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# Ideology Versus Clientelism: Modernization and Electoral Competition in Brazil

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IDEOLOGY VERSUS CLIENTELISM:  
MODERNIZATION AND ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN BRAZIL

by

Cássio da Silva Muniz

A Dissertation Submitted in  
Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of

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at

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August 2015

## ABSTRACT

### IDEOLOGY VERSUS CLIENTELISM: MODERNIZATION AND ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN BRAZIL

by

Cássio da Silva Muniz

The University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, 2015  
Under the Supervision of Professor Natasha Borges Sugiyama

This study investigates how parties utilize the political dimensions of ideology (left-right) and clientelism (programmatic-patronage) to compete electorally in developing democracies. It proposes a combined utility theory, which suggests polarized competitive elections in modernizing national electoral markets compel programmatic parties to coalesce with clientelistic parties to gain access to regional private electoral markets. Methodologically, this study draws on a mixed-method approach focusing on Brazil as a crucial test case. It applies spatial voting models to assess the validity of ideological competition as well as geospatial voting distribution based on clustering and dispersion to devise a new quantitative measurement of clientelism based on subnational electoral market characteristics. Field research helps uncover how political elites form strategically combined ideological and clientelistic party coalitions to increase electoral success. The analysis suggests ideology and clientelism operate as independent factors explaining political linkages in developing democracies. The interaction of these dimensions through electoral coalitions, however, indicates the weakening of ideology over time and lack of discernible pattern on the clientelistic level. This study contributes to the literature by investigating party competition on the

ideological and clientelistic levels. It also contributes to the analytical and methodological refinement of the concept of clientelism as a systematic political linkage.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACM	Antônio Carlos Magalhães
ARENA	Aliança Renovadora Nacional, National Renewal Alliance
BF	Bolsa Família, Conditional Cash Transfer Program
DEM	Democratas, Democrats
DV	Dependent Variable
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HI	Herfindahl Index
IBGE	Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatísticas, Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
IPEA	Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, Institute of Applied Economic Research
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
PAN	Partido dos Aposentados da Nação, National Party of Retirees
PCB	Partido Comunista Brasileiro, Brazilian Communist Party
PC do B	Partido Comunista do Brasil, Communist Party of Brazil
PCO	Partido da Causa Operária, Workers' Cause Party
PDT	Partido Democrático Trabalhista, Democratic Labour Party
PFL	Partido da Frente Liberal, Liberal Front Party
PGT	Partido Geral dos Trabalhadores, General Workers' Party
PHS	Partido Humanista da Solidariedade, Humanist Party of Solidarity
PMDB	Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, Brazilian Democratic Movement Party
PMN	Partido da Mobilização Nacional, Party of National Mobilization
PP	Partido Progressista, Progressive Party
PPL	Partido Pátria Livre, Free Homeland Party
PPS	Partido Popular Socialista, Socialist People's Party
PR	Partido Da República, Party of the Republic
PRB	Partido Republicano Brasileiro, Brazilian Republican Party
PRP	Partido Republicano Progressista, Progressive Republican Party
PRTB	Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro, Brazilian Labour Renewal Party
PSB	Partido Socialista Brasileiro, Brazilian Socialist Party
PSC	Partido Social Cristão, Christian Social Party
PSD	Partido Social Democrático, Social Democratic Party
PSDB	Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, Brazilian Social Democracy Party
PSDC	Partido Social Democrata Cristão, Christian Social Democratic Party
PSL	Partido Social Liberal, Social Liberal Party
PSOL	Partido Socialismo e Liberdade, Socialism and Freedom Party
PSTU	Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado, Unified Socialist Workers' Party

PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores, Workers' Party
PTB	Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, Brazilian Labour Party
PTC	Partido Trabalhista Cristão, Christian Labour Party
PT do B	Partido Trabalhista do Brasil, Labour Party of Brazil
PTN	Partido Trabalhista Nacional, National Labour Party
PV	Partido Verde, Green Party
STF	Supremo Tribunal Federal, Supreme Court (Brazil)
TSE	Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Superior Electoral Tribunal
UDN	União Democrática Ruralista, Rural Democratic Union

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challenging me to succeed, and methodically reading my work. Of course, all responsibilities for the mistakes are mine.

## CHAPTER 1

### **Introduction: A Combined Utility Theory of Political Linkage**

How can political parties simultaneously compete in ideological and clientelistic electoral markets? The demand side perspective of political competition suggests that public electoral markets require programmatic parties, while private electoral markets call for clientelistic parties (Desposato 2001). However, variation among and within political systems shows that ideology and clientelism are encompassing features of both developed and developing societies (Kitschelt 2000, Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002), which indicates that parties necessitate strategies to overcome this seemingly ambiguous situation in order to win national-wide competitive elections.

In this respect, developing democracies have experienced the advancements of programmatic parties (Hagopian, Gervasoni, and Moraes 2009, Rosas 2005) although that does not preclude the existence of their clientelistic counterparts (Montero 2010). The puzzle is: how can these antagonistic forces coexist in the same political system? The case of Brazil is an interesting example of this development. Since 1994, two programmatic parties (Workers' Party – PT and Brazilian Social Democratic Party – PSDB) have polarized national elections and leftist parties have made inroads in traditional clientelistic bastions once held by the now called Democrats – DEM (formerly Liberal Front Party – PFL). Yet, these clientelistic parties remain as active regional political forces and partners of more programmatic parties nationally.

At the subnational level, two states stand out as intriguing, Bahia and Rio Grande do Norte, for having undergone shifts in the pattern of political competition once dominated by traditional parties on the right. The incursion of the left in Rio Grande do Norte started earlier in 2002 and lasted two consecutive terms until the right regained power in 2010, which they have held since. In Bahia, on the other hand, the left only gained power in 2006 and was re-elected in 2010 and 2014. These two states are representative of a wave that brought to power more programmatic, mostly leftist, parties in a region that has historically been characterized by the dominance of oligarchic groups linked to clientelistic parties, usually on the right of the political spectrum (Montero 2010, Herrmann 2014). Since 1988, virtually all states in this region have had more programmatic parties replacing clientelistic ones. For instance in Maranhão, the PDT won the 2006 election beating the Sarney machine for the first time since 1960. However, this election was later judicially overturned on the basis of political power abuse (Callucci 2009, April 1). In other examples, the PT won in Piauí in 2002 and Sergipe in 2006; PSB won in Alagoas in 1998 and in Pernambuco in 2006, both replacing the PMDB; PSB also won in Ceará this same year defeating PSDB;<sup>1</sup> and finally, PSDB won in Paraíba in 2006 replacing the PMDB.

Scholars of Brazilian politics are divided between those who claim that clientelism has declined as a consequence of systemic change (Borges 2011, Hagopian et. al. 2009, Hunter and Power 2007) or institutional factors (Borges

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<sup>1</sup> Ceará is an interesting case because PSDB has governed the state since 1987 and PSB won with the support of one of the main PSDB leader, Tasso Jereissati.



2011), and those who suggest that clientelism is still a very encompassing element in politics (Avelino Filho 1994) and rightist parties, in particular (Montero 2010). Hunter and Power (2007), for instance, credit the success of the incumbent president Lula in the 2006 election to systemic changes in the Brazilian environment based on three interrelated explanations. Complementarily, Borges (2011) looks into the interaction between presidential and state elections to explain the decay of the local political bosses and, for that matter, the emergence of leftist governors in the least developed states. By the same token, Hagopian et al. (2009) claim that structural changes in Brazil have forced parties to switch their electoral strategies from patronage to programmatic linkages.

Conversely, Montero (2010) refutes the systemic approach by arguing that leftist victories in the Northeast are a consequence of localized strategies of party-building and state-level elite alliance-formation. In this sense, Montero (2010) claims that governors can still take advantage of the extant clientelistic network.

Research to date, however, does not explain how parties strategically operate on a two-dimensional political spectrum when competing electorally. Rather, ideology and clientelism are confounded in a one-dimensional political linkage. This dissertation aims to integrate the two levels of political competition. It does so by treating ideology and clientelism as two interdependent forces interacting through electoral coalitions among parties in the process of shaping electoral competition.

Moreover, the extant literature on electoral coalitions deals with cabinet formation under parliamentarism (Martin and Stevenson 2001); presidentialism

(Amorim Neto 2002, 2006, Cheibub 2002, Geddes 1994); comparative studies of presidential and parliamentary regimes (Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004); and electoral coalitions under presidentialism in developed countries (Golder 2005) in the Americas (Amorim Neto 2006), and in Brazil (Amorim Neto 2002, Machado 2009, Mignozzetti, Galdino, and Bernabel 2011, Nicolau 1996). The theoretically-derived hypotheses are drawn from considerations about size, ideology, and institutional incentives and constraints (Martin and Stevenson 2001). However, clientelism is not included as an independent explanatory variable leading to coalition formation. I argue that political parties coordinate their access to public and private electoral markets by forming electoral coalitions that allow them to garner votes in clientelistic markets while preserving their ideological party brand. This mechanism is described below by the combined utility theory of political linkage.

Formal democratic institutions have been the focus of comparative research following the most recent wave of democratic transitions. This institutionalist approach, however, is limited to the extent that socio-economic factors and elites' strategic operation also contribute to changes in patterns of electoral competition. The recent rise of more programmatic parties in developing countries indicates important shifts in national voting patterns and has reignited a longstanding debate between the emergence of the ideological coherence of parties and the electorate versus the persistence of clientelistic relations. The objective of this dissertation is to investigate changes in party competition in developing democracies based on the political dimensions of ideology (left-right) and

clientelism (programmatic-patronage). I define traditional political linkages as those where electors exchange votes for individual material benefit (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007) and use Brazil as a case study.

Previous studies tend to consider ideology and clientelism as constituting two dimensions at opposite poles (e.g. Epstein 2009, Hagopian et. al. 2009, Montero 2010), suggesting that the expansion of one dimension determines the suppression of the other. This approach however does not explain why more programmatic parties appear to advance in clientelistic or private electoral markets. To what extent do inroads by programmatic parties reflect an advance against clientelistic bastions, in their own right? Or do programmatic parties now utilize clientelism to advance electorally? This research investigates whether shifts in the pattern of political competition result from structural changes in the electoral market (e.g. modernization), elite strategies, or perhaps a combination of both. In other words, has modernization changed the pattern of electoral competition or is patronage still pervasive in Brazil? This project adjudicates between those two views of electoral competition by developing a theoretical framework that allows for the concomitant test of both ideological and clientelistic strategies.

The dissertation develops and tests a combined utility theory, which proposes that polarized competitive elections in modernizing national electoral markets compel programmatic parties to coalesce with clientelistic parties to gain access to regional private electoral markets. Socio-economic changes that bring about modernization create a public electoral market, which demands

programmatic-oriented representation where patterns of political competition are based on ideological linkages. However, uneven social-economic change can perpetuate private electoral markets, which demands patronage-oriented representation based on patterns of political competition derived by clientelism.

The implication of this theory is that programmatic parties will compete mainly in public markets, whereas clientelistic parties will compete mainly in private markets. The relative size of each market determines the dominant pattern of political competition. If the public market is larger than the private one, then programmatic parties will polarize electoral competition. Conversely, if the private market is larger than the public one, then clientelistic parties will polarize electoral competitions. This further implies that successful patterns of electoral competition in polarized competitive democratic systems will result from a party's ability to recruit additional votes from the dimension on which it is weaker.

Thus if the electoral market is predominantly public, programmatic parties will try to recruit additional votes in the private electoral market. Since programmatically dominant parties that engage in a direct clientelistic strategy risk alienating ideological voters, they will develop strategic electoral coalitions with clientelistic parties as an indirect strategy to increase their vote share. In exchange, clientelistic parties are provided access to resources, which can preserve their existence as the weaker broker. The combined utility theory which considers structural changes (modernization) and elites' strategic use of both formal (coalition) and informal (personal vote) institutions could explain why

programmatic parties are advancing in areas once considered party machine domains.

This dissertation contributes to the literature on party systems and clientelism in developing democracies. Political parties are essential components of democratic regimes: they organize participation, by creating shortcuts to information according to policy preferences, and structure inclusion, by mediating those preferences and turning them into policy outcomes. Political parties regularize democratic practices: they establish the “rules of the game,” making it possible to transform political conflict in policy outcomes. This research also helps fill the gap in current scholarship by integrating the dimension of clientelism and ideology as an elite-centered strategic approach. The advantage of this approach is that elites tend adapt to existing conditions to achieve an optimum outcome. When faced with structural changes and constrained by formal institutional rules, elites will use informal institutions to advance their interests, i.e., gaining and maintaining office. In this sense, patterns of political party competition should result from the interaction of economic development, formal rules, and societal characteristics.

Unequal cross-national economic development has historically linked parties to constituents according to developmental levels in specific regions (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Nyblade and Reed 2008, Piattoni 2001); programmatic parties tend to thrive in more developed regions, while party machines fare better in bailiwicks (Desposato 2001). In order to explain patterns of political competition, programmatic parties are defined electorally as those whose votes are mainly prospected from public goods markets in which the electorate is


more sensitive to ideological appeals. Clientelistic parties are defined by their ability to prospect their votes from markets in which voters prefer private goods and, therefore, are less sensitive to ideological appeals. This definition underscores the electoral dimension of party behavior in contrast to understanding programmatic parties by their legislative performance. One implication of voters' preferences for private or public goods is that politicians have incentives either to cultivate personal votes through clientelistic linkages or to engender party labels through ideological appeals. Similarly, an implication of changing utility theory is that structural changes make discretionary resources scarce, creating incentives for programmatic politics. Neither approach explains why programmatic parties have been able to score significant victories in less developed areas of Brazil typically associated with private goods markets.

Methodologically, this dissertation builds on well-established literature on mixed-method approaches by combining subnational quantitative and comparative case study analyses to test the combined utility theory on political linkages strategies adopted by political parties in developing democracies that rely on both ideological and clientelistic relations to compete in elections.

Brazil represents a crucial test case for this theory (Eckstein 1975, George and Bennett 2005, Gerring 2007). The country has historically had unbalanced socio-economic development among the different sub-regions and has had both programmatic and clientelistic parties (see figure 1.1). At the national level, two programmatic parties have polarized elections since 1994 that have shaped political competition at the subnational level. For instance, Brazil has experienced a shift in

electoral competition that has undermined oligarchic forces across the country. Particularly notable are the decline of regional political bosses and the growth of programmatic parties across the political spectrum, including in the less developed Northeast region that will be the particular focus of this cross-regional analysis.

Figure 1. 1: Dimensions of Political Competition



The quantitative analysis aims to test the validity of the argument of ideological (Chapter 2) and clientelistic (Chapter 3) political linkages, looking at each independently as well as looking at their interactions by means of coalitions (Chapter 4). In Chapter 2, I use an existing measure of party ideological placement

to test party differentiation based on spatial distribution. In Chapter 3, I devise and test the validity of a new quantitative measure of clientelism, based on geographic distribution of votes depicting electoral market characteristics. This measure is the result of sophisticated computational iterations that run for months at a time.<sup>2</sup> This approach also contributes to the analytical and methodological refinement of the concept of clientelism as a systematic political linkage, which has remained elusive to measurement in spite of its broad application in the fields of anthropology, sociology, education, public policy, and political science. In chapter 4 I test the effect of both ideology and clientelism on coalition formation.

Field research in Brazil's Northeast helps uncover the ways in which parties and political elites form strategic coalitions with both ideology and clientelism in mind, in order to increase their electoral resources. For instance, the case studies considered in this project (Chapter 5) highlight transitions from dominant political machines to more programmatic party leadership. In the state of Bahia, Antônio Carlos Magalhães (ACM) led a political machine that, with the exception of the 1986 election, dominated politics from when he was appointed its governor in early 1970s by the military regime until 2006 when the Workers' Party won the election outright in the first round. Similarly, in the state of Rio Grande do Norte, the Alves and Maia families' political machines took turns in power until their defeat by the Brazilian Socialist Party in 2002. Case studies contrast with statistical modeling in that they provide: conceptual validity due to the difficulty in measuring some important concepts; development of a new hypothesis due to the open-ended

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<sup>2</sup> I would to thank Dr. David Armstrong for his help with the computational models.



nature of the qualitative question; exploration of causal mechanisms to accommodate the in-depth investigation of contextual factors; and allow for causal complexity (George and Bennett 2005). Moreover, while within case studies control for an array of institutional variables, they still constrain the variance of societal variables that could be captured in cross-national designs (Desposato 2001). However, variations indeed happen within the country and to capture them we resort to a most similar cases approach (Przeworski and Teune 1979).

To preview this dissertation's main findings, the analysis suggests that both ideology and clientelism are relevant independent dimensions of political competition in developing competitive democracies. In this sense, the validity of ideology is confirmed by gubernatorial runoff election models, which predict the migration of party votes between the first and second round of election according to the principle of party ideological proximity. Similarly, the validity of clientelism as a second dimension of political linkage is partially confirmed by the models that 1) measure the clientelistic nature of the political parties based on the geographical dispersion (clientelistic) and clustering (programmatic) of the votes they received and 2) compare it with the nature of the electoral market in terms of the size of the local public sector (the larger, the more clientelistic) as well as the private sector (the larger, the more programmatic). The interaction of these two dimensions through coalitions, however, is more complex. In this sense, the model suggests that ideology appear to be more important a dimension than clientelism. However, it seems that even ideology has become less decisive a factor in determining electoral coalitions over time. This conclusion is supported by qualitative interviews with

party elites. The findings about clientelism are not conclusive as there is no discernible pattern of electoral coalition formation at this level, which indicates that parties form electoral coalitions haphazardly.

This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 evaluates the validity of the general argument that party systems in developing democracies are inchoate and show low ideological distinction as a function of the low level of party identity against the competing argument that parties are becoming more programmatic. I apply the general theory of spatial voting distribution, which assumes that voters choose parties according to ideological proximity, to adjudicate issues related to ideological differentiation. Further, I propose two approaches that draw both on aggregate and individual-level data at the subnational level. The first assesses the ideological distribution of votes between the first and second round in gubernatorial runoff elections. The second adds another level of validity by analyzing individual-level preferences. The analysis clarifies the character of ideological differentiation and declining clientelism in Brazil.

Chapter 3 deals with clientelistic politics as a second level of political competition. To unveil the electoral strategies employed by parties when competing in private electoral marketplaces, this chapter proposes a model of geospatial dominance and dispersion of party votes for the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies by applying the Herfindahl Index, a general measure of market concentration by companies, as a proxy for clientelism and to assess the evolution of competition among parties. Further, I refine this assessment by using geospatial measures of clustering and dispersion of party vote distribution.

Chapter 4 integrates ideology and clientelism to assess the logic of coalition formation. It applies the combined utility theory developed in this study to explain party electoral competition dynamics through oversized ideologically heterogeneous electoral coalitions and, consequently, party development and electoral outcomes in multiparty presidential regimes in developing democracies.

Chapter 5 fleshes out the methodological findings and provides conceptual validity of the study. The analysis draws on case studies of two states in Northeast Brazil, Rio Grande do Norte and Bahia, which have experienced political changes that highlight national shifts in electoral competitions. Rio Grande do Norte had been the political domain of two oligarchies (Maia and Alves), which most often competed against each other but also cooperated with one another to control the state apparatus. Bahia was the bastion of the Antônio Carlos Magalhães (ACM), who more singlehandedly controlled state power. Power shifts that brought more programmatic parties to power in these states justify their selection as case studies.

Chapter 6 concludes by highlighting the independent effects of ideology and clientelism on party competition and the interaction of these two levels by means of electoral coalitions. It also offers suggestions for future research

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **Literature Review**

In this section I discuss previous findings related to the operation of ideology, clientelism, and electoral coalitions on party competition. Aiming to answer the puzzle of how parties strategically and concomitantly access public and private markets in order to win competitive polarized elections in developing democracies, I propose a combined utility theory, which suggests that programmatic parties will form electoral coalitions with clientelistic parties to garner votes in private markets while preserving their ideological brand. In the following paragraphs I review the literature, present the theory, and propose the independent and combined effects of ideology and clientelism on party competition by means of electoral coalitions.

Characteristics of the electoral market determine salient dimensions under which parties will evolve and, as a consequence, define the pattern of party competition. Whether and what type of societal cleavages emerge varies by country and region, including distinctions between the left versus right (e.g. Power and Zucco 2009), secular versus Christian (e.g. Coppedge 1997), xenophobic nationalist-ethnic versus regional separatist (e.g. Horowitz and Browne 2005), and liberal versus conservative (e.g. Huber and Inglehart, 1995). More recent studies on Brazilian politics have considered the difference between programmatic and clientelistic politics as an important element in defining party development (Desposato 2001, Epstein 2009, Hagopian et al. 2009) as well as change in party competition (Montero 2010, Zucco 2008).

One limitation found in much of the literature on electoral markets and partisan strategies is that scholars tend to conflate programmatic parties with left parties and clientelistic parties with right parties. A better understanding of the pattern of party competition requires a conceptual distinction between ideology and programmatic/clientelistic dimensions, as parties may respond strategically to the independent demands imposed by the relative salience of each. In this sense, I will discuss their independent effects and analyze how this interaction explains patterns of political competition in Brazil. I break down this discussion into three sections as follows: the first section deals with ideology, the second discusses clientelism, and the third will consider the concomitant operation of ideology and clientelism in electoral coalition formation.

## **Ideology**

Political parties' brands provide informal short cuts for voters on the policies they represent. Parties differentiate themselves based on the policies they pursue between elections; during the election they hope to be rewarded with votes from constituents who believe in those same policies. Thus, policies link parties and voters conventionally positioned on a left-right political spectrum, which defines the horizontal axis of political competition. Electoral ideological competition, however, suggests a sufficiently differentiated party system. In this sense, it is necessary to understand the extent to which Brazilian parties are distinguished among themselves. This information is crucial in determining this aspect of political competition and, therefore, the ideological distribution of votes among parties.

Ideology is the most significant framework based on which electoral competition takes place. This is so because ideology reduces the informational cost of both parties, which invest resources to publicize their programs, and of voters, who invest time to learn about the parties' programs (Downs 1957). Conversely, personal vote corresponds with a secondary dimension that determines the marginal distribution of votes, conventionally placed on a vertical axis of political competition. This arena of clientelistic competition is the main focus of this study. However, since parties, to a lesser or greater extent, compete in both dimensions it is necessary to understand these axes equally, as these strategies are not isolated from each other but can be complementary.

The literature on ideology mainly offers two competing perspectives that dispute the ideological strength or weakness of the Brazilian party system. These perspectives can be further divided along party- and voter-centered approaches. On one hand, party-centered scholars believe Brazilian parties are ideologically different along the political spectrum and show some degree of ideological coherence (Power and Zucco 2009). Scholars argue that the party system has been increasingly stable and have found reduced electoral volatility (Braga 2006, 2007, Lyne 2005, Santos 2006). Non-leftist parties are also thought to have set down deeper roots in society and have evolved away from clientelistic and largely non-ideological roots (Hagopian et. al. 2009). Conversely, other party-centered studies

contend that Brazil shows a low degree of ideological organization (Rosas 2005)<sup>3</sup> and, more specifically, that Brazilian parties are divided between the Workers' Party versus the rest and that the remaining parties do not show ideological differentiation, which has rendered the system relatively more inchoate (Lucas and Samuels 2010).

The voter-centered literature tends to agree with the latter perspective (i.e. low degree of ideological differentiation). Scholars argue that only leftist voting results from strong ideological commitment (Holzhacker and Balbachovsky 2007) and that the overall system shows high levels of personalism (Almeida 2007, Ames 2001, Kinzo 2005, Mainwaring 1999, Nicolau 2006) and generally low-levels of party sympathy (Almeida 2007, Ames 2001, Ames and Smith 2010, Kinzo 2005, Mainwaring 1999, Mettenheim 1995, Nicolau 2006, Rennó 2000, Rua 1997).

These approaches, nonetheless, focus on either elite or public opinion data based on a unidirectional relationship between voters and parties. In doing so, scholars have not considered the strategic interplay between parties and voters that individual-level data may overlook. For instance, public opinion data generally surveys broad geographic areas and as a result may not account for local effects of party organization (Ames 1994). This study posits that parties matter electorally and their brands bear some strategic value both to the leaders and to the voters. Hence, an understanding of the ideological linkage between party and voters remains crucial to assess party competition in Brazil.

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<sup>3</sup> Rosas' (2005) method to locate the parties ideologically yields odds results that are inconsistent with the literature. Indeed, he admits it and indicates that this discrepancy may be driving the results (p. 837 n. 17)

## **Clientelism**

In contrast to politics that are dominated by ideological differentiation that prevails among well-developed democracies, clientelism is often viewed either as a characteristic of traditional societies or as a political strategy in settings where some level of democratic advancement is observed (Avelino Filho 1994, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Nichter 2010). Often framed as a constitutive element of traditional societies, clientelistic politics is marked by the asymmetric, stable, and directly personal relationship between patron and client (Scott 1972); the party system is constituted by cadre parties and the economic resources used in the exchange are provided privately by the patron (Graziano 1973, Scott 1969).

