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Grassroots and Professional Volunteers: Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee 1982-1994

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GRASSROOTS AND PROFESSIONAL VOLUNTEERS:

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by

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ABSTRACT

GRASSROOTS AND PROFESSIONAL VOLUNTEERS:
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The issue of food insecurity is a growing problem. Multiple studies and organizations have examined and attempted to solve the issue of hunger. The Hunger Task Force was founded in Milwaukee in 1974 and influenced by grassroots organizing of concerned Milwaukee residents' efforts to help alleviate hunger in Milwaukee. I examine the historical context of the city of Milwaukee that led to the inception of the Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee. This thesis delves deeper into the origins of the Hunger Task Force and how those origins related to its operations in the 1980s and early 1990s.

I utilize archival data from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM) and published secondary literature to define and analyze what I am calling the elite and nonelite volunteer programs at the Hunger Task Force. Elites were mostly white career professionals, and nonelites were low-income women of color. This shows the effects of an organization deploying its volunteers differently and departing from its origins of operating. It also explores the

importance of community voice in advocacy work and governance. This thesis argues that elite

and nonelite Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee volunteers received unequal levels of supervision

due to the different level of trust by the Board of Directors.

To my parents,

friends,

my aunts and uncles,

and my advisor

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

HTFM   Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee

HAN   Hunger Action Network

EFPN   Emergency Food Pantry Network

MPS   Milwaukee Public Schools

UWM   University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Food insecurity in America is a growing problem. Growing, here, has two different meanings. One meaning is that more people are without food, not knowing where their next meal will come from. The second meaning of growing is that more research and studies are being conducted to determine why so many people are food insecure and how to alleviate this burden from American cities and rural areas. In 2017, an estimated 1 in 8 Americans—about 40 million people, including 12 million children—were food insecure.[1] According to a study completed by United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) researchers, Wisconsin is one of the states whose average number of food insecure households is above the country's average.[2]

With this phenomenon affecting so many people, it is no wonder that there are hunger-based nonprofits and conferences in around the Milwaukee area. Just this March, I attended the 2019 Hunger and Health Summit in Wisconsin Dells organized by Feeding Wisconsin. The event brought together "over 350 hunger fighters, health promoters, food and farming advocates, and community builders"[3] and over 50 hunger-based organizations. These organizations provide a great deal of aid to those in need of food assistance. These organizations provide emergency food through food pantries, resources on and sign-up assistance for government food assistance, and mobile markets and pantries.

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[1] "Household Food Security in the United States in 2017," USDA, https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=90022, last modified September 05, 2018.

[2] "USDA, Economic Research Service, using data from the December 2015, 2016, and 2017 Current Population Survey Food Security Supplements," USDA, https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/food-security-in-the-us/key-statistics-graphics.aspx#map, accessed July 17, 2019.

[3] "2019 Summit: March 25 & 26, 2019: Feeding Wisconsin," Feeding Wisconsin, https://www.feedingwi.org/programs/conferences/2019_summit.php, accessed June 6, 2019.

This thesis includes an analysis of two different volunteer programs operated by the Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee (HTFM) and its shift from grassroots volunteers' involvement in multiple avenues of alleviating food insecurity. The organization began with grassroots activists working hands-on to fight food insecurity and indirectly through advocacy work. As the organization developed, it shifted to include grassroots activists in mostly a hands-on capacity, leaving the advocacy work to more educated career professionals.

In the analysis that follows, I examine the historical context of the city of Milwaukee that led to the inception of the Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee, and I utilize archival data from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM) and published secondary literature to define and analyze what I am calling the elite and nonelite volunteer programs at the HTFM. Elites and nonelites will be explained further in the introduction; for now, elites were volunteers who were mostly white career professionals, and nonelites were low-income women of color. This thesis delves deeper into the origins of the organization and how those origins related to its operations in the 1980s and early 1990s.

There are unavoidable limitations with this study, due to the historical nature. There is the possibility of bias and exaggeration from the authors of meeting notes and reports. Additionally, without interviewing the authors of the archival materials and other primary sources, there is the possibility of misinterpretation and missing data due to inaccessibility of data. There are times in the thesis when exact dates or persons are unknown for unknown reasons. Even with these limitations, however, I have exposed the known pieces of data in this study and have represented the given data as faithfully as possible.

The thesis includes a chapter explaining why the HTFM volunteer group, Emergency

Food Pantry Network (EFPN), is categorized as the nonelite and a chapter explaining how the

Board of Directors and the Hunger Action Network (HAN) is categorized as elite. A review of the

relevant literature is integrated throughout each chapter. The EFPN was effective in its goal to

unite Milwaukee's emergency food pantries in information sharing and providing food and

resources to its clients. Although the EFPN was effective, it had less autonomy than other

groups managed by the HTFM such as the Hunger Action Network (HAN). The EFPN and HAN

were the responsibility of two different HTFM board committees. Board members committees

were self-selected by board members.[4] The EFPN was the responsibility of the Board of

Directors Food Program Committee.[5] The Hunger Action Network was the responsibly of the

Board of Directors Advocacy Committee.[6]

The Hunger Action Network is covered in Chapter Two. HAN was a group also

coordinated by the HTFM that was comprised of professional men and women who held

managerial and directorial positions at other organizations in the Milwaukee area. They were

given less supervision than EFPN. This thesis argues this lack of equal supervision was due to

the elevated level of trust that the Board of Directors attributed to HAN over EFPN. This chapter

also asks if this lack of supervision was to the benefit or detriment of the group.

Chapter Three shares the history of the Emergency Food Pantry Network, which was

coordinated by the Hunger Task Force. This nonelite network was comprised of hundreds of

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[4] Board Member Responsibilities, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, 1975-1996, Box 1, Folder 27, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee archives, Golda Meir Library, Milwaukee, WI (hereafter Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records).
[5] Board of Director Committee Summary Descriptions, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, 1975-1996, Box 1, Folder 27.
[6] Board of Director Committee Summary Descriptions.

pantries all over Milwaukee County, most operating out of churches and community centers. This group of volunteers was mostly low-income women of color. This thesis argues that EFPN had less autonomy and more oversight from the HTFM Board of Directors than the elite member group, Hunger Action Network. I argue that this differential oversight was due to a shift from the organization's grassroots roots and the trust the organization had in the career professionals. HTFM believed that HAN members would be able to advocate for protection against food insecurity solely based on their educational attainment and professional experience. This trust was not based on experience HAN members had with the issue of food insecurity.

Importantly, the terms nonelite and elite are not to lessen the accomplishments or humanity of the volunteers working in these programs. The terms are being used to exhibit the difference in level of autonomy given by the HTFM, direct experience with the issue of hunger, proximity to the areas of Milwaukee greatly affected by the issue of hunger, race, and job status and title. The terms are used to highlight the differences in demographics and privilege of the Hunger Action Network (HAN) and the Emergency Food Pantry Network (EFPN).

The scholarly literature used in this thesis involves the study of the overall effectiveness of nonprofit organizations. The literature finds that there is not a clear consensus on how nonprofits should be evaluated. Nonprofits tend to create their own measures of success; however, consensus on how to measure them more broadly is lacking. The review of this literature agrees with existing research on grassroot participation and diverse participation on nonprofit Boards and highlights its importance. There is a lack of research on community input

on governing bodies at nonprofits. This thesis calls for further research on community voice at nonprofits.

The irony of Hunger Task Force's close monitoring of the nonelite group is in the origins of the organization itself. As the introduction will further explain, the Black Panther Party's Free Breakfast program, led by Party members and volunteers, was the direct predecessor of the Hunger Task Force. The Black Panther Party's Free Breakfast Program was run by Black people from various income levels and was a program that was based entirely on volunteers and donations. However, the majority Black volunteer program at its successor in Milwaukee, the Hunger Task Force, was monitored closely. The irony lies in the fact that the HTFM was founded based on the precedent from a Black-led organization with members with varying levels of income, education, and age; however, the deployment of volunteers does not reflect the organization's roots.

HAN members were utilized more as advocates. They did not receive training on advocacy work nor on the communities being served by the HTFM. Although these volunteers were career professionals, they could have benefitted from more monitoring and training. Chapter Three will argue that due to the race, income, and job status of these volunteers, their operations were given more autonomy than the nonelite group. This autonomy was given in spite of their lack of closeness to the problem of hunger and distance from the neighborhoods served. Archival sources document both the accomplishments and mistakes of HAN. Even though it made major mistakes, the group still received less monitoring than the nonelite group, EFPN. These mistakes could have been avoided had the organization provided HAN with the same supports as the EFPN received.

Both groups were working towards the mission of the HTFM but were attracted to the organization in different capacities. EFPN volunteers were mostly women of color, low income, and some were food insecure themselves. These volunteers were positioned to be on-the-ground operatives; they did hands on work at the pantries. They received more monitoring than HAN and more training on the issue of hunger, programs that could help food-insecure families, and professional training. With this training, EFPN was able to better connect with clients in the pantries and have a better idea of how food insecurity affected people. EFPN volunteers also could share useful ideas back with the organization. This thesis argues that because the HTFM already saw members of HAN as professionals they did not provide them with the same supports as the EFPN. This difference in autonomy, monitoring, and support led to more mistakes being made by HAN.

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The History of Black Milwaukeeans

The HTFM's origins had a strong connection to grassroots efforts by leaders in the Black community and the Black Panther Party of Milwaukee. These leaders fought for equality for Black Milwaukeeans in housing; they fought to end police brutality; and they fought to ensure Black Milwaukeeans were paid fairly. Through their work, these leaders also fought to feed those Milwaukeeans who were food insecure.

The 1910 census indicated that Black people were a small part of the population in Milwaukee, about 1,000 people out of the 373,857 who resided in the city.[7] The Great

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[7] Andrew Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest: The Community Programs and Services of the Black Panther Party in Milwaukee,* 1966-1977 (New York: Routledge, 2007), 41, citing the U.S. Census.

Migration was the movement from about 1916 to 1970 of over 6 million Black people to cities in the North, Midwest, and West in an attempt to escape the racist and segregationist "Jim Crow" practices in the South.[8] After the Great Migration's start, the Black population in Milwaukee rose from about 1,000 in 1910 to 2,346 in 1920, which was still only about .5% of the Milwaukee general population. After World War II, more Black people moved to Milwaukee to escape Jim Crow and find work. Out of Milwaukee's 637,392 residents, over 11,000 were Black in 1950. And by the 1970s over 105,000 residents in the city were Black, comprising almost 15% of the population.[9] Historian Paul Geib called this influx of Black people to Milwaukee from 1940 to 1970 the "Late Great Migration." He explains how the influx of Black people to other industrial Midwestern cities like Detroit, Chicago, and Cleveland occurred during the period right after World War I, but Milwaukee did not see this increase until later.[10]

Black Milwaukee residents seeking jobs and less racism were still met with racism, lack of support from the mayor and police, and lower wages than White people received. Geib also describes the lack of welcome Black people faced when migrating to Milwaukee:

> Not everyone was pleased, however, with that late arrival. As their numbers mounted, so did social and economic fears, making the migrants not only the subjects of discrimination in the workplace, but also the objects of study among policy makers. These public officials confused the Black arrivals as the cause of general urban decline.[11]

In 1960, Peter Eisinger, an Urban Studies professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, found that the average white Milwaukee household income was $7,000, while the average Black family household income was $4,000. The 1960 Conference on Economic Progress

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[8] Paul Geib, "From Mississippi to Milwaukee: A Case Study of the Southern Black Migration to Milwaukee, 1940-1970," *The Journal of Negro History* 83, no. 4 (1998): 230.
[9] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest*, 41.
[10] Geib, "From Mississippi to Milwaukee," 231.
[11] Geib, "From Mississippi to Milwaukee," 231.

considered an annual income less than $4,000 was as insufficient for survival.[12] These low

wages meant that a large number of Black families in Milwaukee were considered to be living in

poverty, not making enough to sustain themselves.

In addition to the income imbalance, Black Milwaukee residents were met with an

unempathetic Mayor Henry Maier and police department. The Civil Rights Movement in

Milwaukee can be explained as "longstanding efforts by African Americans, Latinos, Native

Americans, and their white allies to improve social, political, and economic prospects for non-

white Milwaukeeans."[13] These activists worked to dismantle segregation in housing and schools

and discrimination in education and employment for people of color in Milwaukee, and for the

authority of indigenous tribes to govern themselves in Wisconsin.[14] Even with the 1968 Fair

Housing Act "and growing minority participation in municipal and state politics, however, the

inability to regain the movement solidarity of the 1960s and 1970s has allowed Milwaukee to

remain one of the United States' most segregated cities well into the twenty-first century."[15]

Milwaukee's Civil Rights activists marched, sued, built unions, created organizations, wrote

weekly newspapers, and staged protests and boycotts to fight against discrimination.[16] Mayor

Henry Maier denounced civil rights activism and activists in the city and blamed them for the

racial protests and worsening of relationships between the races in Milwaukee; he denounced

Civil Rights activists like Father James Groppi.[17] Father James Groppi guided the NAACP's Youth

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[12] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest,* 42.
[13] Kevin D. Smith "Civil Rights," *In Encyclopedia of Milwaukee*, edited by Margo Anderson and Amanda I. Seligman, https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/civil-rights/, accessed July 10, 2019.
[14] Smith, "Civil Rights."
[15] Smith, "Civil Rights."
[16] Smith, "Civil Rights."
[17] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest,* 41.

