Soft Power, NGOs, and the US War on Terror

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SOFT POWER, NGOS, AND THE US WAR ON TERROR

by Layla Saleh

A Dissertation Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in Political Science

At The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
December 2012
ABSTRACT

SOFT POWER, NGOS, AND THE US WAR ON TERROR

by

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At The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2012
Under the Supervision of Professor Steven B. Redd

Bringing together foreign policy literature and INGO (international non-governmental organization) scholarship, this dissertation seeks to explain geographic and temporal variation in the US government’s use of hard, soft and smart power in the War on Terror. Making an important theoretical contribution, I revise Nye’s concept of soft power, more rigorously conceptualizing it as a consciously-utilized strategy employing methods other than hard power (military or economic sanctions) to influence a target government or population to enhance US interests. Soft power is a strategic means of achieving a foreign policy goal. I conceptualize smart power as including both soft and hard power, whose proportions will vary by context. I argue that the US executive begins its counter-terrorism strategizing with an assessment of the terrorist threat from a particular country. The US executive will use hard power to fight a short-term terrorist threat, soft power to fight a long-term terrorist threat, and smart (i.e., combined) power to fight a combined threat. The political, economic, and NGO regulatory context of a country also influence the kind and degree of soft power the US executive uses in countries posing a long-term or combined threat, ultimately influencing the smart power makeup of US counter-terrorism strategy in such countries. I examine a particular form of US soft power: government funding of NGOs. I explore the theoretical and empirical interest of NGOs, arguing that US soft or smart power utilizing NGOs will be impacted by their goals, capabilities, and the government’s
relationship with them. Employing qualitative methods, I provide a big-picture overview of US strategy in the War on Terror, as well as country case studies of US strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This project presents and tests a relevant, innovative, integrated theory of US foreign policy strategizing, making theoretical and empirical contributions to foreign policy and INGO literatures.
This dissertation is dedicated to my husband Abdullah Alkeilani, my parents Bilal and Abida Saleh, and my two sons, (the younger) Bilal and Omar. Abdullah, I could not have begun, let alone completed, this part of the journey without your constant support, encouragement, and reminders that along with hard work, faith in God helps make the challenging possible. Mama and Baba, you instilled in me the ambition and the necessity of dreaming big to fulfill our duty as caretakers of this Earth, and to make our mark on this flawed world. Bilal and Omar, I do this for you and your future. And finally, to the bleeding, wounded, but steadfast and undefeated people of my beloved Syria: may this be a first step, God willing, enabling me to contribute to your dreams of liberty, freedom, and basic human dignity.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: SOFT POWER, NGOS, AND THE US WAR ON TERROR

Under what conditions is the US executive likely to use force, also known as hard power, against a particular threat to the country? Alternatively, under what conditions is the US executive likely to address specific threats through other methods, such as soft power? And when will the US executive decide to use a combination of the two kinds of power? These questions have been significant so long as the US has faced any sort of security threat and the executive has had to deal with such threats—in other words, for as long as the United States has existed as a sovereign nation. However, these questions as they have been framed here, with respect to hard, soft, and combined power, have been particularly significant since Joseph Nye (2004a) popularized the notion of “soft power.”

The uniqueness of “soft power” lies in the contrast Nye (2004a) draws between it and the “hard power” used by various actors, usually states. He defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments [the latter being “hard power”]” (x). This concept of soft power has since become quite popular among academics and policymakers alike, but categorizing what we might call the non-use of force against particular targets cannot account for the conditions under which the US executive will decide to use soft power in a particular context. Even Nye’s (2008b) hybrid concept of “smart power,” which puts forth the possibility that both hard and soft power might be used concurrently, clarifies only that soft and hard power may be employed as complementary methods. We are still left wondering when or why the US would use hard, soft, or combined power and against whom. Nye’s notions of soft and smart power leave an enormous gap, both theoretical and substantive, regarding the US’s use of various forms of power in
innumerable contexts, and this dissertation is an important theoretical and empirical step to fill that void.

**Purpose**

This dissertation attempts to do the following: 1) re-conceptualize Nye’s soft power framework as a consciously-utilized strategy employing methods other than hard power, aimed at target countries to enhance US interests, 2) theorize about the conditions under which the US is likely to use hard, soft, and smart power in the specific context of the War on Terror, and 3) test this revised theory through empirical examinations of the War on Terror in general, but also through case studies of the US War on Terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Because Nye’s concept of soft power is rather vague and does not lend itself to empirical testing, re-conceptualizing the concept was of paramount importance. Furthermore, putting together a theory about when the US will use hard, soft, and/or smart (or combined) power goes beyond Nye’s rather prescriptive suggestions that soft power is a useful tool that should be used by the US more often. The theory I present in this dissertation thus makes an important contribution to the literature, bringing Nye’s notions of soft power into the realm of testable theory. I will argue that the US executive is more likely to use soft, hard, or smart (or combined) power as a function of specific factors, in a theory that explains both temporal and geographic variation of the US’s deployment of each of these kinds of power in the War on Terror. And because theories are developed to be tested, I test mine in both a big-picture overview and in more limited, specific contexts of the War on Terror that the US has been waging for more than ten years. The application of my theory to the domain of this war is in itself a substantive contribution to the literature.
on counter-terrorism and, as will be demonstrated shortly, to the literature on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well.

**Conceptual Framework**

As indicated above, Nye’s (2004a) notion of soft power is well-known and widely used, but it remains conceptually vague. The concept has been referred to as “shallow,” (Bohas 2006) and “lack[ing] rigour” (Zahran and Ramos 2010, 16). Furthermore, scholars such as Fan (2008) have suggested that Nye inadequately articulates the differences between hard and soft power or the relationship between the two (151), to the extent that it may be understood from Nye’s work that “soft power is cultural power” and nothing more (149). Bohas (2006) finds Nye’s discussion of the sources of soft power--US culture, political values, and foreign policies--too vague (412). Similarly, Fan (2008) points out, “soft power...is a rather confusing concept” because it does not adequately consider who possesses soft power in a given country (148). Bohas (2006) and Zahran and Ramos (2010) agree, pointing to the soft power wielded by non-state actors (19).

In addition, scholars have pointed to another important shortcoming of Nye’s concept of soft power: the conditions for its use, and the use of the alternatives of hard and smart or combined power, are unclear. As Eriksson and Norman (2011) write, soft power is an “ambiguous notion” that can be interpreted and applied in myriad ways (433), implying that Nye’s ideas do not tell us enough about when soft power is used. Layne (2010) explicitly states that the causal mechanisms through which Nye claims that soft power operates are “fuzzy”: for instance, is multilateralism the cause of legitimacy in the eyes of others, or are shared values the cause (54)?

Against this backdrop of critiques of Nye’s notions of soft, hard, and smart power, I start with a clearer and more precise definition of soft power. Aside from addressing
Hynek’s (2010) critique that soft power may also in some cases be used coercively, I have not really strayed from Nye’s (2004b) definition of hard power: it refers to traditional military power, as well as economic power when used to punish or threaten, e.g., through sanctions. My concept of soft power, however, is much narrower than Nye’s (2004b): he defines soft power as just “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (x). Building upon and revising his concept, however, I conceptualize “soft power” as a consciously-utilized government strategy that uses non-hard power methods, aimed at persuasion, to influence a target government or target population in a way that will enhance US interests. In other words, soft power is a strategic means of achieving an end or a goal, rather than a form of power that is by definition normatively desirable, as Nye’s work seems to suggest.

After improving on the definition of soft power as a concept, I have developed in this dissertation my own theory explaining the conditions under which the US will use hard, soft, and smart or combined power in a particularly relevant context: the War on Terror. I focus on the US executive as the primary actor in foreign policy decision-making, as any discussion of foreign policy decisions must begin with the president (Wittkopf and McCormick 1998; Banks and Straussman 1999; Rockman 2000). While the Constitution affords a general separation of powers between the president and Congress, Congress rarely exhibits strong opposition to presidential foreign policy decisions (Rockman 2000). Therefore, any effort to explain American foreign policy decisions and strategies must center around the president; the role of Congress appears to be less important, and is beyond the scope of this paper. My theory of US strategy in the War on Terror, then, focuses on the president and his foreign policy advisors, which include Cabinet heads and leaders of relevant executive agencies, such as USAID.
So what are the factors impacting the US executive's decisions to use hard, soft, or combined power in the War on Terror? I argue that the independent variables shaping US strategy at a specific point in time and in a specific context are the threat level and/or type of threat posed by the target country, the target country’s political and economic context, and the preferences, goals, and work of the relevant NGOs. The president and his advisors take into account the kind of terrorist threat (short-term, long-term, or various combinations of the two) they determine to be coming from a particular country. When facing what it determines to be a short-term terrorist threat, the US executive is more likely to use hard power, while it is more likely to use soft power when tackling a longer-term terrorist threat. In the many cases where a combined threat exists, the US executive will utilize combined or smart power that includes both soft and hard power. The political and economic context of that target country will also influence US strategy in the kind and degree to which it uses soft power.

While it is tempting to theorize about the US executive’s use of soft power in general, even my revised definition of the concept indicates that it covers a great deal of territory, from government-funded television programs to foreign exchange programs to government-funded development initiatives in foreign countries. Thus, I have focused in this dissertation on a particular form of soft power that is both theoretically and substantively interesting: US funding of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Simply put, NGOs are “private, self-governing, non-profit institutions” with goals ranging from promoting economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution to providing humanitarian aid to helping foster civil society and democratic institutions (Aall 2000, 124). Their activities vary and include relief and development efforts, advocacy, agenda setting, public education campaigns, and mobilizing publics, enabling NGOs to influence individuals, states, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs),
and even other non-state actors (Ahmed and Potter 2006,55). INGOs are international NGOs or NGOs based in one (usually developed) country and operating in another; as Kerlin (2006) describes, they operate in their various sub-fields but in international contexts.

In recent years, governments have viewed NGOs as offering competitive advantages that make them desirable channels of dispensing foreign aid, including grass-roots access and credibility, efficiency, and flexibility (Tvedt 1998; Evans-Kent and Bleiker 2003; Ahmed and Potter 2006). Despite these perceived advantages, NGOs themselves may be at a disadvantage when accepting funding from donor governments such as the US (Edwards and Hulme 1998), and the relationships between NGOs and the governments who fund them may vary by organization and over time (Najam 2000). Thus, my theory also takes into account NGOs as an important actor. The US executive’s strategy, in this case whether to use soft or combined power that involves government funding of NGOs, is also influenced by the NGOs themselves: their experience, preferences, and goals are the conditions that the US government uses to decide which NGOs and which of their projects to fund.

All these factors--threat level and/or type of threat posed by the target country, its political and economic context, and the preferences, goals, and work of the relevant NGOs--can vary over time, and they interact with one another to ultimately shape US strategy in the War on Terror. As an important note, a smart power strategy can take different forms based on time and place, and its proportions of soft and hard power will vary based on these independent variables. Thus I have deemed the term “combined power” more useful than the term “smart power,” as it does not denote any sort of superiority or normative advantage of one blending of soft and hard power over another the way Nye’s original hybrid term does. Finally, this dissertation does not seek to assess the effectiveness or success of the United State’s strategies in the War on Terror and their respective hard, soft,
and combined power components. Instead, this dissertation merely seeks to explain the variation in the breakdown of such a strategy over time and place, contributing to the theoretical and substantive literature on foreign policy decision-making, counterterrorism, and soft power.

**Organization of the Dissertation**

Chapter I has introduced the issues under examination in this dissertation. In Chapter II, I examine Nye’s concepts of soft, hard, and smart power, as well as applications and critiques by other scholars. As will be discussed extensively, Nye’s concepts of soft and smart power are quite interesting but suffer from a lack of conceptual clarity, an inadequate explanation and differentiation regarding the sources and actors who might wield soft or smart power, and very little discussion of causal mechanisms through which soft power operates. I also review the assessments by some scholars that soft power is an ineffective strategic tool, claims that are relevant and interesting but whose accuracy this project does not seek to assess. I conclude by suggesting that despite the conceptual and theoretical inadequacies of Nye’s concepts and arguments catalogued in this chapter, soft power and smart power remain concepts worth studying, refining, and testing. They represent the theoretical starting point of this research project.

Chapter III presents my own theory of the conditions under which the US executive is likely to use soft, hard, and/or combined power, explaining variation in the US government’s use of these different kinds of power in the War on Terror, i.e. the dependent variable. I argue that the US executive examines threat levels from various contexts, using hard power against short-term threats, soft power against long-term threats, and smart (combined) power against combined threats. Examining US government funding of NGOs as a specific form of soft power, I further suggest that the target country context also impacts
US strategizing. I also claim that the mission and activities of the relevant NGOs, as well as their relationship with the US government, further shape US strategy. In other words, threat levels, the target country context, and the mission and activities of relevant NGOs are the independent variables that explain variations in the outcome of the hard, soft, and combined power components of US counter-terrorism strategy in the course of the War on Terror.

Chapter IV is the first of the three empirical chapters of this dissertation, providing a big-picture overview of the US War on Terror and applying my theory to explain variation in the US executive’s decisions to use soft, hard, and combined power over time and place. This chapter draws on official government documents, memoirs of the president and his advisors, as well as financial data from Congressional Research Reports and the OECD. I demonstrate that US hard, soft, and combined strategy has evolved over time and place, in variation that can be at least partially explained by variation in threat levels (short-term, long-term, or combined) acknowledged to be emanating from different geographic contexts over time. The US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the surges there, suggest that the US is more likely to use hard power when facing a short-term terrorist or security threat. Alternatively, the executive is more likely to use soft power when facing a long-term terrorist or security threat, as evidenced by US foreign aid (including support to various international and local NGOs) to conflict-ridden or unstable countries, as well as the emphasis on democracy-building in the Middle East and South Asia. More often, however, the US faces a combined, short-term and long-term threat, implementing a combined strategy in such cases. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as US hard and soft power targeting countries such as Pakistan, stand as evidence of this combined strategy.
In Chapter V, the second empirical chapter of the dissertation, I present a country case study of Afghanistan as a target of US counter-terrorism strategy in the US War on Terror. After a brief background discussion of US policy towards the country pre-9/11, most of the chapter catalogues the evolution of the War on Terror itself in Afghanistan, from its beginnings in October 2001 until as near the present day as possible. The Afghanistan case demonstrates the US executive’s decision to use hard power against what is deemed to be an immediate short-term terrorist or security threat and combined power in what is deemed to be a combined short-and long-term terrorist or security threat. Furthermore, Chapter V delves into the specifics of the Afghan country context and the regulatory environment to test the impact of those variables on the US government’s use of a specific kind of soft power, funding the work of NGOs. I conclude the chapter by providing an overview of US-funded NGO work in Afghanistan, along with a more detailed examination of the work of two specific US-funded INGOs in the country, using original interview data in the case of the latter.

Chapter VI, the final empirical chapter, is a country case study of Pakistan as a target of US counter-terrorism strategy in the US War on Terror. As in Chapter V, I begin with a background on US strategy or policy towards Pakistan before 9/11. After this brief introduction, I demonstrate that the US has indeed used hard power in Pakistan when facing what it deemed was a short-term, immediate terrorist or security threat, and that as the threat level has escalated in recent years, US hard power strategy has also intensified. I also show that the US has used soft power in Pakistan from the early days of the War on Terror, in what appear to be efforts to stave off a potential long-term terrorist threat; such efforts have intensified with the passage of time, at some point becoming part of US combined power efforts in the country. I also examine the socio-economic and political country context in Pakistan, which have indeed dictated the kinds of US soft power
programs and NGO projects implemented in the country. As in Chapter V, I provide both an overview of US-funded NGO work in the country since the beginning of the War on Terror, as well as a mini-case study of a US-based INGO, relying on original interview data.

Chapter VIII offers a conclusion to the dissertation by reviewing the most important findings of this research project. I also discuss the implications of these findings, as well as potential avenues for future research.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW: SOFT, HARD, AND SMART POWER

Introduction

The empirical goals of this project are to assess how and to explain why the US government’s use of soft power and hard power, and the relationship between the two, has changed over time and across countries. Accomplishing these empirical aims would be impossible, or not very useful from an academic perspective, without a strong theory about what soft power and smart power actually are. Joseph Nye is the “father” of the concepts of “soft” and “smart” power, and this chapter examines his concepts, as well as applications and critiques by other scholars. As will be discussed extensively in the pages below, Nye’s concepts of soft and smart power are quite interesting but suffer from a lack of conceptual clarity, an inadequate explanation and differentiation regarding the sources and actors who might wield soft or smart power, and very little discussion of causal mechanisms by which soft power can be said to operate. Some scholars even suggest that soft power is an ineffective strategic tool, claims that are relevant and interesting but whose accuracy this project does not seek to assess. Despite the conceptual and theoretical inadequacies of Nye’s concepts and arguments, however, soft power and smart power remain concepts worth studying, refining, and testing, and represent the theoretical starting point of this research project. The next chapter will present my revised, fleshed-out theory of soft, hard, and smart power and why the US government adopts them and when, as well as why the strategies vary over time and place. Before revising Nye, however, we must first understand his arguments and the critiques they have generated.

Soft Power
Joseph Nye (2004 which one?) popularized the concept of “soft power,” which is always contrasted with traditional “hard power” used by various actors (usually states). He defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments [the latter being “hard power”]” (x). Elsewhere, Nye (2004b) writes that soft power “occurs when one country gets another country to want what it wants,” as opposed to hard power, used when “a country orders others to do what it wants” (76).

Soft power relies on images and messages, which can admittedly be interpreted in different ways, depending on the audience (Nye 2004 which one?, 44). Nye (2008 ?which one) writes that because soft power depends on a state’s ability “to shape the preferences of others” (95), public diplomacy can be seen as an instrument governments use to mobilize soft power resources to attract not only the governments of other nations, but also the publics of those foreign countries (100). Because soft power targets an audience, whether it be the government of another country, or a foreign public (through public diplomacy), Nye (2008a) writes that “…soft power depends more on the subject’s role […] than does hard power. Attraction [upon which soft power is based] depends on what is happening inside the mind of the subject” (xiii). It appears, then, that the success of soft power is partially dependent on the actions or interpretations of the subject of that power, an issue which has given rise to much critique by other scholars, as will be examined later.

Given that soft power, or the successful implementation of soft power, depends on both the actor utilizing it (such as the US government) and the target (the government and/or people of Pakistan, for instance), what exactly are the sources of soft power? Nye (2004b) writes that a country’s “culture, its values and domestic practices, and the perceived legitimacy of its foreign policies” constitute its soft power (5). Thus, a country’s pop culture, despite containing “an element of triviality and fad,” is an important element of its soft power, providing that country with “more opportunities to get its messages across
and to affect the preferences of others” (78). So while Nye (2004b) appears to resent the critics who have “misused and trivialized [soft power] as merely the influence of Coca-Cola and blue jeans” (5), he has consistently considered popular culture as a cornerstone of any country’s soft power. Aside from popular culture and values, though (and more concretely, perhaps), Nye (2008a) also considers economic resources to be a source of soft power, at least sometimes, but since they can also be used for hard power, it can be “difficult to distinguish” the role of each kind of power when it comes to using economic resources (xi).

While it is theoretically plausible and potentially convincing that a country’s economic resources can be used as tools of both soft and hard power, Nye (2008a) does not take the time to explain or differentiate or define what kind of economic resources can be deemed either “soft” or “hard,” which adds to the fuzziness and lack of clarity of some of his concepts and definitions. This lack of clarity, however, does make economic resources flexible or open to interpretation, and for the purposes of this research project, the US government’s support for NGOs (which is to a great extent economic) is considered a use of soft power.

As mentioned above, Nye (2004b) considers the resources of soft power to be a country’s values and culture, its domestic practices, and its foreign policies (when seen by others as legitimate). In fact, Nye (2004b) places a country’s foreign policies in the “it depends” category, even more clearly than he does its economic resources. Essentially, foreign policies can either enhance or take away from US soft power (since Nye is mostly considered with American power) in the eyes of others. For example, while President Carter’s pro-human rights policies, as well as President Reagan and President Clinton’s democracy promotion policies, have added to American soft power, Nye (2004b) argues that apparent or perceived arrogant or multilateral foreign policy decisions or actions can hurt and take away from American soft power (93). In fact, Nye (2010a) states outright that over the tenure of President George W. Bush, US soft power declined a great deal, as
evidenced by dramatically lower approval in opinion polls from around the world (4). It may be empirically questionable to depend only on public opinion polls to measure the soft power of the United States—after all, is there a real connection between public opinion and government policy, for instance? Nye defends his reliance on public opinion polls to indicate the level of American soft power by arguing that “where opinion is strong and consistent over time, it can have an effect [on policy],” adding that to best measure the connection between public opinion and “other variables,” one must engage in “careful process tracing of the sort that historians [and political scientists!] do” (218). So at the very least, Nye (2010b) considers public opinion polls as a starting point for measuring soft power, and such polls have indicated that many foreign policy actions under Pres. G.W. Bush have led to a decline in American soft power. The point here is not to assess the success or failure of the War on Terror (although Nye and other scholars certainly do that, and Nye suggests specific ways to improve the ongoing fight), but to demonstrate how specific foreign policy decisions and actions, as well as more general attitudes, can, according to Nye, either add to or take away from the US’s soft power. Determining which of these effects “foreign policy” in general has is a difficult and interpretive task, highly dependent on the target population and/or government, inevitably adding to the difficulty of measuring soft power or even determining whether or not it exists and/or to what relative degree—all points that will be discussed later in the chapter, and areas upon which my revised theory of soft power, presented in the next chapter, tries to improve.

That being said, due to the complexities and the relatively subtle nature of soft power (for Nye, practical more than theoretical), Nye (2008a) points to the challenges it poses when utilized in government strategies: first, soft power escapes the full control of the government using it, since it draws upon cultures and values (xiii). Also, credibility is necessary for soft power to work, which can be a challenge for the US government operating
in other countries, for example. Furthermore, soft power is not useful in dealing with such problems such as nuclear weapons in North Korea. However, when the government is trying to achieve goals like promoting democracy, human rights, and freedom, Nye (2008a) suggests that we may find that “soft power turns out to be superior to hard power” (xiv).

So why exactly can hard power be more useful or “superior” to soft power, and why do governments try to implement it? For one thing, Nye (2004b) argues that when a country’s power is seen by others as legitimate, they are less likely to resist soft power (expressed through cultural or ideological attraction and the implementation of international norms, etc.) (77). Furthermore, he suggests that in a changing world, the cost of military force has risen, so soft power represents a less costly alternative (71); rising nationalism in poor and weak states means that military occupation and intervention are less viable alternatives than they were in previous eras (74). Furthermore, because of modernization, urbanization, and better communication technologies around the world, in developing countries have seen power less concentrated in governments; it has “diffused” to other private actors (74), who can, he implies, be influenced more effectively through soft power. Particularly when dealing with relatively new global issues and threats like terrorism and drugs, it is more difficult for great powers (such as the US) to get what they want when using economic and military force—hard power. Instead, they can wield more influence by utilizing multilateral institutions, good communication, and using information as a tool—all examples of soft power (75). Thus, Nye (2004b) argues that the US can be successful in facing the new context of globalization and combating specific problems such as terrorism not just through coercive military and economic power, but also through soft power, as expressed through its culture, values, and implementing policies “that make others feel that they have been consulted and their interests taken into account” (8). It appears, then, that US unilateral military action, for instance, would be for Nye an example
of using hard power, not at all suitable (at least on its own) as a strategy in confronting terrorism.

Thus, Nye (2010a) writes, “...in the struggle against terrorism, we need to use hard power against the hard core terrorists, but we cannot hope to win unless we gain the hearts and minds of the moderates” (7). To accomplish both these objectives, of defeating the “hard core terrorists” as well as winning over the “moderates,” Nye (2004b) writes, a successful counter-terrorism strategy by the US should consist of five elements, bringing together both hard and soft power: military action (preferably not unilateral); intelligence-sharing between countries (211); diplomacy, including public diplomacy that targets the publics of foreign countries and not just their governments; homeland security; and aid and assistance to increase the capacity of poor countries to deal with their respective challenges (212). While this five-pronged strategy might be useful to policymakers, it is theoretically (and perhaps even empirically) unclear, as Nye (2004b) fails to specify which of these strategies or approaches to use under what conditions. This is a common critique of much of Nye’s work, and will be more extensively addressed later on in this chapter.

**Smart Power**

Given the difficulties and challenges of using soft power, and the inevitable futility of using soft power to deal with serious military threats, for instance (North Korean nuclear weapons being one example), it would appear that a combination of hard and soft power would present the most well-rounded and successful foreign policy approach. Enter the hybrid concept of “smart power”: Nye (2008) writes that “the ability to combine hard and soft power effectively is ‘smart power’” and wholeheartedly advocates its use, although admittedly, this concept integrating the two forms of power emerges years after his original claims on behalf of soft power. Wilson (2008) does a better job defining smart power more
clearly, explaining it as a situation when actors combine hard and soft power in “mutually reinforcing” ways that are efficient and effective (115). For Wilson (2008), it is important to go back to the definition of power itself, which is the ability to make others act in a way that they would not have done otherwise. Hard power is when this is done through coercion, while soft power relies on persuasion (114). Unfortunately, advocacy for smart power is met with both institutional and political challenges in the US, because of the bias towards hard power; Wilson (2008) argues that this bias should change so that US officials feel more comfortable using smart power.

Like Wilson (2008), Nye (2010a) writes not just in defense of smart power as a concept, but as a practical strategy that should be used, particularly in the War on Terror. Thus, he argues that the US needs “an integrated strategy for combining hard and soft power,” that brings together public diplomacy, development assistance, broadcasting, and other soft power tools into the national security strategy (whose default tools are based in hard power) (7). Interestingly, Nye (2010a) himself questions what the “right proportion” is between military spending and soft power spending (7), presumably implying that governments should be responsible for coming up with the answer to such a question. The suitable proportion of hard to soft power (even a rough, relative proportion, without specific details of dollars spent) is also an interesting theoretical question, which Nye fails to really address, so this is another issue dealt with in my revised theory of soft power.

Despite the lack of theoretical and/or practical clarity of how to decide when to use soft or hard power, Nye has certainly been working in more practical avenues to promote the incorporation of soft power—leading to strategies of smart power—in US foreign policy. For instance, he co-chaired a Smart Power Commission with former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who served under President George W. Bush. Some of the findings
of this Commission have been that the US had a good smart power strategy during the Cold War, but has more recently been leaning too much on the military in its foreign policy. This is a problem, writes Nye (2010a), because “promoting democracy, human rights and development of civil society are nto best handled with the barrel of a gun” (9). Thus, according to this Smart Power Commission, the five areas of priority for US foreign policy are strengthening alliances, global development, public diplomacy based on face-to-face interactions, economic integration in the global economy, and taking a leadership role in efforts towards energy security and against climate change (Nye 2010a, 10). Aside from the fact that these are monumental and rather daunting (and very general) “priorities,” the interesting point here is that these issues appear to be mostly ones that will utilize soft power, perhaps to the exclusion of strengthening alliances, which would presumably involve both hard power and soft power methods. Perhaps this great emphasis on soft power in the Smart Power Commission stems from the assumption that military efforts (and economic "hard power" efforts, such as sanctions) are very much a part of US foreign policy, and do not need to be much improved. In any case, it is striking that even in these policy or “priority” recommendations by the Smart Power Commission, it remains unclear what exactly smart power is, or rather what, even generally speaking, the smart vs. hard power decision should be based on. Most recently, Nye (2011) put forth a few specific issues that any smart power strategy must address: the preferred goals or outcomes, available resources based on context, preferences of targets of influence, the type of power most likely to be successful, and the probability of success (209). This breakdown is the first step to explaining any sort of hard, soft, or smart power strategy, but certainly further clarification is needed. Thus, revising Nye’s theories or concepts of soft and smart power remains necessary, and is part of my theoretical and empirical contributions to this discussion, as will be laid out in the next chapter.
Despite the difficulty of measuring the concept of "smart power" or prescribing how to use it specifically, several scholars call on the US to employ exactly this kind of strategy and cite its importance. Ferguson (2003), for instance, writes that the US should be disabused of the notion that it is a superpower, because military (i.e., hard) power is not the only way to measure its influence. In fact, the US’s military actions since 9/11 have cut into its soft power. The only way to respond to this shortcoming is to view the world as made up of global, interdependent networks (32). Blinken (2003) calls for a new strategy of “engagement” whereby the US goes beyond the Bush doctrine of preemption in order to deal with problems that cannot be solved by hard power alone (38). The threats facing the US today (rogue states, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism, as Patrick (2006), also lists them) cannot be destroyed only by hard power. To meet this challenge, the US should employ four strategies through a “comprehensive engagement” paradigm: threat reduction, nuclear deterrence, counter-terrorism, and a use of soft power (46). While Blinken’s (2003) categories are conceptually muddled and may overlap, the direction of his argument represents an advocacy of the “smart power” approach in a specific context, namely, the War on Terror.

Application and Expansion of Nye’s Concepts

Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy is one of the subsets of “soft power” most frequently discussed in the literature, all based on or at least citing to Nye’s concepts. According to Nye (2008 which one?) public diplomacy can be seen as an instrument governments use to mobilize soft power resources to attract not only the governments of other nations, but also the publics of those foreign countries (100). Melissen (2005) defines public diplomacy as an interaction
characterized by “direct relations with people in a country to extend the values of those being represented” (8). Williams (2009) points out that public diplomacy has become especially relevant post-9/11, with the emphasis on winning a “war on ideas” as an essential part of fighting terrorism (219). Van Ham (2003) also discusses public diplomacy, although his definition is the broadest of the three. It includes three possible modes: engaging foreign peoples directly (like Nye 2008; Melissen 2005), influencing citizens to bring about change in a foreign government, and/or presenting or creating a positive image of one’s country and its policies. Unlike classical diplomacy, public diplomacy is value-oriented, rather than issue-oriented (429). Public diplomacy seeks to address or shape the image of a country’s general values in a specific target country, rather than diplomatically address specific contentious issues between the two countries. As Williams (2009) points out, public diplomacy has become especially relevant post-9/11, with an emphasis on winning a “war on ideas” as an essential part of fighting terrorism (219).

Like Nye (2008), Van Ham (2003) points to the importance of public diplomacy in the post-9/11 world, since, after all, the US is fighting “to win the moral and political support of the Muslim world” (427). This focus on trying to attract support is clearly in line with Nye’s (2004 which one?) concept of soft power. Van Ham (2003) even references soft power when he describes public diplomacy as being a part of “Noopolitik” (as opposed to realpolitik), which emphasizes a strategy of soft power expressed through the media and focusing on values, norms, and ideas (440). Thus, public diplomacy, while certainly not a new phenomenon—Nye (2008 which one?) points to its origins, at least in the US, as long ago as World War I—can certainly be considered part of the newer concept of soft power. The question, both theoretically and empirically, is what distinguishes public diplomacy from soft power? Nye’s (2008) description of public diplomacy as an “instrument” of soft
power is far from satisfying; this ambiguity becomes most problematic when one sets out to measure either of the two concepts.

Conceptualization and measurement are not the only problems facing public diplomacy. As a strategy, it is less predictable than classical diplomacy whose audience was foreign governments, rather than foreign populations (Melissen 2005). Furthermore, in order for public diplomacy efforts to be successful, the “brand” or image being created needs to match the “product” or actual policies of the country being represented (Van Ham 2003). This brings us to the question of the relationship between public diplomacy, or more broadly, soft power, and more traditional “hard power” actions, such as military operations or economic sanctions, that governments take, issues that will be taken up both in the theoretical section of this project (presented in the next chapter) as well as the empirical testing and application of my revised soft/smart power theory.

Support and Expansion of the Soft Power Concept

While some theoretical problems with Nye’s work have already been presented, and critique of his concepts will be discussed at much greater length ahead, it is important to point to scholars who have supported and expanded his concept of soft power without essentially tearing it apart. Yasushi and McConnell (2008), for instance, argue that while many people critique Nye’s work for being too state-centered, such criticism is unwarranted because Nye does in fact acknowledge the role of non-state actors in wielding soft power, although the two kinds of actors may have different goals or preferences (xx). Seiichi (2008) goes even further, not just defending Nye’s concept of power but also expanding it, dividing what he calls the “operation of power,” both soft and hard, into four stages: resources, transmission, reception, and outcomes. By breaking down the implementation of power into these stages, Seiichi (2008) suggests that the role of subjectivity in soft power becomes
important and apparent, so that it is "virtually impossible" to predict the impact of soft
power (193). Interestingly, while Nye argues again and again that the government should
use more soft power, Seiichi (2008) advocates instead for a more limited government role
in wielding soft power, particularly its subset of public diplomacy. Instead of being the
primary wielder or force of soft power, the government should rely on the market to do so
and instead act as a “facilitator and network hub” among the other actors who might better
implement soft power (202). While Seiichi’s (2008) recommendation is unique in the
literature on soft and smart power, his work is noteworthy because it embraces Nye’s
concepts and expands upon them, without the extensive and biting critique (most of it
admittedly valid) that Nye’s work usually provokes by scholars.

In what might count as another defense of Nye’s work, Eriksson and Norman (2011)
analyze Nye’s work and concept of soft power in terms of its political utilization, or how
“particular concepts coined by academics are used in the formulation of policy, whether
those concepts reflect dominant beliefs in society or not” (420). Because Nye’s work on soft
power is easily accessible to policymakers and fits in (to some extent) with earlier policy
paradigms, it has become politically utilized (423). Summarizing Nye’s concept of soft
power as giving rise to policies that rely more on diplomacy than force, trade and cultural
reciprocity instead of threats and military campaigns, and engagement instead of isolation
(427), Eriksson and Norman (2011) suggest that over the course of the Bush
administration, soft power was increasingly politically utilized. In President G.W. Bush’s
first term, the term “soft power” was not used explicitly, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
(in)famously said he did not know what was meant by the term. However, by Bush’s second
term in office, “more emphasis was put on public diplomacy and its budget [were]
somewhat strengthened,” accompanied by increased use of the term by Secretaries Rice,
Powell, and Gates (430-1). Eriksson and Norman (2011) also point out that as a concept (but
not as an explicit term), soft power was part of the 2002 National Security Strategy (the basis for what became known as the Bush Doctrine), as well as the 2003 National Security Strategy, which both referenced the War on Terror as being some sort of war or struggle for ideas (428). Furthermore, these Strategies suggested the War on Terror to be both a military and ideological fight against terrorism, implying that soft and hard power would be complementary tools to wage this war (i.e. smart power) (429). This sort of analysis by Eriksson and Norman (2011) is useful insofar as it concretely demonstrates the progressive adoption of the concept and terminology of “soft power” in the US War on Terror, indicating and reminding us that soft power and smart power are not just concepts debated theoretically among scholars, but concepts and terms used and implemented, to varying degrees, in US counter-terrorism strategies—the starting point for this research project.

*Implementing Soft Power*

Several writers begin with Nye’s concept of soft power and apply it to different contexts or trace its implementation in various countries. Fraser (2003), for instance, traces the historical use of soft power in American foreign policy; Hynek (2010) analyzes Canada’s reliance on soft power in its foreign policy; while Heng (2010) compares the soft power policies of Japan and China. Fraser’s (2003) application of the soft power concept may be seen as most directly linked to Nye, who in his development of the concept of soft power has again and again used the example of the United States (Nye 2004, Nye 2008, etc.). Unlike Nye, however, Fraser (2003) confines himself to a more narrow definition of soft power, which he considers to be, in essence, American popular culture: movies, music, television, fast food, and the like. Contrasting the two types of power, Fraser (2003) writes, “if hard power, by definition, is based on *facts*, soft power is based on *values*” (10), although it is unclear what exactly he means by “facts,” especially as a distinctive feature of hard power.
Viewing American soft power through the (rather too) narrow lens of popular culture, he applies a new name: “weapons of mass distraction” (13), presumably implying that American popular culture, when spreading to foreign countries, may distract their respective target populations or governments from what else the US government might be doing, perhaps from its “fact-based” hard power. This new label for soft power is far from useful, however, not just because Fraser (2003) does not adequately explain what he means by it, but also because it implies an opposition between hard and (his restrictive definition of) soft power, which may very well work in tandem, as Nye explains in his discussions about smart power.

Heng’s (2010) concept of soft power, on the other hand, is much more satisfying than Fraser’s (2003), and not just because the former not only points out that both states and non-state actors, such as NGOs or private sector organizations, can wield soft power (a point that Nye (2004b) also makes). In addition, Heng (2010) points to Nye’s use of the US Marshall Plan, which was a mix of military and economic aid, as an example of soft power, and so soft power, which can involve diplomacy, economic aid, and cultural promotion, involves an “imperfect correlative relationship between inducements, coercion, and attractiveness” (280). Thus Heng (2010) does not confine his discussion of soft power to popular culture, but he does not exclude culture from his application of soft power to the Chinese and Japanese cases, either. Finally, Hynek’s (2010) discussion of soft power in the Canadian context is also more sophisticated and less narrow than Fraser’s (2003), as he analyzes Canada’s use of soft power in the field of “human security,” focusing on NGO-government interactions that have been a part of Canada’s foreign and security policies in recent years. It is interesting to note, then, that while Fraser (2003), Heng (2010), and Hynek (2010) all seek to apply Nye’s concept of soft power in different contexts, they (and in all likelihood, countless other scholars) do not all seem to be using the same base concept.
of soft power, and some of these base concepts, like Fraser’s (2003), are by no means improvements on Nye’s original concept but are in fact too restrictive and narrow.

Despite Fraser’s (2003) narrow definition of soft power, which he confines to (in his case, American) popular culture, his historical application of the concept is interesting insofar as it demonstrates ways in which the US government deploys various forms of American pop culture to promote its strategic interests. This American soft power, suggests Fraser (2003), “ Promotes values and beliefs [ such as democracy, free enterprise, and individual freedom ] that, while contentious, are ultimately good for the world,” causing many people across many countries to view the United States as “ a model society that has championed these values ” (260). He argues that US soft power has been utilized for a long time; Cold War projects like the Voice of America radio, activities of the US Information Agency, and CIA-supported covert projects like the Congress for Cultural Freedom all represent targeted use of American soft power in the fight against the Soviet Union (28). Currently, however, American use of soft power surpasses any of its previous implementations, though, spurred on by globalization (32), although American soft power is also facing more resistance from non-Western countries, such as Saudi Arabia (33)—this final statement may or not may be true, since certainly American television, movies, music, and fast food ( which constitute Fraser’s (2003) definition of soft power ) are widely popular even in countries like Saudi Arabia. Despite the possible presence of this animosity toward American popular culture ( soft power ) around the world, Fraser (2003) suggests that these tools of American soft power are “ important cultural antidotes ” that can help prevent grievances that may lead to hatred or violence against Americans (265)—here we see echoes of Nye’s calls for using soft power to help win the War on Terror, although the latter certainly has more in mind than just pop culture promotion.
Like Fraser (2003), Hynek (2010) is interested in soft power in foreign policy, but in his case he analyzes the use of soft power in the Canadian context of “human security,” whereby “issues traditionally viewed as military problems could be successfully framed as humanitarian problems” (66). Thus, Hynek (2010) is interested in the collaboration or interaction between the Canadian government and the NGO sector as an example of the expanded utilization of soft power in that country’s foreign policies—it would appear, based on Hynek's (2010) discussion, that merely involving humanitarian- or development-oriented NGOs in Canadian foreign policy can in itself be considered an exercise of soft power on the part of any government; certainly my own project starts with this same basic notion. Heng's (2010) comparison of Chinese and Japanese soft power features a seemingly more expansive concept of soft power than either Fraser's (2003) or Hynek’s (2010), in the most Nye-esque application of the concept. Both China’s promotion of its culture and its attempts to demonstrate adherence to international norms constitute for Heng (2010) examples of wielding soft power, as does Japan’s liberal democratic system. Interestingly, though, Heng (2010) suggests that China’s promotion of its culture is a form of soft power directed not only at external (world) audiences and governments, but also internally at the Chinese people, “to instill cultural pride, consolidate internal coherence against economic inequality, [and] promote regime legitimacy through moral example” (286)—here is a slight expansion of Nye’s concept of soft power.

The most important point Heng (2010) makes comes from the inherent assumption that countries will exercise different forms of soft power based on their economic system, regime type, history, and position in the world—so China under authoritarian rule uses soft power in the form of promoting its culture, signing a non-aggression treaty with ASEAN, and advocating for its economic development approach as an alternative to Western models (287). Japan, on the other hand, simply by being a democratically-ruled country, exerts a
great deal of soft power, but like China, it also promotes its traditional culture as a soft
power tool (286). Heng’s (2010) logic here is not only theoretically satisfying, but it can also
be applied in the other direction; a country will exert its soft power in different ways, or use
a particular mix of hard and soft power (soft power), partly based on the context of its
target country or population, as my own revised theory of soft power will posit—certainly,
Nye’s (2008a) reference to the extensive role of the subject in soft power is relevant here.

Critiquing Nye

Soft Power as a Concept

Nye’s concepts of soft and smart power have generated widespread critique among
scholars, although most of the criticism has been directed against soft, and not smart,
power. Bohas (2006), for instance, Nye’s treatment of soft power is “shallow” because he
considers hard power as “opposed” to soft power, since implicit in his definition is that
“real” power is exercised through force, resulting in a “dichotomy [that] prevents us from
taking soft power seriously” (410). While Bohas (2006) is certainly going too far by
suggesting that that Nye downplays the importance of soft power—after all, Nye coined the
term and developed the concept with the clear goal of demonstrating the utility and
effectiveness of soft power, particularly in US foreign policy!—he does not stand alone in
pointing out the problematic “dichotomy” inherent in Nye’s explanation of soft power.
Hynek (2010), for instance, also critiques the soft and hard power dichotomy, writing that a
“full conceptual appreciation of the notion of soft power is only possible after the original
emphasis on its contrast with hard power is replaced by an examination of the practical
means of achieving soft power” (62). In other words, Hynek (2010) is suggesting that it is
more useful to understand soft power through the ways it is utilized, and Nye’s assertion
that soft power is always based on attraction, while hard power is always based on coercion, represents a false starting point for both concepts.

Zahran and Ramos (2010) agree, decrying Nye’s definition of soft power because it “lacks rigour” (16), as evidenced by Nye’s categorization of hard power as involving tangible resources command power, whereas soft power involves intangible resources and co-optive power, where this distinction does not always hold. As counterexamples, Zahran and Ramos (2010) suggest that a state can use soft power through multilateral institutions a way to coerce other countries, exercising command behavior, or it could co-optive behavior to create hard power resources such as military alliances (18). In other words, soft power can be used to manipulate (and not just “attract” or “co-opt,” as Nye asserts), and co-option or attraction can be used to generate hard power, a possibility that seems to escape Nye. Certainly my own project, which examines the US government’s use of soft power in its funding of and partnerships with NGOs to help fight the War on Terror, not just to prevent terrorism but also to influence other countries and ensure their cooperation in fighting terrorism, is an example of soft power being used, at least partially, as an instrument of coercion, a possibility which Zahran and Ramos (2010) astutely point out.

Fan (2008), too, points to Nye’s problematic definition of soft power, arguing that he does not clearly articulate the difference between hard and soft power or the relationship between the two, and that one can understand from Nye’s work that “soft power is nothing more than the ‘soft’ face of hard power” (151). Certainly Fan’s (2008) critique goes too far and is much less nuanced than Zahran and Ramos’s (2010) analysis of the problematic distinctions (or lack thereof) between Nye’s “hard” and “soft” power. After all, while it seems possible that in some cases soft and hard power may overlap or stem from the same source (i.e. the US military, mostly viewed as a source and tool of hard power, has
increasingly been engaging in activities and methods that can be classified as soft power), it is a misreading of Nye to suggest that soft power is merely an approach or “nice” face of military or threatening economic resources. Nevertheless, Fan’s (2008) point that Nye’s explanations of the interaction between the two types of power and the exact differences between them leave much to be desired is a valid one.

Sources and Actors

Another point of criticism of Nye’s concept of soft power relates to its sources and the actors who utilize it. As Fan (2008) points out, “soft power...is a rather confusing concept” not just because Nye describes it in several different ways (i.e. shaping the preferences of others, or persuasion through attractiveness, etc.) but also because it is important to consider who possesses soft power in a given country (148). Fan (2008) demonstrates this last point more specifically, showing that in his early work, Nye (1990) writes that soft power comes from three sources: culture, international laws and institutions, and American multinational corporations (MNCs), but by 2004, Nye modifies the sources of soft power to include culture, political values, and foreign policies, without explaining the purpose of this conceptual change. Bohas (2006) also finds Nye’s discussion of the sources of soft power (US culture, political values, and foreign policies) problematic, because these “sources” are very vague (412). Similarly, Layne (2010) points to the expansion of the concept of soft power over time: first it referred to ideas and culture, not carrots and sticks, but most recently, Nye and policymakers and experts influenced by his work use the term to refer to such varied tools or strategies as multilateral diplomacy, foreign aid, developmental assistance, exporting democracy, and nation-building (58). Certainly the revision or expansion of a concept over time is not in itself problematic; the issue arises when the concept appears to have changed without the necessary theory-
building or accompanying explanations. Some scholars react to this theoretical or conceptual expansion by eliminating a large part of the concept: for Fan (2008), “a country's soft power itself is not a separate form of soft power but the mere manifestation of its hard power,” such as political power exercised through military efforts, or economic power expressed through aid or sanctions (148). Thus, the style of a country's foreign policy may be attractive, but it is tied to substance, actually making it a part of hard power; actually, then, “soft power is cultural power,” and Nye does not make this distinction clear enough (149). Fan's (2008) critique does go too far—it is altogether too simplistic to do away with all of foreign policy as involving soft power, and regard only culture, in the manner of Fraser (2003), as a source of a country's soft power—but he does pick up on an important ambiguity and lack of conceptual clarity in Nye’s delineation of the sources of soft power.

Similarly, Zahran and Ramos (2010) argue that Nye does not clarify which actors hold soft power; he assumes that the state does, but many non-state actors have both kinds of power (19); furthermore, Nye does not account for the relationship between the state and civil society, two important sources of soft power (20). Bohas (2006) shares this sentiment, arguing that when examining power in general, we need to look at non-state actors, who can influence government decisions (400); he implies that Nye does not consider non-state actors in his discussions of power. This critique is certainly exaggerated, as Nye (2004b) does point out that non-state actors can wield soft power. However, Zahran and Ramos’s (2010) critique that the relationship between governments and other actors, the soft power of each, and the relationships between, is under-theorized in Nye's work is well-taken. My work, for instance, considers non-state actors (specifically, NGOs) as sources of soft power that are utilized by the US government, but certainly the two actors have different agendas, and the ultimate form that the US expression of soft power takes in a
given context partially on the relationship between the government and the NGOs—in other words, NGO preferences and goals can constrain US soft power (and smart power) strategies.

Causal Mechanisms

Yet another critique aimed at Nye’s concept of soft power involves its causal mechanisms, or how exactly soft power works. Although Nye (2010) answers many of his critics by claiming that “soft power is an analytical concept, not a theory,” implying that scholars should stop treating it as a theory (219), his discussions of why the US should use more soft power and how soft power can help in the war against terrorism, for example, depart from the realm of simple “concepts” and enter into realm of actual theory, ultimately precluding this rather weak response. As Eriksson and Norman (2011) write, soft power is an “ambiguous notion” that can be interpreted and applied in myriad ways (433), implying that Nye does not adequately how soft power works. Layne (2010) explicitly states that “the causal mechanisms through which soft power is supposed to operate are fuzzy [...] is legitimacy [in the eyes of others] the consequence of multilateralism, of shared values, or both?” (54). This point is well-taken; not only does Nye include different (and vague) potential sources of soft power in his definition of the concept, as well as fail to explain the relationships among the various actors involved in soft power, but he also does not explain how exactly soft power operates in a clear and theoretically logical way. How exactly does promoting human rights, or projecting a positive image of the United States through its movies, add to the United States’ soft power? And what are the consequences of that? Furthermore, Layne (2010) adds that “although Nye does not cast soft power as a theory,” the concept must be empirically tested to assess the validity and causal logic of Nye’s claims (53); this research project is certainly an answer to this call, aiming not only to revise and
refine Nye’s theory of soft, hard, and smart power, but to empirically test it in the context of the US War on Terror.

Some scholars put forth new perspectives on soft power that can map out clearer causal mechanisms through which it operates. Bohas (2006), for example, argues that to in order to understand soft power, we need to think in terms of domination and hegemony; thus soft power interacts with force and economic capital and “constrains by shaping upstream rather than coercing later,” targeting individuals and utilizing non-state actors such as MNCs and NGOs who are closely allied with US territory (411). Thus, for Bohas (2006), American hegemony in the world is mostly made up of a “soft power which constrains foreign people through the diffusion of the American way of life” (397), to the extent that people are so influenced by American soft power that they cannot live without American cultural products. In an illustrative example, Bohas (2006) points to the paradox of the anti-Americanism that exploded around the world as a result of opposition to the 2003 invasion of Iraq: despite the widespread outrage against US foreign policy, people in most countries did NOT, as might have been expected, boycott American goods, because they are so “constrained” by American cultural soft power that they simply cannot live without American products. While Bohas’s (2006) theory takes Nye’s concept in a very different direction from what Nye presumably intends, it is an example of taking the concept of soft power (and restricting it to its cultural elements, albeit “supported by socio-economic structures” (397)) and explaining how it operates and what effects it has, something Nye fails to clearly and explicitly do.

More specific than Bohas’s (2006) critique is Hynek’s (2010) analysis of the interaction between governments and NGOs in the Canadian “human security” context. His argument is interesting because it does not present a causal mechanism of how soft power
operates in general, but rather how a widely-held notion of the relationship between NGOs, who have been utilized by the Canadian government (and others) as a way to increase soft power, and the government is simply wrong. Thus, Hynek (2010) describes his argument as a “rebuttal of the usually stressed causal arrow flowing from the NGOs toward the government (i.e. the idea that the pressure of NGOs leads to changes of governmental preferences)”; instead, NGOs impact government preferences and thus policies, but the government also impacts what NGOs can or cannot do (69). Here is an argument about how soft power can work in a bi-directional way, influencing preferences and thus actions or policies, flowing either from NGOs to government or from government to NGOs (or both, presumably). Not only does Hynek (2010) bring specific actors and how they interact into the picture, but also demonstrates that the relationship does not take only one form, instead varying by context and over time—Canada’s national security goals in the War on Terror impacted how it dealt with NGOs and the kinds of NGO projects the government funded, for instance. Certainly NGOs and governments are not the only actors involved in smart power (even Nye would agree with that), but Hynek’s (2010) argument is useful insofar as it demonstrates how the concept of soft power can be fleshed out into a causal argument about how different actors can exercise soft power and impact one another in various ways.