In contrast, the political strategic component of clientelism is manifest in democratic institutional settings where the symmetric, intermittent, instrumental-rational and broker-mediated exchange relationship prevails (Scott 1969, 1972, Weingrod 1968). The electoral nature of clientelism represents both a passage from a traditional to a transitional and, eventually, developed society (Avelino Filho 1994) and an evolution from the strictly local to a national level of hierarchical political machines (Scott 1968). Thus, electoral clientelism is defined as exchanges of votes from citizens for private goods from politicians (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). The degree to which clientelism is prevalent influences the strategy of a party that can even choose whether or not to adopt clientelism (Kitschelt 2000). Some parties, such as the Argentine Peronist, indeed chose this path by shifting from labor-based to clientelistic politics in order to proceed with economic reforms without alienating the working and lower classes (Levitsky 2003).



Recent studies on Brazilian politics have divided scholars between those who view clientelism as being on the decline or as persisting. Those who view a decline tend to identify systemic programmatic policy (Borges 2011, Hagopian et. al. 2009, Hunter and Power 2007) or institutional constraints (Borges 2011) as reasons for this trend. Others argue that clientelism is still an encompassing element of Brazilian politics, in general, (Avelino Filho 1994) and within rightist parties, in particular (Montero 2010).

Hunter and Power (2007) credit the success of the incumbent president Lula in the 2006 election to systemic changes in the Brazilian environment based on three interrelated explanations: first, an economic retrospective vote based on the positive economic performance that especially benefited the lower classes; second, Lula's coattail effect due to his popularity as a consequence of his social and economic policies; and third, the very effect of his conditional cash transfer program. Complementarily, Borges (2011) looks into the interaction between presidential and state elections to explain the decay of the local political bosses and, for that matter, the emergence of leftist governors in the least developed states. While Hunter and Power (2007) find no correlation between the growth of Lula's vote share in less developed areas and the growth of his own party's vote share for the Chamber of Deputies, Borges (2011) finds a presidential coattail effect on gubernatorial elections, which support the claim of interdependence between national and state elections.

By the same token, Hagopian et al. (2009) claim that structural changes in Brazil have forced parties to switch their electoral strategies from patronage to

programmatic linkages. According to Hagopian and colleagues, economic reforms have limited access to federal and state government discretionary and patronage-based spending thus encouraging politicians to become more party-oriented as a strategy to develop their party brands and organize their electoral competition. Their study innovates methodologically by moving away from the conventional assessment of party behavior based on floor voting records and party switching. They do so by incorporating the basis of the deputies' campaign strategies and attitudes that reflect the empowerment of party leaders to the detriment of their own individual power (Hagopian et. at. 2009).

Among the authors who see the decline of clientelism, there is general agreement that this is occurring while party machines are also on the decline. Where the analysis differs is with respect to why and how this has happened. Hunter and Power (2007) and Borges (2011) approach the problem from the demand side of the electoral market and consider a left-right dimension of interaction between the actors. Hagopian et al. (2009), in turn, approach the problem from the supply side of party development that operates on a programmatic-clientelistic dimension. The electoral demand side appears to offer a better framework to explain the development of parties, as it seems unlikely that parties would unilaterally adopt an evolving strategy that does not reflect the changes in the electoral market itself. On the other hand, the left-right dimension may not be the most appropriate approach to explain competition on clientelistic market, as it would require an assumption that clientelistic politics is determined by party's position on the political spectrum.

Contrary to those who argue clientelism is on the decline, Montero (2010) argues that leftist inroads into the poorest areas of the Northeast, the *grotões*, are the result of localized strategies of party-building and state-level elite alliance-formation. Montero's (2010) rationale is threefold: one, that the federalization of social policies and the corresponding municipalization of its implementation do not prevent governors from cultivating actual clientelistic networks; two, that anyone can claim credit for the success of economic and social policies due to the incapacity of the less educated population to differentiate the source of these policies; and, three, that the systemic explanation fails to indicate why the decline of clientelism would benefit the left at the subnational level. Based on that, Montero (2010) claims that governors can still take advantage of the extant clientelistic network even when the economic and social policies are not intermediated by them.

The problem with Montero's (2010) rationale is that he assumes the electorate is not sophisticated enough to identify the originator of these policies, thus allowing incumbent mayors and governors of any political persuasion to credit-claim their success. In fact, Montero (2010) cites a study conducted in Recife, Pernambuco by Figueiredo and Hidalgo (2009) who indicate that beneficiaries of the *Bolsa Família* link this program to Lula, to whom they show a positive attitude, but they do not extend their support to Lula's co-partisans or party. This seems to contradict his view that the level of differentiation of the less educated voters, who tend to be the target of cash transfer programs, is low. Moreover, focus group interviews conducted in Bahia and Pernambuco suggest that the poor are indeed sophisticated in their knowledge of the origins of social programs; recipients of the

*Bolsa Família* associate this policy to Lula or to the federal government, not local mayors and governors (Sugiyama and Hunter 2013).

Montero (2010) is correct in his observation that systemic modernization explanations fail to indicate the mechanisms through which the decline of clientelism would benefit the leftists at the subnational level, but not for the reasons he indicates. In this sense, his view assumes that competition takes place on a left-right dimension, thus ignoring the potential that all parties can engage in clientelism. If parties' competition is organized on an ideological (left-right) scale, then how are they competing in clientelistic electoral markets? Moreover, Montero (2010) rightly indicates that we should look into party-building and state-level elite alliance-formation to understand the shift in politics in the Northeast. However, the ideological dimension of party formation is insufficient to explain alliance-formation, which also may respond to national hierarchical forces. In fact, this is equivalent to Borges' (2011) institutional approach to the problem, except that he also fails to establish the causal mechanisms that integrate the subnational and national levels of government. In sum, both the systemic and the strategic approaches fall short of integrating the national and state levels of Brazilian politics.

Understanding clientelistic politics is essential to explaining party building strategies and electoral outcomes. It is unlikely that clientelism alone however could account for patterns of all political competition in modernizing societies. In this sense, for Avelino Filho (1994), the understanding of the passage from a clientelistic political system to a more institutionalized one requires moving away from a dichotomous analysis of these two systems to an analysis that is focused on their

points of intersection, i.e. the ability of the patrons to manipulate client's hope for future benefits.

I agree with those premises, but while the mechanisms by which this intersection occurs to form a continuum between clientelistic and universalistic practices is useful to study transformations at the system's level, it is problematic for the understanding of party development and party electoral advancement. The contention resides in the assumption that clientelism perpetuates itself by eliminating competitiveness through its capacity to manipulate citizens' hope for future benefits (Chubb 1981 cited by Avelino Filho 1994). In order to capitalize on future benefits, clientelistic networks have to rely on personal trust between patron and client. However, this kind of relationship is the main characteristic of traditional clientelism as opposed to the more mercantile characteristic of modern clientelism expressed in democratic institutional settings.

Accordingly, democratic electoral competition improves the client's bargain power (Piattoni 2001) by offering options at the clientelistic level as well as providing the client with an exit option (Kitshelt and Wilkinson 2007) by voting along ideological preferences. Thus, it appears that some authors confound practices of the old (relational) and new (electoral) forms of clientelism, which they claim to distinguish.<sup>4</sup> By this token, recent studies on clientelism have helped to advance the literature by explaining how clientelistic politics operate.

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<sup>4</sup> I do not contend that immediate transactions between patron and client are the only way in which the exchange takes place. In fact, this relationship is molded over time; hence, the promise of future benefits must be part of this transaction though it is not the main link between patron and client and it is not determined by one side but is reciprocal (see Kitshelt and Wilkinson 2007: 7, Nichter 2010).

In this view, Nichter (2010) differentiates the strategies associated with clientelism as relational and electoral. By focusing on the latter, he theorizes about the dual commitment problem, which derives from the interaction between elites and clients. Nichter (2009) further distinguishes between prospective and retrospective clientelism. Prospective clientelism is related to the credibility of the promises made by both elites and clients in terms of their likelihood to be fulfilled after the elections, thus the dual commitment problem. Retrospective clientelism, in turn, refers to the credibility of the citizen, but not of the elite, because the citizen has already received the benefit before the elections. This approach is an advance on Avelino Filho's (1994) study, which misses the retrospective aspect of electoral clientelism. On the other hand, Nichter (2009) misses the point that the co-existence of prospective clientelism, with more developed democratic electoral institutions, is only possible under a system of moral control that is proper to the relational kind of clientelism. In other words, those authors appear to overstate the importance of the traditional form of clientelism over the more modern manifestation of this phenomenon. The extent to which promises of future benefit influence behavior implies that the promise itself becomes a private good. For the purpose of this study, it is more important to establish the degree to which clientelism is prevalent than to consider the nuances of the operation of the clientelistic relations.

Furthermore, Nichter (2010) identifies the different types of electoral clientelism (vote buying or turnout buying during the electoral period) and the mechanisms through which it works, but he does not address the payoffs resulting from the adoption of such political strategy. Moreover, by focusing on the strictly

local aspect of clientelism, as does Montero (2010), Nichter fails to explain how national and sub-national politics are linked strategically.

In addition, because the model assumes the existence of only one political machine (Nichter 2010), competition among political machines, which has implications for the relationship between patrons and clients (Caciagli and Belloni 1981), is not considered in his study. There are three important implications of this competition: one is related to the increasing cost of keeping the clientele; the second refers to the unsustainability of the patrons-client relationship, even though this competition is responsible for the change from a strict relational to a state-party hegemonic clientelistic relationship (Caciagli and Belloni 1981); and the third implication of the competition between local bosses is related to the decreasing cost of the central government to enlist the cooperation of local bosses that no longer monopolize the clientelistic relations in a given bailiwick. An opposite problem is present in Borges (2011), who acknowledges the competition among political bosses but does not consider competition at the national level.

A better understanding of the dynamics of political competition requires a theory that can account for party building and the pattern of political competition overall. Thus, it is necessary to consider the integration of different levels (national and state) and dimensions (ideological and clientelistic) in which this competition takes place. It is possible that the integration of these levels and dimensions occurs by means of electoral coalition practices. This approach, for instance, would contribute to the understanding of why some parties sacrificed ideological

principles and historic state interparty disputes to coalesce nationally, and why in some states the national strategy did not supersede local rivalries.

## **Coalitions**

Scholars can integrate analysis of ideological competition alongside clientelistic practices by focusing on the practice of coalition formation. The systematic study of coalitions was originally directed toward the understanding of parliamentary regimes and cumulated with the subsequent expansion of the concept to include presidential regimes. The main objective of these studies is to explain cabinet formation given the constraints and incentives inherent to each one of those government types. Although not completely ignored by the literature (Duverger 1959), until recently little attention had been put on the pre-electoral<sup>5</sup> variant of coalitions, defined as associations of parties with the objective to stand elections. The works dedicated to this subject tend to focus on formal institutions and the size and ideology of the parties, thus missing informal institutions of which clientelistic politics is an important component (e.g. Golder 2006, Martin and Stevenson 2001). The consideration of clientelism as a second dimension operating in the political system could help to explain oversized ideologically heterogeneous electoral coalitions and, consequently, party development and electoral outcomes in multiparty presidential regimes in developing democracies.

Pre-electoral coalitions are thought to be important to the extent that they are utilized, shape policies, are normatively representative (Golder 2005), and

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<sup>5</sup> I use the terms pre-electoral, electoral coalitions, and electoral alliances interchangeably.



structure cabinet formation (Laver 1998, Strom and Muller 2000). These studies have been based on both *a priori* and empirical approaches, which consider the office- or policy-seeking motivational assumptions of the politicians (Laver 1998, Martin and Stevenson 2001). *A priori* approaches seek to build logic models of government-formation processes whereas empirical approaches examine the specific variables that account for government formation (Laver 1998). Those models have been successfully used to assess cabinet formation in parliamentary systems (Martin and Stevenson 2001), presidential systems (Amorim Neto 2002, 2006, Cheibub 2002, Geddes 1994), comparative perspectives on both presidential and parliamentary regimes (Cheibub et al. 2004), and electoral coalitions in industrial societies (Golder 2005) in the Americas (Amorim Neto 2006) and in Brazil (Amorim Neto 2002, Machado 2009, Mignozzetti et. al. 2011, Nicolau 1996). Theoretically derived hypotheses are drawn from considerations about size, ideology, and institutional incentives and constraints (Martin and Stevenson 2001).

Analysts of coalition formation are highly influenced by the work of Riker (1962), who used a rationalist approach to argue that party size creates incentives to form a minimum winning coalition, where actors seek to distribute gains among the smallest number of participants. Riker's (1962) assumption is a refinement of the concept of minimal winning coalition, which ceases to be winning when any one member of this coalition is subtracted (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). By considering a minimum winning coalition as a subset of the minimal winning

coalition, Riker reduces the number of parties to predict coalition formation.<sup>6</sup>

However, he does not consider the role of ideology, which is further specified by the analogous assumption that it is easier to form a coalition of a small number of parties than it is to form a coalition of ideologically proximate parties.

The role of ideology in coalition formation is the obvious focus of the policy-seeking approach but it is also retained implicitly in office-seeking approaches, which consider policy proximity an important element of bargaining. Other scholars have elaborated in this vein with the concept of a “minimal connected winning coalition” that is formed along a contiguous ideological dimension but that ceases to be either winning or connected when a single member leaves the coalition (Laver and Schofield 1990).

The problem with this approach is that assuming parties as being office-seeking implies that as parties are invested in the purpose of gaining office, they will apply the necessary strategies to achieve such an end. In this sense, the consideration of ideology as the only determinant dimension limits the possibilities of combined strategies. In other words, if a party is policy-seeking it will certainly place a higher value on ideologically contiguous coalitions. However, if a party is office-seeking it may relax the requirement of ideologically consistent coalitions, provided they can enter those coalitions without being severely punished by an ideologically demanding electorate. More generally, assumptions about the goal of

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<sup>6</sup> Riker (1962: 43) also admits a coalition bigger than the minimum in the real world: *“Even though the members of a winning coalition know they have indeed formed a winning coalition, they keep on adding members until they have reached some specific size larger than the minimum”* [italics in the original].

the party as either policy- or office-seeking will certainly fail to account for party systems transformation over time. For instance, the transformation of a party system from clientelistic to more programmatic, as Hagopian et al. (2009) claim is the case in Brazil, implies that parties are placing more value on policies.

Conversely, the transformation of parties from policy- to a more office-seeking strategy, which is the case of the Brazilian Workers' Party (Hunter 2007, 2010, Samuels 2004), suggests that a more balanced approach that considers the influence of both strategies is more conducive to an understanding of the dynamics involving coalitions (Strom 1990).

Scholars who embrace an institutional approach, on the other hand, emphasize the role that institutions play on the process and outcome of the coalition-formation, as well as the resulting implications on decision-making after the government has been formed (Martin and Stevenson 2001). The pre-formation approach is usually associated with the *a priori* literature based on formal bargaining while the post-formation approach relies on spatial voting models and specific rules that affect the decision making of the already established government. These models are not self-exclusive in the sense that the use of one approach does not preclude the application of the other. In fact, formal theory has been used to generate institutional hypotheses on cabinet formation in presidential regimes (Amorim Neto 2006) and on pre-electoral coalition formation in developed parliamentary democracies (Golder 2006, Martin and Stevenson 2001).

Institutional explanations have been particularly important in explaining cabinet formation in presidential systems in the Americas (Amorim Neto 2006) and

pre-electoral coalition in parliamentary regimes with inferences about semi-presidential and presidential systems (Golder 2006). Institutional hypotheses also have been applied in the Brazilian case to explain policy outcome as a result of coalition formation (Amorim Neto 2002), minimum winning electoral coalition (Machado 2009), and electoral coalition in proportional elections (Mignozzetti et. al. 2011). The main determinants of electoral coalitions as an outcome variable are: size of the party – when small and constrained by electoral threshold either formal or given by district magnitude (Nicolau 1996), parties tend to enter electoral alliances with other parties to overcome this institutional hurdle (Nicolau 1996, Soares 1964); maximization of seats (Lima Jr. 1983), which aim at reversing the effects of party fragmentation produced by proportional systems, thus electoral uncertainty (Golder 2005, Nicolau 1996); strategic interaction among the different levels of competition (Borges 2011, Lima Jr. 1983); and, ideological consistency or the alliances (Amorim Neto 2002, Mignozzetti et. al. 2011, Schmitt 2005, Soares 1964), which is central to this study.

Those approaches, however, present some shortcomings as the ideological dimension alone can only account for the ideological manifestations of the parties' preferences and strategies depending on the main goal of the party. While it would be plausible to predict that a policy-seeking party would gravitate toward parties that are ideologically consistent, the introduction of office-seeking strategies would expand the strategies of the parties to include others that are not so consistent with their policy prospects. In fact, when the two Brazilian democratic periods are compared (1946-64 versus post-80s), the most recent democratic period shows a

more consistent ideological pattern of electoral coalitions (Schmitt 2005). However, over time, the post-80s period have shown a decline in the ideological consistency of electoral alliances (Carreirão 2006). This trend urges an explanation and it is likely that clientelistic politics may account for some of the variation of those electoral coalitions.

The incentives for electoral coalition formation are varied and are also conditioned by coordination strategies superseded by different governmental levels. The direction of the coattail effect is often disputed. Some authors have demonstrated coattail effects of local elections on national elections (Ames 1994, Samuels 2000), while others have argued the opposite (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).<sup>7</sup> Specifically in regards to electoral coalitions, some authors emphasize the importance of subnational elections (Machado 2009, Montero 2010), others focus on the national determinant of electoral coalitions (Borges 2011), and yet some others stress the interaction of the two levels (Power and Mochel 2008). Borges (2011), for instance, indicates that the decay of the local political bosses in the least developed states is due to two interrelated constraints that affect the capacity of political elites to establish and maintain electoral coalitions: vertical competition (i.e. at the federal and state levels) and the weakness of the parties.

Focusing on presidential and gubernatorial elections as respectively the national and state dimensions of voting distributions, Borges (2011) shows the presidential coattail effects on gubernatorial elections, which supports his claim of

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<sup>7</sup> Brambor and colleagues basically refute Samuels (2000) on a methodological basis arguing that this author's finding is due to the omission of the constitutive terms of the interaction model.

the interdependence of national and state elections. Borges (2011) shows evidence of the decline of the political bosses and, although an electoral coalition seems to be the right approach to assess the elite's strategies, he fails to indicate the pattern of the electoral coalition and its operation at the national and state level. To be fair, the author does not ignore the interplay of national and regional strategy, but this interaction needs to be clearly established by explaining the mechanisms under which electoral coalitions are formed.

Montero (2011), on the other hand, argues that the subnational pattern of party-building and elite alliance formation at the state-level explain the vote share between leftist and conservative in selected federal units. The dynamics of those alliances result from segmentations either on the leftist or on the conservative side, thus altering the electoral result that could both displace conservative machines and bring them back to power. Electoral alliance is certainly a key element in understanding the electoral dynamics in Brazil, but analysis that consider left versus conservative parties limit this scope as it implicitly assumes that clientelistic politics segments parties ideologically with the left appearing programmatic and the conservative as clientelistic.

Political competition in multiparty democratic developing countries occurs in a very heterogeneous cross-national electoral market. Thus, the national success of a party depends on its ability to garner votes in both public and private goods markets. However, a programmatic party cannot overtly pursue clientelistic politics because it would risk losing public market voters, hence defeating its purpose of building a party brand as the most efficient way of electoral linkage in the public

goods market. By the same token, an expanding programmatic party cannot alienate clientelistic votes, especially if it has exhausted its universe of expansion in the public goods market and in view of competition with other programmatic parties within this same market. Given the expansion of the competitive public goods market as a consequence of structural changes in developing democracies, the success of programmatic parties depend on their ability to extract additional votes from private goods markets at the subnational level. The way to do this without compromising the party brand is to coalesce with political machines already established in those private goods markets.

### **Toward a Utility Theory of Partisan Coalitions**

Theories of voter-party linkages have focused either on the demand or on the supply side of politics. The demand side approach derives from the assumption that the voter's relative preference for public or private goods creates different informational demands on the political system (Desposato 2001). The supply side approach claims that structural shifts resulted in parties' decreased access to patronage-based funds, thus creating an incentive for politicians to develop their party brands (Hagopian et. al. 2009). Both perspectives contribute to the understanding of political linkages though they have some shortcomings.

The demand side approach focuses on parties' legislative behavior, which is assessed by cohesion in roll-call votes, and considers the private and public electoral markets as dichotomous extremes. This implies that a party in the legislature is more responsive to the type of demand that characterizes each

electoral market. If extended to the electoral arena, this approach would predict the election of either programmatic parties in public goods markets or clientelistic parties in private goods markets. In this sense, it falls short of explaining programmatic parties' victories in predominantly private goods markets as well as clientelistic parties' successes in predominantly private goods markets. A better explanation of parties' electoral outcomes, as opposed to legislative behavior, would have to relax the extreme dichotomous assumption in favor of the possibility that parties can engage both markets.

The supply side, in turn, considers both the legislative and the electoral levels of party behavior. However, its assumption of the electoral market as a public goods market would only predict the election of programmatic parties, thus missing the clientelistic one. Moreover, analysis of partisan electoral behavior is informed by surveys of elected deputies' campaign discourses. If the general perception is that programmatic behavior is more morally accepted than clientelistic behavior, then surveys may be biased toward positive responses, which would overpredict programmatic electoral behavior.

In order to address this gap in the literature that tends to treat ideology and clientelism as two opposite continuous poles, I propose a combined utility theory, which bridges the concomitant operation of both ideology and clientelism as salient processes of political linkages. While the analytical distinction of ideology and clientelism is useful in studying the static manifestation of those political phenomena at the systemic level, the comprehension of the dynamics of electoral competition and party development requires the interaction of those two elements,



each one with its own continuum. In this sense, the pattern of political competition in multiparty developing democracies operates on two levels: ideological (left-right) and clientelistic (programmatic-patronage). Socio-economic changes that bring about modernization create a public electoral market that demands programmatic-oriented representation determining patterns of political competition on the ideological dimension. However, uneven social-economic changes perpetuate the existence of a private electoral market that demands patronage-oriented representation determining pattern of political competition on a clientelistic dimension. See figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 for a visual illustration of this theory, which posits that parties have features of both ideological commitments as well as clientelistic practices.

The implication of this theory is that programmatic parties will compete mainly but not exclusively in public markets, whereas clientelistic parties will compete mainly but not exclusively in private markets. The relative size of each market determines the dominant pattern of political competition. If the public market is larger relative to the private one, then the electoral competition will be polarized by programmatic parties. Conversely, if the private market is larger relative to the public one, then the electoral competition will be polarized by clientelistic parties.

This further implies that successful patterns of electoral competition in polarized competitive democratic systems will result from the ability of a party to garner additional votes from the dimension in which a certain party is weaker. Thus if the electoral market is predominantly public, programmatic parties will try to win

additional votes in the private electoral market. Since programmatic dominant parties engaging in direct clientelistic strategy risk alienating ideological voters, they will coalesce with clientelistic parties as an indirect strategy to increase their vote share. In exchange, clientelistic parties are provided access (or the possibility of access) to resources that preserve their existence as the weaker broker. The combined utility theory which considers structural changes (modernization) and elite's strategic use of both formal (coalition) and informal (personal vote) institutions could explain why programmatic parties are advancing in areas that were once considered party machine domains.

In the following section I will lay out the theory-derived hypotheses on ideological and clientelistic levels of political linkage and how those dimensions interact in the process of electoral coalition formation in explaining patterns of electoral competition.

## **Ideology**

Socio-economic changes that engender modernization create a public electoral market that, in turn, demands ideologically-oriented political parties. In this sense, I hypothesize that the Brazilian party system is ideologically differentiated on a left-right political spectrum. The confirmation of this hypothesis is a necessary condition to further assess the systemic and clientelistic base of the electoral competition.

## **Clientelism**

Electoral clientelism implies the coexistence of minimally advanced democratic institutions with archaic societal characteristics that survives in modern days as a consequence of uneven socio-economic development. Thus, I hypothesize that private goods markets would favor clientelistic political parties.

## **Coalition**

Electoral coalitions are the coordination among political parties with the aim to win elections. The composition of coalitions will depend on the objective of the parties that join those alliances. In this sense, the assumption that parties are rational office-seeking entities implies that they are utility maximizers; in other words, they will pursue the best strategy to gain office. Elites realize their strengths and limitations and operate strategically by forming coalitions that better support their political survival and/or expansionist ambitions. In a multiparty political system with nationally polarized elections among programmatic parties, I expect that coalitions will form with a heterogeneous composition of programmatic and clientelistic parties.

In the following sections I undertake the analysis of the independent effects of ideology (Chapter 3) and clientelism (Chapter 4). Further, I will test the independent effects of both ideology and clientelism and then establish a link between them according to the operation of coalitions in explaining patterns of electoral competition.

## CHAPTER 3

### **Party Ideological Differentiation in Brazil**

Have parties in emerging democracies become more programmatic? The conventional view holds that parties in developing democracies are institutionally weak, undisciplined, and non-programmatic. The feckless nature of these party systems, scholars contend, undermine ideological linkages ensuing clientelistic behavior based on personal vote and individualized electoral strategies. Recent electoral success of more programmatic parties in developing democracies however has reignited the debate regarding the consistency of the party system versus the prevalence of clientelistic relations. A burgeoning literature has recently challenged conventional wisdom by empirically demonstrating the strengthening of these party systems (e.g. Hagopian et. al. 2009). This is particularly true for the Brazilian case, where programmatic parties have made inroads in traditionally oligarchic strongholds. This chapter purports to evaluate the validity of the general argument that party systems in Brazil are inchoate and shows low ideological distinction as a function of the low level of party identity.