Council. Father Groppi led the Youth Council to be a non-violent entity that would bring to more attention to the issues of racism in the Greater Milwaukee area. Although the members of the Youth Council were non-violent, they did face violence from others. The Youth Council faced verbal and physical attacks during their protests, which included marches for fair housing and an end to discriminatory practices by organizations.[18] Due to the violence the Youth Council faced, the Commandos formed to protect the Youth Council. Founders of the Commandos were previous leaders in the Youth Council. The Commandos were comprised mostly of young Black men who protected Father Groppi and Youth Council members during their marches. They did not incite any violence; however, if racist protestors attempted to harm any members of the Youth Council they fought back.[19]

Along with the lack of support from the Mayor, the Chief of Police was neither pleasant nor tolerant towards Black Milwaukee residents. Police Chief Harold Breier had a history of tension with Black city residents. In 1964 Breier became Chief of Police, much to the dismay of many Black residents in Milwaukee. Breier's police department was accused of incidents of brutality against young Black people and had a reputation for aggression. Many residents were so worried and upset with his appointment that they filed federal lawsuits and created the organization Citizens' Anti-Police Brutality Committee.[20] Police Chief Breier refused to meet with the Chair of the Citizens Anti-Police Brutality Committee, Reverend B.S. Gregg, even after hearing of the committee's concerns. Rev. Gregg, a black pastor in Milwaukee, had testified

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[18] Steven Avella, "James Groppi," In *Encyclopedia of Milwaukee*, edited by Margo Anderson and Amanda I. Seligman, https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/james-groppi/, accessed June 28, 2019.
[19] Patrick D. Jones, *The Selma of the North: Civil Rights Insurgency in Milwaukee* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 135.
[20] Ronald H. Snyder, "Chief for Life: Harold Breier and His Era" (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2002), 109-112.

before the Fire and Police Commission about hiring more Black police officers and psychological

testing for Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) officers before the request to meet with

Breier.[21] To further his pettiness and obvious disdain for the Civil Rights Movement and its

leaders, Breier withdrew the Milwaukee Police Department from co-sponsoring a youth law-

enforcement summit in 1966. Breier threatened to not attend or co-sponsor the event if second

generation Italian-American and South Side Milwaukee native Father James Groppi and other

Civil Rights leaders were still invited to attend.[22]

Under Police Chief Breier's leadership, the Milwaukee Police Department's Tactical

Squad was notorious for their brutality. They were known for patrol cars that contained three

to four shotgun- and rifle-armed officers. The Tactical Squad was well-known for creating

unsafe environments in Black neighborhoods by aggravating and escalating situations. Andrew

Witt's *The Black Panthers in the Midwest* transcribes stories from various newspapers that

illustrate the brutality the Tactical Squad and other MPD officers enacted against Black women,

men, and teenagers.

Black people in several American cities were fed up with the police brutality and housing

discrimination and fed up with their peaceful marches and protest not gleaning them the

equitable practices they were advocating for. So they staged public disturbances in the summer

of 1967. These disturbances caused damage to property, arrest, injuries, and even deaths.

Milwaukee's civil disorder began late on Sunday, July 30 due to altercations between Black

youth and the Milwaukee police. The civil disorder in Milwaukee did not last very long due to

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[21] Snyder, "Chief for Life," 111.
[22] Snyder, "Chief for Life," 111.

Mayor Henry Maier and Wisconsin Governor Warren P. Knowles deploying Milwaukee Police officers and "500 National Guard-members to seal off the area"; Mayor Maier also declared a state of emergency and a 24-hour curfew on the whole city.[23] This act of civil disorder aggravated the already fraught relationships of Black Milwaukeeans with White Milwaukeeans and the police. Black residents believed the cause of the civil disturbance

> Lay with their mounting frustrations over the failures of White-dominated local leadership to deal with Black grievances. Most Blacks lived in segregated and often substandard housing, while the city council repeatedly voted 17-1 against a fair housing law. Black Milwaukeeans filled few high-end jobs in government and private businesses. Most critical were black complaints of police harassment and excessive use of force in dealing with Black youth and civil rights demonstrators.[24]

Conversely, White residents, along with Mayor Maier, believed that Black youths or "out of control and mayhem filled hoodlums" were to blame for the disorder.[25]

After the public disturbances in Milwaukee, not many changes occurred; the City Council and Mayor Maier did not enact any new laws or policies protecting Black residents from police harassment, or desegregating schooling and housing. Police officers continued to harass, beat, and kill Black residents, having most of these occurrences labeled as "justifiable"; and Black residents still lived in segregated and substandard housing.[26]

Recognizing the changes that needed to occur in Milwaukee, desegregating housing and schooling and putting an end to Milwaukee police officers harassing Black residents, individuals and organizations took action to fight against the racism Black Milwaukeeans were facing. The

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[23] William Dahlk, "Civil Disorder of 1967," In *Encyclopedia of Milwaukee*, edited by Margo Anderson and Amanda I. Seligman, https://emke.uwm.edu/entry/civil-disorder-of-1967/, accessed June 17, 2019.
[24] Dahlk, "Civil Disorder of 1967."
[25] Dahlk, "Civil Disorder of 1967."
[26] Dahlk, "Civil Disorder of 1967."

Milwaukee chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) increased its membership by over 4,000 people during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Moreover, the NAACP helped to create and inspire the formation of other community organizations with missions to increase the advancement of Black people.

The Black Panther Party was also an organization known for increasing the advancement of Black people in America. The Black Panther Party was formed in 1966 in Oakland, California, by Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale. Newton and Seale formed the political organization as a response to the problem of police brutality again the Black community. The thousands of Black Panther Party members in the chapters across America were recognizable by their black berets and black leather jackets.[27] The Party believed that problems faced by Black people were too severe. Black people were losing their lives. They believed that the peaceful marches associated with the Civil Rights Movement were not sufficient to enact prompt changes. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) records on the Party noted that the Black Panther Party members believed the "primary objective of the Black Panther Party was to bring the entire black community together to work on common problems."[28] Newton and Seale created the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense's Ten-Point Platform and Program, which stated their ideology and ways of operating. Newton and Seale called it a combination of a Bill of Rights and a Declaration of Independence for the Black Panther Party.[29] The Ten Point Program "called for

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[27] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest* 54.
[28] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest,* 54.
[29] Joshua Anderson, "A Tension in the Political Thought of Huey P. Newton," *Journal of African American Studies* 16, no. 2 (2012): 249-267.

an immediate end to police brutality; employment for African Americans; and land, housing and

justice for all."[30]

The Panthers had a troubled relationship with the FBI and local police departments. The

FBI kept the Black Panther Party under surveillance by its counterintelligence program called

COINTELPRO. The Panthers practiced self-defense against racist groups and individuals and the

police. Many members were harassed, arrested, and beaten for their affiliation with the Party.

This intimidation led to the disbanding and reforming of the Party. After the turbulent

experiences the Black Panther Party had in Milwaukee, Oakland, and the other cities where the

Party was active, the party diminished in 1976. In 1977 Huey P. Newton, Black activist and co-

founder of the Black Panther Party, decided to close all branches of the Party outside of

California in order to stop the surveillance from law enforcement on other branches of the

Party.[31]

In 1969, after the public protest, testifying, statutes passed, newspaper articles,

marches, and advocating with little change in the treatment of Black people in Milwaukee, the

Black Panther Party emerged in Milwaukee.[32] The Milwaukee branch of the Black Panther Party

wanted to be more than bodyguards or enforcers; they wanted direct action programming that

provided tangible results for Black people.[33] The Milwaukee Black Panther Party actively

recruited women and believed in working coalitions with all ethnic groups, similar to the

national level of the Party. However, unlike the national level, the Milwaukee branch worked

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[30] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest*, 54.
[31] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest,* 54.
[32] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest,* 50.
[33] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest,* 50.

with cultural national groups like the Black Arts Theater, whose goal was to advance Black

cultural awareness and pride through the arts.[34] The MPD and FBI took notice of the Party; this

surveillance lead to the MPD assigned the "Red Squad" to monitor and harass members.[35]

The Milwaukee Black Panther Party also advocated for changes in the MPD, such as

separate police departments for Black-inhabited, Latino-inhabited, and White-inhabited

neighborhoods so that officers would represent the communities they were policing. They

fought to end the harassment of Black individuals by the police. They were successful in their

fight to provide tangible results for Black residents in Milwaukee. Police Chief Harold Breier, as

mentioned earlier, had a reputation of aggressive policing towards Black people. Due to the

many complaints filed against Chief Breier, he was stripped of many of his powers.[36] The

Milwaukee branch of the Black Panther Party had a fraught past with law enforcement;

however, the Party's goal was to help low-income Black people in Milwaukee through

programming, like providing free breakfast. So, even though the Party was portrayed by law

enforcement and other groups as a menace, they were helping out many in the Black

community. They were encouraging other people of color to organize and fight for their rights.

During the 1960s and 1970s, when the Black Panther Party was operating, their Free

Breakfast Program was helpful to the local communities where they operated. The Black

Panther Party began their free breakfast program in September 1968 at St. Augustine's church

in Oakland, CA. The program grew quickly and by late 1969, the Black Panther Party had 45

chapters participating in the program; it was so popular that the Party invited volunteers who

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[34] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest,* 50.
[35] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest,* 54.
[36] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest,* 54.

were not official members of the Party to help cook and distribute food. Members of the Party and the outside volunteers cooked grits, bacon, toast, eggs, and orange juice for many children around the country.[37] Geographer Nik Heynen interviewed former members of the Black Panther Party in Oakland and members of the St. Augustine church where the program originated. Ruth Beckford, a St. Augustine parishioner, told Heynen about conversations she had with a principal of a local school about students' performance after the breakfast program began: "The school Principal came down and told us how different the children were. They weren't falling asleep in class, they weren't crying with stomach cramps, how alert they were, and it was wonderful." [38] The Free Breakfast Program run by the Black Panther Party was a positive aspect of the community that fed children and families and also engaged members of the community.

In Milwaukee, through the Free Breakfast Program and other endeavors the Party shed light on food-related issues that the Black community was facing. For example, the Milwaukee branch of the Party managed an egg co-op at their headquarters. They sold eggs at wholesale prices and hosted food giveaways on a weekly basis.[39] In another example, the Party received complaints about the high prices at I & L Foodstores on the North Side of Milwaukee. The Party recognized the seriousness of the lack of access poor residents of the area had to other options for food supplies. They protested the high prices; many were arrested; and yet I & L did not lower their prices. However, the protest did persuade I & L Foodstores to donate to the Party's

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[37] Nik Heynen, "Bending the Bars of Empire from Every Ghetto for Survival: The Black Panther Party's Radical Antihunger Politics of Social Reproduction and Scale," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 99, no. 2 (2009): 407

[38] Heynen, "Bending the Bars of Empire from Every Ghetto for Survival," 412.

[39] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest,* 50.

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Breakfast Program. The Black Panther Party Free Breakfast for School Children and families was one of their most visible programs and became a requirement for Party branches across the United States.