In a more general and thus more widely applicable alternative, Lukes (2005) also outlines what might be considered categories of causal pathways, something not addressed in Nye’s work, although the former’s explanations are not as radical as Bohas’s (2006) or as actor-specific as Hynek’s (2010). For Lukes (2005), it is important to understand how exactly the “attraction” or “co-option” or “persuasion” of soft power takes place, and thus it is important to “distinguish between different ways of securing compliance through persuasion” (490). Mattern (2005) agrees, critiquing Nye for not clearly explaining the concept of attraction and how it works; Lukes (2005) tries to flesh out this concept and
presents a causal argument of how one actor can “attract” another. An actor wielding soft power can either employ different strategies to induce compliance based on the fixed or assumed preferences of the target, or the actor wielding soft power can actually change the target’s preferences. Furthermore, Lukes (2005) emphasizes the necessity of distinguishing between when soft power is used (under what conditions?) and the mechanisms or strategies by which it is employed (how is soft power used?) (491).

So while unlike Bohas (2006), Lukes (2005) does not present a clear theory of how, for example, American hegemony persists because US soft power—culture—constrains how target populations choose to live, thereby cementing American world domination, the latter does present a categorization of how we can analyze and understand soft power and the different pathways through which it can operate. We can apply Lukes’s (2005) theory and say, for instance, that the US uses soft power to change the preferences of the Afghans under conditions of a military invasion and through funding NGOs that support democratic governance. We can also apply Luke’s (2005) theory and say alternatively that the US works with the preferences of the Pakistani government (staying in power) in conditions of extreme poverty by funding NGOs working toward economic development, thus preventing some potential challenges against Musharraf’s regime. This is a far cry from Nye’s work, which posits, in article after article and book after book, that soft power, stemming from American values, culture, and foreign policy, can attract other countries to do what the US wants, without really explaining how.

*The Ineffectiveness of Soft and Smart Power*

Not all scholars agree with Nye, or even with other scholars who critique Nye’s concept but consider it an important one (Lukes 2005; Bohas 2006; Fen 2008, and others) on the importance of soft power or its subset of public diplomacy. Sondhaus (2007)
disputes Nye’s advocacy of the importance of soft power, pointing to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo and US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11 as evidence that despite Nye’s assertions, “hard power” remains relevant and important (203). Thus, Sondhaus (2007) argues that while hard power supported by soft power is a good strategy, “soft power not supported by hard power is no power at all” (214); for him, this is an insurmountable problem in Nye’s (2004) theory. It is inaccurate to say, however, that Nye (2004) actually proposes that the US exert soft power to the exclusion of hard power, since his concept of smart power calls on using a combination of the two.

While Sondhaus (2007) suggests that soft power is not useful when it is not supported or backed by hard power, Layne (2010) goes even further in his critique of Nye’s concept, arguing that soft power, even with the existence of hard power, is not an effective as a strategy. He cites the example of Pres. Bush in his second term, where his administration tried to incorporate more soft power approaches, such as when Secretary of State Rice met with European leaders to “mend relations” that had been hurt by the controversy over the 2003 Iraq invasion, and “yet, this soft power diplomacy yielded scant results” (63). Furthermore, Layne (2010) declares that President Obama, “whom the Europeans regard as the embodiment of the virtues of hard power,” was unsuccessful in convincing NATO members to add to their Afghanistan commitments in a 2009 meeting (63). He points to yet another example: President Obama’s speech in Cairo in 2009, aimed at improving US relations with the Muslim world, a goal that was not achieved, according to Layne (2010), and will not be achieved until the US puts in place policies that align with the national interests of Muslim countries (71). It appears here that Layne (2010) is missing the point, reducing the entire concept of soft power into speeches and rhetoric, which are certainly a part of soft power (public diplomacy), but not to the exclusion of actual “policies.” Perhaps Layne’s (2010) point about the strategic futility of soft or smart power is
a valid one—and the purposes of this research project are NOT to assess the success or lack thereof of smart power strategies in the War on Terror, but rather to trace and explain their development and variation over time and across countries. Even so, Layne (2010) appears to be trivializing Nye’s concept, however flawed, into “nice” rhetoric or a president’s reputation for cooperation and diplomatic demeanor, rather than actual strategies and actions based on soft power.

Layne (2010) has even more to say about smart power, arguing that it is just another label for the liberal foreign policy strategies of democracy and good governance promotion and economic development, used in the War on Terror to stave off the collapse and failure of weak states in order to reduce the threat of terrorism (68). Thus, smart power is just another name for modernization theory and nation-building, two strategies that the US has applied and failed at since the Vietnam War (70). Nye (2010) responds directly to this critique, arguing that smart power is not just another name for democracy promotion, good governance, and economic development, but it “can be applied to many different policies in different contexts, and its descriptive content can also fit different situations” (225). This is not a very strong or rigorous response to such a scathing and fundamental critique, but Nye’s (2010) implied point, that even if smart power uses the specific strategies of promoting democracy and economic development, it can be applied in contexts as diverse as the War on Terror or the Arab Spring, is a valid one. In other words, smart power has as its goal attracting others, whether they be populations or governments of target countries, in ways that align with American interests, and not just modernization theory or democracy promotion because development and democracy are in themselves normatively desirable.

**Conclusion**
Although Layne’s (2010) critiques may be unwarrantedly harsh, it is also clear that Nye’s work is far from theoretically satisfying. While the theoretical discussion of using “soft power,” or combining soft power and hard power into “smart power,” is an interesting and attractive one, the concepts of soft and smart power are vague and unclear—any type of non-military action might fit under Nye’s (2004) definition of soft power, or any non-military action combined with military action might fit into Nye’s (2008) and Wilson’s (2008) definitions of soft power. It is therefore not very useful to describe a strategy—here, the US strategy in its War on Terror—as being one of merely “soft” or “smart” power without refining Nye’s concepts and presenting a revised theory, since applying these concept does not tell us much about what exactly the strategy entails, the motivation behind it, etc. There is evidence to suggest that US policymakers have espoused the use of “soft” or “smart” power in the context of the War on Terror—former US Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff (2008), for instance, wrote that the US should use “soft power” in order to “win nations and peoples to its side...[and] reduce the appeal of terrorist organizations and deter individuals from joining them” (14). After all, what politician or policymaker would not want to advocate the use of such an attractive strategy?

However, the expectation in this research project is that while US policymakers may frequently all cite the necessity of using soft power—and calls for the use of “soft” or “smart” power seem to have increased as the War on Terror has evolved—applications of what is called “soft” power (relevant here is the use of NGOs), and its combination with “hard power,” resulting in “smart power,” will take on different forms in various contexts. Thus the next chapter will present my theory of US strategies in the War on Terror, which rely on both hard and soft power, often combining them into smart power, and why it varies over time and across geographical contexts, based on several factors—so soft power, often combined with hard power, will look different based on the situation. In order to make
Nye’s work more useful theoretically and convincing empirically, a more comprehensive and specific theory of hard, soft, and smart power must be explained.
CHAPTER 3

A MORE RIGOROUS THEORY OF SOFT, HARD, AND COMBINED POWER

Introduction

The United States War on Terror has proven to be a unique kind of war, with military as well as non-military offensives. In fact, the United States has been using not only traditional “hard power” approaches to this ten year-old war, but has also arguably been using non-traditional, “soft power” methods. This research project seeks to explain the variation in the US government’s use of hard, soft and smart (i.e., combined) power in the War on Terror, examining soft and smart power specifically through the US government’s partnering with or funding international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). In order to explain the variation in US soft/hard power strategy, both over time and across countries, it is necessary to examine three sets of factors: the US government’s goals and leadership preferences; the threat level and political and economic context of the target country; and the goals and preferences of the INGOs involved. By examining these three factors, we can explain the variation in the kind and extent of US-INGO interaction in the different countries where the US is waging its War on Terror.

This theory seeks to explain both temporal and geographic variation in the US government’s strategy, accounting for its hard and soft power elements and a variety of possible combinations of the two. In other words, under what conditions is the US government more likely to use soft, hard, or various degrees of smart power in fighting the War on Terror? I argue that the independent variables that shape US strategy at a specific point in time and in a specific context are the threat level and/or type of threat posed by the target country, the target country’s political and economic context, and the preferences, goals, and work of the relevant NGOs. The primary actor here is the US executive, namely
the President and his advisors, who take the first step in making strategy based on their ideological preferences, in favor of using either more or less force to combat threats. The next step of the strategy-making process is the assessment and determination of the threat level coming from a specific country: short-term vs. long-term potential for terrorism. When facing what it determines to be a short-term terrorist threat, the US executive is more likely to use hard power, while it is more likely to decide to use soft power when tackling a longer-term terrorist threat. In the many cases where a combined threat exists, the US executive will utilize combined or smart power that includes both soft and hard power. The exact makeup of the smart power used, i.e., its proportions of hard and soft power, will depend on the other variables: the makeup of the combined threat, the political and economic needs of the host country, and the preferences and capabilities of the NGOs. I also include a few control variables that figure into strategizing in the War on Terror: executive leadership preferences and ideology, the United State’s relative power in the world, and military capabilities or power of the target country.

Once the US executive has determined the threat level coming from a particular country, other variables may impact the executive’s counter-terrorism strategy. A threat level that is determined to be immediate and short-term is enough to explain the US executive’s use of hard power, but the threat level alone cannot account for the type and extent of soft power tools the US government uses to fight long-term or combined (short and long-term, together) terrorist threats. In such situations, the political and economic context of the target country also comes into play. Specifically, the political and economic needs of a target country determined to pose a long-term or combined terrorist threat will impact the kind of soft power tools the US will use. Since this project examines a specific type of soft power used by the US government in the War on Terror, the target governments’ treatment of NGOs will also influence US strategy. The US will use less of this
soft power when the target country’s government places more limitations on NGO activity, and vice versa. In this way, the target country’s political context will impact the extent to which US counter-terrorism strategy uses soft power. In situations where the US faces a combined threat and thus uses smart power, the target country’s policies will help determine the makeup of the combination of hard and soft power. I am examining a specific example of US soft power in this project, funding and partnering with NGOs, whose work, in cases of a US smart power strategy, will interact with hard power efforts. Thus, the US executive interacts with this final actor in developing and then implementing US counter-terrorism strategy. The experience, goals, and capabilities of these NGOs, as well as their relationship with the US government, are the conditions that determine whether or not the US decides to partner with them in fighting terrorism, and then whether to continue that partnership over time.

My theory, then, illustrated in Figure 1, explains the conditions under which the US executive decides to use either hard or soft power, or various degrees of smart power, in fighting the War on Terror. The President and his advisors, who have their ideological preferences, take into account the kind of terrorist threat (short-term, long-term, or various combinations of the two) they determine to be coming from a particular country. The political and economic context of that target country will also influence US strategy in the kind and degree to which it uses soft power. Finally, the US executive’s strategy is also influenced by the NGOs themselves: their experience, preferences, and goals are the conditions that the US government uses to decide which NGOs and which of their projects to fund. All of these independent variables vary over time, and they interact with one another to ultimately shape US strategy in the War on Terror, specifically its soft, hard, and smart power components. As a final note, a smart power strategy can take different forms based
on time and place, and its proportions of soft and hard power will vary based on the independent variables examined here.

Figure 1

Soft, Smart, and Combined Power Decision-Making
**Soft Power: A Revised Definition**

This chapter presents my theory of hard, soft, and smart power strategies in the US War on Terror; the specific form of soft power examined here is US partnerships with NGOs. Any theory incorporating the concept of soft power must start with Joseph Nye’s work, as he coined the widely-used phrase. However, Nye’s concept of soft power is problematic in several ways, the most important of which are a general lack of conceptual clarity and rigor (Bohas 2006; Hynek 2010; Zahran and Ramos 2010; Fan 2008); no clear delineation regarding the sources and actors involved in soft power (Fan 2008; Bohas 2006; Zahran and Ramos 2010); and no explicit outlining of the causal mechanisms involved in the use or implementation of soft power (Eriksson and Norman 2011; Layne 2010; Bohas 2006; Hynek 2010; Lukes 2005; Mattern 2005). It is worth noting once again that one of Nye’s (2010b) responses to his critics has been that his concept of soft power is “an analytic concept, not a theory” (219). However, his numerous publications on the subject and his various suggestions about how and why soft power can be an effective tool of US foreign policy (2004b, 2010a) have pushed soft power into the realm of actual theory, even if Nye fails to acknowledge that.

In order for the concept of soft power—and by extension, the concept of smart power—to be useful, it is necessary to use a clearer and more precise concept of soft power, one that points to the sources and actors involved. It is equally necessary to present a theory of how and why soft power is used, which is the purpose of this chapter. In this project, hard power is used to mean the use of coercive power. Aside from addressing Hynek’s (2010) critique that soft power may also in some cases be used coercively, I have not really strayed from Nye’s (2004b) definition. Hard power, then, refers to traditional military power, as well as economic power when used to punish or threaten, i.e., through
sanctions. My concept of soft power, however, is much more narrow than Nye’s (2004a): he defines soft power as just “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (x). Nye also points to three general sources of soft power, which in their current theoretical incarnation are a country’s “culture, its values and domestic practices, and the perceived legitimacy of its foreign policies” (Nye 2004b, 5). In order to make the concept of soft power more theoretically useful and open to operationalization, we must narrow its definition or go down the “ladder of abstraction,” in the words of Sartori (1970). Building upon and revising Nye’s concept, however, I conceptualize “soft power” as a consciously-utilized strategy that uses non-hard power methods, aimed at persuasion, to influence a target government or target population in a way that will enhance US interests; soft power is a strategic means of achieving an end or a goal.

In my revised concept, then, soft power does NOT just spontaneously or unconsciously “happen,” the way Nye (2004b) suggests it can when he writes that it can emerge from society rather than from conscious government action (92). My concept of soft power does not preclude American popular culture as a possible source of soft power, but it is soft power only when it is consciously utilized by the US government in order to enhance American interests or goals. Why this specificity? One problem with Nye’s concept of soft power is a lack of operationalization; it is empirically hard to measure or recognize, since it mostly refers to outcomes, as indicated by his discussion of a decline in American soft power as evidenced by opinion poll data (Nye 2010a, 4). But we cannot take soft power seriously as a legitimate theoretical concept if we measure it based on outcomes; instead, my concept of soft power measures consciously-adopted and implemented strategy, making for a theoretically clearer concept. Finally, while as Nye (2004b) himself and other scholars (Heng 2010; Zahran and Ramos 2010; Bohas 2006) have pointed out, non-state actors can certainly exhibit or use or generate soft power, in this project, the actor generating soft
power is the US government. However, the United States government can and does rely on and utilize other actors, such as NGOs, in implementing soft power strategies.

So in my revised concept, what are the sources of soft power, and what forms can it take? The sources of soft power may lie, as Nye (2004b) suggests in the culture, values and actions, and positively-viewed foreign policy, if and when these sources are utilized in US government strategy. For instance, in my concept of soft power, popular American television shows viewed by foreign publics can be considered soft power only if they are actively promoted by the US government. Soft power, then, can take a myriad number of forms: funding NGOs to do development work in target countries, US government-funded promotion of American culture or business in pursuit of specific policy goals or objectives; diplomatic efforts highlighting the superiority and success of the American values of human rights and democratic governance to help reach specific US goals, etc. Thus my conceptual definition is a narrower one than Nye’s, but it retains some flexibility, as soft power will vary based on context.

Clearly soft power, even according to my more narrow definition of the concept, has been widely used and implemented as a strategy by the US government, but it is also clear that soft and hard power are often pursued as complementary strategies. So while Nye’s (2008b) label of “smart power” may appear trite, his definition of the term, “the ability to combine hard and soft power effectively,” is still a useful baseline in my theory, with one caveat. The adverb “effectively” is not theoretically useful, as determining what combination of hard and soft power is effective requires an assessment of policy outcomes, which is not the goal of this project. Thus, in this project, smart power refers to an integrated strategy of both hard and soft power, in which the US government consciously and purposefully combines hard power with other more persuasive, non-threatening exercises of power, i.e.,
soft power, in pursuing US interests. Just as soft power can take various forms, so can smart power—we can imagine an infinite possibility of soft power/hard power combinations. It is impossible to define the exact proportion of hard to soft power inherent in smart power: doing so would almost be measuring part of the dependent variable of this project, i.e. the various levels of soft and hard power, or their combination (smart power) the US uses in its War on Terror. Smart power by definition varies across time and place in its proportions of hard and soft power,

**The US Executive and Foreign Policy**

This theory explaining US strategies based on hard, soft, or various degrees of smart power, starts with the US executive: the President and his advisors. Any discussion of foreign policy decisions must begin with the president, who is the central actor and decision-maker in this area (Wittkopf and McCormick 1998; Banks and Straussman 1999; Rockman 2000). As Wittkopf and McCormick (1998) demonstrate, even a watershed moment like the end of the Cold War did not disrupt this relationship between Congress and the President (442). Thus, foreign policy remains dominated by the President, with members of Congress supporting or opposing his positions based on their ideological preferences (457). Rockman (2000) agrees, suggesting that while the Constitution affords a general separation of powers between the President and Congress, Congress rarely exhibits strong opposition to Presidential foreign policy decisions. The President is more focused on world affairs, but Congress is generally preoccupied with domestic issues, so its foreign policy role has been “reactive rather than proactive” (143). Banks and Straussman (1999) echo this same idea but see it as a problem that may lead to an “imperial” presidency, as the title of their article suggests. For them, the US military campaign in Bosnia, which President Clinton funded without Congressional authorization, violated the Constitution (1999). A
more recent example of the same kind of issue arose regarding US involvement in the current NATO campaign in Libya, where despite a great deal of Congressional opposition, the American offensive continued for months.

An assessment of the normative implications of the President’s power in American foreign policy is beyond the scope of this project. The point is that any effort to explain American foreign policy decisions and strategies must start with the President, and the role of Congress appears to be less important, and is thus beyond the scope of this dissertation. Dobbins et al. (2008) even call the President the “prime mover” of American foreign policy (3). This theory of US strategy in the War on Terror, then, will not take into account Congressional actions or positions, but will instead focus on the President, his foreign policy advisors, which include Cabinet heads and leaders of relevant executive agencies, such as USAID. Some scholars, such as Sicherman (2011), argue that US foreign policy is constrained to some extent by public opinion. Thus foreign policy that is very widely unpopular cannot endure, making US foreign policy options limited by the pragmatic culture of American society (362). The impact of public opinion on US foreign policy decisions, however, is far from uncontested. Scholars including Holsti (1992; 1998) and Jentleson and Britton (1998) defend the importance, lack of volatility and, in the case of the latter, the relative “prudence” of American public opinion in foreign policy issues. Other scholars disagree. Burk (1999), for instance, finds evidence challenging the “casualties hypothesis,” arguing that the level of casualties in a US military intervention cannot explain the level of public support for or against US military intervention. Thus, public opinion cannot account for US executive decisions to continue or pull out of military offensives in Lebanon or Somalia. Since the possible impact of public opinion on executive foreign policy decisions is unclear, my theory does not take it into account in explaining US foreign policy strategy.
The Terrorist Threat

The above section discussed the importance of executive preferences, particularly as they relate to the usefulness of soft, hard, and smart power to deal with threats against the US. My theory posits that the next step in the formulation of foreign policy strategy in the War on Terror is the US executive’s assessment of the threat level posed by a particular geographic location. The important distinction here is between short-term, immediate terrorist threats and long-term, potential terrorist threats. In other words, the US fights against both actual, existing terrorists who pose an immediate threat against the US, but the US also works to prevent actual threats from developing and becoming immediate threats in the present and future. I suggest that the threat level determined by the US executive to be coming from a particular country will determine what kind of power—hard, soft, or smart—the US decides to use to fight the terrorist threat.

Short-Term, Immediate Terrorist Threats

Hypothesis 1: The US executive is more likely to rely on hard power tools, i.e. military power, rather than soft power tools, in addressing short-term, immediate, existing terrorist threats.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (2009), who served under Presidents Bush and Obama, implied a relationship between the kind of terrorist threat posed in a specific context and the tools best suited to address that threat. The use of military force is necessary to fight and capture existing terrorists but, Gates (2009) suggests, in the long run, a different strategy must be adopted to prevent future threats from emerging and threatening US security. These include measures such as development programs and pro-democracy efforts (12), in other words, soft power. Ayub and Kouvo (2008) point to this same distinction, arguing that in Afghanistan, there has been a “mismatch” between short-term security and counter-terrorism operations and long-term, state-building concerns.
(641). In the language of my theory, both Gates (2009) and Ayub and Kouvo (2008) point to a complex situation whereby military efforts are needed to address short-term, immediate terrorist threats, but soft power tools are needed to address the long-term terrorist threat and prevent it from growing into an immediate one.

**Longer-Term, Potential Terrorist Threats**

*Hypothesis 2: The US executive is more likely to rely on soft power tools, rather than hard power tools, in addressing long-term, potential terrorist threats in an effort to prevent them from escalating into immediate, short-term terrorist threats. In contexts where both a short-term and long-term terrorist threat is determined to exist, the US executive is more likely to rely on a combination of hard and soft power tools, rather than choosing just one of these. The kind of smart power combination that emerges, or its proportion of hard to soft power, will depend in part on the combination of the threat; i.e., if the short-term threat is minimal and the long-term threat is extensive, US strategy will rely on more soft power than hard power, and vice versa.*

Soft power strategies have increasingly come into play in addressing the longer-term terrorist threats that exist against the United States. This project deals with variation over time and place in the War on Terror, and as Dobbins et al. (2008) astutely suggest, when examining foreign policies of specific Presidents, one must consider the learning that takes place over time *within* administrations (1). If we see an increased emphasis on addressing long-term terrorist threats within the Bush or Obama administrations over time, it is not necessarily the case that the long-term threats just arose and increased over time. It may also or instead be the case that there was a new determination by the administration that this long-term threat existed. In this theory, any terrorist threat must be determined by the President and his advisors to exist in order for any counter-terrorism strategy to be forged.

Given that the President and his advisors must determine the existence of a long-term, potential terrorist threat in order to combat it, what is the logic of using soft power
tools to do so? Essentially, a soft power strategy stems from the belief among policymakers and some academics that instability and a lack of development are important causes of terrorism. As Tujan et al. (2004) write, the connection between the lack of development and instability and terrorism exists because terrorism takes advantage of the difficult conditions resulting from poverty, war, occupation, and repression as a means of mobilizing dissatisfied members of such countries, justifying to them the use of terrorism (54).

Wunderle and Brier (2007) suggest that the US must realize that military operations alone will not put an end to terrorism and instead, fighting poverty, promoting education, free markets, and economic relations with the US should be used as ways to fight terrorism (2008). My argument is that the latter strategies, all utilizing soft power tools, are seen by policymakers as a tool to address the long-term, potential threats of terrorism.

One way that tools of soft power—consciously-utilized, non-threatening methods aimed at persuading populations or governments, influencing them in a way that aligns with US interests—in target countries are seen as useful is by addressing grievances of the population that might, if left unchecked, explode into actual and immediate terrorist threats. In other words, this kind of soft power involves public diplomacy (Nye 2008a). Wunderle and Briere (2007) describe the grievances among the publics of foreign countries that present a long-term terrorist threat to the US. They discuss the “inner conflict” that exists in the minds of the youth in poor, underdeveloped countries. These young people simultaneously admire Western civilization and are taught to revile it on moral grounds, particularly in Muslim countries. This “inner conflict” can grow and be exploited by terrorist leaders, who capitalize on people’s humiliation and religious fervor to incite violence against Western countries (206). Moghadam’s (2006) discussion of the “globalization of martyrdom” is in line with this kind of logic. Even Michael Chertoff (2008) himself, Bush’s second Homeland Security secretary, wrote that the growth of terrorism is due to failed
political and economic systems in the developing world, whereby “violent Islamic extremism” was adopted as an ideology by those frustrated with the state of affairs in their country (15). The debate about motivations for terrorism is an ongoing one—Pape (2003), for instance, argues that extremist Islamist ideology is not a cause or motivation of terrorism, while Moghadam (2006) insists that Islamic fundamentalism is an important motivation for terrorism. It is clear that the roots of terrorism are complex and probably involve not just poverty and underdevelopment but also ideological and political goals. The point here is that tools of soft power, using such methods as funding and partnering with NGOs, appear to be most suited to address grievances such as poverty and underdevelopment that may morph into actual and immediate terrorist threats.

Addressing mass grievances and long-term terrorist threats through tools of soft power can in this way be used to prevent their growth into more pressing and immediate short-term threats of terrorism. Wunderle and Briere (2007) indicate that the US should “align” the resources of its foreign assistance programs with its foreign policy objectives (211), suggesting that development aid should be included in the overall foreign policy strategies of combating terrorism. Former Secretary of Homeland Security Chertoff (2008) even refers explicitly to Nye’s concept of soft power as an important part of US anti-terrorism strategy. He argues that the US needs to take concrete steps such as providing humanitarian aid to developing countries not just to fight poverty, but also to make extremist terrorist ideology less appealing—i.e., addressing the long-term threat of potential terrorism. Potential recruits are not driven to desperate measures or ideas if they have more economic opportunities or if they see the US as a helpful power instead of as an enemy (Chertoff 2008).
This second benefit of US provision of humanitarian aid to developing countries who pose threats to the US is evident when Chertoff (2008) cites US relief efforts after the 2004 tsunami which, he writes, helped improve Indonesian public opinion towards the US and decrease Indonesian public approval of terrorist groups (15). As De Wijk (2003) writes, the War on Terror is unusual because the US needs to use not just traditional military and diplomatic power, but also other soft power tools such as humanitarian aid and propaganda, to win over the populations of the Muslim world (19). Of course, traditional diplomacy is one form of soft power, but De Wijk (2003) is calling for additional uses of soft power: attracting Muslim populations through public diplomacy, along with foreign aid. Lord (2006) agrees with De Wijk (2003), writing that any long-term efforts to combat terrorism in the Arab and Muslim world need to include “winning the hearts and minds” of potential terrorists in order to dissuade them from resorting to terrorism. This involves targeting both mass audience, or public diplomacy, as well winning over political and cultural elites in the region who may be allowing terrorism to persist there unchecked (38).

The existence of “failed states” is also cited in the literature as an explanation for the growth of terrorism, particularly against the US and the West. Tayekh and Gvosdev (2003) argue that terrorists seek out weak states that cannot stop their activities but still display some degree of sovereignty that deters other countries from taking action against them (95). Failed states allow terrorists to acquire more territory than if they were scattered across other states--assuming acquiring territory is an objective of terrorists, as Pape (2003) suggests it is. Furthermore, failed states usually do not have strong law enforcement in place, allowing terrorists to raise money through illicit activities such as drug smuggling. There is also a lack of state power generally and of civil society in failed states, and this vacuum allows terrorist groups to more effectively recruit members (Tayekh and Gvosdev 2003, 105). It may be imprecise to conflate “weak states” and “failed states” together, but a
similar logic underlies Patrick’s (2006) assessment of the threats, including terrorism, emerging against the US from weak states who lack the will and/or capacity to provide development and security for their populations. Ken Deji’s (2005) link between poverty and potential instability nicely rounds off Patrick’s (2006) argument. The former suggests that sustainable development, aimed at solving the problems of poverty in a long-term fashion, is now an important part of US strategic interests since extreme poverty can turn countries into a threat by ruining their institutions, leading to instability (7). In the worst case, a weak or failed state, to use Tayekh and Gvosdev’s (2003) terminology, may result, possibly presenting a long-term terrorist threat to the US. Chenoweth (2004) somewhat disputes this claim, arguing that a lack of state strength, i.e., political and economic stability and development, rather than the existence of “failed states,” is an important cause of terrorism.

When considering the soft power tools that can help address failed states or ones that are unstable, in Chenoweth’s (2004) terminology, the distinction may be irrelevant, since the same set of tools can be used to address both situations in an attempt to mitigate what the US executive determines to be a long-term terrorist threat.

The existence of weak, unstable, or failed states is seen as one potential opportunity for terrorism to take root or spread; some scholars suggest that one way to combat such a threat is by promoting democracy. It is certainly possible for an authoritarian state to be stable; Huntington (1968) suggests, for example, that political stability is more important than the kind of regime in power. However, some scholars suggest, and many policymakers seem to accept, that democracy itself can help combat terrorism. As Windson (2003) explains, there is no direct link between a lack of democracy and terrorism, just as there is no direct link between poverty and terrorism, but an absence of democracy has helped generate the circumstances favorable to the rise of extremist movements (363). Thus, she argues, the existence of democracy can by its very nature help remove these conditions.
This is because democracy entails peaceful change in government, outlets for dissent and discussion, the rule of law, the existence of civil society, a free flow of information, a stronger state, social and economic development, and liberal values and ideals, all of which can counteract the conditions that help foster terrorism (366-7). Lord (2006) agrees that pushing for democratization should be part of the strategy to combat terrorism because of these characteristics of democracy (51).

What options are available to the US if it seeks to promote democracy in places that may pose a long-term terrorist threat? Windson (2003) calls for more “robust” US foreign aid as a way to promote democracy. To that end, government agencies such as USAID should rely on the expertise of the NGO sector in general because of the institutional knowledge of NGOs, as well as the creative efforts on the part of specific NGOs working on democracy promotion, in a region where change is difficult (377). By its very nature, such a strategy relies on tools of soft, and not hard, power. Roy (2005) suggests that in the context of failed or authoritarian states, one way that outside powers can pursue democratization is through promoting the development of a civil society that includes political parties and NGOs as a first step in democracy-building (1004). Hobson (2005) agrees, pointing out that democracy promotion has become an important part of Bush’s War on Terror and a “strategic necessity” in fighting terrorism (40). US efforts in that direction have included the establishment of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which funds civil society and education programs (42).

Fandl (2006) makes a similar point about fostering civil society in an effort to bring about democratization, astutely bringing together the issues of economic development and democracy. He suggests that the US can fight what I categorize as the long-term terrorist threat by promoting development, which will decrease inequalities, help lead to democracy,
and provide potential terrorists with alternative outlets to express their grievances (308). Fandl’s (2006) argument thus builds on the strong correlation, widely addressed in political science literature, between economic development and democracy. He suggests that to combat the long-term terrorist threats, the US should promote economic growth, which in turn will make democratic reform possible and more likely to be successful (320). Both of these elements, fighting poverty and promoting democratization, utilize tools of soft, rather than hard, power.

*Combined Short-Term and Long-Term Terrorist Threats*

The above sections outlined the distinction between immediate short-term and long-term terrorist threats. As I argue, the existence of the level or kind of terrorist threat, short vs. long-term, will lead policymakers to consider different kinds of strategies, utilizing hard or soft power, as appropriate tools to address each. Ten years into the War on Terror, however, it seems that most often, the US is waging a war against both short-term and long-term terrorism. My theory posits that with the existence of both kinds of threats, US policymakers will pursue strategies based on both hard and soft power—smart power—whose proportional makeup will vary depending on the independent variables examined here. One thing to note is that while the term “smart power,” coined by Nye and frequently used by policymakers and academics alike, may sound like an attractive term, the makeup of smart power is both a conceptual and an empirical issue that Nye failed to address. In other words, how much soft power must be combined with hard power in order for a strategy to be considered a “smart” one? I have used continue the term “smart power,” simply because it is so widely used, but from this point onward, it is more useful to consider it in terms of “combined power,” denoting the use of both hard and smart power in varying proportions.
Williams (2008), presumably referring to both short-term and long-term threats, argues that to ensure the national security of the US, a combined military and development strategy must be put in place (1111). While the President can send more troops to Afghanistan, those troops cannot implement longer term development strategies that can ensure future peace (1119). In other words, Williams (2008) is suggesting that both hard and soft power strategies must be used to deal with combined short-term and long-term terrorist threats. Lake’s (2010) analysis of US state-building efforts over the last century also points to an integration of both hard and soft power to combat both immediate and potential terrorist threats. He explores a new counterinsurgency strategy in 2007, suggesting that fighting the insurgency is synonymous with winning over the hearts and minds of the locals, in an effort to decrease support for those whom the US is fighting (273); clearly such a strategy involves both hard and soft power.

Like Williams (2008) and Lake (2010), Azam and Thelen (2010) discuss the use of development promotion, in this case the dispensing of US bilateral foreign aid, to target countries, which has been a strategy in the War on Terror since at least 2002, with the establishment of the Millennium Challenge Account (237-8). Their attempts to assess the effectiveness of foreign aid, as opposed to military action, in terrorist prevention is beyond the scope of this project, but the point about both kinds of policies being used is an important premise of this theory. Collins’s (2004) description of American military efforts in Afghanistan as a “three-block war” is also relevant. Such an operation has multiple but sometimes simultaneous stages whereby Block 1 is combat, Block 2 is peacekeeping and stabilization, and Block 3 is humanitarian reconstruction. In a similar vein, Waisova (2010) discusses Canada’s development policy, whereby the Canadian government has used development aid to combat poverty and state failure, which after 9/11 were deemed security threats (83). Indeed, the Canadian government often entangled development aid
with military operations in places like Afghanistan (84). Lucas (210) also points to the civilian-military interface in the Afghan war, in this case the deployment of academic specialists with expertise in the local culture, in a phenomenon known as “military anthropology” (23-24). The important point in all of these arguments is that countries waging the War on Terror have used both hard power and soft power tactics; I argue that the former is used to address immediate, short-term terrorist threats, whereas the latter is used to address long-term, potential terrorist threats, and a combination of the two is used to address combined threats.

**The Target Country’s Context**

Up to this point, my theory has taken into account the preferences and assessments of one set of actors: the President and his advisors. Of course, the War on Terror itself is fought against a terrorist threat determined to be coming from other countries, as discussed in the above section. I have argued in the above section that the US executive will decide to use hard power against immediate, short-term terrorist threats. In cases where either a long-term or a combined terrorist threat exists, however, the US executive’s strategizing and implementation of counter-terrorist measures will be affected by an additional set of factors: the domestic political and economic context of the target country.

*Hypothesis 3: Where a long-term or combined terrorist threat is determined by the US executive to exist, the socio-economic and political needs of that country’s population will shape the kind of soft power tools the US uses, including the types of NGOs it funds. For example, the US government is likely to fund economic development programs in a country with high levels of poverty, and likely to fund literacy programs in a country with low literacy rates, etc.*

*Hypothesis 4: Where a long-term or combined terrorist threat is determined by the US executive to exist, the US is likely to use more soft power, in the form of funding NGOs, where the government of the target country places fewer limitations on NGO activity, and vice versa.*
The US President and his advisors formulate policy based on their preferences and the threat level they determine to be coming from a particular country. However, the making and implementation of strategy is a dynamic process, and the host country context will also impact the kinds of soft power policies the US decides to implement when dealing with what it determines to be a long-term or combined terrorist threat. This political and economic context will influence the kinds of soft power tools the US uses, as well as their extent. Ultimately, in these situations where a combined terrorist threat is determined to exist, the socio-political context of the target country will impact the proportional makeup of the US’s smart power strategy. This project examines a specific kind of soft power tool used by the US government, funding and partnering with NGOs, to be discussed in greater detail in the next section. Here I argue that in situations where the target country’s government places fewer limitations on NGO activity, the US is likely to use more of that soft power. This will increase the ratio of soft-to-hard power; the reverse is also expected to be true. Of course, the political and economic context of the target country, and thus the makeup of US soft or smart power strategies, will vary over time.

This cross-country variation will be examined in the case study sections of this project, which will focus on US strategies in fighting terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan. A cursory look at these two countries reveals some important differences. For instance, the most powerful political force in Pakistan is the military, and it is a poor nation with a per capita GDP of $2,400 as of 2010 (CIA World Factbook 2011). Afghanistan, on the other hand, has been besieged by war since the Soviet invasion in 1979, with a much smaller population of 29 million people and a GDP per capita of only about $1000 as of 2010; its economy is heavily dependent on foreign aid, and the country is besieged with problems ranging from crimes such as drug trafficking, as well as corruption and weak governance (CIA World Factbook 2011). Thus if we compare the two cases, Afghanistan is much poorer than
Pakistan, with a much lower rate of female literacy, and so perhaps the US is funding NGOs who work in combating poverty more extensively in Afghanistan than in Pakistan. In contrast, while Pakistan is certainly not a full-fledged, legitimate democracy since the military has so much political power, its government is comparatively more stable than Afghanistan. Perhaps in Pakistan, then, a more prominent part of the US strategy in fighting terrorism is utilizing INGOs who work in democracy promotion or strengthening civil society, since they might be more effective than in Afghanistan, which is even less politically stable.

The target country's treatment of the NGO sector will impact the extent to which the US will use the specific kind of soft power examined in this project, the US government's funding of NGOs to combat what it determines to be long-term or combined terrorist threats. Thomas (2007) points out that the biggest challenge of NGOs in developing countries comes from the existing political or economic system, often because NGOs are viewed as politically threatening (56). Similarly, Bratton (1989) views the relationship between NGOs and governments in developing countries as a power struggle, whereby authoritarian regimes often view the NGOs as a threat to their authority, and thus take a variety of approaches to curb or limit NGO influence. Such restrictions can include monitoring the organizations’ activities, trying to involve themselves in NGO work, and sometimes even absorbing NGOs into state apparatuses (577-79). More specifically, Salamon (2006) suggests that NGOs operating in countries with authoritarian regimes can play a supplemental role to the government but cannot challenge state power or cooperate with the state on equal footing, limiting the development of the nonprofit sector (414).

In the same vein, Rita (2008) expounds on the powerful role of the state in which NGOs operate in shaping and influencing their work, even in developing democratic states
such as India (164). One way states impact the work of NGOs is by granting or denying territorial access to NGOs; authoritarian states are more likely to place limits on activists and their ties to the outside world, but even democratic governments can place limits on NGO activities by citing, for instance, security concerns (166). In India, the state regulates NGOs through eligibility requirements, a strict registration process, inspection and seizure proceedings, and sometimes revoking registration and an NGO’s ability to receive foreign funding (175). While Rita appears to be discussing state limits on Southern NGOs (NGOs based in the developing world), the same kinds of restrictions might hamper the activities of INGOs coming from countries such as the US. This might particularly be the case since these Northern NGOs or NNGOs, as they are called, often form partnerships with Southern NGOs (SNGOs), located in the global South or developing countries (Ahmed and Potter 2006, 142).

Stevens’ (2010) work offers another example of an authoritarian government’s extreme restrictions of NGO activities, particularly those receiving Western funding, this time in Uzbekistan. As part of its partnership with the US in the War on Terror, the Uzbek government allowed a great deal of US aid into the country, much of it funneled through NGOs (357). Once it started to view the US and its support of NGO operations as politically threatening in 2003, the government largely cracked down on the NGO sector, closing down 269 NGOs between 2005 and 2007. It also instituted much stricter registration and operating requirements for those that remained (357-8), until the NGO sector has increasingly become a part of the government (361). The important point here is not just that the governments of target or host countries can influence and restrict NGO activity, but that governments’ treatment of NGOs can vary over time. The relationship between the target government and its NGO sector will impact US strategy, with increasing limitations
on NGO activity by target country’s governments leading to a decrease in US partnerships with NGOs and thus less soft power in its counter-terrorism strategies, or vice versa.

NGOs

My theory explains US foreign policy strategizing in the War on Terror, specifically the conditions under which it will use soft, hard, and various degrees of smart power. I have argued that the US executive forges a counter-terrorism strategy based on its assessment of the threat level coming from a particular country. In cases where a long-term or combined terrorist threat is determined to exist, the US executive’s strategizing is also impacted by the political and economic context, which will affect the kind and amount of soft power it uses. One more actor is involved when the US is forging its soft or smart-power strategy to fight long-term or combined terrorist threats: the non-governmental associations (NGOs) themselves, with whom the US forms partnerships in the specific kind of soft power tool examined in this project. In this section I will explain not only why the US government views NGOs as important partners in exercising soft power in various contexts of the War on Terror, i.e. why they are theoretically interesting, but also how US policymakers are constrained by the capabilities and preferences of these NGOs. Once formed, the NGO-government interaction must also be explored to help account for variation over time, since it will help explain the US government’s continued or terminated funding of specific NGOs in exerting this particular type of soft power.

Background on NGOs

It is important to provide some theoretical background on non-governmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs are non-state actors, although they are often funded at least in part by governments, through agencies like USAID in the United States. Aall (2000) defines NGOs as “private, self-governing, non-profit institutions” with goals ranging from promoting
economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution to providing humanitarian aid to helping foster civil society and democratic institutions (124). Ahmed and Potter (2006) add that the ultimate importance of NGO activities stems from the influence they have on individuals, states, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), and even other non-state actors (55). As such, their activities in relief, development, advocacy, agenda setting, public education campaigns, and mobilizing publics are all ways to influence various actors in different political arenas. INGOs are international NGOs, which, as Kerlin (2006) describes them, operate in their various sub-fields but in international contexts. INGOs are contrasted with Southern NGOs (SNGOs) who are formed and operate solely in developing countries. Over the last two or three decades, partnerships between NNGOs and SNGOs have become increasingly common, whereby NNGOs utilize SNGOs as implementers of various programs (Ashman 2001; Agg 2006). Because this project attempts to explain US strategizing in the War on Terror, I will limit my examination to INGOs based in the United States; these INGOs often partner with SNGOs, something that will be explored in the empirical sections of this project.

Salamon (2006), often considered the father of the literature on NGOs, suggests that the past few decades have been characterized by a “global associational revolution,” or a huge increase in the presence of NGOs all around the world. Indeed, Boli (2006) points out that the number of international NGOs has grown from 374 in 1909, to just under 10,000 in 1981, to over 25,000 in the year 2000 (334). NGOs have been influential in such important historical occurrences such as the break-up of the Soviet Union, ending apartheid in South Africa, and helping along democratic transitions in the Philippines, Argentina, and Chile (416). Simmons (2010), describes four areas where NGOs have been influential: agenda setting (e.g., bringing human rights as an issue to be addressed by the UN charter); negotiating outcomes (e.g., helping negotiate the treaty in the Chemical Weapons
Convention in 1997); conferring legitimacy (because of the less overtly political nature of NGOs and their closeness to the grass roots levels of society); and implementing difficult solutions to problems (e.g., the Red Cross providing healthcare to political prisoners, something states often neglect to do) (241). Aall (2000) adds, in more general terms, that NGOs can help build long-term relationships in places, provide early warnings about impending conflicts, act as mediators when conflicts occur, seek international intervention, and raise funds or participate in reconstruction in the aftermath of conflicts (133).

**Why NGOs?**

NGOs have rapidly proliferated around the world in the past few decades. Why, though, would states want to fund or utilize NGOs? What makes NGOs theoretically interesting as a form of soft power? These are important questions to answer, since this project will explore the US's soft power in the War on Terror, *as expressed through funding and partnering with NGOs*. Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) work on transnational advocacy networks is an interesting place to start: they argue that such networks, made up of activists motivated by “principled ideas or values,” seek to influence states and international organizations in both domestic and international politics (1-2). NGOs are an important part of these networks, which emerge in issue areas where the access between domestic groups and governments is blocked. This leads to a boomerang pattern or effect, whereby domestic NGOs seek out international allies to exert external pressure on their state, with the goal of changing the state’s behavior or policies in some issue area. These transnational advocacy networks may also emerge with the presence of political entrepreneurs and conferences that provide links and contacts among networks (12).

Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) constructivist focus on values and norms is echoed by Nye (2004b), who argues that NGOs help to develop new norms in their quests to impact
the policies of governments and business leaders (87). Keck and Sikkink’s theory (1998) is a useful starting place, but in this project, I am reversing the direction of one relationship: NGOs do not have to seek out international allies, but instead states such as the US use NGOs to bring about change in a target country, in this case to help fight long-term or potential threats of terrorism in an expression of soft power. These external actors use their own INGOs, who may in turn fund and/or partner with SNGOs operating in the target country, such as Afghanistan, in order to bring about certain changes such as promoting democratic governance in an effort to fight the terrorist threat.

Risse-Kappen (1995) explores a similar concept of what he calls “transnational relations,” or interactions between national governments or international organizations with non-state actors (3). This fits in with Nye’s (2003) metaphor of world politics as a three-dimensional chess game, where the US leads in the top layer of “classical interstate military issues,” several powers lead the middle level of “interstate economic issues,” and a variety of players, including state and non-state actors such as NGOs, all wield power in the bottom layer of “transnational issues.” Surpassing Nye (2003), though, Risse-Kappen (1995) suggests that the impact of transnational actors on states will depend on variation in domestic structures and the presence or absence of international agreements and organizations, which he calls “international institutionalization” (6). Thus, a more state-dominated domestic structure will be harder for transnational actors to “penetrate,” while a more fragmented, less cohesive domestic structure with a more organized civil society will be more susceptible to influence by transnational actors (7). These theories about when and how non-state actors such as NGOs can influence state policies or behavior are useful from a different lens in this project: not the effectiveness of NGOs, but the circumstances under which the US is more likely to utilize them. The US government is more likely to use soft power, specifically by partnering with or funding NGOs, in circumstances where these
organizations can be more effective. Thus Risse-Kappen’s (1995) argument fits in with my earlier prediction that the US government is more likely to partner with NGOs in contexts where these organizations are allowed to flourish and the target country’s government places few restrictions over their activities.

States may choose to utilize NGOs for other reasons, and not just because they are given room to operate in certain countries. A great deal of scholarship has been done on the comparative advantages of NGOs, suggesting more specific reasons why states might wish to use NGOs. State funding of INGOs is distinct from bilateral foreign aid studied by other scholars (Meernik et al. 1998; Wang 1999). Furthermore, the comparative advantages of NGOs or INGOs make government funding of INGOs theoretically interesting as a kind of soft power. Evans-Kent and Bleiker (2003) write that in recent years, NGOs are increasingly popular organizations, seen as providing services that states cannot or do not wish to provide (103). They add that NGOs often have more credibility than states or IGOs among local populations and more contacts at the grassroots level, making them more effective in delivering their respective services. Tvedt (1998) and Ahmed and Potter (2006) add the flexibility of NGOs to the list: NGOs are private organizations not required to use the planning, evaluation, and reporting procedures as extensively as are government agencies. Furthermore, they suggest that NGOs can be more efficient than aid bureaucracies, and can quickly change the direction of projects that are deemed ineffective or face serious obstacles (105). Ahmed and Potter (2006) trace the trend of donor governments relying on NGOs to dispense official aid back to the 1990s, when the perceived comparative advantages of NGOs made them the “preferred vehicle for the provision of official development assistance” (55). Maragia (2002) makes the same point, calling NGOs “conduits” used by states to dispense development aid (331), and Tvedt (1998) points to their increasing utilization by states in foreign policy (112).
Another comparative advantage of NGOs is the trust they have among publics around the world; Nye (2008c) himself argues that NGOs should be utilized by governments in public diplomacy efforts to influence foreign governments and publics, since they are often trusted more than governments (105). In fact, the Edelman Trust Barometer conducted surveys in Brazil, India, Italy, China Japan, Germany, France, the UK, and Russia and found that in 2011, 61% of those surveyed said they trusted NGOs to “do what is right,” whereas only 52% of them trusted government (Edelman Trust Barometer 2011). Perhaps foreign publics in developing countries are wise in trusting NGOs more than their own governments. Kerlin (2006) writes that one reason US government agencies like USAID funnel assistance through INGOs is that these organizations are more dependable, especially when it comes to finances, than the foreign governments that are seen as financially corrupt (382). NGOs can also be more efficient and cost effective than governments when working with war-torn populations, and they have technical expertise in things like infrastructure projects, distributing goods and services, and helping to build emerging economies though programs such as micro-credit loans (Ward 2007, 49).

Adding to the list of the comparative advantages of NGOs, Mercer (2002) argues that NGOs are considered to play an important role in the democratization process. They are assumed to increase the strength and plurality of political institutions by working with grassroots organizations and representing poor, marginalized groups (8), as well as challenging state power (9). Mercer (2002) suggests that these assumptions can often be false, and that too much of the time, NGOs just reproduce and aggravate existing social cleavages (13), and thus their role in democratization will vary by context (19). Still, her discussion of the assumptions about the role that NGOs can play in creating civil society, and thus promoting democracy, is quite important. It fits in with policymakers’ common understandings about the role that democratization plays in fighting terrorism, a role also
explored in the literature (Windson 2005; Hobson 2005; Fandl 2006). It becomes clear from
Mercer’s (2002) suggestions, then, why US policymakers would choose to utilize NGOs as a
specific form of expressing their soft power to fight against a long-term or combined
terrorist threat.

**NGOs and Governments**

**Hypothesis 5:** The US government (through various agencies, such as USAID) is likely to utilize
a specific NGO as part of its soft power approach to fighting a long-term terrorist threat when
the preferences of the NGO align with those of the government, i.e., when the NGO does not find
a conflict between its own mission and the projects for which the US funds it.

**Hypothesis 6:** The US government (specifically the funding agency, such as USAID) is more
likely to continue to utilize a specific NGO in the fight against a long-term terrorist threat if
the relationship between them has been more cooperative and less confrontational. The US
government is less likely to continue to utilize a specific NGO in its fight against a long-term
terrorist threat (i.e. “non-engagement”) if the relationship between them has been more
confrontational and less cooperative.

