotism has played a significant role in getting a job and receiving governmental/municipal spending in Turkey.

Restriction Strategies: Restrictions on the freedom of expression have been used by undemocratic leaders predominantly for political ends while disciplining the "society." Several countries, such as the UAE and China, have used censorship on certain websites. Among these, Turkey's ban of YouTube and other websites (e.g., Wikipedia) has attracted attention due to the incongruity between this action and perceptions of Turkey as a democracy (see item 6 in Table 2.1). Another restriction strategy is to deprive oppositional actors of their fundamental social rights. That is why some specific academic and journalist groups or individuals, who have been a major oppositional segment, have faced severe repression, criminalization, stigmatization, and exclusion in Turkey (see item 7 in Table 2.1). Another strategy of restriction is to silence oppositional groups. The governmental/municipal measures are part of a battle in Turkey for public space. Banning protests in specific neighborhoods or places are common practices, which will likely

be familiar to respondents (see item 8 in Table 2.1).

2.6.3 Key Polarization Measurements

My analysis features several distinct measures of polarization. Previous research typically gauges individual-level affective and ideological polarization scores via survey instruments. I have used the most common three levels: general, dyadic, and candidate level polarization scores.

Affective Polarization

I have generated both general and dyadic affective polarization scores for each individual. As a general measure, I primarily used the most common measure, *feeling thermometer*, asking respondents to rate how cold or warm they feel toward the five prominent political parties (i.e., AKP, CHP, MHP, IYI Parti, and HDP) on the standard 100-point thermometer. To calculate my first general affective polarization score for each respondent in a multi-party context, I have used the method of Reiljan (2019). First, I subtract my respondents' average feelings toward other parties from their in-party feeling evaluations. Then, this result is weighted with the 2018 vote shares of the other parties.[27] The following formula summarizes our calculation strategy for respondent i supporting party n:

$$AP_{n,i} = \sum_{\substack{m=1 \\ m \neq n}}^{N} \left[\left(Like_n - Like_m \right) \left(\frac{Voteshare_m}{1 - Voteshare_n} \right) \right] / \, m - 1 \quad (1)$$

'Like' represents the respondent's feeling toward each party; n denotes the respondent's party; and m signifies the out-party. I have added '1 - vote share' to make the combined vote shares of the out-parties equal 100 percent. Individuals were inferred more affectively polarized when their scores get closer to 100. I call that measure as *Feeling Thermometer* in the following sections ($M = 63.7$, $SD = 24.1$ out of hundred).

As a second general measure, I asked respondents "to what extent they feel personal insult when someone criticizes" their party, with five possible answers ranging from (1)

[27] If I do not know the respondent's party, I assume he/she is an AKP supporter.

disagree strongly to agree strongly (5). Individuals were inferred more affectively polarized when their choices gets closer to five. I call that measure as *Personal Insult* (PI) in the following sections ($M = 2.2$, $SD = 1.76$ out of five).

As for dyadic measurements, my first dyadic measure mimics the prominent affective polarization measurement method used in the US two-party system. To calculate each respondent's dyadic affective polarization scores, I subtract their average feelings toward one of the other parties from their in-party feeling evaluations; and do this for each opposition party. Again, individuals were inferred more affectively polarized when their scores get closer to 100. I call that measure as *Feeling Thermometer – D* in the following sections ($M = 50.1$, $SD = 37.4$ our of hundred).

I also generated three more dyadic affective polarization scores, which ask respondents differing social distance measures toward their main opposition parties. I rely on three different sets of questions. I coded "AKP" as the main opposition party for CHP, HDP, and IYI Parti supporters and "CHP" for AKP and MHP supporters for each calculation. This was a reasonable decision because, as Gidron et al. 2021 confirms that governing coalition partners in parliamentary democracies display much warmer feelings towards each other.

First, I asked respondents how well six different traits describe their in-party and the main opposing party. Respondents used a 5-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree* to 5 = *strongly agree*) to indicate whether displayed party members are honest, cooperative, generous, hypocritical, selfish, bigot.[28] Following Garrett et al. 2014, I dichotomized all six traits and set them to 1 when respondents ' choices show agreement (i.e., 4 or 5), and otherwise 0. Respondents' out-party evaluations across positive and negative traits were then summed. On average, 1.64 ($SD = 1.39$, out of three) negative traits are attributed to out-party members, compared with 0.22 ($SD = 0.68$, out of three) positive traits. For each respondent, I subtract the net numbers of negative traits from the net numbers of positive traits. Finally, higher negative scores were inferred more affectively polarized ($M = –1.42$, $SD = 1.66$, $Min = –3$, $Max = 3$). I call that measure *Trait Battery* in the

[28]The battery mainly comes from Garrett et al. 2014, yet I adapt the battery for the traits that are more common in Turkey.

following sections.

The second battery I used gauges how disturbed would my respondents are having neighbors from, doing business with, having their children marry, or befriending someone from the main opposition party. On my scale, 1 refers to "Very disturbed," and 5 refers to "Not disturbed at all." To calculate dyadic scores for respondent i, I got the average score across all four questions. Individuals were inferred more affectively polarized when their scores get closer to 1. I call that measure as *Social Distance* in the following sections ($M = .34$, $SD = .32$ out of 1).

Finally, I asked respondents whether they have much in common with most of the main out-party supporters, with five possible answers ranging from (1) disagree strongly to (5) agree strongly). Individuals were inferred more affectively polarized when their choices show more agreement (i.e., 4 or 5). In the following sections, I call that measure as *Social Commonality* ($M = 3.05$, $SD = 1.9$ out of five).

All five measures have been used by previous studies of affective polarization: Iyengar et al. (2012) use feeling thermometers, Levendusky and Malhotra (2016) use social distance, Nugent (2018) use personal insult, and Garrett et al. (2014) use a trait battery.

Ideological Polarization

I rely on a different set of questions to gauge ideological polarization scores for each respondent. First, I use the most common measure, left-right scale question, asking respondents, "In politics, people talk about the "left" and the "right." Where would you place yourself?" On my scale, 1 means "left" and 5 means "right." Extreme answers "1,2" and "4,5" were coded as 1, and moderate answers "3" were coded as 0. Individuals with extreme answers were inferred "high-level ideologically polarized." I call that measure as *L-R Polarization* in the following sections ($M = 2.9$, $SD = 2.05$ out of five).

Second, I asked respondents how much they agree or disagree with the three specific policies, with five possible answers ranging from (1) disagree strongly to agree strongly (5). Policies were: (1) The "Religious Culture and Ethics" course should be compulsory; (2) The "Canal Istanbul" project should definitely be completed; and (3) The Turkish economy suffers a great deal when it opens to the global economy (foreign trade or foreign investors). Recent public opinion surveys show that those issues are among the most polarized issues in the current political environment of Turkey (Erdogan 2020). To calculate issue polarization score for respondent i, I get the average score across all three questions ($M = .76$, $SD = .28$ out of one). I call that measure *Issue Polarization* in the following sections.

Finally, following Graham and Svolik 2020, relying on my pre-treatment questions on globalization and refugee policies, I compute the squared distance between candidates' positions and respondents' ideal policy positions on globalization and refugees

2.6.4 Correlations Among Polarization Measures

Finally, I calculated correlations among all measures to address concerns about the possible correlation between ideological and affective polarization. The correlation matrix of the measures of polarization is presented in Table 2.2.

To begin, consider the correlation scores among affective polarization measures. As expected, all dyadic affective polarization items (e.g., Therm-D, Trait, SocDis, Common) are strongly correlated with one another, except the correlation between social distance

and trait battery. Consistent with the prior research (see Druckman and Levendusky 2019), this suggests that trait ratings differ from the specific behavioral consequences gauged by the social-distance items. This kind of gap also holds for the general measures. The correlations between general measures (e.g., Therm and Insult) are almost half of the correlations between dyadic measures. To be clear, this does not mean that one measurement method is better than another. However, they measure distinct manifestations of affective polarization (Druckman and Levendusky 2019).

Table 2.2: Correlation Matrix: Measures of Polarization

	Therm	Insult	Therm-D	Trait	SocDis	Common	L-R	I-Pol	I-Prox
Therm	1.00								
Insult	0.27	1.00							
Therm-D	0.36	0.05	1.00						
Trait	0.12	0.00	0.53	1.00					
SocDis	0.14	0.28	0.55	0.37	1.00				
Common	0.02	0.13	0.63	0.45	0.62	1.00			
L-R	0.28	0.2	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.01	1.00		
I-Pol	0.27	0.12	0.08	0.11	0.04	0.04	0.32	1	
I-Prox	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	1.00

Note: Cell entries are the pairwise polychronic correlations between the various measures of polarization. Abbreviations are defined as follows: "Therm = Feeling Thermometer","Insult = Personal Insult","Therm-D = Dyadic Feeling Thermometer", "Trait = Trait Battery", "SocDis = Social Distance", "Common = Social Commonality", "L-R = Left-Right Polarization", "I-Pol = Issue Polarization", "I-Prox = Issue Proximity."

Left-Right Polarization and Issue Polarization, on the other hand, display some levels of correlation ($r = .32$). There is not so much correlation between issue proximity and other polarization measures because their unit of analysis is substantively different. While issue proximity focuses on candidate-level polarization, other ideological polarization measures look at the individual-level general ideological polarization scores.

What is most striking in Table 2.2 is that the correlation between ideological and affective polarization is very low. However, the correlation score between Left-Right polarization and Issue Polarization is almost identical with their correlations with the feeling thermometer measure ($r = .27$ vs. $r = .32$). One possibility is that those ideology measures would be intimately connected to partisan identification, especially in multiparty contexts.

2.7 Results

I begin my analysis by examining general results for all respondents, which are illustrated in Figure 2.2. The x-axis displays the "average marginal component effect" (AMCE) scores for the forced-choice outcome, while the y-axis depicts the attributes and their respective levels. Following the standard approach, I use ordinary least squares regressions with standard errors by a respondent to estimate the AMCE for each attribute (Hainmueller et al. 2014). Note that the AMCE displays the marginal impact of an attribute averaged over the joint distribution of the remaining ones. The estimates are based on the regression model where the *Candidate Preferred* variable is regressed on sets of levels for each level (omitting the baseline categories). Each dot is the AMCE on the likelihood of a candidate to be chosen, and the horizontal lines provide the confidence interval (CI=95%). Dots in the dashed line without confidence intervals represent baseline categories.

The first four attributes include a candidate's socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, ethnicity, and profession). These categories do not show significant impact; nonetheless, they are relevant. I find no measurable effect of candidate age or profession on voters' preferences among candidates. By contrast, the effect of a candidate's gender is low but statistically significant (p= .02). Shifting a candidate's gender from male (the baseline) to female provides a slight advantage and increases their likelihood of selection by 2.3 percentage points among the public (SE = 0.012). This result may cast doubt on research investigating the role of candidates' gender in Turkey (Matland and Tezcür 2011), which could not previously find empirical support in 2011. The ethnic identity of the candidate matters as well (p = .02). Being Kurdish decreases candidates' vote share by 2.5% (SE = 0.009), which echoes the history-long importance of ethnic identities in Turkish politics as evidenced by prior research (Somer 2019, Selçuk and Hekimci 2020, Laebens and Öztürk 2020). Finally, none of the professions show significant effects. However, being an teacher, farmer, or academic is viewed more favorably than other professions – surprisingly, even to lawyers.

Figure 2.2: Do Turkish Citizens Tolerate Undemocratic Actions?



Note: This figure plots the average marginal component effect (AMCE) of each attribute level on the probability a candidate is selected relative to baseline levels. Each dot is the AMCE score, and the horizontal lines provide the confidence intervals (CI=95%) based on respondent-clustered standard errors. Dots on the dashed line without confidence intervals represent baseline categories.

The results from the fifth attribute, party of the candidate, are all significant and consistent with the current distribution of the legislature seats in Turkey, showing that while CHP candidates are 5.2 percentage points (SE = 0.016) less likely to be preferred by the Turkish electorate compared with AKP candidates, this likelihood is between 19.3 (IYI Parti, SE = 0.019) to 26.1 (HDP, SE = 0.020) percentage for other opposition parties.

The next largest effects were for globalization and refugee positions and significant.

Strikingly, pro-globalization and pro-refugee candidates were penalized by 3.4 (SE = 0.007) and 5.7 percentage points (SE = 0.008) compared to candidates taking anti-globalization and anti-refugee positions.[29] When I examined my respondents' willingness to punish candidates that undermine democratic norms, I found considerable variation in the impact of the individual undemocratic actions on a candidate's probability of being chosen. I could not find significant results for Gerrymander, Censorship, and vote buying. Partisan redistribution had by far the largest negative impact (7.8%, SE = 0.019) on respondents' preferences. However, consistent with prior research (e.g., Graham and Svolik 2020, undemocratic positions, in general, decrease their likelihood of selection, while the magnitude of that effect ranges from 1.8% (Gerrymander, SE = 0.019) to 7.8% (Partisan Redistribution, SE = 0.018).[30]

2.7.1 How Bad is Polarization for Democracy?

These baseline results in Figure 2.2 demonstrated that engaging in undemocratic actions reduces candidates' vote share. However, of greatest interest is the impact of polarization (affective or ideological) on respondents' willingness to punish candidates that undermine democratic norms. In this section, I begin my substantive analysis of the conjoint experiment by examining the impact of polarization on undemocratic support in different-party contests. In those scenarios, respondents always see one candidate from their party and one candidate from another party.[31]

Figure 2.3 plots the fraction of respondents voting and rating for their undemocratic in-party candidates as a function of their polarization levels.[32] To capture how likely respondents are to punish their undemocratic in-party candidates, in-party candidates always engage in one of the undemocratic actions, and out-party candidates always take generic positions; all other attributes randomly vary across scenarios.

[29] Since I discuss those outcomes in another manuscript, I do not dive into a detailed analysis of globalization- and refugee-related policy positions here.

[30] Naturally, the magnitude of this overall impact is relatively small compared to advanced democracies. In the US, Graham and Svolik 2020 found that the impact of undemocratic positions on vote share ranges from -10.2% to 16.1% in general.

[31] Avoiding same-party contest is reasonable because regular partisans in Turkey are not allowed to participate in primary elections in which they would reward or punish candidates

[32] For plotting purposes, affective polarization is measured only by the feeling thermometer, and ideological polarization is measured only by issue polarization.

Figure 2.3: Different Party Contests: Defection (voting choice) from the Undemocratic In-Party Candidate by Respondent's Affective Polarization Level



Note: Each plot in this figure displays voting and rating estimates of average marginal component effects (AMCE) for contests between undemocratic in-party and generic out-party candidates conditional on different polarization levels. While left panel displays estimates for affective polarization, right panel displays estimates for ideological polarization. Each plot displays two different contests. While black colored lines shows estimates for general contests between in-party and any out-party candidates, red colored lines indicates estimates for contests only between in-party and main out-party candidates.

Here, I also compare different types of contests. Prior research indicates that polarization and its consequences in multi-party contexts tend to be crystallized in competitions between the main large opposition parties (Wagner 2020). Contrary to two-party systems like the US, each camp in a divided multi-party environment may consist of one or more parties (Reiljan 2019), and coalition partners might be more tolerant towards each other (Gidron et al. 2021). If this is the case, examining "in-party vs. *MAIN* -out-party" contests should indicate more substantial patterns. While red-colored dashed lines indicate estimates for contests only between in-party and main out-party candidates, black-colored dashed lines indicate estimates for general out-party contests.

This figure immediately makes apparent the dramatic loyalty gap between high- and low-level polarized citizens. Under the general out-party contests, partisans with higher

levels of affective polarization scores are 29.9 percentage points more likely to support their in-party candidates than low levels (45.8% to 75.7%). When we look at main-out party contests, the difference between high- and low-level scores becomes 26.6.2% (55.6% to 82.2%). Without exception, across all levels of affective polarization, respondents become more tolerant (from 4% to 9.8%) towards undemocratic in-party candidates in main out-party contests than in general out-party elections. Ideological polarization displays more or less the same pattern. When we look at the general out-party contests, high-level ideological polarization increases partisans' likelihood of supporting an undemocratic in-party candidate by 10.7 (58% to 68.7%) percentage points. However, this gap becomes 20.4% (60.1% to 80.5%) when we look at main-out party contests. The same pattern is also evident in the scale outcome.

Confirming my Hypotheses 1 and 2, voters with high-level affective and ideological generates more support for in-party candidates engaging in undemocratic actions. As for Hypothesis 3, I expected this effect to be higher for affective polarization. Strikingly, my analysis provides an astonishing pattern. Compared to ideologically polarized voters, high-level affective polarization generates only a 1.7% additional impact on undemocratic tolerance in main-out party contests. However, this gap becomes 7 percentage points in the general out-party contest.

This challenging gap tells us that ideological and affective measures provide different manifestations of polarization. It may also shed lights on the mixed findings in research analyzing two party US election system. Suppose one treats multi-party contexts as two-party systems and focuses merely on the main opposition parties. In that case, it becomes complicated to disentangle the diverging impacts of affective and ideological polarization. However, suppose one considers general out-party contests as a robustness check. In that case, she will find that there is still room for in-party candidate punishment for ideologically polarized partisans – especially in general out-party contests. For high-level ideologically polarized voters, the likelihood of punishing undemocratic candidates changes by 11.8 percentage points depending on whether the out-party candidate is from the main-out party or another out-party. This gap turns into 6.5% for affectively polarized

voters.

2.7.2 Partisan Differences

Having described the general patterns of preferences in candidate selection among voters, I also address the question of whether there is heterogeneity in undemocratic support between different party members. I expected this effect to differ for winners (i.e., the governing party members) and losers because it is empirically confirmed that losers tend to redouble their commitment to democracy when authoritarian leaders win the election (Claassen 2019). In the context of democratic backsliding, unlike advanced democracies, opposition parties compete in a political climate where the undemocratic leader uses harassment, intimidation, repression, and other techniques to systematically skew the playing field in its favor (Levitsky and Way 2010). In these contests, the opposition parties tend to frame their political rhetoric over their fight for democratic norms and seek to establish more tolerance within the society because they prefer that the backslider's power be limited (Selçuk and Hekimci 2020). Since affective polarization is likely to reinforce the power of political cues among partisans (Kingzette et al. 2021, Druckman et al. 2021), the level of support for undemocratic actions could be lower among opposition party members.

To test for this mechanism, I estimate AMCEs of highly affectively polarized partisans for each party group in Figure 2.4. I find evidence that partisans differ in their preferences for undemocratic candidates depending on their political party. The results, however, do not suggest clear patterns in the size or direction of effects across partisan identities. For instance, at first glance, high-level polarized (whether ideological or affective) partisans who identify themselves with the AKP are more likely to support in-party candidates violating democratic norms. Nevertheless, there are huge overlaps across parties. Instead, the impact of affectively polarization on IYI Party supporters exceeds the impact on AKP supporters once we look at main out-party contests. The few differences between AKP and CHP supporters also suggest that affective polarization is terrible not only for the governing party but also for the main opposition parties in multi-party contexts.