Party-centered and vote-centered studies offer competing perspectives about party differentiation in Brazil. These studies are mostly based on national legislative and executive elections or on party behavior in the legislature. Recently, there has been some interest in subnational politics related to party behavior in state legislatures (Desposato 2001) and gubernatorial influence on the national legislative agenda (Abrúcio 1998, Cheibub, Figueiredo, and Limongi 2009,

Desposato 2004, Samuels 2000). However, little attention has been paid to subnational election as an important level of analysis to understand partisan evolution in developing democracies. To address this gap, this chapter focuses on gubernatorial electoral outcomes to assess party ideological differentiation in Brazil. Runoff elections are designed to confer legitimacy to the political system by forcing the voter to select from a subset of candidates who compete for the plurality of the votes in a second round when the first round fails to produce a majority winner (Pérez-Liñán 2006).<sup>8</sup> Gubernatorial runoff elections are common in Brazil, with about half of the 27 federal units electing executives in the second round.

Governors are crucial political actors that wield influence far beyond their state's borders and can shape national politics. The importance of the governors resides in the consistency in which they can transform local demands in far reaching policies and influence party behavior. The electoral district in a gubernatorial election is the entire state, which in most cases is large and diverse in socio-economic composition. Where socio-economic disparities are more pervasive, clientelism and patronage (private markets) – the quid-pro-quo exchange for votes that has historically been prevalent in Brazil – is thought to diminish the development of programmatic parties.

Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the public market dimension that explains the ideological choices that demands programmatic party behavior. Brazil has now experienced over two decades of stable and competitive elections at all

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<sup>8</sup> This prevents multi-party systems from electing a candidate that has less than the sum of the votes of all other candidates.

levels, which may have allowed sufficient time for some party amalgamation. At the same time, the country has also experienced dramatic socio-economic and demographic changes that could also result in higher demands for programmatic party behavior. In this sense, some regularity in party behavior that would explain party-voter linkages at the subnational level should be expected. This chapter argues that programmatic and clientelistic politics are, respectively, a function of the degree to which an electoral market is sensitive to public- or private-goods demands.


In order to adjudicate the issue related to ideological differentiation, I propose two approaches that draw both on aggregate and on individual-level data at the subnational level. The analysis clarifies the character of ideological differentiation in Brazil. Specifically, this asks whether ideology matters for electoral competition in Brazil.

## **Theoretical Approach**

This chapter draws on a general theory of spatial voting distribution to analyze the evolution of Brazilian political parties. It assumes that voters choose parties that best reflect their ideological position (Downs 1957, Enelow and Hinich 1984, Green and Shapiro 1994). The main research hypothesis derives from the principle of spatial voting, which suggests that the probability of voting for a party increases as the proximity between party and voter in the political spectrum increases. This hypothesis will be operationalized differently according to the scope of the aggregate- and individual-level data. The left-right ideological dimension,

which is the focus of this chapter, is the most used and parsimonious spatial voting model. In this sense, the spatial distribution of the Brazilian parties considered in this study is illustrated in Figure 3.1 according to Power and Zucco's (2009) scale.

Figure 3.1: Spatial Distribution of Selected Brazilian Parties



This analysis draws on gubernatorial elections from 1990 to 2010 to answer the question of whether political parties in Brazil ideologically distinguishable among themselves. The dichotomous dependent variable for the aggregate-level model represents the elected party in the runoff elections. For the individual-level model, the dichotomous dependent variable represents the respondents' declared party choice in the first round elections.

The independent variable of interest is ideological proximity. Several ideological cleavages could be considered: left- right (Power and Zucco 2009); Christian-secular (Coppedge 1997); xenophobic nationalist-ethnic/regional separatist (Horowitz and Browne 2005); and liberal-conservative (Huber and Inglehart 1995). Among those cleavages, the unidimensional left-right scale tends to be a consensual distribution of the political parties' ideology in Brazil (Coppedge 1997, Huber and Inglehart 1995, Power and Zucco 2009). I extend this dimension for the ideological cleavage of the voter as well, based on the theory that the ideological position of the parties reflects the ideological position of the voter (Downs 1957). Further, assuming ideological consistency, in the runoff, the voter

will choose the closest party to her ideal point, which is indicated by her choice in the first round. For this reason, all else being equal, the probability of a party to be elected increases if the aggregate votes received in the first round by this party and by its ideological proximate parties are greater than the votes received by all the other parties.

The variable of interest for the aggregate-level model is ideological proximity, which is the result of the addition of votes according to the spatial distribution of the parties in the left-right ideological political spectrum. I use Power and Zucco's (2009) index of party ideology, which varies from one (left) to ten (right), to position each party<sup>9</sup> in the political spectrum. Then, I redistribute the first round votes according to their ideological proximity, assuming that in the first round each party's voters occupy that party's ideal point and that in the second round the party chosen is the ideologically closest to the voter's single-peaked preference. After redistributing the votes, I generate a binary variable, which assumes the value one for the highest aggregation and zero otherwise.

The control variables for the aggregate-level analysis are incumbency, position in the first round, president proximate coattail, and president concurrent coattail. The theory of incumbency advantage states that, for good or bad, the executive is personally responsible for the performances of the policies adopted. From an advantageous perspective, incumbent executive officers have access to

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<sup>9</sup> Since Power and Zucco (2009) only consider major parties, I draw on Machado (2009) to use proxies to calculate the scores of the reminder parties. The methodology aggregates the minor parties into two groups: small parties on the left and small parties on the right, according to literature. The first group received the median score of two moderate parties on the left (PDT and PSB) and the second group received the median scores of two programmatic parties on the right (PTB and PL).



public resources and distribute “pork.” They also benefit from name recognition (Hinckley 1980), can use free and continuous access to the media, and have more access to campaign funds (Jacobson 1985). While incumbency may be negative during times of economic and political turmoil, it is mostly advantageous for the candidate. Given the first round threshold of 50%, the existence of a runoff and the advantages of incumbency, I expect a positive relationship between a candidate or party’s incumbency and subsequent party election.

The distinction between candidate and party incumbency is important for several reasons. First, party and candidate incumbencies do not necessarily correspond, as party switching is a widespread phenomenon in Brazil (Ames 2001, Melo 2000). Although party migration is less frequent among governors, as they are extremely powerful (Samuels 2000) and exert considerable control over the party decisions, there is no incentive for party defection. Second, reelection for the executive offices has only been adopted since 1998. By adding party incumbency, the analysis captures the effects of incumbency thoroughly, without missing the marginal effect of candidate incumbency before the re-election rule. Finally, party and candidate interact complementarily rather than exclusively (Hinckley 1980). Hence, the structure of the incumbent party will necessarily grant some advantage to his candidate. Both party and candidate incumbency are binary and assume the value one when the candidate or party is incumbent and zero otherwise.

First round elections that failed to produce an outright winner, thus provoking a runoff, may have mechanical and behavioral implications. From a mechanical perspective, the best-positioned candidates in the first round needs to

acquire fewer new voters than the runner-up candidate in order to succeed in the runoff. The behavioral effect on voters may result from the fact that the best-positioned candidate in the first round can claim the result as a preliminary victory. That may create a sense of inevitability since rational voters do not like to waste their vote, in the sense that such a vote would not contribute to selection of the winner. Hence, I expect a positive relationship between position in the first round and party election. The variable first round position refers to whether the candidate finished the first round in the first or second place. This is a binary variable in which one represents the first place and zero the second place.

Studies on coattail effects suggest that high presidential approval ratings increase the electoral chances of other party members (Campbell 1986, Ferejohn and Calvert 1984). The coattail effects of proximate<sup>10</sup> elections have also been related to legislative fragmentation in cross-national election (Cox 1997, Golder 2006, Lijphart 1994) as well as subnationally (Ames 1994, Samuels 2000). The results of presidential coattail effects on party fragmentation, though, are conflicting. Some authors argue that presidential elections increase party system fragmentation (Filippov et. al. 1994), while others disagree (Cox 1997, Shugart and Carey 1992). Yet, a third view finds no correlation between presidential elections and congressional party size (Samuels 2000, Coppedge 2002). Although not consensual, the literature indicates some level of influence of presidential elections on legislative contests. In Brazil, gubernatorial and presidential elections are

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<sup>10</sup> Proximate election refers to the most recent previous presidential election and subsequent gubernatorial election, while concurrent election refers to presidential and gubernatorial elections within the same period.

concurrent and campaigns are mounted around the presidential candidate so as to minimize coordination cost and maximize electoral outcomes. Thus, I predict a positive sign between elected president and elected party in gubernatorial races.

Finally, I control for the concurrent coattail effect of the incumbent president's party on gubernatorial runoff elections and expect a positive sign between those two variables. The influence of presidential coattails is modeled by its proximate and concurrent effects. The proximate effect is coded one when the previous elected president and currently elected governor belong to the same party and it is coded zero otherwise. Similarly, the concurrent coattail is coded one when both president and governor elected simultaneously belong to the same party.

The independent variable of interest in the individual-level model is distance, which is measured by the difference between voter's self-placement in the political spectrum and the party's placement according to the Power and Zucco (2009) scale.

The individual-level analysis controls for demographic, socioeconomic, and sociocultural variables. Older age is associated with the rightist vote due to the memories of military regime anti-leftist propaganda (Ames and Smith 2010). The pattern of the women's vote in Brazil has also been associated with rightist parties (Ames and Smith 2010). Higher income has generally been associated with identification with the leftist Worker's Party (PT). However, since Lula's reelection in 2006, there has been a shift in the PT's electoral base to include lower income voters.

Personal income is captured as a categorical variable with eight increments. A higher level of education is associated with voting for the PT (Zucco 2008). The

*Bolsa Família* (BF) program, a federally funded conditional cash transfer policy that benefits poor families in exchange for keeping their children in school and vaccinated, is also considered. This program has been linked to the success of the PT's re-election for the presidency in 2006 (Zucco 2008), but it appears that the same correlation is non-existent for governors, as voters credit the program to the central government and Lula (Sugiyama and Hunter 2013). BF is a dichotomous variable with 1 representing participants in the program and zero otherwise. Finally, I include clientelism, as its effects in developing democracies have been studied extensively (Kitschelt 2000, Remmer 2010). This variable is dichotomous and measures respondent's attitude toward clientelism with 1 indicating a clientelistic attitude and zero otherwise.<sup>11</sup>

The nature of the individual-level statistical model does not allow us to relate the alternative specific variables directly to the dependent variable. However, it is possible to predict the variables' direction based on the position of the party in the political spectrum. As explained above, the expectation is that the higher the income the higher the probability to vote for the leftist party. We expect the same relationship for educational levels. Since recent research suggests no true linkage between BF and governors, no direction is anticipated on this variable. Finally, following the literature, age and clientelism are expected to be negatively associated to leftist parties and positively associated to rightist parties.

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<sup>11</sup> The question posed is: "A candidate offers a food basket to a poor family that is going hungry, what should the members of this family do: 0 – Not accept the food basket and not vote for another candidate, or 1 – Accept the food basket and vote for the candidate."

## Aggregate-level Data and Analysis

The data for this dissertation was collected from the Brazilian Superior Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral), which serves both as electoral commission and appeals court. The dataset includes 78 gubernatorial runoff elections for six consecutive elections between 1990 and 2010,<sup>12</sup> totaling 156 observations as there are two candidates for each runoff. States-years with decisive first round elections are not included in the dataset. The dichotomous dependent variable *elected party* assumes the value one when a party is elected and zero otherwise. The independent variable of interest is dichotomous ideological proximity, measured as the aggregate vote of the most ideologically proximate parties in the first round. I expect that the larger the aggregation of these votes, the greater the chance of the most proximate party to be elected in the runoff election.

The aggregate-level analysis applies a unidimensional deterministic model of spatial electoral competition in runoff elections for governors. In a related study in France, Rosenthal and Sen (1977) test the validity of the different approaches and, although they conclude that probabilistic models as opposed to deterministic ones, offer an overall best prediction. They also add complexities that are necessary to account for when the electoral system allows more than two candidates in the runoff. Since the Brazilian system yields only two runoff candidates, the deterministic model is perfectly adequate. Moreover, they also call attention to the temporal stability separating the voter's choice between the first and second

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<sup>12</sup> Runoff elections in Brazil started with the Constitution of 1988.

round<sup>13</sup> and assert that runoff election can be reasonably predicted by resorting to one single political dimension (left-right).

This method allows for the concomitant assessment of the distribution of parties' votes along the political spectrum and the corresponding redistribution of votes in the runoff according to the principle of most proximate vote. This model also allows for the inference of the winner of the runoff election. Finding regularities in the redistribution of votes between the first round and the runoff elections would imply some level of party and electorate ideological differentiation at the aggregate level. Parties matter electorally and their brands bear some strategic value both to the leaders and to the voters, as the strategies adopted by party elites are not dissociated from those of the electorate.

Although many external factors concur to explain the electoral outcome, I focus on endogenous variables leading to the runoff election to infer the ideological differentiation of the Brazilian party system. In fact, an advantage in studying runoff models of spatial voting is that the exogenous information is mostly accounted for in the first round (Rosenthal and Sen 1977).

The spatial voting model offers a predictive model for gubernatorial runoff elections and sheds light on the issue of ideological differentiation. A predictive model of a binary outcome only makes sense if it can forecast over 50% of the variation of the dependent variable, since a random pick would yield a 50% chance of selecting the winner. Indeed, the model overall makes correct prediction of about 75% of the cases. More specifically, the model predicts the winner in 79% of the

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<sup>13</sup> The time elapse between the first and second ballot is one week in France and one month in Brazil.

cases and the loser in 71% of the cases. The baseline model (model 1), as shown on Table 3.1, indicates that ideological proximity, first round order, and presidential proximate coattail are statistically significant at  $p < .05$  or lower and the signs are in the expected direction.

<b>Table 3.1: Determinants of the Winner Party in Runoff Election</b>					
<i>DV: Elected Party</i>					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Ideological Proximity	1.447*** (0.39)	1.615*** (0.40)	1.429*** (0.39)	1.534** (0.58)	1.153* (0.56)
Incumbent Candidate	0.325 (0.88)	0.180 (0.51)		1.370 (0.83)	-0.553 (0.69)
First Round Order	1.816*** (0.39)	1.806*** (0.40)	1.825*** (0.40)	1.516* (0.60)	2.256*** (0.56)
Proximate Coattail	1.315* (0.53)		1.285* (0.54)	1.486 (0.78)	1.165 (0.82)
Concurrent Coattail		3.052** (1.14)			
Incumbent Party			0.17 (0.45)		
Constant	1.927*** -0.38	-1.927*** -0.38	-1.897*** -0.37	-2.049*** -0.56	-1.748*** -0.51
Pseudo R2	0.250	0.273	0.249	0.276	0.265
LR	-81.09	-78.58	-81.24	-37.18	-41.78
N	156	156	156	74	82
* $p < 0.05$ , ** $p < 0.01$ , *** $p < 0.001$ , standard errors in parenthesis					

The position in the first round confirms the ideological differentiation hypothesis and is the single strongest predictor of the winner in gubernatorial runoff elections. In model 1, each unit change on this coefficient indicates a 514%

increase in the odds of being elected. Moreover, since the literature suggests that the effect of incumbency and order in the first round may not be an additive one, I test the interaction between those two terms but find no statistical significance (not shown in the model).


Models 2 and 3 test the coattail effect while also controlling for variations in incumbency. Presidential proximate coattail is statistically significant at  $p < .05$ . This is the weakest coefficient but it still indicates that a unit increase in the presidential proximate coattail increases the odds of being elected by 272%. Most importantly, however, is the effect of concurrent coattail on the outcome of the dependent variable. According to model 2, the independent effect of belonging to the same party as the president in concurrent elections suggests that for each unit increase of this variable the odds of winning the runoff contest also increase by 2000%. This finding strongly supports the concurrent coattail hypothesis and indicates, as Brambor et. al. (2006) suggest, the overall influence of presidential coattails in other elections.

Ideological proximity also offers a robust support for the outcome of the gubernatorial runoff election at the  $p < .001$  level across the first three models. When the ideology proximity variable assumes a value of one for the largest aggregation of votes in the first round redistributed between the two runoff candidates, a unit increase change in the odds of predicting the elected party increases about 325%. This means that on average, the electorate differentiates the parties according to their ideological position in the political spectrum and will rationally choose parties in the runoff that are ideologically closer to the one that they chose in the first



round. Figure 3.2 shows the probability of a party to be elected given the aggregate votes of the most ideologically proximate preference of the elector in the first round of the election. Thus, when ideological proximity changes from zero to one, the probability for a party of getting elected increases from about 0.3 to about 0.7.

Figure 3.2: Probability of Party Election Given Ideological Proximity



Interestingly, candidate incumbency is not statistically significant, although it is in the expected direction. A further test of party incumbency also failed to show statistical significance (model 3). A possible explanation for the lack of explanatory power for incumbency may be related to the majoritarian requirements of runoff elections coupled with competitive elections and multiparty characteristic of the Brazilian party system. Multiparty competitive elections would make it more

difficult for a candidate to decide the election in the first round. In fact, if incumbency gives any advantage to a candidate, it would be realized in the first round. However, run-off elections exist exactly as a consequence of the failure of any candidate to achieve the majority of the votes in the first round. In this case, it could be argued that the failure of the incumbent candidate (provided there is one in the race) to win the election outright in the first round may indicate that the aggregate voters prefer all challengers over the incumbent (Bullock and Johnson, 1985). Moreover, by the time the run-off campaign starts, the non-incumbent candidate who won a spot in the run-off ticket has already had sufficient exposure to offset the name recognition advantage conferred to the incumbent during the first round election.

In order to refine the analysis, two additional models (4 and 5) separate electoral competition on a left-right basis. It has been said that the differentiation of the Brazilian party system is observed only on a left-right basis. To test this claim, model 4 restricts the data to electoral contests that occur between leftist and rightist parties. Model 5 restricts the data to electoral competitions either among leftist parties or among rightist parties.<sup>14</sup> Thus, if Brazilian parties were indeed differentiated on a left-right basis, model 4 would show a statistically significant relation between ideological proximity and elected party. Conversely, if Brazilian parties are only differentiated on a left-right basis, then we should expect no

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<sup>14</sup> Brazilian parties are generally classified as left, center, or right. The restrictive models, however, segment parties on a left and right dimension. Since Power and Zucco's (2009) party ideology scores vary from one (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right), these models consider parties with scores 5.0 or lower left and parties with score 5.1 or higher, right.

statistical significance of the variable ideological proximity in model 5. If the differentiation happens across the political spectrum, we would expect the coefficient on model 4 to be higher than the coefficient on model 5, because it would be easier for the electorate to differentiate between a left and a right party than among left of the center or among right of the center parties.

Indeed, this test provides additional evidence on party differentiation, as the variable ideological proximity is statistically significant for both models 4 and 5. Most importantly, the finding indicates the electorate is not only able to differentiate parties on a left-right dimension but also to make more nuanced differentiation among parties on the left when leftist parties face competition against one another, or among parties on the right that compete amongst other rightist parties. Moreover, as expected, the coefficient in model 4 is not only more robust than that in model 5 but also the level of statistic significance is better at  $p < .01$  versus  $p < .05$ . Thus, we can confidently say that the analysis shows that the Brazilian party system is indeed ideologically differentiated.<sup>15</sup>

## Individual-level Data and Analysis

To shed further light on partisan ideological differentiation, I turn to individual-level data on the 2006 first-round gubernatorial election. The data comprises 620 interviews with Brazilians conducted by the Latin American Public

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<sup>15</sup> The following variables (not shown and not statistically significant) are also tested for previous overall influence on elections: incumbent coalition, which measures the effect of belonging to the government coalition; verticalization, which is dummy for an electoral rule that prevented parties from forming heterogeneous coalitions in the states vis-à-vis the presidential coalition ticket, as this rule indicates an effect on the size and composition of coalitions (Machado, 2009); and the institution of re-election, which is a dummy for 1998 when re-election started.

Opinion Project – LAPOP. The dependent variable is the self-declared vote in the first round gubernatorial election of 2006. The survey was conducted in 18 of the 27 states (including the Federal District) and is representative of all five Brazilian geographical regions. The independent variable of interest is distance, which is measured by the difference between voter's self-placement on the political spectrum and the party placement according to the Power and Zucco (2009) scale. The expectation is that the smaller the distance between voters's self-placement and the party's placement, the more likely the individual will vote for the candidate of that party.

The individual-level analysis resorts to conditional logistic (fixed-effects) models to assess the distance between party placement and voter's self-placement in the political spectrum. Both respondent and party placement are measured on a one to 10 scale, with one representing the extreme ideological left and 10 representing the extreme ideological right of the political spectrum. Contrary to multinomial logit models that consider only the position of voters, conditional logistic models have the advantage of placing voters relative to parties (Alvarez and Nagler 1998). Thus, it is the appropriate model to assess the ideological differentiation of voters and parties in a given party system. This is important because the outcome is the choice among several candidates given the multiparty nature of the Brazilian system. It also makes it easier to combine case-specific and alternative-specific variables (Long and Freese 2006).

The conditional (fixed-effects) logistic model includes both case-specific and alternative-specific variables. This model allows for inferences about variations

across individual observations (case-specific) and about variations within individual observation (alternative-specific). In this model the case-specific variables are: gender, age, income, and *Bolsa Família* status. The alternative specific variables are the self-reported votes for the 2006 gubernatorial election. The results are shown in Table 3.2.

The alternative-specific conditional logistic model of ideological vote in Brazil shows 3,535 observations for 505 cases distributed in seven alternatives per case (party choice). Since many of the Brazilian parties are regional, region is nested into the model to limit the individual choices to the effective choice of parties available in that region, thus avoiding perfect prediction for those parties. However, no inferences can be made about specific regions, as the model with a region dummy does not converge statistically. The nested model is overall statistically significant at  $p < .05$ .

The key finding is that the Brazilian political party system shows some degree of party and voter ideological differentiation. In models 1 and 3, the variable distance shows the right sign and it is statistically significant. It shows that the shorter the ideological distance between the voter and the party the higher the probability for the voter to choose that party, which indicates voters' and parties' ideological differentiation. In the full model (shown in Appendix A for the sake of space) and in model 2 the variable distance is in the predicted direction, but it is not statistically significant after the exclusion of the *Bolsa Família* variable.


**Table 3.2: Alternative Specific Conditional Logit  
Estimation for the 2006 Brazilian  
Gubernatorial Election  
DV: Party Choice**

Base Line: PP			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	<u>b/se</u>	<u>b/se</u>	<u>b/se</u>
alt distance	-0.020* (0.01)	-0.017 (0.01)	-0.023* (0.01)
PDT income	-0.105 (0.19)	-0.100 (0.18)	
bolsa família	-0.361 (1.47)		-0.147 (1.44)
constant	0.733 (0.72)	0.682 (0.70)	0.317 (0.30)
PT income	-0.137 (0.15)	-0.148 (0.15)	
bolsa família	0.178 (1.12)		0.666 (1.08)
constant	2.250*** (0.60)	2.306*** (0.58)	1.747*** (0.25)
PMDB income	-0.136 (0.15)	-0.152 (0.15)	
bolsa família	0.548 (1.09)		0.859 (1.06)
constant	2.287*** (0.59)	2.377*** (0.57)	1.845*** (0.23)
DEM income	-0.025 (0.17)	-0.063 (0.16)	
bolsa família	1.039 (1.14)		1.507 (1.09)
constant	0.808 (0.67)	1.035 (0.63)	0.573* (0.27)
PSB income	-0.349* (0.17)	-0.400* (0.17)	
bolsa família	1.339 (1.10)		2.055 (1.06)
constant	2.081** (0.64)	2.375*** (0.61)	1.004*** (0.27)
PSDB income	0.004 (0.15)	-0.034 (0.14)	
bolsa família	0.914 (1.08)		1.091 (1.05)
constant	2.010*** (0.59)	2.217*** (0.56)	2.014*** (0.23)
N	3535	3563	4200
BIC	1878	1852	2156

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

The demographic (age and gender) and socio-economic (income) variables, while contributing to the fit of the model,<sup>16</sup> are not statistically significant, except for income when it comes the PSB (Socialist Party of Brazil). This finding is inconsistent with the literature that usually associates high-income voters with parties on the left of the political spectrum (e.g. Zucco 2010). In fact, each unit increment in income decreases the odds of voting for PSB versus voting for PP by factor of 0.71, or 29%. However, it is somewhat consistent with recent electoral shifts that link low-income vote to the main Brazilian leftist party (PT).