The comparative advantages of NGOs illustrate why governments might want to
fund NGOs or utilize them as part of the War on Terror. The obvious caveat, though, is that
we cannot assume that the NGOs will always want to be “used” by governments. In fact, I
argue that the relationship between NGOs and governments, explored extensively in the
NGO literature, will impact the US government’s strategizing in its ongoing War on Terror.
Cooper and Hawking (2000) discuss the interaction between governments and NGOs in the
context of diplomacy. NGOs can “kick-start” specific issues and bring them to the agenda
(370), sub-contract for governments (372), or work with them as partners in projects like
humanitarian relief efforts (374). Reinmann (2006) clearly points out that the interaction
between states, IGOs, and NGOs does not just work in one direction where IGOs and states
may finance and dictate the actions of NGOs; the relationship is instead complex and
symbiotic (46). Thus, countries such as the United States and IGOs such as the UN partnered
with NGOs and began to rely on them to promote not only civil society, but neoliberal economics and democracy in the 1990s (Reinmann 2006, 60). On the other hand, many of these NGOs rely on states and IGOs for financing in order to carry out programs that promote policies related to neoliberal economics and democracy (Reinmann 2006, 51).

Despite a potentially symbiotic relationship between NGOs and states, some scholars consider NGOs to be at a disadvantage when they accept funding from governments. Edwards and Hulme (1995), for instance, suggest that Western donor governments effectively force NGOs to operate in social and economic services on a very large scale, in contexts for which the NGOs do not have enough capacity or comparative advantage in the long run. Putting NGOs in such a position takes away from their potential efforts in things like institutional development and advocacy, threatens the independence of NGOs, and poses problems for their accountability to local populations by emphasizing short-term outputs and quickly visible results (Edwards and Hulme 1995, 962). As Roy (2005) puts it, for NGOs, “supply defines demand—or more exactly, the donors decide what is desirable” (1008), thus shaping what NGOs may or may or may not do. Boris (2006) suggests that INGOs do not always have the same perspective of their funding government, and they actually work towards independence from their funders (27). Siddiquee and Faroqi (2009) describe a tension between NGOs having to implement the policy agenda of the donors, including governments, from whom they receive funding rather than their own social missions (245). Because of their financial dependency and their need for funding, NGOs may spend a great deal of energy trying to meet the accountability demands of these donors (Archi 2008). Countless works catalogue the challenges, expenses, and constraints upon NGO autonomy that such accountability demands from donors present (Tandon 1996; Wils 1996; Townsend and Townsend 2004; Bornstein 2006; Makuwira 2006; Abrahams 2008; Mutua 2009; Peter 2009; Szporluk 2009; Harsh et al. 2010, etc.)
More specifically, Smith (2006) points out potential conflicts that can take place between funding governments and NGOs: there can be disagreements over policies, services, clients, staff, internal organization, and procedures (235). The potential for conflict is particularly high in situations where NGOs are working with militaries, which, as Spearin (2008) points out, can include the US military or private security contractors hired by the US government. In such situations, NGOs often struggle to maintain their humanitarian ethic or mission, and more broadly, the NGO principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence (371). All of this possible tension between the two actors implies that NGOs must decide the extent to which they can submit to donor governments’ demands, and whether or not those demands are in line with the NGOs’ own mission and preferences, before deciding to accept funding from governments. Of course these preferences on the part of the NGOs in turn impact the viability of implementing a US soft or smart power strategy that relies on NGOs.

Not all INGOs that receive funding from governments have the same kind of relationship with those governments, and scholars have categorized these relationships in various ways. Coston (1998) comes up with a typology of government-NGO relationships: repression, rivalry, competition, contracting, third-party government, cooperation, complementarity, and collaboration. These categories are based on who has the power advantage, the formality or informality of government-NGO ties, the level of NGO input in policy planning, and which side benefits more. While Coston’s (1998) typology is a bit tedious and difficult to apply, Najam’s (2000) 4-category typology of government-NGO relationships is simpler and more relevant here. His categories are based on the different strategies and goals of each actor (NGOs and government): when both the goals and strategies of both the government and NGOs are similar, a “cooperative” relationship emerges. Similar strategies but different goals will yield “co-optation” of NGOs by the
government, while similar goals but different strategies lead to a “complementary”
relationship between the two. The worst-case scenario, so-to-speak, exists when both
strategies and goals of NGOs are dissimilar, leading to a “confrontational” relationship.
Interestingly, a fifth possibility exists for Najam (2000), “non-engagement” between the two
actors; I argue that a confrontational relationship between NGOs and the US government is
likely to lead to this outcome.

Najam’s (2000) typology is useful in explaining variation over time, i.e., the
persistence or termination of a US partnership with a specific NGO in the War on Terror.
Obviously, this categorization is subjective, and determining the nature of the relationship
will be an important part of the case studies in this project. The extreme case would be
when an INGO might decide to stop receiving funding and working with the US government.
For example, some NGOs, already receiving funding from a US government agency, may pull
out of military operations if they do not see eye-to-eye with US policy objectives (Spearin
2008, 372), or perhaps as they discover the before-unknown specifics of US objectives and
strategy.

Another important classification relating to NGOs relates to the kind of work that
they do. The National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS), which gathers and publishes
data on all NGOs registered in the US, lists 29 different categories for International NGOs
(nccs.urban.org). This categorization is very specific, but Kerlin (2006) breaks it down into
ten more manageable types of INGOs: general; international relief; health; education;
environment, population, and sustainability; economic; human rights, migration, and
refugees; democracy and civil society; agriculture; and science and technology. Kerlin
(2006) points out the categories of INGOs who received the biggest increase in government
funding between 2002 and 2003: in order, they are international relief, health, education,
democracy and civil society, and environment/population/sustainability INGOs (380). Furthermore, Kerlin (2006) points out that the US government tends to fund larger INGOs (381), perhaps because they are more established and more able to meet the demands and costs of grant-writing requirements (381). Gubser (2002) categorizes INGOs by their agendas, which include humanitarian aid, democratization, religion, and “people to people” activism (147). The kind of work that an INGO does is particularly relevant in this project that seeks to explain the formulation and implementation of US hard, soft, and smart power strategy in the War on Terror. As I posited earlier, it is expected that the US government through its agencies that fund NGOs, primarily USAID but also possibly the Department of Defense, State Department, etc. will fund NGOs who can carry out projects seen by the US government as combating the threat of long-term terrorism, based on the needs and political and economic situation in each respective country.

Control Variables

Executive Ideology and Preferences

In this theory, we must control for the foreign policy ideology of the President and his advisors, since this will impact the kinds of foreign policy strategies advocated by the executive. Since this project is concerned with policy decisions about what kind of power to utilize in fighting the War on Terror, the relevant characteristic here is the president and his advisors’ attitudes and ideological preferences towards military force. Do they favor a more hard power approach in fighting terrorism, or one based more on soft power that relies on the targeted powers of American persuasion, or a combination of the two? If they favor a combination, does that combination consist of more or less hard or soft power? By accounting for the ideological and leadership preferences of the President and his foreign policy circle, we can reach a starting point for this theory that begins with the US executive.
To this point, Sicherman (2005) makes a relevant argument. He distinguishes between presidents who are “hawks” and those who are “doves,” both of whom are “cheap,” ever-constrained by a lack of funds and preferring quick, inexpensive solutions to crises (361). So while “Cheap Hawks” such as President George W. Bush, as Sicherman (2005) calls them, recognize external threats but due to a lack of available resources, hoping that strong rhetoric alone can intimidate the enemy, “Cheap Doves” do not recognize a threat and thus take no military action against the enemy (364). Although Sicherman’s (2005) discussion of the “cheap” nature of hawks and doves is not particularly illuminating, his delineation between hawkish and dovish presidents is a useful one. Important to note is that hawkish and dovish ideologies are typically considered to correspond to party identification: Republicans tend to be seen as hawks, while Democrats tend to be seen as doves. Thus, I will control for executive ideology in this project, specifically preferences of using hard or soft power when dealing with security threats. More extensive tests of the relative significance of ideology in explaining US strategy are beyond the scope of this project, although they may be an important variable to test further in future research.

In taking ideology into account, we may encounter problems of endogeneity, i.e., a president might be labeled a “hawk” simply because he used force during his administration, thus discounting the explanatory power of ideology as a factor influencing his decision to use or not to use force. To avoid the endogeneity issue, I will be examining presidential preferences or ideology of each President before he assumed the role of Commander in Chief in the War on Terror. A president’s preferences before he actually became president or had to lead the War on Terror cannot be caused by his later actions in the War on Terror; thus, this control variable of presidential ideology cannot be endogenously affecting the outcome of variation in US hard, soft, and smart power strategy. Again, I treat this examination of ideology as a control variable: of course, these leadership
preferences are important as a starting point, but they will not alone determine the actual strategy that will be crafted. Instead, these preferences will interact with specific threat levels and with other actors; all of these variables together will shape what will become the actual counter-terrorism strategy. Another important point to make is that it is not necessary to explicitly use the “hawk” and “dove” terminology, but this terminology is discussed here because it is widely used and familiar to most people. Unlike what Sicherman (2005) suggests, however, a president who is more of a “dove” does not choose to “do nothing” in my theory, but may instead prefer to rely more on soft power tools, such as development aid, extensive diplomacy, and the like.

*US Power in the World*

It may seem obvious that a US executive (the President and his advisors) with more hawkish ideological preferences will favor hard power as a starting point for forging US counter-terrorism strategy and vice versa. Even so, it is important to control for this variable, as discussed above. Another factor influencing US strategy in the War on Terror, seen by some as “obvious,” relates to American power and hegemony in the world.

Some scholars suggest that the United States must rely more on soft power tools in dealing with other countries, particularly those that pose threats, because the US is not as powerful as it once was. Oglesby (2009), for instance, argues that particularly since the onset of the global economic crisis in 2008, the US has grown economically weaker. This economic decline, as well as the US’s decreasing military might around the world as a result of the considerable resources spent in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, has led to a situation in which the US “is no longer the dominant hub around which the world is centered” (94). Thus, suggests Oglesby (2009), the US must develop a new kind of diplomacy that takes seriously the plurality of voices, opinions, and interests of other
countries around the world in order for the US to maintain or reassume any global leadership it once had (97). This argument suggests that US policymakers’ choices to use tools of soft power is a kind of last resort, since a decline in hard power makes military options less and less viable ways to deal with emerging threats. Indeed, Nye (1990) himself, in his first work on soft power, countered the prevailing notion of American global decline by suggesting that the US could maintain its status of global dominance through soft power, even if its hard power was in decline.

The verdict on a decline in US power in the world is far from unanimous, however. In a book review, Layne (2011) compares Calleo’s (2009) suggestion that 2007 was the starting point of a decline in US hegemony with Norrlof’s (2010) more optimistic argument that in fact the US is still, and will continue to be, the world’s strongest power. Layne (2011) ultimately sides with Calleo (2009); for him, the Great Recession, the US’s inability to hold on to its role as the world’s strongest economic power, particularly vis-à-vis China, and the dwindling status of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency attest to the US’s global decline. Unlike Oglesby (2009), however, Layne (2011) does not indicate that a decline in US economic and military power makes it necessary for the US to rely more on soft power in its international relations. Instead, Layne (2011) suggests that American soft power, too, has suffered a major blow since the Great Recession, although he does not explain how or why.

Other scholars disagree with both Layne’s (2011) and Oglesby’s (2009) conclusions. Russett (2011), for example, proclaims that US military power is still unrivaled, and even American setbacks from the Great Recession have not taken away from its relative economic strength, even if its absolute strength has somewhat diminished (2). He also considers American soft power to be a factor that cemented American global hegemony in
the post-World War II era, but since his conception of the concept is limited to cultural power and influence (64), his discussion of American soft power is not relevant in assessing the extent to which US soft power strategies can be attributed to its relative strength in the world. In line with Russett’s (2011) assessment of American relative power, Davidson and Menotti (2009) argue that despite the Great Recession, the US maintains its “global primacy” and remains the world’s only “pole,” with more than twice the economic and military strength as the next country (14).

Alternatively, Kitchen (2010) suggests that soft power can be used to enhance the US’s hard power, clearly pointing to the importance of a combined smart power strategy to maintain US global dominance. He points to the example of US leadership under President Clinton, whereby the US embraced and promoted globalization as the new state of affairs. By turning more and more towards international institutions, particularly in the economic arena, the US was able to enhance its own economic hard power while using its soft power to influence other states’ preferences in alignment with its own. This resulted in unprecedented American global power in the 1990s, and Kitchen (2010) suggests that President Obama should focus more on increasing American structural power, including its economic dominance, in conjunction with his predilection for increasing American soft power, in order to avoid US global decline.

The issue of a decline in US structural, i.e., economic and military, power appears unresolved and must be further tested empirically, but is beyond the scope conditions of this project. In this dissertation, my argument here is that a consideration of using soft power tools in US counter-terrorism strategy, and the actual implementation of soft power, is not because of a decline in US hard power vis-à-vis other countries. Instead, I choose to focus on the variables outlined earlier in the chapter: that US executives consider, and in
some cases actually use tools of soft power in the War on Terror because of what they consider to be its merits, and not because they are short on hard power resources. Controlling for US relative power is thus important for this theory.

Power of Target Countries

I have argued above that the US is more likely to use hard power against a state that poses an immediate, short-term terrorist threat. While threat level is the primary variable of interest in explaining the US use of hard power, it is also important to consider something else: the capability balance between the US and the target country. As Geller and Singer (1998) summarize, most theories that explain international conflict assume rationality in state behavior, where states weigh the costs and benefits of military offensives. Scholars point to the correlation between a state’s initiation of a war and its later victory as evidence of this rational strategizing: a state is more likely to initiate a war if it expects to win (70). In other words, the US is more likely to use hard power against a state it deems to pose an immediate terrorist threat if the target state is weaker than the US. For instance, while the US went to war in Iraq and Afghanistan (relatively weak states) as part of its War on Terror, it would be unlikely for the US to wage a military offensive against a more powerful country like China, even if the US determined that China posed a short-term terrorist threat. It is not a coincidence that the US tends to use hard power against relatively weak states with relatively limited military capabilities.

Alternative Explanations

In this project, I do not claim to present a universal theory of US counter-terrorism strategizing. First, I am examining a very specific form of soft power, US government funding of NGOs, given the limited time and resources I had in carrying out this project. A variety of other forms of soft power could have been alternatively examined, including
American pop culture or the rhetoric of policymakers, among other things. In studying only NGOs as a particular form of soft power, I have no doubt constrained my theoretical explanation to variables relevant to NGOs. I have chosen to focus on the US executive’s assessment of threats, the socio-economic and political context of a target country, and the preferences of specific NGOs in this more rigorous theory explaining variation in US strategy in the War on Terror. However, a number of alternative or additional explanations are perfectly viable, but were simply beyond the scope conditions of this project.

For instance, the state capacity of target governments may impact US soft power strategy, even if we continue to examine NGOs as a form of soft power. Perhaps as the state capacity of the Afghan government increases or the corruption of the Afghan government decreases, the US government will prefer to fund the Afghan government itself, rather than NGOs, to carry out development projects. Such a shift would not necessarily mean a change in US soft power strategy, but instead a change in the way the US government operationalizes this strategy of funding development in a target country.

Alternatively, public opinion may influence the strategizing of the US executive, and this is a variable that I have chosen to leave out, as it is beyond the scope of this project. It may be worth testing in the future, however, whether US public opinion after the 9/11 attacks influenced President Bush’s quick decision to go to war in Afghanistan, or the extent to which public opinion impacted President Obama’s emphasis on Afghanistan, rather than Iraq, as the primary front in the War on Terror. Other factors, including the state of the US economy and the budget situation, may have also constrained the executive’s strategizing; these variables are not included in my theory, but may be important alternative explanations worth testing in future research.

**Research Design**
The research questions explored in this project have not been systematically addressed by scholars, perhaps because my theory brings together various literatures, on US foreign policy, terrorism, and NGOs. Partly because this project involves theory-building, this research cannot easily be carried out through a large-N, statistical regression analysis, as the data necessary to answer the research questions at hand is not all quantitative and is certainly not all available in one dataset. The first part of this research project will provide a general overview of the evolving US strategy in the War on Terror, beginning to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 and the effects of the control variables. Thus, Part I will examine the independent variables addressed above: the preferences or ideology of the President and his advisors, the relative power of the US, and the assessment and determination of the terrorist threat level (short vs. long-term) coming from specific countries. This “big picture” chapter seeking to explain War on Terror strategy over time will require obtaining data on actual hard power and soft power activities the US has carried out since the start of the War on Terror. In this part of the research project, I sought to trace the decision-making process by US policymakers in the various agencies involved in the War on Terror (DOD, USAID, State Department, Department of Homeland Security). The data for this part of the research project came from any documents or records from these agencies, speeches by policymakers, annual National Security Strategies, any published writings by advisors of President G.W. Bush and President Obama on the topic, the memoirs of policymakers, and, if necessary, journalistic accounts that helped illuminate the trajectory of the decision-making process. I also explored whether or not US relative power in the world has declined over time, and thus whether any soft or smart power strategy can be attributed to such a decline.

In order to measure the dependent variable of variation in US hard, soft, and smart power strategy over time and place, I traced US military expenditures related to the War on Terror over time and by country or geographic region, in Part I. This data was taken from
publications by the Department of Defense, such as its website and other public documents, as well as publicly available Congressional reports. Next, I gathered data on US financial support of NGOs in its War on Terror. Some of this data was available through the publications of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which catalogues its members’ spending on various forms of foreign aid. To get a closer look at the various NGOs funded by the US government, I drew on USAID publications, such as their annual reports documenting their partnerships with Private Voluntary Organizations, or PVOs (another name for NGOs). These annual reports document USAID grants to the NGOs, the country or countries in which they operate, and the kind of work that they do (http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/private_voluntary_cooperation/ 2010). I gathered similar data from the State Department and the Department of Defense, who also partner with NGOs or PVOs. Of course, not all NGOs financed by or partnering with these government agencies do work related to the War on Terror, so I narrowed down the list to NGOs or PVOs operating in contexts and regions related to the War on Terror: i.e., NGOs funded by the US government in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) as well as South Asia.

Merely measuring the money that the US government has spent on NGOs as the War on Terror has progressed will not be enough to explain the relationships between the variables cited above. The real test of hypotheses 3-6 comes in the form of more detailed case studies about particular countries. Thus, the rest of the research project involves country-level case studies on two countries where the US is fighting the War on Terror to determine how country-specific efforts in the War on Terror fit in with the larger strategy explored in Part I. Case selection is an important step in this research, and I followed what Gerring (2007) calls “diverse case” selection, where the goal is to achieve maximum variance and which requires at least two cases “that are intended to represent the full range
of values” of the variables under study (98). For categorical variables (such as different hard, soft, or smart power strategies), Gerring (2007) suggests that the researcher choose one case from each category (98). Afghanistan and Pakistan exhibit variation in US anti-terrorism strategy in its hard, soft, and combined forms. In Afghanistan, the United States is carrying out a full-fledged traditional war, but in Pakistan, the US is carrying out military operations on a much smaller scale, depending more on drones and special forces. US soft power strategy, i.e., funding and partnering with NGOs, also varies across these two cases.

For each case of these two cases, I began with an overview of US policy toward the country before Sept. 11, 2001, to provide some background and document policy changes post-9/11. Then to study variation in US War on Terror strategy in each country, I conducted an in-depth qualitative study to examine the independent variables of threat level, NGO preferences, capabilities, and experience, and the political, economic, and NGO context of the respective countries. This required drawing upon any US government documents assessing the threat levels of each country over time, as well as any government publications of US anti-terrorism strategy in each case, from such agencies as the Department of Defense, USAID, and the State Department. Explaining and mapping out the political, economic, and NGO context of each country required using secondary source material explaining those respective factors. It would be particularly useful to interview any USAID officials who can help illuminate US soft power strategy, expressed through funding and partnering with NGOs, for each country, if possible.

Another important component of these country studies will be examining the work of particular NGOs that receive US government funding or serve as partners with the US government. I selected between one and two NGOs from each of the two countries, based
on the amount of money the NGO received from the US government. If the largest NGO recipient of US government funding in Afghanistan is the same as the largest recipient of US government funding in Pakistan, for example, I choose the second-largest recipient so as to increase my case selection. I gathered data for this part of the case studies from USAID, State Department, or DOD records of funding and collaboration between the two. I also drew on financial data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) NCCS database, interviews with NGO administrators, and data from documents published by the NGO itself. For each case study, I gathered this data to answer questions such as the following: At what point did this NGO become involved in US anti-terrorism efforts in this country, if at all? Does it see itself as a partner of the US government in the War on Terror, or have its operations since 2001 simply been a continuation of programs in place before this US-led war? How much money does it receive from the government? What kinds of projects does it carry out in the country? To what extent is it involved with US military operations in the country? Does the NGO see itself as involved in any kind of “public diplomacy” with the people of each country? How have the answers to any of these questions changed over time? Has the NGO had to change some of its policies to meet the goals of its US government funders in the context of the War on Terror? How was such a change communicated to, and then implemented by, the NGO? Finding answers to such questions will help me explain the relationship between NGOs and the US government, testing hypothesis 5.

The Data-Gathering Experience

One of the difficulties of qualitative research designs is operationalizing and coming up with clear measurements for the variables under study. Unlike in quantitative research, I could not merely use available datasets measuring the relationship between the US
government and the NGOs it funds, for instance, or a dataset measuring how the president and his advisers decided to go to war in Iraq. Another difficulty that arises in this kind of research is access to certain kinds of data, most notably for interviews. Even when quantitative measures did exist for some of the things I sought to measure, such as the level of US government funding for civil society or NGOs in South Asia or the Middle East, I was still constrained by the availability of this kind of data. For instance, the OECD only had data on US funding of civil society or NGOs around the world from 2005-2010, while the War on Terror began in 2001 and continues to this day.

To measure the variable of the president and his advisers’ assessments of threat levels from various countries, I relied on some public speeches, and a great deal on the memoirs of President Bush and his foreign policy advisers. The ideal measurement here would be interviews with these officials, but access to them is very difficult at best, if not impossible. In some cases, as will become in Chapter 4, the accounts of President Bush’s advisers collided, adding to the difficulty of measuring this variable and analyzing the data. I also relied on government documents, such as the National Security Strategies and National Strategies for Combating Terrorism, to measure what the executive saw as the threat level and relevant strategy was for particular countries and regions.

In order to measure the second independent variable, the socio-economic and political contexts of particular countries, I had to rely on second-hand accounts, including data from the CIA World Factbook and historical accounts by other scholars about US strategy in particular countries. Even to measure a subset of this independent variable, the NGO regulatory environment, I had to rely on second-hand accounts by organizations monitoring NGO activity in various countries. I was able to get some additional information from the interviews I conducted on the regulatory environment within Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Perhaps ideally, I would have conducted field research in Pakistan and Afghanistan to really be able to measure the regulatory environment there, or even to add nuance to the measurements of the socio-economic and political needs of those countries, but the obvious security risks, as well as the expense and time limitations, prevented me from doing that.

I measured the final independent variable, the preferences and capabilities of particular NGOs funded by the US government and the subsequent relationships between these two actors, through documents published by the NGOs themselves, as well as some documents published by NGO umbrella organizations, such as InterAction. Most of the data for this variable, though, came from the interviews with NGO workers themselves in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and this data-gathering component of the project was particularly challenging. The biggest problem was gaining access to people in these organizations who were willing to talk to me; many organizations declined to answer my questions, saying they were too busy or that the issues I wanted to discuss were rather sensitive. It appears that the biggest concern of these NGOs was the security risk posed to their employees in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and thus many were unwilling to answer any questions about their relationships with the governments of the country in which they worked. Even the NGO workers that I did speak to were very careful in how they discussed the environment in the country in which they worked, and about their relationship with USAID. Perhaps they were concerned about risking future funding opportunities from USAID if they were overly critical or open in their accounts, even though I promised them anonymity. The apparent sensitivity of the data I was trying to gather made measuring this variable particularly challenging.
Finally, I measured the dependent variable, the actual soft, hard, and combined power makeup of US strategy in the War on Terror, using a variety of sources. This data included Congressional Research Service reports on military spending, OECD data on US funding of civil society and NGOs in South Asia and the Middle East, and USAID and State Department documents and even blogs documenting their respective activities and funding of various development and humanitarian assistance projects in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Gathering this data was easier than collecting the interview data outlined above.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented not only my revised concept of what soft and smart power are, but also my theory of US strategy-making as it draws on hard, soft, and smart power in the War on Terror. I have argued that the US executive begins its counter-terrorism strategizing based on its ideological preferences and that any considerations of soft power strategies cannot be attributed to a relative decline in US power. The next step of the strategy-making process is the US executive's assessment and determination of the threat level coming from a specific context: short-term vs. long-term potential for terrorism. When facing a short-term terrorist threat, the executive is more likely to use hard power, while it is more likely to decide to use soft power when facing a longer-term terrorist threat. Wherever a combined threat exists, the US executive will use combined or smart power, whose relative makeup of hard and soft power depends on the proportion of short-term or long-term terrorist threat.

The kind and degree of soft power that the US executive decides to use in countries where it has determined that a long-term or combined terrorist threat exists will be influenced by the political, economic, and the NGO regulatory environment of those countries. I argue that the specific economic and political problems of a country will shape
what kinds of NGO projects the US will fund in that country. Furthermore, the US
government will likely use more soft power in the form of NGOs in countries that place
fewer restrictions on those organizations. In this way, the political and economic needs of a
country with a combined terrorist threat, as well as its government’s friendliness to NGOs,
will influence the makeup of smart power the US uses in that country. In this project, I
examine US soft power as expressed through funding and partnering with NGOs. To this
end, my theory has explained the importance of NGOs as an actor—US soft or smart power
that utilizes NGOs will be impacted by the goals and capabilities of these NGOs.
Furthermore, the relationship between the NGOs and the US government after their initial
partnership will impact future US strategy. This qualitative research project seeks to
explain the big picture US strategy in the War on Terror and its evolution over time, also
looking to specific country cases to further understand and untangle the relationships
between the respective variables. Such a dual approach will allow me to test this theory
explaining the use of US hard, soft, and smart power in the War on Terror.
CHAPTER 4

OVERVIEW OF US STRATEGY IN THE WAR ON TERROR

Introduction

No matter how often this has been said, and however much of a cliché it has become, it remains true that the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon dramatically changed the course of US history, its foreign policy in particular. Soon after the attacks, President George W. Bush announced the start of what became known as the War on Terror, a name that was later modified by President Obama to the “War on Al-Qaeda.” The US launched wars in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, and pursued counter-terrorism operations across the globe. Military power was not the only tool used; the US has also persistently used soft power over the course of the War on Terror, at some times more than others, and often soft power has been combined with military or hard power. This chapter provides a big-picture examination of the overview of the United States’ War on Terror strategy over the last ten or so years, specifically its hard, soft, and combined components.

I will demonstrate that US hard, soft, and combined strategy has evolved over time and place, in variation that can be at least partially explained by variation in threat levels (short-term, long-term, or combined) acknowledged to be emanating from different geographic contexts over time. More specifically, I find support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 discussed in the theory chapter: the US executive is more likely to use hard power when facing a short-term terrorist or security threat, as demonstrated by the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the surges there. Alternatively, the executive is more likely to use soft power when facing a long-term terrorist or security threat, as evidenced by US foreign aid to conflict-ridden or unstable countries, as well as the emphasis on democracy-
building in the Middle East and South Asia. More often, however, the US faces a combined, short-term and long-term threat, and in such cases a combined hard and soft power strategy is implemented, as evidenced not only by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also US hard and soft power targeting countries such as Pakistan.

**The 9/11 Attacks and Immediate Response**

Although George W. Bush’s two-term presidency has been defined by his role in leading the War on Terror, and he is considered a war President, that was certainly not clear when he was first campaigning for office in 2000. In fact, in a presidential debate on October 12, he refused to make a blanket statement about the direction of US foreign policy, arguing only that as President, he would do what was in the “best interest of the country,” dealing with important issues like peace in the Middle East (Bush 2000a). Furthermore, Bush (2000a) argued, the US needed to be “humble,” in the world, and at the same time “project strength in a way that promotes freedom.” So while he said in the debate that he supported the NATO operations in Kosovo to remove Slobodan Milosevic, he wanted the US to withdraw its troops and trade them for European boots on the ground instead. Bush the presidential candidate declared (2000a) that he was “worried about over-committing our military around the world,” and that as President, he would be “judicious” in deploying the US military. Thus sending US troops to Haiti was not a good idea, he claimed, since it was just an example of “nation-building” that was not really effective in transitioning the country into democracy. The US should not try to impose its way of life on other countries around the world, Bush (2000a) concluded.

A couple of months earlier, during a campaign speech in Miami, Bush the presidential candidate had pledged his commitment to focusing on Latin America, because “those who ignore our hemisphere do not fully understand American interests” (Bush
Thus, he promised that under his leadership, the US would further commit to democracy and freedom in Latin America, as well as dealing with issues like clean water, illegal immigration, criminal justice, poverty, debt reduction, and expanding free trade between the US and other countries in the hemisphere (Bush 2000b). In her memoirs of her time serving under President George W. Bush, Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote (2011) that throughout the 2000 campaign, and in the early days of the Bush Presidency before the 9/11 attacks, the executive was concerned with foreign policy issues such as missile defense, reducing offensive nuclear spending, relationships with emerging democracies such as India, and US-Latin American relations, an issue on which the President was particularly well-versed (7). Rice (2011) suggested that upon taking office, the US executive’s foreign policy goal was “simply to calm the [Middle East] region,” but nothing more than that (54). Miller (2010) describes the initial foreign policy of George W. Bush as a mixture of defensive (multilateral) and offensive (unilateral) realism, concerned with the global balance of power. For instance, the President was concerned with increasing the power of the US military so as to compete with Russia and China and he was generally opposed to humanitarian intervention (Miller 2010, 50-51). Vice President Cheney and Secretary Rumsfeld, were, Miller (2010) claims, hawkish offensive realists even before 9/11 (52). More generally, Lindsay (2011) suggests that before 9/11, President Bush was more focused on domestic, rather than foreign policy, issues (766).

So while many may consider Bush a warmonger President, one who led the US into war and used hard power all too easily, it is clear that he did not come into office with a clear plan of going to war or with a strong disposition to wielding US hard power around the globe. It would be difficult to classify Bush, then, as a “hawk,” in line with Sicherman’s (2011) categorization, before the 9/11 attacks. An explicit contrast can be drawn between the President and Donald Rumsfeld, a close advisor to President Bush, and his first
Secretary of Defense. In his memoir, Rumsfeld (2011), who had worked for decades in the
White House prior to serving under President G. W. Bush, wrote that President Carter
should have increased the defense budget after the Soviet Afghan invasion, and that the
1979 American hostage situation in Iran “prov[ed] again that weakness is provocative”
(260). This was a favorite quote of his, and a statement that he repeated to Pres. George W.
Bush when asked to serve as his Secretary of Defense: “Weakness is provocative. But so is
the perception of weakness,” he told the then President-elect, and went on to explain that
US national security had been “undermined” for years by a lack of decisive foreign policy
leadership and action (283), such as the US retreat from Lebanon under President Reagan
and the US retreat from Somalia under President Clinton (268). In his first months as
Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld (2011) dealt mostly with Russia and China (305), rather
than the Middle East or countries harboring terrorists. Still, it is clear from his
preoccupation with the projection of US strength around the world to preempt any
perceptions of weakness, that Rumsfeld was predisposed to using US hard power in various
contexts, probably much more extensively than the President himself, even before 9/11. We
might easily consider him a “hawk.” And certainly Secretary Rice and Secretary Powell did
not always agree with him; President Bush (2010) likened Powell and Rumsfeld to a “pair of
old duelers who kept their own pistols in their holsters, but let their seconds and thirds fire
away” (87). These differences within the US executive became clearer in the debates leading
up to the US invasion of Iraq, as will be discussed later. The important point here is that
there are no clear indications that President Bush came into office seeking to go to war, or
even considering the use of hard power as the primary tool of US foreign policy, even
though some of his advisors, such as Rumsfeld, had clearer preferences for showcasing US
hard power.
If the American public was shocked by the 9/11 attacks, it would seem that the US executive—the primary actor of interest in foreign policy decision-making—was also taken aback. President Bush (2010) described his initial reaction to the attacks, writing, “My first reaction was outrage. Someone had dared to attack America. They were going to pay” (127). Further expressing his anger in rather strong language, he wrote, “My blood was boiling. We were going to find out who did this, and kick their ass” (128). Dick Cheney, President Bush’s Vice President, had a similar reaction on 9/11; he wrote (2011) of his realization that defending and protecting the US would “require going on the offense” and defensive measures would not be enough (333). Interestingly, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote that immediately after the 9/11 attacks, he remembered the Beirut bombing that killed American Marines more than two decades before: for him, the United States’ “hesitant” and “feckless” responses to terrorist attacks over the years made attacks like the one on 9/11 possible (343). This sentiment appears perfectly in line with Rumsfeld’s preoccupation and ongoing concern about the demonstration of US hard power strength around the world; in his eyes, its absence had made the US vulnerable.

It appears that all the primary foreign policy actors of the US executive (the President, Vice President, Secretaries of Defense and State, and National Security Advisor) agreed that a US military or hard power response to the attacks was inevitable. President Bush himself told Secretary Rumsfeld hours after the attacks that he considered them “an act of war,” and they immediately agreed to escalate the military readiness level of the US armed forces to DefCon Three, for the first time since 1973. In the same conversation, the President told Rumsfeld that as soon as they had dealt with the “immediate crisis,” he “planned to mount a serious military response” (133). Vice President Cheney (2011) and Secretary Rumsfeld (2011) both recalled that on the day of the 9/11 attacks, the President and his foreign policy advisors discussed the threat of Iraq and whether or not the US
should launch a military response against that country. Rumsfeld (2011) wrote that “I had no idea if Iraq was or was not involved,” but the only responsible reaction would have been to consider the possibility (347). President Bush (2010) recalled that Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz tried to push for attacking Iraq at the same time as Afghanistan, with Rumsfeld’s support, although Secretary of State Powell and CIA Director George Tenet did not support such an attack (189). Ultimately, Cheney (2011) wrote, they decided that Afghanistan “should be first.” As Secretary Rice (2011) recalled, even before the official decision was made, in the deliberations right after the attacks, the President’s foreign policy advisors “all knew” that the US would declare war against the Taliban and go to war in Afghanistan; the strategy sessions were more about figuring out the details and specifics than about making the big decision (83). Thus, it is clear that in the face of a direct attack on US soil, the US response, led by the President, was to use hard power against what was a short-term terrorist threat.

Indeed, it would appear that President G. W. Bush led the American public to expect no less. In a speech from the White House on September 11, 2001, the President told Americans, “Our military is powerful, and it’s prepared” (1). Furthermore, the President made it clear that the US would target not just the perpetrators themselves, but also those who gave them sanctuary. He recalled that in his speech to the American public on 9/11, he announced that any nation who harbored terrorists was responsible for their actions (Bush 2010, 137). Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the US executive’s goals were to prevent another strike, and make clear to Americans and to the world that “we had embarked on a new kind of war” (Bush 2010, 140). This idea, that the US War on Terror was a new and unique global effort, has persisted in the years since its conception. Vice President Cheney (2011) wrote that intelligence, stopping terrorist support, and dealing with states using and selling weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) were all priorities “in this new kind of war”
Secretary Rumsfeld (2011) even went so far as to declare that he never liked the term the “War on Terror” because it connoted military action when intelligence, law enforcement, public diplomacy, the private sector, and other aspects of national power were all part of the struggle (352). This not only indicates the uniqueness of the US effort, but also reflects Rumsfeld’s view on the necessity of using soft power (e.g., public diplomacy) in conjunction with military and other kinds of power in this ongoing struggle. Secretary Rice (2011) also mentioned the broad scope of the War on Terror, and its focus “on terrorists with global reach who threatened our way of life and that of our friends and allies”; this war was against not just terrorists but terrorism itself (98).

Although the US executive is the most important decision-maker in US foreign policy, Congress still has a role to play. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Congress demonstrated its full support for the President’s determination to exert US hard power in response to the attacks. On September 14, 2001, Congress passed a war resolution that authorized the President to use force against states, organizations, or countries that had perpetrated the attacks, as well as any groups or states that had helped plan or carry out the attacks or shelter the perpetrators, so as to prevent future terrorist attacks on the US (Bush 2010, 154). President Bush suggested that this resolution was the basis for all his future actions in the War on Terror, which he saw as legitimized by Congress despite future criticisms that would be directed at his foreign policy decisions. “In the years ahead,” he wrote, “some in Congress would forget those words. I never did” (Bush 2010, 155). Bush (2010) also described ongoing reports of threats from Al Qaeda and Afghanistan, from the days after 9/11 all the way up to the start of the US invasion of Afghanistan.

Thus, when President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, his ultimatum to Afghanistan’s Taliban government was in keeping with his earliest
reactions to the 9/11 attacks. In his speech, the President demanded that the Taliban give up all Al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan, release all foreign citizens in their custody and protect all foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers, close all terrorist training camps, and give the US access to the camps to make sure they are closed. “[The Taliban] will hand over the terrorists,” Bush (2001) declared, “or they will share their fate” (11). Describing the wide scope of the War on Terror, the President explained that the US would use “every resource at our command,” including diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, and weapons, to disrupt and defeat Al Qaeda (12). From the onset, it is clear that the President's strategy included a combined approach of hard and soft power. Furthermore, this would be a long war, a “lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen” (12). And, in words that became hallmarks of what the War on Terror was all about, Bush famously declared, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime,” and presumably a US target (12). This speech made clear the US's intention to wage a military campaign against the Afghan government unless the Taliban conceded to the President's demands.

Sure enough, the Taliban did not heed the US ultimatum, and on October 7, 2001, the US began its offensive in Afghanistan, marking the start of a war it is still waging today. President Bush (2010) explained his decision to go to war, arguing that it was vital to protect American national security: “Removing al Qaeda’s safe haven in Afghanistan was essential to protecting the American people...We were acting out of necessity and self-defense, not revenge” (184). Vice President Cheney (2011) elaborated on the goals of the war in Afghanistan: the US needed to “take out al Qaeda, take down the Taliban,” and make sure that no other terrorist operations could be carried out from that country (340). Rumsfeld (2011) recalled the numerous meetings he had with several regional leaders right
before the US invasion of Afghanistan. These included the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Egypt, Uzbekistan, and Turkey, all of whom the US asked for help and cooperation in the upcoming war (379). The suggestions of Uzbek President Karimov particularly resonated with Rumsfeld (2011), who remembered the former’s suggestion of the necessity of “putting an Afghan face on the conflict” and having humanitarian aid accompany military operations in an effort to ensure the support of the population (384).

Indeed, Rumsfeld (2011) wrote that in the first 48 hours of the US military campaign in Afghanistan, the US dropped 210,000 food rations over the country (387). On this point Secretaries Rumsfeld and Rice agreed, despite the persistent frictions between them over the years, disagreements described by Rice (2011) as a “professional conflict” (18). Rice (2011) recalled that early in the US-led Afghan war, “freeing Afghan women emerged early as a policy goal,” adding a humanitarian element not just to the US’s justification for the war, but also impacting the war strategy itself. Also from the beginning, Andrew Natsios, head of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), led much of this humanitarian work that went along with US military action in Afghanistan (91). Even in his speech upon the start of the US war in Afghanistan, President Bush (2001) announced to the American public that the bombing had begun in a campaign that included allies such as Canada, Australia, Germany, and France, as part of a global war against terrorism. This war, already drawing on diplomacy, intelligence, freezing assets, and arrests of terrorists, would also involve dropping food and medical aid to civilians in Afghanistan (17). About a month later, in his address to the UN General Assembly in New York, President Bush discussed US and other countries’ aid to Afghanistan in the forms of food and medicine, explaining that the US had already dropped 1.3 tons of food and 20,000 blankets over the country. Furthermore, the President declared that the US would work with the UN and development banks to ensure reconstruction after the conflict (42). From
the outset, then, the US war in Afghanistan, while foremost a military campaign, also contained elements of soft power. The exact makeup of this combined power would vary over the course of the Afghan war, as will be discussed later on. Overall, President Bush (2010) described the decision to attack aggressively in Afghanistan as a “departure” from weaker US responses to attacks. Almost echoing Rumsfeld’s (2011) logic, Bush wrote that terrorists had understood weak US responses as weakness and “an invitation to attempt more brazen attacks” (191).

From the beginning of the US war in Afghanistan, Pakistan became an ally of the US in its War on Terror, although relations between the two countries would become rockier over the years. President Bush (2010) wrote that Pakistan had “a troubled history with the United States” and after President Musharraf came to power in a military coup, US aid to the country was almost nonexistent. Days after 9/11, however, Secretary of State Powell spoke to Musharraf and confronted him with several demands, including condemning the attacks, not allowing al Qaeda sanctuary in his country, breaking diplomatic relations with the Taliban, and cooperating with the US in its war against al Qaeda and terrorism. Musharraf pledged his support for the US (188), marking the beginning of what would become a strange and tenuous partnership between the two countries. Secretary Rice (2011) described President Musharraf as a “flawed partner” from the beginning, a leader from whom the US needed action and not just pledges of support. The US pressured him to make arrests and freeze assets of suspected terrorists (125), something that happened a few months later, in December 2001 and January 2002 (126).

The US war in Afghanistan was the first major military offensive in the US War on Terror, initiated just weeks after the 9/11 attacks. As President Bush (2001) declared in a November 2001 speech at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, “Afghanistan is just the beginning of the
war against terror” (46). And yet this was a very important beginning, where the US decided to attack the country and send ground troops there “until the Taliban and al Qaeda were driven out,” leaving room for a “free society” to take root (Bush 2010, 191). The former President described the offensive in Afghanistan, named Operation Enduring Freedom, as having four phases: first the US would send special forces and the CIA, then begin an air campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, accompanied by humanitarian air drops, then send in US and coalition partner ground troops, and finally, the US would stabilize the country and work with the Afghans to create a free society (Bush 2010, 194). Bush the Republican nominee had derided “nation-building” as antithetical to US interests and a waste of US effort during the 2000 presidential campaign. However, as President he saw it as important to not only rid Afghanistan of dictatorship, but also to rebuild the country, i.e., engage in nation-building, because of both a “moral obligation” and a “strategic interest” in doing so (205).

Former Vice President Cheney also suggested (2011) that the US went to war in Afghanistan to defend the US from future attacks, and that should remain the priority ten years later. Rather than being concerned with how long the US would stay in the country, the US objective should be making sure that the Afghan security forces could defend their country; thus a strong, probably lengthy US commitment to the country was necessary, so that the US could avoid the mistake it made in the 1980s when it left the country after the Soviets were defeated (Cheney 2011, 347). Interestingly, in a tone different from that of former President Bush (2010) or former Vice President Cheney (2011), former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld (2011) recalled warning the President against an over-extended US commitment to the war there. He told President Bush, “We ought not to make a career out of transforming Afghanistan,” and should instead limit the goal to fighting terrorists, rather than trying to democratize the country (398). Yet, Rumsfeld (2011) maintains the US
executive’s position that the US offensive in Afghanistan was not just a military struggle, writing that as early as October 2003, “it was clear that bullets alone would not win the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan,” and that an ideological struggle against what Rumsfeld terms “Islamism” was an important part of this effort (669).

These accounts by President Bush and his foreign policy advisors illuminate the initial US strategy in the first months after the 9/11 attacks: the US executive decided to use hard power against the actors it held responsible for the attacks, and those it deemed to represent a short-term security or terrorist threat. Thus the President authorized the use of force against Afghanistan less than a month after the 9/11 attacks. Equally important to note, however, is that the US did not rely only on a hard power strategy in this War on Terror: in Afghanistan, for instance, the US also dispensed humanitarian aid to the population. I have argued that this use of combined power, where soft power accompanied the military offensive, can be explained by the US executives’ determination that both short-term and long-term security threats existed in Afghanistan, and the former should be dealt with through soft power to help win over “hearts and minds” to the US side. The US invasion of Afghanistan as a response to the 9/11 attacks, as well as its accompanying soft power efforts in the country, clearly supports my first and second hypotheses: the US executive is more likely to use hard power when facing an immediate, short-term terrorist or security threat from another country, and more likely to use combined power when facing a combined, short-term and long-term threat.

The 2002 National Security Strategy

Less than a year later, the US would issue a National Security Strategy, which would be updated in 2006 and 2010. In the President’s letter accompanying the official strategy, Bush (2002) wrote that the United States had a “duty” to protect the values of freedom,
education, and property rights. Because it was a country with unmatched military power and political influence, the US would seek to "create a balance of power that favors human freedom" whereby countries could choose political and economic liberty for themselves (1). In pursuing such a balance of power, the US would fight terrorists and tyrants, build positive relations with other great powers, and encourage freedom around the world to defend, preserve, and extend the peace using tools of the military, law enforcement, intelligence, and disrupting terrorist financing (1). Here Bush (2002) introduced the doctrine of "pre-emption," or, "as a matter of common sense and defense, America will act against such emerging threats [including WMDs] before they are fully formed" (2). The US would also act to support democracy, economic development, free markets, and free trade across the country, dealing with weak states that could be dangerous and vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists and cartels (2). To that effect, the National Security Strategy (2002) consisted of several parts, including "encourag[ing] change" in the direction of democracy (3) and utilizing foreign aid to support freedom and those who peacefully seek it (4). Defining the enemy, the National Security Strategy (2002) declared it to be "terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents," and as President Bush had declared earlier, the US would not differentiate between terrorists themselves and those who supported and protected them (5). The US would act with regional partners against terrorists, providing such allies with military, political, and financial aid, but "we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively" to prevent terrorists from harming the US (6).

The National Security Strategy (2002) presented another important principle or facet of this struggle, reflecting the unique nature of the War on Terror and perhaps explaining why the US would draw upon both hard and soft power while waging this war. The War on Terror was not just a war against terrorists but also a "war of ideas," whereby
the US needed to convince others that terrorism was an illegitimate tool, support moderate, modern governments, particularly in the Muslim world, focus resources on “at risk” areas most vulnerable to terrorism, and use public diplomacy “to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism” (6). Thus, in Afghanistan, the US was working with the UN, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other countries for humanitarian, political and security aid to rebuild the country (7).

Furthermore, the Strategy (2002) mentions the UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey that featured a new goal to help nations help themselves, as well as the subsequent establishment of the Millennium Challenge Account to countries who reform in the direction of democracy and free enterprise (21-2). Education, HIV/AIDS, health, nutrition, water, sanitation, and agricultural development (22-3) were all important areas for the US to address in developing countries. Thus, as the US executive saw the country facing a combined threat, i.e., not just short-term security threats but also long-term threats from weak, failing, undemocratic states, it laid the groundwork for a combined hard and soft power strategy.

At the same time, the National Security Strategy (2002) discussed the role of building US power and capacity: “It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge” (29). Not only must the US overcome any vulnerability to a military challenge, but the President needed a broader range of military options available to him in this long war (30). This is an important point, one that dispels any suggestions that the US uses soft power in its foreign policy simply because it cannot use military strength. The National Security Strategy (2002) spoke to the contrary, arguing for US international superiority and preemption when necessary, as well as the importance of promoting development and dealing with poverty, public health problems, and the like, the latter all domains of soft power. In other words,
despite being primarily lauded (or disparaged) for its doctrine of preemption, this National Security Strategy (2002) also advocated a combined (or "smart power") approach that uses both hard and soft power in the War on Terror. As Dunn (2006) suggests, it "signal[ed] a greater willingness to wield [the United States'] diplomatic and military power in pursuit of its threatened state of security" (23). Put another way, both hard and soft power (and any smart power combination of the two) were possible policy tools according to the overall doctrine outlined by the first National Security Strategy. To this end, the Strategy (2002) also called for more funding to the State Department (30), which would interact with NGOs and other international institutions and engage in, among other things, public diplomacy (31). Specific humanitarian goals included building up police forces, enhancing legal codes, local governments, and electoral systems across countries (National Security Strategy 2002, 31). As former Secretary of State Rice (2011) commented, the Strategy (2002) emphasized the use of various tools in the War on Terror, including intelligence, disrupting terrorist finances, promoting open markets, and the importance of making development assistance conditional on good governance reforms through programs like the Millennium Challenge Account (155). Of course, even with a clear strategy that calls on using a combination of hard and soft power, the makeup or proportions of each varies across time and place, as will be discussed later.

In his memoirs, the former President himself described what came to be known as the Bush Doctrine, whose principles were outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, as one in which the US sees no difference between terrorists and those who harbor them, and a determination to fight the enemy abroad before they attack the US, or to “confront threats before they fully materialize” (396). Quinn (2008) points out that this doctrine of preemption often stands out as the most memorable part of the National Security Strategy (2002), but this principle is actually tempered by a commitment to a "balance of power that
favors freedom” also discussed in the Strategy (41). Aside from the doctrine of preemption, other key elements of the National Security Strategy (2002) include the centrality of values like democracy and economic liberalism, values declared to be universal and would thus be actively promoted by the US. Furthermore, the Strategy (2002) also emphasizes that all Great Powers can cooperate to realize these goals (Quinn 2008, 42). But the irony, as Quinn (2008) points out, is that the US is the one who can identify what the “common interests” are, and the Strategy (2002) also emphasizes the necessity of maintaining US military hegemony (44).

Dunn (2006) also comments on the Bush Doctrine as gleaned from the 2002 National Security Strategy in the context of US grand strategy. This strategy in general, and the doctrine of preemption in particular, was a departure from what Dunn (2006) refers to as the containment and deterrent policies that had been the overarching principles and strategies of US foreign policy for the previous fifty years. Miller (2010) agrees that the preemption component of the Bush Doctrine marked a change in US grand strategy. Instead of the defensive (multilateral) liberalism that promoted the US ideology emphasizing democracy and market economies since the end of the Cold War, the Bush Doctrine demonstrated an offensive, or more unilateral, liberalism leading to hegemonic behavior, as exemplified by the Iraq War (46). Under this new doctrine, regime type was seen by the US executive as increasingly more important because it would dictate a country's behavior, and thus regime type became linked to US and global security. Furthermore, tyrants were seen as potential sponsors of terrorists, signaling a greater threat to the US (48).

The 2002 National Security Strategy, and the ensuing Bush Doctrine, make clear the specifics of US strategy in the first few years of the War on Terror. The US would use hard power against terrorists who posed an immediate security threat to the US and its allies, but
it would also wield force against those who harbored such terrorists or provided them with sanctuary. Perhaps the ultimate expression of this hard power strategy was the doctrine of preemption, whereby the US would act alone against such short-term threats to the US. At the same time, the Strategy (2002) indicated that the US would use soft power efforts, such as development aid and democracy promotion, in vulnerable countries so as to stave off what could become immediate terrorist or security threats. In other words, the 2002 National Security Strategy provides further evidence for my first and second hypotheses, that the US executive will use hard power against what it sees as immediate terrorist or security threats, soft power against long-term security threats, and combined power against combined threats.