Figure 2.4: Different Party Contests: Defection (voting choice) from the Undemocratic In-Party Candidate by Respondent's Party



Note: This plot displays estimates of average marginal component effects (AMCE) for contests between undemocratic in-party and generic out-party candidates conditional on "highly polarized" respondents' party identification. Dashed lines indicate average estimates. All other attributes randomly vary, and horizontal lines are 95

2.7.3 Different Undemocratic Actions

In my substantive empirical analysis so far, I have examined undemocratic actions as a single phenomenon. To better understand the substantive meaning of these results, I now shift to the action level, at which a variation between different actions can be interpreted as a conceptually and empirically different kind of undemocratic support.

Previous research stresses that polarized partisans view undemocratic actions that will help win the election as a reasonable price to pay for preventing the out-party from being the winner (Grossman et al. 2022). This implies that in a polarized context, elections are not only a platform on the right path to national affairs but also a status rivalries, regardless of issue content.

Figure 2.5: Differing Undemocratic Actions Conditioned by Polarization



Note: This plot displays estimates of average marginal component effects (AMCE) for contests between undemocratic in-party and generic out-party candidates conditional on different types of undemocratic actions. Dashed lines indicate average estimates. All other attributes randomly vary and horizontal lines are 95

If my reasoning is correct, polarized partisans should primarily be concerned with winning the election, not hurting their out-party members by firing them from state offices or silencing them through censorship. Considering undemocratic actions more specifically, I might expect that affectively polarized partisans should be more willing to tolerate undemocratic actions aiming to eliminate threats pointed out towards their party (i.e., Gerrymandering, Vote Buying, Banning Protests, Repression).

The results in Figure 2.5 display variation in the effect of the individual undemocratic actions on an in-party candidate's vote share among highly polarized voters. Consistent with my expectation, polarization (affective or ideological) has a more significant effect on undemocratic tolerance for gerrymandering, banning protests, repression, and vote-buying – especially in main out-party contests. It is evident that this pattern is more apparent in the main out-party contests. Contrarily, nepotism receives far more tolerance

compared to other types of undemocratic actions.

These findings confirm that polarized partisans are primarily concerned with winning the election but not much with hurting out-party members. My findings also echo Klar et al. 2018, who find that negative partisanship (the approach argues that individuals support their party mainly because they dislike the other party, see Abramowitz and Webster 2016) and polarization are both theoretically and empirically different, despite possible overlaps.

2.7.4 Isolating the Impact of Undemocratic Actions

These results above demonstrated that polarization does increase undemocratic candidates' vote share. However, we still do not know how polarization marginally and directly increases tolerance toward undemocratic actions. To address this shortcoming, I plot the fraction of respondents voting for their undemocratic versus generic in-party candidates as a function of their affective polarization levels.

In Figure 2.6, I treat the "D+ vs. D+" scenarios as my control category (shown in black) when both in-party and out-party candidates engage in generic actions but differ across other attributes. I treat the "D- vs. D+" scenario as my treatment condition (shown in red), where the in-party candidate always adopts an undemocratic action, but the out-party candidate remains generic democratically. By doing so, I plan to isolate the treatment effect of undemocratic actions conditioned by respondents' polarization levels. To simplify the comparison for each plot, I only focus on main-out party contests. For plotting purposes, "star-shaped" estimations represent AMCE scores for high-level affectively polarized partisans, while "diamond-shaped" ones provide AMCE estimations for low-level polarized partisans.

First and foremost, this figure immediately makes apparent the higher loyalty gap between high- and low-level affectively polarized voters when an in-party candidate engages in undemocratic behavior. If we compare the distance between star-shaped and diamond-shaped estimates in "D- vs. D+ (red)" conditions to "D+ vs. D+ (black)", while partisans with higher levels of affective polarization become more willing to support

Figure 2.6: Main Out-Party Contests: Defection from the Undemocratic In-Party Candidate by Respondent's Polarization Level



Note: Each plot in this figure displays estimates of average marginal component effects (AMCE) for contests between in-party and main-out-party candidates conditional on different polarization measures and levels. Each polarization type consists of one treatment (D+ vs D+ : Black) and one control (D- vs D+ : Red) group. All attributes randomly vary but (un)democratic actions. Horizontal lines are 95% confidence intervals based on respondent-clustered standard errors. In each plot, "star-shaped" estimations represents AMCE scores for high-level polarized partisans, while "diamond-shaped" ones provides estimations for low-level polarized partisans.

their in-party candidates, low-level affectively-polarized partisans are more likely to punish their undemocratic in-party candidates. For instance, if we look at the social distance measure, the difference between high- and low-level scores becomes 37.4% (from 97% to 59.6) in the "D- vs. D+ (red)" condition, although it was only 13.8% (from 83.6% to 69.8%) in "D+ vs. D+ (black)."

Although the same pattern is evident across other affective polarization measures, the shift from "D- vs. D+ (red)" to "D+ vs. D+ (black)" conditions almost disappears for ideological polarization measures. The gap between high and low ideologically polarized partisans is narrow, and shifting in-party candidates from generic to undemocratic positions generates very few differences.

These findings provide crucial support for my Hypothesis 3. I expect the affective

mechanism to have more explanatory power in explaining support for undemocratic leaders. Consistent with my theoretical and empirical expectations, isolating the marginal impact of undemocratic actions indicate that affective polarization – especially in immature democracies – is more influential on individuals' willingness to support undemocratic candidates than ideological polarization – without exceptions.

2.7.5 Unique Impact of Affective Polarization

In my empirical analysis so far, I examined my estimations simply by comparing respondents who are high/low levels polarized. I now adopt an approach that isolates the causal effect of affective polarization on respondents' choices of candidates in hypothetical election scenarios.

Figure 2.7 displays the estimated marginal impacts when replicating my benchmark model examined in Figure 2.6 for the subcategories of high-level affectively polarized respondents. I investigate whether there is an interaction between affectively polarized respondents' willingness to punish undemocratic in-party candidates in different party contests and priming conditions.

I find that there is. Receiving prime does decrease undemocratic candidates' likelihood of selection across all measures, in both (general and main opposition) different party contest types, excluding a slight increase for social commonality measure in the out-party contest. Surprisingly, this impact is found more substantial in opposition party contests (6.6% for general feeling thermometer, 2.8% for dyadic feeling thermometer, 11.9% for personal insult, 5.4% for trait battery, 4.8% for commonality, and increases to 9.8% for social distance). To put the magnitude of these estimates in context, compare the effect of priming with that of globalization (2.9%) and refugee (6.4%) policy positions.

"Loving Turkey Prime" has an impact on an affectively polarized respondent's candidate choice that is either greater or comparable in the magnitude of candidates' globalization and refugee policies. Overall, the pattern of results here is quite robust across different measures, and a clear insight emerges: the prime leads my respondents to view socially closer to them. As a result, respondents who received "Loving Turkey Prime"

Figure 2.7: Isolating Impact of the Affective Polarization in Main-Out-Party Contests



Note: Each plot in the left panel displays estimates of average marginal component effects (AMCE) for contests between undemocratic in-party and generic out-party candidates conditional on priming category, while the right panel displays same results for contests with main opposition parties. All other attributes randomly vary and horizontal lines are 95% confidence intervals based on respondent-clustered standard errors. In each plot, "red-colored" estimation represents AMCE scores for "highly polarized" respondents received prime, while "black-colored" one provides AMCE estimations for "highly polarized" respondents that did not receive prime.

evaluated them more positively and less biased.

2.8 Conclusion

Autocratic leaders functionally use polarization mechanisms to avoid electoral consequences for their undemocratic actions. These mechanisms explain why Erdoğan, Orbán, and Chávez's supporters remain loyal at the expense of losing their democratic institutions and their power in the ballot box for punishing unfavorable incumbents.

The main goal of this paper was to provide a comprehensive picture of polarized partisans' willingness to punish/reward undemocratic candidates. In separate analyses, prior research does not tell much about whether marginal contributions of ideological and affective polarization on support for undemocratic leaders are minimal or not. This gap

also becomes crucial when looking at developing countries where party structures tend to be immature and well-established issue-based competitions are relatively absent. I find that a critical obstacle to the viability of ideological mechanisms could be affective, emotional, and identity-based polarization – especially in the developing world. Additionally, previous experiments did not manipulate polarization while estimating its causal impact, leading to biased conclusions. This article introduces conjoint analysis to vary eight theoretically relevant attributes of hypothetical candidates by manipulating partisans' polarization levels before the experiment starts.

My representative sample allowed me to conclude that low-level affectively polarized partisans who do not define politics in identical terms are more likely to defect from their in-party candidates for violating democratic norms via voting against their party. High-level polarization, however, makes democratic punishment highly costly, regardless of whether the contest is with the main out-party or any other minor parties. Looking further beyond the results highlights the need for future research on how generalizable those causal outcomes are. Future research could also examine why different undemocratic actions receive less tolerance than others. Another interesting future research could investigate the variation of affective polarization's impact on different political parties.

Chapter 3

"You Can't Polarize Us": The Differential Effects of Social Capital on Affective Polarization

Abstract

Students of political science have suggested that ideological polarization, negative campaigns, media consumption, social environment, and social sorting all exacerbate affective polarization. I present a new theory stating that affective polarization is grounded in our social capital. I argue that partisans lacking social capital are more likely to evaluate out-party members negatively, and different social capital types moderate this relationship (e.g., bonding and bridging social capital). To test these claims, I conducted an original survey in Turkey between February and March 2022, a nationally representative survey that included 2500 eligible-voter respondents. My results suggest that partisans' levels of social capital are significantly correlated with affective evaluations of political out-groups. More importantly, I find that affective polarization does not occur when partisans have strong homogenous connections but when they lack a strong relationship with out-group members.

3.1 Introduction

Affective polarization - partisans' intense dislike of members of the opposing party - has risen dramatically in the past two decades. While systematic evidence of rising animosity comes mainly from American politics literature (Iyengar et al. 2012, Druckman and Levendusky 2019), a growing comparative literature confirms that this trend has also taken place in other democratic countries (e.g., Reiljan 2019, Boxell et al. 2020, **?**, Gidron et al. 2020 and Orhan 2021).

Recent literature has provided descriptive and explanatory analyses of affective polarization trends (see Iyengar et al. 2019). Among various explanations, empirical inquiries have consistently confirmed that social environment could characterize inter-party animosity. So far, most academic attention has been devoted to network composition (Klar 2014, Bond et al. 2018), network discussion (Sumaktoyo 2019, Amsalem et al. 2021), and online networks (Barbera 2019, Bail et al. 2018). However, we still do not know whether social capital also contributes to partisan animosity. We know from well-established literature that individuals' political behavior and attitudes are well shaped through the stock of their social capital. In people's social lives, multiple institutions such as families, religious organizations, voluntary associations, and other cultural patterns nurture their habits and values (e.g., Putnam 1995, Brehm and Rahn 1997 and Sullivan and Transue 1999).

In the present study, I shed some light on this question. I examine whether better access to a set of resources (i.e., material or cultural, actual or potential) and norms (i.e., reciprocity, trustworthiness, and collective action) embedded in social networks shapes affective evaluations. In particular, I portray affective polarization as an indicator of societies that lost their capacity to resolve shared problems cooperatively and bring diverse people together for collective purposes. Past empirical research has repeatedly demonstrated that social capital provides important channels to deepen trust, reciprocity, tolerance, and quality information (Brehm and Rahn 1997, Inglehart 1997, Sullivan and Transue 1999, Cigler and Joslyn 2002, Claibourn and Martin 2007). I argue that value orientations advanced within such "little democracies" might spill over and shape behav-

iors and attitudes in a larger political context, which is affective polarization in my case. Drawing theoretically on the social capital literature, I hypothesize that partisans lacking social capital are more likely to evaluate out-party members negatively, and different social capital types moderate this relationship (e.g., bonding and bridging social capital). Hence, I expect having higher levels of social capital to have a depolarizing impact on partisanship.

To test these claims, I conducted an original survey in Turkey between February and March 2022, a nationally representative survey that included 2500 eligible-voter respondents. I focus on Turkey because it offers an invaluable and timely context to study the relationship between social capital and affective polarization for two reasons. First, it is currently the most affectively polarized country globally (Orhan 2022). Second, social connections play a more critical role in developing countries where parties possess weak brands (Baker et al. 2006). In other words, talking to neighbors, work colleagues, church peers, Facebook friends, etc., creates a cascade phenomenon in developing world where individuals pass political knowledge and preferences to other individuals.

My results suggest that partisans' levels of social capital are significantly correlated with affective evaluations of political out-groups. I show that the estimates are robust across different model specifications. I also demonstrate that an alternative set of indicators of social capital yields very similar results. Lastly, I present follow-up sub-group analyses suggesting that bridging and bonding social ties should not be considered perfect opposites. I find that as long as individuals hold bridging ties, having a solid relationship with in-party members does not necessarily lead to out-party animosity. In other words, affective polarization does not occur due to partisans have strong homogenous connections, but it emerges rather because they lack a strong relationship with out-group members.

The present research primarily builds on and contributes to the growing literature on the causes of affective polarization (Iyengar et al. 2012, Mason 2015, Webster and Abramowitz 2017, Handlin 2017, Payne 2017). Although social environment were linked to affective polarization by several scholars (Klar 2014, Bail et al. 2018, Tucker et al. 2018,

Sumaktoyo 2019, Amsalem et al. 2021), I provide relatively more exogenous measures (e.g., social agency, memberships) to account for current growing trend in inter-party animosity. As a minor contribution to the social network literature, I show that homogenous and heterogenous networks are not mutually exclusive. My findings indicate that having strong bridging social capital could moderate the effect of strong bonding social capital via inducing ambivalence or discouraging partisans from being extremely hostile toward out-party members. Contrary, I found that having strong bonding social capital could also moderate the effect of strong bridging social capital via sustaining more consistency and definiteness in partisan's orientation and worldview.

3.2 Importance of Affective Polarization

The previously dominant ideological nature of mass polarization no longer characterizes public opinion that much today. One of the challenging findings of public opinion research in the United States over the past decade has been the increasing dislike between members of the Democratic and Republican parties, identified as affective polarization. Various emotions, such as fear and anger, have driven Americans into two hostile camps. Regardless of how divided voters are on the issues, members of the two major parties growingly display animosity toward and desire social distance from out-party elites and supporters (Iyengar et al. 2012, Mason 2015, Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Recent comparative inquiries have extended this discussion and provided cross-national evidence showing that affective polarization has become more salient in other advanced (Reiljan 2019, Boxell et al. 2020, Gidron et al. 2020) and immature democracies (Laebens and Öztürk 2020, Orhan 2021, Somer et al. 2021, Haggard and Kaufman 2021) as well.

Investigating the sources of affective polarization is highly crucial and timely because partisan animosity has negative implications on democratic politics. Although some levels of polarization may not be problematic (see McCoy et al. 2018, hyperpolarization would have numerous pernicious consequences. Recent inquiries show that growing inter-party dislike may decrease people's trust in government and institutions (Hetherington and

Rudolph 2015), undermine democratic norms (Carey et al. 2020, Kingzette et al. 2021), lower willingness to punish in-party politicians (Pierson and Schickler 2020, Orhan 2021), increase conformity with in-party policy positions (Iyengar et al. 2019), diminish support for legislative bipartisanship (Levendusky 2018b), weaken electoral accountability (Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018), make citizens less satisfied (Wagner 2020), and lead to the dehumanization of oppositional political groups (Martherus et al. 2021). Affective evaluations may also spill over into the non-political realm by influencing employer preference (Gift and Gift 2015), altering economic behavior, increasing discrimination against each other (McConnell et al. 2018), and even hampering prospective romantic partners (Huber and Malhotra 2016).

However, the sources that exacerbate inter-party partisan animosity and divide societies into a liked in-group ("we") and a disliked out-group ("they") are still heavily debated. Some scholars see the salience of political identity (Iyengar and Westwood 2015) or sorting (Mason 2015), where various identities (ideological, religious, partisan) come into closer alignment, as a driving force. Other scholars argue that affective polarization is the natural offshoot of elite polarization (Rogowski and Sutherland 2016) or ideological polarization (Abramowitz and Webster 2016). Comparative literature extends this research agenda by emphasizing its structural underpinnings, such as government performance (Reiljan 2019). A different line of research upon which I build here hones in on the role of the social environment. Most studies in this literature examine the effects of different aspects of social environment (e.g., on affective polarization. Here, I explore the role of social capital by distinguishing it into different forms.

3.3 Social Environment and Affective Polarization

Foundational descriptions and explanations for affective polarization have mainly focused on social group identifications. Since the publication of The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960), one line of research viewed partisanship as an essential form of

social identity (Green et al. 2004, Huddy et al. 2010, Iyengar et al. 2012, Mason 2015). Drawing mainly on theories from social psychology investigating the consequences of feeling part of a social group, generally called social identity theory, two substantive anticipations about the implications of a salient identity were translated into the affective polarization realm (see for a review Iyengar et al. 2019). First, it is experimentally supported by students of social identity theory that individuals holding strong attachments to their party should evaluate their in-party members more positively - which is known as in-group bias (Tajfel and Turner 1979, Tajfel 1982). Second, strongly attached partisans should react with stronger emotions to any threats to their political party, particularly anger (Mackie et al. 2000, Smith et al. 2007). Therefore, behavioral scholars conclude that the more salient individuals' partisan identity, the more they are prone to be affectively polarized (Iyengar and Westwood 2015).

However, the characterization of partisanship as a substantial driver cannot fully explain why in-group bias and out-group animosity increase over time. The present research is motivated by the assumption that one's social environment (e.g., family, friends, work environment, community) matters a great deal in the development of partisan affiliations (e.g., Jennings et al. 2009, Klar 2014). The idea that the social environment shapes individuals' political behavior and attitudes is not new. Canonical studies in the discipline have noted that social networks may promote positive outcomes by exposing people to diverse ideas and actions, thereby freeing them from their preexisting beliefs (see Allport 1954, Mutz 2002). Within this literature, recent inquiries have found that people in heterogeneous networks tend to engage in less partisan-motivated reasoning (Klar 2014), high tolerance (Ikeda and Richey 2009, Pattie and Johnston 2009), less out-group prejudices (Santoro and Broockman 2021), more positive affective evaluations (Bond et al. 2018, Sumaktoyo 2019), and accordingly, less polarization (Amsalem et al. 2021). Relatedly, growing online echo chambers (Barbera 2019, Bail et al. 2018) also contribute to affective polarization (see for a review Tucker et al. 2018) because preexisting ideas in filter bubbles go unchallenged due to various algorithms of social media companies.