Figure 3.3: Party Vote Choice and Income



The relationship between income and party choice (Figure 3.3) shows that the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) is the most appealing party to higher

<sup>16</sup> The demographic variables are omitted for the sake of space but a full model with these variables is shown in the Appendix.

income voters. In fact, the slope shows that a one-unit increase in income increases the odds of voting for PSDB as opposed to voting for PP (the baseline party) by a factor of 1.004 (0.4%). The opposite is true for its main electoral competitor, the PT. In this case, a one-unit increase in income decreases the odds of voting for the PT as opposed to voting for PP (the base line party) by a factor of 0.87 (13%). This finding is consistent with Zucco (2008) and Montero (2010), who find regional divides in presidential elections.

The direction of the variable *Bolsa Família* shows that all parties, with the exception of PDT, benefit from this program. However, none of them are statistically significant, which aligns with Sugiyama and Hunter's (2013) analysis that the *Bolsa Família* is perceived as being federally provided, indicating that state and local politicians do not reap any benefit from managing the recruitment of its beneficiaries.

## **Conclusion**

Scholars of party institutionalization have engaged in a longstanding and animated debate over the existence of ideological coherence among developing democracies. Brazil is exemplary of such debate, where scholars have long grappled with the question of whether parties have developed meaningful ideological frames. Contrary to some assessments that Brazilian parties display non-programmatic and clientelistic characteristics, this study shows remarkable nuance in terms of ideological differentiation. Importantly, parties demonstrate ideological linkages with voters at the subnational politics level, where personalism and clientelism have



historically prevailed. This chapter draws on an innovative methodological approach that uses aggregate- and individual-level data to help settle this debate.

At the aggregate level, the unidimensional deterministic model of spatial electoral competition for gubernatorial runoff elections confirms the hypothesis of ideological differentiation. This claim is supported by logistic regression models based on the principle of the most proximate vote, which posits that voters will chose the closest parties to his own ideological position. To test this hypothesis, the model aggregates the votes cast to parties in the first round and redistributes them accordingly to the ideological proximity between the two parties selected for the runoff election. This method allows for probabilistic inference on the outcome of the runoff election by assuming ideological transference of votes between the first round and the runoff election. Further, as a consequence of the predictive regularities, it also indicates ideological differentiation of the Brazilian party system.

Most importantly, the empirical analysis at the aggregate level confirms the hypothesis of ideological proximity. This result suggests that in runoffs, the electorate indeed choses the most proximate party to the one she selected in the first round of the election. Moreover, this study suggests the Brazilian party system is differentiated both at the party level and at the electorate level. The evidence at the electorate level is also strongly confirmed by additional models that restrict the sample to electoral disputes among left of center parties, as well as competition among right of center parties.

Applying a new methodological approach based on alternative-specific conditional logistic regression models, this dissertation further confirms the

ideological differentiation of the Brazilian party system through individual-level data. Using national survey data from the 2006 LAPOP, it finds a negative and statistically significant relationship between the case-specific variable distance, measured as the modular difference between voter's self-ascribed ideological placement and party's external measure of ideological position in the political spectrum, and voter's choice.

This chapter makes an important contribution by adding nuanced analysis about ideological political linkages in subnational politics, where personalism is more likely to prevail. In this sense, subnational elections provide a high-bar for testing whether parties have developed meaningful ideological linkages with voters. The evidence strongly supports the ideological differentiation of the political parties in Brazil. Most remarkably, even competition between parties within the same ideological spectrum shows partisan differences across Brazil where subnational political competition is often deemed prone to patron-client relationships.

Having settled the matter of whether Brazilian parties display ideological differentiation, we can turn to the issue of how clientelism may relate to the more stable ideological features of subnational partisanship. In the next chapter I discuss the clientelism dimension of party linkage. First, I propose a measurement of clientelism (Herfindahl Index), which is based on the geographic concentration of votes received by parties and an alternative measurement based on clustering and dispersion of votes (Cluster Index). After locating the parties along the programmatic-clientelistic political spectrum, I compare and test the validity of the measurements proposed with regression models.

## CHAPTER 4

### **Political Competition in Brazil: Measuring Party Clientelism**

Is there a clientelistic dimension to partisan competition in Brazil? This chapter focuses on the political aspect of clientelism,<sup>17</sup> defined as electoral transactions between citizens and politicians involving exchanges of votes for private goods (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). I argue that, in spite of programmatic advancements, clientelism persists as a crucial element in political parties' competitions. Competitive elections in multiparty democracies with diverse electoral markets compel parties to adopt strategies that allow them to garner votes in both predominantly public and private markets. To unveil the electoral strategies employed by parties when competing in private or public electoral marketplaces, I test a model of geospatial dominance of partisan voting for the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies from 1998 to 2010. Working with two hypotheses: 1) that public goods markets would generally benefit programmatic parties and, conversely, 2) that private goods markets would benefit clientelistic parties, this chapter applies the Herfindahl Index, a general measure of market concentration by companies, as a proxy for clientelism to assess the dynamics of party competition. I further refine the methodological approach by proposing a new Cluster Index of geospatial measures of clustering and concentration of votes.

This chapter is organized as follows: the first section proposes a measurement of clientelism based on the Herfindahl Index (HI) the second presents

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<sup>17</sup> Clientelism has been studied originally from both an anthropological and a sociological perspective. In this paper I use clientelism and electoral clientelism interchangeably, as defined above.

the models and findings, the third analyzes the findings for the HI models, the fourth proposes an alternative measurement based on clustering and dispersion of votes (Cluster Index- CI), the sixth discusses the findings for the CI, and the last section concludes.

## **The Herfindahl Index**

As developed in Chapter 2, this dissertation examines whether partisan competition is structured along two dimensions: ideological commitments and clientelistic/programmatic strategies. This chapter tests the hypothesis associated with the clientelistic dimension of partisan politics. Specifically, I draw on Ames' (2001) concept of dominance and clustering, which describes the spatial distribution of electoral support for a candidate for the Chamber of Deputies and Montero (2010), who uses geographical information system (GIS) to measure the degree of dispersion and concentration of parties according to their ideology. In this vein, dominance is related to the ability of a deputy to receive a high percentage of vote shares in municipalities that contribute to the majority of his individual vote. This phenomenon is more common in rural areas in which the mediation of the local boss is crucial for the deliverance of such high vote share thus making the candidate less accountable to the electorate. Conversely, clustering is related to strategy in which deputies prospect their individual votes in contiguous municipalities.

This phenomenon, in turn, does not necessarily require the mediation of local bosses thus making the candidate more accountable to the electorate. This is consistent with the theory developed here, which states that public electoral

markets are more conducive to the success of programmatic parties while private electoral markets tend to benefit clientelistic parties. Different from the Ames (2001) and Montero (2010), I borrow the Herfindahl Index (HI) concept, which measures monopolistic behavior by companies, to estimate the level of competition among parties. High HI indicates clientelistic behavior while lower HI indicates programmatic behavior.

The logic is that programmatic parties' votes are more dispersed, while clientelistic parties' votes tend to be more concentrated due to the effect of dominance. By this token, through the dispensation of private goods, clientelistic parties are able to secure the support of local political bosses who, in exchange, deliver bulks of votes in a given municipality. Without accounting for the contiguity of the municipalities,<sup>18</sup> clientelistic parties' votes share of these basic electoral districts would be proportionally larger in comparison to programmatic parties, which would catch ideological votes dispersed among the different electoral districts. This aims to answer the question of whether there is a clientelistic dimension to partisan competition in Brazil.

## **Data and Measurements**

The Brazilian electoral commission<sup>19</sup> provides party election data for the Chamber Deputies from 1998 to 2010 for all states, except the Federal District,

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<sup>18</sup> An alternative explanation, which is discussed further in this chapter, takes into consideration the contiguity of the municipalities and the clustering effects of partisan votes on programmatic/clientelistic politics.

<sup>19</sup> Elections in Brazil are run by Electoral Courts. The Superior Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral) centralizes the electoral data.

resulting in 2,639 available observations.<sup>20</sup> Utilizing the data on the Chamber of Deputies, as opposed to the majoritarian election, makes it possible to compare parties sub-nationally as they are more likely to run candidates across the different states and coordinate it as part of a national strategy to maximize their seats. The majoritarian election restricts the number of parties for the effect of comparison since only a few parties run candidates for executive positions. The mayoral election is an exception, but even in this case, the eminently local nature of this kind of election makes it less comparable nationally.

## **Dependent Variable**

### ***Herfindahl Index***

I draw my measurement of clientelistic parties from Ames (2001) according to the principle of dominance and clustering as described above. However, the Herfindahl Index (HI) only considers the individual municipality where votes are prospected. In this sense, the HI does not account for the contiguity of the municipalities, which is equivalent to the clustering strategy. Instead, by looking into the municipalities individually, the HI considers concentration and dispersion of votes as two opposite strategies respectively associated with clientelistic and programmatic party behavior.<sup>21</sup> The concentration and dispersion of the votes is first calculated for each candidate in each municipality, which also takes into

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<sup>20</sup> Data preceding 1998 are incomplete either for some states or for the municipal level of aggregation. Although the Federal District has representation in the Chamber of Deputies, it works as one single municipality.

<sup>21</sup> This study treats concentration and dispersion as respective proxies for clientelistic and programmatic party behavior as the Herfindhal Index does not take into consideration the contiguity of the municipality (clustering).

account population size. Further, the results are integrated at the party level by taking the average of the candidates per party and for each state and election-year. Finally, the values of HI are normalized to account for the extremely high distribution of smaller parties. The HI varies from 0 to .8, where high indices of the variable would indicate that the party's votes are more concentrated while low indices of the variable would indicate that votes obtained by the party are more dispersed. Thus, since each strategy adopted reflects the maximizing utility of each party according to the characteristics of the electoral market in which they are competing, this measure would indicate the degree to which a party is electorally clientelistic.

## **Independent Variables**

### ***Ideology***

Right of center parties are usually associated with clientelistic linkage strategies (Montero 2010). The test of this variable will be conducted by using the left-right measures of ideology as devised by Power and Zucco (2009), which comprises six waves of measurements based on interviews with congressional deputies and senators. The scale goes from one (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Thus, we would expect a positive sign for this variable. That is, as parties move to the right of the political spectrum they tend to concentrate more votes.

### ***Private Sector's Size***

This variable measures the ability of the municipality to generate taxes and is obtained by dividing local tax revenues by current municipal income<sup>22</sup> and averaged by state. Autonomous municipalities suggest a more developed private sector and thus a population that is less susceptible to quid pro quo politics resultant from clientelistic linkages. I would expect a negative relationship with the dependent variable. That is, the greater the size of the private sector, the less likely a clientelistic party will prospect votes in that municipality.

### ***Public Administration's Size***

This variable measures the public sector economic contribution as a percentage of the economy in the year prior to the election (Zucco 2008).<sup>23</sup> This is obtained by dividing the GDP of the public administration by the municipality's overall GDP, and then averaged by the state. A jurisdiction with a relatively high proportion of its economy reliant on the public sector would indicate a strong dependence of the municipality on public funds, which can be a source for clientelism. Social indicators condition vote-buying and other clientelistic behavior: greater poverty, inequality, and generally lower social indicators coincide with a far higher incidence of clientelistic behavior (Desposato 2001). Thus, I would expect a positive relationship with the dependent variable.

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<sup>22</sup> I thank Cesar Zucco for clarifying the measurement of this variable.

<sup>23</sup> Except for the 1998 election, for which the closest data available is 1996.



### ***GDP per Capita***

This variable captures the municipal GDP per capita, which includes all sectors and uses a national implicit deflator.<sup>24</sup> The GDP per capita is the average of all municipalities for each state for the four years preceding the election. This variable is a proxy for modernization, which predicts that as economic development increases demands for private goods or clientelism decreases. Clientelism is generally conceived as reminiscent of traditional societies. As such, modernization would eventually erode the moral structures that mold patron-client relations (Nichter 2010) paving the way to programmatic linkages (Scott 1969). I would expect a negative relationship with the dependent variable.

### **Control Variables**

#### ***Urbanization***

Urbanization is also a proxy for the modernization effect that predicts increasing demand for policies. This variable measures the ratio of urban to rural population in the state for each electoral cycle according to the most recent census conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). The data was obtained from the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) website.<sup>25</sup> I expect a negative relationship with the dependent variable, as clientelistic parties would fare better in more rural environments.

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<sup>24</sup> An implicit deflator is the ratio of the current-currency value of a series to its corresponding chained-currency value, multiplied by 100.

<sup>25</sup> Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas Aplicadas – IPEA ([www.ideadata.gov.br](http://www.ideadata.gov.br))

### ***Population***

This is a standard control variable as it has been widely reported that the size of the population matters in explaining socio-political factors. I use the log of the population of the states based on the most recent census prior to the electoral cycle. I predict a negative relationship with the dependent variable, as state population growth in Brazil is historically associated with the modernization effect of industrialization and urbanization.

### ***Region***

The Northwest, North, and Center-West regions report higher levels of vote-buying than the South and Southeast (Epstein 2009). To test this variable I use a dummy for the five regions with the Southeast as the baseline. Thus, I would expect a positive sign for the first two regions and a negative one for the South region.

### ***District Magnitude***

District magnitude refers to the number of representatives elected in a single electoral district, which in Brazil coincides with the state boundaries. There is large variation in the district magnitude with the smallest state electing eight representatives and the largest electing the maximum of 70. The size of district magnitude has been positively associated with personal vote: as the district magnitude increases in systems in which intraparty competition is high (open list with single vote) so does the necessity for each candidate to differentiate herself

from her copartisans, thus resorting to personal vote strategies (Shugart and Carey 1995). Thus, I expect a positive sign for this variable.

## Model and Findings

The statistical model purports to test the validity of the dependent variable, Herfindahl Index, which is a proxy for clientelism measured by the principle of concentration of party votes in the electoral district. This original measure helps to unveil parties' electoral strategies on a dimension that has proven elusive to measurements. The continuous nature of the dependent variable requires an OLS model. Although several variables are correlated, tests show that collinearity is no reason for concern (see Appendix).

The full model can be expressed econometrically in the equation below:

$$HI = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Ideology} + \beta_2 \text{Local\_Taxes} + \beta_3 \text{Size\_Public\_Sector} + \beta_4 \text{GDP\_Capita} + \beta_5 \text{Urbanization} + \beta_6 \text{Log\_Population} + \beta_7 \text{North} + \beta_8 \text{Northeast} + \beta_9 \text{South} + \beta_{10} \text{Centerwest} + \beta_{11} \text{District\_Magnitude} + \beta_{12} \text{Local\_Taxes} * \text{Size\_Public\_Sector} + e$$

Table 4.1 shows the estimation of five regression models explaining the clientelistic-programmatic behavior of the Brazilian parties. Model 1 includes the main explanatory variables, Model 2 adds the socio-demographic variables, Model 3 includes the regional and institutional variables, Model 4 adds an interaction term, and Model 5 combines the regions into two more homogenous grand regions. Surprisingly, ideology is not statistically significant in any model tested. It appears that the common belief that rightist parties tend to be more clientelistic does not bear out in these models. The variable private sector's size is statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ) from Models 1 to 3 but the effect on the parties' clientelistic behavior is

contrary to the expected. However, in Model 4 and 5 it is not statistically significant and the sign inverts its direction in Model 5.

The variable public administration's size shows a positive sign and it is statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ) in Model 1. However, contrary to the prediction, when the socio-demographic, regional, or institutional variables are added (Models 2-5), the sign inverts and it remains statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ). The variable GDP per capita, which tests the modernization effect, is statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ) and in the expected direction in all models. For each unit increase in the GDP per capita there is an 11% decrease in clientelistic voting (Model 4).

**Table 4.1: Concentration and Dispersion of Party Vote**  
***DV: Clientelistic Party (Herfindahl Index)***

	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se
ideology_100	0.026 (0.00)	-0.027 (0.00)	-0.070 (0.00)	-0.067 (0.00)	-0.047 (0.00)
localtxyr	2.213*** (0.10)	1.972*** (0.10)	1.805*** (0.10)	0.343 (0.34)	-0.151 (0.33)
sizepub	0.078*** (0.02)	-0.034 (0.02)	-0.076** (0.02)	-0.217*** (0.04)	-0.231*** (0.04)
gdpcavg	-0.020*** (0.00)	-0.009*** (0.00)	-0.014*** (0.00)	-0.011*** (0.00)	-0.008*** (0.00)
urbanization		-0.003*** (0.00)	-0.005*** (0.00)	-0.005*** (0.00)	-0.004*** (0.00)
logpop		-0.037*** (0.00)	-0.046*** (0.00)	-0.044*** (0.00)	-0.060*** (0.00)
north			-0.030*** (0.01)	-0.031*** (0.01)	
northeast			-0.072*** (0.01)	-0.068*** (0.01)	
south			-0.052*** (0.01)	-0.052*** (0.01)	
centerwest			-0.071*** (0.01)	-0.061*** (0.01)	
magnitude			0.001*** (0.00)	0.001*** (0.00)	0.002*** (0.00)
c.localtxyr#c.size~b				3.817*** (0.84)	4.800*** (0.82)
grandnorth					-0.025*** (0.01)
constant	0.183*** (0.01)	0.759*** (0.03)	0.976*** (0.06)	0.979*** (0.06)	1.172*** (0.05)
R-sqr	0.205	0.342	0.402	0.407	0.386
dfres	2632	2630	2625	2624	2627
BIC	-4978.2	-5459.5	-5673.1	-5686.0	-5619.3

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

The results for the socio-demographic variables are consistent with the predicted direction and they show a statistically significant ( $p < .01$ ) relationship with clientelism in all models. As urbanization increases one unit clientelistic votes decreases by 5%. Likewise, for each 1% increase in population size clientelistic votes decrease by .00044 units in Model 4. The regional variables slightly contribute to the overall fit of the model as their introduction increases the R-square from .342 in Model 2 to .402 in Model 3. However, using the Southeast as a baseline, only the regions South and Center-West show the predicted sign with a negative and statistically significant relationship with clientelism ( $p < .001$ ). The North and Northeast regions are both statistically significant but with the inverted sign.

The full model (Model 4) tests political, clientelistic-programmatic, modernization, and demographic-regional variables. The F test indicates a good fit for the model, with  $F(12, 2624) = 149.97$  and a significant probability level ( $\text{Prob} > F = .000$ ). The model explains 40.7% of the variance on clientelism ( $R\text{-squared} = .407$ ). The strongest predictor in this model is public administration's size ( $-.217$ ;  $p < .001$ ). Finally, the institutional variable district magnitude shows a positive, weak, and statistically significant relationship with clientelism. For each unit change in the size of the district magnitude, an increase of only 1% would be expected in clientelism.


## **Discussion of The Herfindahl Index**

The Herfindahl Index (HI) has mainly been used to assess the monopolistic behavior of companies. It has also been applied in Political Science to measure party system fragmentation (Dalton 2008) and concentration (Bardhan and Yang 2004).

To my knowledge, the HI has not been used before to proxy party clientelistic behavior. I argue that parties devise electoral strategies that are reflected in the geographic concentration or dispersion of votes. Concentration results from parties' engagement with local political bosses who tend to control bulks of votes in their respective municipalities, which is a characteristic of clientelistic politics. Dispersion, in contrast, derives from parties' engagement on ideological politics, which will find likeminded voters across the regions. The adaptation of the HI to capture the electoral market concentration of political parties could provide a useful measurement of clientelistic party behavior.

The models overall offer some support for the validity of the measurement of clientelism based on the HI but their interpretation is more nuanced. In fact, taken as states' average, municipalities in which the public administration's size is greater indicates that parties tend to be more clientelistic. However, a change in the sign of both public administration's size and public sector's size suggests an interaction between the two variables. In order to understand this interaction, Figure 4.1 breaks down the values of public administration's size into the 5<sup>th</sup>, 50<sup>th</sup>, and 95<sup>th</sup> percentiles. It shows that the median effect of private sector's size on clientelism increases as the public administration's size also increases.

Figure 4. 1: Predictive Margins of the Effect of the Private Sector's Size on Clientelism (Herfindahl) by Higher, Median, and Lower Values of the Public Administration's Size.



The interpretation of this effect should consider the supply and demand side of clientelistic politics. Municipalities with more capacity to generate local taxes, that is, a more dynamic private sector, implies the existence of a bigger public market with more demands for parties with ideological appeals. The consequence is that the diminished pool of private market voters would increase the price of the clientelistic vote, thus requiring more public resources to buy it. However, this relationship becomes more complex when the highest (95<sup>th</sup> percentile) and lowest (5<sup>th</sup> percentile) values of the public administration's size are considered. In fact, on

one hand when the private sector's size is below .05,<sup>26</sup> states in which the municipalities have bigger public administration's size show a smaller impact on clientelistic party behavior than in states in which the municipalities have smaller public administration's size. On the other hand, when the private sector's size is above .05, states in which the municipalities have bigger public administration's size have more impact on clientelistic party behavior than in states in which the municipalities have smaller public administration's size.

Following from the previous explanation, given similar supply of clientelistic votes in municipalities with small private sector's size, more public resources appear to have less impact on clientelism than less public resources. It could be the case that having more public resources would allow for more investments in public goods, thus offsetting the necessity to resort to clientelistic politics. This situation is perfectly plausible as having more public resources would allow for the natural expansion of public goods and services thus increasing the number of people employed in the public sector through legitimate public entrance exams.


This relationship, however, is more evident to lower and higher values of the private sector's size as Figure 4.2 shows.

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<sup>26</sup> The intercept, where the lower and higher values of the size of public administration have the same effect on clientelism.




Figure 4. 2: Plot of Size of Private Sector on Size of Public Sector



As Figure 4.2 suggests, the correlation between medium-to-high values of the size of both public administration and private sector is non-existent. The scatterplot also shows an outlier,<sup>27</sup> which refers to the small state of Roraima in the year of 1998 and is explained by the fact that the only data available for that year was the state capital. Thus, differently from the other states, it does not reflect the average of the municipalities.

<sup>27</sup> The outlier does not drive the results in which case it was not dropped from the dataset.

Figure 4. 3: Predictive Margins of the Effect of the Public Administration's Size on Clientelism (Herfindahl) by Higher, Median, and Lower Values of the Private Sector's Size



While Figure 4.1 considers the effect of private sector's size on clientelism moderated by size of public administration, Figure 4.3 inverts it to analyze the effect of public administration's size on clientelism moderated by private sector's size. In this sense, Figure 4.3 shows that the median effect of the public administration's size on clientelism decreases as the private sector's size increase. However, this relationship is different for the higher (95th percentile) and lower (5<sup>th</sup> percentile) values of the private sector's size. Indeed, it shows that the effect of the public administration's size on clientelism decreases for lower values of private sector's size increase, while it increases for higher values of the size of private sector.

In addition, it appears that private markets require more public resources in the dispensation of clientelistic politics. This analysis is consistent with reports from politicians who claimed during the field research interview that votes were becoming more expensive because there were fewer residual clientelistic votes to be bought (A. Imbassahy, personal communication, August 14, 2013).

On a different note, contrary to expected, clientelism does not appear to be sensitive to party ideology as it is consistently not statistically significant throughout the models. It may be the case that parties' realignment in the last two decades, which resulted in movements across the political spectrum, may have confounded any correlation. In fact, Power and Zucco's (2012) waves of surveys measuring partisan ideological placement show a substantial variation within the parties. Additionally, it has been indicated that parties are to some extent engaging in both clientelistic and ideological politics (Strom 1990). Indeed, this claim is confirmed in the field research interviews where elected officials cautiously (e.g. J. Neto, personal communication, July 25, 2013) or openly (e.g. L. Lima, personal communication, August 27, 2013) suggest such practices.

### **The Cluster Index**

The Herfindahl Index (HI) measure of electoral market concentration shows some validity as a proxy for clientelism. But while this index captures the concentration of party votes in an electoral district, which is consistent with party's clientelistic behavior, it does not take into account the contiguity of the municipalities in which candidates prospect their votes, which could be related to

the strategies of more programmatic parties. According to Ames (2001), clustering, or votes that are obtained in contiguous municipality, tends to generate candidates who are more accountable to their constituents and less susceptible to local bosses. In this sense, clustering could be a better measure of programmatic party' strategy. Since HI deals with concentration taking into consideration votes received in municipalities of each state, the assessment of programmatic party behavior could be improved further. In this sense, the HI approach can only reveal the degree to which a party is more or less clientelistic (a function of the concentration of their votes in the municipality), thus missing the programmatic behavior (a function of clustering) to which this analysis now turns.