The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

The US executive released its first National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism just a few months after publishing its 2002 National Security Strategy. This second Strategy (2003) explained its function as supporting the 2002 National Security Strategy, but while the latter dealt with preventing attacks on US soil, the Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003) would deal with the identification and counteraction of threats before they could reach US soil (1). Like the 2002 Strategy, this 2003 Strategy defined the enemy as terrorism (1), and against which the US in its War on Terror would “use every instrument of national power,” including military, diplomacy, economic strength, law enforcement, intelligence, and information (1). The US would use all of these tools to pursue a counter-terrorism strategy that would “initially disrupt, over time degrade, and ultimately destroy the terrorist organizations,” relying on international support when possible, but acting alone and preemptively when necessary (2).
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003) went into detail about the background and structure of terrorism, suggesting that underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, and ethnic conflict are exploited by terrorists to recruit members and justify their causes. The international environment can make their movement easier and may give them a physical base, and their leadership at the top “breathes life into a terror campaign” (6). Thus, a loss of leadership can be very disruptive for a terrorist organization. Terrorist organizations can operate within a single country, such as Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, or they can operate regionally, as does Jemma Islamiya, or, most destructively, they can operate globally, a reach epitomized by Al Qaeda (8-9). In order to combat these terrorist groups, the Strategy (2003) discussed four fronts in the War on Terror: defeating global terrorist organizations by attacking safe havens, leadership, communications, and resources; and denying more sanctuary and sponsorship of these groups by making sure states take responsibility under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (11). The third front involves diminishing the conditions exploited by terrorists, focusing on at-risk areas and working with international community to do so, and finally, the fourth front seeks to defend the US homeland, citizens, eliminating threats as early as possible (12).

To meet these broad goals, the National Security for Combating Terrorism (2003) put forth specific methods of implementation: identifying terrorists and their organizations and locating them (16), and destroying them through law enforcement, military power, targeting their financing, based on strategies that varied by region (17). Furthermore, the US sought to end state sponsorship of terrorism and to arrive at international standards of accountability relating to terrorism (18), to form and maintain international coalitions for this struggle (19). To this end, the US would work with “willing and able states” through alliances such as NATO, and would “enable[e] weak states” by helping them fight terrorism through legal, law enforcement, and military training, as exemplified by US efforts in the
Balkans and the Philippines (20). Finally, the US would try to persuade “reluctant” states less willing to cooperate, perhaps for security reasons, through measures such as diplomacy and financial assistance. States unwilling to cooperate in this global War on Terror would be held accountable (21). And in a specific explanation of how the US would use soft power in this extensive war, the Strategy (2003) declared that the US would try to “diminish underlying conditions” exploited by terrorists through supporting economic, social, and political development in vulnerable states, often by working with the international community to fight instability, and to rebuild countries. To this end, the US would work with governments, NGOs, and public-private partnerships, in programs such as the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative (23). The Strategy stated that NGOs were key players in combating terrorism, and the US would work with them to “prevent terrorists from taking advantage of their services” (18), presumably a reference to allegations that terrorists were using some charitable organizations as a front to funnel money for their operations. Also declared in the Strategy (2003) was the United States’ intent to use “effective, timely public diplomacy” and government-sponsored media to promote open information and support people’s freedom around the world (24).

Like the 2002 National Security Strategy, this 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism indicated the US’s intent to deploy hard power (to disrupt and eliminate terrorist groups and governments that sponsor them) as well as soft power (to stabilize vulnerable countries and get rid of economic and political grievances) in the War on Terror. The Strategy (2003) does not clarify the proportions of each kind of power in this intended combination, and as I have argued earlier and will demonstrate later, the use of each kind of power will vary by context. In any case, this Strategy (2003) provides further evidence in support of my second hypothesis, that the US executive is likely to use a combination of hard and soft power when dealing with a combined short and long-term threat. More
specifically, these Strategies together suggest that soft power would be targeted at countries and communities, hard power would be targeted at terrorists, their organizations, and those who protected them, and smart or combined power would be targeted at contexts in which both existed.

The War in Iraq

The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism was released in February, at the same time that the US was preparing to go to war in Iraq. As former President Bush (2010) wrote, after the 9/11 attacks, “we had to take a fresh look at every threat in the world,” and Saddam Hussein was deemed by the US executive as posing an imminent security threat to the US because of his history of sponsoring terrorism, firing at US aircraft, defying 16 UN resolutions, using WMDs, and, according to the intelligence of the time, his determination to produce and use more WMDs (229). Bush (2010) and Rice (2011) commented on the link the administration made, in their case to go to war in Iraq, between al Qaeda and the dangers posed by the Iraqi regime, writing that in the summer of 2002, the US received intelligence that Zarqawi, a figure affiliated with Al Qaeda, was working in a lab in Iraq, possibly to produce biological weapons. Vice President Dick Cheney recalled (2011) that even before 9/11, in late 2000, the US received reports of an Iraqi threat and WMD-related activities (367). He argued (in retrospect, of course, years after it became clear that Saddam Hussein was not in possession of WMDs) that after the 9/11 attacks, “there was no place more likely to be a nexus between terrorism and WMD capability than Saddam Hussein’s Iraq” (369). Interestingly, the issue of responsibility for 9/11 itself and Iraq was a contentious one within the Bush administration; Rice (2011) wrote that even though the CIA demonstrated that “there was simply no convincing case to be made for a link between 9/11 and Saddam,” Vice President Cheney and his staff “were absolutely convinced that
Saddam was somehow culpable” (170). Nevertheless, it appears that by late 2002, at least, there was agreement among members of the US executive that Saddam Hussein posed a direct security threat to the US.

Thus, Bush’s (2010) and Cheney’s (2011) accounts both indicated that in the months after the 9/11 attacks, the US executive determined the US to be facing an imminent, short-term terrorist threat from Iraq, mandating that the US go to war there. Cheney (2011) recalled that there was bipartisan agreement in Congress about the threat coming from Iraq, as evidenced by the testimonies of Senators John Kerry and Hilary Clinton and Congressman Rockefeller (392). Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (2011) wrote in greater detail about the specific warnings of a WMD threat from Iraq. In August 2002, CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin presented evidence that Iraq had rebuilt facilities for chemical and biological weapons, had biological warfare capabilities, and that the country’s nuclear weapons experts still resided there (Rumsfeld 2011, 433). In October 2002, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq concluded that the country had gone on with its WMD programs and had rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities (433). Furthermore, the Estimate suggested that Saddam Hussein did indeed wish to acquire weapons of mass destruction and might seek terrorist assistance to attack the US (434).

Finally, in October 2002, Congress passed an Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq (Rumsfeld 2011, 436). Before actually beginning the war in Iraq, however, Rumsfeld (2011) recalled that President Bush knew it was “desirable” to have approval from the United Nations Security Council to take action in Iraq, although it “was not a necessary precursor to military action” (440), as the National Security Strategy (2002) clearly indicates. Rice (2011) suggested that a UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq was important not so much for the legitimacy of US action, but in order to “clear up
any ambiguity about where the international community stood” (180), perhaps to send a strong, unified signal to Saddam Hussein. The UNSC obliged and passed Resolution 1441, indicating that Saddam Hussein would face “serious consequences” if he did not comply with the demands of the international community, but as Rice (2011) indicated, this broad language did not make it clear what those consequences would be (184). Thus, at the urging of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a stalwart US ally, the US sought a second UNSC resolution explicitly authorizing the use of military force in Iraq, in an attempt to garner French and German support (Rumsfeld 2011, 442). The second resolution infamously failed to pass, and the French and German governments vocally opposed the US invasion of Iraq, a stance Rumsfeld (2011) referred to as a “regrettable position” (443).

In the end, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein a 48 hour ultimatum to comply with US demands, including “com[ing] clean” about his WMD program. After Saddam Hussein ignored this warning, President Bush authorized the use of force in Iraq in March of 2003, a decision based on the President and his advisors’ assessment that “the only logical conclusion was that [Saddam Hussein] had something to hide, something so important he was willing to go to war for it” (224). Former Secretary of State Rice (2011) explained the US decision to invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein in a similar way, arguing that “we believed we had run out of other options” in dealing with him (187). Presumably responding to claims that the US should not militarily impose democracy on other countries (a constant refrain of critics of the Iraq War), Rice (2011) wrote that the US did not invade Iraq to democratize the country “any more than Roosevelt went to war against Hitler to democratize Germany” even though in Germany, after Hitler’s defeat, democratization became a US goal (187). Instead, the US went to war in Iraq because “we saw a threat to our national security and that of our allies” (Rice 2011, 187). Thus, in March of 2003, the US and 33 coalition countries sent troops to Iraq (Rice 2011, 204). Despite the extensive
controversy surrounding the Iraq invasion, it is clear that the US executive at the time saw itself as facing a short-term terrorist or security threat from Saddam Hussein, and subsequently decided to use hard power against that regime, in line with the prediction of my first hypothesis.

President Bush (2010) indicated that even before the US war in Iraq commenced, the administration worked on a reconstruction plan, working with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and creating the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (249). It is clear that from the beginning the US planned for some sort of combined power, where rebuilding and reconstruction, efforts that would require soft power, would accompany or perhaps follow the initial military offensive. Eventually, the US engaged in deep efforts to bring about democracy in the country; former Vice President Cheney (2011) regarded these efforts not as the US “impos[ing] democracy at the point of a gun,” as critics alleged, but as fulfilling an “obligation” to make sure that post-Saddam Iraq represented the US values of democracy and freedom (387). Similarly, former Secretary Rice (2011) indicated that while the US goal in invading Iraq was not the imposition of democracy there, President Bush thought that after the military campaign, “an affirmation of the United States’ principles” should follow, which translated into democracy-building. The logic behind this later effort was that a democratic regime would spill over into the rest of the Middle East and “address the freedom gap” that was a source of terrorism (187). Interestingly, former Secretary Rumsfeld appears to have disagreed with the President, the Vice President, and then National Security Advisor Rice: he wrote (2011) that he advocated more limited US goals in Iraq and a more limited role for US reconstruction in the country, with room for more efforts by the UN. “I did not think [that] paving roads, erecting power lines...and organizing democratic governmental bodies were missions for our men and women in uniform” he writes, and he sought to avoid Iraqi
“dependency” on US troops (482). Thus, Rumsfeld (2011) wrote, he did not see democratization as part of the US role or goal in Iraq, simply because it was too difficult of a task (500).

This disagreement over US goals in Iraq translated into different preferences for the kind of strategy or power to be employed there: a more limited military campaign as Rumsfeld (2011) envisioned, without extended reconstruction and democratization efforts, would require mostly hard power. On the other hand, a mixed campaign where the US sought regime change but also (ultimately) democratization, as preferred by the President, Vice President, and NSA/Secretary of State, would require a greater combination of hard and soft power. Ultimately, the President would decide not to follow Secretary Rumsfeld’s suggestions and the US would indeed expend a great deal of money and effort in rebuilding and trying to democratize Iraq. Rumsfeld (2011) indicated that USAID, the National Security Council, and the State Department all coordinated on planning for a postwar Iraq, including creating the Future of Iraq project in the State Department (485). Paul Bremer, the US interim leader in Iraq, instituted the Achieving Vision to Restore Full Sovereignty to Iraqi People program, which included improving water delivery, health care, and civil society in the country, all efforts, which Rumsfeld (2011) argued, exceeded the Defense Department’s plans and resources (513). Former Secretary Rice (2011) also wrote about early postwar planning in Iraq, which involved strategies on how to end the war, humanitarian concerns, reconstruction, and political arrangements for a new interim government (190).

Thus the US created not just the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (192) and the Iraqi Interim Authority (193), but also the Iraq Stabilization Group, months after the US-led invasion (242). Rice (2011) wrote that by 2004, Congress had approved $18.4 billion for Iraq reconstruction, money that was used for revitalizing
agricultural lands, schools, hospitals, clean water, bridges, pipelines, and an electric grid. In retrospect, she added, it may have been more efficient to pursue reconstruction through smaller and more local projects, a shift that would take place in 2004 and would be magnified during the civilian and military surge of 2007 (268-9).

In any case, all of these reconstruction projects are examples of the US deploying soft power, of course in combination with the military offensive or hard power in the country. It would appear, then, that the US initially went to war in Iraq (i.e., used hard power) as a response to what it determined was a short-term terrorist or security threat. Shortly thereafter, the US executive pursued reconstruction, development, and even political reform or democratization in order to stabilize the country, not just fulfilling a moral obligation on the part of the US, but also to prevent further security threats (or deal with long-term threats) from the country, as Rice (2011) indicates. This provides further support for my second hypothesis: the US executive is more likely to use combined power against what it sees as a combined threat. Thus what we might call the second major stage of the US War on Terror involved using combined power: hard power against what was seen by the US executive as an immediate terrorist or security threat, as well as soft power to rebuild the country and counteract more long-term security threats against the US. US strategy in this second front of the War on Terror was not very different from its strategy in the first front (Afghanistan), insofar as combined power was used in both contexts.

**Updated Strategies in 2006**

A few years into the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq and halfway into President Bush's second term, the US executive released updated versions of both the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The National Security Strategy (2006) featured a more pointed emphasis on spreading democracy; President Bush
wrote in the accompanying letter that for the past four years, the US has had "two inseparable priorities" of winning the War on Terror and "promoting freedom as the alternative to tyranny and despair," making the promotion of democracy in the Middle East a priority, for example (1). Thus, the National Security Strategy (2006) documented US progress against tyranny around the world, including the removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, as well as witnessing reforms in Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, the Color Revolutions in Eastern Europe, and moves toward democracy in Africa, Latin America, and Asia (2). For the first time, the National Security Strategy (2006) made a clear delineation between short-term and long-term approaches to the War on Terror: in the short run, the US would use military force to kill or capture terrorists, cut off their funding, and prevent their access to WMDs. In the long run, however, “winning the war on terror means winning the battle of ideas,” since ideas can transform people with grievances into terrorists (National Security Strategy 2006, 9). This latter, long-term effort presumably depends more on soft power tools, including ones used to promote and institute democracy, which could help counteract some of the grievances that give rise to terrorism in the first place (10).

US victory in the War on Terror would require winning the wars in Afghanistan in Iraq, according to the National Security Strategy (2006), by “consolidating” success in Afghanistan and continuing with political, security, and economic actions in Iraq (12-13). The Strategy (2006) also highlighted the growing threat of the Iranian and North Korean regimes and their violation of non-proliferation treaties, declaring, “we may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran,” where the ultimate goal for the US is the opening up of the Iranian political system and the protection of freedom there. To that end, the US would block threats from that country while increasing its engagement with the Iranian people (20). While the US had a "strong preference" for dealing with these nuclear
threats through diplomacy with allies, preemption was still in place as a strategy, the National Security Strategy (2006) continued (23).

An ongoing emphasis on promoting economic growth and trade agreements was also evident in the National Security Strategy (2006, 25-31) in an extension of what was outlined in the 2002 strategy. The Strategy (2006) catalogued US development efforts around the world, including the Millennium Challenge Account, the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, and assistance to Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (31-2). Perhaps most significant in its discussions of the use of soft power, the National Security Strategy (2006) also outlined the new US “transformational diplomacy,” which it defined as “working with our many international partners to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system” by promoting “good behavior” among countries (33). In line with this new direction, the Strategy announced a new position of a Director of Foreign Assistance in the State Department, who would also be the head of USAID; this Director’s role would be to more effectively coordinate an overall US foreign assistance strategy (33).

The National Security Strategy (2006) ended by describing US goals in specific regions around the world, including the promotion of economic development and the expansion of democracy in Africa (37), seeking a more democratic, economically liberal Middle East, with a democratic two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reform in US allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, supporting people against tyranny in Syria and Iran, and democracy in Iraq (38). In Pakistan, the US was “eager” to witness more stability and democracy (39), and the US acknowledged China’s growing economy and calls for peace and reform there (41). More generally, the National Security Strategy (2006) called for supporting the State Department in the new transformational diplomacy, including
increasing public diplomacy around the world through foreign exchange programs, dialogue with Muslim leaders, and citizen ambassadors (44-5). In the end, though, this National Security Strategy (2006) came during a time of war, and it updated its description of the enemy as not just “terrorism” (as in the 2002 NSS), but as “militant Islamic radicalism” (36).

Overall, the National Security Strategy (2006) featured a stronger commitment to democracy promotion around the world, particularly in the Middle East, than did the National Security Strategy of 2002. Again, this kind of goal would require more soft power, rather than hard power. This strategy provides support for my second hypothesis: the US executive would use a combination of soft and hard power when facing a combined terrorist or security threat. During the same year, the US executive also released an updated version of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006), which repeated the refrain of the War on Terror being both “a battle of arms and a battle of ideas” being waged by the US and using military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement tools (1). Like the National Security Strategy issued that same year (2006), this National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006) delineated between short-term and long-term points of focus in the War on Terror, this time with more detail about terrorist groups and their activities. Thus, for the short run, the Strategy (2006) declared the goal to be capturing and killing terrorists, making sure they do not have safe havens or access to weapons of mass destruction, increasing security in potential target areas, and cutting off terrorist funding and resources (7). Echoing the National Security Strategy (2006) and demonstrating that this National Strategy for Combating Terrorism did indeed function as a supplement to the former, the latter proclaimed that in order to win the “battle of ideas” that is the long-term goal of the War on Terror, the US seeks the “advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy” around the world (9). To complement the effort of democracy promotion, the Strategy (2006) described a US commitment to promoting economic
development, border control, and stronger justice systems in vulnerable, failing states (16), particularly with international coalitions and partnerships such as NATO, the EU, the African Union, ASEAN, and the OAS (19).

As evidenced in part by the National Security Strategy (2006) and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006), it is clear that the latter years of the Bush Administration were characterized by a shift in strategy. This shift was not so monumental as to replace the use of hard power or military action with soft power through development assistance, but it appears to have involved an increased emphasis on democracy promotion and development (both goals that require soft power methods) as a means of ensuring US national security. Former President G. W. Bush (2010) described this so-called “freedom agenda,” the last piece of the overall Bush Doctrine, as a commitment to “advance liberty and hope as an alternative to the enemy’s ideology of repression and fear” (397). Former Secretary of State Rice (2011) described this freedom agenda and the shift it represented in the US War on Terror strategy more clearly. When she became Secretary of State in Bush’s second administration, she recalled that much work needed to be done “to strengthen” US diplomacy itself, as well as people’s perceptions of it (290). Thus, the second Bush administration, epitomized through the new Secretary of State, featured a stronger diplomatic emphasis and a shift away from unilateralism, according to Rice (2011), whereby “our interaction with the rest of the world must be a conversation, not a monologue” (298). Moving in this direction meant some reorganization within the State Department, including a new combined position of “Under-secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs” (309), a new Bureau of South and Central Asia, so that the region would be lumped together with Afghanistan rather than Europe (313), as well as the establishment of a Civilian Response Corps in 2006 for post-conflict reconstruction (314). Demonstrating the
US’s increasing attention to Iran, Secretary Rice (2011) also created an Iran desk in Dubai, as there had been no Iran desk prior to that time within the State Department (313).

Aside from just an energetic diplomatic surge on many regional fronts, other changes took place within the second Bush administration. Former Secretary Rice (2011) described the evolution of the last part of the Bush Doctrine, or the freedom agenda, as evolving around 2005 “from the tactical goal of pursuing al Qaeda to creating a strategic agenda for freedom in the Middle East,” as highlighted by President Bush’s Second Inaugural Address (325). In this speech, which focused on a new, or at least, expanded, US goal of promoting freedom around the world, the re-elected President suggested that the only way the US way of life, its very liberty, could persist was if freedom was spread across the globe: “The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.” Working toward this goal, which the President admitted would be the “concentrated work of generations,” was “not primarily the task of arms,” although the US would continue to use force if necessary. Instead, the US would encourage democratic reforms in other countries, stand with people seeking freedom, and work with allies in this “concerted effort of free nations to promote democracy,” a struggle that was “a prelude to our enemies’ defeat” (Bush’s Second Inaugural Address 2005).

Former Secretary Rice (2011) described this expanded US focus on democracy promotion as a doctrine whereby “U.S. interests and values could be linked together in a coherent way, forming what I came to call a distinctly American realism” (325). This was similar to the post-WWII era, when the US combined its interests, which involved maintaining a certain balance of power in the world, with its values of democracy and liberty, in its strategizing, presumably through programs like the Marshall Plan. In the
Middle East, then, while the "immediate problem" was capturing al Qaeda terrorists, protecting US security, and preventing the proliferation of WMDs (326), "only the emergence of democratic institutions and practices could defeat terrorism and radical political Islam," and thus the "long-term strategic shift in the way [the US] defined our interests" was necessary (328). This shift bore fruit through the establishment of programs like the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, kicked off at the Forum for the Future in 2004, which (using soft power, of course) brought together civil society and governments in order to press for reform (Rice 2011, 328).

Sharp (2005) describes the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative as involving development and reform efforts by several countries to promote both economic and political liberalization in the Arab world. At the first meeting in Morocco, twenty world leaders from around the world met and pledged a total of $60 million for business development in the region (Sharp 2005). The following year featured a number of meetings and conferences of civil society groups in Istanbul, Sanaa, Venice, and Rabat, discussing issues such as women's empowerment, political pluralism, and electoral reform (BMENA US Department of State Archive). Incidentally, the Middle East Partnership Initiative is a State Department program continuing to this day, currently working with civil society groups in the region to promote change in line with the Arab Spring uprisings (MEPI website), perhaps reflecting a shift in US foreign policy goals in the region. In any case, President Bush’s new Freedom Agenda, which initiated programs like the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, represented a change in the way the US executive calculated or considered US interests: promoting democracy, particularly in regions like the Middle East that were plagued by a long-term threat of terrorism, became an important strategy not just because it was in line with US values, but because the establishment of democracies in the region would help eliminate the terrorist threat and ensure greater US security.
Former Secretary Rice (2011) catalogued other changes she implemented as the new Secretary of State in the second Bush Administration. As alluded to in the 2006 National Security Strategy, USAID became part of the State Department because, as Rice (2011) wrote, it was a constant problem not to have budgets and goals of the two agencies in sync (341). So while it was “controversial” to create a new office of the Director of Foreign Assistance within the State Department (426), it was important to demonstrate that instead of just focusing on one development issue at a time and ignoring others, the reform would ensure her belief that “development assistance ought to support broader US foreign policy objectives” of promoting democracy and good governance, even if USAID objected (427). Other changes that Rice (2011) put in place included a rather symbolic new practice of greeting both members of the military and civilian workers when she visited war zones such as Kabul and Baghdad, symbolizing that “there was no tidy division between the tasks of the warriors and those of the diplomats” (343), perhaps reflecting Rice’s commitment to a US combined or smart power strategy. More concretely, dealing with the shortfall of “civilian expertise” in Iraq, the former Secretary established Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq, borrowed from a presumably effective or successful experience in Afghanistan. These groups were a “kind of hybrid force” combining military officers, diplomats, and reconstruction workers from a variety of organizations who worked together in conflict areas, helping to secure the people’s support in Iraq by providing economic assistance, reconstruction, and promoting good governance (372). These PRTs were another quintessential example of the US utilizing combined or smart power in war zones that had earlier presumably been the domain of just military power.

The Freedom Agenda and its accompanying programs and efforts, including an increased emphasis on economic development and political reforms in war zones, demonstrated a clear change in the second Bush Administration toward goals and strategies
that would rely on more soft and combined power. Eriksson and Norman (2011) catalogue some of these changes that took place pointing out that in the first Bush administration, the term “soft power” was not used explicitly in explaining or discussing US strategy, and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld even famously said that he did not know what the concept meant. By President Bush’s second term, however, “more emphasis was put on public diplomacy [a subset of soft power] and its budget [was] somewhat strengthened,” and Secretaries Rice, Powell, and even Gates increasingly used the term in their descriptions of US counter-terrorism strategies (430-1). Even former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, whom I have referred to earlier in the chapter as one of the hawkish figures within the Bush administration, wrote that a few years into the War on Terror, he consistently called for more civilian power in the military to “bolster our military’s expanding humanitarian efforts” such as relief after the tsunami in Indonesia in December 2004. This kind of assistance noticeably shifted public opinion in the region more favorably towards the US, and by engaging in such humanitarian and relief efforts, “We did well for America by doing good” (624). Another example was US military help in Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake; there, too, public opinion increased in favor of the US rather dramatically (624). The Secretary of Defense’s call for more civilian-military integration is certainly a prime example of a shift toward a more combined or smart power strategy in the War on Terror; the goal of improving public opinion towards the US, as we have seen in strategy documents over the years, is certainly in line with “winning the hearts and minds” of specific populations to help counteract the threat of terrorism emanating from the Muslim world.

What we might call the third stage in the War on Terror, marked by the updated National Security Strategy (2006) and National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006), did not take the War on Terror into new geographic fronts, nor was this stage characterized
by notable increases in US hard power efforts. Instead, as illustrated by the documents discussed above, this stage of the War on Terror featured a shift towards *more* soft power in what was already a combined power strategy: the use of US military force in Afghanistan and Iraq was affirmed, but US democracy promotion in the Middle East also took center stage. This increasing emphasis on soft power may be due to an acknowledgement of an increased long-term security or terrorist threat around the world, in line with my second hypothesis. It may or may not be the case that the long-term threat suddenly increased from non-democratic, under-developed countries, but the shift towards more soft power in promoting democracy through Bush’s Freedom Agenda at the very least signifies an increased acknowledgement by the Bush administration that the US faced a long-term security or terrorist threat from non-democratic countries. As such, it was in the US’s security interests to more firmly and emphatically promote democracy, particularly in the Middle East, which would require the use of more soft power.

**The Surge**

Important changes in US War on Terror strategy were also put in place on the military front. As former President Bush (2010) described it, the initial military strategy in the country was “as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down” (356). In other words, the US would slowly scale back its military efforts in the country until Iraqi forces were in a position to take over their own security. However, after the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Bush wrote (2010) that al Qaeda found a new haven in the country (358). Former Vice President Cheney (2011) added that by 2006, the increase in bloodshed in the country was profound, partly because al Qaeda had entered the country and was killing Shi’a Muslims and Americans, and Sunnis were fighting an insurgency against the US occupation (436). It was clear that the strategy of Americans standing down so Iraqis could stand up
“wasn’t working” (438), and some tactical change had to be implemented. Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld (2011) pointed to the bombing of the Shi’a Samarra Golden Mosque in February of 2006 as a turning point in the Iraq War, a harbinger of increased violence and sectarianism in the country (679). Cheney (2011) described “the surge” in Iraq, as it came to be known, as a counterinsurgency strategy with the goal of protecting Iraqis, trying to gain control of and secure Baghdad and then capturing the enemy, all the while engaging in more contact with the local population (450). In January 2007, the President made the decision to send 20,000 extra troops to Iraq, mostly to the capital Baghdad, as well as to Anbar province, which was “the home base of al Qaeda in Iraq” (455).

Former Vice President Cheney (2011) alleged that Former Secretary of State Rice (2011) was opposed to the surge in Iraq (449), but she presented a somewhat different version of the story. Rice (2011) wrote that she saw the surge as a strategy through which the US would integrate both military and civilian counterinsurgency efforts, deploying Americans among the Iraqis “to deliver populations security, reconstruction, and governance” (547). In what sounds like a surge in US smart or combined power, rather than just military power in Iraq, Rice (2011) added that part of the surge was the President’s request for a dramatic increase in the budget of the State Department to support not just the efforts of the surge per se, but also the overall new shift to transformational diplomacy. This increased budget added 245 new positions in various countries, including 57 new positions in the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, as well as a $6 billion dollars of supplemental funding for US efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon (555). Also included in this additional funding was money to supplement the PRTs in Iraq, which was important because as Rice (2011) described it, “there was little distinction between war and peace” there and the teams working on governance and reconstruction efforts often worked in areas of high security risk. While there was some back-and-forth
between the State and Defense Departments about who would lead the PRTs, Rice (2011) wrote that in the end, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were led by the State Department, and they are “one of the really successful experiments of the Iraq war” (557).

It is important to note that Bush (2010), Cheney (2011), and Rumsfeld (2011) all pointed to a deteriorating security situation in explaining the decision to undertake a surge in Iraq. In other words, they suggested that an increase in a short-term military or terrorist threat made it necessary for the US to increase its military efforts in response. Rice (2011), in her description of the surge as a combined or smart surge involving both military and non-military elements, pointed to the shortage or lack of US efforts addressing more long-term terrorist/military threats due to diplomatic, development, and reconstruction efforts that were not extensive enough for US strategic interests. In other words, not only can the threat level (short-term, long-term, or combined) explain an initial decision to use soft, hard, or combined power, but an acknowledged change in the threat level can help explain a change in the degree to which a certain kind of power is used, e.g., an increase in military forces in a given context.

President Bush’s decision to carry out the surge in Iraq, whether we consider it in purely military terms as Bush (2010), Cheney (2011), and Rumsfeld (2011) seemed to do, or as a surge in combined soft and hard power, as Rice (2011) did, was highly controversial at the time. Dyson (2010) references the former President’s distinct personality traits as useful in explaining his decision in selecting the surge policy, against the advice of members of his Cabinet, military leaders, and members of Congress (557). The Former President’s closed-mindedness prevented him from acknowledging the failure of the Rumsfeld-Casey plan (where Americans would stand down as Iraqis stood up), his stubbornness limited the remaining options under consideration (575), and his risk acceptance made the choice of a
strategy—viewed skeptically by many and seen as unlikely to be effective—an actual possibility (576). Former President Bush’s personality and leadership traits did not feature characteristics like cognitive flexibility, an open advisory system, a deep personal involvement in details, or pragmatism, which scholars such as George (1980) see as vital for good presidential decision-making. Yet, concludes Dyson (2010), Bush made the decision to undertake the surge because of his unique cognitive style and leadership (585). Later on, of course, politicians who supported the strategy, including Senator John McCain, could point to it as a success (Donnelly 2008, *The New York Times*).

While “the surge” is a term used to refer to the dramatic increase in troop levels in Iraq in 2007, former President Bush (2010) described another surge that took place around the same time. By late 2006, he wrote, the US strategy in Afghanistan needed adjustment partly because of limited coordination between countries in rebuilding efforts, coalition partners’ restrictions on what their troops were allowed to do in the country, and corruption (211). Because of these factors, Bush ordered what he called a “silent surge” in late 2006 of 10,000 extra troops in the country. The US also increased its Provincial Reconstruction Teams there and sent more civilian experts from the US to work with the Afghan government (212). Because of what appeared to the US executive as an increase in both a short-term security threat (including limited action or capabilities on the part of coalition partners) and a long-term security threat due to corruption and problems with rebuilding, then, the President authorized an increase in both military power and soft power in the country—this is in line with the predictions of my second hypothesis. Rice (2011) recalled that by 2008, when she visited Kandahar, the PRTs were not functioning very smoothly, however, and “it looked as if the civilians and military had no idea what each other was doing” (636). Rumsfeld (2011) made a similar complaint, arguing that though the PRTs in Afghanistan were working with local leaders on both military and non-military
projects, not enough coordination existed between the military and civilian components, leading to a situation where most of the work ended up being military (687).

Despite the lack of coordination between military and civilian efforts in Afghanistan, this fourth stage in the US War on Terror was characterized by “surges” in military or hard power in both Afghanistan and Iraq. According to Secretary Rice, the same period marked an increase in diplomatic and civilian efforts in Iraq as well. The important point here is that the emergence of a new threat in a new place is not necessary for a shift in US strategy to take place—shifts in degrees of threat levels acknowledged by the US executives are also significant, leading to shifts in degrees of different kinds of power used in various contexts. In what I called the third stage of the War on Terror, discussed in the section before this one, the US strategy with an increased focus on democracy promotion, or the Freedom Agenda, reflected an acknowledgement that the long-term terrorist threat against the US existed in countries throughout the Middle East, as well as in the war fronts of Afghanistan and Iraq. In this fourth stage of the War on Terror, the increase in the degree of hard power used in those same two countries, or the “surges,” was a shift in US strategy orchestrated to deal with what was acknowledged to be an increasing short-term terrorist or security threat against the US. These two sets of changes in the degrees of soft and hard power employed in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively, provide further evidence for my second hypothesis, that the US executive is more likely to use combined power, with varying components of hard and soft power, where it sees various combinations of long-term and short-term security threats.

**Enter Obama**

After eight years of War on Terror leadership by President Bush and his team, a new political figure emerged on the foreign policy scene. Even before he was elected president,
during the presidential campaign against Republican John McCain, Obama’s position was that the policy in Iraq had been a failure, as the US had sent too many troops to Iraq and not enough troops to Afghanistan. At a campaign event in July 2008, for example, the Democratic candidate Obama declared that “This war [in Iraq] distracts us from every threat that we face and so many opportunities we could seize. This war diminishes our security, our standing in the world, our military, our economy, and the resources that we need to confront the challenges of the 21st century. By any measure, our single-minded and open-ended focus on Iraq is not a sound strategy for keeping America safe” (Boston Globe 2008). As Senator, Obama had voted against the US invasion of Iraq, and throughout the campaign he continually lambasted his opponent McCain for having supported the Iraq War. In the first Presidential Debate in September 2008, for instance, Obama repeated that McCain had been wrong about the Iraq War from the beginning, and like other US policymakers had failed to predict the counter-insurgency and sectarian violence that would rip through the country (CNN 2008). At the same time, presidential candidate Obama did not run on a “dovish” platform that would avoid war at all costs. In his speech accepting the Democratic party nomination on August 28, 2008, Obama declared that as president, he would “never hesitate to defend this nation,” but would only send troops overseas with a “clear mission” and the necessary logistical support for them to fulfill the job at hand. At the same time, Obama emphasized “tough, direct diplomacy” to deter Iranian nuclear weapon ambitions, and a commitment to building partnerships across the globe to tackle the various challenges of the 21st century (http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/campaign2008/dnc2008/speeches/obama.html).

In some ways, Obama’s positions on foreign policy were not very different from George W. Bush’s in 2000: the US would use military force when absolutely necessary—and Obama viewed the war in Afghanistan as one such example, where the US should actually
scale up its military offensive. Of course, as has been explored in detail above, after the 9/11 attacks, former President Bush increasingly looked to hard power as a primary way of meeting US foreign policy objectives, namely, security, especially during his first term. Obama’s campaign, which revolved around the theme of change from the Bush Doctrine and other Bush policies, also focused on the need for the US to use what we can term more soft power around the world: more diplomacy, engagement, and a reliance on partnerships with other countries. Ideologically, then, it would be difficult to classify the candidate Obama as a “dove” a la Sicherman (2011), but neither is he clearly identifiable as a “hawk”: he appears to have advocated a mixed approach, of smart or combined power. Lindsay (2011) emphasizes the sharp ideological differences between Bush and Obama, suggesting instead that the two had “two competing US foreign policy visions” (765). While former President Bush’s vision was more offensive, President Obama was “rejecting the core principles of Bush’s worldview,” and specifically what the current President saw as Bush’s failure to appreciate the impact of globalization and the necessity for diplomatic engagement because the US could not do everything on its own (765). At the same time, Lindsay (2011) concludes, both had one thing in common, which was a “conviction that other countries both wanted and needed US leadership” (765). Thus, Lindsay (2011) describes President Obama as a foreign policy “pragmatist” who would use hard power when necessary but also use other forms of power like diplomatic tools and foreign aid to achieve US foreign policy goals (773). In any case, candidate Obama pledged that as President, he would “end the war in Iraq responsibly” (http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/campaign2008/dnc2008/speeches/obama.html). Ultimately, this position translated into US withdrawal of its combat troops from Iraq by the end of 2011, almost two years after Obama took office.

A Shift in Strategy
Obama had made another significant campaign promise, vowing to refocus US military efforts on Afghanistan, which was, unlike Iraq, the legitimate military front of the War on Terror. As President, he did indeed increase US military troop levels and offensives in Afghanistan, but his foreign policy strategy demonstrated a more significant shift. This change came in March of 2009; just a couple of months after Obama took office, he announced a new Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) strategy. As General James Jones described the new strategy in a Foreign Press Center Briefing, it reflected a “change of tone and change in conduct” of US foreign policy, with more emphasis on dialogue, discussion, consultation, and listening to allies (1). Furthermore, the US executive had in place a new, feasible goal for the War on Terror, which was to “disrupt, dismantle, and prevent al-Qaida [not all terrorists, thus the change] from being able to operate in its safe havens” (Jones 2009, 1). To that end, the US would begin treating Afghanistan and Pakistan as “one challenge in one region,” which would translate into an increased focus on Pakistan and major increases in economic and military support in efforts directed at both countries (2). A month earlier, the President had added 17,000 troops in Afghanistan, and called for 4,000 more to be sent to the country. It is clear, then, that the Obama administration viewed Afghanistan as presenting a short-term security or terrorist threat to the US, and thus made the decision to scale up US hard power in that country, in line with my first and second hypotheses.

An expanded US military presence was not the only aspect of the new AFPAK strategy, which, as Jones (2009) explained, would also involve “intensive regional diplomacy” with other South Asian countries and more resources to “civilian efforts” in both countries, through the State Department and foreign assistance programs (2). For instance, Jones (2009) declared President Obama’s support for a Congressional bill authorizing $1.5 billion per year in aid to Pakistan over the next five years, as well as reconstruction zones.
along the Afghanistan and Pakistan borders (3). Interestingly, Jones (2009) suggested that the biggest strategic shift inherent in the AFPAK strategy was the emphasis on “capacity building” through civilian efforts, and a need for coordination for all the money sent by various countries and agencies to target locations in the War on Terror. More specifically, any aid money and work should pay particular attention to issues like establishing the rule of law and working against the plague of corruption (4). In Afghanistan, not only was a stronger Afghan army needed, but the country also required more engineers, irrigation projects, teachers, schools, and hospitals, and increased coordination among existing EU, NATO, UN, the IMF, the World Bank, and NGO efforts to that end (5). Commenting on what had become a rocky US relationship with Pakistan, Jones (2009) said it was in “a restart mode” and the US was working on increasing trust and confidence with the Pakistani armed forces (6). The 2009 AFPAK strategy definitely reflected a decision to use more smart or combined power, not only increasing such power in Afghanistan but also adding Pakistan to the geographic forefront in the War on Terror. The beginnings of a shift toward US military efforts in Pakistan was evident in the latter days of the second Bush administration, when the President issued a decision allowing US Special Forces to operate within the country even without approval by the Pakistani government, due to an increasing US concern that the Pakistani government was not doing enough to counteract the growing terrorist threat there (Schmitt and Mazzetti 2008, The New York Times). President Obama’s AFPAK strategy cemented this change, publicly placing Pakistan alongside Afghanistan as a target of US military and civilian operations in the ongoing fight against terrorism. Not only did Afghanistan present a combined security threat, requiring that the US increase both its soft and hard power efforts there, but Pakistan itself presented both a long-term and short-term security or terrorist threat to the US, leading to the US escalation of military and non-
military efforts there. These changes are in line with my second hypothesis: the executive is more likely to use combined power against what it sees as a combined threat.

In May 2010, the Obama administration issued an updated version of the National Security Strategy. In the accompanying letter, President Obama (2010) wrote that the US was ending its war in Iraq but was “renew[ing] our focus” on Afghanistan (1). The President declared that the US would maintain its superior military power in light of the various threats it faced from countries, non-state actors and failed states (1), but the US would also “complement” its armed forces with diplomacy, development, intelligence and law enforcement (2). To this end, the US needed to build deeper connections with people around the world through its military, diplomatic efforts, the private sector, NGOs, and regular citizens (3). The text of the actual National Security Strategy (2010) reflects the administration’s AFPAK strategy, arguing that the US would, through deeper partnerships with allies and multilateral institutions, focus on al Qaeda in both Afghanistan and Pakistan (1). Including Pakistan alongside Afghanistan, of course, was a shift from earlier National Security Strategies. The Strategy (2010) declared that “Al-Qa’ida’s core in Pakistan remains the most dangerous component of the larger network,” and the US was working with the Pakistani government against these threats (20). This shift in strategy, then, with an increased military focus on Pakistan, came as a response to a determination by the US executive that the short-term terrorist threat from Pakistan had increased significantly, and needed to be met with US military efforts there.

Weapons of mass destruction were still the biggest threat to the US, according to the National Security Strategy (2010, 4). Presumably highlighting the differences in the direction and policies of the Obama administration with those of the Bush administrations, the Strategy (2010) acknowledged that “some methods employed in pursuit of our security
have compromised our fidelity to the values that we promote, and our leadership on their behalf,” making it harder for the US to support things like democratic change around the world (10). Thus, it was imperative for the US to move towards more “comprehensive engagement” with partners and other strong countries like China, India, and Russia.

Through diplomacy and development promotion, the US would try to prevent conflict, increase economic growth, and strengthen weak countries, all the while strengthening democratic institutions and fighting poverty, climate change and disease around the world.

At the same time, the US military would engage with other countries by working with foreign governments and in some cases, helping to train their militaries (11). The US would also “pursue engagements among peoples—not just governments” and engage with civil society actors to do so (12). It is important to note here that while the Strategy (2010) tried to set itself apart from the strategies under former President Bush, it remained in line with some aspects of the Bush Doctrine, particularly the Freedom Agenda highlighting the necessity of US democracy promotion around the world.

The biggest substantive change inherent in the 2010 National Security Strategy, then, involved a new focus on Pakistan as a front in the War on Terror. The Strategy also mentioned explicitly for the first time that the US would deal with potential safe havens for al-Qa'ida in places like Yemen and Somalia before they took root, by helping governments there with development and security assistance (21), presumably preventative soft power efforts against long-term terrorist threats. These countries had not been a major or very publicized target of the US War on Terror, although Rumsfeld (2011) did write that a few years into the War on Terror, the US engaged in some operations, including some involving special forces, against terrorists in the Horn of Africa, North Africa, Pakistan, and Yemen (631).
The other major change in the 2010 National Security Strategy was a greater emphasis on US diplomacy, engagement, and statecraft, tools of power which had been alluded to in previous National Security Strategies (2002, 2006) but were given a more extensive platform in this latest incarnation of the Strategy. Thus, while military force was necessary for defending the US and its allies, sometimes even for humanitarian purposes, the US would “exhaust other options before war whenever we can.” The Strategy (2010) did not go so far as to completely abolish the preemption component of the Bush Doctrine, maintaining that the US could still act unilaterally to defend its interests. Again, though, we see a nuanced change in tone or degree: the US would abide by its own standards while doing so, meeting specific objectives and goals (22). In the broader US effort to renew its global leadership, the US needed to “strengthen the power of our example” to encourage democratic sentiments and movements around the world, by prohibiting torture, dealing with terrorist threats legally and transparently whenever possible (36), and protecting civil liberties and the rule of law (37). This mention of avoiding the use of torture was presumably a reference to the use of waterboarding against US detainees under the Bush administration, a controversial practice viewed by its critics as illegal torture on the one hand and stalwartly defended by others, such as former Vice President Dick Cheney (2011) years after leaving office, as an effective and legitimate interrogation technique.

Under the leadership of President Obama and his foreign policy advisors, including Vice President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Secretaries of Defense Robert Gates and then Leon Panetta most recently, the US continued its extensive counterterrorism operations, focusing more on Afghanistan and Pakistan and withdrawing steadily from Iraq. In June of 2011, the White House released an updated version of the

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1 The Obama administration has come under attack for conducting drone attacks in Pakistan, though (Schmitt 2011, The New York Times).
National Strategy for Counterterrorism, optimistic in tone about the beginning of the end for al Qaeda. President Obama (2011) wrote in the letter preceding the document that “today, we can say with growing confidence—and with certainty about the outcome—that we have put al-Qai’da on the path to defeat.” US Special Forces had killed Usama bin Laden just two months earlier in Pakistan, “the most important strategic milestone in our effort to defeat al Qaida” (3). The Strategy (2011) suggested that his death, along with the new revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, had “changed the nature of the terrorist threat” and made al Qaeda and its ideology less relevant (1). Again we see a shift in tone or nuance characteristic of the Obama administration, this time pertaining to the name given to the US’s global counter-terrorism efforts: the Strategy (2011) said that the Obama administration was at war with al Qaeda, not with terrorism (i.e., the term “War on Terror” was a misnomer) or with Islam, and to win this war, the US would use military and civilian power, as well “the power of our values” (2). The threat of al Qaeda continues, and an important part of US strategy involved “countering its ideology” (3).

Similar to the 2006 National Security Strategy and National Strategy for Counterterrorism, this 2011 Strategy differentiated between short-term and long-term counter-terrorism goals or considerations (7), although it did not make the categorization much more specific than that. US goals did not appear to have changed much, as reflected in the Strategy (2011): the US remained committed to protecting the country, its people, and interests, disrupting and defeating al Qaeda, although “affiliates and adherents” of the group were added as a target. Furthermore, the US continued in its efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring or using WMDs (8) and in its attempts to get rid of terrorist safe havens (9). The US would counter the ideology of al Qaeda through “focused” foreign and development assistance, as well as a “positive vision of engagement with foreign publics,” showing that
while the US was trying to “build” around the world, al Qaeda was only trying to “destroy” (9).

Like the National Security Strategy (2010), this Strategy for Counterterrorism (2011) discussed the terrorist threat from Afghanistan and Pakistan, specifically the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the borders (12). In Pakistan, the US was working with the Pakistani government to weaken al-Qaeda’s leadership, support, and infrastructure faster than the group could rebuild them, and to this end, the US and Pakistan needed to cooperate more closely, as only by working with Pakistan would the US be able to defeat al Qaeda. In Afghanistan, the US and the International Security Assistance Force were working to make sure al Qaeda would not return, strengthening the Afghan government, military, and civilian institutions in that undertaking (13). Al Qaeda also posed a threat in the Arabian Peninsula, specifically in Yemen and from Gulf State money, and to this end the US was going after al-Qaeda but also working to “stabilize the country and prevent state failure” (14), a nod to a combined short-term and long-term threats there and a corresponding combined use of hard and soft power. The Strategy (2011) also mentioned an al Qaeda presence in East Africa, as well as the presence of the affiliated Al Shabaab group in Somalia, a country plagued by humanitarian challenges (14) that, it is implied although not clearly stated, the US would work to alleviate. An Al Qaeda threat was also acknowledged in North Africa, specifically in Algeria and Morocco, although the Strategy (2011) says the US would engage in “capacity building initiatives” in those countries to help governments in the region fight the threat (16). Thus the threat of Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghrib appeared to be a less pressing threat than the one from other countries such as Pakistan. Finally, the Strategy (2011) discussed an improving situation in Iraq, where the ultimate US goal is to strengthen Iraqi capacity to be able to defeat al Qaeda there, maintaining lasting peace and security in the country (15). Certainly the Obama
administration deemed the short-term security threat from Iraq as diminished to the point where the US could gradually disentangle its combat troops from the country, which it did in subsequent months.

The first few years of the Obama administration featured some important changes in US counter-terrorism strategy, including bringing Pakistan to the forefront of the US war on terror, or war on al Qaeda, as it came to be known. In line with this acknowledgement of an increased combined threat coming from Pakistan, the US increased its hard and soft power efforts in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, which became part of a single “AfPak” strategy. The US also increased its hard power efforts and special operations in places where an al Qaeda threat was deemed to exist, such as Yemen and Somalia. In these countries, too, as in other countries or regions (such as Algeria and Morocco), the US also increased its soft power efforts, including humanitarian and capacity building work, in an acknowledgement of the more long-term terrorist or security threats those countries posed. Overall, then, US counter-terrorism strategy under President Obama has been characterized by an increase in both hard and soft power efforts, often combined in countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan. The exception to this trend has been Iraq, where the US had withdrawn all of its combat troops by the end of 2011 because the executive no longer considered the country to pose a short-term security or terrorist threat against the US.

**US Relative Power**

This chapter has been cataloguing variation in the United States’ hard, soft, and combined power strategies over the course of the War on Terror and across countries. So far I have demonstrated that the US executive increasingly emphasized soft power, often but not always in combination with hard power, starting as early as Bush's second term. Some critics or cynics of strategies utilizing soft power may suggest that a country, even the
US, would increasingly utilize such a strategy as it grows weaker: when using military power is not an option, then soft power is the other alternative. Certainly one point made in the 2010 National Security Strategy could be interpreted in such a way. The Strategy (2010) states that while maintaining a strong military as a deterrent is a foundation of US strategy, “when we overuse our military might, or fail to invest in or deploy complementary tools, or act without partners, then our military is overstretched,” and to avoid such a situation the US must constantly adapt its diplomatic and development efforts, particularly those directly connected to the military (18). Whether or not this statement is interpreted to mean that the Obama administration was increasing its reliance on diplomatic and development tools because the US military was overstretched is not precisely the point here, although the next section will catalogue the US’s use of soft and hard power in the War on Terror, including during the Obama administration.

It is worth addressing whether or not US power has indeed been declining in recent years, in an effort to either totally dismiss the notion that the US may be using more soft power because it is relatively weaker, or alternatively, to give such an idea some credence. The debate about US national decline has gained some prominence in recent months, with a number of scholars publishing articles or books on the topic. Robert Kagan (2012), for instance, argues that American decline would immeasurably hurt the international world order that was created and has been maintained by US leadership, and the current order emphasizing democracy and markets would be replaced by something far more sinister, hurting the US and the rest of the world. A rise in China, the “leading candidate” for a new superpower in the face of possible US decline, would mean a global push away from, rather than toward, democracy, for example (74). So is the US in decline? Kagan (2012) and Beckley (2011) argue no. The US share of the world’s GDP has remained stable over the past four decades, Kagan (2012) writes, hovering around 27% or 28%. India’s and China’s
shares of global economic output have indeed grown, at the expense not of the US, but of Europe and Japan (105). While China’s economy is expected to surpass the US’s “at least in terms of sheer volume” sometime during the 21st century, that would not make China the richest country (102), and such economic growth would not necessarily translate into overall power in the international system. Comparing the power of China to that of the US across indicators of wealth, innovation, and conventional military capabilities (56), Beckley (2011) adds that the US is “wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991” (43). Importantly, Beckley (2011) also points out the importance of comparing the per capita income, and not just overall GDP, of the two countries, and finds that the average Chinese citizen is now $17,000 poorer compared to the average American than he or she was in 1991 (59).