Yet, while various components of social surroundings (e.g., network composition, net-

work disagreement) have been connected to affective polarization in a number of studies, the role of social capital remains understudied. For decades, social scientists have investigated various consequences of social capital on democracy. For instance, having strong social capital Increases political engagement (see (Lake and Huckfeldt 1998)) and turnout (Knack 1995), improves government (Putnam 2000) and economics (Carpiano 2006) performance, decreases political corruption (Putnam 1993), and promotes confidence in government (Brehm and Rahn 1997). Despite the substantial evidence on the democratic consequences of social capital, research into its association with affective polarization - one of the hottest debates in contemporary politics - is limited in scope. To fill this gap, I examine the possibility that issues of reciprocity, trust, and care conveyed in a social environment may also shape how individuals interact and thus the way affective evaluations of politically opposition groups flow through the social capital.

3.4 Social Capital and Affective Polarization

In this study, I present an alternative theory to explain the process by which social capital might shape affective polarization. In order to avoid confusion, I define *social capital* as a set of resources (i.e., material or cultural, actual or potential) and norms (i.e., reciprocity, trustworthiness, and collective action) accessed and harnessed via various forms of social networks (Putnam 2000).[33] I here portray affective polarization as an indicator of individuals that lost their capacity to resolve shared problems cooperatively and come together with others for collective purposes.[34] Arguing that partisans' levels of social capital are negatively correlated with affective evaluations of political out-groups, there are at least three potential theoretical mechanisms that might account for such an impact.[35]

[33] In my view, social networks provides relational infrastructure that makes possible to exchange resources. The term social capital is concerned more with the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the social networks by an individual.

[34] Although social capital is either an individual or collective property (Coleman 1988, Putnam 1993), I treat social capital as an individual asset in this article. It is reasonable to argue that the reciprocal relationship between community involvement and trust in others is a demonstration of social capital in individual behavior, attitudes, and predispositions (Brehm and Rahn 1997). It is also not a "community" that participates or builds trust, but the people who comprise that community, belong to civic organizations, and acquire positive feelings towards others.

[35] In the following parts, I strictly focus on the political consequences of social capital. I view social capital as a broader conception of social values, interactions, and relations that have substantive implications for the political realm.

First, growing out-party animosity could be induced by weakening trust and reciprocity. Trust can be defined as "'a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another."(Rousseau et al. 1998, 395) Briefly, it is more about having confidence in other people and institutions. Reciprocity, on the other hand, refers to exchanging social support for mutual benefits ((Gouldner 1960), 161]. In plain English, it implies that I will help you out know and I expect you will help me out in the future. In each society, several institutions nurture trust and reciprocity that lead to social capital, such as voluntary associations, sport or religious organizations, or cultural patterns. The more individuals involve in their community activities and diverse settings, the more they learn how to trust other people and build up the principle of reciprocity (Brehm and Rahn 1997). Growing trust and reciprocity, in turn, result in cooperation and allow people to involve in goal accomplishment rather than competition (Inglehart 1997). However, as Putnam (2000) says, social trust is a valuable community asset if—but only if—it is warranted." (p.143) In political realm, if partisans are not embedded in social environments where they interact with others more frequently, such isolation could make them less likely to develop a norm of reciprocity, a by-product of self-interested cooperative endeavors (Putnam 1993). Once partisans isolate themselves from community activities and its lessons of social trust, they lose mechanisms to like individuals who are different from them, which are out-party members in the political realm (Putnam 2000). Such lack of trust and reciprocity could threaten social cohesion and allow partisans to make biased inferences about the intentions of other party members. Instead, while societies become unable to bring people from different parties together for common goals, people will start losing their fear of betrayal (Putnam 2000). Accordingly, civically disengaged partisans tend not to believe that communities can solve their problems cooperatively, which in turn could hamper democratic compromise fundamentally (see Sullivan and Transue 1999). In this case, it is a lack of repeated reciprocal interactions with others that drive the social distance, and the chain of events is one in which social isolation leads to distrust, which in turn, increases disliked evaluations.

The second possible reason social isolation (i.e., low-level social capital) could encourage negative out-party evaluations is the intolerance that social capital could fundamentally reverse. Tolerance connotes the absence of an ability to accept diversity or engagement of ideas different from one's own attitudes or ideas (Schirmer et al. 2012). Tolerance, as a concept, is associated with diversity because, one can only tolerate groups or ideas that she object. Tolerance is highly crucial for a peaceful society because it helps increasing openness and keeping negative attitudes or feelings from becoming unwanted actions such as discrimination, persecution, or prejudice (Vogt 1997). In this regard, tolerance can be treated as a concept that is inevitably and conceptually linked to affective polarization. Prior research confirmed that social capital has the capacity to change "I" into "we" because civic engagement raises social/political awareness (Claibourn and Martin 2007) and forces partisans' to collaborate on shared problems of the society (Putnam 1993). Socially engaged, active partisans could learn more about different sub-groups' problems and their contributions to the community; and become aware of how the community influences them as a part of "we." Relatedly, people's political views are rarely obvious in early meetings, and social organizations make them become friends with fellow members long before discovering each other as members of disliked groups. As a result, civic engagement has a capacity to spread tolerance to others, and partisans with a higher stock of social capital could treat out-party members equitably; and they tend not to oppress them for their differences (Verba et al. 1995, Wise and Driskell 2016). Growing tolerance could act as a glue for partisans to respect the opposition, which also could make them less sensitive or responsive to threat perceptions (Sullivan and Transue 1999). If this mechanism alone were at work, I would expect mainly out-party evaluations to be affected positively.

Third and finally, the high cost (i.e., time and energy) of gathering information in low levels of social capital (Coleman 1988) could be another mechanism that explains growing out-party animosity. People are often inclined to acquire information through cheap communication (e.g., via interaction with others) rather than via their isolated efforts (Huckfeldt 2001). Prior research suggests that individuals belonging to voluntary

associations have substantively stronger access to more information than isolated people (Claibourn and Martin 2007). Informal and formal chats/meetings about current shared problems are likely to pass along quality information. This type of environment could increase the likelihood of exposure to counter-attitudinal information about others, which could fundamentally characterize affective evaluations (Ahler and Sood 2018). In political realm, if partisans exercise bias in their information environment due to low level social capital, this could exacerbate the polarizing potential of political campaigns, partisan media, and misinformation (Garrett et al. 2014). Growing selective exposure, in turn, could drive greater bias toward out party-members. Hence, I would expect out-party animosity might increase dramatically.

Taken together, weakening social capital is another factor that drives out-party animosity over time. When partisans isolate themselves from civic engagement, they are less likely to access information and build social trust and tolerance about people who are not like them (i.e., out-party members in the political realm).

> *Hypothesis 1:* Social capital decreases partisans' affective evaluations toward out-party members.

Although high levels of social capital have a good effect on tolerance, trust, and quality information, some specific types of engagement could be toxic for those expected consequences (Putnam 2000). Unless these networks of relationships are transformed to accommodate tolerance and trust, they are unlikely to reduce affective polarization. The majority of recent inquiries on social capital examine various forms of social capital, such as bonding social capital (strong ties with people who are like me in important respects such as class, race, age, etc.) and bridging social capital (weak ties with people who are not like me). In fact, the social network theory of social capital provides a comprehensive framework accounting for how and why different types of social capital (e.g., bridging and bonding) may twist the three core causal mechanisms (i.e., trust, tolerance, and information) that may each independently be related to affective polarization.

For example, affective polarization could vary with the number of memberships in various organizations. I anticipate this relationship will be positive, drawing upon the

three core mechanisms (i.e., trust, tolerance, and information). It is reasonable to assume that the greater number of memberships in different associational sectors, the greater the potential for exposure to diverse information and meeting with people from different backgrounds, which may drive more inter-group tolerance (Cigler and Joslyn 2002) and trust (Claibourn and Martin 2007).

> *Hypothesis 2:* Membership in different voluntary associations decreases affective polarization.

Whether those networks provide bonding or bridging ties are also essential. This is mainly because social capital, as a set of resources and norms, is also created through the patterns of personal interaction embedded in individuals' social network. In bridging networks, cross-cutting social linkages effectively introduce new perspectives to individuals (Allport 1954, Huckfeldt et al. 2004). Prior research suggests that voters' information about out-party members substantively characterizes people's affective evaluations toward out-party members (Ahler and Sood 2018) and candidates (Lupton et al. 2015). Since individuals holding bridging ties get exposed to a more balanced set of information, bridging networks are more likely to minimize the influence of preexisting issue frames (Druckman and Nir 2008), leading to more informed reasoning (Huckfeldt et al. 2004) and cause attitudes to become more ambivalent (Mutz 2002). These networks, consequently, increase tolerance and trust (Mutz 2002, Wise and Driskell 2016), which in turn reduce partisan identity salience (Lupton et al. 2015) and prejudices toward out-groups (Allport 1954).

> *Hypothesis 3a:* There is a negative relationship between bridging social capital and affective polarization.

Conversely, darker sides of social capital could occur when partisans have too much bonding but not enough bridging social ties. As relations with out-group members become increasingly insular, positive effects of trust and tolerance mechanisms tend to decrease. In fact, the information environment among bonding ties tends to be strongly skewed (Amsalem et al. 2021), which facilitates the flow of information that is unfavorable to the opposition and favorable to the in-party (Huckfeldt et al. 2004). This creates echo

chambers where motivated reasoning tends to be confirmed and reinforced (Druckman and Nelson 2003, Klar 2014), which in turn increases social conformity (Levitan and Verhulst 2016), decreases social trust (Hawdon et al. 2020), and exacerbates reliance on in-group interest and extremity on issues (Klar 2014).

> *Hypothesis 3b:* There is a positive relationship between bonding social capital and affective polarization.

As for operationalizing bridging and bonding social capital, most studies in the past measure and operationalize those two network types as if they are mutually exclusive [see Sumaktoyo 2019 for his review and critics]. However, those two phenomena should not always be mutually exclusive. Having strong social ties with out-party members does not necessarily lead to weak bonding ties or vice versa. It is always reasonable to consider that partisans can maintain relationships with out-party members despite their tendency to affiliate with in-party members.

How would the level of affective polarization change when both strong bridging and bonding ties are present and interact with each other?[36] Relying upon mechanisms described above, I expect that having strong bridging social capital could moderate the effect of strong bonding social capital via inducing ambivalence or discouraging partisans from being extremely hostile toward out-party members. Contrary, I expect that having strong bonding social capital could also moderate the effect of strong bridging social capital via sustaining more consistency and definiteness in partisan's orientation and worldview. Therefore, my hypotheses are formulated as follows:

> *Hypothesis 4:* The impact of high-level bonding (high-level bridging) social capital on affective polarization will decrease (increase) as individual's bridging (bonding) social capital increases.

[36] I found that bridging and bonding social capital are not perfect opposites. See the following measurement section.

3.5 Methodology

My main goal in this paper is to examine how different levels of social capital characterizes affective evaluations toward out-party members. To investigate this linkage, I conducted an original nationally representative survey in Turkey. The data collected by *MetroPOLL Strategic and Social Research*[37] between February and March 2022 and included 2500 eligible-voters.[38] More detailed information is presented in Appendix.

3.5.1 Measuring the Dependent Variable: Affective Polarization

My main dependent variable of the analysis, affective polarization, is a continuous variable gauging the difference between the individual's placement of in-parties and out-parties[39] on the feeling thermometer, asking respondents to rate how cold or warm they feel toward the five main political parties (i.e., AKP, CHP, MHP, IYI Parti, and HDP) on the standard 100-point thermometer. To calculate the general affective polarization score for each respondent in a multi-party context, I rely on the measurement strategy of Reiljan 2019. I first subtract my respondents' average feeling scores toward out-parties from their in-party feeling scores. Then, I weight this result with the 2018 vote shares of the other parties. [40] The following formula summarizes my calculation strategy for respondent i supporting party n. *'Like'* represents the respondent's feeling toward each party; n denotes the respondent's party; and m signifies the out-party. I have added '1 - vote share' to make the combined vote shares of the out-parties equal 100 percent.[41]

[37] *MetroPOLL* is one of Turkey's leading non-partisan survey research firms with significant 16-years experience conducting opinion polling, demographic research, content analysis, and other data-driven social science research. They do not take any policy positions. They are committed to meeting the highest methodological standards.

[38] The survey was conducted face-to-face, and probability proportionate to size (PPS) stratified sampling method was used by administrative units as per census (district, neighborhood). A random selection of sampling points was made from each stratum (no more than ten interviews per sampling point). Random route household selection within each sampling point (no more than one household per building). The provinces was determined in accordance with the Classification of Statistical Regional Units (İstatistiki Bölge Birimleri Sınıflandırması - IBBS) established by the Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu - TUIK). This nomenclature, which was put into effect in 2002, was defined according to the NUTS criteria, the territorial nomenclature of the EU, in order to produce data comparable to that of the European Union (EU) and to create possible solutions for the developmental differences between the various regions of the country.

[39] Instead of conventional style of asking partisan identification, I asked respondents whether they identified themselves with any particular political party in the given list to the degree of feeling as a part of it.

[40] If I do not know the respondent's party, I assume he/she is an AKP supporter.

[41] For robustness checks, I also calculate affective polarization scores between the two dominant parties: AKP and CHP. This measurement completely mimics the two-party system measurement strategy.

$$AP_{n,i} = \sum_{\substack{m=1 \\ m \neq n}}^{N} \left[\left(Like_n - Like_m \right) \left(\frac{Voteshare_m}{1 - Voteshare_n} \right) \right] / \, m - 1$$

I also created a continuous affective polarization score at the leader level as a second measure. Prior research suggests that we are still "not be able to clarify whether respondents were thinking of partisan voters or party leaders when providing their thermometer scores" (Druckman and Levendusky 2019, p.116). Therefore, comparing leader and party level measurements may provide deeper insights. I follow a strategy completely mimicking the prominent affective polarization measurement method used in the US two-party system. To calculate each respondent's affective polarization scores at the leader level, I subtract their average feelings toward the main opposition party leader from their in-party leader. I coded "AKP" as the main opposition party for CHP, HDP, and IYI Parti supporters and "CHP" for AKP and MHP supporters for each calculation. This was a reasonable decision because, as Gidron et al. 2021 confirms that governing coalition partners in parliamentary democracies display much warmer feelings towards each other.

3.5.2 Measuring the Key Independent Variable: Affective Polarization

There were 32 potential social capital items in the original questionnaire. Relying on previous research (Brehm and Rahn 1997, Onyx and Bullen 2000, Keele 2007), I adopted using 6 of the original items for creating social connections and social agency measures, 5 of them for gauging bridging and bonding social capital, 5 of them for creating social trust and tolerance measures, and 16 of them for measuring number of membership that each respondent affiliated.[42] A measure gauging the stock of social connections was created by aggregating separate measures of neighborhood relationship, friends, and engaging discussions with other people. Those variables are evaluated through a battery of yes-no

[42]Membership options are directly borrowed from Turkish Government's website on nation-level organizations (i.e., www.siviltoplum.gov.tr). The list of organizational categories included Occupational/Professional Associations, Associations Supporting Public Institutions/Personnel, Food/Agriculture/Farming Associations, Societal Values Associations, Associations Operating in the Field of Health, Reconstruction/Urban Development Associations, Solidarity Associations, Sport Clubs, Disability Associations, Religious Organizations or Groups, Education/Research/School Clubs or Organizations, Culture/Art/Literature Groups, Charity Organizations, Environmental/Animal Rights Organizations, Human Rights Organizations, Youth Clubs or Associations

questions asking respondents whether they have done any of the following in the last 3 months: (a) Visited a neighbor, (b) Had dinner/lunch with people outside my family, (c) Engaged discussions with people from other party. Social agency measure is created via using three different yes-no agency questions: "actively worked as a volunteer", "took initiative at work without being told", and "picked up others' rubbish in public". The principal components analysis used to create the aggregate measures of social connections and social agency are shown in Table 3.1. Both factors, respectively, account for 50% and 45.41% of the variation . All factor loadings are almost over .5, suggesting that they are important determinants of the variance explained.

Table 3.1: Social Capital Factors

Characteristic	Factor Loading
Social Connections	
Visited a neighbor	.54
Had dinner/lunch with people outside my family	.62
Discuss with people from other party	.56
Eigenvalue	1.22
Percentage Variance	50.00
Social Agency	
Actively worked as a volunteer	.46
Took initiative at work without being told	.65
Picked up others' rubbish in public	.60
Eigenvalue	1.16
Percentage Variance	45.41

As for operationalizing bridging and bonding social capital, most studies in the past measure and operationalize those two network types as if they are mutually exclusive [see Sumaktoyo 2019 for his review and critics]. Although asking respondents about how many of their friends share their specific characteristics (i.e., religion, party preference) or asking respondents to list the names of people with whom they discuss politics (generally with follow-up questions related to those discussants' characteristics) are informative, those questions have limitations to capture network composition at the individual level. Having strong social ties with out-party members does not necessarily mean a lack of strong bonding ties or vice versa. It is always reasonable to consider that partisans can

maintain relationships with out-party members despite their tendency to affiliate with in-party members.

I calculate bonding and bridging social capital from five questions asking respondents, "How many of your friends are [AKP/CHP/MHP/HDP/IYI PARTI]?" with three possible answers ranging from (1) "none of them" to "a lot of them" (3). Bonding social capital was calculated simply from the network composition question asking how many of the respondent's friends share her partisanship. For example, if the respondent is an AKP supporter, her response to "How many of your friends are AKP supporters?" has defined her bonding social capital score. On the other hand, bridging social capital was calculated by averaging the responses to the same questions asked by the other four parties. For instance, if the respondent is an AKP supporter, her bridging social capital score was calculated by averaging her responses to the same questions asking about MHP, CHP, HDP, and IYI PARTY.

Table 3.2: Distribution of Respondents among Bridging and Bonding Social Capital

	High Bridging	Low Bridging
High Bonding	41.65%	29.13%
Low Bonding	17.24%	11.98%

Table 3.2 indicates what proportion of respondents fall into each of the four subgroups in my survey. As one can see, partisans are allayed across the range of bonding and bridging attachment. Confirming the homophily argument – the tendency to affiliate with similar others –, the majority of my respondents (70.78%) reported high levels of bonding social capital. Despite that, 58.8% of respondents holding high-bonding social capital also hold high-bridging social capital (which represents 41.65% of the whole sample). Finally, both measures are weakly correlated and share less than 5% of their variance. Together, those indicators convey another descriptive evidence that bridging and bonding social capital should not be considered perfect opposites. However, we still do not know much about how those various combinations of bonding and bridging social capital marginally shape political behavior. Prior studies provide little insight into this question. Table 3.3

provides descriptive statistics for the dependent and the key independent variables below.

Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Key Independent Variables

Statistic	N	St. Dev.	Min	Mean	Median	Max
Affective Polarization (General)	2,099	0.24	0.00	0.64	0.67	1.00
Affective Polarization (Leader)	2,495	0.35	0.00	0.54	0.57	1.00
Affective Polarization (AKP-CHP)	2,495	0.35	0.00	0.54	0.56	1.00
Social Agency	2,107	1.17	−1.28	0.00	−0.29	3.04
Social Connections	2,317	1.22	−1.13	0.00	0.02	2.70
Bonding Social Capital	2,036	0.26	0.00	0.84	1.00	1.00
Bridging Social Capital	2,099	0.10	1.71	1.78	1.74	2.02
Interpersonal Trust	2,417	0.28	0.00	0.08	0.00	1.00
Tolerance	2,372	0.31	0.00	0.60	0.50	1.00
Social Trust	2,455	0.36	0.00	0.40	0.25	1.00
Life Satisfaction	2,368	0.34	0.00	0.39	0.25	1.00
Political Knowledge	2,177	0.49	0.00	0.60	1.00	1.00

3.5.3 Control Variables

Several controls are included (all rescaled ranging from 0 to 1) for age (1:Older), sex (1:Male - dummy), education (1: High), income (1:Rich), ethnicity (1: Kurdish - dummy), and religious sect (1: Sunni - dummy). My key control variables were, however, including identity-related measures (i.e., party, ideology, religion), and issue extremity. As in previous research (see Mason 2015), partisan identity strength is coded to range from 0 (pure independent) to 1 (strong partisan). [43] Similarly, ideological identity strength is coded as a 5 point scale variable to range from 0 (moderate right or left) and 1 (strong right or left positioning); ethnic and religious identity strengths are coded as 5 point scale variables ranging from 0 (weak) and 1 (strong). To capture issue position extremity, I follow previous work (e.g., Mason 2015) and construct an index of three different issue items. The index incorporates (1) The "Religious Culture and Ethics" course should be compulsory; (2) The "Canal Istanbul" project should definitely be completed; and (3) The Turkish economy suffers a great deal when it opens to the global economy (foreign trade

[43] For sure, this is a weak method of gauging partisanship as a social identity. The results of this analysis, therefore, should be considered as a conservative test of the relationship between affective polarization and partisan social identity.

or foreign investors).[44] I asked respondents how much they agree or disagree with those policies with five possible answers ranging from (1) disagree strongly to agree strongly (5). To calculate issue extremity score for respondent i, I get the average score across all three questions ranging from 0 (Moderate) to 1 (Extremity). The discussion of findings proceeds by first analyzing results pertaining to the central question of whether social capital have implications for affective polarization. I break down the characteristics of social capital into three separate groups representing social connectedness, civic engagement, and degree of network heterogeneity. Next, I evaluate the extent to which the three potential causal mechanisms (trust, tolerance, and information) facilitate the effects of social capital.

To examine the role of trust, I focus on two measures of trust, which are (a) the standard generalized trust question asking respondents "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" and (b) social trust measuring to what extent my respondents "feel safe walking down the street after sunset". Consistent with previous research, generalized trust is coded as a dummy variable, which is 1 if the individual believes that "most people can be trusted". As for social trust question with five possible answers ranging from (1) disagree strongly to (5) agree strongly, each answer is rescaled and the trust measure is coded to range from 0 (weak trust) to 1 (strong trust).

To examine the importance of tolerance, I rely on a question asking respondents to what extent they "enjoy living among people with different lifestyles," ranging from (1) disagree strongly to (5) agree strongly. Each answer is rescaled and the tolerance measure is coded to range from 0 (weak tolerance) to 1 (high tolerance).

Finally, to capture the information mechanism, I included a question accounting for differences in political knowledge in a simple way. Following Şaşmaz et al. 2022, I asked respondents "Before Recep Tayyip Erdogan became president, who elected the president of Turkey?" Respondents are coded as "1" (knowledgeable) when they pick up the correct option ("The Parliament/members of the Parliament").

[44] Recent public opinion surveys show that those issues are among the most polarized issues in the current political environment of Turkey (Erdogan 2020).

3.6 Analysis and Results

I start by presenting the main results of my statistical analysis for affective polarization in Figure 3.1 (for detailed model output see Appendix). Consistent with my theory, the main results suggest a strong relationship between social capital and affective polarization. The correlations of various indicators of social capital on affective polarization are observed individually in the pooled OLS analysis, controlling for issue position extremity and other relevant covariates.[45]

Model 1 in Figure 3.1 includes factor variables capturing respondents' social connectedness and active social agency roles as a first predictor for social capital. In line with Hypothesis 1, the directions are negative, but I could not find significant support for social agency roles. Although the magnitude of the effect is small, negative findings for social connections provide initial evidence suggesting that partisans with sincere connections with their friends and neighbors are less likely to evaluate out-party members relative to isolated individuals.

Models 2 and 3 show that the coefficients of different social capital measures are relatively large and significant. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, two measures of social capital (i.e., bridging and bonding), on their own, are significantly capable of resulting in significant changes in affective polarization. Moving from holding less bridging social capital to more bridging social capital decreases the total range of polarization by about 21.5%. Conversely, bonding social capital has positive impacts on out-party evaluations. Having stronger ties with in-party members increases negative feelings toward out-party members by 15.4%. Those results are significantly correlated with affective polarization even when various identity-related measures and issue position extremity are held constant.

The independent measures related to the number of memberships are tested in Model 3, and they are significant (excluding one or two memberships) and relatively large. In other words, moving from no membership to higher numbers of attachment to social organizations exacerbates affective polarization by about 6.7%. To put the magnitude

[45] Controlling issue position extremity is one method of showing the difference between ideological and affective polarization (see Mason 2015).

Figure 3.1: Effects of Social Capital on Affective Polarization



of this estimate in context, compare the coefficient of ideological identity strength. The effect of higher numbers of memberships on the likelihood of being affectively polarized is either greater or comparable in the magnitude of respondents' ideological identity strength (6.8%). Overall, the pattern of results here is quite robust across different social capital measures, and a clear insight emerges: social capital makes partisans more resistant to affective polarization.

Finally, apart from religious measures (e.g., religious identity strength or being Sunni), age, and education level, all my control variables at the individual level significantly affect affective polarization. As expected, issue position extremity, partisan/ideology identity strength, being a minority (i.e., Kurdish), and income all exacerbate partisan animosity. These results suggest that dislike toward out-party members are powerfully driven by the level of stocks embedded in our social capital, even when political issues are unchanging.

An individual with moderate ideological positioning over several issues can still be very affectively polarized if her social capital is weak. Surprisingly, male partisans are less likely to be affectively polarized, while prior research in the US provided the opposite findings (for example, see Mason 2015, Sumaktoyo 2019). In all, the results of these analyses are consistent with my expectations that partisans' levels of social capital are significantly correlated with affective evaluations of political out-groups.

There would be endogeneity issues to consider. One may argue that people may choose their friends and associates, in part, because of agreement on political issues and involvement in politics. Or, the more people like people from other parties, the more likely they are to participate in diverse settings. There is still room, however, to be suspicious about this direction. First, as noted above, a robust body of empirical evidence highlights the importance of networks in shaping political behavior. Second, several empirics indicate that the homophily thesis fails to characterize all of an individual's social networks (Huckfeldt and Mendez 2008, Mollenhorst et al. 2008). Third, it should be noted that some of my measures (i.e., membership) is more exogenous than the attitudinal measures. Finally, if citizens only generate networks to those with whom they politically agree, it naturally means that the potential for socially deliberative politics to create political innovation and electoral change is extinguished. If an agreement is a precondition for communication, then there is no place or opportunity for persuasion in our lives. Thus, I still subject these expectations to empirical scrutiny.

3.6.1 Robustness Checks

To test the robustness of the estimate to different specifications, I estimate two other models (1) using leader-level affective polarization as a dependent variable and the general affective polarization scores between the main two party members (i.e., AKP and CHP partisans). Since larger parties' leaders have mainly spread affective polarization, my confidence in social capital estimates is strengthened when I compare these two specifications. The main results in Figure 3.1 proved robust to these different models presented in Table 3.4. Coefficients for the number of memberships were almost identical, although the

highest number of memberships lost its significance while looking at leader-level affective polarization. Coefficients for social connections and social agency are slightly larger, but both are statistically significant now. Bonding social capital measures are almost similar to the main results, whereas the effect of bridging capital becomes more substantive.

Table 3.4: Robustness Checks

	DV: Leader Level Affective Polarization			DV: Main Opposition Affective Polarization		
	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Social Connections	$-.014^{**}$			$-.014^{**}$		
	(.007)			(.007)		
Social Agency	$-.018^{**}$			$-.022^{***}$		
	(.007)			(.007)		
Bridging Social Capital		-1.455^{***}			-1.741^{***}	
		(.075)			(.075)	
Bonding Social Capital		$.173^{***}$			$.133^{***}$	
		(.026)			(.025)	
Membership (1-2)			$-.040^{*}$			$-.064^{***}$
			(.021)			(.021)
Membership (3+)			$-.053$			$-.118^{**}$
			(.047)			(.048)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observation	1,189	1,350	1,373	1,189	1,350	1,373
R^2	.324	.478	.318	.289	.490	.278
Adjusted R^2	.316	.473	.311	.281	.485	.271

$^{*}p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$

So far, however, this pattern of findings tells us not much about the nature of mechanisms underlying this effect. As I noted above, trust, tolerance, and information could account for the observed effect of social capital on affective polarization. Here, I present some further analyses that evaluate the extent to which these three proposed processes of influence account for the overall impact. One of the direct ways to get some sense of the relative contributions of those mechanisms is to introduce those measures to my main models. In Table 3.5, I show the same equations as in Figure 3.1[46] and Table 3.4, but with the addition of measures of trust, tolerance, and information level of the respondents. If all those mechanisms are at work, one would expect to see the effects of social capital disappear entirely (or reduce) unless yet another mechanisms are at work.

[46]To see the models used in Figure 3.1, see Table C.1.

Table 3.5: Effects of Social Capital on Affective Polarization, Controlling for Trust, Tolerance, and Knowledge

	DV: Affective Polarization								
	[Individual	Level	Affect]	[Leader	Level	Affect]	[Main	Opposition	Affect]
Social Connections	−.008			−.017**			−.013*		
	(.005)			(.007)			(.007)		
Social Agency	.003			−.016**			−.023***		
	(.005)			(.007)			(.008)		
Bridging Social Capital		−.242***			−1.459***			−1.757***	
		(.064)			(.079)			(.078)	
Bonding Social Capital		.148***			.169***			.131***	
		(.022)			(.027)			(.027)	
Membership (1-2)			−.019			−.037*			−.068***
			(.016)			(.021)			(.022)
Membership (3+)			−.101***			−.068			−.142***
			(.035)			(.047)			(.048)
Interpersonal Trust	−.010	−.008	.002	−.007	−.027	−.002	.0002	−.027	.009
	(.020)	(.019)	(.019)	(.028)	(.023)	(.027)	(.028)	(.023)	(.028)
Social Trust	−.045***	−.039**	−.039**	−.024	−.028	−.009	−.021	−.030	−.010
	(.017)	(.016)	(.016)	(.023)	(.020)	(.022)	(.024)	(.020)	(.023)
Tolerance	−.057***	−.041**	−.054***	−.047*	−.017	−.048*	−.063**	−.021	−.061**
	(.019)	(.018)	(.018)	(.026)	(.022)	(.025)	(.027)	(.021)	(.025)
Political Knowledge	−.029**	−.028**	−.026**	−.060***	−.035**	−.057***	−.075***	−.041***	−.070***
	(.012)	(.011)	(.012)	(.017)	(.014)	(.016)	(.018)	(.014)	(.016)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observation	1,157	1,314	1,337	1,119	1,261	1,282	1,119	1,261	1,282
R^2	.275	.281	.251	.328	.478	.322	.295	.496	.287
Adjusted R^2	.265	.273	.242	.317	.471	.312	.284	.489	.278

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

As shown in Table 3.5, when theoretical mechanisms are added to the equations, they are still consistently negative predictors of affective polarization in the direction that would be expected. Once individuals hold more general trust and tolerance to other people, they are more likely to have more positive evaluations toward out-party members. This is also true for the level of political knowledge. The more informed one is about politics, the less likely one is to engage in affective evaluations. Nonetheless, I could not find evidence for the classical general trust question. More importantly, even with the addition of these new variables, social capital measures remains a significant negative predictor of affective polarization (excluding social connections and social agency), and in Model 9, the coefficients for holding three or more memberships slip just to the other side of the p¡0.05 cut-off (p¡.01).

In all cases, the reduction and increase in the size of key coefficients are relatively slight. All these patterns provide evidence, albeit indirect, that trust, tolerance, and information are not probably at work in translating social capital to less affective polarization. They do not eradicate the effects of social capital. Instead, social capital does still have the capacity to change "I" into "we." If it is not trust, tolerance, or knowledge, there should be different mechanisms at work, which is pretty striking and needs to be explained by further research.

3.6.2 Further Analyses

I also argue that bridging and bonding social capital should not be considered perfect opposites. In other words, having strong social ties with out-party members does not necessarily mean a lack of strong bonding ties or vice versa. I hypothesize that having strong bridging social capital should moderate the effect of bonding social capital via inducing ambivalence or discouraging partisans from being extremely hostile toward out-party members. Contrary, I expect that having strong bonding social capital could also moderate the effect of bridging social capital via sustaining more consistency and definiteness in partisan's orientation and worldview.

Figure 3.2: Comparing Effects of Different Combinations of Bridging and Bonding Social Capital



I test this argument by regrouping my respondents into four different subgroups: individuals with (a) Low Bonding – Low Bridging social ties, (b) Low Bonding – High Bridging social ties, (c) High Bonding – Low Bridging social ties, and (d) High Bonding – High Bridging social ties. In order to better examine whether different combinations are capable of decreasing or increasing affective polarization beyond the impact of other key control variables, I present predicted probabilities in Figure 3.2. All values are drawn from OLS regressions using different measures of affective polarization measure as dependent variables, and all other variables are held at their means (for detailed model output, see Appendix).

This figure immediately makes apparent the dramatic variation among subgroups. First, when we look at the second and fourth columns in each plot, a clear insight emerges:

as long as you hold bridging ties, having a strong relationship with people like you does not necessarily lead to out-party animosity. As long as individuals hold bridging ties, moving from low bonding to high bonding ties slightly increases affective polarization (ranging between 4% to 9%). Second, consistent with the previous literature, holding bridging ties significantly reduces affective polarization. If we hold low bonding ties constant, moving from low bridging to high bridging ties leads to a 9% decrease in respondents' general affective polarization scores and a 19% decrease when using leader-level or main opposition affective polarization scores. Similarly, tightly bonded but unbridged social ties are 5 percentage points more likely to be polarized than people with intense bonding and bridging ties. And this gap becomes 23% when we look at the main opposition party followers. All these patterns imply that affective polarization does not occur when partisans have strong homogenous connections but when they lack a strong relationship with out-group members.

Table 3.6: Summary of Effects from Different Association Memberships

	DV: Affective Polarization		
	General	Main Opposition	Leader
Education	$-.284^{**}$	$-.152$	$-.373^{**}$
	(.112)	(.154)	(.149)
Urban Development	.025	$.107^{*}$	$.101^{*}$
	(.043)	(.060)	(.058)
Religious	$-.032$	$-.079^{*}$	$-.061$
	(.034)	(.046)	(.044)
Occupational	.007	$-.092^{*}$	$-.036$
	(.040)	(.055)	(.054)
Environmental/Animal	$.277^{***}$	$.164^{***}$	.074
	(.039)	(.054)	(.052)
Other Associations	No	No	No
Covatiates	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observation	1,373	1,373	1,373
R^2	.281	.287	.331
Adjusted R^2	.267	.273	.318

$^{*}p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$

Finally, as an exploratory analysis, I suspect whether some specific group memberships may reduce or increase the positive effects of memberships. Prior research indicates that some group memberships – especially religious organizations – may encourage intolerant attitudes and reinforce negative perceptions of people outside (Cigler and Joslyn 2002).

Table 3.6 presents a series of OLS models where I regress each type of association on affective polarization measures. However, I exclude association types' scores in all columns if they do not provide any significant results across three models (for detailed model output, see Appendix). Strikingly, joining associations specializing in urban development or environment may significantly increase affective polarization, while associations related to education, occupation, and religion may negatively impact.

3.7 Conclusion

How does affective polarization evolve and manifest itself today? A number of features of the contemporary environment have contributed to partisans' proclivity to divide the world into a liked in-group (one's own party) and a disliked out-group (the opposing party). Students of political science have suggested that ideological polarization (Rogowski and Sutherland 2016), negative campaigns (Iyengar et al. 2012), media consumption (Druckman et al. 2017), and social sorting (Mason 2015) all exacerbate affective polarization. The primary motivation for this paper was a theoretical gap in the research where the critical concepts of affective polarization and social capital intersect. A small but growing number of empirical studies have examined social environment and affective polarization (Ikeda and Richey 2009, Pattie and Johnston 2009, Klar 2014, Bond et al. 2018, Tucker et al. 2018, **?**), but only a few of them have considered the role of social capital. This paper is dedicated to presenting a new theory stating that affective polarization is grounded in our social capital.

Drawing on multiple analyses, I confirmed that partisans' levels of social capital are significantly correlated with affective evaluations of political out-groups; and those estimates are robust across different model specifications. Second, I also demonstrated that an alternative set of indicators of social capital yields very similar results. Lastly, I presented various heterogeneous analyses suggesting that bridging and bonding social ties should not be considered perfect opposites. I find that as long as individuals hold bridging ties, having a solid relationship with in-party members does not necessarily lead to out-party animosity. In other words, affective polarization does not occur when parti-

sans have strong homogenous connections but when they lack a strong relationship with out-group members.

References

Abramowitz, A. I. (2021). It's only you and me and we just disagree: The ideological foundations of affective polarization. *The Forum*, 19(3):349–364.

Abramowitz, A. I. and Webster, S. (2016). The rise of negative partisanship and the nationalization of u.s. elections in the 21st century. *Electoral Studies*, 41:12–22.

Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2006). *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.

Achen, C. and Bartels, L. (2017). *Democracy for Realists*. Princeton University Press.

Ahler, D. J. and Sood, G. (2018). The parties in our heads: Misperceptions about party composition and their consequences. *The Journal of Politics*, 80(3):964–981.

Albertus, M. and Grossman, G. (2021). Democratic fragilities in the americas. *Working Paper*.

Allport, G. W. (1954). *The Nature of Prejudice*. Addison-Walley.

Ames, B. (2001). *The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.

Amsalem, E., Merkley, E., and Loewen, P. J. (2021). Does talking to the other side reduce inter-party hostility? evidence from three studies. *Political Communication*.