While the Breakfast Program operated by the Black Panther Party was dependable, free, and helped feed hungry children, there were funds available for the school district to take advantage of to establish a school breakfast program. In 1966 the federal government created a nationwide breakfast program, the Child Nutrition Act of 1966, that provided states funding to provide free food to students in public schools and childcare facilities. This piece of legislation states that:

> In recognition of the demonstrated relationship between food and good nutrition and the capacity of children to develop and learn, based on the years of cumulative successful experience under the National School Lunch Program with its significant contributions in the field of applied nutrition research, it is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress that these efforts shall be extended, expanded, and strengthened under the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture as a measure to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's children, and to encourage the domestic consumption of agricultural and other foods, by assisting States, through grants-in-aid and other means, to meet more effectively the nutritional needs of our children.[40]

Schools were required to serve the meal "free of charge or at reduced charge to children who were unable to pay the full charge, and, as in the case of the school lunch program, there could be no segregation of, or discrimination against, any child because of inability to pay."[41] In Milwaukee, however, the Milwaukee Public School (MPS) Board refused to implement the program. The Milwaukee branch of the Black Panther Party started publicizing

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[40] "National School Lunch Program," USDA, https://www.fns.usda.gov/nslp/history_6#stateadmin, accessed March 2, 2018, quoting the legislation.
[41] USDA, "National School Lunch Program."

their Breakfast Program in order to create awareness and to garner more funding and donations. They publicized that the breakfast program would be free to all schoolchildren, Black and White.[42] They reached out to students at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee to volunteer at the pantry and to Cross Lutheran Church to operate the pantry out of their building. Cross Lutheran Church had about 400 members, about 40% of whom were Black. Its minister, Reverend Joseph Ellwanger, was hesitant to involve his interracial church with the Black Panther Party, which had a controversial reputation. Rev. Ellwanger stated that he realized that the Party was filling in a much-needed gap but that he did not want the church being associated with the militant teachings of the Party.[43]

Until the Black Panther Party organized their Free Breakfast Program in Milwaukee, many Milwaukeeans did not understand how many families in the city were without food.[44] After learning about the widespread issue of hunger in Milwaukee, many leaders in the community wanted to learn more about how the hunger was affecting the city's children. One of the leaders who requested more information on childhood hunger was Reverend Ellwanger. After Reverend Joseph Ellwanger and the Black Panther Party in Milwaukee had some sort of disagreement on the seriousness of hunger, Rev. Ellwanger called for a report on childhood hunger in Milwaukee to educate himself and interested congregation members. The report was a wake-up call to Rev. Ellwanger and members of his congregation who did not understand the degree to which hunger affected Milwaukee children. This news roused Rev. Ellwanger to call a meeting on July 21, 1969 to discuss how to move forward with combating childhood hunger in

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[42] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest,* 72.
[43] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest,* 73.
[44] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest,* 74.

the city. This meeting led to the creation of the Citizens for Central City School Breakfast

Program (CCCSBP). The influence of the Black Panther Party on the program was described by

founding members: "we are fully willing to endorse the fact that the free breakfast program

was initiated by the Panthers."[45] Shortly after their inception, the CCCSBP issued a proposal to

the Milwaukee School Board calling for breakfast programs at the North Side and South Side

schools where a large number of the students came from poor families.[46] The CCCSBP was

resourceful and well organized. They studied other existing public school breakfast programs in

cities like Flint, Michigan and Chicago, Illinois and found the positive effects on the

achievement, attendance, and behavior of students who attended schools where the breakfast

program was implemented.[47] The CCCSBP's plan was well received in Milwaukee, with over 30

community groups and churches supporting the plan.[48] The group calculated how much the

program would cost, calculated the amount the federal government would cover, and raised

the additional necessary funds from local foundations and organizations. After securing about

$36,600 dollars in funding, the CCCSBP took their proposal to the Milwaukee School Board with

the hopes that the Board could provide the necessary $6,000 to start the program.[49] The School

Board rejected the proposal, arguing that it was parents' responsibility to feed their children at

home. Some members of the School Board stated that "the purpose of the Milwaukee School

Board is primarily, one of education, not as charity...some of those welfare mothers are too

lazy."[50]

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[45] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest,* 75.
[46] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest,* 75.
[47] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest*, 75, citing *Milwaukee Courier*, 20 August 1969, 1.
[48] Andrew Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest*, 75, citing *Greater Milwaukee Star*, 30 August 1969, 2.
[49] Andrew Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest*, 75, citing *Greater Milwaukee Star*, 30 August 1969, 1.
[50] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest*, 76, citing *Milwaukee Courier*, 4 July 1970, 1.

After applying persistent pressure to the MPS School Board, the CCCSBP was successful in its mission to begin a school breakfast program in Milwaukee Public Schools. The CCCSBP did not stop advocating for more school breakfast programs to be implemented into more schools. In 1970, an experimental school breakfast program was put into action at three Milwaukee public schools, a quarter of the CCCSBP's proposed twelve schools. After much petitioning and advocacy from the CCCSBP, Milwaukee Public Schools eventually initiated breakfast in twelve of its schools, up from three in 1970. Eventually the twelve schools grew to twenty-three, with reports that the programs fed over 2,000 children daily.[51]

The persistence and success shown by the CCCSBP drew the attention of Milwaukee's Social Development Commission, which offered CCCSBP funding for a staff position to coordinate hunger work in the community. After about five years of operating, the CCCSBP changed its name to the Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee "in order to illustrate that it was no longer an ad-hoc organization, and to recognize that it was receiving monies from the city of Milwaukee."[52] In 1974, the CCCSBP was fully absorbed into the Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee, with CCCSBP members serving as members of the first Board of Directors.[53] So, the HTFM has its roots in the organizing of concerned community members in Black communities. The fight started by the CCCSBP for school breakfast expansion was continued after being absorbed into the Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee. In 1981 the program was in 49 Milwaukee public schools feeding over 9,000 students.[54]

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[51] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest*, 75, citing *Milwaukee Courier*, 30 September 1972, 3, 5

[52] Witt, *The Black Panthers in the Midwest,* 77.

[53] Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee: A Chronology of Achievement 1969-1991, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, 1975-1996, Box 1, Folder 2.

[54] Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee: A Chronology of Achievement 1969-1991, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

The grassroots work of the Black Panther Party and the CCCSBP brought about the inception of the Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee. These two groups saw an issue affecting children and adults in their neighborhoods, sought further information on the issue, and worked to help fight it. This type of grassroots activism led to the establishment of a successful nonprofit, HTFM. This thesis will argue that the roots of the organization were erased by the leaders of the organization when the Board deployed the EFPN and HAN volunteers. The grassroots organizers similar to the founders of the organization received more support and surveillance. But the professionals, who were not as knowledgeable nor close to the issue of food insecurity, made more mistakes in the quest to meet their goals due to the lack of supervision and support. The next two chapters will give further details on the monitoring, performance, and support each group received.

Chapter 2: Elite Volunteers

Opportunities to engage in volunteering are vast. There are many nonprofits and social movements that have motivated people to spend their time volunteering. The cover story of the May 17, 1968 issue of *Time* magazine was titled, "Poverty in America: Its Cause and Extent." The magazine included such articles as "What Can I Do?" and "A Nation within a Nation." The first article discussed poverty in America compared to other countries.[1] The second article discussed many people's inactivity in the Civil Rights Movement. The first article discussed how the work of a few people in the Civil Rights Movement benefited a lot of people.[2] This movement of dedicated and brave people proved to be successful with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, demonstrating that volunteerism and activism can play a role in enacting change.

In *Winners Takes All*, Anand Giridharadas reflects on the wealth gap in America: how it affects those who are wealthy and how it affects those who are not. The wealthy find that the capitalist system that the United States and other countries operate under maintain that profits can be turned into societal progress. Giridharadas argues that capitalism does not lead to societal progress, and this kind of thinking leads to some of the wealthy to believe that they have the responsibility of framing and solving society's issues. Giridharadas argues that it is not adequate to leave this decision in the hands of the shrinking numbers of the wealthy.[3] Giridharadas argues societal issues and inequities cannot and should not be solved and decided

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[1] "Nation: A Nation within a Nation," *Time*, May 1968.

[2] "Essay: What Can I Do?," *Time,* May 1968.

[3] Anand Giridharadas, *Winners Take All: The Elite Charade of Changing the World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2018), 4.

upon by the elites. The elites of the world are a small number and do not know or experience

issues that many of the non-wealthy face. Due to the elites' personal ignorance of many of the

inequities faced by a large portion of the world, they are not the best suited to solve these

issues. This perceived divergence from democracy has led to anger and resentment from many

towards the wealthy. Some of the wealthy, however, acknowledge this anger and resentment

by taking on the charge on these inequities and have become change agents.[4]

It can be argued that elites have played a role in "founding, sustaining, and overseeing

nonprofit organizations."[5] In *Why the Wealthy Give*, Francie Ostrower argues that philanthropy

and volunteering, giving money and/or time, is an:

> Integral and defining element of elite culture. I believe that it also provides a case study
> in the nature and functioning of upper-class culture in American society. The case of
> philanthropy shows that American elites do fashion a separate cultural world for
> themselves by drawing on and reformulating elements and values from the broader
> society.[6]

Ostrower highlights that elites give time and money and with this can frame the values of

society with their influence and interest.

One could wonder how philanthropy became a part of the elite culture. For some,

philanthropy is a major hobby or career of members of their social circles. For example, many

corporate and nonprofit Board of Directors select their own members, so the criteria and

selection of those who will serve on the Board are made by those already in the position.

Boards of Directors setting the criteria for selecting Board members can lead to Boards being

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[4] Anand Giridharadas, *Winners Take All,* 4.
[5] Francie Ostrower, *Why the Wealthy Give: The Culture of Elite Philanthropy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 6.
[6] Ostrower, *Why the Wealthy Give,* 6.

comprised of people from the same social setting. This homosocial reproduction leads the

replication of the same kind of social individuals with power and privilege.[7] Board Members will

reach out to their networks to recruit new Board members, leading to potential homogeneity

and the increased number of Elites on Board of Directors.[8] Relatedly, researcher Robert

Schneider advanced the attraction selection attrition model by arguing that over time, an

organization will begin to attract, select, and retain a similar group of people. Schneider

hypothesized that the common backgrounds, characteristics, and orientations of this group

leads to homogeneity. He also argued that this homogeneity can lead to organizations' inability

to respond to changes, threats, and opportunities.[9]

Boards

Board members are responsible for ensuring that an organization stays true to its mission

and vision. Board members oversee the finances and strategic planning of an organization[10] and

ensure that the organization abides by the law[11] and that members contribute financially.

Below are the five traits that research indicates makes an effective board member:

1. Attendance at mandatory meetings
2. High quality of attendance at meetings and events; meaningful participation
3. Knowledge of the organization's mission, vision, services, and programs
4. Providing assistance when necessary
5. Obtaining a general sense of overall issues that the nonprofit faces[12]

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[7] Rosabeth Moss Kanter, *Men and Women of the Corporation* (New York: NY: Basic Books, 1993), 12.

[8] Ostrower, *Why the Wealthy Give,* 134.

[9] Benjamin Schneider, "The People Make the Place," *Personnel Psychology* 40, no. 3 (1987): 437-53.

[10] Ruth Bernstein, Kathleen Buse, and Lise Slatten, "Nonprofit Board Performance: Board Members' Understanding their Roles and Responsibilities," *American Journal of Management* 15, no. 1 (2015): 24.

[11] Robert D. Herman, David O. Renz, "Board Practices of Especially Effective and Less Effective Local Nonprofit Organizations," *The American Review of Public Administration* 30, no. 2 (2000): 148.

[12] Jennifer Bright Preston and William A. Brown, "Commitment and Performance of Nonprofit Board Members." *Nonprofit Management and Leadership* 15, no. 2 (2004): 221-238.

This list seems undemanding; these five points could be effectively completed by many individuals. Research conducted by Balduck et al., however, points out that this list does not include "a good relationship with the beneficiaries."[13] While a good relationship with beneficiaries might not be necessary due to lack of interaction with beneficiaries, it is interesting to point that knowledge of client base is not included in the board requirements either.

Archival research and current data indicate that most of the Board seats for Hunger Task Force were and are held by executives, directors, or manager-level individuals from the Milwaukee County area for-profit and nonprofit organizations. Moreover, research indicates this trend at the Hunger Task Force is not unusual. Survey and quantitative research conducted by James Austin shows that many business graduates tend to involve themselves in nonprofit organizations by sitting on a board. Austin found that "81% of Harvard M.B.A. graduates report being involved with nonprofits, with 57% indicating service on the board of directors of nonprofit organizations". On average "business executives serve on two boards."[14] This could help describe the number of business CEOs and upper management or elites on the board of the Hunger Task Force. Board work can be time consuming, so why sit on a board instead of donating or volunteering in other capacities? Austin's survey points out the top reasons that business employees and executives tend to join boards:

- Belief in the nonprofit's mission
- Giving something back to society, sense of community responsibility
- Perceived benefits such as skill enhancement and networking

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[13] Anne-Line Balduck, Annick Van Rossem, and Marc Buelens, "Identifying Competencies of Volunteer Board Members of Community Sports Clubs," *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (2010): 213-235.
[14] James E. Austin, "Business Leaders and Nonprofits," *Nonprofit Management and Leadership* 9, no. 1 (1998): 40.

- Betterment of personal reputation[15]

The reasons why those executives and managers with business backgrounds or elites choose to join nonprofit boards echoes the reasons that nonelites volunteer from the Mark Clary and E.G. Snyder assessment (see Appendix). The assessment shows that the reasons people volunteer in a non-governance capacity are to gain a better understanding of the problem, the alignment of the mission with their values, the desire to seek recognition for the good deed, to strengthen social connections, and to feel better about oneself.

Homosocial reproduction can be witnessed on nonprofit Boards of Directors. Nonprofit boards tend to be made up of elites because of homosocial reproduction. Board members at the HTFM in 1980s and 1990s were nominated to join the board by current members.[16] Board nominees were asked to commit to five responsibilities before selection:

1. Attend regular monthly meetings
2. Choose a committee to actively serve on if selected as a member
3. Actively support fundraising and advocacy activities
4. Participate in a one-day retreat on planning
5. Commit time to acquaint oneself with the issues that come before the board so decisions can be made.[17]

People from higher social circles tend to invite people from similar neighborhoods and industries to join Boards. For example, members of the HTFM Board in the 1980s to early 1990s lived in middle-income to wealthy suburbs such as Glendale, Wauwatosa, Brookfield, Shorewood, Oak Creek, Fox Point, and Whitefish Bay. Some of the positions and companies these elite individuals held and worked in exhibited their power in their industries and in the

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[15] E. Austin "Business Leaders and Nonprofits" : 42.