The US “remains unmatched” militarily, and so far there has been no decline in US relative military capability; the US spends $600 billion a year on defense, more than all other great powers combined, and spends only 4% of its GDP in doing so (Kagan 2012, 107). Furthermore, the US military is more powerful than ever before with fewer troops overseas, and here Kagan (2012) compares the 1 million troops overseas out of a US population of 160 million in 1968 with the current situation, when the US is fighting two wars with a total of only 500,000 troops overseas out of a population of 313 million people (128). So while the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have reflected the high cost of military power as well as its high cost, they have not led to a decline in US relative power (138). In line with this argument, Beckley (2011) argues that the United States gets “more bang for its buck” for money it spends on the military (74).

In his most recent book, Joseph Nye (2011) himself agrees with Kagan’s (2012) and Beckley’s (2011) assessments of the prospects of China becoming more powerful than the
US, writing that at least in the first half of this century, China might “give the United States a run for its money” but will unlikely become more powerful than the US (202). These assessments are relevant in this empirical investigation of the United States’ evolving strategy in the War on Terror because it appears from their conclusions that it was unlikely that the US executive decided to increase its use of soft power in specific contexts of the War on Terror because its relative power was declining globally. Not only have Nye (2011), Kagan (2012), and Beckley (2011) demonstrated that the relative power of the US, measured in terms of economic and military might, has NOT declined so far, but the primary competitor of the US is China, a country that is neither a target nor an active participant in the US War on Terror. It is fair to say, then, that the US’s use of soft or combined power in the War on Terror can be explained strategically on the perceived merits by the US executive of soft or combined power, and not because the US is afraid to use military power more frequently because it is threatened by other powerful nations.

**Military Spending in the War on Terror**

So far, this chapter has examined the evolution of hard, soft, and combined power strategies in the War on Terror. The next step in explaining the variation in strategy over time and place requires an examination of military spending over time, in an alternative measure of the dependent variable, or the change in US soft, hard, and combined power strategies over time and place. In a Congressional Research Service Report, Belasco (2011) documents US government spending on War on Terror Operations between September 2001 and March 2011. She finds that by March 2011, Congress had approved a total of $1.283 trillion in military costs for the three post-9/11 operations: Operation Enduring Freedom mostly for Afghanistan but also on other small operations from the Philippines to Djibouti, Operation Noble Eagle to enhance security at military bases, and Operation Iraqi
Freedom. These total costs include military operations, base security, reconstruction and foreign aid in the respective target countries, embassy costs, and veterans’ healthcare. In some ways, this total picks up on smart or combined power costs in specific War on Terror targets, since reconstruction and foreign aid are tools of soft power that the US has used. Belasco (2011) adds that most of this $1.283 trillion was spent through the Department of Defense, with a remaining 5% on foreign aid and diplomacy, and 1% on medical care for veterans. Most of this budget involves “incremental” war costs that are in addition to the DOD’s peacetime budget, covering things like personnel pay, operation and maintenance, buying new weapons, research and development, testing and evaluation, the construction of military bases, and expanding inventory (2). The DOD’s spending documented in this report also includes programs specifically related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, including the “logistical costs of allies” such as Pakistan and the counter-terror operations they perform (funded by the US), the Commanders Emergency Response Program, the Afghan Security Forces Fund, the Iraq Security Forces Fund, and the IED (Improvised Explosive Device) Defeat Funds (2).

The level of US troops deployed overseas in War on Terror operations peaked in Iraq in 2007, as a result of the surge there, but until 2009, not much change in troop levels took place in Afghanistan after the initial US invasion there (11). Notable recent shifts in spending over time include a huge increase between Fiscal Year 2009 and Fiscal Year 2010, when the Department of Defense’s average monthly spending grew from $4.4 billion a month to $6.7 billion a month—during this time period, the US almost doubled its troops in Afghanistan, from 44,000 to 84,000 (Belasco 2011). Furthermore, spending on Iraq fell dramatically in the same period, from an average of $7.9 billion to $6.2 billion, accompanied by a fall in US troop levels there from 141,000 to 96,000 as the US began its withdrawal from the country.
Figure 2 breaks down the total war funding by operation as of March 2011, with 63% or $806 billion going to Iraq, 35% or $444 billion going to Afghanistan and other Enduring Freedom smaller operations, 2% or $29 billion going to enhancing security for US bases worldwide, and less than 1% or $6 billion “unallocated funds.” Figure 3 provides a visual image for the breakdown of War on Terror spending by agency. As mentioned above, 94% of spending, or $1,208.1 billion, went through the Department of Defense, a mere 5% or $66.7 billion through the State Department and USAID, and 1% or $8.4 billion on veterans’ medical expenses. A huge majority of War on Terror spending, then, was through the prime agency for hard power, the Department of Defense, while one measure of soft power spending, money spent through the USAID and the State Department, puts it at a mere 5% of the overall budget. This spending is not completely inclusive, however, as the US does spend money on soft power through other agencies; for instance, some government funding to NGOs goes through the Department of Defense.
Nevertheless, to get an idea of one measure of soft power spending and how it changed over time, it is useful to look at the State Department/USAID’s budget as it evolved through the course of the War on Terror, as shown in Figure 4. US State Department/USAID funding peaked in 2004, in the second year of the Iraq invasion, and then declined dramatically in the following year, when US troops were actually drawing down in Iraq. Even with the Iraq surge in 2007, there was little change in State/USAID’s budgets until 2010, the same time as the surge in Afghanistan. If the budget for fiscal year 2012 were to be approved, 2012 would see an increase in the State Department/USAID’s budget. Figure 5 shows the changes in DOD, State/USAID, and VA spending over time.
Figure 4

Estimated State/USAID War Funding, FY2001-FY2012 Request

Data from Belasco (2011), CRS Report

Figure 5

Estimated War Funding by Agency: FY2001-FY2012 War Request

Data taken from Belasco (2011), CRS Report
Figure 6 shows the Department of Defense’s spending over time by operation, showing that spending in Iraq peaked in 2007, with the surge, and spending in Afghanistan remained relatively steady between the end of 2001 and 2005, until it rose a bit in 2006 (with Bush’s “silent surge”), and then rose steadily until it peaked in 2010. The shifts in DOD spending by operation correspond to the number of boots on the ground in each country over time. The initial Iraqi invasion in March 2003 included 94,000 troops, which went up dramatically in 2004 to 149,000, followed by a drawdown the next year with the next large increase in troop levels between January and November 2007, when troop levels reached 170,000. By 2010, only 50,000 troops remained in Iraq. In Afghanistan, the troop levels were relatively low at the beginning of the invasion at 10,000, when the operation focused mainly on Kabul, but as insurgent violence increased across the country, the mission expanded and troop levels were increased to 20,000 in 2006, with the surge during the end of the Bush administration leading to 45,000 troops in Afghanistan in early 2009 (Belasco 2011). President Obama would, as discussed above, dramatically increase troop levels and spending in Afghanistan, which regained focus as the center of the War on Terror,
increasing troop levels twice by 2010, when troop levels in the country reached 98,000. As discussed earlier in the chapter, increases in DOD spending or troop levels were a result of the US executive’s acknowledgement of an increased short-term security or terrorist threat in the respective battlegrounds of the War on Terror.

**US Foreign Aid in the War on Terror**

Since this is an empirical examination of hard, soft, and combined power strategies in the War on Terror, it is imperative to document the evolution of US spending on foreign aid over time and place, with funding for International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs) being the primary subset of interest here. In a Congressional Research Service report, Tarnoff and Nowels (2004) suggest that US policy on foreign aid was “transformed” after 9/11 and foreign aid has been used as a tool in the War on Terror, dispensed to various US allies and others including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan and Indonesia. Most bilateral (or direct country-to-country) aid is managed through USAID (which in 2004 was not yet a part of the State Department), with the Treasury Department giving out multilateral aid, and the DOD and State Departments dispensing military and security-related aid (1). McCleary (2009) agrees, arguing that in the post-9/11 world, the executive’s concern with fragile and failing states was strengthened, and for the first time, development in such countries was linked to US national security(152). As of 2004, USAID had laid out five goals of US foreign assistance: transformational development; strengthening fragile states; humanitarian assistance; strengthening US geostrategic interests in countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel; and trying to decrease the impact of global problems such as HIV/AIDS (Tarnoff and Nowels 2004, 3). These goals are very much in line with the objectives of the 2002 National Security Strategy discussed above. Tarnoff and Nowels (2004) add that most USAID workers are foreign nationals working overseas,
where projects are implemented by contractors, consultants, and NGOs (21-2). Andrew Natsios (2004), a former USAID administrator, points to USAID’s budget of $14.2 billion in 2003, a major increase from its $7.8 billion budget in 2001.

Documenting changes over the course of the War on Terror, McCleary (2009) writes that NGOs (or Private Voluntary Organizations, PVOs, as USAID calls them) funded by USAID were more and more frequently required to work with the military in carrying out their work (155), as discussed above in the example of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PVO workers, suggests McCleary (2009), were unhappy with this arrangement, and after the invasions of Afghanistan and later Iraq, they were “increasingly vocal in their opposition” to the military carrying out relief work in conflict areas (155). Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld (2011) comments on the thorny relationship between NGOs and the military, recalling in his memoir that NGOs who worked in Afghanistan were unhappy and talked to the press about US military action that made it difficult for them to deliver food and were upset “when the Department of Defense declined to help feed the enemy “ (390). According to Rumsfeld (2011), some NGOs went so far as “tr[y]ing to ingratiate themselves with Taliban authorities” by publicly criticizing US and coalition actions (391), a rather strong accusation but one that reflects McCleary’s (2009) assessment of the difficult relationship between the two actors. Lischer (2007) also points out that generally, NGOs are reluctant to get involved in military interventions because they do not want to violate their three guiding principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence (100-101; see also Howell and Lind 2009). NGOs are therefore conflicted about working with military or government forces, and yet some, like the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and CARE, receive over half their funding from the US government (108) and have operated in Iraq and Afghanistan in the current War on Terror.
Describing changes in the relationship between the US military and foreign aid over the War on Terror, McCleary (2009) notes that in 2005 the Department of Defense issued a Stability Operations Directive, giving stability operations, which include peacekeeping and humanitarian aid and assistance, the same priority as major combat (155). This was clearly an important shift in US military strategy, codifying the use of combined power within the US military itself: peacekeeping and humanitarian aid, or soft power efforts, were as significant as combat or hard power operations. The Department of Defense subsequently increased its non-military personnel who would work on reconstruction efforts, which, McCleary (2009) implies, meant the DOD was increasingly doing work that should have been carried out by the State Department (156). Whether this change was wise or unwise is beside the point here: the relevant issue here is that with the progression of the War on Terror, including the evolution of the Bush Doctrine to include the Freedom Agenda, the Department of Defense began using more soft power and working in domains such as reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, using an increasingly combined strategy. Demonstrating this increasing emphasis on combining soft and hard power, former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates argued (2009) for more of a “smart power” strategy incorporating both hard and soft power, arguing that while military force will still be important to fight and capture terrorists in the long run, “the US cannot kill or capture its way to victory” (12). Gates (2009) specifically mentioned “civilian agencies” and NGOs as private sector actors who, along with academics, are coordinating with the US military and providing it with expertise to undertake “various initiatives” that try to deal with grievances of local populations (12), part of what I have categorized above as long-term terrorist threats.

NGO-military collaboration is not just in place in formal “war zones,” as Williams (2009) points out. He writes that since 2003, the US military has become involved in issues
that were previously outside of its domain and had been dealt with by USAID and the State department, and thus combining hard power to fight insurgencies with soft power efforts towards achieving stability in vulnerable regions (220). Williams (2009) cites the regional Combatant Command zones (COCOMs) as examples of this integrated strategy; these zones are led by commanders in charge of all US military activity in a geographic region, including public diplomacy work, humanitarian work, disaster preparation, civic action programs, and military training (224). Thus the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was created post 9/11 to prevent the growth and spread of terrorism in the Horn and works towards regional stability through efforts including humanitarian work, and the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) works on counterterrorism and public diplomacy, democracy promotion, and development assistance “to address the underlying social and economic inequalities that often foment terrorism” (Williams 2009, 226).

Tarnoff (2009a) traces US reconstruction efforts in Iraq, an actual war zone, in another Congressional Research Service Report. By 2009, the US had appropriated $49 billion for reconstruction in the country (1). There was a decline in US reconstruction assistance to Iraq by 2010, when Obama became President (8), which coincides with the start of US withdrawal from the country. Discussing PRTs in Iraq, Tarnoff (2009) describes them as groups where the military protects civilian US officials and development specialists, allowing them to work in areas they otherwise could not have without security protection; at one point there were 15 US-led PRTs in Iraq. These groups work with local community leaders in Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils on infrastructure projects like roads, water, schools, and health clinics (16). In Afghanistan, the other major war zone in the US War on Terror, the US had spent $38 billion in aid to the country, almost two-thirds of it after 2007 (Tarnoff 2009b, 1). More than half, or 54% of that money, went to security
programs, 32% went to development and humanitarian-related aid, 5% for governance and democratization, and 9% for counter-narcotics programs. This aid was dispensed by the DOD, USAID, the State Department, and the US Department of Agriculture (1). Tarnoff (2009b) writes that in Afghanistan, the US led 12 PRTs, out of a total of 26 NATO-led PRTs, with the goal of “improve[ing] governance and provision of basic services” (3). With the new Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) strategy in 2009, the US began providing more assistance to the country, focusing more on borders and adding civilian personnel to monitor and implement aid programs (4). US-sponsored aid programs in the country include working on village infrastructure, including water, irrigation, roads, schools, and electricity, economic growth and agriculture (5), public health care, promoting the rule of law (6), and programs specifically designed for women and girls (7). Tarnoff (2009) adds that in Afghanistan, NGOs, both international NGOs and local (SNGOs) were important players in dispensing this aid and carrying out the various programs.

So exactly how much money has the US government spent on NGOs in the War on Terror, and how has it varied over time? The best source for this data is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which only starting in 2005, began tracking money spent by various countries, including the US, to recipient countries and delivered through a category called “NGOs and Civil Society.” Included in this category is money funding international NGOs (INGOs) based in other countries like the US, as well as Southern NGOs (SNGOs), or NGOs from another developing country.

http://www.oecd.org/document/13/0,3746,en_2649_34447_39245773_1_1_1_1,00.html). The figures below show US aid money delivered through NGOs to South and Central Asia (which includes Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Georgia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and to the Middle East (which includes Bahrain, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Yemen). Since a list of exact countries targeted as part of the US War on Terror does not exist, I am discussing data from what I have deemed the most relevant regions in the world with respect to terrorism, South and Central Asia and the Middle East, to give an important overall picture of US aid to countries through NGOs. The next couple of chapters will explore in depth US government and NGO efforts in the specific countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan, to test the parts of my theory not explored in this general overview. We see that, overall, aid to NGOs peaked between 2008 and 2009, when Barack Obama became President. In the Middle East, the peak, where US aid through NGOs reached over $743 million, peaked in 2009, where the peak came later in South and Central Asia, in 2010 at more than $1286 million. Importantly, US aid through NGOs to South and Central Asia (which includes both Afghanistan and Pakistan, which in the last few years have become the primary focus of War on Terror military operations as well) continued to increase into 2010. In 2010 in the Middle East, however, US aid to NGOs actually fell dramatically, at the same time that the US was starting its drawdown from Iraq. Figure 7 confirms that the overall Middle East trend reflects the situation in Iraq: the US NGO aid to Iraq indeed peaked in 2008, then fell dramatically in 2010. On the other hand, US NGO aid to Afghanistan has only been rising, with a dramatic increase in 2009, as shown in Figure 8. It is interesting, then, that shifts in NGO aid to these regions has coincided with shifts in military spending and troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, which suggests a truly combined strategy in the War on Terror, at least since 2005.
Figure 7

US Aid to Middle East, S. and C. Asia through NGOs/Civil Society, 2005-2010

Data from OECD

Figure 8

US Aid to South and Central Asia through NGOs/Civil Society 2005-2010

Data from OECD
Figure 9

US Aid to Middle East through NGOs/Civil Society, 2005-2010

Source: OECD

Figure 10

US Aid to Iraq through NGOs/Civil Society, 2005-2010

Source: OECD
What about the period before 2005, in the early days of the War on Terror? Since the OECD did not begin tracking US aid flows to different countries specifically through NGOs until 2005, a couple of other different measures can give us an idea about the evolution in US aid to the same region. The OECD also provides data on total US bilateral aid to those same regions for the years 2000-2010, as shown in figures 12 and 13. Interestingly, official development assistance (ODA), which includes military aid to Middle Eastern countries, peaked in 2005, a couple of years into the Iraq war but before the surge, and then declined dramatically the following year. Data on US ODA to Central and South Asia is available from 2000, a year before the 9/11 attacks, which is interesting to show just for comparing aid levels immediately before the War on Terror and afterward. We see a consistent increase over time in US aid to those regions, not just in the year 2001 but for every year, and the most noticeable spike in aid was in 2008. Since this broader category of data covers all US aid to those regions, and since I have theorized in particular about NGO aid, I cannot adequately explain the variation in aid over time to these different regions, except through a new hypothesis, which I will not test here, that the decrease in overall US
aid to the Middle East is correlated to the winding down of the war in Iraq. In any case, this is an interesting finding, that spending on soft power decreased as military hard power decreased; we might expect the opposite sort of trend, whereby a decrease in US hard power in a particular location such as Iraq might be accompanied by an increase in US soft power spending there, presumably to combat a remaining long-term security or terrorist threat. In contrast to the Middle East region, no such winding down of the war in Afghanistan (which is in the South and Central Asia category) has taken place—rather we have seen an escalation of the war, most noticeably in 2009-2010. As demonstrated earlier, throughout the War on Terror we have often seen US soft power being used as a complement to US hard power, which accounts for my hypothesis, although certainly the two have not always been used hand-in-hand.

Figure 12

Total US Aid to the Middle East, 2002-2010

Source: OECD
We can only get a rough idea of how much the US spent on funding NGOs, the specific example of soft power examined in this research project. A good estimate would be USAID funding of PVOs, their name for NGOs, starting in 2001 or 2002, since the US funds NGOs extensively through this agency, which became part of the State Department in 2006. McCleary’s (2009) data set provides information, taken from the USAID, on total federal revenue spent through USAID on PVOs, up to the year 2005. Figure 14 shows the change over time, from the year 2000, before the 9/11 attacks, up to 2005. Overall, we see an upward trend, although federal funding of USAID PVOs started to fall in 2005. Of course it is hard to explain the drop in federal funding of PVOs in 2005, which is why this section is in essence providing another measure (federal dollars spent on NGOs/PVOs) of US soft power spending. The next two chapters will attempt to explain variation in federal funding of NGOs or PVOs in two specific countries, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Conclusion

This chapter has explored the evolution of US strategy, particularly its hard, soft, and combined power components, through the course of the War on Terror. The data presented in this chapter was a measurement of the dependent variable in this project: changes in US soft, hard, and combined power strategy over time and place. The data in this chapter shows that the US executive’s strategy in the War on Terror has changed over time and place, with hard power, as well as increasing degrees of hard power, being used in some places (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, the surges in Iraq and Afghanistan, increased military offensives in Pakistan), increased soft power used in other places, as well as an increased soft power strategy, particularly in the 2006 and 2010 National Security Strategies, and overall, an increased emphasis over time on a combined power strategy.

Because this project is not just descriptive in nature, and I am seeking to explain changes over time, I have also tested Hypotheses 1 and 2 in this chapter: the US is more likely to use hard power against what it sees as a short-term threat, soft power against what
it considers a long-term threat, and combined power against what it deems to be a combined threat. Broadly speaking, I have found support for both of these hypotheses, in the data gleaned from strategy documents, memoirs written by various members of the US executive, and data about hard and soft power expenditures over the course of the War on Terror. As the initial invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, as well as do the surges in those two countries and the escalation of US military action in Pakistan, when the US executive determines that a short-term terrorist or security threat exists, it is more likely to use hard power. Conversely, this chapter has shown that the US executive is more likely to use soft power to battle more long-term threats, seen particularly in weak, unstable, undemocratic states—and a shift towards more use of soft power over time is also clear, particularly since the 2006 National Security Strategy. More frequently, however, we see an emphasis in US strategy on a use of combined power: in cases where the US executive has used hard power, we see soft power, aimed at longer-term threats, also used, presumably because a combined threat is acknowledged to exist. To test these hypotheses in more depth, as well as to test the remaining hypotheses, the next two chapters will closely examine two country studies and the evolution of US War on Terror strategy there.
CHAPTER 5

US WAR ON TERROR STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

Introduction

Afghanistan was the immediate and initial war front in the US War on Terror that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While the narratives and images of US military action in the country have become etched in the minds of most Americans, along with the plotlines of the ups and downs, initial victories and later stalemates, of this long war, many are less familiar with the factors impacting the evolution of US military strategy in the current Afghan war. Still less familiar might be the factors impacting the development of US soft power strategy in the country, which when viewed together with US hard power strategy, has been a case of clear US combined power strategy in what appeared at some points to be an unending conflict.

This chapter tests the hypotheses laid out earlier in the dissertation through the case study of the US war in Afghanistan. I begin with a background discussion of US strategy or policy towards Afghanistan before the 9/11 attacks, in order to lay out a frame of reference from which to compare US War on Terror strategy in the country. Most of the chapter, however, catalogues the evolution of the War on Terror itself in Afghanistan, from its beginnings in October 2001 until as near the present day as possible, providing further testing of Hypotheses 1 and 2. As discussed less extensively in the previous chapter, the Afghanistan case provides support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, demonstrating the US executive’s decision to use hard power against what is deemed to be an immediate short-term terrorist or security threat and combined power in what is deemed to be a combined short-and long-term terrorist or security threat. Furthermore, this chapter delves more closely into the specifics of the Afghan country context and the regulatory environment to
test the impact of those variables on the US government’s use of a specific kind of soft power, funding the work of NGOs, finding support for Hypotheses 3 and 4. The socio-economic and political needs of a target country shape the kinds of NGO projects the US government will fund, and the US government is more likely to fund NGOs in a country with a relatively open NGO regulatory environment. Finally, by examining both the big picture of US-funded NGO work in the country, as well as the work of two specific INGOs in the country, supported by original interview data, I test Hypotheses 5 and 6: the US is likely to fund NGOs whose mission and goals align with its own, and more likely to continue this funding relationship if the relationship between them has been more cooperative. I find mixed support for them, although more in terms of projects carried out by specific INGOs than partnerships or relationships between the US government and those INGOs themselves.

**Background: US Policy Towards Afghanistan Before 9/11**

While this entire research project tests my theory explaining variation in US strategy in the War on Terror, it is useful to begin with some background on US policy towards a country that started out as, and has gone back to being, the primary US front in that war. Recent US involvement in the country infamously began more than three decades ago at the height of the Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union. While its neighbor, Pakistan, clearly allied itself with the US in that decades-long conflict, Afghanistan instead reached out to the Soviet Union, which provided it with economic and military aid and diplomatically supported it against Pakistan (Rais 2010, 204). At the same time, the US did provide some development assistance to Afghanistan during the Cold War, although it is telling to compare the levels of US and Soviet assistance to the country: between 1955 and 1987, the USSR provided $1.27 billion in economic aid and $1.25 billion in military aid to Afghanistan, while the US dispensed $533 million in economic aid, a
fraction of those numbers, and no direct military aid, to the country (Rais 2010, 205). During the Cold War, only a small number of American NGO workers had operations in Afghanistan, funded by both the US and the USSR (Burke 2011, 81), something that would dramatically change a few decades later.

In the aftermath of a bloody coup in 1978 against the ruling Afghan government, a pro-Soviet, Marxist government was installed. Faced with a widespread insurgency against the new government, the Soviet Union officially invaded Afghanistan in 1979 (US State Department 2011, “Background Notes: Afghanistan”). The United States saw the Soviet invasion as problematic for regional security in countries economically important to the West (Rais 2010, 207), so it stepped into the conflict, albeit indirectly. Through Pakistan, the US conducted an anti-Soviet military campaign in Afghanistan (US State Department 2010, “Background Notes: Pakistan”). Pakistan essentially became the “key transit country for arms supplies to the Afghan resistance” in the US fight against the Soviets (Epstein and Kronstadt 2011, 4), and collaborated with the US until the end of that war (Ajami 2010, 32). Finally, in the Geneva Accords of 1988, the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw from the country, and did so the following year, ending a decade-long war that cost the Afghans about a million people. After the Soviet retreat, Afghanistan plunged into a civil war until the Taliban came into power in the mid 1990s, cementing its rule over 90% of the country by 1998. The US essentially stayed out of the picture in Afghanistan during the 1990s, except for its cruise missile attacks on an Osama bin Laden terrorist training camp in August of 1998 (US State Department 2011, “Background Notes: Afghanistan”). In fact, the US, along with most of the world, did not recognize the Taliban government at all.

**US Military Strategy in Afghanistan After 9/11**

Against this backdrop, of indirect US support to the Afghan resistance against the Soviets through Pakistan during the Cold War, followed by a lack of US involvement in the
country in the decade following the Soviet withdrawal, US policy towards Afghanistan since October 2001 stands in sharp contrast. As catalogued in an earlier chapter, President Bush issued an ultimatum to the Taliban government of Afghanistan, demanding that it hand over the al Qaeda members responsible for the 9/11 attacks and cooperate with the US, or face the wrath of the US military. Shortly afterwards, on October 7, 2001, the US began its military operations in Afghanistan, clearly in response to what the President and his advisers determined was a short-term, immediate terrorist and security threat against the United States. The first stage of the US war in Afghanistan, however, consisted mostly of US Special Forces working with Afghan Northern Alliance troops, relying primarily on US air power rather than boots on the ground. The high-risk, fast-paced strategy was planned by CIA counterterrorism head Cofer Black (Rothstein 2012, 60). Initially, the goal of Operation Enduring Freedom was to wipe out or capture al Qaeda and dethrone or oust the Taliban, and thus the US wanted to keep a “light footprint” in the country (Burke 2011, 47). The international Bonn Agreement in 2001 created an interim Afghan government and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), an international force authorized for a six-month mandate by a UN Security Council Resolution to deal with the security situation in the capital, Kabul, and its surroundings, as well as ensure the necessary conditions for the delivery of humanitarian aid in the country. The United Kingdom led the ISAF force for the first three months, followed by Turkey, although ISAF was still ultimately under the authority of US Central Command (Weinberger 2002, 6-8); later on, ISAF would no longer be led by a specific country but would be taken over by NATO forces.

By May 2002, a total of about 13,000 troops were in Afghanistan, 8,000 of them from the US and 4,650 of them ISAF troops. While the goal of US troops was to kill or capture al Qaeda and Taliban officials, the ISAF troops were to provide security and eventually reconstruction to the country (Burke 2011, 85). A couple of things become clear
here: first, the US went into Afghanistan with a relatively limited goal, that of capturing or killing al Qaeda and Taliban officials seen as posing a short-term terrorist or security threat against the US. Second, from the outset, the US coupled its hard power strategy with some level of soft power, not only providing some humanitarian assistance from the moment it began military operations (Rumsfeld 2011), but also identifying reconstruction and ensuring humanitarian access as the responsibility of the ISAF troops. Therefore US strategy in Afghanistan was a combined one from the outset, as predicted by Hypotheses 1 and 2, because of the combined threat posed by the country; changes in US strategy in the country would be one of degree, not kind, as will be examined in the following pages.

The US initially defeated Taliban troops in Afghanistan, leading Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to declare a shift in US strategy to “stability and stabilization and reconstruction activities” in a visit to Kabul in May 2003 (Rothstein 2012, 61). However, the insurgency against the US and NATO forces had begun in the spring of 2002 against the Afghan interim government, with the goal of forcing US and NATO forces to leave the country (Jones 2006, 116). The US created an Afghan National Army in 2003 (Weinbaum 2005, 169), although the training of this fledgling force was actually handed off to British, French, Romanian, Bulgarian, and Mongolian coalition ISAF forces, rather than US troops (Rothstein 2012, 61). Between 2002 and 2006, the Taliban reasserted its presence throughout Afghanistan, using its ethnic kinship with other Pashtuns who felt politically sidelined as a basis for increased support across the country (Burke 2011, 304). By late 2005, large parts of Kandahar, Helmand province, and the Southwest were back under Taliban control (310), and the US increased its troops to Afghanistan in 2006 and the ISAF mission was extended (311).

Despite the resurgence of the Taliban and increase in insurgency activity against US, ISAF, and NATO forces, no significant overhaul of US strategy in Afghanistan took place until
2009, partly because after 2003 US attention was focused on another war in Iraq. After President Obama took office, however, he put in place a new strategy for Afghanistan in March of 2009 to refocus on Afghanistan and Pakistan; this Af-Pak strategy relied heavily on what became known as the COIN (counterinsurgency) “shape, clear, hold, and build” strategy adopted from the Iraq war, based on the pillars of security, governance, reconstruction, and development (Rothstein 2012, 62). Under the leadership of General McChrystal, this new COIN strategy, which also included a dramatic surge in US military troops in the country, also focused on protecting Afghans, state-building, and improving relations with insurgents; it limited the conditions under which airstrikes were allowed in order to limit Afghan civilian casualties (65). In addition, Afghan President Karzai put in place his own rules in 2009 to limit Afghan casualties, including provisions like prohibiting night searches, mandating that US troops be accompanied by Afghan troops, having women search women, and decreeing that US troops could only fire on suspected enemy targets unless the enemy fired first (66). Obama’s new Af-Pak strategy, which treated Afghanistan and Pakistan as two parts of the same operation, also involved attempts to have former insurgents join Afghan security forces (Celso 2010, 186).

Etzioni (2011) suggests that this Af-Pak strategy that was unveiled in March 2009 “was basically framed as a counterterrorism mission” that would be conducted by the CIA and the military (3). In fact, the 2009 Af-Pak strategy went back to a “more pragmatic, security-based intervention” in the country and a goal of decreasing, rather than completely wiping out, the Taliban threat (Burke 2011, 443). The Obama administration’s goals were to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Afghanistan” (US State Department 2011, “Background Notes: Afghanistan”), with military surges in 2009 and 2010. In 2010, President Obama fired General Stanley McChrystal in the aftermath of comments he made to Rolling Stone magazine that “belittled”
other members of the US Afghan strategy team and appointed General Petraeus in his stead; the President claimed that the direction of US strategy in the country would not change in light of this leadership handoff (Cooper and Sanger, June 23, 2010, *New York Times*). Perhaps inevitably, however, some changes in US strategy did take place as General Petraeus assumed leadership in the Afghan war: he focused on counterinsurgency, which involved the US building a government seen as legitimate, and “holding” or keeping control of territories it had gained (Etzioni 2011, 4). Petraeus’s strategy focused again on security and pursuing the enemy, and not just protecting the Afghan people (Rothstein 2012, 70): one innovation was the creation of Village Stability Operations (VSOs), local security forces that included Afghan tribal leaders with local legitimacy (74). This sort of strategy that involved building legitimacy was presumably meant to deal with the issue of a perceived lack of legitimacy of government officials in the country; this dearth of faith in the country’s government was a problem exhibited most prominently in the aftermath of the fraudulent 2009 re-election of President Hamid Karzai (Burke 2011, 438).

One of the changes that took place with the new COIN doctrine, implemented in Afghanistan with the unveiling of the Obama Af-Pak Strategy in 2009, was an increase in the number and activities in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). These groups have existed in the country since mid-2003, and are led mostly by US troops but also by some US allies such as Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands; each PRT is a team consisting of representatives from the central government, the military, and civilian experts such as engineers (Weinbaum 2005, 170-1). PRTs were constructed to work on “post-conflict and preemptive-conflict development and reconstruction” to meet the goals of security, development and governance; they often include representatives from the US State Department, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and sometimes the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). They work with local Afghan
governments and ministries to engage in projects like school construction and other rebuilding efforts (Blosser 2007).

More recently, some PRTs specifically work with Afghan government officials on women’s issues to “build capacity and opportunity for Afghan women” by conducting and attending local community meetings, or shuras (Michel 2010). PRTs in Afghanistan have carried out other projects, including building health clinics, infrastructure, and helping to establish a legal system in the country (Jones 2006, 118). The increase in PRT work that was a part of the 2009 COIN strategy in Afghanistan was part of a broader shift that included the creation of the Department of State’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Office, along with a new Center for Complex Operations (Bodine 2010, 28). This intensification of complex operations, when “multiple agencies assume complementary roles and operate in close proximity—often with similar missions but conflicting mandates” included the Department of Defense adding stabilization and reconstruction work to its repertoire (Miklaucic 2010, xi-xiii). Here, then, we see a paradox in US military operations in Afghanistan: with the progression of the US-led war in the country, there has been a changing role for the military, from an actor or institution engaged just in hard power to one that has increasingly adopted elements of soft power to make it a force of combined power in US strategy. As discussed in the previous chapter, this increase in the use of soft power came with an increased acknowledgement, particularly under the Obama administration, that fronts in the War on Terror, including Afghanistan, presented a combined terrorist or security threat to the US and must therefore be the target of combined US power, as Hypothesis 2 predicts.

The increase in soft power took place at the same time as an increase in US hard power in Afghanistan, as illustrated by the surge. Along with announcing a military surge
President Obama’s Af-Pak strategy, increases in US hard power to meet the increased short-term security or terrorist threat acknowledged to be coming from both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the President declared that a drawdown of troops after the surge would begin in June 2011. This gradual withdrawal of US troops, which continues to this day, was instituted as a response to what was expressed as a decreasing security threat to the US. On May 1, 2012, President Obama gave a speech during a surprise visit to Kabul, outlining an agreement he signed with President Karzai to cement the US withdrawal of combat troops from the country by 2014. In his speech, Obama said that Afghans could now ensure their own security, and in 2013 NATO and US troops would shift from combat to counter-terrorism and training operations. The US was to have an “enduring partnership” with Afghanistan, and the President pledged some form of unspecified US support to the country until 2024. “Our goal is not to build a country in America’s image, or to eradicate every vestige of the Taliban,” he declared; such a goal would require a much longer US commitment, more US money, and more US lives (Landler 2012, The New York Times). The US State Department describes the 10-year Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement signed by Presidents Obama and Karzai as one that reflects the United States’ “enduring commitment to strengthen Afghan sovereignty, stability, and prosperity and continued cooperation to defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates,” as well as a prelude to the US declaring Afghanistan a Major Non-NATO Ally. Militarily, the US would be shifting security responsibilities to the Afghan National Security Forces but continue providing humanitarian assistance, security, capacity building, counter-narcotics, and infrastructure support for the country (US State Department 2012, “U.S. Relations with Afghanistan”).

This overview of the evolution of US military strategy in Afghanistan provides support for Hypothesis 1, demonstrating that when faced with what it acknowledges is a short-term security or terrorist threat, the US executive will decide to use hard power.
Initial US operations in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks reflect such a phenomenon, as do increases in US troop levels in the country, particularly in 2009 and 2010, in response to increased insurgent attacks against the US and thus an increasing terrorist or security threat. Indeed, the number of insurgent attacks in Afghanistan against US and NATO troops gradually increased in 2009, peaking in August of that year to almost 900 attacks per week, followed by a dip in insurgent attacks until January 2010. In 2010, insurgent attacks increased until they reached an all-time high of more than 1600 weekly attacks in September 2010, decreasing until they returned to a relatively stable 800 attacks per week by June 2011 (Livingston and O’Hanlon 2012). Figure 15 demonstrates the level of US troops in Afghanistan, beginning with 0 troops on the ground in 2001, up to an increase reflected in the surges of 2009 and 2010 to 98,000 US troops on the ground by September 2010. The gradual withdrawal of US troops from the country reflects an acknowledgement by the US executive of a decreasing threat level against the US: it is important to note that in his speech announcing the proposed end of US combat operations in the country, President Obama declared not that the Afghan security situation was resolved, but that Afghan troops would be able to assume responsibility for the country’s security. In other words, threats against the US and NATO no longer existed to such a degree as to justify US combat operations in the country after 2014. The increase in insurgent attacks in April and May 2012, up 31% from May 2011 and the first increase in insurgent attacks in 11 months (Hodge and Totakhil 2012, Wall Street Journal), may challenge this determination of a declining security threat, but the strategy for US combat troop withdrawal was already in place by the time this increased violence was occurring. It is also significant that the US will continue some level of support, particularly for capacity-building, infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance, until 2024, perhaps reflecting an acknowledgement by the US
executive that a long-term security threat still exists, dictating more of a soft power strategy.

Figure 15

![US Troops on the Ground in Afghanistan, Dec. 2001-Sept. 2010](image)

Data from Belasco 2011, *CRS Report*

**US Soft and Combined Power Strategy in Afghanistan**

*Country Context*

This research project seeks to explain temporal and geographic variation in the US’s hard, soft, and combined power strategy in the War on Terror. As I have argued in the theory chapter, one explanation for variation in the specifics of a US soft or combined power strategy is the country context: Hypothesis 3 states that the US is more likely to fund NGO projects, for example, that deal with the most pressing social, political, and economic needs of a particular target country it determines poses a long-term and combined terrorist threat. Thus, it is imperative to lay out the Afghan country context to test Hypothesis 3.
Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, and the accompanying social and economic problems are not very surprising. For instance, in 2011, the life expectancy of the average Afghan was only 49 years, and the literacy rate was only 28.1%, with 43% of males and only 12% of females able to read. High unemployment abounds in the country, and before the current US war in the country, only about 10% of Afghans had access to electricity. The healthcare needs of the population are quite extensive, as access to healthcare is quite limited. In addition, Afghanistan is an ethnically divided society, with about 42% Pashtuns, 27% Tajiks, 9% Hazaras, and 9% belonging to other ethnic groups; the country is also split among religious lines, with 80% Sunnis and the rest mostly Shi’a. In Afghanistan, kinship ties are extremely important, with religious and traditional customs playing a predominant role in people’s lives, particularly in the rural areas (US State Department 2011, “Background Notes: Afghanistan”). Indeed, the challenge of creating a strong central government in Afghanistan dates back to the insurgency against British colonizers in 1841: the country has a long tradition of decentralized rule, with local populations dealing with their own problems through processes of mediation and arbitration by community leaders of their choosing (Barfield 2012, 54). Tribal, ethnic, and clan identities reign supreme, rather than a national or state identity in Afghanistan (Hill 2010, 164), posing a significant challenge for governance and even military control in a war-torn country.

Another challenge in Afghanistan, one that continues long after the US-led war in the country, is corruption: in 2009 it ranked 179 out of 180 in the global Corruption Perceptions Index (Rodriguez and Lorentz 2012). Patronage networks are frequently determinants of political favors and even the dispensation of development aid itself. Furthermore, the narcotics trade, specifically from poppies for opium, is an important part of the agricultural sector and has been used to fund the insurgency to a tune of $60 to $100
million a year, by some estimates (Rodriguez and Lorentz 2012, 195-6). After the rural economy was destroyed following years of war with the Soviets, the opium trade and smuggling became rampant, especially after the US and other countries sharply decreased development assistance to the country in the 1990s (Riphenburg 2005, 46). With Afghanistan producing about 87% of the world’s opium, poppy cultivation has been a persistent problem, with a resurgence following the US invasion: 74,045 hectares of poppy were cultivated in 2002, jumping to 131,000 in 2004, decreasing to 104,000 in 2005 (Jones 2006, 115). Another figure is quite telling: out of $8 billion Gross National Product in 2007, the narcotics industry accounted for $3 billion, and by 2008, the industry was worth twice what it had been in 2002 (Burke 2011, 316). The biggest problems plaguing Afghanistan, then, appear to be poverty, a lack of education, especially among females, and access to electricity and healthcare. Governance challenges include a lack of national identity and the predominance of ethnic or tribal identities, corruption, and the opium trade. The question, then, is whether or not US soft power strategy, which in a war zone has been combined with or complementary to its hard power strategy to produce combined power, addresses these aspects of the Afghan country context, as my theory would suggest. The preceding chapter already tested Hypothesis 2, demonstrating that Afghanistan was seen by the US executive as posing a combined terrorist or security threat to the US since 2001, leading to the implementation of US soft power (which increased over time) along with hard power. Afghanistan, acknowledged to pose a combined threat, has been the target of combined soft and hard power efforts by the US, particularly in the last few years.

The NGO Regulatory Environment

The specific type of soft power wielded by the US government and of most interest in this project is its funding of NGOs and their projects, for reasons outlined previously. I
have argued that the regulatory environment surrounding NGOs in the target country, in this case Afghanistan, will impact this US soft power strategy, with more restrictive NGO regulations or oversight providing an obstacle to the implementation of such a strategy. Afghanistan is an interesting case, not only because it has been a warzone since the earliest days of the US War on Terror, but because the political apparatus installed in the aftermath of the US invasion has been heavily influenced by the US and its allies, dating back to the UN-sponsored Bonn Agreement in December 2001. Aside from establishing ISAF (discussed above), this Agreement also laid out a two year schedule for a political transition, with an Interim Afghan Authority to be headed by Afghan exile Hamid Karzai. An Emergency Loya Jirga (a traditional communal decision-making event) would determine the makeup of the Transitional Authority in 2002, followed by the adoption of a new Constitution, with elections two years later (Papagianni 2005, 749). Hamid Karzai was elected President in 2004 and then again in 2009, despite widespread allegations of fraud in the second presidential election (Burke 2011, 438; Al-Tamimi 2012).

It follows, then, that the Constitutional and legal system in the country, heavily influenced by foreign powers, namely the US, might be favorable to US interests, particularly in the realm of international development assistance that has been such a central part of the Afghan war. On paper, then, the NGO regulatory environment is rather open and unrestrictive, which, as my theory predicts, favorably impacts a US soft power strategy that utilizes NGOs. Again, however, when examining this regulatory environment, the obvious caveat is that it was impacted by actors who would benefit from an open, less restrictive regulatory environment; the efficacy of a US NGO-based soft power strategy, then, can be at least partly attributed to the US itself. Significant restrictions on NGO activity, then, may come from less formal features of the political and economic system, such as corruption and patronage networks; such a feature of the regulatory environment
comes across in the interviews of INGO workers in the country, discussed later in the chapter. Nevertheless, it remains useful to catalogue the most prominent features of the official, codified NGO regulatory environment as it currently exists in Afghanistan.

The 2002 transitional Afghan government put in place a Law on Social Organizations, but the most current and most relevant piece of legislation pertaining to NGOs operating in Afghanistan is the 2005 NGO Law. Although some proposed amendments to the NGO Law are taking place in the country’s legislature, the 2005 NGO Law stands today without any changes (NGO Law Monitor: Afghanistan 2012). This law mandates that organizations must register with the Ministry of Economy, although some issues remain unclear even with the law: the number of members an organization must have, the number of foreigners allowed, the exact reporting requirements, and the specifics of tax benefits to non-governmental organizations (Irish and Simon 2007). A non-distribution constraint does exist, as is typical of NGO regulation, although the law does not refer to it explicitly as such: profits or income generated by a non-profit organization (i.e., NGO) may be used only for the activities of the organization (Law on Non-governmental Organizations 2005, 6). All NGOs must submit project documents to the Ministry of Economy, except when conducting emergency humanitarian documents; annual financial records must be submitted to the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance, and any relevant donor agencies (8-9), in the case of foreign-funded organizations. Foreign-funded NGOs, or what I have referred to in this project as INGOs, face stricter rules, with additional reporting requirements including proof of registration and work in another country to be submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as statements from their headquarters about the organizations’ activities and goals, to be submitted to the Ministry of Economy. Several government institutions are involved in the NGO application review process, including the NGO Department of the Ministry of Economy, with final review by the High Evaluation Commission that brings
together representatives from the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (6).

Other important elements of regulations on NGOs include a prohibition against their work on construction projects or contracts, unless an exception is granted by the Ministry of Economy. NGOs must also submit twice-annual reports with the Ministry of Economy for every project they carry out, and they are not allowed to participate in political activities such as campaigning or fundraising for candidates. Currently, about 1,550 NGOs and 1,700 Social Organizations (the latter being organizations formed specifically for "social, cultural, educational, legal, artistic, and vocational objectives," according to the 2005 NGO Law) exist in Afghanistan, with 72,000 Afghans working with NGOs. Organizations classified as NGOs by the law (and the organizations discussed in this project fall under that category) face no prohibitions on foreign funding. Also, Social Organizations (SOs) are officially not allowed to receive foreign funding, a provision that is not always enforced. Some NGOs have faced challenges in the country regarding the extensive reporting requirements: in January 2012, Economy Minister Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal closed down 600 Afghan and 195 foreign NGOs, citing their failure to meet the reporting requirements outlined in the 2005 NGO Law (NGO Law Monitor: Afghanistan 2012). Aside from the considerable reporting requirements for NGOs in the country, it appears that the official NGO regulatory environment in Afghanistan is relatively unrestrictive, which is reflected in the extensive US-funded NGO activity in the country, to be discussed in more detail shortly. This finding provides some support for Hypothesis 4, which predicts that the US government is more likely to fund NGOs in countries with a more open NGO regulatory environment. Particularly when compared to NGO work under Taliban rule and before the US invasion, the NGO regulatory environment in Afghanistan is not very restrictive, leaving room for foreign-funded and local NGOs to operate widely in the country.
US State Department and USAID in Afghanistan

It may be useful to start with an overall look at US aid to Afghanistan that is channeled through “NGOs and Civil Society Organizations,” a category that includes both INGOs and local NGOs in Afghanistan. This data, shown in Figure 16 and taken from the OECD and available for the years 2005-2010, demonstrates an upward trend in US funding of such organizations, with a dramatic increase between 2008 and 2009, and an increased budget for 2010.

Figure 16

More broadly, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which has been part of the US State Department since 2006, is the primary actor implementing soft power in target countries, including Afghanistan, during the War on Terror. The agency describes itself as “furthering America’s foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets while also extending a helping hand to people struggling to make a better life, recover from a disaster or striving to live in a free and democratic country,” especially in the war contexts of Iraq and Afghanistan (www.usaid.gov). USAID is an agency of interest in this research project not just because it dispenses US development assistance in general, but also because it funds a great deal of
NGO projects, work that will be discussed shortly. In Afghanistan, USAID has worked on economic growth, healthcare and education, and infrastructure, often as a partner with the US military (USAID in Afghanistan: Partnership, Progress, Perseverance 2012, 3), in the ultimate expression of combined power.

Table 1

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<tr>
<td>National Solidarity Program</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy/Governance Including Civil Society</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>132</td>
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<tr>
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<td>104</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>50</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Program Support</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Assistance/FFP 480 Title II</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>376</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>471</strong></td>
<td><strong>462</strong></td>
<td><strong>1172</strong></td>
<td><strong>1511</strong></td>
<td><strong>748</strong></td>
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Tables 1 and 2 show USAID's budget by sector in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2006, and 2007 and 2011, respectively. Some categories represent broad categories (rule of law, governance, etc.) while others represent specific projects (the National Solidarity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>FY2007</th>
<th>FY2008</th>
<th>FY2009</th>
<th>FY2010</th>
<th>FY2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>447</td>
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<td>789</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alternative Development</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>140</td>
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<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>538</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>97</td>
<td>635</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cash for Work</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>75</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>175</td>
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<tr>
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<td>24</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy/Governance Inc. Civil Society</td>
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<td>143</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>93</td>
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<td>Election</td>
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<td>90</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Communication</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>113</td>
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<td>156</td>
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<td>Program Support</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>46</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>58</td>
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<td>PAs, DOC, and IPA</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1478</td>
<td>1621</td>
<td>2153</td>
<td>3496</td>
<td>2053</td>
<td>1082</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Program, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, etc.). “GIRoA/Crosscutting” includes programs for outreach, gender, public outreach/information systems, and evaluation.

Several things stand out: first, there is a general upward trend in terms of USAID spending in Afghanistan: it started out with $471 million in 2002, peaked in 2010 at $3,496 million, then decreased in 2011 to $2,053 million. The rapid increase between 2008 and 2010 coincides with the US military surge in the country in 2009 and 2010, and the decreased budget in 2011 coincides with the beginning of US troop withdrawal from the country in 2011. It is equally important to examine USAID spending on specific sectors or categories in Afghanistan over time: between 2002-2006, roads and power appear to take up the most spending, peaking in 2005. The biggest increases in budget during the same period took place in the education, healthcare, and alternative development sectors, peaking in 2004. Food Assistance spending was very high in 2002, immediately after the US invasion, then decreased dramatically in the years after that. Later on in the Afghanistan war, between 2007 and 2011, the most spending took place in the sectors of alternative development, roads, power, democracy/civil society (which peaked in 2010), PRTs (which previously had not taken up much of the budget), and healthcare. There was considerably more spending on Democracy/Governance and Civil Society in the second period than in the first period. The most dramatic increase took place in the agricultural sector, which went from $67 million in 2007 to $447 million in 2010, and back down to $88 million in 2011. Programs for water and general program support were categories in which spending was consistently low for the entire period of 2002-2011.

While some of this USAID spending is outsourced to NGOs, as will be discussed later (even outside the category of “civil society”), this USAID budget is a measure of more general soft power spending, which in Afghanistan, is part of a combined power strategy. The sectors discussed here presumably reflect the US government’s assessment of the
country’s needs, and many of them line up with those discussed earlier in the chapter, providing some support for Hypothesis 3, predicting that the socio-economic and political needs of a country would shape the kinds of NGO projects funded by the US government. As expected, US soft power spending through USAID, focused on issues like economic development, power, healthcare, education, and governance. There is less of a focus, at least by USAID, on combating poppy or opium production, although spending on the Agriculture sector addresses this challenge, as will be discussed later in more detail.