Aytaç, S. E. and Çarkoglu, A. (2018). Presidents shaping public opinion in parliamentary democracies: A survey experiment in turkey. *Political Behavior*, 40:371–393.

Bail, C. A., Argyle, L. P., Brown, T. W., Bumpus, J. P., Chen, H., Hunzaker, M. B. F., Lee, J., Mann, M., Merhout, F., and Volfovsky, A. (2018). Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 115(37):9216–9221.

Baker, A., Ames, B., and Renno, L. R. (2006). Social context and campaign volatility in new democracies: Networks and neighborhoods in brazil's 2002 elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(2):382–399.

Bakker, B. N., Schumacher, G., and Rooduijn, M. (2020). The populist appeal: Personality and anti-establishment communication. *The Journal of Politics*.

Bansak, K., Hainmueller, J., Hopkins, D. J., and Yamamoto, T. (2021). Using conjoint experiments to analyze election outcomes: The essential role of the average marginal component effect (amce). *Working Paper*.

Barbera, P. (2019). Social media, echo chambers, and political polarization. In Persily, N. and Tucker, J. A., editors, *Social Media and Democracy: The State of the Field*. Cambridge University Press.

Baumeister, R. F. and Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. *Psychological Bulletin*, 117(3):497–529.

Becher, M. and Brouard, S. (2020). Executive accountability beyond outcomes: Experimental evidence on public evaluations of powerful prime ministers. *American Journal of Political Science*.

Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1):5–19.

Billig, M. and Tajfel, H. (1973). Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 3(1):27–52.

Boix, C. (2003). *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge University Press.

Bond, R. M., Shulman, H. C., and Gilbert, M. (2018). Does having a political discussion help or hurt intergroup perceptions? drawing guidance from social identity theory and the contact hypothesis. *International Journal of Communication*, 12:4332–4352.

Bougher, L. D. (2016). The correlates of discord: Identity, issue alignment, and political hostility in polarized america. *Political Behavior*, 39(3):731–762.

Boxell, L., Gentzkow, M., and Shapiro, J. M. (2020). Cross-country trends in affective polarization. *National Bureau of Economic Research*.

Brehm, J. and Rahn, W. (1997). Individual-level evidence for the causes and consequences of social capital. *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(3):999–1023.

Brewer, M. B. and Pierce, K. P. (2005). Social identity complexity and outgroup tolerance. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 31(3):428–437.

Broockman, D. E., Kalla, J. L., and Westwood, S. J. (2020). Does affective polarization undermine democratic norms or accountability? maybe not. *Working Paper*.

Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., and Stokes, D. E. (1960). *The American Voter*. University of Chicago Press.

Campbell, J. E. (2016). *Polarized: Making sense of a divided America*. Princeton University Press.

Capoccia, G. (2005). *Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe*. The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Carey, J., Clayton, K., Helmke, G., Nyhan, B., Sanders, M., and Stokes, S. (2020). Who will defend democracy? evaluating tradeoffs in candidate support among partisan donors and voters. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, pages 1–16.

Çarkoglu, A. and Aytaç, S. E. (2015). Who gets targeted for vote-buying? evidence from an augmented list experiment in turkey. *European Political Science Review*, 7(4):547–566.

Carpiano, R. M. (2006). Toward a neighborhood resource-based theory of social capital for health: Can bourdieu and sociology help? *Social Science and Medicine*, 62(1):165–175.

Chen, J. and Rodden, J. (2013). Unintentional gerrymandering: Political geography and electoral bias in legislatures. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 8(1):239–269.

Chiopris, C., Nalepa, M., and Vanberg, G. (2021). A wolf in sheep's clothing: Citizen uncertainty and democratic backsliding. *Working Paper*.

Cho, T. and Liu, Y. (2016). Toward a talismanic redistricting tool: A computational method for identifying extreme redistricting plans. *Election Law Journal*, 15(4):351–366.

Cigler, A. and Joslyn, M. R. (2002). The extensiveness of group membership and social capital: The impact on political tolerance attitudes. *Political Research Quarterly*, 55(1):7–25.

Claassen, C. (2019). Does public support help democracy survive? *American Journal of Political Science*, 64(1):118–134.

Claibourn, M. P. and Martin, P. S. (2007). How membership in voluntary associations improves policy accountability. *Political Research Quarterly*, 60(2):192–201.

Clark, T. S. and Linzer, D. A. (2015). Should i use fixed or random effects? *Political Science Research and Methods*, 3(2):399–408.

Coleman, J. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. *American Journal of Sociology*, 94:95–120.

Croissant, A. and Haynes, J. (2021). Democratic regression in asia: introduction. *Democratization*, 28(1):1–21.

Dahl, R. A. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. Yale University Press.

Dalton, R. J. (2008). The quantity and the quality of party systems. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(7):899–920.

Dias, N. and Lelkes, Y. (2021). The nature of affective polarization: Disentangling policy disagreement from partisan identity. *American Journal of Political Science*.

Druckman, J., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M., and Ryan, J. B. (2020). The political impact of affective polarization: How partisan animus shapes covid-19 attitudes. *Working Paper*.

Druckman, J. and Nir, L. (2008). Campaign mixed-message flows and timing of vote decision. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 20(3):326–346.

Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M., and Ryan, J. B. (2021). Affective polarization, local contexts and public opinion in america. *Nature Human Behaviour*.

Druckman, J. N. and Levendusky, M. S. (2019). What do we measure when we measure affective polarization? *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 83(1):114–122.

Druckman, J. N., Levendusky, M. S., and McLain, A. (2017). No need to watch: How the effects of partisan media can spread via interpersonal discussions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(1):99–112.

Druckman, J. N. and Nelson, K. R. (2003). Framing and deliberation: How citizens' conversations limit elite influence. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(4):729–745.

Dryzek, J. S. (2010). *Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance*. Oxford University Press.

Erdogan, E. (2020). Türkiye'de kutuplaşmanın boyutları. *Working Paper*.

Esen, B. and Gumuscu, S. (2016). Rising competitive authoritarianism in turkey. *Third World Quarterly*, 37(9):1581–1606.

Esen, B. and Gumuscu, S. (2021). Why did turkish democracy collapse? a political economy account of akp's authoritarianism. *Party Politics*, 27(6):1075–1091.

Ezrow, L. (2007). The variance matters: How party systems represent the preferences of voters. *The Journal of Politics*, 69(1):182–192.

Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., Bachman, B. A., and Rust, M. C. (1993). The common ingroup identity model: Recategorization and the reduction of intergroup bias. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 4:1–26.

Gandhi, J. and Ong, E. (2019). Committed or conditional democrats? opposition dynamics in electoral autocracies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 63(4):948–963.

Garrett, R. K., Gvirsman, S. D., Johnson, B. K., Tsfati, Y., Neo, R., and Dal, A. (2014). Implications of pro- and counterattitudinal information exposure for affective polarization. *Human Communication Research*, 40(3):309–332.

Gelman, A. and Hill, J. (2007). *Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models*. Cambridge University Press.

Gibler, D. M. and Randazzo, K. A. (2011). Testing the effects of independent judiciaries on the likelihood of democratic backsliding. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(3):696–709.

Gibson, E. L. (2012). *Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies*. Cambridge University Press.

Gidengil, E., Stolle, D., and Bergeron-Boutin, O. (2021). The partisan nature of support for democratic backsliding: A comparative perspective. *European Journal of Political Research*.

Gidron, N., Adams, J., and Horne, W. (2019). Toward a comparative research agenda on affective polarization in mass publics. *APSA Comparative Politics Newsletter*, 29(1):30–36.

Gidron, N., Adams, J., and Horne, W. (2020). *American Affective Polarization in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge University Press.

Gidron, N., Adams, J., and Horne, W. (2021). Who dislikes whom? affective polarization between pairs of parties in western democracies. *Working Paper*.

Gift, K. and Gift, T. (2015). Does politics influence hiring? evidence from a randomized experiment. *Political Behavior*, 37:653–675.

Ginsburg, T. and Moustafa, T. (2008). *Rule By Law*. Cambridge University Press.

Gouldner, A. W. (1960). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. *American Sociological Review*, 25(2):161–178.

Graham, M. H. and Svolik, M. W. (2020). Democracy in america? partisanship, polarization, and the robustness of support for democracy in the united states. *The American Political Science Review*, 114(2):392–409.

Green, D., Palmquist, B., and Schickler, E. (2004). *Partisan Hearts and Minds*. Yale University Press.

Grillo, E. and Prato, C. (2021). Reference points and democratic backsliding. *American Journal of Political Science*.

Grossman, G., Kronick, D., Levendusky, M., and Meredith, M. (2022). The majoritarian threat to liberal democracy. *Journal of Experimental Political Science*, 9(1):36–45.

Haggard, S. and Kaufman, R. (2021). *Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World*. Cambridge University Press.

Haggard, S. and Kaufman, R. R. (2016). *Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change*. Princeton University Press.

Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D., and Yamamoto, T. (2015). Validating vignette and conjoint survey experiments against real-world behavior. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 112(8):2395–2400.

Hainmueller, J., Hopkins, D. J., and Yamamoto, T. (2014). Causal inference in conjoint analysis: Understanding multidimensional choices via stated preference experiments. *Political Analysis*, 22(1):1–30.

Handlin, S. (2017). *State crisis in fragile democracies: Polarization and political regimes in South America*. Cambridge University Press.

Hawdon, J., Ranganathan, S., Leman, S., Bookhultz, S., and Mitra, T. (2020). Social media use, political polarization, and social capital: Is social media tearing the u.s. apart? *International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction*.

Heper, M. and Keyman, E. F. (1998). Double-faced state: Political patronage and the consolidation of democracy in turkey. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 34(4):259–277.

Hetherington, M. J. and Rudolph, T. J. (2015). *Why Washington Won't Work*. The University of Chicago Press.

Horiuchi, Y., Markovich, Z., and Yamamoto, T. (2020). Does conjoint analysis mitigate social desirability bias? *MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2018-15. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id* = 3219323.

Huber, G. A. and Malhotra, N. (2016). Political homophily in social relationships: Evidence from online dating behavior. *The Journal of Politics*, 79(1):269–283.

Huckfeldt, R. (2001). The social communication of political expertise. *American Journal of Political Science*, 45:425–438.

Huckfeldt, R., Johnson, P. E., and Sprague, J. (2004). *Political Disagreement*. Cambridge University Press.

Huckfeldt, R. and Mendez, J. M. (2008). Moths, flames, and political engagement: Managing disagreement within communication networks. *The Journal of Politics*, 70(1):83–96.

Huddy, L., Bankert, A., and Davies, C. (2018). Expressive versus instrumental partisanship in multiparty european systems. *Political Psychology*, 39:173–199.

Huddy, L., Mason, L., and Aarøe, L. (2010). Measuring partisanship as a social identity, predicting political activism. *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Society for Political Psychology*.

Ikeda, K. and Richey, S. (2009). The impact of diversity in informal social networks on tolerance in japan. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(3):656–668.

Inglehart, R. F. (1997). *Modernization and Post-modernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton University Press.

Iyengar, S. and Krupenkin, M. (2018). The strengthening of partisan affect. *Political Psychology*, 39:201–218.

Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., and Westwood, S. J. (2019). The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the united states. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 22:129–146.

Iyengar, S., Sood, G., and Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, not ideology. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 76(3):405–431.

Iyengar, S. and Westwood, S. J. (2015). Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(3):690–707.

Jennings, M. K., Stoker, L., and Bowers, J. (2009). Politics across generations: Family transmission reexamined. *The Journal of Politics*, 71(3):782–799.

Kapstein, E. B. and Converse, N. (2008). *The Fate of Young Democracies*. Cambridge University Press.

Keefer, P. (2007). Clientelism, credibility, and the policy choices of young democracies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(4):804–821.

Keele, L. (2007). Social capital and the dynamics of trust in government. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(2):241–254.

Kemahlıoğlu, Ö. (2012). *Agents or Bosses? Patronage and Intra-Party Politics in Argentina and Turkey*. ECPR Press.

Kinder, D. R. and Kalmoe, N. P. (2017). *Neither liberal nor conservative: Ideological innocence in the American public*. University of Chicago Press.

Kingzette, J., Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M., and Ryan, J. B. (2021). How affective polarization undermines support for democratic norms. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 85(2):663–677.

Klar, S. (2014). Partisanship in a social setting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(3):687–704.

Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., and Ryan, J. B. (2018). Affective polarization or partisan disdain? *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 82(2):379–390.

Knack, S. (1995). Civic norms, social sanctions and voting turnout. *Rationality and Society*, 4(2):133–156.

Kronick, D., Plunkett, B., and Rodríguez, P. (2019). Heresthetic threats to democracy: Evidence from venezuela. *Working Paper*.

Laebens, M. G. and Öztürk, A. (2020). Partisanship and autocratization: Polarization, power asymmetry, and partisan social identities in turkey. *Comparative Political Studies*, pages 1–35.

Lake, R. L. D. and Huckfeldt, R. (1998). Social capital, social networks, and political participation. *Political Psychology*, 19(3):567–584.

Layman, G. C., Carsey, T. M., and Horowitz, J. M. (2006). Party polarization in american politics: Characteristics, causes, and consequences. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9(1):83–110.

Lelkes, Y. (2018). Affective polarization and ideological sorting: A reciprocal, albeit weak, relationship. *The Forum*, 16(1):67–79.

Lelkes, Y. (2019). Policy over party: comparing the effects of candidate ideology and party on affective polarization. *Political Science Research and Methods*, pages 1–8.

Levendusky, M. S. (2018a). Americans, not partisans: Can priming american national identity reduce affective polarization? *The Journal of Politics*, 80(1).

Levendusky, M. S. (2018b). When efforts to depolarize the electorate fail. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 82(3):583–592.

Levendusky, M. S. and Malhotra, N. (2016). (mis)perceptions of partisan polarization in the american public. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 80:378–391.

Levitan, L. C. and Verhulst, B. (2016). Conformity in groups: The effects of others' views on expressed attitudes and attitude change. *Political Behavior*, 38:277–315.

Levitsky, S. and Way, L. (2010). *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War.* Cambridge University Press.

Levitsky, S. and Ziblatt, D. (2018). *How Democracies Die.* Crown.

Lieberman, R. C., Mettler, S., Pepinsky, T. B., Roberts, K. M., and Valelly, R. (2019). The trump presidency and american democracy: A historical and comparative analysis. *Perspectives on Politics*, 17(2):470–479.

Linz, J. J. and Stepan, A. (1978). *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes.* The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, S. M. (1959). *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics.* Garden City: Doubleday.

Lührmann, A. and Lindberg, S. I. (2019). A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it? *Democratization*, 26(7):1095–1113.

Luo, Z. and Przeworski, A. (2019). Democracy and its vulnerabilities: Dynamics of democratic backsliding. *Working Paper.*

Lupton, R. N., Singh, S. P., and Thornton, J. R. (2015). The moderating impact of social networks on the relationships among core values, partisanship, and candidate evaluations. *Political Psychology*, 36(4):399–414.

Lupu, N. (2015). Party polarization and mass partisanship: A comparative perspective. *Political Behavior*, 37:331–356.

Lust, E. and Waldner, D. (2013). Parties, polarization, and democratic development in the middle east. *Working Paper.*

Lust, E. and Waldner, D. (2015). Unwelcome change: Understanding, evaluating, and extending theories of democratic backsliding. *USAID*.

Mackie, D., Devos, T., and Smith, E. R. (2000). Intergroup emotions: Explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79(4):602–616.

Mainwaring, S. and Pérez-Liñán, A. (2014). *Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America: Emergence, Survival, and Fall*. Cambridge University Press.

Martherus, J. L., Martinez, A. G., Piff, P. K., and Theodoridis, A. G. (2021). Party animals? extreme partisan polarization and dehumanization. *Political Behavior*, 43:517–540.

Mason, L. (2015). "i disrespectfully agree": The differential effects of partisan sorting on social and issue polarization. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(1):128–145.

Mason, L. (2018). Ideologues without issues. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 82:866–887.

Matland, R. E. and Tezcür, G. M. (2011). Women as candidates: An experimental study in turkey. *Politics Gender*, 7(03):365–390.

Mayer, J. (2016). *Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of Radical Right*. Doubleday.

McConnell, C., Margalit, Y., Malhotra, N., and Levendusky, M. (2018). The economic consequences of partisanship in a polarized era. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(1):5–18.

McCoy, J., Rahman, T., and Somer, M. (2018). Polarization and the global crisis of democracy: Common patterns, dynamics and pernicious consequences for democratic polities. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 62(1):16–42.

McCoy, J. and Somer, M. (2019). Toward a theory of pernicious polarization and how it harms democracies: Comparative evidence and possible remedies. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 681(1):234–271.

Mehlhaff, I. D. (2021). Mass polarization and democratic decline: Evidence of a negligible relationship. *Working Paper*.

Meyerrose, A. M. (2020). The unintended consequences of democracy promotion: International organizations and democratic backsliding. *Comparative Political Studies*, pages 1–35.

Mollenhorst, G., Völker, B., and Flap, H. (2008). Social contexts and personal relationships: The effect of meeting opportunities on similarity for relationships of different strength. *Social Networks*, 30(1):60–68.

Mutz, D. C. (2002). Cross-cutting social networks: Testing democratic theory in practice. *The American Political Science Review*, 96(1):111–126.

Nugent, E. R. (2018). The psychology of repression and polarization in authoritarian regimes. *Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs*.

Oakes, P. J. (1987). The salience of social categories. pages 117–141. Basil Blackwell.

Onyx, J. and Bullen, P. (2000). Measuring social capital in five communities. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 36(1):23–42.

Orhan, Y. E. (2021). The relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding: Comparative evidence (forthcoming). *Democratization*.

Orhan, Y. E. (2022). The relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding: Comparative evidence (forthcoming). *Democratization*.

Osmanbaşoğlu, G. K. (2021). Introduction to turkey's electoral geography. In Bekaroğlu, E. A. and Osmanbaşoğlu, G. K., editors, *Turkey's Electoral Geography*. Routledge.

Pattie, C. J. and Johnston, R. J. (2009). Conversation, disagreement and political participation. *Political Behavior*, 31:261–285.

Payne, K. (2017). *The Broken Ladder: How Inequality Affects the Way We Think, Live, and Die*. Penguin Books.

Pérez-Liñán, A., Schmidt, N., and Vairo, D. (2019). Presidential hegemony and democratic backsliding in latin america, 1925–2016. *Democratization*, 26(4):606–625.

Pierson, P. and Schickler, E. (2020). Madison's constitution under stress: A developmental analysis of political polarization. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 23:37–58.

Przeworski, A., Alvarez, R. M., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., Limongi, F., and Neto, F. P. L. (2000). *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990*. Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, R. D. (1993). *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton University Press.