[16] Board Member Responsibilities, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, 1975-1996, Box 1, Folder 27, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee archives, Golda Meir Library, Milwaukee, WI (hereafter Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records).

[17] Board Member Responsibilities, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

city. At the Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee, many Board of Director members were lawyers for top firms in the city, Executive Directors of non-profits and county departments, State Assembly representatives, owners of restaurant franchises and local companies, and senior vice presidents of banks and other financial institutions.[18] These elites were recruited by friends or professional acquaintances to the cause of feeding the hungry. Often times, these elites were recruited by their company to volunteer at nonprofits. Companies have relationships with nonprofits where an employee has a Board seat or set volunteer hours.

<p style="text-align:center">• • •</p>

<p style="text-align:center">Hunger Action Network</p>

This chapter explores volunteer opportunities offered to elites at Hunger Task Force. Elites are categorized as individuals who hold high-ranking positions in government, businesses, or nonprofit organizations, who are more than likely benefit from white privilege and are not from the community being served. This chapter focuses mostly on the HTFM's Hunger Action Network (HAN). The HAN was comprised of career professionals, mostly executive directors, other directors, and managers. These career professionals were operating in tandem with the EFPN, attempting to alleviate food insecurity; however, they were not as monitored nor trained as the pantry volunteers. This chapter focuses on HAN because they worked on the same issue as the EFPN, but with different supervision and different volunteer bases. The trust in career professionals shown by the HTFM illustrates the organization's deviation from its origins in grassroots power.

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[18] Board of Directors and Committee Membership List 1990-1994, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, 1975-1996, Box 1, Folder 26.

The Hunger Action Network was an elite organization coordinated by the Hunger Task

Force. Two of the initial members of HAN were Barbara Notestein, HTFM's Executive Director,

and Nova Clite, Food Stamp Coordinator for the Hunger Task Force. Due to the involvement of

Clite and Notestein, HAN became the responsibility of the HTFM. The Hunger Action Network

was the responsibility of the Board of Directors' Advocacy Committee.[19] The Advocacy

Committee was responsible for "promoting, enhancing and overseeing advocacy, goals,

objectives and programs of HTFM [and] mobilizing legislative and political action efforts as a

means to end hunger in our lifetime."[20] The Advocacy Committee was responsible for

- Providing information/education to full Board on current/upcoming hunger and hunger related issues (social, economic, legislative)
- Oversee relationship between the HTFM constituent groups: Emergency Food Pantry Network, Hunger Action Network
- Develop outreach strategies to secure broad-based community support to HTFM positions and advocacy efforts working with constituent groups as well as individual groups
- Expand committee membership to include non-board members to increase networks, skills, and resources available to committee
- Establish annual meeting schedule
- Submit summary report of all committee meetings to staff, board chair, and executive director, including attendance

Other members of HAN were career professionals. The organizations that the original members

were affiliated with worked in county government, faith-based groups, and other secular

nonprofit organizations. Below are the original eighteen individuals' titles and the organization

they worked for:[21]

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[19] Board of Directors and Committee Membership List 1990-1994, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.
[20] Board of Directors and Committee Membership List 1990-1994, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

Table 1: HAN initial membership list, 1983

Organization member is affiliated with	Title of person listed
Milwaukee County Department of Social Services	Director
Interfaith Program for the Elderly	Executive Director
House of Peace	(not listed)
Women's Coalition, Inc.	Chairperson
Community Advocates	Executive Director
St. Vincent de Paul Society	Executive Secretary
Bread for the World	Coordinator
Shoots 'n Roots Urban Gardening Program	Urban Garden Agent
Second Harvest	Manager
United Way of Greater Milwaukee	Executive Director
Outpost Natural Foods Co-op	(not listed)
St. Vincent de Paul Society Southside Free Meal Program	Coordinator
(individual citizen)	N/A
Milwaukee Urban League	Executive Director
United Auto Workers-Region 10	CAP Coordinator
Task Force on Emergency Shelter and Relocation Services	Chairperson
Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee	Executive Director
Family Services of Milwaukee	Executive Director

Source: Hunger Action Network mailing list, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee 1975-1996, Box 3, Folder 66, HAN; Membership List, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 4, Folder 1, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee archives, Milwaukee.

The list shows that many involved in this original effort would classify as "elite" in the definition of this thesis. There are individuals holding high titles in the city's small and powerful nonprofits, which have influence and connections within the state of Wisconsin and nationally. HAN's membership stayed around 16-25 members. Many of the members were in social services work or were public servants. Some were teachers in Milwaukee Public Schools, social workers, health care workers, county employees, city employees, pantry and hot meal operators, and church affiliated.[22] Between 1982 and 1994, most of the members lived in Milwaukee, with a handful of members living in suburban Butler, West Allis, and Brookfield.[23]

HAN was created because the individuals referenced in the Table 1 were concerned with how the Reagan administration would affect poor families in the Milwaukee area. In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan praised self-sufficiency and entrepreneurship. The Reagan administration increased the defense budget, proposed supply-side economics as a solution to the financial federal deficit, reduced government regulations, reduced taxes for the wealthy and businesses, eliminated social service programs, and greatly reduced government spending on social programs that benefited the elderly, the ill, children, the poor, and those in poor mental health. In his 1982 State of the Union speech, Reagan called for "New Federalism," which would transfer certain powers and responsibilities from the federal government to state control. Had this New Federalism been completely enacted, it would have allowed States and

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[22] Hunger Action Network mailing list, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records; Hunger Action Network Membership List 1993, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records; Hunger Action Network Steering Committee, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

[23] Hunger Action Network mailing list, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee; Membership List 1993, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

local governments to either abandon or reduce the funding for programs such as food stamps and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (A.F.D.C), which benefitted low-income individuals and families.[24] These ideals scared many families in Wisconsin. Many believe that the social welfare benefits would be taken away or cut completely.

President Reagan's attack on social welfare programs was clear. Not only did his administration try to reduce government spending on Medicaid, food stamps, Job Corps, energy assistance, and other programs, he also proposed reducing Social Security and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). This proposal was met with opposition from many members of Congress, old-age groups, advocates of the elderly, and labor groups; ultimately, he was not successful. Reagan's other economic policies did, however, succeed in disadvantaging low-income residents. President Reagan assured the American people that his policies would provide a "basic safety net" for the "truly needy," but instead the opposite occurred. Between 1980 and 1983, the percent of Americans living in poverty increased from 11.7 percent to 15.3 percent or about 35.3 million people, the greatest number since the mid-1960s.[25] The recession in the early 1980s also led to a rise in unemployment rates. Eventually and begrudgingly Reagan signed a relief package. Although many Americans were still dealing with poverty and in need of public assistance, many families' incomes improved after the relief package. The Reagan administration, and Reagan's supporters believed in individualism and that poverty was not an issue to be handled by the American government. They argued that the

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[24] Walter I. Trattner, *From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America* (New York: Free Press, 1999), 365.
[25] Trattner, *From Poor Law to Welfare State*, 368.

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poor were responsible for their welfare and did not deserve "handouts."[26] These cuts to social

welfare programs, unempathetic attitudes of many Americans, increase of those in poverty,

and the general policies of Reaganomics led many in America to be food insecure.

Despite the Reagan administration's apparent indifference, many nonprofit and private

groups around the United States recognized that due to myriad personal circumstances and the

recession, people needed hunger relief. In Milwaukee, the Hunger Action Network was formed

as one of those organizations to prevent hunger.[27] In 1983 a group of concerned individuals

met to discuss Reagan's proposed cuts to social welfare programs. These individuals were

concerned that those in need would not be able to access the food they needed to live. This

group of people wanted to bring awareness to the issue of hunger.

In April 1983, the initial coalition of organizations and individuals wrote a letter to labor

unions, social service providers, food co-ops, businesses, elected officials, and individuals

explaining the facts about hunger, what was already being done in the city, and what they

planned to accomplish. Part of the letter states,

> During the past few years it has become evident that there are thousands of low-income
> Milwaukeeans who must struggle every day to put food on their tables. Over 14,000
> individuals used the city's emergency food pantries in January 1983. Each month
> approximately 25,000 free meals are served at six locations. Federal funding cuts and
> new restrictive regulations have severely eroded the Food Stamp Program, WIC
> (Supplemental Feeding Program for Women, Infants, and Children), and the elderly and
> child feeding programs. At the same time, the recession deepens and the
> unemployment rate soars to record-breaking heights. Many churches, agencies, and
> individuals are attempting to respond to the growing hunger problems in our city. A
> variety of programs, pantries, and other initiatives have sprung up in the past two years.
> The Hunger Task Force and undersigned organizations and individuals are taking the
> lead in developing a community-wide food action coalition. Its purpose will be to

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[26] Trattner, *From Poor Law to Welfare State,* 370.
[27] April 1983 letter, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, 1975-1996, Box 3, Folder 65.

coordinate existing services, respond to issues, such as proposed funding cuts, and develop and implement new approaches to impact Milwaukee's hunger problem.[28]

This letter was intended to be used as background information on hunger in Milwaukee as coalition members approached community and state elected officials when discussing the issue of hunger in the Milwaukee area. This coalition of concerned citizens also developed a survey, with the goal of identifying issues the broader community was most concerned about. The goal of the survey was to not only see what issues were most concerning but also to see how those surveyed would like to be involved in coping with those issues in Milwaukee. The survey included options for more involvement in issues such as urban gardening, infant feeding (formula supplies), nutrition education, cooperative food buying, coordination of private sector and public sector effort, improved food distribution systems within Milwaukee, and emergency food pantry/meal site coordination.[29] The survey was sent to 383 elected officials and organizations. Out of the 383 surveys sent out, 55 were returned.[30] Based on the survey, the coalition of individuals who were monitoring the survey decided unanimously on May 20, 1983 to create a formal coalition for preventing hunger in Milwaukee and to name it the Hunger Action Network. This coalition was formed after reviewing the survey results gathered by the Hunger Task Force and in opposition to Reagan's proposed cuts in food stamp assistance and the larger number of Milwaukeeans needing emergency food services. [31] The Hunger Action Network (HAN) started in May 1983 as a "broad-based, community-wide network of

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[28] April 13, 1983 letter, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.
[29] Hunger Task Force Questionnaire, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 65.
[30] Meeting notes April 1983, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, 1975-1996, Box 3, Folder 65.
[31] Memo March 1985, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 66.

organizations, institutions, and individuals who were involved in trying to prevent hunger in the Greater Milwaukee area."[32] The group's mission was to "develop and maintain a network to coordinate and organize resources and facilitate communication for the prevention of hunger in the Milwaukee area."[33] In 1983 the Hunger Action Network was committed to hunger-related advocacy work locally and statewide. They promoted legislative initiatives such as food stamp outreach, Healthy Start for mothers and children, and employment and welfare reform.[34]

By June 1983, the coalition gained more members.[35] The members of the HAN were given autonomy by the Advocacy Committee, meaning they had the freedom to decide how they wanted to attack the issue of hunger. This autonomy lead to a lack of training and support from HTFM. Nova Clite, a HTFM employee, was involved; that was the main oversight HAN received. Clite reported HAN activities back to the HTFM staff at meetings but mostly provided advice to members of HAN.[36]

Hunger Task Force Board of Directors granted Food Stamp Coordinator Nova Clite the ability to use her time spent on HAN as part of her job duties after issues were raised from HAN members about the lack of consistent support from the HTFM. Clite was working with HAN due to its affiliation of the HTFM. She was essentially volunteering her time to HAN, due to it not officially being a part of her work duties. HAN was the responsibility of the Board of Directors Advocacy committee, but Clite was spending working time assisting HAN.