Figure 17

**USAID-Managed Afghanistan Budget by Sector, 2009: $2.1 Billion**

- Agriculture 14%
- Economic Growth 8%
- Infrastructure 13%
- Health 5%
- Education 4%
- Stabilization 18%
- Dem. and Governance 38%

Source: USAID in Afghanistan: Partnership, Progress, Perseverance 2012
USAID-Managed Afghanistan Budget by Sector, 2010: $3.4 Billion

- Agriculture 23%
- Economic Growth 7%
- Infrastructure 13%
- Health 5%
- Education 4%
- Stabilization 15%
- Dem. And Governance 33%

Source: USAID in Afghanistan: Partnership, Progress, Perseverance 2012

USAID-Managed Afghanistan Budget by Sector, 2011: $2.0 Billion

- Agriculture 8%
- Economic Growth 5%
- Infrastructure 33%
- Health 8%
- Education 5%
- Stabilization 12%
- Dem. And Governance 29%

Source: USAID in Afghanistan: Partnership, Progress, Perseverance 2012
Figures 17-19 provide a more general breakdown of USAID’s budget in Afghanistan by sector between 2009 and 2011. Several trends are noteworthy here: as indicated above, there was a spike in USAID’s spending in Afghanistan in 2010; I have hypothesized that this was to accompany the military surge in the country that took place between 2009 and 2010. The USAID budget itself more than doubled in 2009 with the civilian and military surge put in place by President Obama, with civilian personnel increasing from 44 people in the country to almost 380 (USAID in Afghanistan: Partnership, Progress, Perseverance 2012, 8-16). Second, as indicated in the pie charts above, the Democracy and Governance Sector consistently takes up the largest proportion of the Afghanistan USAID budget, although it decreases from 38% in 2009 to 29% in 2011. Third, spending on Agriculture rose significantly from 14% of the budget in 2009 to 23% of the budget in 2010, then decreased quite a bit to only 8% of the budget in 2011. Infrastructure spending was consistent between 2009 and 2010 (13% of the budget), but increased to 23% in 2011, despite the decrease in the overall budget. Spending on Health, Education, Economic Growth, and Stabilization did not vary much from 2009-2011. While explaining the exact reasons for such variation in USAID’s spending in Afghanistan by sector are beyond the scope of this project, it is probable that spending by sector varied due to the assessment of the country’s needs by USAID and/or military staff in Afghanistan, along the lines of what Hypothesis 3 predicts.

As reflected in the budget data on USAID’s activities in Afghanistan since 2002, the agency has worked on a variety of sectors and needs in the country. It has collaborated with NGOs and the Afghan government on healthcare and clinics (USAID in Afghanistan: Partnership, Progress, Perseverance 2012, 24), established 34 community centers to teach people their legal rights, as well as promoted local governance by creating 112 community councils (23); and secured micro-finance loans for 830,000 people, new jobs, and mobile
phone subscriptions to promote economic development (20). Additionally, USAID in Afghanistan has carried out cash-for-work and short-term income programs for farmers, working with the Afghanistan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock to come up with alternatives to poppy production in the agriculture sector (19). For instance, USAID started an Agriculture Rural Investment and Enterprise Strengthening program, with microfinance projects in southern regions facing the most violence, and its Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation worked on community-based development in areas of conflict, with microfinance projects targeted at refugees, women, and farmers, in order to provide alternatives to poppy farming for the latter (Ohanyan 2008, 118-122). For these microfinance projects, USAID often funded INGOs as implementing partners, including Mercy Corps, CARE, WfW International, CHF International, International Catholic Migration Committee, World Vision, and Catholic Relief Services (Ohanyan 2008, 126). Other USAID projects include building or refurbishing more than 680 schools, printing and distributing millions of textbooks in Dari and Pashto (the two most common local languages), and focusing on female education (USAID in Afghanistan: Partnership, Progress, Perseverance 2012, 27). USAID in Afghanistan has also ensured increased access to electricity to the local people by activities such as building power lines, and it has built a number of roads across the country as well (28).

USAID has worked with other international donors on several of the projects it has funded in Afghanistan over the years. For instance, in March 2002 the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund was set up as a part of the country’s transitional budget, with education as one of the major projects, with $1.45 billion raised by 2007 from 25 donors. Most of the project money was used to pay teachers’ salaries and cover children’s enrollment in school for grades 1-12 (Berry 2010, 588). As indicated in the charts above, this Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund was one of the projects on which USAID
spending increased over time until it spiked to over $400 million in 2010, only to drop off in 2011. NGOs have worked on education, sometimes with the Ministry of Education, to implement parts of projects like the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (Berry 2010, 589). Another part of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund has been the National Solidarity Program, which builds Community Development Committees to provide services based on demands determined by local communities: at least 300 schools have been built through this program, also funded partly by USAID (590). Such a program can be said to address not only sectors pertaining to the specific needs of local communities (such as education, described here), but also to promote civil society or local governance in Afghanistan by empowering communities to participate in development decision-making.

Particularly during the Bush administration, USAID's work in Afghanistan on democracy promotion focused more on formal institutions of liberal democracy, such as putting in place a constitution codifying legitimate elections, an independent judicial system, the rule of law, and the subordination of police, military, and intelligence forces to democratic rule (Hill 2010, 156). Often the agency itself was responsible for establishing the "blueprints for the[se] plans," working with Afghan and American-based NGOs to do so (163). After spiking in 2004 under the Bush administration and then decreasing dramatically, democracy, governance, and civil society was increased with the Obama administration between 2008 and 2010, as indicated in the budget data above, reaching an all-time high of $231 million of the USAID budget in 2010, then decreasing to about $90 million the following year. However, there are suggestions that USAID democratization efforts in Afghanistan were dictated less by the agency and more attuned to the Afghans themselves under the Obama administration, as part of what Ambassador Eikenberry referred to in a memo as the "Afghanization" of US development assistance, so that it would be led by Afghans (Hill 2010, 168).
As mentioned earlier, USAID is the development arm of the US Department of State, but the State Department itself has also worked with NGOs in Afghanistan. For instance, the US embassy in Afghanistan has partnered with the Afghan government and NGOs to improve reading among Afghan children and adults. The embassy has worked with civil society organizations [i.e., NGOs] in the country to provide literacy classes to 7,000 adults, at least half of them women, and has partnered with NGOs to supply books to schools, orphanages, and libraries (Baxter 2011). The US embassy in Afghanistan has also collaborated with the country’s Acting Minister of Women’s Affairs to implement a program promoting gender equality in the country, pledging to provide $27 million in grants over three years to improve Afghan NGO and civil society groups that work on women’s issues in the areas of education, healthcare, skills training, and family counseling (Hart 2010). Not always acting alone, the US embassy in Afghanistan sometimes works with allies on development in the country, through funding such projects like the NATO-led “SILK-Afghanistan” (to the tune of $3.1 million), which since 2002 has provided high-speed internet access to university students and teachers; this project includes a partnership with the Afghan Ministry of Education (Peters 2010). Other divisions of the US State Department also fund humanitarian or development projects in Afghanistan: its Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration funds NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and others to “provide protection and assistance to refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons, and victims of conflict in the region,” with $10.4 million in funding in 2008 alone (Pierce 2008). The sectors addressed by these projects have much in common with the sectors identified in the USAID budget discussed above: healthcare, education, women’s issues, but also include humanitarian work for refugees, which was not specifically delineated as a category in the USAID budget. Once again, it is clear that the socio-economic and political context of a target country helps shape the kinds of projects funded, including
NGO-implemented projects, funded by US government agencies such as USAID or the State Department more broadly, lending support to Hypothesis 3.

**NGO Work in Afghanistan**

This is a research project aimed at explaining US government strategy in the US War on Terror, specifically variation in its hard, soft, and combined power components. Thus, in the previous section, I catalogued the work of US government agencies, namely USAID and the State Department, and their funding of various development and humanitarian projects, as well as partnerships with NGOs since the beginning of the current war in Afghanistan. To get a more detailed and varied understanding of the work of NGOs in the country—particularly since NGOs and their projects are the specific form of soft power of interest in this project—InterAction is a useful source of information. Describing itself as the “largest alliance of U.S.-based international non-governmental organizations (NGOs),” this umbrella organization has more than 190 members. It “seeks to shape important policy decisions on relief and long term development issues, including foreign assistance, the environment, women, health, education and agriculture,” and information-sharing about development and humanitarian needs, as well as the activities of its members, is an important part of InterAction’s work ([www.interaction.org/about](http://www.interaction.org/about)). Sources of information useful for this project include member activity reports describing the work of US-based INGOs in Afghanistan, and InterAction has made four of these annual reports publicly available, for the years 2004, 2008, 2009, and 2010. These reports provide a useful look at the US-based INGOs working in Afghanistan and the projects they have conducted over the years, including efforts funded by US government agencies, as well as the main challenges or concerns the organizations face working in this war-torn part of the world.

*2004 Interaction Report*
In 2004, for instance, the biggest challenges for the InterAction member INGOs working in Afghanistan were demining, helping returning refugees to settle in their home country, working with farmers to produce crops other than opium poppies, ensuring the smooth running of elections, creating or rebuilding the banking system, and building or rebuilding infrastructure (Bashan 2004, “Interaction Member Activity Report, Afghanistan,” 4). About three years into the US-led war in Afghanistan, 65% of the population in cities and 81% in rural areas had no access to safe water, only 6% had access to electricity, malnutrition plagued some 50% of children under five years old, and the negative impact of Taliban rules on women were still being felt, particularly in the areas of healthcare access, education and training for the workplace (Bashan 2004, 5). In addition, the security of international and local NGO workers was a top concern; the continued presence of INGOs in the country after their initial flood into Afghanistan with the onset of the war in late 2001 was being threatened (6). Security has been a persistent challenge for NGO workers in the country, as later InterAction reports and interviews with INGO workers will attest.

Against this backdrop of socio-economic, humanitarian, and development needs, the work of the 29 member organizations who contributed to the 2004 InterAction report for Afghanistan comes as no surprise. There is a clear split, however, between INGOs that began work in the country after the US-led invasion in 2001, and those that had been working in Afghanistan for years prior to the war. Organizations including Action Against Hunger, Adventist Development and Relief Agency International, AirServ International, American Jewish World Service, AmeriCares, Christian Children’s Fund, Food for the Hungry, and World Vision started projects in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the war. Older, veteran organizations, some of whose work in Afghanistan dates back to the 1950s and many of whose work dates back to the 1980s, include the Aga Khan Foundation, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, Concern Worldwide, International Medical Corps,
International Rescue Committee, and Save the Children (Bashan 2004). The binary variation of INGO presence in Afghanistan is interesting insofar as it reflects humanitarian or development needs in Afghanistan far before the US war, but also an intensification of needs, as well as greater access for INGOs to work in the country, after October 2001. INGOs have been present in Afghanistan for at least the last three decades, and their existence there can be divided into four stages. During the Soviet invasion which began in 1979, many operated from nearby countries in a period of humanitarian consensus about the country’s needs; during the civil war between 1992 and 1996, institutions were destroyed in the country and no coordination existed between INGOs. During Taliban rule between 1996 and 2001, more coordination existed among INGOs who worked in the country, and after 9/11, INGOs and their work became seen as having ties to NATO forces (Donini 2009, 7), and the number of INGOs working in the country increased significantly, as the InterAction report (Bashan 2004) attests. As discussed earlier, the regulatory environment became much friendlier to INGOs after the US-led war in 2001, with the presence of US and NATO forces in the country, which is correlated with more US funding of NGO projects in Afghanistan as Hypothesis 4 predicts.

What kind of work did INGOs conduct in Afghanistan, as of 2004? Their work can be divided into several broad categories, which again come as no surprise, given the country context: nutrition and food, agriculture, healthcare, education, women's needs (including education, literacy, and work training), rebuilding infrastructure, refugee assistance, water and sanitation, and business and economic development (Bashan 2004). Interestingly, many of the INGOs whose work is documented in the 2004 InterAction report partnered with ministries of the Afghan government to implement projects. The Aga Khan Foundation, for instance, has worked with the Afghan government on the National Solidarity Program, a community-based development project in which local communities decided which small
development projects they needed most (17); GOAL has also worked on the National Solidarity Program (46), as has Oxfam (66). CARE has worked with ministries like the Afghan Ministry of Education in implementing its education projects, with a special focus on girls (30), as did Catholic Relief Services (31). World Vision has partnered with the Ministries of Public Health, Education, Agriculture, and Rural Relief of Development in the country (81). Such a trend of INGO partnerships with local and national governments once again reflects a regulatory environment friendly to INGOs in Afghanistan, which, as Hypothesis 4 predicts, positively impacts US funding of INGOs and their projects in the country.

As expected, many of the INGOs whose work is featured in the 2004 InterAction report have carried out projects funded by US government agencies. The Aga Khan Foundation, for instance, has implemented a US government-funded project to limit poppy production among Afghan farmers, albeit with limited success since local law enforcement did not cooperate with them in such an endeavor (21). AirServ International’s air transportation for humanitarian organizations to remote or insecure areas, which began in March 2002, has been funded by the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, part of USAID (22). Work on areas including agriculture, education and training, women’s programs, healthcare, and local governance by the Christian Children’s Fund, which started in December 2001, has also been funded in part by USAID (36). Concern Worldwide’s food security, community infrastructure, water and sanitation, and emergency intervention work has also been bankrolled in part by the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (40), and USAID has also been a donor of the emergency food and shelter program and the National Solidarity Program work of GOAL (46-7). The International Rescue Committee’s work providing shelter, water, education, healthcare, and protection of refugees has also been funded by USAID and the US Department of Labor (55), and Relief International’s
agriculture, business development, education, women’s issues, healthcare, infrastructure, refugee, and rural development program have been the object of US government funding as well (70). The US Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, part of the US State Department, has been a source of funding for the United Methodist Committee on Relief’s healthcare, hygiene, vocational training, relief supplies, and education projects as well (75).

Another trend that emerges in the work of INGOs in Afghanistan is their partnerships with local organizations or NGOs, who help them carry out parts of specific projects, including some of the ones funded by US government agencies. Thus it is important to keep in mind that a US government NGO-based soft power strategy includes funding that reaches both INGOs and local NGOs. In the earlier section, I broke down the various sectors of US government-funded humanitarian and development work, some of it carried out by INGOs or local NGOs, and how spending varied over time. Cataloguing the work of specific INGOs and their projects, especially those funded by different agencies of the US government, helps fill in the picture of a US NGO-based soft power strategy in Afghanistan. From the outset of the war in Afghanistan, INGOs have worked, on their own and with local NGOs and Afghan government agencies, to carry out projects in healthcare, education, infrastructure, women’s issues, refugee support, agriculture, and economic development, with some projects focusing on local governance in conjunction with development (e.g., the National Solidarity Program). These sectors broadly fall in line with Afghanistan’s socio-economic and political needs indicated earlier in the chapter, as predicted by Hypothesis 3.

*Changes and Consistencies over Time: 2008 and 2009 InterAction Reports*

What kinds of changes do we see, if any, in the work of INGOs and the challenges facing them in Afghanistan with the progression of the War on Terror and the US-led
offensive in that country? For one thing, security appears to be a persistently escalating concern for INGOs in the country. In 2008, “security [was] a continued and increasing concern as conditions have deteriorated over the past year,” with threats sometimes becoming so severe that NGOs had to remove their staff from some areas of the country, as well as “minimize visibility or extent of program coverage” (Ruchala 2008, “InterAction Member Activity Report: Afghanistan, 4). In the following year, security continued to escalate as a concern for INGOs and local NGOs in the country, with increased violence and threats that resulted in a “shrinking humanitarian space,” as well as more and more “resentment” by the Afghan people of the deteriorating social and economic and security conditions in the country (Fass and Hass 2009, “InterAction Member Activity Report: Afghanistan, 4). Security was listed as a concern of NGOs in 2010, with 80 security incidents against such organizations taking place that year (O’Brien 2010, “Afghanistan Member Activity Report,” 5).

In 2009, other problems or challenges were also mentioned, including reconstruction needs after the US/NATO invasion, the continued challenges of putting women in the workforce and education them, children’s education, healthcare, limited access to drinking water, food insecurity, poppy cultivation, and increased negativity by the Afghans about “the prospects of US policy objectives” accompanying the deterioration of security, increased corruption and government incapacity (Fass and Hass 2009, 6). Another change in 2009, linked to the arrival of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke on the scene, included the linking of the US's Afghanistan strategy to Pakistan (i.e., the Af-Pak strategy), along with a “civilian surge” and increased US staff in the country beginning in May 2009 (Fass and Hass 2009, 7). Interestingly, by 2010, a new concern for INGOs in Afghanistan involved their relationship with the Afghan government, particularly in light of President Karzai’s ban on private security companies in the country. While most INGOs do not employ
these private companies, they expressed a concern that such a ban would further compromise their security and access in the country. Furthermore, INGOs indicated a concern of shrinking funds for their work, citing a 2/3 decrease in humanitarian funding by international donors, particularly the US, since 2004 (O’Brien 2010, 5). The timing of such a concern is rather surprising, particularly since, as indicated several times above, USAID funding appears to have peaked in 2010, along with the US military surge in the country, dropping off significantly in 2011. Perhaps the concern for funding by the INGOs in this 2010 InterAction report reflects worries about the future of US humanitarian funding, or perhaps the proportion of funding specifically allotted to INGOs shrank in 2010 despite an increase in the overall USAID and State Department budgets; it is hard to tell.

The issue areas addressed by INGO work in 2008 do not exhibit much change from their work documented in 2004: healthcare, education, medical and relief supplies, refugee support, infrastructure, and rural and economic development are all consistent sectors of INGO projects. US government-funded projects listed in 2008 include Counterpart International’s 3 year USAID program “to increase the role and viability of civil society in Afghanistan” (Ruchala 2008, 29), which appears to be a new endeavor not discussed four years earlier. The International Medical Corps, working with the Afghan government to provide immunization, surgical care, and medical training in the country, also carried out USAID funded projects (30). The International Rescue Committee was involved in implementing a USAID program to improve the Afghanistan education system (34). Save the Children carried out another USAID-funded project in conjunction with an Afghan government body, this time the Ministry of Public Health: this Health Service Support Project set out to improve that Ministry through information, education, and communication (43). USAID-funded partnerships between INGOs and government ministries in the country once again reflect the active role by the US in shaping governance
in Afghanistan, which, it appears, reflects positively on the regulatory environment facing INGOs in the country. Such an open environment in turn probably positively impacted the propensity for the US government to fund NGO projects in Afghanistan, as expected by Hypothesis 4. I did not predict, however, what appears to be this endogenous relationship between the legal or regulatory system, shaped in part by the US in Afghanistan, and US funding of INGOs in that country: it appears the US helped mold the conditions favorable to a society where NGOs are allowed to operate freely, which impacted its funding of NGOs and a reliance on them to carry out development projects there.

Again by 2009, there does not appear to have been much change in terms of the kinds of projects carried out by INGOs in Afghanistan. US government-funded projects include the education and training, winterization, healthcare, water and sanitation, and refugee shelter work by the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (Fass and Hass 2009, 14). Additionally, the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development carried out projects addressing local governance, rural development, supporting internally displaced persons (IDPs), hygiene and water, and emergency relief, with USAID as a donor (20). CARE’s work, partly funded by USAID, continued to deal with women and children’s issues, education and economic development, maternal and infant healthcare, subnational governance, IDPs and refugees, and disaster relief (24). Catholic Relief Services worked on a project promoting access to education, called the USAID Partnership for Advancing Community-Based Education in Afghanistan, in conjunction with the Ministry of Education (27). The healthcare programs of Church World Service were funded by the US Department of State Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (33), as were the child development and protection programs of Childfund International (34).
Counterpart International continued to promote civil society in 2009, particularly through its USAID-funded Initiative to Promote Afghan Civil Society, a five-year program in place since 2005 that worked with 220 CSOs (civil society organizations, another name for local NGOs), with a focus on women’s organizations. Additionally, Counterpart International was implementing a three-year USAID program called Support for Electoral Process, to educate and train voters, which began in 2008 (Fass and Hass 2009, 37). USAID also funded Counterpart International’s radio roundtables with community and religious leaders (37), in another project aimed at community and civil society development. International Medical Corps’ healthcare programs, specifically targeting women, and refugees, were also funded by USAID as well as the USDA (41-2). International Relief and Development was involved in several USAID programs, including the Human Resources and Logistical Support program, scheduled through 2011, to provide technical capacity and inspection of programs and ministries for public works (44). The Strategic Provincial Roads was another USAID program started in 2007 to build roads, and the Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production of Agriculture was also carried out by International Relief and Development after the 2008 drought, working with Afghan ministries and providing cheap fertilizer and seeds to farmers (45). Mercy Corps was another INGO implementing several US government-funded programs, including USAID’s Incentives, Driving Economic Alternatives, North, East, and West program to ensure livelihoods for rural communities, as well as USDA’s Afghanistan Agri-Business and Agricultural Development Program, helping farmers to produce and sell fruits and nuts, in conjunction with the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (51). Other USAID-supported Mercy Corps projects include one supporting farmers selling raisins and pomegranates, as well as the Food Insecurity Response for Urban Populations, providing access to food for people in cities affected by the increasing costs of living and the global food crisis (52).
The United Methodists Committee on Relief implemented an Integrated Returns Program partially funded by the US State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, beginning in 2004 and extended in 2009, as well as the USAID-funded Winterization and In-Kind Material Aid program (60). Finally, World Vision was implementing a USDA Food for Education program, in place since 2004, to distribute food in schools to increase enrollment (66), and a Health and Education Initiative in Ghor (HEALING) program for nutrition, agriculture, and health (67). Other World Vision projects funded at least in part by US government agencies include the USAID-supported Better Health for Afghanistan Mothers and Children to provide improved maternal and child health care, and the USAID Food Insecurity Response for Urban Populations, aimed at crop diversification and better farming production (68). By 2009, then, we see a trend of US-government projects in healthcare, civil society development, education, and agricultural development, although as indicated above, many of these projects had been in place for several years by that time. The pattern of INGOs working with Afghan government agencies, including provincial and local governments, as well as partnering with local NGOs to implement their projects, continued into 2009.

*Most Recent Updates on INGOs in Afghanistan: 2010 InterAction Report*

By 2010, when the US military surge in Afghanistan was well under way, the work of US-based INGOs continued. Such efforts proceeded despite the worsening security environment in the country, marked by a 31% increase in civilian casualties from the year before, according to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (O’Brien 2010, 5). Project areas continued to include agriculture and rural development, healthcare, education, refugee support, economic assistance, and civil society promotion. The Academy for Educational Development worked on a USAID-funded program called the Afghanistan
Higher Education Project, in place since 2006, as well as the USAID FORECAST Participant Training Project for Afghanistan, aimed at development and training for various Afghan institutions (8). Catholic Relief Services continued to implement projects in various areas, including the USAID-funded Partnership for Advancing Community-Based Education in Afghanistan, along with the Ministry of Education (17). ChildFund International carried forward in its USAID and State Bureau of Populations, Refugees, and Migration projects (20), and Church World Service implemented projects in health care and health education, funded partly by State’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (22). The USAID-funded civil society programs carried out by Counterpart International were extended, with the goal of improving the skills and capacity of local organizations, civic education and training, gender equality, democracy and governance (26).

Management Sciences for Health implemented a USAID project for Basic Support for Institutionalizing Child Survival, in place since 2007, as well as the USAID Grant Management Solutions Project (O’Brien 2010, 35-6). The refugee project carried out by the United Methodist Committee on Relief was extended by USAID, focusing on helping refugees find jobs, providing them with vocational training, wells, hygiene, and winterization (45). Finally, World Vision’s Food Insecurity Response for Urban Populations, as well as the USDA funded programs to increase school enrollment by providing food in schools, continued (47), along with USAID-funded midwifery training, in place since 2008, and the USAID Better Health for Afghan Mothers and Children project (48). By 2010, then, we did not see a great deal of qualitative difference in the kinds of projects carried out by INGOs in Afghanistan, or the ones funded by the US government: healthcare, education, women’s issues, agriculture, and civil society promotion continued to dominate. Partnerships with government agencies and local NGOs persisted as well. The US government funding of NGOs through 2010 still supports Hypothesis 3, predicting US funding of NGOs whose work deals
with the socio-economic and political needs of a country, although it appears that funding of specific NGO projects, as opposed to specific NGOs, is more accurate, as will be confirmed by the data from interviews with INGO workers.

**INGOs and the US Government**

The previous sections have discussed at length US soft power in Afghanistan—which has been implemented in conjunction with US military strategy since 2001, in a combined power strategy—specifically in the form of USAID/State Department programs and the work of NGOs. Broadly speaking, the data on humanitarian and development programs funded by USAID and the State Department, and often implemented by NGOs, supported Hypothesis 3: the US government appears more likely to fund NGO projects that meet the specific socio-economic and political needs of a target country. The final piece of the puzzle, then, explaining variation in US soft or combined power strategy in the form of funding and partnering with NGOs, has to do with the relationship between specific NGOs and the US government. Hypothesis 5 predicts that the US is more likely to fund NGOs whose mission does not conflict with its own strategy, and Hypothesis 6 predicts that a more positive, cooperative relationship between the US government and a specific NGO makes a continued partnership between the two more likely. As the data below will begin to suggest, and as data from the interviews will later confirm, I find support for these hypotheses not for NGOs per se, but more for specific projects carried out by NGOs and funded by the US government.

The biggest area of tension between US-based INGOs and its US government agency funders such as USAID has to do with the NGO-military interaction. As discussed above, part of the US combined power strategy in Afghanistan since the early years of the war, a trend which has intensified since the Obama Af-Pak strategy was put in place, with its reliance on
COIN, has been a dependence on PRTs to conduct stabilization, reconstruction, and development work across the country. The existence of these groups, which bring together civilian workers and military personnel, has posed a problem for many NGOs. The US and other donor countries often pressure INGOs to work with PRTs, which does not hold well with the INGOs themselves. In addition, INGOs that receive US funding are prohibited from interacting with the Taliban and other groups on US terrorist lists, which makes it difficult for them to negotiate access into Taliban-controlled areas (Donini 2009, 9) and can thus limit the reach of their programs. When British NGO worker Linda Norgrove was killed in Afghanistan, one of many aid worker casualties since the start of the US-led war, a “row” emerged between US government agencies and INGOs about the practices of aid delivery in conflict areas. The death of a colleague provided an occasion for INGOs to “lament that the distinction between them and the military is being blurred, hindering their ability to develop critical trust from the community” (Labott 2010, cnn.com). In some cases, NGOs have refused to be accompanied by PRTs, and instead of relying on them for security, have spoken to locals to assess the security risk of specific areas and whether or not it was safe to conduct work there. Furthermore, INGOs have been critical of US commitments to short-term projects in what they see as a preparation for a US withdrawal of troops (Labott 2010).

CARE is an INGO that has been a very vocal critic of US military strategy and its relationship with INGOs in Afghanistan. In the 2009 InterAction Member Activity Report for Afghanistan, the organization expressed its concern about civil-military relations and indicated that it was trying to make the environment “more respectful of international humanitarian law and the humanitarian principles” which guide INGOs; CARE described itself as working against the “militarization of aid” from USAID, as exemplified through the agency placing more conditions on contracts and its attempts to increase the interaction between NGOs and PRTs as part of the COIN strategy (Fass and Hass 2009, 25). In the 2010
InterAction Member Activity Report for Afghanistan, CARE expressed the same concerns about INGOs and US military strategy (O’Brien 2010, 15). CARE is not the only INGO with worries about its role in US military strategy in Afghanistan; in 2009, ActionAid, AfghanAid, CARE, ChristianAid, CordAid, Dacaar, the International Rescue Committee, Marie Stopes International, Oxfam, and Save the Children collaborated on a report highlighting the challenges posed to civilians by the security strategy in the country. The paper issued “recommendations on how the security strategy of the international community should be changed in order to minimize the harm caused to Afghan civilians and reduce the disruption to development and humanitarian activities in the current environment in Afghanistan” (Caught in the Conflict 2009, 3). Aside from calling for specific actions by the US and NATO forces to do things like issue and implement rules for uniform compensation for civilians subjected to losses or damages in the war (5), the report clearly expressed the INGOs’ stance on the work of PRTs in the country. In conditions where “specialized development actors” can work, “the military should not be engaged in activities in the development or humanitarian sectors” because it is “unsuitable” and its work in such areas “ineffective and unsustainable,” taking funding away from civilian institutions and increasing the mistrust of Western troops by the local population (5). Thus, these INGOs cite the failure of US and French troops to identify themselves as combatants when delivering aid as a problematic practice; such an “integrated approach” to development places both the independence and security of NGOs operating in the conflict environment at risk (6).

Another area of concern for INGOs regarding US policy in Afghanistan has to do with funding and the proposed cuts to US aid in the country in 2012 and beyond. The US State Department and foreign aid budget in 2011 was cut by $8 billion dollars, with steeper cuts to follow in 2012 (Cornwell and Quinn 2011, Reuters). The US plan to withdraw combat troops from the country has been “raising anxieties that Afghanistan will be abandoned and
that the hard-earned development gains in the country will be reversed” (Norland 2011, The New York Times). CARE, for instance, experienced an 80% cut in its US government funding in 2011, and was forced to lay off 400 of its 900 employees in the country; other INGOs such as the International Rescue Committee have been undergoing a similar challenge. To adapt to these funding challenges, INGOs have been trying to shift their work to geographic areas where aid money (e.g., from government donors such as the US) is still available, but those tend to be more insecure places like Kandahar and Helmand Provinces in the south, as opposed to areas that are actually in more dire need of development or humanitarian assistance (Norland 2011). This latter concern is also reflected in the comments of InterAction’s CEO Sam Worthington’s comments in 2011, that too much aid money from the US government goes to military operation areas, and that funding should be more “geographically balanced” (InterAction News Release, Dec. 21, 2010). Some INGOs are concerned not just about US budget cuts, but about a shift in international donor strategy to more “on-budget” funding, or channeling more aid directly through the Afghan government to increase its capacity and accountability to the people, according to a report by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) (Phillips et al. 2012, 10). Along with a decrease in US civilian assistance to Afghanistan, INGOs such as the IRC express concern about the increase in the percentage of that aid that goes directly to the Afghan government, reaching 46% in 2011, up from a mere 10% in 2008 (11). Examples of specific INGO projects impacted by such a shift include the suspension of USAID funding for a community education project in Afghanistan, which began in 2006, but was transferred completely to the Ministry of Education by 2009. The problem with such a change, according to the IRC report, stems from the hasty nature of the shift and the end result, which was that much of the education program came to a halt as soon as the Ministry of Education took over (13), presumably because the Afghan government agency did not have the capacity to carry it through.
It is likely that projected cuts in US development assistance, or even shifts in budget directly to Afghan government institutions instead of to INGOs in Afghanistan, are in large part a result of the US budget crisis, a variable not examined in this project. However, there is also a correlation, indicated above, between the beginning of US withdrawal from Afghanistan and cuts to the USAID budget, seen in 2011. Such a trend, along with a US government focus on development assistance to combat zones in Afghanistan, appears at odds with the goals and missions of INGOs, who prefer to dispense aid based on need rather than military or security strategy. The reluctance of INGOs to engage with PRTs, and their expressions of concern for a “militarization of aid” in Afghanistan, provides some support for Hypotheses 5 and 6. To some extent, the evidence suggests that the US government is more likely to fund NGOs whose mission and goals align with itself, and is more likely to continue that partnership if the relationship between those two actors is a positive one. As will be demonstrated in the interview data below, a conflict between the goals or missions of the US government and INGOs is more likely to be expressed when it comes to specific projects, rather than the entire partnership between and INGO and the relevant US government agency.

**Mini-Case Studies and Interviews**

To get a clearer understanding of the work of INGOs in Afghanistan, particularly their relationship with the US government agencies from which they receive funding, I conducted interviews with employees of two INGOs operating in Afghanistan. Initially, my selection criteria had been to choose INGOs who operated in Afghanistan and were from among the top ten recipients of USAID funding in the War on Terror, using list taken from McCleary (2009). However, given the busy schedules and security concerns of the INGOs operating in Afghanistan, only one of the 10 largest INGO recipients of US government funding in 2005 (6 or 7 of whom operate in Afghanistan), agreed to be interviewed for this
project. I was able to gain access to a second organization that also works in Afghanistan and receives USAID funding, but I had to branch out of my initial selection criteria and choose a smaller organization to do so. In accordance with the conditions under which I conducted these interviews, and the conditions of my Institutional Review Board approval, both the organizations and the individuals I interviewed will be given pseudonyms here. The original data from these interviews allowed for a more in-depth test of Hypotheses 5 and 6, about the likelihood of the US government to fund NGOs with similar missions and to continue partnerships when the relationship is a positive one, with some support for them.

**INGO A**

INGO A is the name that will be given here for one of the ten largest recipients of USAID funding in 2005, a few years into the War on Terror, based on data from McCleary (2009). In 2010, its total revenue was over $500 million, up from over $400 million the year before; more than $200 million came from government grants or contributions in 2010, according to its annual 990 tax report ([www.nccs.urban.org](http://www.nccs.urban.org)). Not all of this money goes to its work in Afghanistan, as this organization operates in 120 countries around the world. It has operated in Afghanistan since 1976, but conducted its projects from across the border in Pakistan until after the US invasion in 2001. INGO A’s work focuses on women’s groups and children because “they suffer most and first,” according to the organization’s Chief of Party, Livelihoods and Food Security, whom I interviewed in English via Skype from his office in Kabul, Afghanistan and whom I will call Chief X here. I asked him about some of the most urgent needs and challenges in Afghanistan, and his answer referred to the problems of a “man-dominated country, [where it is] very difficult for women and children, [who are] vulnerable people” in a country torn apart by war for decades. He cited the lack of job opportunities for people, as well as the lack of development, particularly in remote areas, where the “community doesn’t know what a vehicle is, and has never seen it before.” He
also mentioned a divide between the capital and the rest of the country: “Afghanistan has two faces. Kabul is very different from the remote areas, where we have no access because of the Taliban.”

Chief X made clear to me repeatedly that INGO A does not consider itself a “political organization, but a humanitarian organization.” Thus, it is not interested in the activities of the Taliban in the country, and works where it is needed: “where the community accepts our activities, we go,” after an assessment by its security department. In some areas, the Taliban does not allow access to UN organizations or INGOs, and in those areas, INGO A tends to rely on local NGOs, whose “capacity is not good, [but] they are improving.” The security situation in Afghanistan has been precarious, particularly in recent years; in 2010, 2 members of INGO A’s staff were kidnapped when they were riding in a white vehicle, which is the color of vehicles in which government officials tend to ride. After the kidnappers found out that they had kidnapped INGO A staff, and not government workers, and because of the support of the government and the community, they released them two and a half weeks later.

INGO A carries out a number of projects in Afghanistan, but Chief X described a change over the years: they have gone from a focus on projects meeting more short-term needs, like food security and livelihood, to “more sustainable projects” aimed at developing infrastructure and roads. One of their most recent USAID-funded projects was a community development program, carried out over the course of two and a half years, with a budget of $19.5 million dollars. This Community Development Program was started in March of 2009, and was the second incarnation of what had been a Food Insecurity Response for Urban Populations program (“Community Development Program-North: Final Program Report” 2011, 4). The program funded the building and rebuilding of roads, walls for schools and
clinics, building community centers, micro-hydro power stations, bridges, irrigation canals, women’s handcraft businesses, and educational training for youth (6). The main goals of the projects were income generation (8), youth engagement (9), sustainable infrastructure (13), and community mobilization and contribution (16). The program was implemented by INGO A and Mercy Corps, in coordination with the Afghan government, including various local and provincial authorities, and local NGOs (18). In 2006, INGO A implemented a different USAID-funded project, which began in 2003, this one in the area of healthcare, with an objective to “achieve a sustained reduction in under-five and maternal mortality” and improve household health practices (Parker et al. 2006, 6). Thus, this project included training of workers in the Ministry of Public Health and the Provincial Health Office, as well as training community health workers, carrying out immunization, and distributing food and iodized salt to the Jawzjan Province community (6). As further evidence of collaboration with the Afghan government, this project, carried out by INGO A, helped implement the Basic Package of Health Services used by government-run facilities in the country, with a focus on immunization, nutrition, disease control, and maternal and newborn care (8). The report on the project indicates that INGO A consulted with USAID “to ensure that its views and priorities were reflected in the design and work plan of the project” (51), indicating extensive USAID involvement in the project planning. These USAID-funded projects carried out by INGO A, in the areas of infrastructure, education, community development, and healthcare, fit in with the larger picture of USAID-funded projects in Afghanistan that reflect the socio-economic needs of the country, as predicted by Hypothesis 3.

When asked about the changes in funding levels from USAID over the years, Chief X responded that the beginning of the Obama Af-Pak strategy marked a period when “we saw a lot more funds,” but that in the last year, funds have been cut. He speculated that
this cut in funding had to do with a change in USAID’s strategy over the past year, and challenges to USAID budgets from the US Senate, resulting in funding cuts not just for his organization, but also for other INGOs in Afghanistan including World Vision, Mercy Corps, and CARE. This answer suggests that domestic factors, including budget challenges, may also impact the implementation of the US government’s soft power strategy, a variable I have not included in this project but that may be of interest in future research.

Asked about INGO A’s relationship with USAID, its US government funder, he responded that the organization had been a recipient of USAID support long before the start of the current Afghan war, and emphasized the positive aspects of funding from this agency. USAID is “more realistic than other donors,” he said, and can “realize your problems, and always support us to sort out our problems.” They are “very easy to work with.” Unlike other donors (such as the World Bank or the UN), USAID is more cognizant of the problems, including security and corruption, facing the INGOs who implement the projects they fund, according to Chief X. In addition, USAID has a “very good relationship” with Afghan government officials, and helps mediate any issues that arise between INGO A and the government. While repeating that INGO A was not a “political organization,” Chief X agreed that USAID had its own priorities, although he personally agreed with them: “If we provide [the Afghans] with more opportunity for education, they won’t become involved with the Taliban and terrorist activities. They need a safe place where they can work, a good job, and family. If the situation improves, automatically Taliban activities [are] reduce[d].”

Nevertheless, this alignment of strategy does not extend so far as to a relationship between INGO A and the military: any relationship with the military is “absolutely restricted” by the organization. “It is very simple,” Chief X told me. “If we will allow [the military] to come to our office with guns, the people will understand that we are involved against the Taliban. We are working for the community. If the security situation is ok, we will definitely go. This
is our basic policy.” The implication here is that INGO A prefers to operate with a needs-based approach, regardless of where the Taliban operates, and does so along as it can ensure access to the needy. Despite going after and receive US government funding, INGO A does not like to align itself with US or NATO military activity, and see any work with PRTs as compromising its neutrality in the eyes of the local population, and thus the trust and access they have in Afghanistan. This provides support for Hypothesis 5, which predicted that the US government would fund NGOs with missions similar to its own, although in the case of INGO A, this is probably more true for specific projects. Where INGO A sees a USAID-funded project as being in line with its own mission, including providing aid to any needy group in Afghanistan, it will seek such project funding. On the other hand, it will not work in areas or seek project funding that necessitates its work with PRTs or any other military body in the country.

In order to receive funding from USAID, INGO A must prepare a project proposal for the agency, and if it receives approval, the funds are granted and project implementation begins. Because INGO A has a “good reputation” with USAID, according to Chief X, it has repeatedly received funding from the agency. However, changes in USAID rules have posed a problem for INGO A: new USAID regulations require that the agency vet not only the INGOs whom it funds, but also any local NGOs with whom the INGO subcontracts for projects in the amount of $150,000 or greater. This procedural change is due to a USAID concern regarding corruption and any possible ties to the Taliban. This new vetting process has disrupted the grant process between INGO A and USAID, and funding for one of its projects has been “hanging,” so INGO A has been negotiating with USAID for the past few months. Here we see a reluctance on the part of a US government agency to fund a particular project due to specific concerns it has, ones which INGOs may or may not share. Nevertheless, Chief X firmly maintained that INGO A will continue to go after USAID funding.
“USAID is one of the big donors for us, and if we lose their money, it is a big problem for us.”

Such a position makes the empirical reality much more nuanced than Hypothesis 5 and 6 predicted, although the general direction of the prediction holds: an organization like INGO A will not go after funding for projects and may resist USAID requirements that go against its mission or values, such as ones involving engagement with PRTs, but this does not mean that an INGO will seek to end its overall partnership with USAID. Chief X showed a clear desire on his part for the relationship between INGO A and USAID continue, despite this particular funding challenge. On the other hand, a US government agency itself may have qualms about funding particular projects with INGOs due to particular strategic concerns it has, although Chief X gave no indication that USAID has professed an unwillingness to fund other INGO A projects in the future. On the contrary: the ongoing negotiations to which he referred reflect an eagerness on both sides to continue the partnership between INGO A and USAID, specific projects notwithstanding. Such a result was unanticipated by Hypothesis 6, which predicted that the US government is more likely to continue partnerships with NGOs when the relationship between them is positive, and vice versa.

Asked about the regulatory environment within Afghanistan, Chief X responded that even during the Taliban period, INGO A was registered and “accepted” by the Afghan government, although the “challenges [have been] reduced” since the days of Taliban rule. INGO A “needs” to work with local and provincial governments in carrying out its projects, and for the most part, they are “supportive,” although “I cannot say [their support extends to] 100%” of the time, said Chief X. He suggested that nepotism and corruption had a role to play in the cases where government support for INGO A’s work was limited: sometimes, “government people are looking to support those areas where they have relatives.” Working in large cities is particularly challenging, because government officials “are interested to see great [amounts of] funds, and they want donors to give money directly to government.”
INGO A is leery of project money going directly through government agencies in Afghanistan, because “whatever we are doing, most of the money goes to the community. When it goes through government, only 20% goes to the community.” In other words, corruption poses a challenge for the work of INGOs working in the country. Thus, while I indicated extensively above that the official regulatory environment is non-restrictive and friendly to INGOs in Afghanistan, making it likely that the US will fund INGOs to work there, as predicted by Hypothesis 4, it appears that unofficial restrictions, such as corruption and nepotism, can pose challenges to INGOs in the country.

Furthermore, Chief X indicated that the Afghan government “is trying to restrict some of the NGOs who are not working well” and “doesn’t want to see those NGOs who are involved in political activities. Some NGOs are working with religious [i.e., Christian] activities and they don’t like to see that.” This kind of restriction exists despite the fact that the 2005 NGO Law does not officially limit the activities of Christian NGOs, and is another example of unofficial regulations affecting the work of INGOs in Afghanistan. Whether problems influence the propensity for the US government to fund such organizations is not particularly clear, although Chief X’s discussion of INGO A’s current face-off with USAID over its new rules about sub-contracting to local NGOs because of concerns about corruption and money reaching the Taliban suggest that perhaps even these unofficial barriers or restrictions on INGO activity will make the US government unwilling to fund, even indirectly, local NGOs affected by these problems.

INGO B

The second INGO that granted me interview access will be referred to here as INGO B. As mentioned earlier, it does not meet my initial selection criteria of being one of the top ten recipients of US government funding. However, simply gaining interview access to its Program Officer for Asia, Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa was enough for me to
include it in this dissertation. Although not one of the top recipients of US government funding, INGO B is still a sizable organization, with a total revenue of $317,301,472 in 2010, up from $281,854,094; in 2010, $200,438,135 (i.e., more than half its revenue) came from US government grants/contributions, according to its 990 tax report (www.ncss.urban.org).

Just as in the case of INGO A, however, this revenue does not all go to INGO B's work in Afghanistan, as the organization operates in 40 different countries, with an emphasis on humanitarian work and “emergency relief, protection of human rights, post-conflict development, [and] resettlement assistance and advocacy,” according to the mission statement included in its 990 report. I interviewed the Program Officer for Asia, Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, whose purview includes the country of Afghanistan, in English over the telephone; I will refer to him hereafter as Officer X.

As was the case with INGO A, INGO B is not an organization that swooped into Afghanistan after the US-led war in 2001; it has been implementing programs in the country since 1988, focusing especially on Afghan refugees and conducting much of its work on the Pakistan side of the border during the decade-long Soviet invasion. In the late 1980s and 1990s, INGO B mostly provided humanitarian assistance in the areas of health, education, water and sanitation, and disaster relief to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Currently, much of its work has shifted to “supporting the returns process” of Afghan refugees, who have flooded back into the country since the start of the current war. “We help returnees resettle, develop sustainable livelihoods, [provide them with] access to healthcare and education services, and [any] humanitarian assistance they need,” said Officer X. After the onset of the 2001 war, with the “huge increase of returnees” as the Taliban was initially defeated, the homecoming of what was “the largest refugee population in the world at the time,” mostly from Pakistan, kept INGO B very busy. Helping to sustain INGO B's activities, especially at the start of the current war, was the fact that “lots of funding [was] available to do this work
with refugees] and humanitarian work generally. There was an endless need for humanitarian and development assistance” in Afghanistan, Officer X told me.

The influx of donor funding to INGO B has not been steady or necessarily consistent, according to Officer X: “There are definitely ups and downs in funding, [with] a lot of funding going into Afghanistan in the early years after 2002,” and a decline more recently. Funding and grants, especially by US government organizations, has been “very closely linked with US counterinsurgency strategy, in terms of its geographic targeting in the country,” and here Officer X pointed to a divergence of strategy or mission between the US government and INGO B. “[Our organization] doesn’t work that way,” Officer X declared, adding that many funding opportunities by the US government had been available “that we wouldn’t have sought.” When pressed about this issue, he explained that it is “important it keep our impartiality and neutrality for operational reasons and humanitarian principles. We want to target assistance to people who are most needy rather than for US foreign policy reasons.” Furthermore, Officer X suggested that “most humanitarian aid agencies” had similar outlooks, in contrast to for-profit contracting agencies employed by the US government. Thus, while INGO B does accept US government funding, “we are careful about our activities and expectations and whether we are able to preserve our neutrality,” avoiding altogether any projects that would involve working with PRTs, for instance. Here in the experience of INGO B, then, we see a much more explicit tension between the organization’s mission and its perception of the US government’s mission, accompanied by a resistance to being pulled in to “US foreign policy goals” instead of its own humanitarian principles. Such a conflict provides some support for Hypothesis 5, although the empirical reality is once again more nuanced than my hypothesis had predicted: INGO B seeks US government funding despite the differences it perceives between its own mission and that of the US government or military, but avoids going after grants for certain projects that it
sees as potentially compromising its mission and principles. Just like Chief X of INGO A, Officer X of INGO B gave no indication that his organization would stop seeking US government funding because of such differences.

Indeed, the grant process and INGO B’s relationship with USAID allows for this kind of selectivity and thus a continuation of the partnership between the organization and the government agency, providing some support for Hypothesis 6. Officer X characterized his organization’s interaction with USAID as “different depending on the funding mechanism” or the exact terms of the funding agreement. In many cases, donors such as USAID “will set out general priorities, but sometimes [they] will be more specific, sometimes less, but they usually define what kinds of activities they want to support in sector areas.” After understanding USAID’s (or another donor’s) priorities and deciding that these priorities are not in conflict with its own, INGO B writes a project proposal “that describes the approach we would take and makes the argument for how we could meet those objectives” in its bid to secure that particular funding opportunity. INGO B also receives funding from the US State Department, which has been “targeting returnees who are resettling” in Afghanistan.

What is the exact nature of the programs carried out by INGO B in Afghanistan? At the moment, it is carrying out a large education program “focused on community-based education” in rural areas “where the Ministry of Education isn’t able to manage fully-fledged schools,” according to Officer X. This program is “a way of bringing in children and others who missed out on education, particularly girls,” into the public education systems, and it also works to recruit teachers from local communities. Eventually, this “informal” education program is “linked up” with the public education system in the country. Interestingly, this program is funded by the Canadian International Development Agency, but that was not always the case, Officer X explained. The current incarnation of the community education
program is a follow-up to a USAID-funded community education program, but two years ago, USAID “took the decision to fund the Ministry of Education directly rather than NGOs,” a decision which Officer X clearly disapproves of. After USAID decided that directly funding the Afghan Ministry of Education to implement the program would be more efficient, the program “fell apart” due the Ministry’s inability to continue the program. “Of course the [Afghan] government should be taking responsibility for those things [like education] but they are often not ready to take on that kind of funding. The policy isn’t always implemented the right way.” Faced with this sudden cut in donor funding for its education program, INGO B sought other donors, and found a willing partner in the Canadian government. Here we see a disconnect not necessarily between the missions of the US government donor agency and INGO B, but in the actual strategy of how to implement a specific project, in this case setting up an informal community education system that would feed into the formal public education system. The difference in strategy led the US government agency to forego INGOs as implementing partners—Officer X indicated that his organization was one of several INGOs working on the PACE program—much to the disapproval of INGO B. Such divergence in strategy is not something I hypothesized about specifically, although the continued partnership between INGO B and USAID indicates that disagreements over how to carry out certain projects may terminate specific projects, but not the entire relationship between the two actors, a more complex reality than Hypothesis 6 predicted.

When asked about the environment in Afghanistan itself, Officer X indicated that the “security environment has gotten worse” in the last few years, which has impacted INGO B’s work in the country. “It is more restrictive for us, [in terms of] where we’re able to travel, especially to have expats travel in the country, especially outside Kabul.” Thus, INGO B has had to “develop remote management for rural areas” where foreigners are too vulnerable to
travel. However, INGO B remains undeterred in its mission and its determination to carry out that mission in Afghanistan: even though “it’s gotten more challenging, [it] hasn’t prevented us from doing the work that we can do.” Adjusting its strategy, INGO B has come to rely more on national Afghan staff to carry out the work in remote areas, since they can “travel more freely than foreigners can” and are less likely to be viewed with suspicion. Because of the problematic security situation, INGO B gets a waiver for the USAID requirement to display its logo on products distributed in the country, although INGO B still uses the USAID logo on official documents or reports. Explaining the danger of publicly displaying the logo in Afghanistan, Officer X said, “Communities do know that we are an international organization that gets funding from the US government, but not everyone that we run into would have the same [positive] understanding of who we are.” To mitigate the security risks of INGO B in Afghanistan as much as possible, “reputation is important,” and INGO B generally has a positive reputation among Afghans, due to its long history of working with Afghan refugees. “The relationship with the local population is critical. Everything revolves around that,” he added.