In order to refine the measurement of clientelistic party behavior, I propose a Cluster Index, which is a new approach that takes into consideration the clustering and dispersion of party votes. This measure consists of first sorting the vote share for each candidate by municipality ranked according to its population size. Second, a new binary variable is coded one if the cumulative sum of the vote share per candidate by municipality is lower than .95 and zero otherwise. Third, a spatial clustering algorithm is run considering the new binary variable described above and then the number of clusters are iterated to find the best fit up to a limit of 10. Fourth, after the optimum cluster solution is found, for each one of clusters it calculates the proportion of votes the candidate received in that cluster ( $vp$ ) and the proportion of the population in each cluster ( $pp$ ). Finally, the dependent variable is obtained by calculating the sum of the product of the proportion of the votes received by each candidate and the proportion of the population [mean product =

sum (vp\*pp)]. This measure indicates the increases in dispersion, which is consistent with clientelistic party behavior. The data is aggregated by state, party, and year.<sup>28</sup>

The new variable, thus, represents a party clientelistic index and is substituted in the previous discussed econometric model as described below:

$$CI = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Ideology + \beta_2 Local\_Taxes + \beta_3 Size\_Public\_Sector + \beta_4 GDP\_Capita + \beta_5 Urbanization + \beta_6 Log\_Population + \beta_7 North + \beta_8 Northeast + \beta_9 South + \beta_{10} Centerwest + \beta_{11} District\_Magnitude + \beta_{12} Local\_Taxes * Size\_Public\_Sector + e$$

Table 4.2 tests the same models as Table 4.1 but with the new variable cluster index, which shows overall best fit for the models. Ideology shows the expected sign but it still cannot support the common belief that rightist parties tend to be more clientelistic. The variable private sector's size is statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ) for all models but the effect on the parties' clientelistic behavior changes direction with only Models 1 through 3 showing the unexpected sign. However, in Models 4 and 5 it is the expected direction and robust. The variable size of public administration's size shows similar behavior across the models except that it is not statistically significant in Model 5.

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<sup>28</sup> The states of Pernambuco and São Paulo are not included, as it did not converged during the iteration process.

**Table 4.2: Clustering and Dispersion of Party Vote  
DV: Clientelistic Party (Cluster Index)**

	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se
ideology_100	0.123 (0.00)	0.050 (0.00)	0.039 (0.00)	0.061 (0.00)	0.028 (0.00)
localtxyr	1.910*** (0.11)	0.790*** (0.12)	0.343** (0.12)	-5.745*** (0.41)	-4.518*** (0.39)
sizepub	0.749*** (0.02)	0.516*** (0.02)	0.422*** (0.03)	-0.117** (0.04)	-0.032 (0.04)
gdpavg	0.009*** (0.00)	0.013*** (0.00)	0.022*** (0.00)	0.032*** (0.00)	0.023*** (0.00)
urbanization		0.005*** (0.00)	0.003*** (0.00)	0.005*** (0.00)	0.005*** (0.00)
logpop		-0.055*** (0.00)	-0.121*** (0.00)	-0.106*** (0.00)	-0.079*** (0.00)
north			-0.005 (0.01)	-0.025* (0.01)	
northeast			0.065*** (0.01)	0.057*** (0.01)	
south			0.009 (0.01)	0.022** (0.01)	
centerwest			0.006 (0.01)	0.036*** (0.01)	
magnitude			0.005*** (0.00)	0.004*** (0.00)	0.003*** (0.00)
c.localtxyr#c.size~b				15.758*** (1.03)	12.862*** (1.00)
grandnorth					0.006 (0.01)
constant	-0.018 (0.01)	0.888*** (0.04)	1.793*** (0.06)	1.746*** (0.06)	1.383*** (0.06)
R-sqr	0.424	0.523	0.585	0.622	0.591
dfres	2436	2434	2429	2428	2431
BIC	-4062.3	-4503.7	-4806.1	-5024.4	-4860.0

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

The variable GDP per capita and urbanization are both statistically significant (p<.001) but in the unexpected direction in all models. However, the log of the population is in the expected direction and shows a statistically significant (p<.001) relationship with clientelism in all models. For each one percent increase in population size, clientelistic votes decreases by .0011 units in Model 4. The regional variables only slightly improve to the overall fit of the model as their introduction increases the R-square from .523 in Model 2 to .585 in Model 3 and only the

Northeast region shows the predicted sign with a positive and statistically significant relationship with clientelism ( $p < .001$ ). In Model 4 they are all statistically significant but again only Northeast has the predicted sign.


The full model (Model 4) improves the explanatory power substantially compared to the same model tested with the Herfindahl Index in Table 4.1. The F test indicates a good fit for the model, with  $F(12, 2428) = 332.53$  and a significant probability level ( $\text{Prob} > F = .000$ ). The model explains 62.2% of the variance on clientelism ( $R\text{-squared} = .622$ ) compared to 40.7% in the equivalent HI model. The strongest predictor in this model is private sector's size ( $-5.745$ ;  $p < .001$ ). District magnitude remains a positive, weak, and statistically significant predictor of clientelism but its coefficient improves slightly from .001 in the equivalent HI model to .004 in the current Cluster Index model. That is, for each unit change in the district magnitude, an increase of 4% would be expected in clientelism.

## **Discussion of the Cluster Index**

The Cluster Index improves on the validity of the measurement of clientelism vis-à-vis the previously tested Herfindahl Index. Here I focus on the interaction effect of the main predictors: private sector's size and public administration's size. As with the HI models, Figure 4.4 also considers the 5<sup>th</sup>, 50<sup>th</sup>, and 95<sup>th</sup> percentiles of public administration's size. Overall, the effect of private sector's size on clientelism increases as public administration's size also increases. However, the magnitude of this effect changes for the lower and higher percentiles. When the public administration's size is below .31 the effect of lower values of the private sector's

size (5<sup>th</sup> percentile) is higher on clientelism than the higher values of the private sector's size (95<sup>th</sup> percentile). This relationship inverts when public administration's size is above .31 with higher values of the private sector's size exerting a more pronounced effect on clientelism.

Figure 4.4: Predictive Margins of Public Administration's Size on Clientelism (Cluster) mediated by Private Sector's Size




Conversely, Figure 4.5 takes into consideration the effect of private sector's size on clientelism moderated by public administration's size. It shows that the effect of private sector's size on clientelism decreases for lower and median values of public administration's size. However, this relationship is different for the higher (95<sup>th</sup> percentile) values of public administration's size. In this case, it shows that the



effect of private sector's size on clientelism increases for higher values of public administration's size.

Figure 4.5: Predictive Margins of Private Sector's Size on Clientelism (Cluster Index) mediated by Public Administration's Size




The analysis of Figure 4.5 suggests that private sector's size is less conducive to clientelistic politics in places where public administration's size is at the median or lower. Conversely, it appears that both private sector's and public administration's sizes work in tandem toward clientelistic politics. This further suggests that the more advanced the municipality is, the more public resources are necessary to feed the clientelistic demands of the electoral market. This argument is

also supported by the interpretation of Figure 4.4 in which, to a higher or a lesser degree, the effect of public administration's size on clientelism mediated by private sector's size is always positive for the three percentile levels considered.

Now that we have analyzed the validity of the statistical models explaining the clientelistic behavior of the political party system, we can turn to the question of how well these models explain political parties. In order to answer this question, I plot the distribution of the 32 existing Brazilian political parties during the period of 1998 to 2010 aggregated by state and year and compared them according to the mean value of the Herfindahl Index and the Cluster Index, ordered by the latter.

Figure 4.6: Clientelistic/Programmatic Positions of the Political Parties by Herfindahl and Spatial (Cluster)




According to Figure 4.6, the Herfindahl plot does not show a discernible pattern when compared to the spatial plot (Cluster Index), which is our reference model. The spatial plot, however, yields interesting findings. It is notable that the

distribution of the political parties according to Cluster Index tends to support the literature, which claims that parties tend to be more clientelistic as they move to the right of the political spectrum. In fact, if we consider the clusters of the dot plot distribution, five distinct clusters can be identified. The first one includes the leftist parties Brazilian Communist Party (PC do B), the Workers' Party (PT), and the Popular Socialist Party (PPS), which are closer in the lower values of the Cluster Index. The second cluster shows the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), the Green Party (PV), the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), and the Socialism and Freedom Party (PSOL). The third cluster includes the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), the Democrats (DEM), and the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB). The fourth cluster shows parties such as the Christian Social Party (PSC), the Party of the Republic (PR), and the Christian Social Democratic Party (PSDC). The last cluster includes parties in the higher value of the Cluster Index such as the more rightist parties the Progressive Party (PP), the Progressive Republican Party (PRP), and the now extinct the Party of the Reconstruction of the National Order (PRONA). Two left leaning parties also unexpectedly appear in this last cluster: the Democratic Labour Party (PDT) and the Workers' Cause Party (PCO). Overall, this finding offers additional evidence supporting the validity of the clientelistic measure of party behavior as assessed by the spatial distribution of votes (Cluster Index).

The position of the political parties on a two-dimension plot of political linkage (left/right and clientelistic/programmatic) in Figure 4.7 shows an interesting picture. The plot uses the Power and Zucco (2009) scale to position the parties on an ideological dimension. The clientelistic dimension is derived from the

Cluster Index and re-scaled for better comparison with the ideological one. Although the parties are located in each of the specific quadrants (1-right/clientelistic, 2-left/clientelistic, 3-left-programmatic, and 4-right/programmatic), we cannot tell what the exact score is in which a party transitions from being programmatic to clientelistic, for instance. Still, the distribution of the parties yields interesting findings. Overall, the parties fall into the expected quadrants.

Figure 4.7: Political Parties Position on a Clientelistic/Programmatic and Left/Right Dimension



Following the literature that associates leftist parties with programmatic politics and rightist parties with clientelistic politics, we would expect to find most of the parties falling along the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> quadrants, which is the case. The whole picture is more complex and some unexpected results also surface. In the right/clientelistic quadrant (1<sup>st</sup>), for instance, small and median parties such as the extinct ultra-right Party of the Reconstruction of the National Order (PRONA), which merged with the Party of the Republic (PR) in 2006 (also located in the same quadrant), and the Progressive Party (PP). In the left/programmatic quadrant (3<sup>rd</sup>) are parties such as the Brazilian Communist Party (PC do B), the Workers' Party (PT), and the Socialist People's Party (PPS). In the left/clientelistic quadrant (2<sup>nd</sup>) there are only three parties: the Workers' Cause Party (PCO), the Unified Socialist Workers' Party (PSTU), the Democratic Labour Party (PDT), which is unexpected given the historic programmatic appeals of these parties. The case of the PDT is particularly interesting and it is possible that its position is a result of shifts undergone in the last 10 years following change in leadership. As a long time PDT representative puts it:

*The political platform of my party is non-existent. They allow state compositions [alliances or coalitions] with no criteria. Our party is no longer a reference [of an ideological party] since Brizola has passed away. It is a fact that PDT was created to fulfill his [Brizola] goal to become president of Brazil, since he could not gain control of the PTB brand after the redemocratization period. He had fame as being a "caudilho" but he was democratic and when he would lose the internal discussion he would concede. We used to discuss national politics, without prioritizing local or regional interests. (Miro Teixeira, Personal Interview, August 27, 2013)*

In the right/programmatic quadrant (4<sup>th</sup>) fall parties like the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), and the Democrats (DEM). While the PSDB is consensually recognized as a programmatic party, PMDB is known for its lack of ideological appeal or as a *fisiológico* (tit-for tat) party in the words of a former party representative (José Dias, Personal Interview, July 31, 2013). The DEM (former PFL) is known for its non-ideological approach to politics; as one DEM party representative suggests, there is not an ideological party linkage but a personal appeal to voters (Paulo Azi, Personal Interview, July 23, 2013).

## Conclusion

Clientelistic political linkages have received considerable attention recently by scholars who have moved beyond the anthropological or sociological understanding of the mechanisms that mediate the relationship between patrons and clients. More specifically, scholars have focused on clientelism as an electoral strategy of politicians or political parties. However, the challenge remaining is related the elusiveness of this concept to measurement, as it practices posit ethical or even illegal concerns related to vote buying, patronage, and deliverance of personal benefits to the detriment of the collective good. This chapter purported to devise a new measurement for clientelism based on the distribution of votes in electoral districts. I argued that competitive elections in multiparty proportional electoral systems compel parties to seek votes either in public electoral markets,

where voters are more sensitive to ideological appeals, and private electoral markets, where voters are more inclined to clientelistic linkages.

The demand side of the electoral markets will drive the strategies of the political parties in their task to gain seats. In this sense, electoral public markets will demand more clientelistic parties, while private electoral markets demand more programmatic parties. Parties then compete and the outcome of the election reflects the strategies adopted according to the programmatic-clientelistic behavior of each party. In this sense, more clientelistic parties would tend to have more concentrated votes as they recruit local political bosses who in return deliver bulks of votes to them in the municipality, while more programmatic parties would show less concentrated votes.

In order to test this theory I use the Herfindahl Index (HI), a general measure of concentration usually applied to measure monopolist behavior by companies, and the Cluster Index, which improves on the previous measure to account for the clustering of votes according to the contiguity of the municipalities. In this sense, the HI calculates the share of votes of each candidate in each municipality, and then integrates it by party year in the electoral district, which coincides in the state in Brazil. After calculating the HI for each party, I then test for the validity of this measurement by running regression models with HI as the dependent variable against four main independent variables (ideology, local taxes, size of public sector, and GDP per capita) and other control variables. Due to the limitations of the HI assessment of programmatic party behavior, I then use the same statistical models

to test the validity of a more refined Cluster Index, which aggregates the distribution of votes in optimum clusters to calculate the dispersion of by party, year, and state.

Party ideology has been associated with clientelistic party behavior. It is suggested that in Brazil more rightist parties tend to be more clientelistic. However, the statistical models failed to confirm this hypothesis as the sign changes direction and it is not statistically significant. The modernization theory, which suggests that as GDP per capita, urbanization, and population size increases clientelism decreases, is partially confirmed.

These variables suggest that as municipalities modernize, parties become less clientelistic, though only the (log) size of population, which are demographic variables operating in the same logic of the modernization theory, consistently confirms this throughout the Cluster models. This indicates that as the size of the population increases clientelism decreases. The results for the regional variables are mixed with only the Northeast confirming the prediction for the Cluster models. I also grouped the most similar regions together dividing them into North (grandnorth) and South, which is statistically significant and in the predicted direction. This study also confirms previous findings as the Cluster models predict that clientelism increases with the size of the district magnitude.

The results concerning the main variables of interest are mixed. In the case of private sector's size, the hypothesis that a more robust local private sector tends to make its citizens less susceptible to clientelistic politics is only partially confirmed. In the Cluster models, it is statistically significant throughout the models but only Models 4 and 5 show the predicted direction.



In the case of the public administration's size, the hypothesis that its increased size relative to the size of the private sector creates more opportunities for clientelistic politics since the local population becomes more dependent on scarce public resources is partially confirmed in the Cluster models. In this case, it is statistically significant for Models 1 to 3 and in the predicted direction but in Models 4 and 5 it changes direction and/or loses statistical significance.

However, the most interesting finding is related to the interaction effect of both public administration's size and private sector's size on clientelism. In this sense, for the Herfindahl models it appears that the effect of the private sector's size on clientelism is higher when the public administration's size is bigger. Conversely, this effect is lower when the public sector's size is small but, in this case, lower values of the public sector's size has more impact on clientelism than higher values. From a different perspective, the effect of public administration's size on clientelism increases for higher values and decrease for median and lower values of private sector's size.

Comparing the Herfindahl and the Cluster models, it is possible to conclude that the effect of private sector's size on clientelism is unequivocally positive and robust for upper values of public administration's size. However, the same effect for median and lower values of public administration's size is either less pronounced for the predictive margins of the Herfindahl model or negative for the predictive margins of the Cluster models. This suggests that in larger private markets the residual pool of clientelistic votes is smaller, thus requiring more public resources for the dispensation of patronage, while in smaller private markets the supply of

clientelistic votes is higher, thus reducing the amount of public resources necessary for patronage. Likewise, the effect of public administration's size on clientelism is unmistakably positive for the upper values of private sector's size for both Herfindahl and Cluster models. However, in the first model, the median and lower values of private sector's size are negative while positive but less robust for the second model. In sum, more developed municipalities have a smaller pool of clientelistic votes that are crucial to win competitive elections mainly contested among programmatic parties. As a consequence, they require more public resources to feed the clientelistic machine.

In the next chapter, I will integrate ideology and clientelism as concurrent dimensions of political competition. The question we will seek to answer is whether pre-electoral coalitions can be explained as function of both formal (ideology) and informal (clientelism) institutions.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **Ideological and Clientelistic Determinants of Electoral Coalitions in Brazil**

This chapter aims to integrate two concurrent dimensions of political competition (ideology and clientelism) to unveil the patterns of political competition in Brazil. The question we seek to answer in this chapter is whether pre-electoral coalitions<sup>29</sup> can be explained as a function of both ideological and clientelistic linkages. I define coalitions as associations of political parties with the objective to stand elections. Previous works have mainly dealt with formal institutions that link voters to parties through policy. To be sure, recent scholarship has paid considerable attention to informal institutions of which clientelistic politics is an important component (e.g. Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Nichter 2010). However, these studies tend to treat ideology and clientelism independently.

This chapter considers both ideology and clientelism as integral and simultaneous factors in the electoral competition process. For this purpose, I have developed the combined utility theory, which argues that polarized competitive elections in modernizing national electoral markets constrain programmatic parties to coalesce with clientelistic parties to gain access to regional private electoral markets. This dichotomy is the result of uneven socio-economic changes that make it possible for parties to coexist in both public and private electoral market domains. Programmatic parties may avoid direct engagement in clientelistic politics, as these

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<sup>29</sup> I use the terms pre-electoral, electoral coalitions, and electoral alliances interchangeably.

parties tend to be more accountable to their voters. Alternatively, they will form electoral coalitions with clientelistic parties as an indirect strategy to increase their vote share.

In order to test this theory, reliable measures of party ideology and clientelism placement on the political spectrum are necessary. The ideology measure is drawn from Power and Zucco (2012) and its reliability is discussed in Chapter 3. The clientelism measure is described in Chapter 4. In this chapter I will assess the validity of these measurements while testing the extent to which these two factors explain the patterns of electoral coalitions.

The working hypothesis is that parties preserve their ideological coherence by forming electoral coalitions with ideologically proximate parties. In this case, a negative relationship between explanatory and outcome variables is expected. That is, as the ideological dispersion of the parties increases the probability of forming coalitions decreases. On the other hand, in order to gain access to additional votes necessary to win competitive elections, programmatic parties will engage clientelistic ones. In this case, a positive relationship is expected, suggesting that as the clientelistic dispersion of the parties increase so does the probability of forming coalitions.

This chapter is organized as follows. The first section presents the data and measurements. The second section introduces the model and discusses the main findings. The final section concludes.

## **Data and Measurements**

The test of the hypotheses associated with coalition strategies will be conducted through data collected from Superior Electoral Tribunal's (TSE) website on four electoral cycles between 1998 and 2010 for the Chamber of Deputies for each of the 26 Brazilian states.<sup>30</sup> The data was collected from Superior Electoral Tribunal's (TSE) website. The selection of the electoral period is due to data availability as the levels of aggregation and organization of the data preceding the 1998 elections are incomplete for all states.<sup>31</sup> Despite some limits in coverage, the dataset is representative of the crucial cases involving two polarizing parties we set up to analyze. The use of data relative to the Chamber of Deputies is justified because it allows for better comparison among the various political parties nationwide. For instance, not all parties run candidates for president, governor, or senator and the race for state-level Chamber of Deputies positions may be subject to very particular local demands. The data is aggregated by state, year, and party and comprises 5,823 observations.

## **Dependent Variable**

### ***Electoral Coalition***

Parties coalesce electorally to win elections and, in seeking this goal, they devise strategies that lead them to such an objective. Studying parties' electoral

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<sup>30</sup> Since the level of aggregation necessary for the analysis of party clientelistic behavior is municipalities, the Federal District is excluded from the database because its administrative subunits are not municipalities.

<sup>31</sup> The writing of this dissertation was already advanced when the 2014 elections were held, thus it was not included in the dataset.

objectives and strategies, scholars are able to explain in general the factors that bring parties together in electoral coalitions (e.g Golder 2005, 2006). This dissertation focuses on polarized competitive elections, which suggests that parties resort to other dimensions of political linkage in order to obtain the differential votes for the victory on election day. In this sense, our main concern refers to the coalition formation around polarizing parties without neglecting the role that the remainder parties play in the overall electoral coalition process. In this sense, the dependent variable consists of a group of variables that considers the electoral coalition for each party independently in any given electoral year. In this case, each party corresponds to a binary variable that is coded one for every time another given party forms a coalition with it and zero otherwise. For instance, the variable PP\_coalition is coded one when other parties form a coalition with the Progressive Party (PP) for the elections years between 1998 and 2010 and zero otherwise.

## **Independent Variables**

### ***Ideology***

The literature suggests parties are attracted to ideologically proximate parties when forming coalitions (Golder 2006). In order to test whether this is the case – whether ideology matters in coalition formation – the model tests for the effect of ideological distance between parties. The variable is based on Power and Zucco's (2007) measure of ideological placement over time, which accounts for variations within parties across time. The parties are placed on a continuum that varies from one (most leftist) to 10 (far rightist). Further, I calculate the ideological

distance, which is the absolute difference between a party's ideology and the ideology of all other parties, which is a measure of dispersion both to the left and to the right of the coalition formed by any given party. In this case, it would be expected that as the ideological distance increases, the probability of forming a coalition would decrease.

### ***Clientelism***

Polarized national electoral competitions compel programmatic parties to seek additional non-ideological votes in bailiwicks. This suggests that these parties will resort to clientelistic parties by means of coalitions to gain access to voters who are non-responsive to programmatic appeals. The literature suggests that leftist parties tend to be more programmatic while rightist parties are more clientelistically inclined (Montero 2010). Accordingly, it would be expected that the variable clientelism would be positively and statistically correlated with rightist parties and negatively and statistically correlated with leftist parties. However, I make no assumption about the programmatic nature of the political parties as far as their position in the political spectrum goes. One field research interview suggests though that parties create coalitions irrespective of ideological commitments (J. Neto, personal communication, July 25, 2013). If this holds true across the board, I would expect that as parties' clientelistic dispersion increases, so does the probability of forming electoral coalitions.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the measure for clientelism is based on sorting the vote share for each candidate from biggest to smallest by municipality, weighted by

its population size. Subsequently, a variable is coded one if the cumulative sum of the vote share per candidate per municipality is lower than .95 and zero otherwise. For instance, if the sequence of vote share is .3, .25, .15, .1, .1, .05, .02, .02, and .01, the cumulative sum is .3, .55, .7, .8, .9, .95, .97, .99, and 1. In this case the new variable is coded 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0. After that, a spatial clustering algorithm is run considering this dummy variable; then, the number of clusters is iterated to find the best fit up to a limit of 10. After the optimum cluster solution is found, it calculates, for each cluster, the proportion of votes the candidate received (vp) and the proportion of the population (pp). Further, the dependent variable is obtained by calculating the sum of the product of the proportion of the votes received by each candidate and the proportion of the population [mean product =  $\sum (vp*pp)$ ]. This measure indicates the increases in dispersion, which is consistent with clientelistic party behavior. Finally, like the ideology distance, I also calculate the clientelistic distance, which is the absolute difference between a party's measure of clientelism relative to all other parties' measure of clientelism.

## **Control Variables**

### ***Party Size***

In proportional elections, parties first need to overcome the electoral quotient to seat any representative. The electoral quotient is obtained by dividing the number of votes by the number of seats. Since smaller parties are less likely to reach this quotient, you would expect that small parties would coalesce with larger



parties in order to gain representation in the Chamber of Deputies.<sup>32</sup> Thus, it would be expected that when the big parties<sup>33</sup> are considered as dependent variables, as the size of the parties increase so does the probability of forming coalitions. Since we are arbitrarily picking the parties according to their size, the inverse is true for small parties; that is, as the size of the parties increases the probability of forming electoral coalitions also increases. The size of the party is based on two measurements: party size seat, or the number of seats for each party in the House of Representatives, and the party size vote, or the number of votes each party receives in the election.

### ***Presidential Coattail***

In order to test the possibility that presidential politics influences subnational legislative elections (Brambor et. al. 2006), I include a dummy variable that captures the legislative coalition with the party in power in the previous election year. The presumption is that parties seek coalitions with the party in power so as to gain access to federal resources. Thus, I would expect a positive and significant effect of the variable coalition coattail on the dependent variable party coalition. Since only two parties (PT and PSDB) have governed during the period considered, the test of this variable is only plausible in models that consider the electoral coalitions for both the PT and the PSDB parties.

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<sup>32</sup> Alternatively, big parties would coalesce with smaller parties to add free TV/radio time in majoritarian elections. Although it is likely that there is some level of coordination between majoritarian and proportional elections for coalitional purposes, I am only interested in the proportional aspect of the coalitions.

<sup>33</sup> Parties are considered big when they have more than 10% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies; medium, between 5 and 9.9%; and small, less than 4.9% (Braga and Pimentel, 2013).

### ***District Magnitude***

In the open list with single vote ballot systems, the district magnitude size has been associated with appeals for personal votes (Shugart and Carey 1995). These systems increase intraparty competition, thus requiring candidates to separate themselves from other parties within the same party. Thus, inclusion of this variable tests the hypothesis that the larger the district, the more likely the dispute for clientelistic votes. Since the party brand is a constant for candidates, the only way they can distinguish themselves is by means of personal vote appeal (Shugart and Carey 1995). In this sense, the magnitude of the district is a proxy for competitiveness, in which case it would suggest that the higher the district magnitude the higher the competitiveness and therefore the necessity to form electoral coalitions.

### ***Model and Findings***

In order to test the hypotheses that ideology and clientelism are both at work when forming political coalitions, I use a logistic model that treats each party coalition individually. In this case, each model consists of a dependent variable that specifically tests all possible coalitions formed by one party with another party. For instance, PP\_coalition will be coded one every time that any other given party forms a coalition with PP (Progressive Party) and zero otherwise. The parties of primary interest for this analysis are the Workers' Party (PT) and the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) as those parties have polarized the national elections since 1994.