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[32] Hunger Action Network update July 1984, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 65.
[33] Hunger Action Network update July 1984, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.
[34] List of Accomplishments, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 1, Folder 2.
[35] Hunger Action Network meeting minutes June 1983, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 65.
[36] Hunger Action Network meeting minutes June 1983, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

Clite was instrumental in the early initiatives of HAN and served as the notetaker for all

meetings. In July 1983, members of HAN met with Hunger Task Force's Board of Directors to

discuss some organizational issues regarding HTFM staff time committed to HAN and the inter-

relationship between HAN and HFTM's Board.[37] In the letter Nova Clite stated that the HTFM

Board of Directors has granted HAN "a firm eight hours a week committed to HAN's

development."[38] Clite also explained her the duties before this decision by the Board and what

she planned to do now that HAN had been granted eight hours of her paid time as a Hunger

Task Force of Milwaukee staff member:

> Currently, I spend several hours a week talking to HAN members on needs, issues and
> ideas, and organizing and reporting on monthly HAN meetings. In the near future, I plan
> to continue these tasks plus concentrate on helping organize the fall meeting or
> conference. Beyond, that depending on the outcomes of the fall meeting, I will also get
> involved in issue organizing and advocacy with HAN.[39]

HAN decided that a conference on hunger would be a great way to inform Milwaukeeans about

the issue of hunger and gain more support. The desired audience for this conference was

broad, including human service and advocacy agencies, labor, business, government officials

(elected and bureaucrats), and recipients. Planning for this conference started shortly after the

formation of HAN, in June of 1983. Initial thoughts around the theme of the conference

revolved around the need for coordinated action between private organizations and public

organizations. Two potential titles for the conference were "Coordination of Private Sector and

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[37] Hunger Action Network/Hunger Task Force Relationship, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 65.
[38] Hunger Action Network/Hunger Task Force Relationship, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.
[39] Hunger Action Network/Hunger Task Force Relationship, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

Public Sector Efforts to Prevent Hunger"[40] and "Hunger in Milwaukee: A Need for Coordinated

Action."[41] Eventually, the latter title, Hunger in Milwaukee: A Need for Coordinated Action, was

selected. The conference included an opening speaker, workshops, a keynote speaker, panel

discussion, and a strategy session. The conference was able to secure Nancy Amidei, the

Executive Director of Food Research & Action Center (FRAC), as the keynote speaker. FRAC was

a nonprofit organization working to "eradicate poverty-related hunger and undernutrition in

the United States."[42] FRAC fought for public policy that reduced hunger and undernutrition on

the state, local, and federal levels. They worked with other nonprofits on the state and local

level to push for stronger public policy to reduce food insecurity.[43] HAN members thought that

with the audience they were attempting to reach, time to report what they'd learned and

gained from the workshops, panel, and speakers would be beneficial for further strategizing

and objective planning for HAN.[44] Special considerations for the "recipients" or grassroots

people involved included special outreach effort, child-care and lunch provided.[45] So, the

conference was open to those concerned with the issue of hunger.

　　HAN members decided on the following seven focus areas for the conference and their

work. HAN members believed these seven topics would address causes of hunger and help to

find solutions.

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[40] Hunger Action Network meeting minutes May 20, 1983, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 65.
[41] Hunger Action Network meeting minutes June 8, 1983, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 65.
[42] "What We Do", Food Research & Action Center, https://frac.org/about/what-we-do, accessed March 1, 2018.
[43] Food Research & Action Center, "What We Do."
[44] Meeting notes June 8, 1983, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.
[45] Meeting notes June 8, 1983, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

Table 2: Hunger Conference workshop title, description, and leader

Topic	Description	Leader of Workshop-HAN members
Commodities	A replacement for food stamps? A look at the shifting federal policies and their impact on local commodity distribution lead	Steven Brachman, Director of Shoots 'n Roots Programs
Information and Referral	What is the function of I&R coordinating emergency food service?	Judy Cohen, Director of Wisconsin Information Services
Food Stamp and income maintenance	What is the impact of Reagan's budget and policy on this vital federal food program?	Nova Clite, Food stamp Coordinator Hunger Task Force Milwaukee
Child Nutrition	What is the future of nutrition programs which ensure growth and development of low-income children?	Gail Sauter, Director of Supplemental Food Programs for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) 16th St Community Health Center
Elderly Nutrition	Are the needs of Milwaukee's low-income elderly being met through existing programs?	William Egan, Director of Village Church-Adult Day Care Program
Emergency Food	An overview of the expanding emergency food network and issues for its future development	Jennifer Teffer, Director of Milwaukee Emergency Food Center
Food Cooperatives and gardening	What part can these initiatives play in preventing hunger in Milwaukee?	Steven Brachman, Director of Shoots 'n Roots Programs

Source: Hunger in Milwaukee: A Need for Coordinated Action handout, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, 1975-1996, Box 3, Folder 65, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee archives, Milwaukee, WI.

To promote HAN and the conference on November 7, Nova Clite and Susan Walsh, a HAN member, appeared on the WTMJ radio show, *Perspective*. As stated before, HAN did not have much guidance other than Nova Clite. The topics proposed for the Hunger conference, according to feedback from participants, were not informative. The sessions included basic

information for professionals in the field, and the leaders of the workshop were not very informed.[46] Had HAN members not been perceived as knowledgeable based on their careers and education and received support, they could have brought in more knowledgeable speakers or been more knowledgeable themselves.

Overall, HAN felt that their conference was a success. They felt as though their goal of informing more Milwaukeeans about the issue of food insecurity was met. 130 people attended the conference and 38 turned in evaluations. Evaluations showed that on a scale of 1 to 5 with one being the conference objective were "very well met" and 5 being "not met at all," 79% rated the conference a 1 or 2 and only 21% rated the conference at 4, 5, or did not answer that question. Most written feedback did indicate that the conference was not directed at educating the Milwaukee community, because most of those in attendance already had knowledge of the issue.[47] Feedback unanimously praised Nancy Amidei for her engaging and informative keynote speech. This feedback seemed to motivate HAN to further delve into the seven workshop topics, creating objectives and goals for each, even including an objective of hiring a staff person with computer skills to develop and maintain data tracking programs for the emergency food pantries on the Wisconsin Information Services staff.[48]

Feedback from the "poor/minorities" about the conference was not positive. Comments from this group noted how the presenters were not experts on food insecurity, with the exception of Nancy Amidei from FRAC. Comments expressed disappointment with the lack of diversity among the speakers and in the audience. One piece of feedback stated, "why were the

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[46] Hunger conference feedback, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 65.
[47] Evaluation of the Hunger in Milwaukee Conference, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 65.
[48] Hunger Action Network objectives 1984, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 65.

people who are, in fact, hungry not present?"[49] Comments questioned the recruitment for the event, including whether or not racially diverse groups were invited. They also noted that none of the "so-called experts" had gone through hunger personally. Many expressed that they did not appreciate the generalization of the poor and food insecure. They also questioned if those experiencing food insecurity were truly meant to attend the conference due to its location in St. Francis, a mostly white suburb of Milwaukee. It was expressed that the conference location was not convenient to travel to.[50]

The objectives presented by HAN included requiring other entities to hire staff to analyze food pantry data. The meeting notes from 1984 do not indicate any training for HAN members being conducted or even requested, but there were objectives asking of training for others.[51] By March of 1984, HAN members had created a pantry training conference for emergency pantry volunteers, with no indication in the meeting notes of reaching out to the volunteers for involvement in the training and conducted the training. The idea that HAN would host a training for pantry workers, who were already receiving trainings via EFPN, was ironic. Ironic, because HAN members did not receive training themselves. There was no indication that HAN members or the HTFM invited any trainings for HAN. HTFM did not require or offer training to them as they did to the EFPN. This lack of support could have been due to the HTFM's assumption that these volunteers would have skills necessary to be advocates due to their education and professions.

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[49] Hunger conference feedback, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.
[50] Hunger conference feedback, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.
[51] Hunger Action Network objectives 1984, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

After receiving feedback from the 1983 conference that it was not as educational as

hoped for the audience, HAN conducted a similar conference the next year and received similar

feedback of the need to tailor the conference to their audience.[52] However, HAN members

agreed that this conference was successful as well, showing a lack of awareness among the

members.[53] The feedback from social service professionals, community members, and the food

insecure showed that the conference was lacking substance. The leaders of workshops were

not providing new information on food insecurity and made generalizations of the populations

they were looking to serve. Commenters also expressed their desire for time to reflect and

brainstorm with others about topics covered. One piece of feedback criticized the workshop

sessions by stating, "talk about objectives prior to actual workshop and allow more time for

group reaction and input."[54]

Adding more to their already limited efforts, HAN members decided that to be more

involved in the media and with influencing proposed legislation, policy, and engaging elected

officials and those running for office.[55] HAN members wanted to spread the word about hunger

in Milwaukee, so they wrote letters to local newspapers, were guests on local radio stations,

and created a survey for elected officials to complete that asked them questions about their

commitment to fighting hunger. The survey was sent to presidential candidates, 25 county

supervisors, 10 Milwaukee-area mayors, the Wisconsin governor, 25 State Assembly members,

the County Executive, 9 Milwaukee area state senators, 3 candidates for U.S. House of

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[52] Hunger Action Network meeting minutes October 25, 1984, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 65.
[53] Hunger Action Network meeting minutes October 25, 1984.
[54] Hunger conference feedback, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records
[55] Hunger Action Network meeting minutes November 1984, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 65.

Representatives, and two U.S. senators. The survey to incumbents and candidates running for office only received a 28% completion rate; however, HAN members felt this was sufficient enough to publish and share among themselves and HTFM. Along with sending out the survey, HAN member also met with Representative Gerald Kleczka's aide to "press their issues with the Congressman." Kleczka's aide, Ann Herrera Ward, encouraged them to voice their concerns but indicated that Rep. Kleczka was focused on reducing the deficit at the time.[56]

By 1985 HAN was endorsing candidates and legislation and continuing to engage with the media. According to meeting minutes, HAN members met with several members of Congress and local officials with no agenda or clear plan. In August 1985 HAN members conducted a poorly organized meeting with Senator Robert Kasten with no agenda, no clear goal for the Senator, and a lack of eye contact from the members in the meeting.[57] The feedback after the meeting indicated that members at the meeting felt embarrassed for their lack of preparation for the meeting and Senator Kasten noted the unpreparedness.[58] Nova Clite suggested in a meeting that HAN could be effective with training members of HAN on advocacy work in May of 1985, but still for HAN members received no training on advocacy.[59] In 1989, the coalition moved away from just hunger-related issues after reading reports that hunger was a symptom of poverty and decided to focus more broadly on poverty locally and statewide.[60]

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[56] Hunger Action Network meeting minutes July 1984, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 65.
[57] Hunger Action Network meeting minutes August 1985, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 65.
[58] Hunger Action Network meeting minutes August 1985, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.
[59] Hunger Action Network meeting minutes May 1985, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 65.
[60] Hunger Action Network meeting minutes April 4, 1991, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 67.

HAN disbanded in 1994. It is unclear, based on archival documents, why HAN disbanded. However, it can be assumed that the affiliation with the Hunger Task Force changed with the new executive director. In 1994, HTFM received new leadership. Michele Goldstein, who had been the executive director from 1988 to 1993, stepped down. Patricia Ann Rudy-Base became the executive director for the HFTM in 1994.

In its first 6 years of operation HAN members received little to no guidance from the Board Advocacy Committee, beyond the HTFM appointed staff member. They did not receive and implement feedback from events and represented themselves in affiliation with HTFM poorly in meetings with powerful elected officials, i.e. the meeting with Senator Kasten where HAN members had no agenda or clear agenda for meeting with the Senator. Even after these mistakes and lack of training, they still operated with an immense amount of autonomy. There was virtually no oversight from the HTFM Board of Directors for the first 4 years of HAN, no trainings, no check-ins beyond staff meeting share backs from Nova Clite, the HTFM employee working with HAN. This lack of supervision led to mistakes from HAN. This trust in career professionals, shown by the HTFM shows their deviation from grassroots power. The volunteer group that was more far removed from the problem received less support, help, and guidance on how to advocate for an issue that they were not that familiar.

HAN members were able to set up meetings with elected officials quickly due to influence and their existing professional status. With many initial members being Executive Directors of other municipal organizations and nonprofits, they had the opportunity to bring the issue of hunger to their peers. As stated in Ostromer's book, similar to Board of Directors,

advisory boards like these tend to consist of people in similar circles.[61] If this circle already

consists of executive directors, managers, and chairpersons, then more than likely they will

recruit people to join their cause who have similar backgrounds to themselves. The members of

HAN, while accomplished in their regular work, required training on how to organize, reach an

audience, and conduct meetings which was not much regulated by the HTFM Board of

Directors.

While the EFPN had a clear goal during its tenure, HAN did not. In 1983 HAN intended to

focus on the Milwaukee area, but by 1984 they decided to branch out to state and federal

hunger-related issues. This expansion to state and federal issues was not successful, however.

During May 1985 meeting, Clite asked HAN members how they could be more effective in

coping with food insecurity on the state level because there was "little organizing going on to

influence the state legislature and there are a growing number of vital issues in the state

budget making process, particularly as the federal resources dry up."[62] One HAN member

commented that it was "difficult to understand and know the state budget making process."[63]

This admission of ignorance did not lead to a training on the state budget, but an absorption of

the state committee of HAN into the local committee. By 1991, HAN had changed its food

insecurity-focused mission to a broader one. The original mission was to "develop and maintain

a network to coordinate and organize resources and facilitate communication for the

prevention of hunger in the Milwaukee area."[64] The mission changed to "HAN is committed to

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[61] Francie Ostrower, *Why the Wealthy Give: The Culture of Elite Philanthropy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 6.
[62] Meeting minutes May 1985, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 66.
[63] Meeting minutes May 1985, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.
[64] Meeting minutes May 1985, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

eliminating the root causes of poverty and hunger through education, networking, and advocacy. The HAN will promote public policies which provide for a decent standard of living for all people. The focus areas of HAN will be hunger and nutrition access to health care and welfare reform and employment."[65] While this change might have seemed necessary at the time, the new mission did not specify Milwaukee and added in more responsibilities of the volunteer group. This shift in area of focus further underscores the autonomy of the group. While HAN's efforts were noble, they were not equipped to handle such a far-reaching goal, especially without training on how to tackle these issues. The shift of the organization from deploying grassroots activist in multiple facets of the problem was clear. No longer were grassroots activist advocates meeting with changemakers and fighting for change like the CCSBP did with MPS Board. Now, grassroots volunteers were being deployed almost exclusively as the hands-on solution to the problem of food insecurity. Those being chosen for advocacy were not as supported in their knowledge around the issue of food insecurity and the grassroots voice was diminishing from the role entirely.