Putnam, R. D. (1995). Bowling alone: America's declining social capital. *Journal of Democracy*, 6(1):65–78.

Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. Simon Schuster.

Reiljan, A. (2019). 'fear and loathing across party lines' (also) in europe: Affective polarisation in european party systems. *European Journal of Political Research*, 59(2):376–396.

Reuter, O. J. and Szakonyi, D. (2021). Electoral manipulation and regime support: Survey evidence from russia. *World Politics*, 73(2):275–314.

Reynolds, A. (2011). *Designing Democracy in a Dangerous World*. Oxford University Press.

Rogowski, J. C. and Sutherland, J. L. (2016). How ideology fuels affective polarization. *Political Behavior*, 38(2):485–508.

Rosenfeld, B. (2021). *The Autocratic Middle Class*. Princeton University Press.

Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., and Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. *Academy of Management Review*, 23(3):393–404.

Rudolph, T. J. and Hetherington, M. J. (2021). Affective polarization in political and nonpolitical settings. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 33(3):591–606.

Santoro, E. and Broockman, D. E. (2021). The short-term, circumscribed, and conditional effects of cross-partisan conversation. *Working Paper*.

Sartori, G. (1976). *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge University Press.

Şaşmaz, A., Yağcı, A. H., and Ziblatt, D. (2022). How voters respond to presidential assaults on checks and balances: Evidence from a survey experiment in turkey. *Comparative Political Studies*.

Schaffer, F. C. and Schedler, A. (2007). What is vote buying? In Schaffer, F. C., editor, *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Schirmer, W., Weidenstedt, L., and Reich, W. (2012). From tolerance to respect in inter-ethnic contexts. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 38(7):1049–1065.

Selçuk, O. and Hekimci, D. (2020). The rise of the democracy – authoritarianism cleavage and opposition coordination in turkey (2014–2019). *Democratization*, 27(8):1468–1514.

Simonovits, G., McCoy, J., and Littway, L. (2022). Democratic hypocrisy and out-group threat: Explaining citizen support for democratic erosion. *The Journal of Politics*.

Skaaning, S.-E. (2020). Waves of autocratization and democratization: a critical note on conceptualization and measurement. *Democratization*, 27(8):1533–1542.

Smith, E. R., Seger, C., and Mackie, D. (2007). Can emotions be truly group level? evidence regarding four conceptual criteria. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 93(3):431–446.

Snyder, R. (2019). *Inside Countries: Subnational Research in Comparative Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Somer, M. (2016). Understanding turkey's democratic breakdown: old vs. new and indigenous vs. global authoritarianism. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 16(4):481–503.

Somer, M. (2019). Turkey: The slippery slope from reformist to revolutionary polarization and democratic breakdown. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 681(1):42–61.

Somer, M., McCoy, J., and Russell Evan Luke, I. (2021). Pernicious polarization, autocratization and opposition strategies. *Democratization*.

Stokes, S. (2007). Political clientelism. In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford University Press.

Strickler, R. (2018). Deliberate with the enemy? polarization, social identity, and attitudes toward disagreement. *Political Research Quarterly*, 71(1):3–18.

Sullivan, J. L. and Transue, J. E. (1999). The psychological underpinnings of democracy: A selective review of research on political tolerance, interpersonal trust, and social capital. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 50:625–650.

Sumaktoyo, N. G. (2019). Friends from across the aisle: The effects of partisan bonding, partisan bridging, and network disagreement on outparty attitudes and political engagement. *Political Behavior*, pages 1–23.

Svolik, M. W. (2013). Learning to love democracy: Electoral accountability and the success of democracy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(3):685–702.

Svolik, M. W. (2019). Polarization versus democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 30(3):20–32.

Svolik, M. W. (2020). When polarization trumps civic virtue: Partisan conflict and the subversion of democracy by incumbents. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 15(1):3–31.

Svolik, M. W. (2021). Voting against autocracy. *Working Paper*.

Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in intergroup discrimination. *Scientific american*, 223(5):96–103.

Tajfel, H. (1982). *Social identity and intergroup relations*. Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, H. and Turner, J. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.

Tucker, J. A., Guess, A., Barberá, P., Vaccari, C., Siegel, A., Sanovich, S., Stukal, D., and Nyhan, B. (2018). Social media, political polarization, and political disinformation: A review of the scientific literature. *Hewlett Foundation*.

Vachudova, M. A. (2021). Populism, democracy, and party system change in europe. *Annual Review of Political Science*, (24):471–498.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K., and Brady, H. (1995). *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Harvard University Press.

Vogt, W. P. (1997). *Tolerance Education: Learning to Live with Diversity and Difference*. Sage Publications.

Wagner, M. (2020). Affective polarization in multiparty systems. *Electoral Studies*.

Ward, D. G. and Tavits, M. (2019). How partisan affect shapes citizens' perception of the political world. *Electoral Studies*, 60.

Webster, S. W. and Abramowitz, A. I. (2017). The ideological foundations of affective polarization in the u.s. electorate. *American Politics Research*, 45(4):621–647.

Westwood, S. J., Iyengar, S., Walgrave, S., Leonisio, R., Miller, L., and Strijbis, O. (2017). The tie that divides: Cross-national evidence of the primacy of partyism. *European Journal of Political Research*, 57(2):333–354.

Wise, J. and Driskell, R. (2016). Tolerance within community: Does social capital affect tolerance? *Social Indicators Research*, 134(2):607–629.

Wunsch, N., Jacob, M. S., and Derksen, L. (2022). The demand side of democratic backsliding: How divergent understandings of democracy shape political choice. *Working Paper*.

Appendix A: Chapter 1

A.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table A.1: Descriptive statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Affective Polarization	179	4.34	.88	1.74	3.87	4.73	7.35
Ideological Polarization	179	3.17	1.28	.28	2.33	4.00	7.04
Liberal Democracy Index$_{t-1}$	179	.71	.18	.11	.65	.82	.88
Regional Democracy	179	.61	.18	.09	.51	.80	.82
Past Democratic Breakdowns	179	.60	.96	0	0	1	4
Judicial Independence	179	3.18	.61	1	3	4	4
Logged GDP Per Capita	175	9.84	1.01	6.17	9.22	10.62	11.54
Economic Inequality	174	33.10	7.40	22.20	27.75	36.32	59.70
Economic Crisis	175	.06	.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Democratic Backsliding	179	.002	.07	−.24	−.02	.01	.28
Respect for CA	179	3.12	.81	1	3	4	4
Change in Accountability	179	.01	.19	−.84	−.04	.06	1.14
Change in Vertical Accountability	179	.01	.16	−.73	−.02	.07	.56
Individual Liberty	179	.92	.11	.24	.91	.98	.99

A.2 Sources of Variables

Table A.2: Sources of Variables

Variables	Sources	Question
All Polarization Scores	CSES	(Q1) Do you feel very close to this [PARTY A-F], somewhat close, or not very close? (Q2) In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place Party A on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right? Using the same scale, where would you place, [PARTY B-F]? (Q3) Parties' positions on the left-right scale (in the expert judgment of the CSES Collaborator)
Liberal Democracy Index	V-DEM	To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?
Democratic Breakdowns	V-DEM	How many previous democratic breakdowns occurred?
Judicial Independence	V-DEM	When the high court in the judicial system is ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it makes decisions that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record?
Accountability	V-DEM	To what extent is the ideal of government accountability achieved?
Vertical Accountability	V-DEM	To what extent is the ideal of vertical government accountability achieved?
Individual Liberty	V-DEM	To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion?
Respect for CA	V-DEM	When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?
GDP Per Capita	World Bank	Gross domestic product divided by midyear population
GDP Growth	World Bank	Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.
Economic Inequality	SWIID	Gini Coefficient: Economic Inequality

A.3 Affective Polarization Index Scores by Country

Table A.3: Affective Polarization Index Scores by Country

	Country	Year	API		Country	Year	API
1	Albania	2005	4.921	31	Czech Republic	2006	5.628
2	Argentina	2015	4.574	32	Czech Republic	2010	5.245
3	Australia	1996	4.253	33	Czech Republic	2013	5.229
4	Australia	2004	4.370	34	Denmark	1998	4.381
5	Australia	2007	4.700	35	Denmark	2001	3.944
6	Australia	2013	4.862	36	Denmark	2007	4.242
7	Australia	2019	4.795	37	Estonia	2011	4.460
8	Austria	2008	4.103	38	Finland	2003	3.484
9	Austria	2013	4.014	39	Finland	2007	3.666
10	Austria	2017	4.382	40	Finland	2011	4.020
11	Belgium	2003	3.216	41	Finland	2015	3.881
12	Brazil	2002	3.221	42	France	2002	4.652
13	Brazil	2006	3.724	43	France	2007	4.453
14	Brazil	2010	4.255	44	France	2012	4.736
15	Brazil	2014	4.111	45	France	2017	5.086
16	Brazil	2018	4.272	46	Germany	1998	4.253
17	Bulgaria	2001	5.270	47	Germany	2002	4.252
18	Bulgaria	2014	6.679	48	Germany	2005	4.254
19	Canada	1997	4.626	49	Germany	2009	3.797
20	Canada	2004	4.224	50	Germany	2013	4.100
21	Canada	2008	4.516	51	Germany	2017	3.878
22	Canada	2011	4.058	52	Greece	2009	4.542
23	Canada	2015	3.883	53	Greece	2012	5.439
24	Chile	1999	3.930	54	Greece	2015	5.111
25	Chile	2005	4.551	55	Hong Kong	1998	2.117
26	Chile	2009	4.616	56	Hong Kong	2000	1.905
27	Chile	2017	4.220	57	Hong Kong	2004	2.773
28	Croatia	2007	4.543	58	Hong Kong	2008	2.807
29	Czech Republic	1996	5.354	59	Hong Kong	2012	3.528
30	Czech Republic	2002	5.111	60	Hong Kong	2016	3.745

(Table A.3 cont'd)

	Country	Year	API		Country	Year	API
61	Hong Kong	2012	3.528	101	Netherlands	2006	2.691
62	Hong Kong	2016	3.745	102	Netherlands	2010	2.831
63	Hungary	1998	5.215	103	New Zealand	1996	4.305
64	Hungary	2002	6.587	104	New Zealand	2002	4.266
65	Hungary	2018	6.581	105	New Zealand	2008	4.374
66	Iceland	1999	3.699	106	New Zealand	2011	4.510
67	Iceland	2003	3.715	107	New Zealand	2014	4.674
68	Iceland	2007	3.814	108	New Zealand	2017	4.387
69	Iceland	2009	3.854	109	Norway	1997	3.969
70	Iceland	2013	4.049	110	Norway	2001	3.856
71	Iceland	2016	3.816	111	Norway	2005	4.317
72	Iceland	2017	4.105	112	Norway	2009	4.246
73	Ireland	2002	3.925	113	Norway	2013	4.103
74	Ireland	2007	3.705	114	Norway	2017	4.571
75	Ireland	2011	4.730	115	Peru	2001	5.418
76	Ireland	2016	4.635	116	Peru	2006	3.452
77	Israel	1996	4.696	117	Peru	2011	4.403
78	Israel	2003	4.711	118	Peru	2016	4.693
79	Israel	2006	4.173	119	Philippines	2004	3.222
80	Israel	2013	4.147	120	Philippines	2010	2.921
81	Italy	2006	3.189	121	Philippines	2016	1.743
82	Italy	2018	5.214	122	Poland	1997	4.776
83	Japan	2007	2.935	123	Poland	2001	4.525
84	Japan	2013	3.563	124	Poland	2005	4.371
85	Kenya	2013	5.571	125	Poland	2007	4.735
86	Kyrgyzstan	2005	3.971	126	Poland	2011	5.220
87	Latvia	2010	4.495	127	Portugal	2002	4.465
88	Latvia	2011	5.115	128	Portugal	2005	4.341
89	Latvia	2014	4.508	129	Portugal	2009	4.722
90	Lithuania	2016	4.510	130	Portugal	2015	6.143
91	Mexico	2000	3.787	131	Romania	1996	4.233
92	Mexico	2003	4.487	132	Romania	2004	4.277
93	Mexico	2006	4.645	133	Romania	2009	4.537
94	Mexico	2009	3.497	134	Romania	2012	5.755
95	Mexico	2012	3.481	135	Romania	2014	4.529
96	Mexico	2015	3.849	136	Serbia	2012	4.891
97	Montenegro	2012	5.248	137	Slovakia	2010	5.141
98	Montenegro	2016	6.468	138	Slovakia	2016	5.384
99	Netherlands	1998	2.661	139	Slovenia	1996	4.704
100	Netherlands	2002	2.802	140	Slovenia	2004	4.215

(Table A.3 cont'd)

	Country	Year	API
141	Slovenia	2008	5.059
142	Slovenia	2011	4.684
143	South Africa	2009	5.691
144	South Africa	2014	5.484
145	South Korea	2000	3.299
146	South Korea	2004	4.038
147	South Korea	2008	3.646
148	South Korea	2012	3.919
149	South Korea	2016	2.955
150	Spain	1996	5.133
151	Spain	2000	4.377
152	Spain	2004	4.869
153	Spain	2008	5.020
154	Sweden	1998	4.189
155	Sweden	2002	4.191
156	Sweden	2006	4.168
157	Sweden	2014	4.356
158	Switzerland	1999	3.470
159	Switzerland	2003	4.549
160	Switzerland	2007	3.688
161	Switzerland	2011	4.100
162	Taiwan	1996	3.008
163	Taiwan	2001	3.111
164	Taiwan	2004	3.853
165	Taiwan	2008	3.587
166	Thailand	2007	5.437
167	Thailand	2011	5.395
168	Turkey	2011	6.932
169	Turkey	2015	7.348
170	Turkey	2018	6.105
171	Ukraine	1998	5.305
172	United Kingdom	1997	4.127
173	United Kingdom	2001	3.078
174	United Kingdom	2005	3.886
175	United Kingdom	2015	4.485
176	United States of America	1996	3.892
177	United States of America	2000	3.720
178	United States of America	2008	3.968
179	United States of America	2012	4.799
180	United States of America	2016	4.723
181	Uruguay	2009	4.967

Appendix B: Chapter 2

B.1 Measuring Party ID and Strength

I measure respondents' partisan identity by asking them if they feel close to any party and coded accordingly. As in previous research (Mason 2015), partisan identity strength is coded to range from 0 (not so close) to 1 (very close)[47]. For sure, this is a weak method of gauging partisanship as a social identity. Therefore, the results of this analysis should be considered a conservative test of the relationship between affective polarization and partisan social identity.

[47] See *partisan strength* and *party ID* in the Appendix G.

B.2 Estimation Strategy

B.2.1 Missing Data

Respondents who report "do not know" or "refusal" on the outcome measures or who skipped the question (if applicable) will be treated as missing, and listwise deletion will be used. Appendix B.9 summarize the survey questions.

B.2.2 Inference Criteria

Throughout this study, I use two-sided tests with an α-value of 0.05 as the cutoff for statistical significance. In our graphical displays, we will plot 90% intervals to signal statistical significance at $\rho < 0.10$.

B.3 National Survey Flow Overview

- **Pre-treatment measures**
  - Demographics
    - Sex, residency, age, education, household income, occupation
  - Identity Measurements
    - Religious identity
    - Sectarian identity
    - Ethnic identity
    - Ethnic identity strength
    - Partisan identity
    - Partisan identity strength
  - Previous vote choices
    - The 2018 General Election
    - The 2019 Local Election
  - Political interest
  - Erdoğan's approval
  - Social capital battery
  - Refugee battery
  - Ethical Positioning
  - Affective polarization battery
  - Ideological polarization battery
  - Democratic satisfaction battery
  - Political knowledge

B.4 Randomization Procedures

B.4.1 Randomization of the Prime

To increase my statistical power, I follow the randomization procedure for priming as shown below.

- First, we measure affective polarization score (APS) of each respondent relying on their out-party evaluations (see the question of "affective4" in Appendix G)
- If APS of the respondent is bigger than 2, whether s/he sees this prime or not will be randomized as follows:
  - ($\rho = 50\%$) Will see this prime
  - ($\rho = 50\%$) Will not see this prime
- If APS of the respondent is less than or equal to 2, whether s/he sees this prime or not will be randomized as follows:
  - ($\rho = 50\%$) Will see this prime
  - ($\rho = 50\%$) Will not see this prime
- If we don't know the APS of the respondent, whether s/he sees this prime or not will be randomized as follows:
  - ($\rho = 50\%$) Will see this prime
  - ($\rho = 50\%$) Will not see this prime

B.4.2 Conjoint Experiment's Attribute Randomization

Attribute	Randomization	Levels
Party **Note:** A coin flip will determine which candidate appear on the left and which appear on the right.	Each candidate will take one party affiliation.	**Levels:** AKP, CHP, MHP, IYI, HDP **Matchups (if we know PARTY ID)** * 2 in-party (2 times) * 1 in-party 1 out-party (8 times) **Matchups (if we don't know PARTY ID)** * AKP-Random (3 times) * Random 2 Party (7 times)
Age	Draw a random integer	**Levels:** Between 35 and 65.
Race	Randomly assigned	**Levels:** Turkish (p = 0.8), Kurdish (p = 0.2)
Gender	Randomly assigned	**Levels:** Men (p = 0.7), Women (p = 0.3)
Profession	Randomly assigned	**Levels:** Business executive (p = 0.2), Lawyer (p = 0.2), Farmer (p = 0.1), Teacher = (p = 0.1), Retired Soldier = (0.1), Academic = (0.1), Small Business Owner (p = 0.2)
Undemocratic Actions	Fully randomized	***Undemocratic Actions*** (1) Supported a redistricting plan that gives his/her party 2 extra seats in the provincial administrative council (2) Hand out charcoal to voters for giving vote for himself (3) Will cut government spending in districts that did not vote for them (4) Will fire municipal employees who don't vote for him (5) Will start a campaign on banning Youtube (6) Will pressure Turkish police forces to detain journalists who accuse the municipality of fraud without revealing sources (7) Will not allow any oppositional group to organize protests after elections ***Generic Actions*** (1) Served on a city committee that establishes the committee`s schedule for each session (2) Participated in a working group on helping people with disabilities (3) Worked on a plan to change the city`s spending on sports (4) Served on the city`s Board of Elections (5) Served on a subcommittee preparing the annual reports of the municipal services. (6) He chaired various associations

Refugee Positions	Fully randomized	***Refugee Positions (Pro)*** (1) Will support the cultural activities of Syrians. (2) Will increase municipal visits to Syrian NGOs (3) Will increase financial aid to Syrian refugees. (4) Will start a campaign to grant citizenship to Syrians. ***Refugee Positions (Anti)*** (1) Will remove Arabic signs of Syrian businesses (2) Will not invite Syrian NGOs to municipal events (3) Will cut financial aid to Syrian refugees. (4) Will start a campaign not to grant citizenship to Syrians.
Globalization Positions	Full randomized	***Globalization Positions (Pro)*** (1) Will allocate cheap/free land to all foreign investors who will establish factories. (2) Will allocate cheap/free land to Western investors who will establish factories. (3) Will allocate cheap/free land to Arab investors who will establish factories. (4) Will allocate cheap/free land to all foreign investors who will buy Turkish companies. (5) Will allocate cheap/free land to Western investors who will buy Turkish companies. (6) Will allocate cheap/free land to Arab investors who will buy Turkish companies. ***Globalization Positions (Anti)*** (1) Will make it difficult to allocate land to all foreign investors who will establish factories. (2) Will make it difficult to allocate land to Western investors who will establish factories. (3) Will make it difficult to allocate land to Western investors who will establish factories. (4) Will make it difficult to allocate land to all foreign investors who will buy Turkish companies. (5) Will make it difficult to allocate land to Western investors who will buy Turkish companies. (6) Will make it difficult to allocate land to Arab investors who will buy Turkish companies.