However, in the subsequent analysis several other parties will be considered according to their size and distribution on the political spectrum. Indeed, competitive elections are an important component of the theory developed in this dissertation, which suggests that as parties exhaust their ideological appeal, they will access other dimensions of political linkages. In this sense, one of the main objectives of this study is to assess the validity of the measurements of the two dimensions of political competition – ideology and clientelism -- to unveil how these dimensions interact to produce the electoral outcome desired by the political parties.

The econometric model of the coalition hypothesis is shown below:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Party\_Coalition} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Ideology} + \beta_2 \text{Clientelism} + \beta_3 \text{Party\_Size\_Seat} + \\ & \beta_4 \text{Party\_Size\_Vote} + \beta_5 \text{District\_Magnitude} + \\ & \beta_6 \text{Presidential\_Coattail} + \beta_7 (\text{Log}) \text{Population} + \\ & \beta_8 \text{GDP\_per\_Capita} + \beta_9 \text{Urbanization} + \beta_{10} \text{Verticalization} + \\ & \beta_{11} \text{Region} + e \end{aligned}$$

Table 5.1 shows the estimation of eight logistic regression models explaining coalition formations for selected parties. Besides the main parties of interest, the PT (big, programmatic, and center-left) and the PSDB (big, programmatic, and center-right), I also include other parties that are representative of both size and position on the clientelistic-ideological spectrum, such as the PMDB (big, programmatic, and center-right), the DEM (big, programmatic, and right), PSB (median, programmatic, and center-left), the PTB (median, programmatic, and center-right), the PMN (small, programmatic, and left), and the PRP (small, clientelistic, and right) (see Figure 4.7 in Chapter 4 to visualize party placement).

Overall, the explanatory variable ideology, which measures the dispersion of coalitions in both directions, is remarkably consistent. It shows a robust and statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ) relation for all but one party (PMN). The overall negative correlation with the dependent variable indicates that as the absolute difference of the parties' ideology increases (a measure of dispersion), the likelihood of forming a coalition with a given party decreases. In other words, it indicates that coalitions tend to be formed with parties that are ideologically proximate. This finding represents strong evidence that ideology indeed matters in coalition formation.

I also test the effect of party ideology over time to account for party shifting along the political spectrum as suggested in the literature (e.g. Hunter 2007, 2010, Power and Zucco 2009, Samuels 2004). To test this effect, I run restricted models for the elections of 2002, 2006, and 2010 (Table 5.8, Appendix C). In general, it shows that the effect of ideology decreases with the exception of the PSDB, for which this effect increases, and the PRP that remains stable. The effect of ideology in three other parties (PSB, PMN and PTB) is not statistically significant. I repeated the process with restricted models for 2006 and 2010 (Table 5.9, Appendix C) and the overall effect of ideology decreases even further in comparison with the previous models (Table 5.8, Appendix C), with the exception of the PSB, for which the coefficient regains statistical significance with a higher value than the fully specified model. The effect of ideology on PT, the PMDB and the PTB loses statistical significance and the PMN increases while also gains statistical significance. The

effect of ideology on the PSDB decreases in comparison to the first restricted model but it is higher than the fully specified model (Table 5.1).

**Table 5.1: Party's Electoral Coalition Formation (1998-2010)*****DV: Party's Electoral Coalition Formation***

	PT b/se	PSDB b/se	PMDB b/se	DEM b/se	PSB b/se	PTB b/se	PMN b/se	PRP b/se
ideology	-0.224*** (0.03)	-0.211*** (0.05)	-0.171*** (0.05)	-0.271*** (0.04)	-0.144*** (0.03)	-0.096*** (0.03)	0.013 (0.02)	-0.173*** (0.03)
clientelism	-1.026 (0.59)	1.206* (0.58)	1.101 (0.60)	0.990 (0.74)	0.181 (0.56)	1.089* (0.47)	-0.398 (0.55)	1.523** (0.53)
size_vote_100	0.002 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	-0.007*** (0.00)
size_seat	-0.012*** (0.00)	0.006** (0.00)	0.006** (0.00)	0.005* (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	0.009*** (0.00)	0.007** (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)
magnitude	-0.029 (0.02)	-0.047* (0.02)	0.041 (0.02)	0.030 (0.02)	-0.023 (0.02)	0.025 (0.02)	-0.003 (0.02)	0.102*** (0.02)
population (log)	-0.147 (0.14)	-0.155 (0.12)	-0.207 (0.14)	-0.280 (0.16)	0.015 (0.13)	-0.035 (0.13)	-0.403** (0.15)	0.058 (0.14)
gdp_per_capita	0.033 (0.06)	-0.060 (0.06)	0.242*** (0.06)	-0.106 (0.08)	0.185** (0.06)	-0.017 (0.06)	0.181** (0.06)	-0.026 (0.07)
urbanization	-0.078** (0.03)	-0.002 (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)	-0.042 (0.03)	-0.070** (0.02)	0.033 (0.02)	-0.045* (0.02)	-0.008 (0.02)
verticalization	-0.094 (0.19)	0.465* (0.18)	0.461* (0.19)	0.023 (0.20)	0.850*** (0.19)	-0.012 (0.20)	0.314 (0.21)	-0.289 (0.25)
north	-0.199 (0.18)	0.031 (0.19)	-1.254*** (0.22)	-0.389 (0.27)	-0.504* (0.20)	0.194 (0.18)	0.058 (0.19)	1.089*** (0.22)
southeast	-0.353 (0.35)	0.065 (0.35)	-1.841*** (0.39)	0.151 (0.47)	-0.864* (0.36)	-0.656 (0.38)	-0.838* (0.36)	0.399 (0.66)
south	-0.894* (0.37)	0.126 (0.37)	-2.052*** (0.40)	0.209 (0.50)	-1.692*** (0.39)	-0.691 (0.38)	-1.792*** (0.41)	0.610 (0.45)
centerwest	-0.235 (0.25)	0.136 (0.24)	-1.023*** (0.26)	0.411 (0.31)	-0.208 (0.26)	0.144 (0.23)	-0.378 (0.26)	0.925*** (0.26)
constant	2.242 (2.00)	1.186 (1.79)	0.933 (2.01)	3.419 (2.31)	-1.586 (1.96)	-1.163 (1.85)	3.761 (2.12)	-2.681 (1.93)
N	2361	2361	2365	1535	2244	2293	2133	1633
BIC	2192.0	2136.5	1969.8	1333.9	1961.5	2111.0	2038.1	1625.3

\* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

The effect of clientelism on coalitions does not change substantially when the restricted models are considered (Table 5.3). It is worth mentioning that the PT is only statistically significant for the 2002 period and subsequent elections. A further restriction of the model for the 2006 and subsequent elections show that the PT loses statistical significance just as in the fully specified model. The same pattern also applies for PMDB. The effect of clientelism on the PSDB coalitions, on the other hand, is statistically significant for the fully specified model but it loses statistical significance in the two remaining restricted models. The same applies for the PTB. Conversely, the DEM, the PSB, and the PMN are not statistically significant in the remaining three models. Finally, the PRP remains statistically significant throughout the models.

When both dimensions of political linkage are analyzed for the whole period considered in this study, it appears that the PSDB is slightly more consistent on its coalition formation on the ideological dimension than is the PT. At the same time, the PSDB appears to extend further on the clientelistic spectrum when forming coalitions, as compared to the PT. In fact, as Table 5.2 indicates, for the 1998-2010 period, the standard deviation of the ideology of the parties under the PT's coalition is bigger than that of the PSDB, suggesting that the PSDB's electoral coalitions were less dispersed than that of the PT. The dispersion of the PT's coalitions decreased for the 2002-2010 period and decreased even further for the 2006-2010 period but is still more dispersed than is the PSDB ideological partners. The PSDB's ideological coalition dispersion also went down when the period was restricted to 2002-2010, went slightly up for the 2006-2010 period though it remained lower than the 1998-

2010 period. This finding suggests that the PT's coalition strategy has been more aggressive in maintaining ideological coherence when compared to the PSDB's strategy. It may be the case that the PT still remains the preferred partner of the center-left, even as the party has shifted over time to the center in order to enlist new allies and become a more credible political party after Lula's presidential electoral defeat in 1998 (Samuels 2004, Hunter 2007, 2010).

<b>Table 5.2: Standard Deviation for Party Ideology and Clientelism</b>				
	Ideology		Clientelism	
	PT	PSDB	PT	PSDB
1998-2010 (PSDB in Executive)	1.919837	1.094385	.0830145	.091273
2002-2010 (PT in Executive)	1.841787	1.016936	.0843211	.0892931
2006-2010 (PT in Executive)	1.656561	1.036928	.0898822	.0914972

Conversely, looking into the clientelistic-programmatic dimension of party competition, the logic changes on the clientelistic dimension. In this case, the PSDB appears to reach further for partners than the PT is willing to do. Although the PT's clientelism standard deviation increases, as the period is restricted to capture changes over time, it remains smaller than the PSDB. In sum, considering the clientelistic-programmatic and left-right spectra the PT's coalition partners appear to be less consistent ideologically but more consistent programmatically consistent, while the PSDB coalition partners are the opposite: more consistent ideologically but less consistent programmatically.



In order to compare the relative importance of ideology and clientelism for the Workers' Party (PT) and the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) over time, Table 5.3 restricts the models for three electoral periods. The analysis shows that over time the importance of ideology for the PT decreases to the point of even becoming not statistically significant when the model is restricted to the elections of 2006 and 2010. In other words, the Workers' Party coalitions become more heterogeneous over time. As for the PSDB, the effect of ideology increases in 2002; that is, the coalitions become more homogenous, and the effect of ideology decreases in 2006 but it is still more homogenous than in 1998.

One explanation for this overall pattern may be that parties are not only broadening their coalitions to capture as many votes as possible, but also that political parties are themselves moving within the political spectrum. As Power and Zucco (2012) demonstrate, both the PT and the PSDB show a clear shift toward the center and to the right of the political spectrum, when compared to their original position prior to governing. For the PSDB, their shift to the right happened in 1997 and the PT's shift happened in 2005.<sup>34</sup> The effects of these shifts are different for each party however, as it appears that the PSDB's new coalitions become more ideologically similar, while the PT's coalitions appear to have become more haphazard over time.

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<sup>34</sup> The six waves of survey that do assess the ideological placement of the parties took place in 1990, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, and 2009.

**Table 5.3: PT and PSDB Electoral Coalition Formation (1998-2010, 2002-2010, and 2006-2010)**  
**DV: Party's Electoral Coalition Formation**

	PT b/se	PSDB b/se	PT_02 b/se	PSDB_02 b/se	PT_06 b/se	PSDB_06 b/se
ideology	-0.224*** (0.03)	-0.211*** (0.05)	-0.166*** (0.03)	-0.276*** (0.05)	-0.066 (0.04)	-0.246*** (0.06)
clientelism	-1.026 (0.59)	1.206* (0.58)	-1.339* (0.64)	1.109 (0.67)	-1.219 (0.72)	1.024 (0.75)
size_vote	0.002 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	0.008** (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	0.009** (0.00)
size_seat	-0.012*** (0.00)	0.006** (0.00)	-0.011*** (0.00)	0.007** (0.00)	-0.005 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)
magnitude	-0.029 (0.02)	-0.047* (0.02)	-0.042 (0.03)	-0.130*** (0.04)	-0.000 (0.04)	-0.166*** (0.05)
population(log)	-0.147 (0.14)	-0.155 (0.12)	-0.205 (0.18)	-0.234 (0.17)	0.098 (0.24)	-0.313 (0.22)
gdp-per_capita	0.033 (0.06)	-0.060 (0.06)	-0.015 (0.06)	-0.193** (0.07)	-0.125 (0.08)	-0.416*** (0.10)
urbanization	-0.078** (0.03)	-0.002 (0.02)	-0.058* (0.03)	0.007 (0.02)	-0.063 (0.04)	0.028 (0.03)
verticalization	-0.094 (0.19)	0.465* (0.18)				
north	-0.199 (0.18)	0.031 (0.19)	-0.208 (0.19)	0.286 (0.21)	-0.136 (0.22)	0.664** (0.25)
southeast	-0.353 (0.35)	0.065 (0.35)	-0.448 (0.39)	0.852* (0.41)	0.292 (0.55)	2.127*** (0.58)
south	-0.894* (0.37)	0.126 (0.37)	-0.822* (0.41)	0.882* (0.42)	-0.246 (0.59)	2.516*** (0.62)
centerwest	-0.235 (0.25)	0.136 (0.24)	-0.131 (0.27)	0.678* (0.30)	0.154 (0.37)	1.477*** (0.40)
o.verticalization	0.000	0.000	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	(.)	(.)
constant	2.242 (2.00)	1.186 (1.79)	3.105 (2.64)	3.053 (2.54)	-1.030 (3.40)	5.310 (3.32)
N	2361	2361	1925	1925	1388	1388
BIC	2192.0	2136.5	1884.7	1705.6	1446.4	1345.3

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

In this sense, a close analysis of the data seems to suggest that a re-shifting of the political parties along the political spectrum in general (Power and Zucco 2009) and of the PT in particular (Hunter 2007, 2010, Samules 2004) weakened the importance of ideology in coalition formation. This argument is endorsed by the House Speaker, who is a strong proponent of political reform, especially the elimination of the proportional representation system. In a recent debate with two political scientists he asserted that “[n]obody sits down to form coalitions looking for people who think like you do. You sit down to form a coalition thinking about how many votes the party has, what are the viable candidates in the other party who

will take votes away from you, what do I have to do to preserve my seat” (Cunha, May 21, 2015).

The effect of the size of the party on coalitions, which assesses the hypothesis that smaller parties coalesce with bigger parties to beat the electoral quotient, seems to matter but only for the measure of party size according to the number of seats in the House of Representatives (as opposed to the size measured by the total votes received in the election). For the PT the relationship is negative, indicating that this party tends to form coalitions with smaller parties, while the PSDB tends to form coalitions with bigger parties. The effect of district magnitude on coalition formation varies across parties and, although negative for both the PT and the PSDB, it is only statistically significant for the latter.

The proxies to test for the effects of modernization (population, GDP per capita, and urbanization) are all negative for the PT and the PSDB. This indicates that these parties tend to form fewer coalitions in areas that are more developed. The important caveat is that urbanization is only statistically significant for the PT. This makes sense given the Worker’s Party’s longstanding history of working with unions that are located in the most industrial parts of the country.

The effect of verticalization, or the legal imposition for parties to replicate in the states the same electoral coalitions for president,<sup>35</sup> on coalition formation varied among the parties. This resolution predicted that parties could only reproduce presidential coalitions for the other elections. The expectation was that parties running presidential candidates would have more restricted electoral coalitions. Yet,

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<sup>35</sup> The verticalization rule was only in effect during the 2002 and 2006 elections.

for the PT its effect is negative and not statistically significant. On the other hand, for the PSDB the effect is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the verticalization clause instituted for the 2002 election explains the PSDB coalition formation.

With respect to region, the regional effects are mostly not significant though the direction of the effect varies. Regional effects are negative for the PT and positive for the PSDB. The South is only statistically significant for the PT. Using the Northeast region as a baseline indicates that the PSDB is more likely to form coalitions in all other regions, while the PT is less likely to form coalitions in other regions as compared to the Northeast.

## **Conclusion**

The question we seek to answer in this chapter is whether electoral competition can be explained as a function of ideological preferences and clientelistic strategies. Toward this aim, I integrated two levels of political competition identified as major determinants of political linkage: ideology and clientelism. After having described and tested the validity of the measures associated with these two dimensions in Chapters 2 and 3, I have integrated these two dimensions to test the combined utility theory, which suggests that competitive polarized elections in developing democracies constrain parties to seek crucial votes on a secondary clientelistic dimension when they have exhausted the main ideological dimension of political linkage. This theory posits that programmatic parties, stronger in public electoral markets, when competing in national polarized

elections will form electoral coalitions with clientelistic parties to preserve their own party brand while garnering votes in private electoral markets, where clientelistic parties tend to have more reach.

This study finds evidence that ideology linkages predominate when it comes to determining electoral coalitions in the electorally competitive Brazilian case. However, it also suggests that ideology has become a less important determinant of electoral coalitions since the 2002 presidential election, which marked a definite shift of the Workers' Party from the left to the center-left of the political spectrum and as a consequence repositioned the Brazilian Social Democrat Party from the center-left to the center-right of the political spectrum. The analysis shows that as ideology dispersion of the parties in a coalition increases, the probability of forming a coalition with the given parties decreases. This empirical finding corroborates the reports from political elites during the qualitative field interviews conducted in the states of Bahia and Rio Grande do Norte and in the Federal District during the summer of 2013. The informants appear to share the common view that since the 2002 presidential election, ideology became less important in defining electoral coalitions.

Regarding the effect of clientelism, on the other hand, the secondary dimension does not yield conclusive evidence. The importance of this dimension is that the direction and statistical significance changes depending on the party considered, suggesting that the parties mostly rely on a wide spectrum of parties when forming coalitions in the clientelistic dimension. Focusing specifically on the two nationally polarizing parties, it appears that the PSDB counts on a wider range

of clientelistic parties in its coalitions than the PT does. Although the PT coefficient is consistently negative it is not statistically significant for the whole period considered. It becomes statistically significant following the 2002 presidential election but it loses statistical significance for the period since the 2006 election. The PSDB, on the other hand, is consistently positive for all the periods considered but only statistically significant when the full model is specified (Table 4.3).

The dispersion of the ideology and clientelism coalition formation indicated by the standard deviation for both parties (PT and PSDB) also shows interesting results. On the ideology dimension, both parties seem to narrow the ideological proximity of the parties in their respective electoral coalitions. However, this coalitions is wider for the PT than its is for the PSDB, which indicates that the PT has been more aggressive in its strategy to form coalitions by attracting more parties from the extremes of the political spectrum when compared to the PSDB. On the clientelistic dimension, however, the analysis inverts somewhat. In fact, the PT appears to increase the spectrum of the parties comprising its coalition over time, but it remains slightly lower than that of the PSDB, which remains more or less constant over time. In sum, the PT has a wider ideological configuration of parties in its electoral coalition, while the PSDB has a wider clientelistic configuration of parties comprising its electoral coalition.

The analysis presented in this chapter is a stylized model that only considers the decision of one party to coalesce with another party. In practice, parties may need to weigh the benefits of entering coalitions with multiple partisans. Indeed, smaller parties may decide not to join coalitions with bigger parties. This is the case

for parties that consistently garner one or two seats each election. As we will discuss in the next chapter, smaller parties systematically avoid coalition with bigger parties because their party quotient, or the seat that is reserved for each party within the coalition, is low thus making it difficult for them to compete with other parties in the same coalition. Rather, they prefer to join forces with other smaller parties.

## CHAPTER 6

### **Politics in Practice: How Ideology and Clientelism Works in Brazil**

In order to shed light on the methodological findings from Chapters 3, 4, and 5, this chapter draws on field research and case studies in Brazil to capture the dynamics of electoral politics in a modernizing setting. Field research in two northeastern states, a region known for its historic reliance on clientelistic politics but that have nevertheless seen the rise of programmatic partisan politics, allows us to examine when, why, and how partisan coalitions form. Rather than infer partisan preferences based on patterns of electoral dispersion, for example, we can ask partisan operatives to explain why they are willing to align with other parties.

The research for this chapter draws on case studies of Bahia and Rio Grande do Norte. These states share cultural similarities, demographic characteristics, and have historically been dominated by oligarchies. Both have also undergone shifts in the long-lasting pattern of political competition with the ascension of opposing leftist parties to power more recently. The incursions of the left in Rio Grande do Norte started earlier in 2002 and lasted two consecutive terms when the right regained power in the 2010 election. In Bahia, on the other hand, the left only gained power in 2006 and was re-elected in 2010. While the left has won a third mandate in 2014, the right has gained the capital, Salvador. The influential capital city elected Antônio Carlos Magalhães Neto (DEM<sup>36</sup>), the grandson of a powerful

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<sup>36</sup> The DEM changed its name from the PFL in 2007.



political boss in the state of Bahia, as mayor in 2012 making him a very strong contender for the governorship in future elections.

These two states are representative of a wave that brought to power more programmatic, mostly leftist, parties in a region that has historically been characterized by the dominance of oligarchic groups linked to clientelistic parties, usually on the right of the political spectrum (Montero 2010). Virtually all states in this region had more pragmatic parties replacing clientelistic ones since 1988. For instance, the PDT won the 2006 election<sup>37</sup> beating the Sarney machine for the first time since 1960 in Maranhão;<sup>38</sup> the PT won in Piauí in 2002 and Sergipe in 2006; the PSB won in Alagoas in 1998 and in Pernambuco in 2006, both replacing the PMDB, and also defeating the PSDB in Ceará this same year;<sup>39</sup> finally, the PSDB won in Paraíba in 2006 replacing the PMDB.

Why did the right manage to return to power in Rio Grande do Norte while in Bahia they seem to be slow to recover their strength? Is this a function of their ability to form a regionally autonomous electoral coalition? Or, is it likely that national polarization influences state-level electoral coalitions as the quantitative models in Chapter 5 suggest? To answer these questions, I conducted elite interviews with federal congressmen, state representatives, mayors, rank-and-file party members, journalists, and one vice-governor to investigate the mechanisms

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<sup>37</sup> The elected governor, Jackson Lago, subsequently lost his mandate on charges of abuse of political power, which benefited his campaign. He was replaced by the runner up candidate, Roseana Sarney (PFL) (Callucci 2009, April 1).

<sup>38</sup> PSB, a leftist programmatic party, won the 2002 election but the elected governor, José Reinaldo, was in fact linked to the Sarney family (Borges 2003).

<sup>39</sup> Ceará is an interesting case because PSDB has governed the state since 1987 and PSB won with the support of one of the main PSDB leaders, Tasso Jereissati.

under which parties' competition strategies are devised in competitive multiparty polarized elections. I then investigate political linkages on two dimensions -- ideology and clientelism -- and examine how these two seemingly opposite dimensions are integrated through coalitions with the purpose to win elections. Before delving into the findings, I first provide some historical background information on the case studies.

## **Rio Grande do Norte**

The state of Rio Grande do Norte is situated in the Northeast. It has an estimated population of about 3.3 million distributed along 167 municipalities. The Gini index is .49 and the Municipal Human Development Index is .684 (IBGE). The recent political history of Rio Grande do Norte has been marked by polarization between two families: Alves and Maia. The legacy of the Alves' family starts with Aluísio Alves who began his political career in the Rural Democratic Union (UDN), a rightist party that opposed the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) of president Getúlio Vargas and subsequently Juscelino Kubitscheck. However, he consolidated his leadership after being elected governor in 1960 through the Social Democratic Party (PSD), after he had served four consecutive mandates as congressman. Subsequently, the vice-governor, Walfredo Gurgel, was elected governor in the 1965 electoral dispute with Alves' support.

In 1966, Alves joined the National Renovating Alliance (ARENA), where he led the minority group. Even though this party supported the military regime, his political rights were revoked in 1969 as a consequence of internal party disputes. He

later joined the opposition party Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), which eventually became the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) during the political transition that called for direct elections at the subnational level in 1982. During this year he suffered an electoral defeat against the Maia family, which had already come to power by direct appointment during the military regime.

The Maia family had won three consecutive governorships. In the first two, Tarcísio Maia (ARENA) and Lavoisier Maia (ARENA) were respectively appointed for the state government in 1975 and 1979 during the military regime. The third, José Agripino Maia (ARENA), was elected by popular vote in 1982. After initially served the government of Alves and migrated to the Maia's political machine, Geraldo Melo (PMDB) returned again to the political group led by the Alves family and was elected governor in 1986. After that, power alternated between these two families: Agripino Maia (PFL) in 1990 and Garibaldi Alves Filho (PMDB) in 1994 and 1998, when the re-election rule took effect. The back-and-forth between these families in power was interrupted by the election of Wilma de Faria (PSB), who was elected in 2002 and re-elected in 2006. However, with the support of the Maia family, Rosalba Ciarlini Rosado (DEM)<sup>40</sup> was elected governor, thus granting the return of the old oligarchic forces to power (Trindade, 2010).

Although the election of Faria as governor in 2002 clearly represents an anomaly vis-à-vis the dominance of these two political families, she was not a political outsider. In fact, she became a public figure in 1979 as the wife of the Governor Lavoisier Maia, who assigned her the role of leading community work

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<sup>40</sup> The PFL (Liberal Front Party) changed its name in 2007 to the DEM (*Democratas*).

sponsored by the state government, a traditional role reserved for First Ladies in Brazil. Later Faria served the government of her cousin by marriage, Agripino Maia. Eventually she was elected House Representative in 1986 through the PDS, a rightist party that evolved from ARENA. Surprisingly, during this period her voting record was aligned with social causes defended by workers' movements, which eventually led her to join a left-of-the-center party, PDT (Oliveira 2005). Afterward, she was elected mayor of Natal in 1988, and after switching to yet another left-of-the-center party (PSB), she was elected again for the same position in 1996 and re-elected in 2000. Finally, Faria was elected governor in the second round in what appeared to be a changing point in the oligarchic state politics.