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[65] Hunger Action Network meeting minutes April 1991, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 67.

Chapter 3: Nonelite Volunteers and the Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee

Grassroots organizing can be effective because it's created by the people it intends to serve. Unlike top-down organizing, grassroots community organizing intends to find solutions to the problems within the community facing the issue itself. Community members who fight to improve the issues affecting their community tend to have better awareness on what would be effective for their community and what would be realistic solutions. While grassroots activism does have its challenges, it does provide innovative ideas through diversity.[1] By obtaining input and expertise from the community, grassroots initiatives can provide insight to social, ethical and cultural aspects of the community. Many of the churches, nonprofits, and other groups of people that were operating food pantries in Milwaukee in the 1980's to early 1990's knew their clients and the cultural aspects of the communities they were serving. By gathering grassroots community pantries, the Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee (HTFM) was able to create an environment where pantries serving different groups of people in Milwaukee were able to learn about effective ways to operate their pantries.

The Emergency Food Pantry Network (EFPN) was an effort by the HTFM to create an organized method for stocking pantries in Milwaukee. At the time, food pantries were not communicating with one another and not receiving a reliable amount of food. Pantries would receive donations on an inconsistent basis, sometimes needing to turn clients away. The Network aimed to create a more stable method of stocking food in pantries rather than continuing the trend of relying on inconsistent donations from individuals. The Network also

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[1] Gill Seyfanf and Adrian Smith, "Grassroots Innovations for Sustainable Development: Towards a New Research and Policy Agenda," *Environmental Politics* 16, no. 4 (2007): 584-603.

aimed to increase the communication between pantries, which made it difficult and time-consuming for hungry individuals and families to find food. Documents in the early stages of EFPN explain that "clients are frequently referred from pantry to pantry, often calling or visiting several times before receiving food."[2] The HTFM organized monetary and food donations for distribution to pantries. The EFPN also ensured that pantries had mechanisms for screening clients, referring clients, and training pantry workers on food stamps and other food assistance. Pantry workers were able to utilize their connections to the communities they served by sharing concerns from clients. Pantry workers voiced concern for the need of special food such as baby formula; thus, baby formula was stocked in pantries for families too.[3]

While the EFPN was effective in its goal to unite emergency food pantries in information sharing and providing food and resources to its clients, the EFPN had less autonomy than other groups managed by the HTFM such as the Hunger Action Network (HAN). They were more heavily monitored and received training multiple times throughout the year on topics related to food insecurity. The EFPN and HAN were the responsibility of two different HTFM Board committees. The EFPN was the responsibility of the Board of Directors' Food Program Committee.[4] The Hunger Action Network was the responsibility of the Board of Directors' Advocacy Committee.[5]

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[2] 1982 Program Objectives, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, 1975-1996, Box 2, Folder 28, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee archives, Golda Meir Library, Milwaukee, WI (hereafter Hunger Task Force Records).
[3] 1982 Program Objectives, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.
[4] Board of Director Committee Summary Descriptions, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 1, Folder 27.
[5] Board of Director Committee Summary Descriptions Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

Emergency Food Pantry Network

Due to the lack of communication and consistent food stock reported by many pantries in Milwaukee, the HTFM decided to intervene. In June of 1982 the Emergency Food coordinator at the Hunger Task Force sent a letter to over 100 operating emergency food banks in an attempt to create collaboration and communication between all of the food banks and food pantries. The Emergency Food Coordinator was a new position for the Hunger Task Force and one of the first tasks of the role was to gather "information about the present system of emergency food banks and food pantries in Milwaukee and the needs that exist in the delivery of services to people who come to them for food."[6] The letter included a survey and an invitation to a meeting in August of 1982 to begin a coalition.[7] The Coordinator noted that communication and coordination among food pantries and food banks was an issue that had become clear during her initial research. In an attempt to increase coordination and communication among food pantries and food banks, this letter was an invitation to building community through information sharing. At the August meeting, it was decided that monthly meeting would be necessary to properly plan for the getting food into pantries and to plan for the future of the pantry Network.[8]

At the September meeting, the HTFM invited pantries to participate in its inaugural event, the "Hunger at Home—Milwaukee Food Day" which had already been significantly planned by members of the HTFM staff, TV news anchors, and Pizza Hut representatives.[9] The

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[6] June 1982 memo, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 28.
[7] June 1982 memo, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.
[8] August agenda 1982, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 28.
[9] September letter 1982, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 28.

event aimed to collect as much food as possible from donation boxes placed at selected Pizza Hut and Arby's locations, and the Milwaukee Brewers' game on October 16, 1982. Pantries would be allowed to take food directly to their pantries from this event if "expectations were met."[10] Those expectations were that each pantry supply two to three volunteers for the event from 8 a.m.-6 p.m. in shifts; pantry representatives needed to be available at 5 p.m. for food distribution; and pantries needed to remember that "we are making history with this effort. We want it to be good news in every respect."[11] At the next month's meeting in October the event was discussed; sixty of the approximately 100 pantries participated in the Hunger at Home-Milwaukee Food Day and over 46 tons of food were collected.[12]

After the successful turnout of donated food items and large number of pantry participation at the Hunger at Home-Milwaukee Food Day, the Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee and those pantries officially created the Emergency Food Pantry Network at an October 28, 1982 meeting. At this meeting, the Network consisted of the 60 pantries that attended the Hunger at Home-Milwaukee Food Day event; Karen Hering, the Food Stamp Coordinator at the HTFM; and Ann DeLeo, an attorney at Legal Action of Wisconsin. A memo was sent out to the 40 pantries that did not participate in the Hunger at Home-Milwaukee Food Day event, inviting them to join the Emergency Food Pantry Network. The memo included information about resources available to pantries that were out of food, upcoming workshops on budgeting and

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[10] September letter 1982, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.
[11] September letter 1982 Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.
[12] October 28, 1982 memo, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 28.

Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and statistical information about food stamps and budgeting.[13]

A memorandum from meeting minutes indicates that years before the formation of the EFPN many South Side pantries came together to form a cluster. This cluster met several times a year to share ideas and problem solve together around common concerns and interests relating to their pantry work.[14] The work of the HTFM did to coordinate these pantries was on a larger scale, connecting pantries and food banks citywide; however, it was already occurring in pockets of the city.

EFPN was well organized from its inception. The Network reached out to every known pantry operating in Milwaukee, even those who did not participate in the first event. The Network partnered with organizations that were knowledgeable about the issue of hunger. Pantries who joined the Network were provided with resources to become more educated on government resources. This strong beginning to the Network could explain its growth in number of pantries over its fourteen-year operation and large number of food and monetary donations over those fourteen years. The Network was able to draw in many pantries already operational in Milwaukee communities to strengthen their ability to gather knowledge and strengthen their reach in the city. The first small scale event, in September 1982, hosted by the Network had seventeen pantries participate and received $1,151.62 worth of food donations.[15] The next month's event saw 60 pantries participating in the Network's event. The strong beginning of the Network can also be attributed to the fact that many of the pantries in the

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[13] October 28, 1982 memo, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.
[14] February 1988 memo, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 25.
[15] September 1982 update, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 28.

Network had been in operation for years and were themselves well run. The pantries were

operating in different spaces, churches, community centers, schools, nonprofits, in different

neighborhoods in the city. Sharing promising practices and experiences with different

demographics strengthened the Network.[16]

By the end of 1982, the HTFM founded the Emergency Food Pantry Network (EFPN),

which had a large reach. It was created in a response to President Ronald Reagan

administration's cutbacks of social welfare programs such as food stamps, Women, Infant, and

Children (WIC), and Medicaid. EFPN's motivations to form after the Reagan administration cuts

were similar to the Hunger Action Network. The 1991 Emergency Food Pantry Network

Membership Policies and Requirements stated that

> the EFNP is an organization made up of 125 pantries throughout Milwaukee County. It
> originated in 1982 in response to an increase in hunger caused by the economy and
> cutbacks in social programs. Pantries in the Network are operated primarily by
> volunteers. The Network is governed by an elected Steering Committee made up of
> volunteers from a cross-section of pantries.[17]

The Emergency Food Pantry Network reached about 30,000 people monthly by 1987. In 1991,

the EFPN included 79 pantries that served over 110,000 clients yearly.[18] By 1993, the 125

pantries provided Milwaukee clients with about 70 tons of food monthly.[19]

The EFPN was a grassroots initiative of the HTFM governed by the Food Program

Committee of the Board of Directors; most of the volunteers were close to the problem, living

in communities where pantries were located or pantry users themselves. As stated in the

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[16] Cluster list, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 25.
[17] Membership Policies and Requirements, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 24.
[18] 1991 Yearly pantry totals, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 30.
[19] Membership Policies and Requirements, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

Emergency Food Pantry Network Policies and Procedures Manual, the emergency pantries were

"operated by a diverse cross section of Milwaukee's community."[20] These pantries in the

Network were being operated by concerned community members. Before being affiliated with

the EFPN, a lot of the pantries were receiving inconsistent food and monetary donations. Out of

the seventeen organizations that participated in the EFPN's first event in September 1982,

eleven were churches and six were community centers. These grassroots pantries served their

congregations, center visitors, and others in the neighborhood. These centers and churches

were located all over the city: Sherman Park neighborhood, downtown, Bay View, and the

south side of the city.[21]

The Emergency Food Pantry Network had structure. They had procedures in place for

monitoring the pantries; for reporting issues with clients, pantry workers and volunteers; and

clear guidelines on what to give clients based on needs. Pantries received routine monitoring

visits. There were procedures in place to ensure that information was reported from food

pantries to the necessary person or persons. There were systems in place where pantry workers

could report issues with the food, warehouse shipments, clients, other staff members, and

volunteers at the pantries. There systems in place for staff or volunteers who did not show up

on time. The Board Food Programs Committee and EFPN worked together to create forms for

reporting these issues.[22]

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[20] Emergency Food Pantry Network Policies and Procedures Manual, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 34.
[21] An update on what is happening September 1982, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 28.
[22] 1989 minutes, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 30.

The Board Committee meeting minutes were also structured consistently from 1989 to 1994. Each topic was discussed in similar order, beginning with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and typically ending with the EFPN. These documented reports were examined and discussed at Board meetings to determine patterns. The members of the Board of Directors Food Program committee had specific roles and duties. Board members had specific responsibilities for aspects of EFPN and the other programs under their management, along with staff support. The Board and EFPN created a manual with resources, procedures, history, and suggested content for bags of food. The manual was printed and present at every Network pantry.[23]

The Emergency Food Pantry Network created an abstract and objectives document to give to pantries who were interested in joining the Network. The document stated that the objective of the EFPN was to:

> Address the need for better coordinated emergency food services, the HTFM will over a three-year period, organize pantries in many areas of the Milwaukee County into about 7 food pantry Networks, serving specific geographical areas. Each Network will have mechanism for screening, referral, protections against liability, adequate food stocks including special foods such as formulas, etc. Weekend and evening coverage will be created. HTFM will provide training on such concerns as food stamp eligibility, food inspection, etc. Massive food and monetary collections generating at least $30,000 in food and $8,000 in cash per year from individuals will be organized. Problems with food stamps or other food programs will be referred to HTFM for resolution.[24]

By 1992, the Network had grown. The EFPN had about 600 volunteers. Most were women of color and themselves low income, under- or unemployed and residents of the

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[23] Emergency Food Pantry Network Policies and Procedures Manual.
[24] Program abstract and objectives, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 18.

neighborhoods "besieged by crime and gang activity."[25] Most of the pantries were being run by

concerned residents in neighborhoods in Milwaukee. Many of the pantries were operated out

of community centers and churches. Women from the neighborhood worked or volunteered at

the pantry and some received food assistance from the pantries themselves.[26] Although these

women might have had a breadth of knowledge of the topic of food insecurity and realistic

solutions for the problem due to their closeness to the problem and people experiencing the

problem, they received more oversight from the HTFM Board of Directors. This oversight did

prove to be beneficial. Unlike, HAN, the EFPN received trainings and more regular visits to the

pantry gave EFPN an opportunity to share trends at pantries.