B.5 Justification of Undemocratic Actions

I do not claim this is an exhaustive list of all relevant undemocratic actions. However, those are the most salient and sufficient to test whether support for undemocratic candidates is driven by affective polarization.

B.5.1 Electoral Strategies

Treatments capturing positions that aim to undermine the fairness of elections focused on two issues: i) gerrymandering, and ii) voter suppression.

(1) Gerrymandering

From the very first elections in Turkey that opposition parties could enter in the Republican Period until the present, gerrymanderers diversified several strategies with a special focus on local elections as well as on metropolitan areas. I designed my treatment to unambiguously communicate this type of manipulation without using a loaded term like gerrymandering. While the identification of a workable standard for judging when a partisan bias in redistricting is extreme enough to be "unfair" is the subject of active research (Chen and Rodden 2013; Cho and Liu 2016), recent studies show that upgrading and downgrading the status of towns and provinces, manipulation of voter eligibility via redistricting, as well as retributive penalization or clientelism/patronage based on election results are all characteristic of gerrymandering in Turkey (Osmanbaşoğlu, 2021). Accordingly, our candidates will:

- Support a redistricting plan that gives his/her party 2 extra seats in the provincial administrative council

(2) Vote Buying.

The prevalence of vote-buying is one of the most significant weaknesses in the democratic processes of developing countries (Schaffer, 2007). When individuals exchange their votes

in return for cash or minor rewards, the equality of the ballot is undermined, a level and competitive political playing field ceases to exist, and elections are deprived of their policy content (Desposato, 2007; Stokes, 2007). There is a voluminous literature on the prevalence and significance of clientelism and patronage in Turkish politics that dates back to the 1970s (Sayarı, 1977; Heper and Keyman, 1998; Kemahlıoglu, 2012). The general disposition of the literature is that with the establishment of a competitive party system in 1946, the historical dependency of the periphery on the center in Turkish politics has resulted in enduring patron–client relationships (Günes-Ayata, 1994).For our candidate-choice experiment, our candidates will:

- Hand out charcoal to voters for giving vote for himself

B.5.2 Redistribution Strategies

Undemocratic leaders are often sustained through a system of specialized patronage relationships and through a series of strategic transfers (redistributive policies, public employment strategies) to regime supporters. I included various treatments that captures undemocratic redistribution strategies, which are by far the most common type of strategies in Turkey and are likely familiar to respondents. Political parties in Turkey has always unprecedentedly used economically coercive state apparatuses to suppress their opponents and purge them from the governmental labour market. In other words, political nepotism has always played a significant role in getting a job and receive governmental/municipal spendings in Turkey. For our candidate-choice experiment, our candidates:

- Will cut government spending in districts that did not vote for them
- Will fire municipal employees who don't vote for him
- Slash spending on existing social protection programs that do not benefit its main supporters

B.5.3 Restriction Strategies

Restrictions on the freedom of express has been used by undemocratic leaders predominantly for political ends while disciplining the "society". A number of countries, such as the UAE and China, have used censorship to certain websites. Among these, Turkey's ban of YouTube and other websites (e.g., Wikipedia) has attracted attention due to the incongruity between this action and perceptions of Turkey as a democracy. For our candidate-choice experiment, our candidates:

- Will start a campaign on banning Youtube

Another strategy of restriction is to deprive oppositional actors of their fundamental social rights. That is why some specific academic and journalist groups or individuals, who have been a prominent oppositional segment, have faced severe repression, criminalization, stigmatization, and exclusion in Turkey. For our candidate-choice experiment, our candidates:

- Said the Turkish police forces should detain journalists who accuse the municipality of fraud without revealing sources

Another strategy of restriction is to silence oppositional groups. The governmental/municipal measures are part of a battle in Turkey for public space. Banning of protests on specific neighborhoods or places are common practice, which will be likely familiar to respondents. For our candidate-choice experiment, our candidates:

- Will not allow any group to organize protests after elections

B.6 Justification of Pro- and Anti-Refugee Policies

I do not claim that this is an exhaustive list of all relevant pro- and anti-refugee policies. An important point to note is that my choices of relevant policies are limited for the sake of being realistic: as the hypothetical candidates are running for municipal presidency, I had to make sure that the policies they offered overlapped with the ones that local authorities have power to implement in Turkey.

B.6.1 Cultural Presence

Resentment against refugees can reveal itself in many different ways. One of them is the decrease in the tolerance shown toward their cultural presence in the midst of the host society. Refugees' cultural activities and symbols of their ethnic identity are among the most visible ones for the host community members. To capture this component, we have selected "supporting Syrians' cultural activities" as our candidate's pro-refugee policy. On the other hand, "removing the Arabic signs of Syrian businesses" will be our candidate's anti-refugee policy.

B.6.2 Social Integration

Another factor that affects resentment levels against refugees is the extent to which they are socially integrated to the host community. Supporting social integration is a result of a more welcoming attitude, whereas social segregation is a result of (and leads to) unwelcoming and exclusionary attitudes toward refugees. Therefore, our candidate's second pro-refugee policy is "increasing municipal visits to the Syrian NGOs" within their jurisdiction. In contrast, our candidate with an anti-refugee policy will promise " not to invite Syrian NGOs to municipal events."

B.6.3 Economic Burden

One of the most salient factors that lead to resentment against refugees is the belief that they create significant economic burdens on the host community's shoulders.

Refugees' impact on a country's economy influences host communities' support for pro- or anti-refugee policies. In this respect, it is important to include a policy that captures the economic aspect of the refugee question. Our candidate with a pro-refugee approach will thus offer "increasing financial aids to Syrian refugees," whereas our candidate with an anti-refugee approach will promise to "cut financial aids to Syrian refugees."

B.6.4 Political Inclusion

Another salient indicator of public resentment against refugees is the host community's stance toward granting political rights to them. This point is where host community members can get extremely jealous of and intolerant toward refugees. Granting citizenship rights to refugees, especially in large numbers, is usually seen by host communities as a higher demand on public resources and/or a contamination of their national identity. In this respect, policies that concern refugees' political inclusion play the role of a catalyst to understand an individual's pro- or anti-refugee position. Consequently, our candidate with a pro-refugee agenda will talk about "starting a campaign to grant citizenship rights to Syrian refugees." In contrast, our candidate with an anti-refugee approach will promise to "start a campaign to deny citizenship rights to Syrian refugees."

B.7 Justification of Pro- and Anti-Globalization Policies

I do not claim that this is an exhaustive list of all relevant pro- and anti-globalization policies. An important point to note is that my choices of relevant policies are limited for the sake of being realistic: as the hypothetical candidates are running for municipal presidency, we had to make sure that the policies they offered overlapped with the ones that local authorities have power to implement in Turkey. But I am confident that those selected are among the most salient, and sufficient in order to test whether globalization policies impact candidate support and if this support is driven by affective polarization.

I keep constant the type of FDI policy is offered by municipal candidates for the sake of simplicity. An important tool for local governments to control foreign investment in their regions is allocation of land. Informal interviews we conducted in Turkey revealed that local governments have substantive control over which companies get land in their region for a reduced price or even for free. These deals are made almost exclusively between local government officials and foreign companies. Thus, liberal FDI policies include a facilitated procedure for foreign investors to get permission to open their subsidiaries on this land.

Below, I talk about two salient dimensions of FDI that we argue respondents will consider when they are indicating their support for candidates depending on their FDI policy.

B.7.1 Type of FDI

Respondents support for liberal FDI policy proposing candidate may change depending on which type of FDI candidate facilitates. Individuals prefer foreign companies opening up subsidiaries (greenfield FDI) over foreign company takeovers of Turkish companies (M&A). To capture this differentiation by FDI entry modes, our candidates will offer liberal and protectionist policies varying in this dimension. Both modes of entry are common in Turkey. Turkey has gone through a period of privatization starting from the 1980s, where many utility companies were sold to foreign investors. Thus, Turkish citizens are aware of cross-border M&As. Moreover, given the abundance of low-skilled

workers in Turkey, many foreign investors found Turkey to be a lucrative host country for investment, increasing the number of greenfield FDI projects in Turkey.

B.7.2 Country-of-origin of FDI

I argue that COO of investor company acts as a heuristic that citizens use to form opinion on FDI. Thus, we expect support for candidates who offer protectionist and liberal policies to depend on where FDI originates. We examine three possibilities. In the first possibility, our candidate deals with FDI coming from a "foreign country." In the second possibility, our candidate's policy is about FDI from "Western" countries. In the final possibility, our candidate's policy is about FDI from "Arab" countries. We chose "Western" countries because we expect respondents to punish/reward candidates who offer liberal/protectionist FDI policy regarding them. This choice reflects an anti-West sentiment among Turkish citizens due to Turkey's failed attempt of colonialization in its recent history [48]. We chose "MENA" countries because Turkish citizens have increasingly become open toward doing business with countries in the MENA region due to government ideological leanings. Moreover, since these countries are mostly Muslim, we expect Turkish respondents to feel closer to Muslim foreign investors than non-Muslim investors.

[48] Turkey has engaged in a war of independence in 1919 against the Allied powers who attempted to colonize Turkey as a result of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War 1.

B.8 Quota Sampling

The survey was conducted face-to-face and probability proportionate to size (PPS) stratified sampling method will be used by administrative units as per census (district, neighborhood). A random selection of sampling point will be made from each stratum (no more than 10 interviews per sampling point). Random route household selection within each sampling point (no more than 1 household per building). Random selection of the respondents will be selected by using Next Birthday Method. This method will be applied by asking the respondent how many eligible persons were in the household, and then asking which person has the next birthday. The person with the most recent birthday is sampled.

These provinces will be determined in accordance with the Classification of Statistical Regional Units (İstatistiki Bölge Birimleri Sınıflandırması - IBBS) established by the Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu - TUIK). This nomenclature, which was put into effect in 2002, was defined according to the NUTS criteria, the territorial nomenclature of the EU, in order to produce data comparable to that of the European Union (EU) and to create possible solutions for the developmental differences between the various regions of the country.

IBBS consists of three phases: "In the first phase, 81 administrative provinces were defined as territorial regions at Level 3. By forming groups – through taking into consideration the provinces that resemble each other regarding economical, social, cultural, and geographical aspects, as well as the magnitude of their population – 26 territorial units were defined at Level 2. In addition, 12 territorial units at Level 1 were defined by grouping the 2nd level territorial units according to the same criterium.

I will base our study primarily on the number of registered voters in 12 territories at Level 1. A sample of a total of 2100 respondents in rural and urban territories will be distributed to the rural and urban areas in each territory. After that, two provinces will

be selected in each territory by taking into consideration their shares in the population of that region (probability proportionate to size). The number of surveys to be carried out in the rural and urban settlement areas of each province will be determined according to the rural-urban population ratio of those provinces in their territory.
Selection of individuals in households is done on the basis of reported target population of 18 years or older in each household.

As an initial screening, within each household, members of the household at voting age will be determined by asking them to show any appropriate proof confirming age of the respondent. And then, one of them will be randomly selected for an survey.
The quality check of the process consists of 3 stages:

(1) Supervisors of the research firm in the field evaluate the quality of the survey by conducting on-site inspections. For example, surveys without a phone number are cancelled.

(2) The questionnaires that reach their center first go through the phone control phase. +/- 30% of each interviewer‘s survey is called by phone and confirmation is obtained. If any fraud is detected, all surveys of that surveyor are cancelled.

(3) After all the data pass the consistency check, the coding process starts.

B.9 Pre-Treatment Measures

[**sex**] Sex? (INTERVIEWER: MARK THE SEX OF THE RESPONDENT)

1Male 2 Female

[**residency**] City? (INTERVIEWER: MARK THE CITY)

[**age**] Age?

118-24 2 25-34 3 35-44 4 45-54 5 55+ -99 REFUSAL

[**education**] What is the highest level of education you have completed?

0No education, illiterate 1 Elementary 2 Secondary 3 High School 4 University 2 Master's program 6 Doctorate 77 DON'T KNOW -99 REFUSAL

[**household income**] What is your and your family's average net income? Please include rental incomes, interest incomes, wages, bonuses, profits, pensions, allowances, material aid, incidental pay, and all other types of income.

0No income 1 Less than 3000 TL 2 Between 3000-6000 TL 3 Between 6000-12000 TL 4 More than 12000 TL 77 DON'T KNOW -99 MISSING

[**occupation**] Which of the following categories best describes your industry (regardless of your actual position) you primarily work in.

1. Legal Services
2. Military
3. Information Services and Data Processing
4. Scientific or Technical Services
5. Government and Public Administration
6. Religious Services
7. Education (University)
8. Education (Preschool, Primary School, Highschool)
9. Education – Other
10. Finance and Insurance
11. Real Estate, Rental and Leasing
12. Construction
13. Mining
14. Media/Broadcasting
15. Hotel and Food Services
16. Health Care and Social Assistance
17. Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
18. Computer and Electronics
19. Industry – Other
20. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting
21. Transportation and Warehousing
22. Merchant – Retail
23. Merchant – Wholesale
24. Publishing
25. Programming/Software
26. Other
27. I don't work
28. I'm a student
29. Housewife
77. I don't know
-99. REFUSAL

[**religious identity**] Which of the following positions defines you better?

1I am a religious person 2 I am closer to being a religious person 3 I am both a religious and secular person 4 I am closer to being a secular person 5 I am a secular person 77 DON'T KNOW -99 MISSING

[**sectarian identity**] Sect?

1Sunni (Hanafi or Shafi'i) Muslim 2 Alewi Muslim 3 Other ___ 77 DON'T KNOW -99 MISSING

[**ethnicity**] Ethnicity?

1Turkish 2 Kurdish 3 Arab 4 Other ___ 77 DON'T KNOW -99 REFUSAL

[**ethnicity strength**] How important is your ethnic identity to you?
(Only display if ethnicity =! 77 AND ethnicity =! -99)

1Extremely Important 2 Very well 3 Somewhat well 4 Not too well 5 Not at all well 77 DON'T KNOW -99 REFUSAL

[**party ID**] Do you feel yourself closer to any of the political parties below? Choose only one.

1AKP 2 CHP 3 HDP 4 MHP 5 IYI PARTY 6 Other ___ 77 DON'T KNOW -99 REFUSAL

[**partisan strength**] How close do you feel?
(Only display if party ID =! 77 AND party ID =! -99)

1Not so close 2 Somewhat close 3 Very close 77 DON'T KNOW -99 REFUSAL

[**previous vote1**] For which party did you vote in the **2018** general elections?

1AKP 2 CHP 3 HDP 4 MHP 5 IYI PARTY 6 Other ___ 7 I WAS ELIGIBLE, BUT I DIDN'T VOTE 8 I WASN'T ELIGIBLE TO VOTE 77 DON'T KNOW 88 REFUSAL -99 REFUSAL

[**previous vote2**] For which party did you vote in the **2019** municipal elections?

1AKP 2 CHP 3 HDP 4 MHP 5 IYI PARTY 6 Other ___ 7 I WAS ELIGIBLE, BUT I DIDN'T VOTE 8 I WASN'T ELIGIBLE TO VOTE 77 DON'T KNOW -99 REFUSAL

[**political interest**] How far are you interested in what is going on in government and politics?

0Not interested 1 2 3 4 Very interested 77 DON'T KNOW -99 REFUSAL

[**Erdoğan's approval**] In Turkey, some people like Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's activities, while others do not. What about you? Do you approve of Erdoğan's activities as the President of Turkey as of 2018?

0I don't approve any of his activities 1 I don't approve most of his activities 2 I approve some and disapprove some of his activities 3 I approve most of his activities 4 I approve all of his activities 77 DON'T KNOW -99 REFUSAL

[**scapital1**] Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

1Most people can be trusted 0 You can't be too careful 77 DON'T KNOW -99 REFUSAL

[**scapital2**] Considering everyone who you would view as a personal friend (not just your closest friends), how many of them do support:

(Key: (0) None of them (1) Some of them (2) Most of them (77) I don't know (-99) REFUSAL)

1AKP 2 CHP 3 HDP 4 MHP 5 IYI PARTY 77 DON'T KNOW -99 REFUSAL

[**scapital3**] In the social media (such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Youtube), how often do you read or watch the posts shared by people who does not support [**$PARTY**]?

0Never 1 Rarely 2 Sometimes 3 Often 4 All the time 77 DON'T KNOW -99 REFUSAL

Display Logic

- if the party ID of the respondent is known
  - $PARTY = Respondent's Party
- if we don't know the party ID of the respondent
  - $PARTY = AKP

[**scapital4**] Have you done any of the following in the last 3 months?

(Key: (1) Yes (0) No (77) I don't know (-99) Refusal)

- Actively worked as a volunteer in a nonpolitical setting
- Took initiative at work without being told
- Picked up others' rubbish in public
- Visited a neighbor
- Had dinner/lunch with people outside my family
- Discussed politics with people I disagree with

[**scapital5**] How much you agree with the following statements?

(Key: (1) Strongly Disagree (5) Strongly Agree (77) I don't know (88) I don't want to answer)

- I enjoy living among people with different lifestyles
- I feel safe walking down the street after sunset
- If I were to die today, I would die satisfied with my life
- When someone criticizes my party, it feels like a personal insult
- I don't have much in common with most of the [$PARTY] supporters

- Display Logic
  - if the party ID of the respondent is known
    - $PARTY = Respondent's Party
  - if we don't know the party ID of the respondent
    - $PARTY = AKP

[**scapital6**] To which of the following organizations/associations do you have volunteer membership?