Several factors should be taken into consideration when accounting for gubernatorial elections: the composition of the electoral coalition, the presidential coattail, position of the other political forces, and the candidates' electoral record. In this sense, the reduced size of the coalition<sup>41</sup> seems to play a smaller role in Faria's election. In fact, if the coalition size were a crucial factor, the main beneficiary would have been the other contenders – Fernando Freire (PPB)<sup>42</sup> and Fernando Bezerra (PTB)<sup>43</sup> – who had stronger electoral coalitions. Instead, it appears that Faria's popularity as a trice-elected mayor of the capital and the largest city in the state, laid the groundwork for her electoral success. As a strong third candidate running against two polarized political forces, she gained enough votes to make it to the second round. In the runoff election she benefitted from the direct support of two

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<sup>41</sup> PSB/PGT/PST

<sup>42</sup> PPB/PMDB/PSDB/PHS/PT do B/PTN/PSD

<sup>43</sup> PTB/PPS/PFL/PV/PAN/PSL

important actors. First, she garnered the support of President Lula da Silva (PT), who the PSB already had as a partner in the national election due to the absence of a local candidate from the PT. Second, she secured the support of Agripino Maia (PFL), who backed the candidacy of Bezerra (PTB) in the first round (Spinelli 2006).<sup>44</sup>

The re-election of Faria in 2006 happened under different political circumstances. Now an incumbent, Faria was able to form a broad coalition of parties on the right, center, and left of the political spectrum,<sup>45</sup> against the two families that coalesced<sup>46</sup> to launch the candidacy of the previous two-time governor, Garibaldi Alves Filho (PMDB). Alves Filho also received the support of Rosalba Ciarlini Rosado (PFL), who belonged to the third most powerful clan in the state (Spinelli, 2006). Although Rosado had won a Senate seat, this coalition was not able to elect the governor. Once again this election was competitive and decided only in the second round. Faria (PSB) framed her campaign as a woman running against traditional political forces and, most importantly, stressed her association with President Lula da Silva. Alves Filho (PMDB), on the other hand, stood as a moderate opposition candidate with vast administrative experience and added that the unusual coalition of the two formerly-opposing forces represented a new political era in the state (Spinelli 2006). It did not work this time around but in the 2010 election the story was different.

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<sup>44</sup> There is no official electoral coalition during the runoff election. The main purpose of electoral coalitions is to beat the electoral coefficient in proportional elections and to add free TV time in majoritarian elections as parties have a share of time according to their legislative size. Since the time is evenly divided between the candidates who make it to the runoff, there is no sense in formalizing electoral coalitions.

<sup>45</sup> PSB/PT do B/PC do B/PMN/PHS/PPS/PL/PTB/PT

<sup>46</sup> PMDB/PFL/PTN/PP

The election of 2010 presented a slightly different dynamic. Faria could not run again for governor as she had already served two consecutive terms. Thus constrained, she stepped down to run for Senator<sup>47</sup> and her vice-governor, Iberê de Souza (PSB), took office and became the running candidate.<sup>48</sup> Although supported by a small coalition<sup>49</sup> mostly composed by leftist parties, different from the previous elections, the left was divided between Souza and Carlos Eduardo Alves (PDT), another member of the Alves family who defected from the PMDB and joined the PDT because there was no space in the former party to accommodate the electoral ambitions of a growing family (A. Alves, personal communication, July 29, 2013).

Rosalba Ciarlini Rosado (DEM) on the other side formed a broader coalition that included parties from the center and right.<sup>50</sup> Additionally, she received the informal support of part of the PMDB (Spinelli 2010), which decided not to formally join the coalition due to internal divergence (Félício 2010).<sup>51</sup> Moreover, Rosado attracted the discontent of otherwise opportunistic political leaders who once belonged to the Faria government who had suffered from accusations of corruption that involved the governor's son and brother (Spinelli 2010). Considering this

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<sup>47</sup> The Brazilian legislation requires any elected official to step down six months prior to election day to run for another position.

<sup>48</sup> This is a widely applied tactic in Brazilian gubernatorial races for the second term sitting governor to step down to run for Senate and support the vice-governor. This tactic is aimed at giving the vice-governor enough visibility leading up to the elections with a possible victory, thus preserving the continuity of the political group.

<sup>49</sup> PSB/PTB/PT/PPS

<sup>50</sup> DEM/PTN/PSL/PSDB/PSC/PMN

<sup>51</sup> Benefited by the support of the PFL (DEM) in the previous election, Garibaldi Alves Filho (PMDB) supported Rosado (DEM) in retribution. There is an agreement within the family stating that they would always support family members but would be free to support other candidates when the family's direct interest is not threatened (Félício, 2010).

scenario, Rosado was elected in straightforward fashion in the first round, thus granting the return of the old political forces to the helm of the state's politics.

## **Bahia**

The state of Bahia is situated in the Northeast and has an estimated population of about 15 million distributed among 417 municipalities. The Gini index is .49, and the Municipal Human Development Index is .66 (IBGE). The recent political history of the state has been characterized by the dominance of the Antônio Carlos Magalhães (ACM) oligarchy. ACM rose to prominence during the military regime when he was indirectly elected as governor, with the support of the regime, in 1971. He stepped down after his term ended in 1975. As there was no re-election rule at the time, ACM returned to power under the same circumstances in 1979, and then supported the victorious 1982 candidacy of João Durval Carneiro (PDS) in the first direct election for governor after the military coup in 1964. Opportunistically allied to the forces that promoted the transition from the military regime to democracy, he was appointed to the Ministry of Communications of José Sarney (PMDB) in 1985 (Terra, Senado Federal). His only sign of weakness was that his candidate for Bahia Governor, Josaphat Marinho (PFL), suffered an overwhelming defeat in the 1986 election.

In 1990, ACM returned to elected office by winning the governorship of Bahia. Subsequently, he successfully ran for the Senate and also helped to elect his choice candidates: Paulo Souto (PFL) in 1994, César Borges (PFL) in 1998, and Paulo Souto (PFL) again in 2002. In a remarkable turn of events, still as a senator in

2006, ACM saw his sitting candidate lose the gubernatorial election against Jacques Wagner (PT). Wagner, who was a former Labor Minister under Lula da Silva's presidency, represented a momentous turn to the left in state politics. Many saw this election as the defining moment of the defeat of oligarchic forces led by ACM, who died in 2007.<sup>52</sup> In fact, many members of his group, César Borges for instance, joined another party in support of the Lula da Silva and Rousseff government. However, his grandson, Antônio Carlos Magalhães Neto<sup>53</sup> (ACM Neto), has inherited his political fortunes and offers a realistic alternative pathway back to power for the political right in Bahia.

An analysis of the election of Wagner (PT) in 2006 and the concomitant retraction of the dominance of one of the strongest oligarchies in Brazil should also take into consideration both local and national factors: the popularity of Wagner, realignment of the political forces, presidential coattail effects, and the public's exhaustion with the old political oligarchy. In reference to the popularity of Wagner, he had been elected to Congress three times in 1990, 1998, and 2002. After unsuccessfully running for governor in 2002, he was appointed as Minister of Labor and Ministry of Institutional Relations, which are responsible for the relations between the Executive and Legislative; both positions gave him substantial national visibility. During the gubernatorial election of 2006 he had not only increased his visibility vis-à-vis 2002, but also was seen as a special interlocutor of Lula da Silva, a

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<sup>52</sup> Some mark the beginning of ACM's political decline with the sudden death of his son and political heir, Luis Eduardo Magalhães (Dantas 2006).

<sup>53</sup> Neto means grandson.



popular president who had prioritized the election of Wagner, thus giving Wagner the advantage of presidential coattails.

Paulo Souto (PFL), who was serving a second non-consecutive gubernatorial term, counted on the structure of ACM's machine, dubbed "Carlismo." In spite of his incumbent position, he could no longer count on the federal political machine under ACM as Lula da Silva's presidency stripped him off of the seemingly monopolistic control of federal appointments in the state as well as central positions within the federal government (Dantas 2007). The relative weakness of ACM as a consequence of his lack of direct ties with the federal government (Montero, 2010) allowed Wagner the opportunity to aggregate important opposition forces under the same coalition,<sup>54</sup> which listed parties mostly from the left, some parties from the center, and parties from the right of the political spectrum. Especially important for this coalition was the support of the PMDB, a party with great reach in the state and whose leader Geddel Vieira Lima was also a Minister in the Lula da Silva's administration. Other factors also contributed to consolidate Wagner's election in the first round: one refers to the neutrality of the PSDB which, in spite of being a preferred PFL ally in national politics, was a historical foe of ACM's machine. The other factor is related to the informal support of the mayor of Salvador, João Henrique Carneiro (PDT)<sup>55</sup> to Wagner (Dantas 2007). Paulo Souto (PFL), on the other hand, formed a homogenous rightist coalition<sup>56</sup> that, like in the previous

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<sup>54</sup> PT/PC do B/PV/PSB/PMN/PPS/PMDB/PTB/PRB

<sup>55</sup> Even though João Henrique Carneiro's party (PDT) was officially part of another coalition, his father, João Durval Carneiro (PDT) was Wagner's preferred running candidate for the Senate. Thus J.H. Carneiro, against the logic of his party, informally supported Wagner's candidacy (Dantas, 2007).

<sup>56</sup> PFL/PTC/PHS/PAN/PL/PP

election, was relatively small but that, differently from the last previous election, did not have the opposition (PT, PMDB, PSDB, and PSB) fragmented into different candidates.

The election of 2010 took place under a slightly different scenario, as is usually the case. Although the outgoing president Lula da Silva was very popular and his support was again crucial, the most important re-alignment happened in the configuration of the electoral coalitions. While the forces that opposed the ACM machine in the previous elections were mostly united, this time around they were fragmented and three important candidates presented a real chance of winning based solely on their previous electoral strength. Paulo Souto (DEM<sup>57</sup>) tried to regain strength after both being defeated in the previous election and the passing of ACM in 2007. He counted on the unprecedented support from the PSDB, which happened by imposition of the PSDB's central committee given its presidential ambitions. Geddel Vieira Lima (PMDB) withdrew his support for Wagner and ran for governor on an extensive coalition formed mostly by small rightist parties.<sup>58</sup> However, this new combination of factors did not upset the re-election plans of Wagner who kept the PSB in his coalition and then officially added the PDT.<sup>59</sup> Under this political configuration, Wagner achieved outright victory in the first round.

I turn now to political linkage variables that focus on the parties' strategic behavior to connect to voters (ideology and clientelism) and strategic organization

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<sup>57</sup> PFL was renamed DEM in 2007.

<sup>58</sup> PMDB/PTN/PTC/PTB/PT do B/PSDC/PSC/PRTB/PRP/PR/PPS/PMN

<sup>59</sup> PT/PSL/PSB/PRB/PP/PHS/PDT/PC do B

to connect to other parties (electoral coalition formation). Interviews with political elites reveal that both strategies are at work.

## **Ideology**

The conventional view contends that parties in Brazil lack institutional strength and are undisciplined and non-programmatic, which contributes to undermining the ideological linkage and, consequently, advancing non-policy based strategies, such as clientelism and personalism (Ames 2001, Mainwaring 1999, Roberts 2002, 2010). Other scholars contend that leftist votes are ideologically driven in Brazil (Holzhacker and Balbachovsky 2007).

Recent electoral success of more programmatic parties in Brazil has reignited the debate regarding the consistency of the party system with a burgeoning literature challenging conventional wisdom by empirically demonstrating the strengthening of these party systems. In tune with this view, Chapter 3 demonstrates, both at the aggregate and individual level, that the Brazilian party system indeed shows some degree of party differentiation. Remarkably however, the overwhelming majority of party operatives interviewed for this project reported that there is lack of ideological linkage between party and voters.

Among the interview respondents on the political right, there seems to be a consensus about this lack of ideological linkage. During field research to Brazil in

2009 for instance, a deputy from the Democratas (DEM)<sup>60</sup> stated in an interview that:

*Today the voter very often votes for the candidate, he does not vote for the party, very often he does not know what the party's platform is, what the programmatic line is. Perhaps he remembers some of the party's point and he identifies himself with this. But he does not vote for the party, he votes for the candidate. I believe that when the deputy Felipe Maia goes on the street to ask for votes, the voter is not voting for the Democratas, he is voting for Felipe Maia (Felipe Maia, 2009).*

When asked about the political linkage between parties and votes in a more recent interview, another politician within the same party quickly replied that there was no such linkage and that the voter chooses the candidate, not the party. He later complained that it had become more difficult for him to get re-elected and credited such challenges to the lack of militancy within his party. He also added that the great advantage of the leftist parties was the ability to count on an active militancy (P. Azi, personal communication, July 23, 2013).

The lack of party affinity can even be reproduced at a higher political level as far as the relationship between mayors and deputies is concerned. In Brazil, national parties' strategies are generally conceived during the mayoral election, which takes place two years before the general elections.<sup>61</sup> Although there is no indication that the mayoral elections influence presidential elections (Nicolau 2008) or that this influence can even be negative (Zucco 2008), the state and house representatives link their electoral prospects to their ability to recruit mayors as *cabos eleitorais*, or

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<sup>60</sup> Although Felipe Maia was a representative for the Lower House, he preferred to schedule the interview in his father's (Senator Agripino Maia –DEM-RN) office at the Senate as he deemed it more comfortable.

<sup>61</sup> The general election elects the president, governors, senators, house representatives, and state assembly deputies.

supporters (J. Dias, personal communication, July 31, 2013). As the PSDB deputy J. Júnior put it, the election of congressmen was directly linked to the elections of mayors (personal communication, August 21, 2013). He explained that elected mayors endorsed the candidacy of congressmen [two years later] and their support was definitive for their election, much more so than for the president. Another deputy from the PMDB adds that the voters would follow their mayors when asked to vote for a Congressman but they would freely choose their president and governor independent of the mayor's request. He added later that nowadays it would be impossible to win an election without the endorsement of the mayors (L. Vieira, personal communication, August 27, 2013).

However, while J. Júnior linked this support to mayors within the same party (personal communication, August 21, 2013), two mayors from different states posited that they were free to choose whom they would support. When asked about how the process of choosing his Legislative Deputy was established, a PDT mayor said that it was not ideological because the number of parties makes it difficult to differentiate among the various parties. He held that the deputies had specific interests in certain areas and they approached the mayors but it was a person-to-person contact as opposed to party affinity (A. Rocha, personal communication, July 24, 2013).

Another PMDB mayor indirectly corroborated this view. When asked if party leaders dictated what candidates they should support, he answered that mayors were free to choose whichever candidates for deputy they wanted to endorse. When further asked about the name of the candidates he endorsed, he replied that for the

State Assembly he endorsed Gesane Marinho. Then, when finally asked about which party she belonged to, he answered that he did not know and further suggested that her party was PMN<sup>62</sup> but pondered that what really mattered was that she was from his region. Finally, he disclosed that for the House of Representatives he endorsed Henrique Alves because this was a matter of party affiliation [*they belong to the same party, PMDB*] (F. Sousa, personal communication, July 31, 2013).

On the left, conversely, there seems to be a general affirmation of the important role ideology plays in politics. This discourse is articulated mostly around the party's program and policies, as opposed to a direct political linkage with the voter. In fact, the explanation revolves around the realignment of one of the main parties on the left, the Workers' Party. Since 2003, the PT has reformulated its program and broadened its electoral coalitions to include parties more at the center and center-right of the political spectrum (Hunter 2007, 2010; Samuels, 2004). Some deputies stated that the Workers' Party became more like the PMDB<sup>63</sup> or "peemedebizou-se" (A. Alves, personal communication, July 29, 2013) as a consequence of this transition.

Politicians at the center-right aligned with the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) affirmed the general tendency of strategic political alignments with the Workers' Party. The PMDB has participated in all but one governmental coalition since redemocratization (Freitas 2012). For this reason the PMDB has gained a reputation for being a quid-pro-quo "*fisiológico*" party. As one

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<sup>62</sup> In fact, she was from the PSD.

<sup>63</sup> The Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB).

party insider described it, the PMDB abandoned the prospect of running candidates for national elections to focus on more a quid-pro-quo kind of politics that comes with governing; for instance, the exchange of legislative amendments for congressional funding (L. Lima, personal communication, August 27, 2013).

Similarly, another state representative from PMDB held that his party was very much criticized for being a *fisiológico* party and reckoned that to some extent it was indeed a fact (Morais, personal communication, August 5, 2013). Finally, a former party member justified his existence by stating that he was elected through PMDB for seven consecutive mandates but that his relationship with his party had worn out. The party had become very *fisiológico* and, as a consequence, he could no longer agree with the direction the party was taking (J. Dias, personal communication, July 31, 2013).

Workers' Party members, however, defend the party's program and policies and separate them from the party's strategy to win elections. For instance, J. Neto suggested that the broad governmental coalition caused confusion since the other parties [in the coalition] did not have a national project [for the country]. Asked if this "confusion" prevented the PT from implementing its program, he answered negatively, adding that the reason was because the PT had a line and the other parties knew this and were expected to follow it. He then enumerated the specific policies as foreign policy, social policies, and transparency and democratization of the Brazilian society (J. Neto, personal communication, July 25, 2013). This opinion was shared by another PT member who emphasized the party's national project and

argued that other parties in the coalition would eventually come to support this project (Luiza Maia, personal communication, July 25, 2013).

A rank-and-file party member recognized the existence of a party program but stressed the difficulty of advancing such a project in view of the heterogeneity in the coalition. In his view, the party's coalition occupied the center-left and tried to promote income redistribution as the main axis of the PT's goals. However, his party could not move forward with other progressive issues such as the reduction of the working hours (M. Braga, personal communication, August 8, 2013). Another congressman from the same party had an identical perspective about the constraints for the party. As a consequence of the heterogeneous governmental coalition, they were unable to approve some amendments such as fiscal reform and the reduction of working hours to 44 hours per week (G. Simões, personal communication, August 27, 2013).

Finally, yet another PT party member offered his diagnosis for the issue of ideology, holding that the lack of ideological constraints was a huge problem in Brazil because there are many parties without a coherent line of thought. Even within the PT, which was a more ideological party, there were representatives that occupied a wide spectrum of positions that ranged from the left to the right. The interviewee suggested that other parties such as PMDB did not have any ideological profile whatsoever. He contended that besides the PT, perhaps the only parties that had some ideological coherence were the PSol and the PC do B. (C. Vacarezza, personal communication, August 13, 2013).



## Clientelism

The understanding that clientelism besets Brazilian politics, in general, (Avelino Filho 1994) and rightist parties, in particular (Montero 2010), is challenged by scholars who claim that clientelism has declined due to systemic (Borges 2011, Hagopian et. al. 2009, Hunter and Power 2007) or institutional (Borges 2011) reasons. Sugiyama and Hunter (2013), for instance, sustains that Brazil has created massive poverty alleviation programs whose implementation spurs modernization while defying established practices of the traditional political system, such as clientelism and patronage. It has also achieved economic stability, which has paved the way for the expansion of the middle class and, consequently, for the demands on the political system. Although still a very unequal society and with unequal regional development, even by developing countries' standards, recent political outcomes suggest substantial changes in patterns of political competition, especially in the less developed areas of the country. I assessed these claim qualitatively during my field interviews. Clientelism is still a phenomenon, but the nuanced perception that it has been losing strength in Brazilian politics appears to vary based on one's ideological orientation and party membership. Party operatives on the left tend to have a more positive view on progress in decreasing clientelism, whereas views of those at the center and right are less so.

The majority of those interviewed stressed that most requests received from their constituents are related to personal benefit. A PDT mayor, for instance, described his interaction with voters as a constant pressure for favors. He contended that the overwhelming majority of the voters in his municipality were

interested in personal benefits with only a minority interested in his program (A. Rocha, personal communication, July 24, 2013). A PDT state deputy added that only voters who had strategic importance received special attention, since they knew all voters wanted was individual benefits (A. Alves, personal communication, July 29, 2013).

This idea was endorsed by another representative from the PR who emphatically responded that the most frequent request from his constituents was for employment. When further asked how he dealt with such requests, he replied that it was very difficult to place people in jobs given his limited resources. He conceded that he tried to clarify this to the voter but suggested that powerful voters, given their status as local leaders, required special attention. Although he claimed to treat all voters equally, he acknowledged that each municipality had its own weight (G. Soares, personal communication, July 30, 2013). Thus, even though he was cautious about admitting the straightforward use of clientelistic strategies - patronage is illegal after all - he suggested that depending on the weight of his supporter the request for employment would be considered.

Later in the interview I asked if voters offered to sell their votes and his answer was a resounding yes. He recognized that those who had money won elections (G. Soares, personal communication, July 30, 2013). Another representative from the PSD was asked about what was necessary for him to receive the support of local elites and he answered that realistically there was a system of mutual support, but this also included friendship and favors that he provided along

his political career that people remembered on election day (J. Dias, personal communication, July 31, 2013).

Institutional mechanisms supporting clientelism were also identified in interviews. The use of patronage, another mechanism through which clientelism operates, is institutionally visible in such case as the Rio Grande do Norte's State Assembly. A. Alves points out that 99.9% of the public servants in the state legislature's Lower House have their jobs as a result of political influence (personal communication, July 29, 2013). He added that only in 2013 would the State Assembly hold its first meritocratic public entrance exam to fill staff positions. At this point, his chief of staff interrupted the interview to add that the legislation has required such entrance exams since the 1988 Constitution but that this law is only now taking effect in this state (Cunha, personal communication, July 29, 2013).

During my visits to the State Assembly, one particular office was always busy with waiting lines that exceeded 20 people on any given day. I learned that this representative's legal staff offered constituents legal consultations free of charge. Later, in an interview with an assistant in this office, I asked what the main demands of the constituents were. He explained that since the representative ran his campaign calling himself "the people's lawyer," most of the requests were for assistance associated with retirement benefits and the resolution of legal claims. When prompted about whether there were employment requests he emphatically replied yes. He added that he received many of those requests but that it was easy to say no because he had a good argument when he said that the deputy was the

people's lawyer and he was willing to advocate for the voters' legal issues but that employment is not a legal issue (T. Moura, personal communication, July 29, 2013).

Another institutional source for clientelistic linkages was described by a high ranking politician who stated his support for single member plurality district (SMDP) as opposed to the actual proportional representation system (PR).

According to him, the SMDP system represented a vote with local identity but that the politicians were concerned that their lack of identity with specific regions would prevent them from amassing votes by acquiring the endorsement of local leaders. He added that such mechanisms were vitiated since they were based on private interests and on the buying of such endorsements (R. Faria, personal communication, August 1, 2013).

Importantly, representatives perceive a notable change on the part of the electorate, which they attribute to modernization. A mayor recognized that the voter was changing and becoming more demanding. He assented that from then on, candidates would no longer win an election by just doing construction works. He argued that with the growth of the socio-economic class "C," one's politicians were obliged to create new jobs because everything else had become just a part of their obligations. He finished by saying that the tendency of the human being was to always want more (F. Sousa, personal communication, July 31, 2013). When prompted to specify the time when he noticed such changes, he answered that he had noticed this difference in his second term in office but that there was still those who only seek personal benefit, concluding by saying he could not lie about it (F. Sousa, personal communication, July 31, 2013).

Similarly, the vice-governor of Rio Grande do Norte agreed that vote buying indeed exists but added that collective issues [as opposed to personal interest] had been advancing and concluded that in each election the voter was increasingly free and demanding (R. Faria, personal communication, August 1, 2013).

The difference between left and right does not come from their acknowledgement of clientelistic practices, but how their mandate is conditioned by the nature of their main voters. Politicians on the right cautiously admit that the control of the state apparatus (A. Alves, personal communication, July 29, 2013), the buying of mayors' endorsements (F. Souza, personal communication, July 31, 2013), and straight vote buying (G. Soares, personal communication, July 30, 2013) are generally decisive clientelistic resources in elections. Conversely, politicians on the left generally invoke their ties with social movements (J. Guimarães, personal communication, August 21, 2013; J. Neto, personal communication, July 25, 2013) as an ideological dimension linking them to the voter.

## **Coalitions**

The study of electoral coalitions has stressed the role of formal institutions conditioning the policy-seeking behavior of political parties. In this sense, a party's ideology is a crucial element in explaining and predicting electoral coalition formation. The office-seeking behavior of the political parties, however, requires consideration of informal institutions, of which clientelistic linkages are essential. The introduction of clientelism as a second dimension operating in the political system helps to explain oversized ideologically heterogeneous electoral coalitions

and, consequently, party development and electoral outcomes in multiparty presidential regimes in developing democracies. This logic is articulated by the combined utility theory, which proposes that polarized competitive elections in modernizing national electoral markets force programmatic parties to coalesce with clientelistic parties to gain access to regional private electoral markets. Socio-economic changes that bring about modernization create a public electoral market, which demands programmatic-oriented representation determining patterns of political competition on the ideological dimension. However, uneven socio-economic changes perpetuate private electoral markets, which demands patronage-oriented representations determining patterns of political competition on a clientelistic dimension.