While "besieged by crime and gang activity" might be an overgeneralization, it is

important to frame the landscape of poverty in some of the communities that these women

might have been coming from who volunteered with the Emergency Food Pantry Network. In

1967 Congress created the Work Incentive Program (WIN), a Social Security Amendment. WIN

came about due to Congress's assumption that too many single mothers were dependent upon

welfare and would benefit from finding work. Through WIN, single mothers utilizing welfare

programs who fell in certain demographic and need categories would be referred for work and

job training.[27] This work requirement component for welfare recipients stated that "the need

for increasing the work incentive of poverty-level women with children (and thereby decreasing

welfare dependency) became a major policy initiative of welfare reform during the Nixon, and

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[25] Requirements, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 35.
[26] Participation of the Client Group, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 28.
[27] U.S. Congress, Finance Committee, Implementation of Amendments to Improve the Work Incentive Program
report prepared by Congressional staff, 92th Cong., 2d sess., 1972, 1-17
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Sprt34.pdf.

later Carter administrations."[28] President Ronald Reagan promoted the idea that welfare had

"expanded too rapidly and that dependency on the programs had increased."[29] Reagan

believed that the "social safety net" was too high; thus he continued budget cuts to many social

welfare programs aimed at assisting the poor. New eligibility requirements were enacted to

programs, making families with gross incomes above 150% of Wisconsin's poverty line ineligible

for state support.[30] Due to the cuts to social welfare programs such as WIC, and changes in

eligibility, many Wisconsin mothers began to work and utilize Aid to Families with Dependent

Children (AFDC) services in the early 1980s. According to a study conducted by researcher

Sandra Danzinger, many working Wisconsin mothers reported outstanding debts, a decline in

well-being and income security, and lower perceived economic status than working mothers

before the cuts to funding, eligibility requirement changes, and work requirements.[31]

Danziger's research concluded from her research that the Reagan annual budget for federal

government Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, "not only removed the option of

supplementing earnings and created extra hardship for women, but also proved to be

detrimental to their sense of economic well-being. Single mothers (interviewed in Wisconsin)

…who were working and on welfare have been victimized by multiple setbacks in their effort to

provide for their families."[32] Many of the women volunteering in the EFPN pantries and food

banks were in the same situation as some of the single working mothers in Danzinger's study,

working mothers receiving federal assistance. This information is based on the brief description

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[28] Sandra K. Danzinger, "The Impact of the Reagan Budget Cuts on Working Welfare Mothers in Wisconsin," (Discussion Papers, University of Wisconsin-Madison Institute for Research on Poverty), 1.
[29] Danzinger, "The Impact of the Reagan Budget Cuts on Working Welfare Mothers in Wisconsin," 3.
[30] Danzinger, "The Impact of the Reagan Budget Cuts on Working Welfare Mothers in Wisconsin," 6.
[31] Danzinger, "The Impact of the Reagan Budget Cuts on Working Welfare Mothers in Wisconsin," 5.
[32] Danzinger, "The Impact of the Reagan Budget Cuts on Working Welfare Mothers in Wisconsin," 25.

of the workers given, "most were women of color and themselves low income, under- or unemployed and residents of the neighborhoods."[33] This evidence is not conclusive but does call attention to Wisconsin mothers in a similar situation as the EFPN volunteers. However, they still utilized their spare time to volunteer to help hungry people in their communities. While the archives do not identify the status of those working at the pantries who were AFDC recipients, the data does state that many were poor.[34]

By 1992, due to the increase in need for emergency food and participation, the EFPN decided to ask the Policy Committee if they could request support for a Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) for the Emergency Food Pantry Network Leadership Development Project.[35] The Policy Committee was open to all members of the EFPN members. Both groups helped to govern decisions made by the EFPN along with the Food Program Board of Directors Committee. Members could nominate themselves or be nominated and elected to the committee. The Committee was in charge of the upholding and updating the Network's by-laws, advising on what resources the Network should obtain, and nominating members to the steering committee.[36] The Steering Committee would act as a leadership development opportunity for members of the EFPN. Community Development Block Grants were issued by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and distributed by the local government in order to provide communities with resources to address a wide range of community development issues.[37]

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[33] Requirements, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.
[34] Requirements, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.
[35] Policy Committee speech, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 35.
[36] EFPN Policy sub-committee, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 35.
[37] "Community Development Block Grant Program," Community Development Block Grant Program-CDBG/U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),

This grant would help to "expand the readiness and involvement of pantry volunteers in community organizing and advocacy efforts taking place in our central city community."[38] The EFPN planned to utilize the CDBG to prepare 35 EFPN volunteers to complete the following tasks

- Develop, train, and support a new Network Outreach Committee that would be active in social change efforts.
- Train and support five key leaders of this Committee
- Provide the vehicle, making it easier for committee members to attend community programs. Further linking the Network and Committee to community initiatives.
- Develop and implement a long-range plan for Network involvement in advocacy and organizing.

Gloria Adams, a member of the Emergency Food Pantry Network of Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee, requested this funding and provided statistics to strengthen her request. Adams stated that in 1992, the US Conference of Mayors found that request for emergency food assistance in cities had risen by 26% in 1991, and 17% of requests were unmet. Adams also shared an anecdote about how her own experience in becoming an advocate for the hungry in her community "under the tutelage of Hunger Task Force." She shared how she employed ideas about ending hunger that she learned working with other members of the EFPN in her neighborhood. Some of the ideas she shared were

- Churches should deal more vigorously with the moral problems of a culture that slows persistent hunger
- Mass media, especially television can provide better and more accurate coverage of hunger and poverty issues
- Input from clients is important to public policy process
- It is important to move from "compassion" to "active citizenship"
- Volunteer power and insight should be utilized more as a part of public policy[39]

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https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_planning/communitydevelopment/programs, accessed July 16, 2019.

[38] Policy Committee speech, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

[39] Policy Committee speech, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

The Policy Committee met, and documents indicate they created a Steering Committee to complete the tasks outlined in the CDBG request. The Steering Committee would still act as leadership development. Members of the Steering Committee would act as role models and guides to other pantry workers by operating their pantries by the EFPN guidelines. The Steering Committee aimed to represent the cross section of the EFPN racially, ethnically, culturally, geographically, and by denomination.[40] Steering Committee members were to be nominated and decided upon shortly after nominations were received. Nomination forms asked EPFN volunteers to describe their involvement with EFPN, what could they bring to the committee, what they hoped to gain from the committee, and one thing that they have done in life that they were most proud of.[41] This process of nominating peers to leadership roles was not present in the Hunger Action Network. No leadership development component was present for the Hunger Action Network; members were not provided with training opportunities nor sought them out.

This evidence shows that this group had less autonomy than the Hunger Action Network (HAN), discussed in the previous chapter. The HAN did not have preset procedures and policies to follow at its inception, like the EFPN did. There was more trust that this group could meet their goals without policies and procedures as a base of their work. There was more oversight on the Emergency Food Pantry Network than the Hunger Action Network from the Board of Director committees that managed this group. The routine and monitoring visits, the training of

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40 Criteria for EFPN Steering Committee Membership, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 35.
41 Policy Committee speech, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

the workers supported the pantries and EFPN in their ability to serve clients. Due to the nature

of their work, the EFPN did have more oversight on pantry operations laws around food

handling, food resale, and food storage. However, the procedures and policies for the EFPN

were not mostly laws of running a food bank or food pantry. A large number of them were

administrative:

- The pantry or its sponsoring organization must be a federally certified, nonprofit organization
- All pantries must submit reports on the number of clients served to the Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee by the 10th of each month
- The pantry must have an on-going, year-round emergency food program with established hours of operation which distributes emergency food directly to individuals in need[42]

In contrast to the Hunger Action Network (HAN) or elite volunteers, the EFPN had great

success. As noted in the elite chapter, HAN was unprepared with a clear agenda or talking

points during their meeting with a Senator to the detriment of their movement. By 1991, the

number of pantries in the Network increased to 125, serving over 36,000 people per month,

with over 2.3 million pounds of food distributed that year. Additionally, the Network

successfully acquired FEMA money and distributed it to over 144 emergency food providers in

the Greater Milwaukee area.[43]

In order to continue to train and uplift workers in the EFPN, the Network looked to find

more funding. In 1992 the HTFM requested Community Development Block Grant funds for

the:

Emergency Food Pantry Network Leadership Development Project. The primary goal of
the Emergency Food Pantry Network Leadership Development Project is to expand the

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[42] Emergency Food Pantry of Milwaukee, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 36; Membership
Policies and Requirements, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 2, Folder 24.
[43] List of Accomplishments, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

readiness and involvement of pantry volunteers in community organizing and advocacy efforts taking place in out central city community. This project will… develop train and support a Network Outreach Committee that will be active in social change efforts.[44]

While this seemed like a great idea to continue to uplift the mostly poor women of color who were closer to the issue of hunger, the question of why not include the HAN members in this development project or a similar project to help them active social change emerges. HAN members would have benefitted from a similar support and a leadership development program. Although HAN members might have been seen as leaders already due to their personal achievements at in their careers, they were all not professional activists. Lifelong learning is key not just to the uneducated, but the highly educated as well. One can be brilliant at many tasks but need coaching and support on other tasks. The EFPN and the HAN were working on different aspects of hunger, but they worked loosely together to alleviate hunger. This lack of empowerment or training for HAN members is suspect. Empowerment is important to any worker, whether it be the boss or the lowest level worker. These efforts to train and develop EFPN could have been seen as patronizing, especially with HAN not receiving similar training. While it could have been seen as patronizing, it was actually helpful to the pantry workers and volunteers. These efforts should have been extended to the HAN volunteers too, to improve their work, but were not. This thesis argues that due to the difference in volunteer demographics of HAN and EFPN, it was assumed by the Board of Directors that the HAN members would already know how to manage. They would not need training like their pantry counterparts. However, even though members of HAN were professionals and managers in their careers, they would have benefitted from training. The EFPN volunteers received training

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[44] Policy Committee speech, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

that benefitted themselves and their clients. They were able to promote and advocate for themselves to achieve higher positions within EFPN, practice public speaking, and attend trainings conducted by professionals outside of the state.[45] This ability to practice and continued knowledge attainment did not occur for HAN volunteers.

Table 3 below outlines the difference in responsibilities for each self-selected board member committee that managed HAN and EFPN. The Food Programs Committee oversaw EFPN and the Advocacy Committee oversaw HAN. The language in the Committee Descriptions and Responsibilities and Duties of the Board committees that governed HAN and the EFPN differed. This difference could indicate the lack of administrative supervision that HAN received.

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[45] Policy Committee speech, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records.

Table 3: EFPN and HAN Board of Director Committees' responsibilities

Emergency Food Pantry Network	Hunger Action Network
Board of Directors Committee —Food Programs	Board of Directors Committee—Advocacy
• Review and develop agency systems for resource purchasing, allocation and distribution at pantries	• Provide information/education to full board on current/upcoming hunger and hunger related issues (social, economic, legislative)
• Develop agency policies, to promote accountability and to ensure that community needs are met	• Oversee relationship between the HTFM constituent groups: Emergency Food Pantry Network, Hunger Action Network, CMPC, ECOM
• Serve as liaison between HTFM and other food providers to avoid duplicate services and promote cooperation	• Develop outreach strategies to secure broad based community support to HTFM positions and advocacy efforts working with constituent groups as well as individual groups
• **Build non-board member participation in committee work, especially from the EFPN**	• **Expand committee membership to include non-board members to increase Networks, skills, and resources available to committee**
• Establish annual meeting schedule	• Establish annual meeting schedule
• Submit summary report of all committee meetings to staff, board chair, and executive director, including attendance	• Submit summary report of all committee meetings to staff, board chair, and executive director, including attendance[46]

The Board of Directors did not have much language around HAN because they were more

hands-off with the Hunger Action Network. The Board of Directors trusted HAN to be able to

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[46] Board of Directors Committee Descriptions, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 1, Folder 27.

decide the best way to fight hunger and act on those ideas. Also, the bullet point regarding non-board member committee participation even differs. The Advocacy Committee aimed to "expand committee membership to include non-board members to increase Networks, skills, and resources available to committee," indicating the potential skill and professional or social Networks that members of the Hunger Action Network, Food Stamp Coalition, and Infant Nutrition Project could bring to the Board Advocacy committee. However, the Food Programs bullet point regarding non-board member committee participation is written as "build non-board member participation in committee work, especially from the EFPN." This is written without indicating the possible skills and social and professional Networks that members of the EFPN could bring to the Board of Directors. The volunteers of the HAN were middle to upper level management professionals in their careers, so they would bring social and professional skills to the board. While it was wise to include participation from EFPN members in the board discussions, it is interesting to note that the language about resources and experience was not included in this bullet point. Understanding that professional experience, at times, is and was more valuable than life experience, this language change was not surprising, but still is important to note.

This thesis does not aim to criticize the work of the Hunger Action Network nor the Emergency Food Pantry Network. This thesis aims to highlight the work of these groups, but also to analyze the level of scrutiny and oversight from the Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee each group received. Meeting minutes, duties and responsibilities, pictures, and notes have indicated that the work that the EFPN completed was well organized and effective in its goal of proving food and food resources to its clients. The EFPN also trained pantry workers and

brought pantries together to problem solve. The volunteers working in the Emergency Food

Pantry Network were largely women of color, poor, and from the neighborhoods they were

serving. The volunteers working with the Hunger Action Network were a mix of men and

women, middle class, and more white individuals than women of color. This class and race

difference could have contributed to the level of autonomy that the HTFM gave to each group.