- Occupational/Professional Associations
- Associations Supporting Public Institutions/Personnel
- Food/Agriculture/Farming Associations
- Societal Values Associations
- Associations Operating in the Field of Health
- Reconstruction/Urban Development Associations
- Solidarity Associations
- Sport Clubs
- Disability Associations
- Religious Organizations or Groups
- Education/Research/School Clubs or Organizations
- Culture/Art/Literature Groups
- Charity Organizations
- Environmental/Animal Rights Organizations
- Human Rights Organizations

- Youth Clubs or Associations

[**affective1**] Please rate your feelings toward the people or groups listed below. On this scale, 0 refers to "very negative" and 100 refers to "very positive." If you feel neither negative nor positive, please choose 50.

1AKP 2 CHP 3 HDP 4 MHP 5 IYI PARTY 6 RECEP TAYYIP ERDOĞAN 7 KEMAL KILIÇDAROĞLU 8 THE WEST

[**affective2**] Below is a list of words that some people use to describe [IN-PARTY & MAIN OUT-PARTY] supporters. How well do you think these words depict [IN-PARTY & MAIN OUT-PARTY] supporters? On this scale, 1 refers to "it doesn't describe them at all" and 5 refers to "it describes them perfectly."

1Honest 2 Cooperative 3 Generous 4 Hypocritical 5 Selfish 6 Bigot 77 DON'T KNOW -99 MISSING

 Display Logic

- For all respondents "IN-PARTY" is the respondents' party ID. If we don't know the respondent's party ID, then we code it as "AKP".
- For AKP and MHP supporters, and those respondents whose party ID we don't know
  - MAIN OUT-PARTY: CHP
- Otherwise
  - MAIN OUT-PARTY: AKP

[**affective3**] How disturbed would you feel in the following circumstances? On this scale, 1 refers to "Very disturbed" and 5 refers to "Not disturbed at all."

1Living next door to a [MAIN OUT-PARTY] supporter 2 Doing business with a [MAIN OUT-PARTY] supporter 3 Having your children befriend a [MAIN OUT-PARTY] supporter 4 Having your child marry a [MAIN OUT-PARTY] supporter 77 DON'T KNOW -99 MISSING

Display Logic

- For all respondents "IN-PARTY" is the respondents' party ID. If we don't know the respondent's party ID, then we code it as "AKP".
- For AKP and MHP supporters, and those respondents whose party ID we don't know
  - MAIN OUT-PARTY: CHP
- Otherwise
  - MAIN OUT-PARTY: AKP

[**affective4-5**] Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following policies.

- I don't have much in common with most of the [**$PARTY**] supporters
- When someone criticizes my party, it feels like a personal insult.

0Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 Strongly Agree 77 DON'T KNOW -99 REFUSAL

Display Logic

- For AKP and MHP supporters, and for those participants whose party ID we do not know
  - $PARTY = CHP
- Otherwise
  - $PARTY = AKP

[**ideological1**] In politics, people talk about the "left" and the "right." Where would you place yourself? On this scale, 1 means "left" and 5 means "right."

0Left 1 2 3 4 Right 77 DON'T KNOW -99 REFUSAL

[**ideological2**] Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following policies.

(W) The "Religious Culture and Ethics" course should be compulsory.

- The "Canal Istanbul" project should definitely be completed.
- The Turkish economy suffers a great deal when it opens to the global economy (foreign trade or foreign investors).

0Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 Strongly Agree 77 DON'T KNOW -99 REFUSAL

[**dsatisfaction1**] In general, how important is it for you to live in a democratically governed country?

0Not important at all 1 2 3 4 Extremely important 77 DON'T KNOW -99 REFUSAL

[**dsatisfaction2**] On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Turkey?

0Not satisfied at all 1 2 3 4 Very satisfied 77 DON'T KNOW -99 REFUSAL

[**dsatisfaction3**] To what extent do you agree with the following comparisons?

(Key: (0) Strongly disagree (4) Strongly disagree (77) I don't know (-99) REFUSAL)

(W) Turkey is more democratic compared to 1990s

- Turkey is more democratic than Russia
- Turkey is more democratic than Arab countries
- Turkey is more democratic than many European countries

[**political knowledge**] Before Recep Tayyip Erdogan became president, who elected the president of Turkey?

1The Parliament 2 The Public 3 The Constitutional Court 4 The Cabinet 77 DON'T KNOW -99 REFUSAL

B.10 Carry-Over Effects

Carryover effects implies that respondents may evaluate candidates differently depending on which profiles they have faced earlier in the conjoint experiment. Hainmueller et al. (2014) showed that as long as the levels are uniformly randomized and there should be no profile-order and carryover effects. The following figure visualizes evidence of the validity. Note that estimates here are marginal means conditional on the scenario number in the conjoint experiment. Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on respondent-clustered standard errors. All attributes' range relatively similar to my estimates in the pooled analysis. To go further, I tested this assumption by controlling for effect heterogeneity between different candidate scenarios. The p-value of the F-Test for this analysis is 0.2209, indicating no carry over effects. Therefore, I cannot reject the null.

Figure B.1: Effects of Social Capital on Affective Polarization



MM)

Appendix C: Chapter 3

C.1 Full Results of the Figure 3.1

Table C.1: Full Results of the Figure 3.1

	Affective Polarization		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Social Connections	−.009*		
	(.005)		
Social Agency	−.001		
	(.005)		
Bridging Social Capital		−.215***	
		(.063)	
Bonding Social Capital		.154***	
		(.022)	
Membership 1-2			−.024
			(.015)
Membership 3+			−.067***
			(.035)
Issue Polarization	.108***	.117***	.125***
	(.022)	(.020)	(.020)
PID Strength	.277***	.221***	.263***
	(.019)	(.019)	(.019)
Left-Right Polarization	.073***	.066***	.068***
	(.016)	(.015)	(.015)
Ethnic ID Strength	.100***	.099***	.108***
	(.023)	(.022)	(.022)
Religious ID Strength	−.010	−.016	−.011
	(.019)	(.018)	(.018)
Male	−.020	−.024*	−.025*
	(.012)	(.011)	(.011)
Age	.003	−.010	−.014
	(.023)	(.021)	(.022)
Education	−.044	−.043	−.048
	(.036)	(.033)	(.034)
Income	.060*	.055*	.061*
	(.029)	(.027)	(.027)
Kurdish	.031	.036*	.014
	(.017)	(.018)	(.016)
Sunni	.006	.018	.016
	(.022)	(.020)	(.021)
(*Intercept*)	.254***	.551***	.264***
	(.041)	(.120)	(.039)
N	1,189	1,350	1,373
R^2	.298	.302	.271
Adjusted R^2	.291	.296	.264
Notes:	*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001		

C.2 Full Results of the Table 3.6

Table C.2: Analysis of Different Associations

	General	Main Opposition	Leader
Education	−.106***	−.180***	−.189***
	(.039)	(.054)	(.052)
Urban Development	−.284**	−.152	−.373**
	(.112)	(.154)	(.149)
Religious	.025	.107*	.101*
	(.043)	(.060)	(.058)
Occupational	−.032	−.079*	−.061
	(.034)	(.046)	(.044)
Environmental/Animal	.007	−.092*	−.036
	(.040)	(.055)	(.054)
mem_sport	−.029	.018	.011
	(.032)	(.044)	(.043)
mem_agriculture	.029	−.084	−.089
	(.049)	(.067)	(.065)
mem_culture	.004	.010	.103
	(.052)	(.072)	(.069)
mem_charity	.017	.040	−.0005
	(.037)	(.050)	(.049)
mem_social_values	−.041	−.035	−.037
	(.051)	(.070)	(.068)
mem_health	.021	−.022	.072
	(.050)	(.069)	(.067)
mem_youth	−.039	.054	.065
	(.053)	(.073)	(.071)
ideo2	.122***	.155***	.153***
	(.021)	(.028)	(.027)
pidstr	.257***	.301***	.312***
	(.019)	(.026)	(.025)
ideo1	.072***	.158***	.176***
	(.015)	(.021)	(.020)
ethstr	.106***	.038	.062**
	(.022)	(.030)	(.029)
relstr	−.018	.037	.090***
	(.018)	(.025)	(.024)
male	−.026**	−.056***	−.045***
	(.011)	(.015)	(.015)
age_resp	−.020	−.014	.006
	(.022)	(.030)	(.029)
educ	−.045	.046	−.062
	(.034)	(.047)	(.045)
income	.052*	.085**	.100***
	(.028)	(.038)	(.037)
kurdish	.009	−.196***	−.187***
	(.016)	(.022)	(.021)
sunni	.017	.010	.041
	(.021)	(.028)	(.027)
Constant	.277***	.164***	.074
	(.039)	(.054)	(.052)
N	1,373	1,373	1,373
R^2	.281	.287	.331
Adjusted R^2	.267	.273	.318

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Curriculum Vitae - Yunus Emre Orhan

www.yeorhan.com

EDUCATION

University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee *Expected May 2022*
PhD, Political Science

Comprehensive Exams: Comparative Politics & International Relations

Istanbul Şehir University *2016*
MA, Political Science and International Relations

Yildiz Technical University *2012*
B.A., Economics

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Authoritarian Politics, Political Institutions, Democratic Backsliding, Mass Polarization, Political Behavior, Social Networks, Ethnic Identity, Gender.

DISSERTATION PROJECT

Title: The Road to Democratic Backsliding

Brief: A theoretical and empirical investigation of the causes and undemocratic consequences of affective polarization.

Committee: Ora John Reuter (chair),
Thomas Holbrook, Natasha B. Sugiyama, Patrick W. Kraft, Murat Somer

PEER-REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS

[1] Orhan, Yunus Emre. 2021 "The Relationship between Affective Polarization and Democratic Backsliding: Comparative Evidence", *Democratization* (Forthcoming)

PUBLIC SCHOLARSHIP

[2] Orhan, Yunus Emre. 15 Jan 2022. "*The Trendline*, POTUS at SiriusXM" A Discussion on my Democratization paper.

[1] Orhan, Yunus Emre and Reuter, Ora John. "Turkey's Ruling Party is Splintering. Here's Why" *Washington Post: Monkey Cage* 22 July 2019. (available here.)

GRANTS SCHOLARSHIPS FELLOWSHIPS

External Grants & Scholarships

NSF/APSA Dissertation Improvement Grant ($15,000)	2021
SPSA Prestage-Cook Travel Award ($300)	2021
APSA Travel Grant ($300)	2021
APSA DDRIG Travel Grant ($1000)	2021
EITM Scholarship for the ICPSR ($4,300)	2019

Internal Grants & Scholarships

UWM Graduate School Travel Award ($514)	2021
Wilder Crane Memorial Scholarship ($1,000)	2021
Wilder Crane Memorial Scholarship ($1,000)	2020
UWM Graduate School Travel Award ($215)	2019
UWM Graduate School Travel Award ($250)	2018
UWM Chancellor Award ($3,000)	2016

Internal Fellowships

UWM TA Fellowship	2016-present
Istanbul Şehir University TA Fellowship	2013-2016

WORKING PAPERS

[2] Social-psychological Dimensions of the Kurdish Question: Ethos of Conflict
R&R at Ethnopolitics

[1] The Differential Effects of Political Threats on Judicial Independence in Autocracies (with Moohyung Cho)
R&R at Political Research Quarterly.

WORKS IN PROGRESS

[8] "How Affective Polarization Increases Support for Illiberal Politicians? Experimental Evidence from Turkey" - (**EGAP** pre-analysis plan available here.)

[7] "Affective Polarization and Support for Undemocratic Behavior in Russia" (with Ora John Reuter, Bryn Rosenfeld, and David Szakonyi) - **EGAP** pre-analysis plan available upon request

[6] "You can't Polarize Us: The Differential Effectsof Social Capital on Affective Polarization and its Conse-quences" - (**EGAP** pre-analysis plan available here.)

[5] "We are Democratic Enough: Do Voters Respond to Relative Democratic Performance? Experimental Evidence from Turkey" - (**EGAP** pre-analysis plan available here.)

[4] "Gender Equality and Democratic Backsliding" (with Moogyung Cho)

[3] "Gender Differences in Support for Democratic Backsliding" (with Moohyung Cho) - (**EGAP** pre-analysis plan available here.)

[2] "My Way or My Party's Way: Do Partisan Cues and Affective Polarization Shape Globalization Attitudes?" (with Aycan Katitas) - (**EGAP** pre-analysis plan available here.)

[1] "Haven't We Done Enough? Ethical Positioning and its Role in Understanding Attitudes toward Refugees within Host Communities" (with Muhammet Ali Asil) - (**EGAP** pre-analysis plan available here.)

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

[18] "Affect, or Issue? A Conjoint Analysis of the Relationship between Polarization and Mass Support for Undemocratic Politicians" *Annual Meeting of the **APSA**, Scheduled 2022*

[17] "Haven't We Done Enough? Ethical Positioning and its Role in Understanding Attitudes toward Refugees within Host Communities" (with Muhammet Ali Asil) *Annual Meeting of the **APSA**, Non-Presenter, Scheduled 2022*

[16] "Affective Polarization and Globalization Backlash - Experimental Evidence from Turkey" (with Aycan Katitas) *Annual Meeting of the **APSA**, Non-Presenter, Scheduled 2022*

[15] "Gender Differences in Support for Democratic Backsliding" (with Moohyung Cho) *Annual Meeting of the **APSA**, Non-Presenter, Scheduled 2022*

[14] "Haven't We Done Enough? Ethical Positioning and its Role in Understanding Attitudes toward Refugees within Host Communities" (with Muhammet Ali Asil) *Annual Meeting of the **MPSA**, Non-Presenter, Scheduled 2022*

[13] "The Road to Affective Polarization: How Homogeneous Social Networks Increases Out-Group Dislike" *Annual Meeting of the **MPSA**, Scheduled 2022*

[12] "Affect, or Issue? A Conjoint Analysis of the Relationship between Polarization and Mass Support for Undemocratic Politicians" *Annual Meeting of the **MPSA**, Scheduled 2022*

[11] "Affective Polarization and Globalization Backlash - Experimental Evidence from Turkey" (with Aycan Katitas) *Annual Meeting of the **MPSA**, Non-Presenter, Scheduled 2022*

[10] "How Affective Polarization Increases Support for Illiberal Politicians?" *Annual Meeting of the **WPSA**, Mini-Conference on Non-Democratic Politics*, 2022

[9] "The Road to Affective Polarization: How Homogeneous Social Networks Increases Out-Group Dislike", *Annual Meeting of the **SPSA***, 2022

[8] "Does Affective Polarization Undermine Democracy? Preliminary Findings" *Annual Meeting of the **APSA**, 2021*

[7] "Affective Polarization and Democratic Backsliding" *Annual Meeting of the **MPSA**, 2021 (virtual)*

[6] "The Differential Effects of Political Threats on Judicial Independence in Autocracies" (with Moohyung Cho) *Annual Meeting of the **MPSA**, 2021 (virtual)*

[5] "The Road to Democratic Backsliding: How Affective Polarization Increases Support for Illiberal Politicians?" *Annual Meeting of the **SPSA**, 2021 (virtual)*

[4] "The Differential Effects of Political Threats on Judicial Independence in Autocracies" (with Moohyung Cho) *Annual Meeting of the **SPSA**, 2021 (virtual)*

[3] "The Judicial Independence Without Democracy: Coercive Institutions and Judiciary" *Annual Meeting of the **MPSA**, 2019*

[2] "He Is a Good Person but a Kurdish!: The Content of Turkish Ethos on the Kurdish Conflict" *Annual Meeting of the **MPSA**, 2018*

[1] "Socio-Psychological Dimensions of the Kurdish Question" ***The International Turquoise Social Sciences Congress**, Turkey, 2015*

INVITED TALKS

[3] Guest Lecturer on *"Democratic Backsliding in Turkey"*, Democratization and Democratic Erosion, by Ora John Reuter, 2022

[2] The INs and OUTs of the PhD Admission Process, *UWM Pi-sigma-alpha*, 2019

[1] Guest Lecturer on *"Political Parties: Comparative Perspective"*, Politics of the World's Nations, by Kristin Trenholm Horowitz, 2018

TEACHING INTERESTS

Can teach **undergraduate and graduate level courses** on (1) Theories of Comparative Politics, (2) Comparative Authoritarianism, (3) Democratic Backsliding, (4) Political Institutions (5) Comparative Political Behavior, (6) Polarization: Causes, Effects, and Solutions, (7) Qualitative, Quantitative and Experimental Political Analysis.

Can teach **undergraduate level courses** on (1) Theories of International Relations, (2) International Conflict, (3) Ethnic Conflict, (4) Politics of the Middle East, (5) International Political Economy, (6) Comparative Public Policy, (7) Politics of Mars, (8) Politics of Inequality, (9) Social Media & Politics, (10) International Political Economy.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee

Instructor, Introduction to Political Science (in-person)	Spring 2022
Instructor, Introduction to Political Science (in-person)	Fall 2021
Instructor, Introduction to Political Science (online)	Spring 2021
TA (for Hong Min Park), Introduction to Political Science,	Fall 2020
TA (for Kristin Horowitz), Politics of the World Nations,	2016-2020
TA (for Kristin Horowitz), Morality, Conflict, and War	Fall 2017, Fall 2019
TA (for Kristin Horowitz), History of International Political Thought	2016-2018

Istanbul Şehir University

TA (for Irvin C. Schick), Mathematical Reasoning	Fall 2013
TA (for Sinem E. Hatipoğlu), Critical Thinking	2014-2015

ADDITIONAL TRAINING

ICPSR — Summer 2020
MLE I-II, Survival Analysis, Multilevel Models, Causal Inference (EITM Certificated)

Istanbul Şehir University — Fall 2014
In-Depth Interview Methodology

SETAV — Spring 2014
Intensive Political Science Research

Istanbul Şehir University — Fall 2013
Teaching Excellence Seminar

AL-DIWAN Arabic Center, Cairo, Egypt — Spring 2013
Modern Arabic Education

FIELDWORK

Turkey (2 Months)) — 2021
Nationally Representative Survey Experiment (PI)

Turkey (1.5 Months) — 2015
In-depth interviews with 30 local opinion leaders

SKILLS

Methods: Causal Inference, Survey Experiment, Conjoint Experiment, OLS, MLE, Hierarchical Models, Survival Models, Elite Interview, Participant Observation
Software: R, STATA, LaTeX, Qualtrics
Language: Turkish (native), English (fluent), Arabic (intermediate)

MEMBERSHIPS

APSA, MPSA, SPSA, WPSA

REFERENCES

Ora John Reuter
Assoc. Professor of Political Science
University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee
P.O. Box 413 - Milwaukee, WI 53201
414-229-4221
reutero@uwm.edu

Natasha Borges Sugiyama
Professor of Political Science
University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee
P.O. Box 413 - Milwaukee, WI 53201
414-229-4221
sugiyamn@uwm.edu

Thomas Holbrook
Professor of Political Science
University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee
P.O. Box 413 - Milwaukee, WI 53201
414-229-4221
holbroot@uwm.edu

This Version: Mar 14, 2022