Like INGO A, INGO B also works with local NGOs, for two reasons, as Officer X explained. First, “it’s good practice to develop local capacity,” according to Officer X, and INGO B helps local NGOs obtain funding because on their own, they would be unlikely to secure grants for projects such as emergency response. INGO B also lends technical support and expertise to Afghan NGOs. A second advantage to outsourcing some of its work to local NGOs is that they often “have reach into places that [we] don’t have, and can respond more effectively than we can,” in a situation similar to the one described by Chief X of INGO A. Working with local NGOs is not without its challenges, however. “One typical challenge is they tend to be personality-based, with strong leaders driving the whole organization, but they don’t have systems and institutions. When one person moves on, the whole
organization collapses.” INGO B seeks to help these organizations establish uniform procedures and stronger institutional structures to prevent such “collapses” from occurring.

As discussed at length earlier in the chapter, INGOs working in Afghanistan or any other target country must also deal with the government of that country, and “the relations can be difficult,” said Officer X. INGO B must spend time working with ministries and local government, often coordinating with them and “bring[ing] them on board, especially with larger programs. We are often trying to build their capacity,” in line with the trend of USAID-funded projects aimed at strengthening Afghan government agencies, discussed earlier. The relationship between INGO B and government agencies is often formalized through a memorandum of understanding with a particular ministry, outlining the specific activities of a particular program. Thus, one of the biggest challenges for INGO B, in its work with Afghan government officials, can be “to get a negotiated final document and getting it up to the senior person” because they are often quite busy. “It is more of an investment of time in negotiating something like a memorandum of understanding.” Interestingly, Officer X spent much less time discussing the problem of corruption in the country than did Chief X of INGO A, although Officer X did admit that corruption is “always there. It happens, and we try to make sure it doesn’t happen.” Because INGO B “is not a conduit for money to go to the Afghan government,” in other words does not give grants to Afghan government agencies, corruption is less of a problem than it might otherwise be, Officer X suggested. In order to maintain a smooth relationship with the Afghan government and avoid pitfalls like corruption, “it helps to clarify what the requirements are for us,” and INGO B complies with all the reporting requirements about its work to the relevant Afghan government agencies. Generally, then, INGO B has no problems in fulfilling its registration requirements, or obtaining visas and work permits in Afghanistan: “it’s something that we manage.” Thus, it appears that the restrictions on INGO B’s activities from the Afghan side come more from
challenges like the deteriorating security environment than from formal or even informal regulations or problems such as corruption, in contrast to the testimony of INGO A’s Chief X, providing more support for Hypothesis 4 than did the experience of INGO A.

**Conclusion**

This chapter provides an in-depth look at the case of Afghanistan in order to test the hypotheses laid out earlier in the dissertation about variation in US hard, soft, and combined power strategy in the War on Terror. I first provided a brief background discussion of US strategy or policy towards Afghanistan before the 9/11 attacks, laying out a frame of reference from which to compare US War on Terror strategy in the country. The majority of the chapter, however, catalogues the evolution of the War on Terror itself in Afghanistan, from its onset in October 2001 to the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed by Presidents Obama and Karzai, outlining the withdrawal of US combat forces by 2014. Through this case study, I further tested Hypotheses 1 and 2 as well as the rest of the hypotheses laid out at the beginning of this dissertation. As discussed briefly in the previous chapter, the Afghanistan case provides support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, demonstrating the US executive’s decision to use hard power against what is deemed to be an immediate short-term terrorist or security threat and combined power in what is deemed to be a combined short-and long-term terrorist or security threat.

Furthermore, this chapter explores in detail the specifics of the Afghan country context and the regulatory environment to test the impact of those variables on the US government’s use of a specific kind of soft power, funding the work of NGOs, finding support for Hypotheses 3 and 4. The regulatory environment in Afghanistan is relatively unrestricted, making it more likely for the US to fund INGOs and (often indirectly) local NGOs who can operate freely in the country. It is important to note, however, that the US government itself had a role to play in setting up the regulatory and legal environment for
NGOs in the country, making for a potentially endogenous relationship between the regulatory environment and increased US funding of NGOs in such an environment. Furthermore, it appears that unofficial restrictions or challenges, such as the problem of corruption, can hinder the activities of NGOs in the country and make US government agencies more cautious about funding specific projects, something that was not predicted by my hypotheses. As predicted, however, the US government appears to have been funding humanitarian and development projects (many implemented through NGOs) through agencies such as USAID based on the socio-economic and political needs of the country. Thus, we see a great deal of funding for healthcare, education, infrastructure, economic development, agricultural development, and women-oriented projects in both the budgets of USAID over the years and the work of INGOs themselves.

Finally, by examining both the big picture of US-funded NGO work in the country, as well as the work of two specific INGOs in the country, supported by original interview data, I tested Hypotheses 5 and 6 and found mixed support for them. It certainly appears that when a tension or conflict exists between the mission of a US donor agency and an INGO, a US government-funded project is less likely to be carried out. However, this pattern holds for specific projects, and not an entire INGO-US government partnership: the interview data provides evidence that specific INGOs may be consistent recipients of USAID funding but not for projects through which the missions of the INGO and USAID are at odds. Similarly, in a more complex picture than what I predicted in Hypothesis 6, an unwillingness by an INGO to cooperate with the US government on certain issues (such as working with PRTs or becoming involved in counterinsurgency strategy) does not necessarily lead to an end to the entire partnership between the two actors, but rather a selectivity regarding the specific projects funded by the US government agency.
Perhaps one of the more surprising findings in this chapter has to do with the closeness between US military strategy and its soft power strategy, specifically US government funding of development and humanitarian projects, many being carried out through international and local NGOs. A pattern emerges of a correlation between an escalation in US military operations in Afghanistan and an increase in USAID’s budget, and vice versa. As the US began its withdrawal of combat forces in 2011, the USAID budget shrank after it had reached an all-time high in 2010 that accompanied the military surge in the country. The question, then, is whether this decreasing emphasis on a soft power strategy that accompanies a dwindling hard power strategy can be attributed to a determination by the US executive that the long-term security or terrorist threat has diminished along with the short-term security or terrorist threat. It appears counterintuitive that the long-term security threat would decrease at the exact time as the short-term security threat, although it is too early to tell either way in the case of Afghanistan. It certainly does appear to be the case, as predicted by Hypothesis 2, that the US executive is indeed likely to use soft power against what it sees as long-term security or terrorist threats, but it may also prove to be the case that in cases such as Afghanistan where a combined threat is deemed to exist and a combined power strategy is used, the US executive is likely to decrease the use of soft power at the same time as it draws down its hard power, regardless of the assessment of the long-term security or terrorist threat. Of course, other factors may come into play as well, including budget issues and other domestic factors, variables which were not tested in this project but which may be worth testing in future research.
CHAPTER 6

US WAR ON TERROR STRATEGY IN PAKISTAN

Introduction

If Afghanistan has been on the front lines of the US War on Terror, for much of the past decade, Pakistan has been a footnote in that same struggle, until it moved to center-stage under President Obama’s Af-Pak strategy in 2009. This chapter examines the case of Pakistan as a target country of US hard, soft, and combined power in the War on Terror, seeking to explain the changes over time that have taken place in a geographic and political context quite distinct from Afghanistan, as discussed in the previous chapter. Unlike Afghanistan, Pakistan has not been the object of a full-fledged war by US and NATO forces; although, certainly in the past few years the US has increasingly carried out military operations inside the country. At the same time, the US has leveled a great deal of military and economic assistance (the latter an example of soft power) at Pakistan since the start of the War on Terror. The in-depth look at the Pakistan case in this chapter will provide an opportunity to test the hypotheses laid out earlier in the dissertation in order to explain the evolution and change on US War on Terror strategy in Pakistan over time, as well as to compare it to the Afghanistan case.

As in the Afghanistan case study, I begin with a background on US strategy or policy towards Pakistan before 9/11, providing a starting point from which to compare developments in the War on Terror. Post 9/11 US strategy in Pakistan stands in stark contrast to pre-9/11 strategy, and the test of Hypothesis 1 will demonstrate that the US has indeed used hard power in Pakistan when facing what it deemed was a short-term, immediate terrorist or security threat, and that as the threat level has escalated in recent years, US hard power strategy has also intensified. Interestingly, however, in Pakistan the
US was mostly working in conjunction with the Pakistani government in its hard power efforts, until recent years, when the US began to act alone militarily against targets within Pakistan. I also find support for Hypothesis 2, which predicted that the US government will use soft power against a long-term threat and combined power against a combined threat. The US has used soft power in Pakistan from the early days of the War on Terror, in what appear to be efforts to stave off a potential long-term terrorist threat. Since then, there has been an intensification of soft power efforts, which at some point involved into combined power efforts, when Pakistan has been faced with things such as natural disasters or refugee crises. As Hypothesis 3 predicts, then, the socio-economic and political country context in Pakistan has indeed dictated the kinds of US soft power programs and NGO projects implemented in the country. It appears, however, that as the regulatory environment in Pakistan has become more restrictive towards INGOs, at least unofficially, INGOs have had some difficulty implementing their work; although, there is not much evidence to suggest that this has stopped the US from funding NGO work in the country.

Finally, the tests of Hypotheses 5 and 6, which predicted that the US will fund NGOs whose mission align with its own and continue the partnership when the relationship is positive, do not yield results nearly as interesting as they did in the Afghanistan case study. This is mostly because it appears that in a context where the US is not technically at war, conflict between the US and INGOs is less likely, and thus it is less likely that the two actors will fail to cooperate or fail to partner, even on specific projects. The situation surrounding the US raid on Osama bin Laden, however, presents an example of INGOs being at odds with the US government, providing some support for Hypotheses 5 and 6. The original interview data from the mini-case study of a US-based INGO at the end of the chapter provides a further test of these hypotheses, with similar results.
Background: US Policy Toward Pakistan Before 9/11

The focus of this research project, including the country case studies of Afghanistan and Pakistan, is an attempt to explain variation in US strategy over the course of the War on Terror. However, one cannot adequately understand US strategy in Pakistan during this ongoing War without grasping what US policy towards that country was in the years prior—certainly a great contrast exists when comparing the before and after situations. The history of US relations with Pakistan dates back to the early days of the Cold War, when Pakistan sought help from the US and clearly aligned itself with the US in the decades-long conflict with the Soviet Union. In 1954, Pakistan signed a mutual security agreement with the US and joined the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO); in return, it became a recipient of US military aid (Ziring 2010, 178). US military assistance to Pakistan peaked in 1962, when Pakistan also joined the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and further cemented itself as a US and Western ally (Epstein and Kronstadt 2011, 4). This pattern of US military assistance continued until 1966 and was then resumed between 1975 until 1979, when the US abruptly cut off military aid to Pakistan (US State Department 2010, “Background Note: Pakistan”). President Jimmy Carter suspended US military aid to the country when Pakistan refused to allow nuclear inspections to take place, but a few years later, the situation would change dramatically as the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Between 1983 and 1988, the US restored military assistance to Pakistan in exchange for its involvement in resisting the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (Ahsan 2005, 241). During this period, President Reagan authorized a five-year, $3.2 billion aid package, with military as well as economic components, to the country, as Pakistan became a “key transit country for arms supplies to the Afghan resistance” and took in millions of Afghan refugees, some of whom still reside in Pakistan today (Epstein and Kronstadt 2011, 4). In other words, Pakistan was “Washington’s chief proxy in the ongoing struggle with international
communism,” and throughout this period of hard power cooperation between the US and Pakistan, the CIA developed close ties with its Pakistani counterpart, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) (Ziring 2010, 183), a relationship that would sour decades later.

It appears, then, that when the US required Pakistani assistance to meet its security or military objectives, provision of military aid, which we might refer to as hard power assistance or cooperation, as well as economic aid, or soft power, became tools through which the US encouraged Pakistani cooperation, a pattern that would play out again during the War on Terror. When the US ceased to require Pakistani assistance after the Soviet invasion, however, US military and economic aid to Pakistan would end just as abruptly. In 1990, after the Soviets had been forced to withdraw from Afghanistan, the United States suspended its aid to the country because of concerns about its nuclear program, and even ended its training of the Pakistani military (Ajami 2010, 32). Under President Bill Clinton, the US put in place sanctions against Pakistan in 1998, when the country conducted its nuclear tests, and instituted new sanctions in 1999 after President Musharraf seized power in a military coup (Ahsan 2005, 242). During this period, US relations with Pakistan’s historic rival, India, greatly improved, as economic ties between the two countries progressed (Ajami 2010, 32). When the 9/11 attacks on the US took place, then, relations between Pakistan and the US were strained by sanctions and a burgeoning relationship between the US and Pakistan’s arch-enemy. The War on Terror would soon change the US-Pakistani dynamic.

**US Hard Power in Pakistan After 9/11: Cooperation, then Conflict**

In the days and weeks after the 9/11 attacks on the US, Pakistan went from being a country that was a target of US hard power in the form of sanctions, to an ally with which the US cooperated and provided with both hard and soft power assistance in order to
respond to its own short-term security and terrorist threats. From the beginning of the US war in Afghanistan, Pakistan became an ally of the US in its War on Terror, in an about-face of the relationship that had previously characterized the two countries. President Bush (2010) wrote that despite Pakistan’s “troubled history with the United States,” in the days after 9/11, things suddenly changed. Secretary of State Powell spoke to President Musharraf and confronted him with several demands, including condemning the terrorist attacks, not allowing al Qaeda a sanctuary in his country, breaking diplomatic relations with the Taliban, and cooperating with the US in its war against al Qaeda and terrorism. Musharraf pledged his support for the US (188), marking the beginning of what would become a strange and tenuous partnership between the two countries. Secretary Rice (2011) describes President Musharraf as a “flawed partner” from the beginning, a leader from whom the US needed action and not just pledges of support. The US pressured him to make arrests and freeze assets of suspected terrorists (125), something that happened a few months later, in December of 2001 and January of 2002 (126).

As Pakistan became an ally in the US War on Terror, the US removed its sanctions on the country, resuming both military and economic assistance (Ahsan 2005, 242). President Bush secured a $600 million emergency package for Pakistan in September 2001, as well as annual payments of $600 million, half of that in military assistance, from 2005 onward. Between 2002 and 2010, two-thirds of US aid to Pakistan had been in the form security aid (Epstein and Kronstadt 2011, 5-6). In 2002, Congress began reimbursing Pakistan for supporting US-led operations in the country related to the War on Terror, through what was called the Coalition Support Fund (Epstein and Kronstadt 2011, 11). Also under the leadership of President George W. Bush, US military forces helped train the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary group in the country, training them to better conduct counter-terrorism operations (15). The fruit of such cooperation has been significant: as of October 2010,
Pakistan had captured 600 or more al-Qaeda members and allies in return for US military (and economic) assistance (US State Department 2010, “Background Note: Pakistan”). The Pakistani case is an interesting one, because as Hypothesis 1 predicts, the US did use hard power against what it deemed was a short-term security or terrorist threat, but for the first half or so of the War on Terror, the US used hard power in conjunction with Pakistan, against terrorist targets within the country and sometimes in Afghanistan itself. In other words, for the first half or so of the US-led War on Terror, the US did use hard power in Pakistan, but the Pakistani government was a US ally, cooperating in exchange for generous US military and economic assistance. This situation stands in stark contrast with the Afghan situation, where the US went to war against Afghanistan, a war that continues to this day. Furthermore, US hard power efforts in Pakistan mostly took the form of hard power assistance, i.e., military aid and training for the Pakistani armed forces.

The US-Pakistani hard power partnership would not remain smooth, however, and the US would suspect, and then directly accuse, Pakistani officials of being too soft on or even making deals with US enemies. Former Vice President Cheney (2011) describes one deal, around late 2006, between President Musharraf and tribal leaders on the border with Afghanistan, where the tribal leaders agreed to deny sanctuary to the Taliban and al Qaeda and Musharraf would leave them to their own devices. Such negotiations were problematic, suggests Cheney (2011), and showed that “increasingly [Musharraf’s] commitments [to the US] were not translating into actions from his government” (498). Rice (2011) recalls that soon after, in the summer of 2007, the US was able to convince President Musharraf to put off his intended declaration of emergency law in the country. Rice engaged in extensive mediation between him and Benazir Bhutto, who was campaigning for President, to reach some sort of power-sharing agreement in a move toward more democratic governance in the country (609). Public and Supreme Court outrage followed the elections in October of
2007, because Musharraf was still both the political and military leader of the country, and in November Musharraf suspended the constitution (610). At the urging of the US, Musharraf agreed to have parliamentary elections within a couple of months, but Bhutto decided she would no longer deal with him (611). In late November, Musharraf gave up his role as head of the military (613), and Bhutto was assassinated a short while later (620), leading to a political crisis in the country. Former secretary of Defense Rumsfeld (2011) suggests that the US insistence that Musharraf give him up his military leadership, which was former Secretary Rice's idea, was a mistake, because he ended up losing control over the country and fomenting instability there (633). By August 2008, Musharraf was forced to resign as President of Pakistan (Burke 2011, 359).

These political crises in Pakistan are worth recounting because they serve as a background for the instability in Pakistan and the tense relations between the US and Pakistani government, at around the same time that US hard power cooperation with Pakistan appeared to be at risk. The start of the problems plaguing this hard power partnership appear to have begun in late 2006, as Cheney (2011) indicated, when President Musharraf began making deals with tribal leaders in the border area with Afghanistan. By early 2008, the US had mounting evidence that at least some parts of the Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI, were supporting the Afghan Taliban (Burke 2011, 370). Thus, in January 2008, Mike McConnell, the US Director of National Intelligence, said in a statement that the “Pakistani government regularly gives weapons and support [to insurgents] to go into Afghanistan and attack Afghan and coalition forces” (371). The Pakistani response to these US allegations appeared mixed. On the one hand, the Pakistani military began conducting strikes against US and coalition targets within its own borders (372). Pakistan even intensified its military offensives in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Agencies) region along the Afghan border, particularly in the SWAT Valley in response to US
pressure to do so and increasing US counter-terrorism assistance; the Pakistani military had also become a target of insurgent attacks, further prompting it to take military action (Burke 2011, 390).

On the other hand, the US was clearly frustrated with what it saw as insufficient Pakistani action against War on Terror targets. In May of 2008, some US officials strongly stated that Pakistani officials had “no interest” in preventing the new phenomenon of attacks into Afghanistan from across the Pakistani border, a situation so unsettling to American officials that they described as “prompting a new level of frustration,” since the Americans viewed the FATA as an important front of the US War on Terror and its operations in Afghanistan (Perlez 2008, The New York Times). Thus, between January and May 2008, the US had launched four Predator missile attacks in Pakistan, demonstrating that statements by Pakistani officials such as Owari Ghani’s, governor of the Northwest Frontier Province, that “Pakistan will take care of its own problems, you [the US] take care of Afghanistan on your side” raised serious concerns for the US (Perlez 2008). So while US hard power cooperation with the Pakistani government (heavily rooted in generous US military assistance to the country) continued on some fronts, by 2008 US hard power strategy in Pakistan began to change, with the US starting to conduct some unilateral military operations against what it saw as increasing short-term security threats in Pakistan itself, due to either an inability or unwillingness by the Pakistani military to conduct such military operations itself. Such a shift does not contradict the predictions of Hypothesis 1: the US was still using hard power against what it saw as short-term security threats, but now along with US military aid and cooperation with Pakistan, the US was also conducting its own military offensives against targets within Pakistan itself without the approval or sometimes even knowledge of the Pakistani government.
The change in US strategy, in order to meet what the US executive saw as an increasing short-term terrorist or security threat in Pakistan, culminated in President Obama’s Af-Pak strategy that was unveiled in early 2009. The US would continue its military and intelligence cooperation with Pakistan and the ISI, who remained a valuable intelligence tool in the US offensive against al Qaeda; an enduring cooperation between the US and Pakistan was also necessary to ensure the NATO supply route through Pakistan into Afghanistan (Staniland 2011, 135). The monumental shift in US strategy, however, was reflected in the “treat[ment] of Afghanistan and Pakistan as two countries but one challenge,” with the goal of defeating al Qaeda in both countries and make their return impossible to either, and an escalation of US military action in Pakistan (Ahmad 2010, 201). Specifically, the US stepped up its drone attacks in the Pakistani tribal areas (195). The new Af-Pak strategy, which was put in place after Musharraf’s departure and the election of a new civilian President, heightened tensions between the US and the Pakistani government and “caused waves of resentment in Pakistan” (Hoyt 2011, 49).

For instance, the US wanted Pakistan to extend its own military operations into the Northern Waziristan region in order to attack the Haqqani network, seen by the US as posing an immediate terrorist or security threat, but Pakistan was unwilling to do so (Ahmad 2010, 197). The US demanded that Pakistan curtail the activities of the organization’s leader, Siraj Haqqani, who was a Taliban warrior, but had “been rebuffed by the Pakistani military,” even after a written message was delivered by the US embassy to the head of the Pakistani military (Perlez 2009, The New York Times). It appears that the US was prepared for a Pakistani refusal of such a demand, as US officials simultaneously indicated that in the case of Pakistani inaction against Siraq Haqqani, the US would intensify its drone attacks in Pakistan (Perlez 2009). In 2009 alone, the US launched 42 drone attacks
in Pakistan, up from 36 attacks in 2008 and a mere 5 attacks in 2007, according to a Brookings Institution report (Livingston and O’Hanlon 2012, 6).

The increase in US hard power action against what it saw as short-term terrorist or security threats in Pakistan was a change that began in 2008 from what had predominantly been US military aid to Pakistan in exchange for cooperation in US counter-terrorism efforts. The US raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan in May 2010, and the assassination of the al Qaeda leader, serves as another example of the changing nature of US hard power strategy in Pakistan. President Obama hailed the death of bin Laden as “the most significant achievement to date in our nation’s effort to defeat al Qaeda,” and indeed the US acted alone during this raid, neglecting to inform Pakistani intelligence in advance of its plans to strike at the compound (Baker et al. 2011, The New York Times). In Pakistan, however, the US raid was seen as an infringement on Pakistani sovereignty, even amid efforts by the US to placate the Pakistani government and secure its commitment to action against “extremist” targets, a commitment Pakistani officials refused to publicly make during Secretary of State Clinton’s visit to Pakistan a few weeks after bin Laden’s death (Myers 2011, The New York Times). It appears, then, that while the US intensified its unilateral hard power actions in Pakistan due to what it saw as a Pakistani unwillingness or inability to take action against short-term terrorist or security threats, this same escalation heightened tensions between the US and Pakistani governments.

The US Af-Pak strategy in Pakistan continues, and the rocky relationship between the US and Pakistan emerging from hard power confrontation rather than cooperation has persisted as well. In November 2011, NATO forces mistakenly killed 25 Pakistani soldiers in a raid, prompting the Pakistanis to close the NATO supply route into Afghanistan in dramatic fashion (Evans and Krasner 2012). The recent incarnation of US strategy in
Pakistan might be characterized as “criticism coupled with continued assistance,” stemming from a fear by the US that the Pakistani state would collapse if US military (and economic) assistance halted and that without Pakistan’s help, US counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan would certainly fail (Kramer 2012, 88). Public criticism of US drone attacks by Pakistani officials, particularly when civilian casualties are involved, has added to this tense relationship (89), but the closing of the NATO supply route served as perhaps the biggest public confrontation by Pakistan against the US. Eventually, five months after blocking the supply route, Pakistan reopened the route through its Southwest border, but only after Secretary of State Clinton personally called Pakistan’s foreign minister to apologize for the November airstrike (Masood 2012, The New York Times). Perceived ISI support for the Taliban-affiliated Haqqani network, which continues to wage attacks from Pakistan against US troops in Afghanistan, remains a contentious issue between the US and Pakistan, particularly with Pakistani refusal to take military action against the network in North Waziristan, despite US entreaties (Walsh and Schmitt 2012, The New York Times). It appears, then, that the ups and downs in the US-Pakistani relationship are destined to continue, but more significantly, US hard power efforts in Pakistan itself, as well as some level of cooperation with Pakistan against targets in Pakistan and Afghanistan, will continue for the time being as well. Unlike the plan for a US withdrawal of combat troops from Afghanistan in 2014, it is unclear what might mark the end of US hard power in Pakistan, whether it be unilateral US action against targets in Pakistan or continued cooperation between the US and Pakistan against mutual targets.

**US Soft and Combined Power Strategy in Pakistan**

*Country Context*
This dissertation seeks to explain temporal and geographic variation in the US’s hard, soft, and combined power strategy in the War on Terror. As I argued extensively in the theory chapter, one explanation for variation in the specifics of a US soft or combined power strategy is the country context: the US is likely to fund NGO projects, for example, that deal with the most pressing social, political, and economic needs of the specific target country it determines poses a long-term and combined terrorist threat. Thus, it is imperative to lay out the Pakistani country context to test Hypothesis 3. Pakistan is a very poor country, with a GDP per capita of only $2,800 in 2011, ranking 174th in the world. Spending only 2.7% of the GDP on education, making it 143rd in the world, the country also has a low adult literacy rate of 54.9%, with an evident contrast between males, 68.6% of whom are literate, and females, only 40.3% of whom are literate (CIA World Factbook 2012). Furthermore, fewer than 50% of Pakistanis have electricity, and the country is plagued by water shortages and very limited access to healthcare; tribal areas, especially the FATA region, are especially poor and underdeveloped (Epstein and Kronstadt 2011, 1).

Pakistan also has a troubled political environment, with a military that has traditionally been very strong (Staniland 2011, 137): as mentioned earlier, US sanctions on Pakistan were intensified after President Musharraf seized power in a military coup in 1999, and his simultaneous leadership of the armed forces and the civilian government was a point of tension in US-Pakistani relations even after the country pledged itself as a US ally in the War on Terror. Even after Musharraf’s resignation and the election of Benazir Bhutto’s widower, President Zardari, Pakistani politics remain unstable and riddled with problems. President Zardari and his administration are tainted with the perception of widespread corruption and ineffectiveness, and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani is seen by the public as incapable of providing the basic needs of the population (Staniland 2011, 138). Civilian politics is very fractionalized, and even members of parties critical of the
military before coming into office, such as the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League-N, end up cooperating with that powerful apparatus once they are elected into office (Hoyt 2011, 48). The reach of the military is quite extensive, then, as the army in Pakistan is “in many respects as autonomous and pernicious an institution as the Mexican drug cartels,” and the country’s ineffective legal system moves at a very slow pace (50).

Furthermore, public opinion poses a problem for the US, particularly as the US fights the War on Terror on the Pakistani front: a Pew research poll conducted in the summer of 2010 indicated that only 17% of Pakistanis viewed the US favorably, and despite massive amounts of US aid to Pakistan, 48% of the population thought the US gave either little or no assistance at all to their country. A 2012 version of the Pew poll found Pakistani public opinion to be deteriorating, with a mere 12% of the population viewing the US favorably (Pew Research Center 2012). In addition to the widespread poverty, illiteracy, and political turmoil, and negative attitudes towards the US, Pakistan has also been crippled by natural disasters of massive proportions in the last few years. The 2005 earthquake killed 75,000 people across the country and left 2.5 million homeless (US State Department 2010, “Background Note: Pakistan”). More recently, the summer 2010 monsoon season brought with it widespread flooding that affected 62,000 square miles in the country, affecting 20 million people and washing away great swaths of infrastructure across Pakistan in “the nation’s worst natural calamity” (Gall 2010, The New York Times). A cataloguing of the country’s socio-economic and political problems, then, would predict that US soft power efforts, including its funding of NGO projects in Pakistan, would be focused on the areas of education, economic development, infrastructure, healthcare, good governance, and disaster relief, perhaps accompanied by efforts to improve public opinion towards the US, according to Hypothesis 3.
The NGO Regulatory Environment

The specific kind of soft power wielded by the US government and of most interest in this dissertation is not just economic assistance or bilateral aid, but government funding of NGOs and their projects, for reasons outlined previously. I have argued that the regulatory environment surrounding NGOs in the target country, in this case Pakistan, will impact this US soft power strategy, with more restrictive NGO regulations or oversight providing an obstacle to the implementation of such a strategy. Pakistan is different from the Afghan case because unlike the latter, Pakistan has not been invaded by US or NATO forces. Afghanistan, however, has been occupied by the US and NATO since 2001, and has had an overhaul of its entire political system, complete with a new Constitution, first-time elections, and attempts to build democratic institutions with heavy US influence. Thus, the US has had much less impact, if any, on the regulatory environment surrounding NGOs in Pakistan than it did in Afghanistan; there is no endogenous relationship here between the regulatory environment surrounding NGOs in Pakistan and US support for their activities. That makes a test of Hypothesis 4, predicting that the US government is more likely to fund NGOs where the NGO regulatory environment in the target country is more open, more definitive and clear-cut.

According to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 45,000 citizen organizations or NGOs existed in Pakistan as of May 2012, employing 300,000 people and attracting 200,000 full-time employees, but 38% of these nonprofit organizations were not registered with the Pakistani government (NGO Law Monitor: Pakistan 2012). Because the Pakistani state is unable or unwilling to deliver social welfare services to a large part of the population, it has opened up space for NGOs to perform this kind of work, and thus the country’s regulatory environment towards NGOs is generally enabling. The country’s
Constitution, in place since 1973, allows for the freedoms of association, speech, and expression, providing the backdrop to an environment friendly and open to the operation of NGOs. As is typical for NGOs or non-profit organizations around the world, many non-profits are tax-exempt in Pakistan; this provision generally applies to nonprofits that benefit society at large and not just their members. NGOs must register with the Economic Affairs Division of the government, as well as with provincial offices, to be officially sanctioned to operate within the country (NGO Law Monitor: Pakistan 2012).

Recent obstacles to the work of NGOs in the country include attempts to revise Pakistan’s NGO laws. For instance, Senator Tariq Azeem of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) party has put forth a new bill called the Regulations of Foreign Contributions Act 2012, seeking to curtail the freedom and operations of foreign-funded NGOs on the premise that they are using foreign money for agendas that contradict the public interest. Specific provisions of this pending legislation, which has yet to be voted on by the lower house in the Pakistani Parliament, include a requirement for NGOs to obtain government permission to receive foreign funding, a five-year expiration date on registration, an ambiguous application process for the government to approve foreign funding, and a maximum of 20% on the administrative expenses of such organizations. Furthermore, Azeem’s proposed legislation allows the Pakistani government leeway to cancel the registration of foreign-funded NGOs at its discretion, also granting government officials expansive powers of inspection, and subjecting NGOs and their employees to criminal penalties if they violate these laws (NGO Law Monitor: Pakistan 2012).

Even if Azeem’s law is not passed, it certainly reflects a suspicious attitude towards foreign-funded NGOs that prevails at least among some people or groups in Pakistan; it is difficult to separate such sentiments from recent US military actions in the country or from
the very negative attitudes towards the US among the Pakistani public. In addition, as the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law's report on Pakistan suggests, threats and attacks on foreign-funded NGOs in the country, especially on organizations that work on issues such as female education, demonstrate that “cultural barriers, more than legal barriers ... constrain the work of some [NGOs] in some parts of Pakistan” (NGO Law Monitor: Pakistan 2012). Just as corruption and nepotism may serve as unofficial restrictions on NGO activities in Afghanistan, it appears that cultural attitudes and suspicion of foreigners may act as unofficial restrictions on NGO activities in an otherwise NGO-friendly regulatory environment in Pakistan. Of course, if Azeem’s legislation passes, the legal environment surrounding NGOs, particularly INGOs, in Pakistan will change dramatically, no doubt impacting US funding of such organizations in the country. Like Afghanistan, Pakistan is also weighed down by corruption across a variety of political institutions, and “corruption and lack of sufficient transparency is identified as a key obstacle to effective implementation of U.S. aid programs in Pakistan” (Epstein and Kronstadt 2011, 27). Corruption, too, appears to be part of the unofficial or informal regulatory environment for NGOs in the country. Indeed, the issue has impacted US aid programs in Pakistan: because of concerns about corruption, USAID enlarged its Inspector General’s Office, its oversight body, in Pakistan to include 9 auditors in 2010, up from only 2 auditors in 2009 (Perlez 2011, *The New York Times*).

As discussed earlier, the US raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad and the subsequent assassination of the al Qaeda leader was met with negative reception in Pakistan. The impact of this US action has affected the INGO sector in the country, particularly the organization Save the Children. The background here concerns the involvement of a physician, Dr. Shakil Afridi, with the CIA and his intelligence work in preparation for the raid; Dr. Afridi was later arrested by Pakistani intelligence and is still in
custody, despite requests by US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta that he be released. Dr. Afridi claims that Save the Children introduced him to CIA officials, something the INGO vigorously denies. In any case, the organization has been subject to what appear to be retaliatory measures by the Pakistani government: many managers working in Save the Children have not been allowed to leave Pakistan, others have not been granted visas to enter the country, and some aid supplies brought into Pakistan by the organization have been held up in customs. Save the Children holds that these actions by the Pakistani government have prevented the INGO from helping 35,000 infants receive medical care across the country over the course of three months. Other INGOs have seen similarly new restrictions on their activities in the aftermath of the bin Laden raid (Walsh 2012, The New York Times). Here are cases that exhibit an increasingly restrictive environment for INGOs in Pakistan, despite the fact that officially, the NGO regulatory environment still does not codify prohibitions on the travel of INGO employees, or sanction the government holding of their supplies. Hypothesis 4 would predict that such a tightening operating environment for INGOs might lead the US to limit or at least be more careful about funding such organizations who work in Pakistan, but there is no evidence of that yet. However, the expansion of the USAID Inspector General’s Office in Pakistan in order to deal with the problem of corruption in aid delivery reflects an adaptive strategy by the US government to deal with another unofficial problem impacting the work of INGOs in the country, lending some support to Hypothesis 4.

USAID in Pakistan

Given the socio-economic and political needs of Pakistan, as well as the official and unofficial regulatory environment for NGOs and INGOs in the country, what sorts of soft power, in the form of economic assistance and funding of NGOs, has the US government
wielded in Pakistan since the start of the War on Terror? Figure 20 shows the level of US economic assistance through USAID to Pakistan since the year 2000, data taken from the Center on Global Development, with figures held constant in 2009 dollars. In 2000, because of the US sanctions on Pakistan, USAID did not dispense any economic assistance, but we see that in the following year, the agency spent about half a million dollars on Pakistan (recall that the War on Terror began toward the end of 2001). USAID aid to Pakistan spiked dramatically the following year, reaching more than $700 million dollars, gradually decreasing over the next few years. In 2009, USAID spending in Pakistan increased a great deal, rising to $1076 million dollars, and increasing again the following year, to $1529 million dollars.

Figure 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>USAID Assistance in Millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>700</td>
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<td>04</td>
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<td>05</td>
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<td>06</td>
<td>700</td>
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<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>1076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>1529</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Center for Global Development

Figure 21 shows data, taken from the OECD, on US aid to Pakistan between 2005 and 2010 channeled through “NGOs and Civil Society Organizations,” a category that includes both INGOs and local NGOs in Pakistan. Unfortunately, figures before 2005 are not available, but this six-year window is useful to examine nonetheless. Overall, an upward trend emerges, with US aid through NGOs in Pakistan standing at a mere $11 million dollars.
in 2005, increasing until it reached a high of more than $232 million dollars in 2009, and then dropping off slightly in 2010 to $223 million.

Figure 21

**US Aid Through NGOs and Civil Society to Pakistan, 2005-2010**

Source: OECD

As indicated by the figures above, US economic assistance to Pakistan was resumed swiftly after the 9/11 attacks and the Pakistani government's pledge to ally itself with the US in the War on Terror. President Bush’s $600 million emergency package in September 2001 included economic aid (and not just the military assistance discussed earlier in the chapter), and the annual payments of $600 million from 2005 onward included $300 million in economic assistance. These steep amounts of aid were meant to meet the six objectives of the Bush administration in Pakistan: peace and security, governing justly and democratically, investing in the people, economic growth, humanitarian assistance, and monitoring, evaluation, and oversight (Esptein and Kronstadt 2011, 21). Beginning in 2003, the US began sending aid to Pakistan targeted specifically at the development of the tribal FATA areas, for the sectors of education, healthcare, and economic growth (6). The immediate and consistent injections of US economic aid to Pakistan since the start of the War on Terror reflect a determination by the US executive that a long-term terrorist or
security threat existed in the country, a threat that would be mitigated by US aid, as Hypothesis 2 predicts. Thus, from the very beginning of the War on Terror, the US has wielded a combined power strategy in Pakistan, although the levels of spending and emphases have changed over time, as exemplified by the changes and intensification of US hard power in the country as discussed above.

Although US aid to Pakistan targeted specifically at the FATA tribal areas was in place beginning in 2003, in 2007 the US escalated those soft power efforts, pledging to give $750 million to Pakistani tribal areas over the next five years. USAID planned to use this money as a “counterinsurgency tool,” according to its statement announcing the program, and would work on projects in healthcare, education, water and sanitation, agriculture, and political reform, the latter of which was intended to improve the effectiveness of this aid. The agency would also rely on local and international NGOs to implement the projects; the INGO Save the Children, for instance, promptly received $11 million in funding at the onset of this program (Perlez 2007, The New York Times). This injection of economic assistance to the Pakistani tribal areas, particularly the specific mention of this form of soft power as a “counterinsurgency” effort, reflects an acknowledgement by the US government of an increasing long-term security or terrorist threat from the Pakistani tribal areas. This threat could be mitigated, according to the logic of this strategy, by soft power in the form of economic assistance, much of it implemented through NGO projects.

US soft power efforts in Pakistan, part of a combined power strategy that also included US military aid and eventually US military operations in Pakistan, came to a head in 2009, under the Obama administration. Nonmilitary aid to Pakistan increased dramatically under President Obama; the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, also known as the Kerry-Lugar-Bergman bill, was the ultimate expression of a change in US
policy and an intensified focus on Pakistan in the War on Terror, as part of the broader Af-Pak strategy. This law, passed by Congress, authorized $1.5 billion a year in aid to Pakistan, to be spent on the development of democratic institutions, the rule of law, economic development, investment, and public diplomacy, making Pakistan the second-largest recipient of US foreign aid. Furthermore, the Kerry-Lugar-Bergman bill made US security assistance to Pakistan conditional on its cooperation with the US on its nuclear program and against terrorism (Epstein and Kronstadt 2011, 8). The spike in USAID spending on Pakistan in 2009 and 2010, shown in Figure 20, then, reflects the provisions of this Kerry-Lugar-Bergman bill. This upward trend was a part of the overall increase in civilian or non-military aid under the Obama administration; by 2010, 45% of US aid to Pakistan was economic, rather than military, a huge increase from the 24% of non-military aid in 2008 (Kramer 2012, 92). Interestingly, this increase in soft power came at the same time that the US escalated or changed its hard power strategy in Pakistan, conducting military operations on its own starting in 2008 rather than just providing military assistance to the government. Such a change reflects an acknowledgement by the US executive, inherent in the Af-Pak strategy, that both the short-term and long-term security or terrorist threats from Pakistan had increased by 2009, warranting an increase in US combined power in the country, as predicted by Hypotheses 1 and 2.

USAID in Pakistan by Sector

It is not enough to examine changes in the USAID overall budget in Pakistan over time; equally important is a look at USAID spending in Pakistan by sector, particularly in order to test Hypothesis 3. Unfortunately, detailed data on USAID spending in Pakistan by sector is not publicly available before 2009, i.e., prior to the implementation of the Af-Pak strategy under President Obama. Nevertheless, it is worth examining more general figures,
such as the breakdown of aid to Pakistan by international donors in general (including the
Asian Development Bank, the IMF, the World Bank, the US, and other countries) by sector in
the years 2002-2009. According to this data from the Brookings Institution, the US
government was the third-largest donor to Pakistan during that time period, in a list that
spans 28 other donors including the governments of countries as well as several IGOs
(inter-governmental organizations), totaling commitments of $31,964 million and actual
disbursements of $16,765 million (Livingston and O’Hanlon 2012, 25). Table 3 breaks down
those commitments and disbursements by sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Committed ($Millions)</th>
<th>Disbursed ($Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balance of Payments/Budgetary Support</td>
<td>9,794</td>
<td>5,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Generation</td>
<td>4,045</td>
<td>988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>3,458</td>
<td>1,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking, Finance, and Insurance</td>
<td>2,387</td>
<td>1,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2,340</td>
<td>1,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Nutrition</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td>1,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>1,558</td>
<td>1,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Livestock</td>
<td>1,503</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Development</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Sanitation</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Be Specified</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender and Women Development</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Prevention/Disaster Reduction</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment/Natural Resources</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Development</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism/Culture/Youth Affairs</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science and Technology</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Welfare</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and Gas</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and Construction</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Development</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Technology/Communication</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocated</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>31,964</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,765</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
International Aid to Pakistan By Sector, 2002-2009. Source: Brookings Pakistan Index, Livingston and O’Hanlon 2012

The reasons for the discrepancies between the levels of “commitment” and “disbursement” of aid to Pakistan are beyond the scope of this project. As indicated in Table 3, a great deal of aid to Pakistan went to budgetary support, followed by various categories involving infrastructure and social welfare services: energy, transportation, education, health and nutrition, agriculture and livestock, rural development, etc. Interestingly, governance was the 7th largest category based on spending, with $1,558 million in commitments and $1,389 million in disbursements. Other notable categories include spending on Gender/Women Development ($505 million in commitments and $218 in disbursements), and the two categories of Crisis Prevention/Disaster Reduction and Environment/Natural Resources (for a total of more than $600 million in commitments and about $400 million in actual disbursements). The breakdown of aid to Pakistan by sector is not surprising, given the socio-economic and political context of the country: a country with high rates of poverty and low levels of literacy and education would need a great deal of aid for infrastructure and social services. Furthermore, as indicated earlier, Pakistan has been plagued by several natural disasters, so it is unsurprising that some of the aid was allocated to deal with such issues. Low levels of female literacy reflect a need in Pakistan for women-specific programs, another category of aid spending, and the political problems and turmoil in the country make the category of “governance” aid unsurprising as well. Thus, the empirical record of aid by sector in Pakistan between 2002 and 2009 generally fits in with Hypothesis 3. The caveat, of course, is that this data refers to aid by many international donors, and not just the US—each country or IGO is likely to vary in its priorities, resources, and reasons for aid spending allocated to Pakistan. Nevertheless, this data provides a useful look at the kinds of aid committed and dispersed to Pakistan during the first three-quarters of the War on Terror.
Since this is a project explaining variation in US strategy in the War on Terror, a more useful source of data on US aid to a target country such as Pakistan would come from USAID itself. Figure 22 shows a breakdown of US aid to Pakistan by sector, between October 2009 (after the adoption of the Kerry-Lugar-Bergman Bill) and March 2012. Figure 23 shows the breakdown of US aid to Pakistan in the areas of emergency flood response and recovery, presumably in the aftermath of the summer 2010 floods. As Figure 22 demonstrates, most of US aid to Pakistan during this period was for “Stabilization,” a very broad USAID category referring to post-conflict development efforts, followed by Social/Humanitarian Programs and Education, Healthcare, Rule of Law, Economic Growth, and Democracy and Governance, for a total of $1,864.6 million during this period of about two and a half years. Interestingly, US aid to Pakistan in response to the floods is its biggest spending category, and about a third of that aid ($316 million) went to the UN and NGOs for their work in Pakistan after the floods. Again, this breakdown of categories of US soft power spending in Pakistan is in line with the predictions of Hypothesis 3, that the US will fund the work of NGOs based on the socio-economic and political needs of a target country. Once again, it is worth mentioning here that often, USAID programs are implemented through INGOs or local NGOs, even when such outsourcing is not specified by the USAID budget category. One other noteworthy issue here is that it would appear, based on the Pakistan case, that when the US is not officially at war in a target country in the War on Terror, a great deal of its soft power budget may be spent on programs in response to particular crises, such as natural disasters. A further examination of USAID’s work in Pakistan will provide further evidence of this, although of course whether or not this is a generalizable finding must be confirmed by broader empirical testing and an in-depth look at more cases. Nevertheless, the contrast with USAID’s work in Afghanistan, an actual war zone, is noteworthy here.
Figure 22

US Civilian Assistance to Pakistan, Oct. 2009-March 2012 ($Millions)

- Energy
- Economic Growth
- Stabilization (USAID)
- Stabilization (Civilian Law Enforcement, Rule of Law, Counternarcotics)
- Education
- Health

Source: USAID Pakistan 2012
As reflected in Figure 22 above, USAID assistance to Pakistan over the last few years can be broken down into several categories. The Stabilization Program attempts to increase the Pakistani government’s legitimacy and reach, as well as to meet the economic and social needs of remote communities in conflict-ridden places, particularly in areas like the FATA tribal region, according to the USAID website. Examples of USAID Stabilization projects in Pakistan include building infrastructure, providing scholarships and training to students and workers, building drinking water supply systems, conducting child vaccinations, rebuilding homes hit by conflicts, and child protection programs (USAID Pakistan, “Stabilization Program” 2011). USAID’s Energy Program seeks to increase energy access and improve the energy sector in Pakistan by building dams that generate hydroelectric power, modernizing thermal power stations, and replacing tube-well irrigation pumps with more modern systems (USAID Pakistan, “Energy Program” 2011). The Education Program implemented by USAID in Pakistan tries to improve children’s access to education across...
the country, as well as improve teaching, provide grants for research, renovate schools impacted by natural disasters, and provide Fulbright Scholarships for students to come to US universities (USAID Pakistan, “Education Program” 2011). USAID also engages in “cross-cutting” Good Governance and Gender Equity efforts in Pakistan, focusing on these issues in all its programs through supporting civil society groups, promoting female employment, encouraging female education, and working with NGOs and local and federal governments (USAID Pakistan, “Cross-cutting Themes: Good Governance and Gender Equity” 2011).

Finally, USAID’s Health program in Pakistan involves collaboration with the Ministry of Health, aiming to make healthcare more affordable to the population and implementing immunization, maternal and newborn health, birth spacing awareness, polio eradication, and reproductive health care programs across the country (USAID Pakistan, “Health Program” 2011). Again, many of these USAID projects are implemented by NGOs, although USAID does not provide the figures for such outsourcing of implementation. These various USAID programs are in line with predictions made by Hypothesis 3, that the US government will fund (NGO) projects based on the socio-economic and political needs of a target country.

As demonstrated earlier, and as evidenced by Figure 23, USAID has exerted a great deal of money and effort on flood responses in Pakistan in 2010. This flood response has included collaboration with NGOs, and in order to publicize the US government’s involvement in such humanitarian relief, USAID requires that NGOs it funds brand its products with the USAID handshake logo and the phrase “from the American people.” Sometimes this requirement is waived in environments where the association of humanitarian workers with any group of foreigners makes them vulnerable to security threats (Ward, DipNote Blog 2010). One USAID project provided $15 million to farmers, providing seed, fertilizer, and soil preparation after the floods to help with the recovery
Aside from typical reconstruction and emergency relief after the floods, the US military also transported 194 international and Pakistani journalists in helicopters to areas affected by the flood in 2010, in order to provide them with access to what was a major news story (Beale, DipNote Blog 2010). Such action by the US military is an interesting example not just because it is a manifestation of combined power exhibited by the US military, but also because it reflects a focus by the US government on issues such as access to information. At first glance, US flood-related assistance to Pakistan may appear irrelevant to its War on Terror, but we can think of such assistance as part of more indirect forms of soft power. In other words, it is useful to consider this disaster and humanitarian relief as part of broader attempts by the US to improve Pakistani public opinion towards it, or to ensure the cooperation of the Pakistani government on matters more directly related to terrorism. As former Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff (2008) argued, by providing humanitarian aid the US can improve public opinion towards it and make foreign publics less likely to see it as an enemy, as evidenced by the spike in public approval towards the US after its extensive relief efforts in the aftermath of the tsunami in Indonesia in 2004. This kind of logic makes US flood assistance to Pakistan of importance in an examination of the US’s wielding of soft power in the War on Terror.

Other USAID non-flood-related projects include training for female police officers in Pakistan, as part of the US’s collaboration with the Pakistani government to improve women’s rights, in a program established in 2002 (Rodriguez, DipNote Blog 2010b). In addition, USAID pledged $28 million dollars for public university education in conflict-ridden areas in Pakistan in 2010, funding which among other things provided tuition waivers for 7,000 students of internally displaced families (Snelsnire, DipNote Blog 2010).

**INGOs in Pakistan**
The above section catalogued USAID’s work in Pakistan over the last few years, but in a project examining US soft power as expressed through funding of NGOs, it is important to examine the specific work of INGOs themselves in Pakistan. InterAction, the US coalition of international NGOs, has published member activity reports for work in Pakistan in 2009 and 2010, which is unsurprising since much of US-funded soft power in Pakistan has taken place since 2009, after the passage of the Kerry-Lugar-Bergman Bill. In 2009, the 22 member organizations featured in the InterAction report named security as a major problem in Pakistan, in the context of poverty, inadequate food, low literacy rates, limited access to education and sanitation, corruption, natural disasters such as earthquakes, inequality, and Taliban fighting in the FATA and NorthWest Province regions of Pakistan (Aronso 2009, 5). Interestingly, many INGOs began work in Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake (6), an interesting contrast to the many INGOs who flooded into Afghanistan after the 2001 US-led invasion.

For the purposes of this project, the INGO work of most interest involves projects funded by the US government as part of its soft or combined power strategy in Pakistan. The Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development, which has been in Pakistan for 15 years, responded to the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan by building emergency shelters, and distributing food and water, with USAID funding most of that work (Aronso 2009, 14). The Aga Khan Foundation carried out, among its other projects, a USAID-funded Child Survival program starting in 2008 for maternal and child health (19). CARE, one of the largest INGO recipients of US government funding, implemented a USAID-funded Pakistan Jobs Project with a budget of $80 million (29). USAID has also extensively funded the International Medical Corps’s projects in the NWFP tribal region of Pakistan, which include healthcare, health education, water, and responding to gender-based violence (42). The International Rescue Committee has implemented a four-year USAID program, starting in 2006, called
Primary Healthcare Revitalization, Integration, and Decentralization in Earthquake-Affected Areas (PRIDE) (48).