While the HAN had more issues with establishing and meeting their goal, EFPN stayed

consistent with their goal and meeting their goal.[47] EFPN continued to add pantries to the

Network, provide training and resources to clients and pantry workers, and served more

clients.[48] It is unclear what led to the end of the EFPN. However, in January of 1994 the Hunger

Task Force Board of Directors met and discussed the EFPN manual. The manual had been

revised and sent to food pantries and selected social service agencies. During this same report,

the Major Food Provider Network is mentioned. This new Network has just been initiated and

included directors from all major food providers in Milwaukee County, discussing ways to work

together to increase the utilization of food programs in the summer of 1994.[49] It seems as

though the Major Food Providers Network replaced the Emergency Food Pantry Network. The

directors of these major pantries were taking on a bigger role in their relationship with the

Hunger Task Force. The legacy of the EFPN was omnipresent, however, with the manual they

helped create that was being sent to food pantries and social service providers.

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[47] Meeting Minutes May 1985, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 66; List of Accomplishments, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 1, Folder 2.
[48] 1991 Yearly Client Totals per Pantry, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 3, Folder 30.
[49] Board Meeting minutes January 1994, Hunger Task Force of Milwaukee Records, Box 1, Folder 28.

Conclusion

The Hunger Task Force grew from grassroots activism, from concerned citizens attempting to make a change in order to provide school breakfast to children in their community. The two groups, HAN and EFPN, studied in this thesis portray the shift in responsibilities of volunteer groups at the Hunger Task Force. The more grassroots program EFPN, was utilized more in a more hands-on manner, with less advocacy work. HAN was utilized to do more advocacy work. The organization did not begin this way. The deployment of volunteers was more balanced. Less educated and educated volunteers were working together more and participating in direct ground work and indirect advocacy work. This thesis is not intended to evaluate the effectiveness of the HTFM, but to examine two groups within the organization and how they were deployed to help. This thesis suggests that grassroots activist should be on boards of nonprofit organizations. These diverse voices should be included in advocacy capacity, governance capacity, and in a hands-on capacity. This was not the practice of the HTFM in its coordination of HAN and EFPN. Both groups did not receive training and support. Nor did both groups participate in hands-on volunteerism and indirect advocacy work. The emergence of the HTFM came out of grassroots activism; it is important to have the innovative and diverse ideas from those close to the problem informing decisions about the future of the organization. Members of EFPN should have been included on the indirect advocacy work and board responsibilities.

The existing scholarly literature does show that grassroot input is beneficial in engaging members of boards in making more informed decisions.[1] Lore Wellens and Marc Jegers compiled research that indicates that negative impacts can occur when nonprofits attempt to respond to the needs and objectives of only one particular stakeholder group (i.e., government, volunteers, non-managerial staff members, board members, or private donors), as opposed to responding to the needs of more than just one group.[2] The management of these stakeholder groups is complex, but necessary. There is a lack of research that includes the perceptions of nonprofit organizations' governance from the point of view of the clients or beneficiaries' stakeholder groups.[3] If there was more representation from clients, it could highlight their desire to be a part of the governance of the organizations that set out to help them. In the case of the Hunger Task Force and other nonprofits, beneficiaries and volunteers can overlap, but their perceptions might only be listened to as a volunteer. Research has shown the importance and appropriateness of including beneficiaries in the governance of organizations that affect them due to:

- Beneficiaries having the right to be involved in decisions that affect their daily lives
- Many nonprofits receive public or private funding with guidelines attached that require client involvement
- Governments encourage organizations to be "close to the customer"[4]

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[1] Sondra Z. Koff, *Citizen Participation in Nonprofit Governance* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 101.
[2] Lore Wellens and Marc Jegers, "Effective Governance in Nonprofit Organizations: A Literature Based Multiple Stakeholder Approach," *European Management Journal* 32, no. 2 (2014): 223.
[3] Wellens and Jegers, "Effective Governance in Nonprofit Organizations: A Literature Based Multiple Stakeholder Approach," 226.
[4] Sonia Ospina, William Diaz, and James F. O'Sullivan, "Negotiating Accountability: Managerial Lessons from Identity-Based Nonprofit Organizations," *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (2002): 5-31.

While there are those who argue that clients should be more involved in organizational

governance, others question whether or not clients are the "best judges of their own interests

and whether they have the tools and skills to participate in governance."[5] While scholars argue

for the importance of including client influence to organizational governance, others have

acknowledged the difficulty in attaining this information and its use.[6] The barriers to obtaining

this information from clients include lack of feeling safe and supported in expressing ideas and

concerns, self-consciousness around level of teamwork, knowledge of organizational structure,

and literacy skills from the clients.[7] Nonprofits can ensure client safety and help improve their

knowledge of the organization's structure by providing training. Research conducted by Leslie

Mandel and Jasmine Qazilbash showed that after training and education on implementing

projects, teamwork, advisory boards and governance structure, youth participants in a school-

based health pilot project in Boston allowed the students to be able to present valuable

feedback that shaped organizational policy.[8] The study conducted by Mandel and Qazilbash is

an example of the positive effects beneficiaries' participation in nonprofit governance can

bestow. Positive effects on the organization can include "increased legitimacy, achievement of

organizational goals, improved commitment among nonprofit board members, increased social

capital among stakeholder groups, and improved quality of received services."[9]

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[5] Wellens and Jegers, "Effective Governance in Nonprofit Organizations: A Literature Based Multiple Stakeholder Approach," 226.

[6] Thomas Packard, "Staff Perceptions of Variables Affecting Performance in Human Service Organizations," *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 39, no. 6 (2010): 971-990.

[7] Wellens and Jegers, "Effective Governance in Nonprofit Organizations: A Literature Based Multiple Stakeholder Approach," 227.

[8] Leslie A. Mandel and Jasmine Qazilbash, "Youth Voices as Change Agents: Moving Beyond the Medical Model in School-Based Health Center Practice," *Journal of School Health* 75, no. 7 (2005): 239-242.

[9] Wellens and Jegers,"Effective Governance in Nonprofit Organizations: A Literature Based Multiple Stakeholder Approach," 223.

This thesis shows that with the proper support, encouragement, structure, and clear objectives, the input of grassroots organizing is beneficial to the mission of nonprofits. Moreover, grassroots volunteers should be included in governance roles due to their closeness to clients and the issues. I argue that in order to evaluate the effectiveness of community input on an organization's operations, future researchers must first determine how nonprofits' effectiveness is measured. With the evaluation of nonprofit governance being a difficult concept to quantify, the topic of evaluating the effects of community voices on the board is difficult to quantify as well.[10] Research must also be conducted of those nonprofits who do include significant community voice on their governing bodies and those who do not in similar locations and fields. While surveys show that the inclusion of community representation on Board of Directors is helpful for other Board members' knowledge, it is more difficult to definitively say with research and not just anecdotally that it helps the organization more than not having these voices on the Board.[11]

The table below summarizes advantages and disadvantages to including grassroot voices on nonprofit boards.

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[10] Francie Ostrower and Melissa M Stone. "Moving Governance Research Forward: A Contingency-Based Framework and Data Application," *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 39, no. 5 (2010): 901-24; Daniel P. Forbes, "Measuring the Unmeasurable: Empirical Studies of Nonprofit Organization Effectiveness from 1977 to 1997," *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (1998): 183.
[11] Sondra Z. Koff, *Citizen Participation in Nonprofit Governance* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2009.), 56; Forbes, "Measuring the Unmeasurable," 183.

Table 4: Advantages & disadvantages to grassroots representation in nonprofit governance

Advantages	Disadvantages
• Expertise in the given problem area through first person experience • A strong capacity for checks and balances in decision-making • Informs the current board on issues that they were not privy to due to lack of closeness to problem. The whole board can become better advocates through information sharing. • The organization's reputation increases reputation and influence with specific groups • Funders may view the inclusion of grassroots representation on boards as a reflection of the organization's commitment to inclusivity • More likely to receive federal funding. The federal government requires compliance with diversity guidelines in the creation of board of directors in many of their grants. • Bringing in multiple perspectives, elites and nonelites, can break the cycle of privilege and power • Organization programs and services reflect the needs and interests of the community.	• Interpersonal challenges among new board members and new grassroots members • Larger board sizes can become a challenge because larger boards tend to have more difficult time in the decision-making processes. This can lead to less efficiency. • Ambiguity around how to incorporate the voices in decision making without employing tokenism • Time spent finding grassroot voices can be spent tending to other matters of the organization

Sources: John Michael Daley, "An Action Guide for Nonprofit Board Diversity," *Journal of Community Practice* 10, no. 1 (2002): 33-54.; James E. Orlikoff and Mary K. Totten, "Community Representation and the Effective Board," *Trustee* 51, no 1 (1998): 14.; Murry Dropkin "Fundraising 101," *The Nonprofit Report* 24, no.1 (2014): 2-5; Zoë Murray, "Community Representation in Hospital Decision Making: A Literature Review," *Australian Health Review* 39, no. 3 (2015): 323-328; Kathleen Buse, Ruth Bernstein, and Diana Bilimoria, "The Influence of Board Diversity, Board Diversity Policies and Practices, and Board Inclusion Behaviors on Nonprofit Governance Practices," *Journal of Business Ethics* 133 no 1 (2012): 179-191.

There are advantages and disadvantages to including community representation or

grassroots representation in nonprofit governance. The advantages outnumber the

disadvantages. Advantages include increased funding support from the federal governance and private funders. Many private funders and federal grants require some level of inclusivity in the governing of the organization. To receive necessary funding, it is in the best interests of the organization to include grassroot representation on their board of directors. The funding advantages are coupled with the reputational boost nonprofits receive from having community representation on their boards. First-hand expertise can also help the organization stay focused on mission and receive solutions from those who have experienced the issue. Additionally, having community voice can make the organization seem more reputable with the target group, other nonprofits, and funders. The disadvantages of incorporating grassroots perspective on nonprofit boards are administrative and interpersonal. The inclusion of community voice requires thoughtfulness in how they are included to avoid tokenism. It also might require boards to re-evaluate board structure to be more inclusive to new members not familiar with meeting structures. Another administrative disadvantage is allocation of time finding individuals to participate on the board. These disadvantages are valid, but also solvable with preparation and planning.

In this thesis, I have argued that although the origins of the Hunger Task Force lie in the work of the Black Panther Party, the organization does not widely publicize this history. This oversight could be due to the reputation some in law enforcement and other groups have put upon the group as militant and defiant. However, as this thesis revealed, the Black Panther Party was a grassroots organization that fought to help Black people in America. They provided physical protection, food and other resources, and advocated for better rights for Black people. This thesis argues that the Hunger Task Force moved away from its promotion of grassroots

activism. The HTFM moved towards deploying volunteers with more education and career experience into advocacy work and grassroots volunteers in hands-on work. This shift was not detrimental for the organization, but it did not provide all volunteers with the support it needed to be successful in meeting their objectives. The EFPN was successful in creating a system of communication between pantries and keeping a steady flow of food and money for pantries to always have resources for clients. HAN was able to pull in more people not from the Milwaukee area to work on issues involving Milwaukee residents. However, HAN could have been more effective in advocating for food security had they received more training and guidance from the HTFM.

Along with this analysis, this thesis examined scholarly literature that explains the benefits to nonprofits when grassroot activism is implemented on their Board of Directors. However, the study of representation on nonprofit Board of Directors is sparse. The topic of input from voices of the community being served on boards of directors and the effectiveness those voices bring to the organization is difficult to measure.[12] More research needs to occur on the topic of community representation on nonprofit boards. A more focused look at the perspective grassroot volunteers input brings to the governance of nonprofits is necessary. It should be a requirement of nonprofit boards to include the voice of its clients or other grassroot activists.

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[12] Ostrower and Stone, "Moving Governance Research Forward": 901-24; Forbes, "Measuring the Unmeasurable," 183.

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Appendix

Table 1. *Functions served by volunteering and their assessment on the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI)*

Function	Conceptual definition	Sample VFI item
Values	The individual volunteers in order to express or act on important values like humanitarianism.	I feel it is important to help others.
Understanding	The volunteer is seeking to learn more about the world or exercise skills that are often unused.	Volunteering lets me learn through direct, hands-on experience.
Enhancement	One can grow and develop psychologically through volunteer activities.	Volunteering makes me feel better about myself.
Career	The volunteer has the goal of gaining career-related experience through volunteering.	Volunteering can help me to get my foot in the door at a place where I would like to work.
Social	Volunteering allows an individual to strengthen his or her social relationships.	People I know share an interest in community service.
Protective	The individual uses volunteering to reduce negative feelings, such as guilt, or to address personal problems.	Volunteering is a good escape from my own troubles.

Source: E.G. Clary and Mark Snyder, "The Motivations to Volunteer: Theoretical and Practical Considerations," *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 8, no. 5 (1999): 156-159.