Mercy Crops has also worked on a number of programs in Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake, providing food, medical teams, healthcare clinics, cash-for-work programs, and health programs for mothers and newborns, with USAID funding (Aronso 2009, 53). Relief International began its work in Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake, working with displaced people and farmers, also receiving funding from USAID and the State Department (59). Save the Children, another large recipient of US government funding, has implemented a USAID-sponsored five-year literacy and community improvement program in FATA and NWFP, as well as disaster preparation and response programs in those same tribal regions after earthquakes and floods (62). Winrock International is another INGO recipient of USAID funding, focusing on agricultural development, infrastructure, and healthcare (63). Finally, World Vision's varied projects in Pakistan include emergency relief, maternal and child health, water and hygiene, education, and food security, with USAID as a major donor (64). Like INGOs working in Afghanistan, these organizations operating in Pakistan often work with Pakistani government agencies as well as local NGOs to carry out their projects.

In 2010, many of these INGOs continued projects, included those funded by USAID, documented in the 2009 InterAction report for Pakistan. Interestingly, the 31 member organizations expressed not just a continued concern about insecurity in the country, but a new problem of inadequate funding. This issue was highlighted after the 2010 flood that affected at least 18 million Pakistanis, increasing the humanitarian crisis and the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) problem in the FATA regions. Furthermore, the INGOs voiced concerns about the USAID requirement of stamping its logo on any project materials in the country, as well as new restrictions by the government of Pakistan on humanitarian
organizations (O'Brien 2010, 5). US government-funded INGO projects not mentioned in the 2009 report include the Academy for Educational Development’s Pre-Service Teacher Education Program, which began in 2008, to improve education policies in conjunction with the Higher Education Commission and the Ministry of Education, as well as another project to increase student access to higher education across Pakistan (8). Another INGO, Concern Worldwide, oversaw USAID’s Responding to Pakistan’s Internally Displaced project in the country, seeking to meet the humanitarian needs of IDPs, with increased funding after the 2010 floods (31). Food for the Hungry worked on emergency response, shelter and housing, water and sanitation, and agriculture and food security projects, with funding from USAID (35). What emerges from these InterAction reports is a picture whereby USAID has funded INGO projects with a major focus on emergency response, as well as other projects primarily in the areas of healthcare and education, lending extensive support to Hypothesis 3.

**INGOs and the US Government**

The case studies in this project test my theory explaining variation in US hard, soft, and combined power strategy in the US War on Terror, and one important variable explaining US soft power strategy is the relationship between US-funded INGOs and their government donors. Here the Pakistan case once again stands in contrast with the Afghanistan case, as INGOs appear to have fewer areas of conflict or contention with the US government. One issue on which INGOs have clearly expressed discontent with the US government has been a change, under the leadership of Ambassador Holbrooke, in which US government prefers to implement aid programs more through local NGOs and the Pakistani government, rather than foreign NGOs. Furthermore, Holbrooke also made a decision to publicize the US government as a source of funding. This decision resulted in the
elimination of almost $200 million worth of USAID projects that were supposed to be implemented by INGOs, as well as denied funding for other new projects (Wright 2011, The Wall Street Journal). Such a shift in US aid strategy can be attributed to concerns in Congress about corruption and insufficient transparency, as well as a preference by Pakistani officials that US aid money go directly through them instead of foreign NGOs (Epstein and Kronstadt 2011, 27-28). Here is an example, in line with Hypotheses 5 and 6, where the US government decided to terminate projects from its end because of concerns about how the INGOs involved were implementing them, or because of a perception among the Pakistani government about INGOs as encouraging corruption. Whether this concern is warranted is not the point here, but the point is that differences between the US government and INGOs can lead to a termination of at least project-specific partnerships, if not entire relationships between the two actors.

From the INGO side, this same decision has fomented concern that local NGOs in Pakistan cannot handle the extra money they would now receive, funding that had been initially intended for INGOs. Furthermore, INGOs working in Pakistan have been displeased with some USAID requirements attached to funding. CARE, for instance, decided to forego a project where USAID required the organization to work in the dangerous tribal areas, and Oxfam International decided to pass up USAID funding for a flood response project that mandated the display of the USAID logo on the food to be distributed (Wright 2011, The Wall Street Journal). In fact, in 2010, 11 INGOs wrote and signed a letter through InterAction to USAID asking for an exemption from having to display the red, white, and blue USAID logo, due to concerns about being more vulnerable to militant attacks. The branding requirements even prompted CARE to reject US funding for a project to work in the Punjab province in Pakistan after the 2010 floods (Abbot 2011). In line with Hypotheses 5 and 6, then, INGOs may decide to refuse funding from the US government where they see a conflict
between their mission and that of the US government. In this case, one of USAID's priorities was to publicize the US government as a source of aid in order to improve Pakistani public opinion towards the US, and clearly several INGOs saw this as a priority that would compromise the security and effectiveness of their programs. As in the Afghan country case, however, foregoing particular USAID-funded projects does not necessarily mean that INGOs will terminate the entire relationship with the US funding agency.

Another area of tension between INGOs and the US government emerged in light of the US raid that killed Osama bin Laden. InterAction, the coalition of 200 US-based INGOs, wrote a letter to the CIA protesting its deployment of Dr. Shakil Afridi to help find Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Dr. Afridi had been commissioned to start a fake vaccination drive in Abbottabad in order to enter the house where bin Laden was suspected of residing, and to acquire DNA evidence confirming the al Qaeda leader's identity. This utilization of a medical professional in the CIA's intelligence work put in jeopardy the work of NGOs in Pakistan to eradicate polio, particularly in an environment where rumors run rampant that vaccination drives are Western plots to sterilize Pakistanis (Shah 2012, *The Guardian*). While no visible changes in the interaction between INGOs and the US government took place in light of the bin Laden raid, Hypothesis 5 would predict that INGOs may be more cautious about seeking US government funding of projects that might be related to US military or intelligence work in the country.

**Mini-Case Study and Interviews**

To arrive at a clearer understanding of the work of INGOs in Pakistan, particularly their relationship with the US government agencies from which they receive funding, I was initially able to interview employees from two INGOs operating in the country. My selection criteria was the same as the criteria in choosing the INGOs for the Afghanistan chapter:
choosing INGOs who operated in Pakistan and were from among the top ten recipients of USAID funding in the War on Terror, from a list taken from McCleary (2009). It appears that most INGOs, if not all, that operate in Afghanistan also work in Pakistan, allowing me to select the same INGOs for the two countries as an added control in order to test variation in the independent variables of interest here. As mentioned in the previous chapter, given the busy schedules and security concerns of the INGOs operating in Pakistan, only one of the 10 largest INGO recipients of US government funding in 2005 (6 or 7 of whom operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan), INGO A, initially agreed to be interviewed for this project.

Unfortunately, after I started the interview process with INGO A, my points of contact pulled out of the project, citing the sensitive nature of my questions and a schedule that was too busy. Despite my best efforts, I was unable to re-gain this interview access, and thus had to eliminate INGO A from my interview pool. I was able to gain access to only one other organization that also works in Pakistan, and receives USAID funding, but I had to branch out of my initial selection criteria and choose a smaller organization to do so: INGO B, which I also included in the Afghanistan chapter. In accordance with the conditions under which I conducted these interviews, and the conditions of my Institutional Review Board approval, I will continue using the pseudonyms for both the organization and the individuals I interviewed. The original data from these interviews allowed for a more in-depth test of Hypotheses 5 and 6, with some support for them.

INGO B, the only INGO that granted me interview access regarding its work in Pakistan, does not meet my initial selection criteria of being one of the top ten recipients of US government funding, but as I discovered, sometimes being given permission to conduct interviews is enough reason for inclusion in original research of this kind. I spoke to INGO B’s Program Officer for Asia, Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, a region that
includes Pakistan, over the telephone in English, and will hereafter refer to him as Officer X. Although not one of the top recipients of US government funding, INGO B is still a sizable organization, with a total revenue of $317,301,472 in 2010, up from $281,854,094; in 2010, $200,438,135 (i.e., more than half its revenue) came from US government grants/contributions, according to its 990 tax report (www.ncss.urban.org). Just as in the case of INGO A, however, this revenue does not all go to INGO B's work in Pakistan, as the organization operates in 40 different countries, with an emphasis on humanitarian work and “emergency relief, protection of human rights, post-conflict development, [and] resettlement assistance and advocacy,” according to the mission statement included in its 990 report.

As Officer X indicated, INGO B has been working in Pakistan for over three decades, since 1980. Originally, its work entailed only working in Afghan refugee camps, an endeavor that has decreased in scale but continued more than ten years into the war in Afghanistan, since “there are still many, many people in those camps.” INGO B’s activities within those camps include providing healthcare, education, and protection, the latter a term used to describe helping secure the legal rights of these displaced people. Such protection can entail working with the UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) to help the displaced gain access to various services, or with the Pakistani government under their status as refugees. Aside from its work with Afghan refugees, INGO B has engaged mainly in disaster response after the 2005 earthquake and the 2010 floods in Pakistan. Furthermore, INGO B has been working with internally displaced people (IDPs) within the country, particularly in the FATA and Northwest Province regions, areas particularly hit by conflict as US and Pakistani military efforts intensified in 2008 and beyond.
When asked about INGO B’s relationship with the Pakistani government, Officer X responded that “it’s a little bit difficult. We haven’t had major problems with the government, but it’s not always easy.” The primary areas of difficulty include obtaining permission from the government for INGO B’s employees to travel within Pakistan, and getting visas for employees to enter Pakistan from outside the country. “Sometimes [the government] rejects people’s visas,” Officer X added, and INGO B has faced obstacles in bringing in expats and getting them to stay in Pakistan. But at the end of the day, “I think the relations with local authorities will vary based on the person, and based on their understanding [of our work],” said Officer X, alluding to the power and reach of what Lipsky (1980) called “street-level bureaucracy.” Usually when the organization cannot secure a visa for a particular individual to enter the country, it tries to find a replacement employee, and so far that strategy has worked for INGO B.

Unlike its work in Afghanistan, INGO B’s work in Pakistan focuses mostly on humanitarian needs and emergency responses, with short-term projects that may span one year instead of five years, according to Officer X. Interestingly, the only area where INGO B implements more expansive, long-term projects in Pakistan is female education. As indicated earlier, INGO B does receive USAID funding for many of its projects, with a huge influx of funding after the natural disasters that have plagued Pakistan in recent years, namely the 2005 earthquake and the 2010 floods. That funding was extensive enough that “it took a while to digest that,” in the words of Officer X. Furthermore, donor funding (including from US government agencies) has been generous in support of INGO B’s work with Afghan refugees in Pakistan: “there’s a lot of donor support for those people. Some of them probably won’t go back [to Afghanistan],” even though occasionally the Pakistani government indicates an intention to close down the refugee camps. In any case, the work of INGO B in Pakistan, which, like the work of most INGOs, is often dictated by the
availability of funding, confirms the predictions of Hypothesis 3: the US government is likely to fund INGOs whose work reflects the particular socio-economic and political needs of a country. In the case of Pakistan, the testimony of Officer X about INGO B verifies a propensity by the US government to fund projects related to disaster response, female education, and working with people displaced by conflict, both from Afghanistan and within Pakistan itself.

As discussed extensively earlier, relations between the US and the Pakistani government have deteriorated in the last couple of years, as highlighted by the fallout from the US assassination of Osama bin Laden and the killing of Pakistani soldiers, which led to the closing of the NATO supply route into Afghanistan for several months. Internally, Pakistan has been rife with political instability, ever since the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the resignation of President Musharraf. When asked about INGO B’s relationship with the Pakistani government, Officer X responded that the political turmoil within the country “increases instability generally, and makes the environment more insecure. [So] we have to be more careful, and review our security policies, but [such problems] haven’t impacted our work in a direct way.” However, the US-Pakistani government interaction can affect some aspects of INGO B’s work: “as relations with the US get more difficult, that does kind of impact things like visas, [although] it’s always hard to draw a direct line between them. As bilateral relations get worse, we are always less sure we’ll be able to get the visas we need.” Challenges or difficulties posed by the Pakistani government to INGO B’s work do not, however, extend to the point of threatening to close down the INGO or curtail its activities. Certainly Office X gave no indication that these difficulties have negatively affected its access to US government funding; here there is mixed support for Hypothesis 4 because despite what appears to be an increasingly restrictive regulatory environment, at
least unofficially, for INGOs within Pakistan, the US government appears to continue its funding patterns based on the officially open regulatory environment within the country.

The variable of most interest and relevance for the interview aspect of this project was the respective INGOs’ relationships with the US government funding agencies. Interestingly, and somewhat contrary to my expectations, Officer X indicated that for INGO B, “there’s less a discussion about our objectives” when it comes to applying for and receiving funding from USAID. “We don’t see US government counterinsurgency objectives coming through the funding stream [in Pakistan] as in Afghanistan.” Unlike the case with its work in Afghanistan, he could not recall an incident where INGO B decided to forego or decided not to seek USAID funding for its Pakistan projects. However, acknowledging that one of USAID’s goals appears to be building civil society capacity within Pakistan, Officer X indicated that INGO B is not involved in such work or projects, with one exception. The organization does conduct projects in the areas of “women's protection and empowerment,” with a focus on gender-based violence, work which can get into the category of female-centered civil society building. Officer X demonstrated no resentment or negativity towards such goals by the US government; on the contrary, if as he understands it building female civil society institutions in Pakistan is a goal of the US government, his reaction suggested that INGO B supports such efforts. Thus, the experience of INGO B in Pakistan suggests support for Hypotheses 5 and 6: the US government is likely to fund and continue its relationship with INGOs with whom it shares similar goals and missions and with whom it has cooperative relationships. The caveat, of course, is that in the case of Pakistan, it appears unlikely or much less likely than in the case of Afghanistan that a conflict between the two actors would arise in the first place, although Officer X did mention that even for Pakistan, “I’m sure there are funds out there linked to the [US] military,” and INGO B would never go after such funding. It would appear, at least from the contrasting experiences of
INGO B in Afghanistan and Pakistan, that conflicts between INGOs and US government agencies are more likely to occur, and thus more likely to negatively impact relationships or partnerships between the two, in cases where the US is exerting more extensive hard power. In Afghanistan, where the US has led a full-fledged war for more than ten years, INGOs are much more resistant to what they see as counter-insurgency-related funding goals than in Pakistan, where US hard power efforts, intensified as they may be in the last three or four years, exist on a much smaller scale.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an in-depth case study of Pakistan as a target country of US hard, soft, and combined power in the War on Terror, seeking to explain variation over time in a geographic and political context that contrasts with the Afghanistan case, discussed in the previous chapter. Unlike Afghanistan, the US has not carried out a full-blown war and invasion of Pakistan, although certainly in the past few years US hard power operations have intensified inside the country. At the same time, the US has directed extensive military and economic assistance (the latter an example of soft power) at Pakistan since the start of the War on Terror. I have used this case study of Pakistan as an opportunity to further test the hypotheses laid out earlier in the dissertation, comparing the results with those from the Afghanistan case study.

Like the Afghanistan case study, I began with a background on US strategy or policy towards Pakistan before 9/11, which served as a useful benchmark from which to compare US strategy after the onset of the War on Terror. The test of Hypothesis 1 in Pakistan demonstrated that the US has indeed used hard power in Pakistan to counteract what it deemed was a short-term, immediate terrorist or security threat, and that as the threat level has grown since 2008, the US has intensified its hard power efforts. Furthermore, and here
we see a contrast with the Afghanistan case, US hard power efforts have also changed in kind, not just in degree: for the first few years of the US War on Terror, US hard power in Pakistan predominantly took the form of military assistance and training to the Pakistani government. As the US began to view the Pakistani government as less reliable or capable, however, it began to conduct military operations on its own, even within Pakistani borders, leading to escalating tensions between the two governments.

I also find support for Hypothesis 2: the US has used soft power in Pakistan from the early days of the War on Terror, in what appear to be efforts to counteract what it saw as a potential long-term terrorist or security threat. Since the early months and years of the War on Terror, there has been an intensification of soft power efforts, which at some point became part of combined power efforts, when Pakistan faced challenges such as natural disasters or refugee crises. As predicted by Hypotheses 3, the socio-economic and political country context in Pakistan has in fact shaped the kinds of US soft power programs and NGO projects implemented in the country. It appears that as the regulatory environment in Pakistan has become more restrictive towards INGOs, at least unofficially, INGOs have had some difficulty implementing their work; although, as indicated by the original interview research in this chapter, there is not much evidence to suggest that this has negatively affected the US from funding INGO work in the country. In fact, the evidence from this chapter suggests that US concerns about the work of INGOs in Pakistan stem not from restrictions on the movement of their employees or the granting of visas, but from concerns about efficiency and corruption. These changes in US funding of INGOs, instituted since the start of the US Af-Pak strategy, include a greater willingness to fund Pakistani government agencies and local NGOs directly than to fund INGOs, although INGO B has not had an issue with this particular funding strategy.
Finally, the tests of Hypotheses 5 and 6, predicting that the US government will fund NGOs with missions in alignment with its own, and then continue that relationship where the interaction has been positive, do not yield results nearly as interesting as they did in the Afghanistan case study. Evidence from the experience of INGO B suggests that in a context where the US is not conducting a full-fledged war and utilizing its entire hard power arsenal, there is less likely to be a conflict in mission between INGOs and the US government, and thus less of a chance that the two actors will fail to cooperate or refuse to work together on specific projects. The situation surrounding the US raid on Osama bin Laden, however, presents an example of INGOs declaring their disapproval with the approach of the US government, particularly the CIA, at least on paper, although the evidence does not extend so far as to suggest that INGOs have subsequently refused to receive funding from the US government. Thus, the results of this case study indicate some support for Hypotheses 5 and 6, as the US government does appear likely to fund INGOs with a common mission and goals and to continue its relationship with them if the experience between the two actors has been positive or cooperative. However, even when the two appear at odds, as in the case of the INGOs after the bin Laden raid, I found no evidence that partnerships between the two actors were terminated, even on specific projects. Of course, more extensive testing in the Pakistani context may yield more evidence in favor of Hypotheses 5 and 6.

It is clear that the US saw Pakistan as a front in both the short-term and long-term counter-terrorism efforts in the War on Terror since the 9/11 attacks. The most interesting finding from this case study, then, is that until the US government escalated its hard power efforts in Pakistan, most of its soft power efforts in the country, at least in its funding of NGOs and INGOs, appear to have focused on disaster and humanitarian relief after the earthquake in 2005, and then the floods in 2010. When US hard power in Pakistan changed
and escalated around 2008, with increasing unilateral operations by the US military in the form of drone attacks in the tribal regions, changes that occurred around the same time that the Pakistani military itself was increasing its operations in those same regions, US soft power efforts grew to include supporting internally people internally displaced by the conflict. Of course, US funding of INGOs in Pakistan also included projects dealing with refugees from Afghanistan, as the interview data suggests. It appears, then, that US soft power efforts appear to be more extensive in contexts where US hard power is also more extensive; the Pakistani case confirms what the Afghanistan case suggested. The US appears to be more likely to use more soft power, or more extensive kinds of soft power, when it is also using more extensive hard power in a particular context in the War on Terror. When it comes to predicting US strategy in Pakistan—and prediction is the ultimate goal of social science research, after all—the question will be whether or not US soft power in Pakistan will continue in the same scope whenever US hard power efforts in the country come to an end or are significantly scaled back. It would appear that the answer is no, although only time and further empirical tests will tell for sure.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION: SOFT POWER, NGOS, AND THE US WAR ON TERROR

It is not enough to simply suggest that the use of soft power, or the “ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye 2004a, x), i.e., relying on persuasive action or rhetoric rather than hard, military power, is normatively desirable. From a theoretical standpoint, and perhaps even a substantive one, the suggestion that the US should simply use more soft power in its dealings with the governments and publics of foreign nations is far from satisfying. Any reading of Nye’s work on soft, hard, and even smart power leaves one wondering: but when does the US government decide to use soft power, rather than hard power? Under what conditions will the president go ahead and command the use of force against a particular target, and will such an order be accompanied by soft power, too?

Despite the many critiques aimed at Nye’s notions of soft or even smart power (see Chapter II), the concept of soft power remains one worth exploring, explaining, and, for policymakers, implementing in some fashion. So while it is not enough to suggest, as Nye (2004a) does, that wielding soft power is a desirable action on the part of the US government, neither is it enough to simply critique Nye’s ideas as idealistic and dismiss them as overly prescriptive. What is needed, then, is a rigorous theory explaining the conditions under which the US government—more specifically, the US executive, the primary actor in foreign policy—will decide to use either soft or hard power, or any combination of the two, in a particular international context. This dissertation has sought to craft and test exactly such a theory, positing why the US executive will use soft, hard, or combined power against terrorist or security threats in the War on Terror. The specific
form of soft power examined in this dissertation has been US government funding of NGOs that carry out various humanitarian and development projects in target countries.

In this concluding chapter, I review the theory I presented earlier in the dissertation (Chapter III), making the case for why understanding the variation in the US executive’s use of soft, hard, and combined power in the War on Terror requires an examination of the threat level understood to be coming from target countries, the political and economic context of such countries, and the mission and capabilities of the relevant NGOs. I then summarize the most important findings from the empirical portions of the dissertation by going through the six hypotheses presented in Chapter III, discussing the research findings that relate to each of these hypotheses. I end with a discussion of the implications of these findings, rounding off the chapter with some thoughts on future research.

**A More Rigorous Theory of Hard, Soft, and Smart Power Decision-making**

Taking into account the extensive critiques of Nye’s soft and smart power framework (Chapter II), I have theorized about the conditions under which the US is more likely to use hard, soft, or variations of combined power in its War on Terror. I started by revising Nye’s definition of soft power itself, although I have not really strayed from Nye’s (2004b) definition of hard power, a term referring to traditional military power, as well as economic power when used to punish or threaten, i.e., through sanctions. My concept of soft power, however, is much narrower than Nye's (2004b). I conceptualize “soft power” as a consciously-utilized government strategy that uses non-hard power methods, aimed at persuasion, to influence a target government or target population in a way that will enhance US interests; soft power is a strategic means of achieving an end or a goal. In this dissertation, I have also substituted the term “combined” power for “smart power,” arguing
that the exact makeup of combined power, or its proportions of hard and soft power, will vary by context.

My theory seeks to explain both temporal and geographic variation in the US government’s strategy, accounting for its hard and soft power elements and a variety of possible combinations of the two. I argue that the independent variables shaping US strategy at a specific point in time and in a specific context are the preferences of the executive, the threat level and/or type of threat posed by the target country, the target country’s political and economic context, and the preferences, goals, and work of the relevant NGOs. I specifically examined the US executive (i.e., the president and his advisors) as the primary decision-maker in US foreign policy, as scholars have identified the president as the central actor and decision-maker in this area (Wittkopf and McCormick 1998; Banks and Straussman 1999; Rockman 2000), with Congress playing a less important role (Rockman 2000).

Having established the importance of the executive in foreign policy decision-making, my theory posits that the next step in the formulation of foreign policy strategy in the War on Terror is the US executive’s assessment of the threat level posed by a target country. The important distinction here is between short-term, immediate terrorist threats and long-term, potential terrorist threats. In other words, the US fights against actual, existing terrorists who pose an immediate threat against the US, but the US also works to prevent actual threats from developing and becoming immediate threats in the present. I argued that the threat level determined by the US executive to be coming from a particular country will determine what kind of power—hard, soft, or combined—the US decides to use to fight the terrorist threat. The use of military force is seen as necessary to fight and capture existing terrorists but in the long run, a different strategy must be adopted to
prevent future threats from emerging and threatening US security (Gates 2009). When the US executive determines that a specific country poses a short-term terrorist or security threat to the US, he is more likely to decide to use hard power against such a threat.

On the other hand, when facing what it deems to be a long-term, potential terrorist threat, the US executive is likely to use soft power in the target country. This is based on the belief that instability, a lack of development, and/or extremist ideology are important causes of terrorism, and therefore addressing these causes through forms of soft power can help eliminate this long-term threat (Tujan et al. 2004, Wunderle and Brier 2007, Tayekh and Gvosdev 2003). In other words, populations of certain poor, under-developed countries exhibit grievances that may lead them to take up terrorism against the US (Moghdam 2006, Wunderle and Brier 2007), and policymakers view tools of soft power as ways to help counteract such grievances. Furthermore, tools of soft power can also help mitigate the dire social, political, and economic conditions inherent in “failed” or “weak” states, whose existence is often understood as an explanation for the growth of terrorism, particularly against the West (Tayekh and Gvosdev 2003; Chenoweth 2005; Patrick 2006). Frequently, however, short-term and long-term threats exist side-by-side in target countries, and thus my theory posits that with the existence of both kinds of threats, US policymakers will pursue strategies based on both hard and soft power—smart power—whose proportional makeup will vary depending on the independent variables examined here.

Once the US executive has taken into account the threat level coming from a particular target country, the president and his advisors also consider the target country context. The political and economic needs of a country will influence the kinds of soft power tools the US uses. Since this theory examines US government funding of NGOs as a specific kind of soft power, I have argued that a target country’s regulatory environment as it relates
to NGOs will also help shape the specifics of US soft or combined power efforts that utilize
NGOs. This is because the governments of target countries may see NGOs as threatening and
try to limit their activities (Bratton 1989; Salamon 2006; Ward 2007; Jalali 2008; Stevens
2010).

But why have I chosen US government funding of NGOs as the specific form of soft
power under examination in this dissertation? NGOs are non-state actors, although they are
often funded at least in part by governments, through agencies such as USAID in the United
States. Basically, NGOs are “private, self-governing, non-profit institutions” with goals
ranging from promoting economic development, environmental protection, human rights,
and conflict resolution to providing humanitarian aid to helping foster civil society and
democratic institutions (Aall 2000, 124). INGOs are international NGOs or NGOs based in
one (usually developed) country and operating in another; as Kerlin (2006) describes, they
operate in their various sub-fields but in international contexts, while Southern NGOs
(SNGOs), also referred to as “local NGOs,” are NGOs based in the developing world, with
whom INGOs often form partnerships.

Governments have increasingly relied on NGOs as conduits through which they
wield soft power by dispensing foreign aid to developing countries in recent years, because
of the comparative advantages these organizations are seen to possess. These advantages
include their credibility among local populations and their grassroots level connections
(Evans-Kent and Bleiker 2003, 103), as well as their flexibility and efficiency when
compared to official government agencies (Tvedt 1998; Ahmed and Potter 2006). Because
they can be more flexible, efficient, and trustworthy than government agencies, and because
they pursue a variety of activities, government-funded NGOs are important tools of soft
power that are also particularly relevant in the War on Terror.
After clarifying why NGOs are theoretically and substantively interesting as tools of soft power wielded by the US, I argued that the relationship between NGOs and governments, explored extensively in the NGO literature, also impacts the US government’s strategizing in its ongoing War on Terror. The relationship between the funding government (in this case the US) and NGOs can vary on a spectrum from cooperative to confrontational (Najam 2000), based on the mission, goals, and capabilities of each. A more positive relationship between the US government and respective NGOs utilized in the War on Terror can help explain the continued partnership between the two actors, and vice versa. Thus the mission and capabilities of the NGOs themselves is the final piece of the puzzle, helping to explain variation in the specifics of the US government’s implementation of a soft or combined power strategy that relies on NGOs. In presenting my theory, I have also pointed out that these independent variables—the threat level, the political and economic context of the target country, and the preferences and capabilities of NGOs themselves—not only interact with one another, but can also vary over time, accounting for the complex outcome that has been US counter-terrorism strategy since the 9/11 attacks.

**Summary of Findings**

This dissertation has not been just a conceptual exercise—i.e., coming up with a logically convincing theory—but also an empirical one, in which I tested my theory in both an overview of the entire War on Terror, as well as more specific case studies of how the War on Terror has played out in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Through the empirical chapters of this dissertation, I found broad support for all six hypotheses presented in Chapter III, although the clearest evidence was for Hypotheses 1 and 2.

*Hypothesis 1: The US executive is more likely to rely on hard power tools, i.e., military power, rather than soft power tools, in addressing short-term, immediate, existing terrorist threats.*
As explained in Chapter IV, the chapter applying my theory to a big-picture examination of the War on Terror, the US executive has clearly made decisions to use hard power against what was deemed to be an immediate, short-term terrorist or security threat against the United States. The US executive at the time, President G. W. Bush and his advisors, chose to use hard power against the actors it held responsible for the attacks, and those it deemed posed a short-term security or terrorist threat, i.e., the Taliban government in Afghanistan. This explains the US military offensive in Afghanistan that began less than a month after the 9/11 terror attacks against the United States. Furthermore, the 2003 US war in Iraq, as controversial as it was and continues to be, also provides strong evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. The evidence from government documents and memoirs of President G. W. Bush and his advisors suggest that the decision to go to war there was a response to what they determined was a short-term terrorist or security threat. Saddam Hussein, they determined, was in possession of and planned to use weapons of mass destruction. The fact that the intelligence leading to this conclusion was faulty at best does not change the logic of the decision-making process of the US executive at the time, i.e., Iraq poses a short-term security or terrorist threat against the US, and the US must counter such a threat through the use of hard or military power.

Interestingly, the evidence catalogued in Chapter IV also suggests that the terrorist or security threat level deemed by the US executive to be coming from a particular target country accounts for not only initial decisions to use force against such countries, but also variation in the degree to which the US has used hard power against those countries. Specifically, Hypothesis 1 explains not just the start of the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also what has become known as the military “surges” in both warzones. In Iraq
in 2007, and in Afghanistan first in late 2006 and then more dramatically in 2009 under President Obama, the US dramatically increased troop levels and military offensives because of an increase in the threat levels determined by the US executives to be emanating from both those countries.

Chapter VI, the case study on the War on Terror in Pakistan, provides further evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. The US has indeed used hard power in Pakistan when facing what it deemed was a short-term, immediate terrorist or security threat, and that as the threat level has escalated in recent years, US hard power strategy has also intensified. Interestingly, however, in Pakistan the US was mostly working in conjunction with the Pakistani government in its hard power efforts, until recent years, when the US began to act alone militarily against targets within Pakistan. US hard power in Pakistan began in partnerships with the government there, after President Musharraf pledged himself an ally of the US in its War on Terror. By the time President Obama took office, however, the US began to see the Pakistani government as either unable or unwilling to take adequate, effective action against terrorists within its borders, effectively resulting in what the US saw as an increasing terrorist or security threat coming from Pakistan. Thus, President Obama’s AFPAK strategy, announced in early 2009, re-classified Pakistan as a target country on par with Afghanistan itself, and since then the US has intensified military efforts, including controversial drone attacks, often conducted without the knowledge or approval of the Pakistani government, against targets within Pakistan’s borders. Such operations included the assassination of Osama bin Laden in 2011.

_Hypothesis 2: The US executive is more likely to rely on soft power tools, rather than hard power tools, in addressing long-term, potential terrorist threats in an effort to prevent them from escalating into immediate, short-term terrorist threats. In contexts where both a short-term and long-term terrorist threat is determined to exist, the US executive is more likely to rely on a combination of hard and soft power tools, rather than choosing just one of these. The kind of combination that emerges, or its_
proportion of hard to soft power, will depend in part on the combination of the threat; i.e., if the short-term threat is minimal and the long-term threat is extensive, US strategy will rely on more soft power than hard power, and vice versa.

The empirical chapters of this dissertation also provide strong support for Hypothesis 2. In fact, what we might think of as the ultimate expressions of US hard power throughout the course of the War on Terror, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have actually been cases where the US has used combined power. As Chapter IV demonstrates, the US did not rely only on hard power strategy in Afghanistan, dispensing humanitarian aid to the population (a form of soft power), based on the executive’s determination that along with the immediate, short-term terrorist or security threat, Afghanistan also posed a long-term, potential terrorist or security threat against the US. Furthermore, as discussed in the findings pertaining to Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2 also accounts for increases in the degree of soft power (in combination with hard power, in the case of the war in Afghanistan) used. The role of the US military itself there changed, from an actor or institution engaged just in hard power to one that has increasingly adopted elements of soft power to make it a force of combined power in US strategy, through things like Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). This increase in the use of soft power was another component of Obama’s AFPAK strategy, based on the acknowledgement that Afghanistan presented an increasingly combined terrorist or security threat to the US and must therefore be the target of combined US power,

The US war in Iraq also provides support for Hypothesis 2, as demonstrated in Chapter IV. While the US initially went to war in Iraq as a response to what it deemed was an immediate threat from Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, the picture grew more complicated after the initiation of military operations there. Soon after the war in Iraq began, the US executive decided to pursue reconstruction, development, and eventually, political reform or democratization in efforts to stabilize the country and prevent further
security or terrorist threats from developing. In other words, US soft power in Iraq, which was increasingly used in combination with hard power, was wielded to counteract long-term or potential security or terrorist threats from the country.

As predicted by Hypothesis 2, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (the latter in which major US combat operations ended last year) remain primarily military operations, despite the combined power deployed there. However, the National Security Strategies, as well as the Strategies for Combating Terrorism, repeatedly state the White House's intention to use forms of soft power, including promoting economic development and working with civil society groups and non-governmental organizations, to stabilize vulnerable countries and try to eliminate political and economic grievances in target countries. In other words, the US has since the early days of the War on Terror pursued a strategy of using soft power, sometimes in combination with hard power as in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but at other times on its own, to counteract long-term terrorist or security threats. Updated versions of the Strategies in 2006 demonstrate a shift towards using more soft power, particularly in the Middle East, and specifically to promote democratic reform through Bush's so-called Freedom Agenda. The 2010 National Security Strategy, released under President Obama, also more clearly emphasized US diplomacy, engagement, and statecraft, in what may be considered not a major substantive shift towards more soft power but perhaps more nuance in the US expression of soft power around the world.

Finally, Chapter VI shows that the US has used soft power in Pakistan from the early days of the War on Terror, in what appear to be efforts to counteract what it saw as a potential long-term terrorist or security threat. Since the early months and years of the War on Terror, there has been an intensification of soft power efforts, which at some point
became part of combined power efforts, when Pakistan has been faced with things like natural disasters or refugee crises.

_Hypothesis 3: Where a long-term or combined terrorist threat is determined by the US executive to exist, the socio-economic and political needs of that country’s population will shape the kind of soft power tools the US uses, including the types of NGOs it funds. For example, the US government is likely to fund economic development programs in a country with high levels of poverty, and likely to fund literacy programs in a country with low literacy rates, etc._

Chapters V and VI, the case studies of Afghanistan and Pakistan, provide support for Hypothesis 3. As Chapter V indicates, Afghanistan is a very poor country plagued by a variety of urgent socio-economic and political problems, including very high unemployment, very limited access to healthcare among the population, very strong local or ethnic ties but a weak national identity, corruption, the dominance of the opium trade in the agricultural sector, and a lack of education, particularly among females. Soft power spending by the US government agency USAID (the United States Agency for International Development), an important measurement of US soft power spending in the country that is also often outsourced to NGOs, provides significant support for Hypothesis 3. USAID spending has focused on sectors such as economic development, power, healthcare, education, and governance. Unlike what would be predicted by Hypothesis 3, though, there is less of a focus, at least by USAID, on combating poppy or opium production, although spending on the agriculture sector partly addresses this challenge.

More specifically and more to the point in this project examining US government funding of NGOs as a form of soft power, the work of US government-funded INGO work in Afghanistan has focused on the sectors of agriculture, education and training, women's programs, healthcare, local governance, food security, community infrastructure, water and sanitation, emergency intervention, and working with refugees. Broadly speaking, these
sectors align with the most urgent socio-political and economic needs of Afghanistan, outlined earlier in Chapter V.

Chapter VI, which provides a detailed look at how the War on Terror has played out in Pakistan, also demonstrates general support for Hypothesis 3. Pakistan is also a poor, developing country (although not as poor as Afghanistan), beset by problems including low adult literacy, particularly among females, limited access to electricity and healthcare, shortages of clean water, a corrupt and fractionalized political system with a very dominant military, frequent natural disasters, and negative public attitudes towards the US (the latter being a problem for the US, but not necessarily for the Pakistanis). As would be generally predicted by these extensive needs, a breakdown of international aid to Pakistan (including from the US) has focused on the sectors of infrastructure and social welfare services, energy, transportation, education, health and nutrition, agriculture and livestock, rural development, governance, gender and women’s development, and crisis prevention/disaster reduction and environment/natural resources.

More importantly, Chapter VI demonstrates that USAID spending in Pakistan has included spending on infrastructure, education, and healthcare, as well as increasing and improving access to energy, promoting gender equity and good governance, and providing emergency or disaster relief. As mentioned earlier, much of this USAID spending is outsourced to NGOs, although the agency does not provide the relevant figures. More significantly, then, an examination of the work of US government-funded INGOs in Pakistan (who, like in Afghanistan, often work with local NGOs) reflects a commitment to a broad range of socio-economic and political needs in the country, providing broad support for Hypothesis 3. The US government has funded INGOs working in the sectors of food security, healthcare, education, water sanitation, and emergency response in Pakistan, the
latter particularly after the disastrous earthquake in 2005 and the extensive floods in 2010. However, we do not see as much of a focus on INGO work in the areas of political reform or building civil society as might be predicted by Hypothesis 3, based on the glaring political needs in Pakistan.

_Hypothesis 4: Where a long-term or combined terrorist threat is determined by the US executive to exist, the US is likely to use more soft power, in the form of funding NGOs, where the government of the target country places fewer limitations on NGO activity, and vice versa._

As Chapter V suggests, the regulatory environment towards NGOs within Afghanistan is generally open, which can help explain the extent and continuity of US funding of NGOs in the country since the start of the War on Terror. However, it is important to note that one trend in Afghanistan has been USAID-funded partnerships between INGOs and government ministries in the country. These kinds of relationships reflect the active role by the US in shaping governance in Afghanistan, which may have had a positive impact on the regulatory environment facing INGOs in the country. Such an open environment in turn probably positively impacted the propensity for the US government to fund NGO projects in Afghanistan, as expected by Hypothesis 4. I did not predict, however, what appears to be this endogenous relationship between the legal or regulatory system, shaped in part by the US in Afghanistan, and US funding of INGOs in that country: it appears the US helped mold the conditions favorable to a society where NGOs are allowed to operate freely, which impacted its funding of NGOs and a reliance on them to carry out development projects there.

Interestingly, however, the interviews with workers from INGOs operating in Afghanistan suggest that sometimes, restrictions that are informal or not codified may impact specific projects carried out by INGOs in the country. The deteriorating security situation, for instance, has increasingly limited the geographic scope of INGOs operating in
Afghanistan. Furthermore, concerns about corruption and financial ties to the Taliban have in some cases resulted in the US government deciding not to fund specific INGO projects in the country. Thus, the results here go beyond the predictions of Hypothesis 4: some factors in the environment of a target country, such as the security situation or the prevalence of corruption, may not be written into laws governing NGO activity but may still restrict the activities of INGOs or the propensity of the US government to fund them. Furthermore, the evidence from Chapter V indicates that the US government may forego funding particular INGO projects, rather than eliminating an entire partnership with a particular INGO, based on such factors.

Chapter VI on Pakistan provides less definitive evidence in support of Hypothesis 4. This case study shows that unlike in Afghanistan, there is no possibly endogenous relationship between the regulatory environment (which in Afghanistan was influenced by the US itself) and the US government funding of NGOs in the country, since the US has not shaped Pakistani public policy in the way it did in Afghanistan. Just as corruption and nepotism may serve as unofficial restrictions on NGO activities in Afghanistan, it appears that cultural attitudes and suspicion of foreigners may act as unofficial restrictions on NGO activities in an otherwise NGO-friendly regulatory environment in Pakistan, as suggested by recently proposed amendments to the NGO law there.

In the aftermath of the US raid in Abbottabad that killed Osama bin Laden, some INGOs have seen restrictions on the travel of their workers and on the dispensation of any aid material they have brought into the country. Here are cases that exhibit an increasingly restrictive environment for INGOs in Pakistan, despite the fact that officially, the NGO regulatory environment still does not codify prohibitions on the travel of INGO employees, or sanction the government holding of their supplies. Hypothesis 4 would predict that such a tightening operating environment for INGOs might lead the US to limit or at least be more
careful about funding such organizations who work in Pakistan, but there is no evidence of that yet. However, the expansion of the USAID Inspector General’s Office in Pakistan in order to deal with the problem of corruption in aid delivery reflects an adaptive strategy by the US government to deal with another unofficial problem impacting the work of INGOs in the country, lending some support to Hypothesis 4. The interview data from a US government-funded INGO operating in Pakistan provides limited support, if any, for Hypothesis 4. Despite what appears to be an increasingly restrictive regulatory environment, at least unofficially, for INGOs within Pakistan, in the form of denying visas to INGO workers and restricting their movement, the US government appears to continue its funding patterns based on the officially open regulatory environment within the country.

Hypothesis 5: The US government (through various agencies, such as USAID) is likely to utilize a specific NGO as part of its soft power approach to fighting a long-term terrorist threat when the preferences of the NGO align with those of the government, i.e., when the NGO does not find a conflict between its own mission and the projects for which the US funds it.

Hypothesis 6: The US government (specifically the funding agency, such as USAID) is more likely to continue to utilize a specific NGO in the fight against a long-term terrorist threat if the relationship between them has been more cooperative and less confrontational. The US government is less likely to continue to utilize a specific NGO in its fight against a long-term terrorist threat (i.e., “non-engagement”) if the relationship between them has been more confrontational and less cooperative.

Chapter V, the case study on Afghanistan, shows support for both Hypotheses 5 and 6 but not for NGOs per se; rather, the evidence suggests that the US government is more likely to fund specific NGO/INGO projects and continue such projects when the preferences or mission of the NGO in question do not conflict with those of the US, and when the relationship between the two actors has been more positive (more cooperative and less confrontational). Furthermore, the evidence from the original interviews with the two INGOs working in Afghanistan suggests that INGOs themselves will only go after project funding when they see a specific project as being in line with their own mission and values,
and will neglect to pursue US government funding in cases where the project in question does not fit in with their goals or mission. The empirical reality is more nuanced than Hypothesis 5 and 6 predicted, although the general direction of the prediction holds: an organization like INGO A will not go after funding for projects and may resist USAID requirements that go against its mission or values, such as ones involving engagement with PRTs, but this does not mean that an INGO will seek to end its overall partnership with USAID. So while Hypotheses 5 and 6 focused on the US government’s role in choosing to fund and/or continue funding a specific INGO, the case studies suggest that the INGOs themselves have just as important a role in deciding to pursue or continue a partnership with the US government, as it relates to specific projects. It appears, however, that just because an INGO chooses not to seek funding for a particular USAID project which it sees as compromising its mission of serving the needy regardless of their political affiliation, for instance, it may still seek funding for different USAID projects in the future.

As pertains to Hypothesis 6, the evidence from Chapter V also suggests a more nuanced reality than was predicted. As the data from the interviews demonstrates, the US government may seek to end the funding of a particular INGO project without going so far as to end the entire partnership with the INGO itself. The continuing negotiations between USAID and INGO A reflect an eagerness on the part of both actors to continue the partnership between INGO A and USAID, specific projects notwithstanding. Such an empirical reality was certainly not predicted by Hypothesis 6.

Finally, the evidence from Chapter VI, the case study of Pakistan in the War on Terror, does not generate findings nearly as interesting as in the Afghanistan case study. Evidence from the interviews with INGO B suggests there was much less conflict between the mission of the INGOs and the US government funding agencies even for specific projects, perhaps because Pakistan is a context where the US is not conducting a full-fledged war and
utilizing its entire hard power arsenal. For the most part, then, we did not see instances in Pakistan where the two actors failed to cooperate, even just for specific projects. The situation surrounding the US raid on Osama bin Laden, however, presents an example of INGOs declaring their disapproval with the approach of the US government, particularly the CIA, at least on paper. Even in that situation, the evidence does not extend so far as to suggest that INGOs have subsequently refused to receive funding from the US government. Thus the results from Chapter VI indicate some support for Hypotheses 5 and 6, as the US government does appear likely to fund INGOs with a common mission and goals and to continue its relationship with them if the experience between the two actors has been positive or cooperative. However, even when the two appear at odds, as in the case of the INGOs after the bin Laden raid, I found no evidence that partnerships between the two actors were terminated, even on specific projects.

Implications of the Research Findings

This dissertation set out to do three things: 1) re-conceptualize Nye’s soft power framework as a consciously-utilized strategy employing methods other than hard power, aimed at target countries to enhance US interests, 2) theorize about the conditions under which the US is likely to use hard, soft, and combined power in the specific context of the War on Terror, and 3) test this revised theory through empirical examinations of the War on Terror in general, but also through case studies of the US War on Terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Given these broad objectives, this study has important implications for research on soft power, on counter-terrorism strategies, and on studies of US foreign policy decision-making in general.

First, this research project has demonstrated the limitations of Nye’s notions of soft power. While it may be tempting to simply prescribe that the US should not rely so much on
hard power and should use more soft power in its dealings with the governments and publics of other nations, any academic or theoretical discussions must go beyond that. Furthermore, Nye’s concept of soft power itself is rather ambiguous and vague, and his work does not sufficiently clarify who uses soft power, when, and how. Thus the early portion of this dissertation made clear that in order for the concept of soft power to be useful either theoretically or substantively, Nye’s work must be improved upon significantly.

Second, the theoretical portion of this dissertation reflects a belief that despite the limitations of Nye’s work, the concept of soft power remains worth exploring both theoretically and substantively. Thus, I presented a more rigorous theory of the conditions under which the US executive is likely to use soft, hard, or combined power in a specific context, the War on Terror. The theory section highlighted the necessity of examining various factors to help explain the complex, varied outcome that has been US counter-terrorism strategy in the last eleven years. In order to account for temporal and geographic variation in US strategy, we must examine the threat level seen by the US executive to come from a particular country, the socio-economic and political context of said country, and the mission and capabilities of the soft power actor involved, in this case the NGOs themselves. Furthermore, the theory presented in this dissertation demonstrated both the theoretical and substantive significance of studying NGOs as a particular form of soft power, bringing what has generally been the domain of the public policy literature into the realm of international relations and US foreign policy research.

Third, the empirical findings of this dissertation suggest that indeed, the US executive is more likely to use hard power against what he and his advisors see as a short-term, immediate terrorist threat. Alternatively, the US executive appears more likely to use
soft power against what is deemed a longer-term, potential terrorist threat, and combined power, whose proportions of hard and soft power will vary, against a combined threat. Most interestingly, perhaps, it appears that the US use of hard power in a particular context in fact necessitates the simultaneous or future use of soft power, as evidenced by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and even the Pakistani case. Furthermore, the empirical evidence, particularly from the case studies on Afghanistan and Pakistan, suggests that the US government will likely fund NGO projects based on the socio-economic and political needs of the target country, although the record also demonstrates that the two will not match up perfectly.

The regulatory environment surrounding NGOs in the target country can also impact US funding of NGO projects, although perhaps not to the degree to which was predicted by the hypotheses. Additionally, other less codified factors can restrict NGO activities and possibly the US funding of such NGOs; these limitations include problems such as corruption or a deteriorating security environment. Finally, the evidence from the case studies suggests the importance of an alignment between the mission of a particular NGO that can be potentially funded by a US government agency, although this factor appears more relevant for particular projects rather than the entire relationship between an NGO or INGO and the US government agencies. Furthermore, the role of NGOs themselves in the relationship between them and the US government agencies that may fund them appears very pronounced, and as important to acknowledge and study as the role of the US government agency itself.

**Future Research**

While this dissertation has made significant inroads in the literature on US counter-terrorism strategy and the use of soft power specifically, there remains a great deal of
potential for future research in this area. First, this study has examined one specific form of soft power, US government funding of NGOs that work in target countries. Future research can explore the US government’s wielding of other forms of soft power, such as funding various media outlets and programs, the rhetoric of US foreign policy leaders, foreign exchange programs between the US and other countries, etc. Studying such alternative forms of US soft power should not change the basic theoretical framework put in place in this project, as it relates to the use of soft power against long-term or potential terrorist or security threats and the socio-economic and political context of the target country, but it will probably also require further theorizing about factors specific to different forms of soft power.

Contexts other than the US War on Terror also present important avenues for future research on the subject. Under what conditions will the US executive decide to use soft or combined power in situations outside the global War on Terror (or War against al-Qaeda, as the Obama administration has renamed it)? For instance, what explains the variation in the use of US hard, soft, and combined power in addressing the complexities and challenges posed by the ongoing Arab Spring? Alternatively, what explains the use of US soft power targeted at other nations during peacetime? Does the US use soft power in targeting its allies or friends, or is US soft power always directed at countries who may be potentially hostile to the United States?

Methodologically speaking, a great deal of work remains to be done on the topic of the use of soft, hard, and combined power as well. As explained in Chapter III, this dissertation has used qualitative methods to empirically support what has essentially been a theory-building exercise. Now that there is a theory in place that has identified the key independent variables that account for the variation in the outcome of US counter-terrorism strategy, attempts to test this theory with more empirical rigor can commence. The theory
can be tested with a larger $n$, through more case studies from the region, as well as through alternative methods, such as experimentation. Additionally, attempts to operationalize the variables in ways that lend themselves to mixed-method or some sort of quantitative testing can also be tried. For instance, more quantitative measures of the threat levels seen by the US executives to be emanating from various countries. Furthermore, more uniform measures of the socio-economic and political contexts of target countries can also be examined (along with increasing the $n$) of the countries under study. Also, increasing the $n$ of INGOs studied and interviews conducted, even for the country cases of Afghanistan and Pakistan themselves, would increase the reliability of the research findings. With regards to the case studies, interviews with USAID officials or country program officers would be an additional way to measure US government strategy, helping to further test my theory. Are USAID officials consciously responding to particular threats when funding and implementing NGO programs in particular countries, or are their decisions to carry out particular projects more a function of budget constraints, an alternative explanation to the kinds and degree of soft power used?

Finally, while I made what I consider a strong case in Chapter III against taking into account domestic factors in accounting for variation in the US government’s use of soft, hard, and combined power in the War on Terror, such factors may still be theoretically and substantively important. Even though the president and his advisors are the primary movers and decision-makers in US foreign policy, some members of Congress may still play a role in outlining the specifics of hard, soft, or combined power strategies. Interview data from Chapter V also suggests that the state of the US economy and the budget deficit may also impact US government funding of INGOs or the USAID budget in general. Future research can address such factors and determine the degree to which they explain US strategy in the War on Terror.
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