This chapter considers the office-seeking approach as the foremost important element guiding electoral formation given the electoral polarization of programmatic parties. The policy-seeking goal of parties remains an important strategy between elections. The focus on office-seeking strategies relaxes the assumption that parties place a premium on ideology as the main determinant driving coalitions. That is, policy-seeking parties will place a higher value on ideologically contiguous coalitions. However, office-seeking parties may relax the requirement of ideologically consistent coalitions, provided they can enter those coalitions without being severely punished by an ideologically demanding electorate.

Political competition in multiparty democratic developing countries occurs in a very heterogeneous cross-national electoral market. Thus, the national success

of a party depends on its ability to prospect votes in public goods and in private goods markets. However, a programmatic party cannot overtly pursue clientelistic politics because it would risk losing public market voters, hence defeating its purpose of building a party brand as the most efficient means of electoral linkage in the public goods market. By the same token, an expanding programmatic party cannot alienate clientelistic votes, especially if it has exhausted its universe of expansion in the public goods markets and needs to compete with other programmatic parties.

In expanding competitive the public goods marketplace as a consequence of structural changes in multiparty systems, the success of programmatic parties depends on their ability to extract additional votes from private goods markets at the subnational level. Theory put forward in this dissertation is that pragmatic parties can do this without compromising the party brand by coalescing with political machines already established in those private goods markets. Does this happen in practice? What do interview subjects from the northeast of Brazil reveal?

Elections for all positions, except for mayors and aldermen, happen concomitantly in Brazil. Generally, the strategies driving electoral coalition formation, with the ultimate goal to win elections, are mainly driven by two motivations: access to free broadcasting time<sup>64</sup> for the majoritarian election and overcoming the electoral coefficient in proportional elections (J. Negrão, personal

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<sup>64</sup> This includes TV and radio broadcasts but it is generally called “free TV time.” The criteria of allocation of the time are, first, representation and, second, proportion of seats in the Chamber of Deputies. One-third of the total time is equally distributed among the parties with representation in the Chamber of Deputies and the remaining two-thirds is distributed according to the proportion of party’s seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

communication, July 23, 2013).<sup>65</sup> The free broadcast time is the main media resource to reach the voters. Since this time is allocated to each party independent of the existence of a candidate, the consequence is that the party owns its time and, in this case, if said party enters an electoral coalition the party's time will be added to the coalition. In this sense, the size of the party will determine the bargaining power when entering the coalition.

For proportional elections, the free broadcasting time is less important because the higher number of candidates reduces each individual's appearance to meager seconds. Hence, the electoral coalitions for proportional elections are driven by the necessity to beat the electoral coefficient. In this sense, small and even medium size parties that do not have enough votes to reach the electoral coefficient from electoral coalitions, for the vote-counting effect, are considered as one single party.

Parties generally try to form competitive tickets that include a presidential, a gubernatorial, a senatorial, and House candidates, but the coordination of these coalitions varies according to each election, the particularity of each state, and the introduction of new legislation.<sup>66</sup> In general, the states have autonomy to form their coalitions; however, states' idiosyncrasies may require a top-down approach by the party's central committee (R. Faria, personal communication, August 1, 2014). As one rank-and-file member explained, the coordination of the electoral coalition is desirable programmatically, but it does not always happen because of *coronelism*

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<sup>65</sup> Calculated by dividing the number of votes by the number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

<sup>66</sup> In 2006 the Superior Federal Tribunal decided that parties that formed electoral coalitions in the presidential election could only do so from state electoral coalitions that mirrored each other.



and the interests of local political families (M. Braga, personal communication, August 8, 2013).

In the 2010 election, for instance, the PT's central committee intervened in the state of Maranhão, forcing the local party to support the candidacy of Roseana Sarney (PFL), whose father was José Sarney (PMDB). Securing an alliance with the Sarney family was crucial for the PT as the elder was the Senate chair, an important ally of the PT in the federal government, since he could ensure PMDB loyalty in Congress to support the PT's legislative agenda. Other times, local interests supersede national alliances as in the case of Rio Grande do Norte in 2010. During this election the PMDB preferred not to form a coalition with the PT and instead freed its members to endorse whatever party it wanted (H. Moraes, personal communication, August 5, 2013). In fact, many parties that do have national ambitions, i.e. strong presidential candidates, may focus on strategies that give them the best chance of electing the highest number of congressmen. L. Lima (PMDB) explains this approach saying that since the PMDB did not have a national project [to elect the president], it prioritized states' elections because the strength of the PMDB came from their senators and congressmen (personal communication, August 27, 2013).

Parties may establish general guidance on preferred parties with which to form electoral coalitions but very few parties follow it (D. Almeida, personal communication, August 8, 2013). The PC do B's guidance, for instance, was not to coalesce with the PSDB and the DEM, but specific cases allowing such coalitions could still be considered (A. Bueno, personal communication, August 8, 2013). The

leftist party, the PSol, was identified by other partisans as the only party that systematically restricted their coalitions based on ideological principles (C. Vacarezza, personal communication, August 13, 2013). This information was confirmed by a rank-and-file member of the PSol who stated that his party prioritized ideological coherence and that the general orientation of the party was to only form coalitions with other left-leaning parties, such as the PSTU and the PCB (J. Guimarães, personal communication, August 21, 2013).

The national polarization between the PT and the PSDB loosely defines the pattern of coalition in the states. C. Vacarezza (PT), for instance, claimed that, as far as coalition formation applied, the replication of coalitions in the states was perhaps the only coherent behavior that stemmed from the national polarization between the PSDB and the PT. In this case, he added, the PSDB represented a more neo-liberal ideological position (personal communication, August 13, 2013). Similarly, A. Imbassahy (PSDB) acknowledged that the PT and the PSDB were programmatic parties that rival each other at the national level and, for that reason, both parties reciprocally rejected coalitions with one another. He added that to a certain extent, the PSDB tends to follow the national line on forming subnational coalitions (personal communication, August 13, 2013).

Although the main factor driving coalitions in proportional elections is the electoral coefficient hurdle that parties need to overcome, individual candidates in medium and small parties may devise strategies to maximize their own chance of being elected once that coefficient is achieved. Big parties achieve their size because they have vote-champion candidates who bring sufficient votes not only to elect

themselves, but also garner the votes to boost other party members through the rule of proportionality. Leaders of smaller parties thus may choose to form coalitions with other smaller parties because they fear that by coalescing with bigger parties their votes would not be enough to beat the other candidates within the same coalition (J. Negrão, personal communication, July 23, 2013).

A state deputy in Rio Grande do Norte confirmed the importance of party size, saying that small parties do not like to form electoral coalitions with bigger parties as the former tend to not elect anybody due to the proportional representation (G. Soares, personal communication, July 30, 2013). The calculus on the potential to be elected is based on previous electoral performance and thus candidates prefer to form coalitions with other parties that will deliver enough votes to reach the electoral quotient without upsetting the chances of the strongest candidate within the coalition. The candidates with less or no potential to be elected are called “*esteiras*” (conveyor belts), as their role is restricted to contribute votes to the pile. When asked if the *esteiras* know that they are only instrumental candidates to the coalition, one informant answered that the majority of candidates did not know they were *esteiras* due to the lack of understanding about the electoral game. He further explained that, as newcomers in politics, the candidates are convinced of their victory even as it is all but certain they will not get elected (T. Moura, personal communication, July 29, 2013).

Finally, another important element driving coalitions is the phenomenon of *capilaridade*, defined as the ability of a party to prospect for votes in remote areas, or, in other words, the degree of reach that a party has in remote areas. J. Neto

(personal communication, July 25, 2013) referred to it as the strength of some parties in specific regions, since some parties do not have sufficient density at the state level but in do in specific areas. M. Braga (personal communication, August 8, 2013) stated that most parties only had regional expression, while only three parties were nationally expressive (PT, PSDB, and PMDB).

With national polarized competitive elections among programmatic parties, the differential vote necessary to win elections has to be garnered in a non-ideological dimension. Since more clientelistic parties tend to have greater reach in more rural areas, they become desirable partners in coalitions for it. A congressman referred to the necessity to form broad coalitions, saying that it was natural for the leftist parties to have access to an electorate that was more ideological but acknowledged that they did not have access to all constituents, such as religious and regional groups. In this sense, he added that it was necessary to form coalitions so as to increase the potential to gain this electorate (D. Almeida, personal communication, August 8, 2013).

To justify the importance of his party as a strategic national partner of the PT, H. Moraes explained that the PMDB was the biggest Brazilian party and the one that had the biggest reach throughout the municipalities (personal communication, August 5, 2013). He added that it would be a big mistake for its presidential ambitions if the PT failed to bring the PMDB into its coalition. In fact, some representatives pointed out the phenomenon of *capilaridade* driving electoral coalitions being specially important in the majoritarian elections (G. Simões, personal communication, August 27, 2013). L. Lima goes further to explain that it

was more important for presidential elections (personal communication, August 27, 2013). For governor, he added, there was a problem related to the widespread nature of parabolic antennas, which allowed the voter to get TV signals straight from São Paulo, thus missing the locally-produced content. According to him, it was important to build a local structure that would bring the message directly to the voters. It was important to be present to deliver the message, he concluded.

## **Conclusion**

Brazil's political structures have shown some signs of change with the election of programmatic parties for the presidency and for the governorship, particularly in the Northeast after 2002. This chapter focused on two states as case studies, highlighting these changes and taking into consideration the operation of ideology and clientelism and the interaction of these two dimensions in defining electoral coalition formation.

In the state of Rio Grande do Norte, we saw that the rise of PSB to power against two oligarchic families leading the PMDB and PFL/DEM parties. The polarization between two historical political forces opened up space for a third candidate who had shown increasing electoral strength as a popular mayor of the most important city. The presidential coattail effect then appeared to have defined the election of Wilma de Faria (PSB) for her first mandate. The re-election, though, happened by way of the re-alignment of both the left under Faria and the right, including the once opposing oligarchies, under Alves Filho. However, this alliance

was not enough to overcome the effects of the presidential coattails with strong support from Lula da Silva for Faria.

In the state of Bahia, several factors explain the rise of the left under the Workers' Party. First, you see the oligarchy's exhaustion and the defection of ACM after 16 uninterrupted years in power. The PT's candidate, Wagner, also benefited from the presidential coattail effect as he did from the re-alignment of the opposition.

Looking specifically at the variables ideology and clientelism, which together account for electoral coalition formation, the qualitative interviews show that, in general, ideology has lost importance as a factor driving electoral coalitions. One of the main factors indicated by party officials during interviews was that the pragmatic move of the PT towards the center of the political spectrum had a notable effect. This strategic move broadened the scope of the electoral coalitions made by the PT thus making ideological criteria less important than the electoral calculus in terms of winning office. A state representative from the PT in Bahia claimed that as her party started to become stronger it realized that it would not be able to win majoritarian elections alone. She added, however, that the PT was initially more prone to form electoral coalitions with parties with which they had a history of alliances (L. Maia, personal communication, July 25, 2013).

Indeed, this strategy was confirmed by a member of an historically allied party, who stated that it has always been discussed within the PC do B that in order to win elections it was necessary to broaden electoral coalitions (D. Almeida, personal communication, July 25, 2013). However, the party personnel also

suggested that, although less ideologically consistent and given the autonomy of the states, there was a general guideline for electoral formations that loosely followed the national polarization of the PT and the PSDB, with each party orienting their counterparts in the states to prioritize electoral coalition that excluded the main opponent in national elections.

As a consequence of the strategic move of the parties to relax the ideological dimension as the main determinant of electoral coalition formation, the electoral calculus prevailed and parties sought electoral coalitions that would deliver the highest electoral prospects. In this sense, clientelism, a second dimension of electoral linkage, became important because strong programmatic parties tried to garner additional votes by forming electoral coalitions with parties that had access to more remote areas of the country. This effect was described as *capilaridade* in reference to the degree of reach of certain parties in more rural areas of the country.

## **CHAPTER 7**

### **Conclusion**

This dissertation has argued that political competition in multiparty developing democracies takes place in two dimensions, those of ideology and clientelism, and that parties resort to electoral coalitions to extract votes in both domains in order to create political linkages with voters. The mechanisms under which political competition takes place still generate heated debates about the evolution of the party system in relatively new democracies. The political party system and the extent of its institutionalization are at the center of this contention.

Some scholars suggest that nascent democracies lack ideological depth and thus rely on clientelistic strategies to link voters to the electoral process (e.g. Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Nyblade and Reed 2008, Piattoni 2001). In contrast, others point out that empirical evidence from contested elections suggests that parties have advanced as a consequence of systemic changes (e.g. Borges 2011, Hagopian et. al. 2009, Hunter and Power 2007). In this debate, ideology and clientelism tend to be confounded in one singular political dimension. Particularly in the Brazilian case, there has been a propensity to assert that political parties on the right are clientelistic and that parties on the left are programmatic. This study breaks from this tendency in important ways by suggesting that ideology and clientelism can operate distinctively. The proposed combined utility theory developed in this dissertation explains how both ideological and clientelistic/programmatic strategies interact during the political process.



The general combined utility theory indicates that competitive polarized elections in developing democracies constrain parties to seek crucial votes on a secondary clientelistic dimension when they have exhausted its potential to attract voters based on ideological appeal. It also posits that programmatic parties, which are prevalent in public electoral markets, compete in national polarized elections by forming electoral coalitions with clientelistic parties to preserve their own party brand while garnering votes in private electoral markets, where clientelistic parties better perform. The confirmation of this theory is particularly relevant as most elections around the world take place in modernizing settings where parties compete in environments that combine both public and private markets.

To test the combined utility theory, this dissertation uses Brazil as a crucial test case. The choice of this country is justified by the uneven socio-economic development across the country alongside the existence of both programmatic and clientelistic parties competing in subnational elections as well as its having had polarized national elections for six consecutive elections. Two parties have dominated national contests for the presidency with the center-rightist PSDB and the center-leftist PT capturing the greatest vote share. The center-rightist PSDB controlled the executive from 1995-2002 and the Workers' Party has won the last three electoral cycles (2003-present).

This polarization at the national level has helped to shape politics at the subnational level, whereby shifts in electoral competition have undermined the oligarchic forces across the country. While the oligarchy has always made inroads and alliances with the federal government, their stronghold has always been in local

politics, particularly in the less developed Northeast region. The recent decline of regional political bosses and the growth of programmatic parties in the Northeast has been particularly notable.

The theoretically-derived hypotheses to assess ideology, clientelism, and their interaction through coalitions are then described further in this dissertation. In order to compete in public markets, political parties need to be sufficiently differentiated to respond the ideologically-oriented demands of constituents. Indeed, the findings presented in Chapter 3 indicate that the Brazilian political party system is ideologically differentiated. Importantly, this study confirms that the Brazilian party system is differentiated both at the aggregate electorate level as well as the individual voter level, as indicated respectively by different statistical modeling. At the aggregate level, the unidimensional deterministic model of spatial electoral competition for gubernatorial runoff elections confirms this claim.

This method allows for probabilistic inference on the runoff election outcome by assuming ideological transference of votes between the first round and the runoff election. That is to say, the model assumes that voters retain their ideological (left/center/right) preference between the electoral rounds. The model results suggest that in runoffs, the electorate chooses the most proximate party to the one she selected in the first round of the election. At the individual level, this study further confirms the ideological differentiation of the Brazilian party system by using a national survey dataset.

The analysis on ideological partisan linkages makes an important contribution by adding nuanced analysis about how these partisan linkages take

place at the state level, where personalism is more likely to prevail. In this sense, subnational elections provide a high-bar for testing whether parties have developed meaningful ideological linkages with voters. The evidence strongly supports the ideological differentiation of the political parties in Brazil. Most remarkably, even competition between parties within is the same ideological spectrum shows partisan differences across Brazil where subnational political competition is often deemed prone to patron-client relationships.

Uneven socio-economic development – where pockets of deep poverty and unemployment have created few opportunities for upward mobility – can nevertheless counter the electorate’s ability to vote freely. Clientelism and patronage, which are longstanding traditional practice in Brazil, suggest the existence of a private electoral marketplace. To test the hypothesis that a private electoral marketplace fuels clientelistic politics independent of ideology, this dissertation developed a two-pronged strategy.

First, Chapter 4 develops an entirely new measure of clientelism. This measure is based on the assumption that programmatic parties tend to have votes clustered in adjacent municipalities while clientelistic parties tend to have more dispersed votes (Ames 2001). On the one hand, clustering refers to representatives’ strategy to garner votes in contiguous municipalities. This phenomenon maximizes limited campaign resources, as it does not necessarily require the mediation of local bosses to access the electorate. Consequently, clustering makes the candidate more accountable to the electorate. Dispersion, on the other hand, is associated with the phenomenon of dominance, which is related to the ability of representatives to

amass a high percentage of vote shares in municipalities that contribute to the majority of his individual vote. Dominance is more common in rural areas where the mediation of the local boss is crucial for the deliverance of such a high vote share. As a consequence, dominance renders the candidate less accountable to the electorate.

To capture these phenomena, I draw on electoral and geospatial data to measure clustering and dominance among parties. I initially used the Herfindahl Index, a measure of concentration that is typically used to assess companies' monopolist behavior, and developed the Cluster Index, which improves on the previous measure to account for the clustering of votes according geographically contiguous municipalities. Both variables are the result of millions of computational iterations that run for months at the time. Although the distribution of the parties on a two dimensional political competition using the measures discussed suggests that in Brazil rightist parties tend to be more clientelistic and leftist parties tend to be more programmatic, the model lacked statistical evidence to confirm this tendency.

One important finding relates to the effect of the interaction term of party competition in private and public markets on the outcomes of clientelistic party behavior. In larger private markets (i.e. larger private sector as a share of the local economy), the residual pool of clientelistic votes is smaller, thus requiring more public resources for the dispensation of patronage. In smaller private markets (e.g. smaller private sectors as a share of the local economy), the supply of clientelistic voters is higher, thus reducing the amount of public resources necessary for patronage. This finding is also supported by qualitative interviews. The main conclusion is that more developed municipalities tend to have a smaller pool of

clientelistic votes which, in turn, requires more public resources to feed the clientelistic machine. Less developed municipalities can make do with fewer public resources as they do not have to compete with other economic sectors to leverage votes.

To test the overall utility theory, this dissertation draws on the unique measure of clientelism (Cluster Index) to analyze whether electoral coalition formation is a function of parties' ideological preferences and clientelistic strategies to win elections. Thus, Chapter 5 represents the second prong of the strategy to test for the role of clientelism and ideology in electoral politics. Specifically, this chapter tests the hypothesis that electoral coalitions will form with a heterogeneous composition of programmatic and clientelistic parties. The model results indicate that electoral coalitions on the ideological dimension are more prevalent. However, ideology has become less important since the 2002 election. This empirical finding corresponds with reports from political elites found during field research. The common view among them was that ideology has lost importance in defining electoral coalitions since 2002 when Lula won the presidential election.

The models on the role of clientelism in electoral coalition formation, however, are not as conclusive. The analysis suggests that polarizing parties on the left resort to less clientelistic partners than do parties on the right. Focusing specifically on the two nationally polarizing parties, it appears that the PSDB counts on a wider range of clientelistic parties in its coalition than the PT does. The dispersion of the ideology and clientelism variables on coalition formation, indicated by the standard deviation for both parties (PT and PSDB), also shows

interesting results. On the ideology dimension, both parties seem to narrow the ideological proximity of the parties in their respective electoral coalitions. However, this dispersion is wider for the PT than it is for the PSDB, which indicates that the PT has been more aggressive in its strategy to form coalitions by attracting more parties from the extremes of the political spectrum when compared to the PSDB. On the clientelistic dimension, the result is the opposite. In fact, the PT appears to increase the spectrum of the parties comprising its coalition over time, but it remains slightly lower than that of the PSDB, which remains relatively constant over time. In sum, the PT has a wider ideological configuration of parties in its electoral coalition while the PSDB has a wider clientelistic configuration of parties comprising its electoral coalition.

Brazil's political structures have shown some signs of change with the election of programmatic parties for the presidency and for the states' governorship, particularly in the Northeast after 2002. In order to flesh out the quantitative findings, qualitative interviews were conducted in the states of Rio Grande do Norte and Bahia from July to August 2013. Rio Grande do Norte is a notable case because it is where the PSB first defeated the Alves and Maia oligarchies, which respectively led the PMDB and the DEM parties. In the state of Bahia, the PT defeated 16 uninterrupted years of rule by the PFL/DEMs, headed by the ACM oligarchy.

Looking specifically at the variables ideology and clientelism, which together accounted for electoral coalition formation, the qualitative interviews reveal that ideology has lost importance as a factor driving electoral coalitions. Party personnel indicated that the diminishing importance of ideology was due to the pragmatic

move of the PT towards the center of the political spectrum. This strategic move broadened the scope of electoral coalitions made by the PT, thus making ideological criteria less important than the electoral calculus to win office. However, party personnel also suggested that their central leadership recommended that the local chapters form electoral coalitions that followed the national polarization of the PT and the PSDB. That is, the PT should avoid forming electoral coalitions with the PSDB, and vice-versa.

Other findings from Chapter 4 suggest that modernization operates to attenuate the effects of clientelism on political competition. In the Cluster models, the size of population, which is a demographic variable operating in the same logic of modernization theory, was also consistently confirmed. Nevertheless, both GDP per capita and urbanization were not in the predicted direction.

In the following sections I will address the limitations and significance of this dissertation and conclude with suggestions about future research.

### ***Limitations***

Informal institutions are complex structures to understand because they lack the evident set of rules that frame and inform their mechanisms. As an informal institution, clientelism has proved an elusive candidate for quantitative studies. While our models suggest reliable measurements, more research is necessary to improve the validity of the parties' clientelistic behavior. Specifically, studies would benefit from a country specialist to assess party placement at the state level on a second dimension of political competition in order to advance the understanding of political linkages beyond ideology. Ideology and clientelism are difficult variables to

disentangle, as there seems to be a general assumption that parties on the left tend to be more programmatic while parties on the right tend to be more clientelistic. This understanding makes it difficult to isolate each variable when conducting field interviews with political elites and party operatives. Scholars should be aware of this conflation and devise strategies to make this difference clear and therefore be better able to assess the nuances that drive each dimension of these political linkages independently.

Another caveat relates to the applicability of specific models, since they are contingent upon the nature of the electoral system and adaptations should be considered. For instance, the aggregate-level analysis of ideological competition would be restricted to systems that practice runoff elections, in which case, it could also be applied to subnational runoff elections. This level of analysis would be especially useful as ideological politics are generally perceived to be lacking at the local level where mayoral elections have greater potential to mobilize personal votes. This model can also be applied to presidential elections with runoffs.

While this dissertation demonstrates that coalition formation is subject to the operation of both ideology and clientelistic politics both quantitatively and qualitatively, it appears that the statistical evidence concerning clientelistic linkages is not conclusive. Several factors may have contributed to this methodological shortcoming. One could be the dynamic nature of the political parties, which shift position on the ideological political spectrum over time as suggested by Power and Zucco (2009). Such shifts may cause some noise in the assessment of coalition formation at the ideological level and may be particularly problematic for the



clientelistic level due to the elusive nature of this concept. Another possibility for this shortcoming in the assessment of coalition formation could also be related to the flexibility of the parties in adapting to local politics. In this sense, all else being constant, it may be the case that the same party may behave more on a clientelistic fashion in a private electoral marketplace and more programmatically in a public electoral marketplace. Although the data allows for such nuance, more time would be necessary to develop this idea.

Finally, the field research posited its own challenges. First, the sensitivity of the subject makes it hard for some elected officials to openly and frankly address the issue of clientelism -- especially when related to vote buying, which is an electoral crime. For this reason, officials are more likely to talk about the “demand” for clientelism from voters rather than the “supply” of vote-buying exchanges.

Another limitation is related to the number of states and representatives interviewed. The number of states visited was contingent upon funding. In this sense, it would have been ideal to travel to more states to increase the sample of both developed and less-developed areas. I compensated this limitation by spending most of my time in the Federal District where representatives of all states congregate from Tuesday to Thursday. Political elites do not grant interviews to scholars easily, a factor that was complicated by the timing of the field research. Initially scheduled for June of 2013, my field trip had to be postponed to avoid an unprecedented and massive protest that took place in Brazil during that month. As a consequence, I arrived in Brazil during the congressional recess, which reduced the

number of available representatives. To compensate, I interviewed other political informants such as journalists, party personnel, and congressional staff.

### ***Significance***

This dissertation has focused on electoral competition in a multiparty developing democracy by integrating the ideological and clientelistic dimensions of political linkages. The findings represent an important contribution to theory building on partisan politics (Amorim Neto and Santos 2001), ideology differentiation (Luna and Zechmeister 2005, Power and Zucco 2009, Rosas 2010), clientelism (Kitschelt, 2000, Remmer 2010, Roberts 2002, 2010), electoral coalitions (Amorim Neto 2002, Golder 2005, Machado 2009, Mignozzetti, et. al. 2011, Nicolau 1996), and modernization (Borges 2011, Hagopian et. al. 2009, Hunter and Power 2007, Sugiyama and Hunter 2013).

This dissertation contributes to the literature on party development in emerging democracies (e.g. Borges 2011, Hagopian et al. 2009, Hunter and Power 2007, Lyne 2005). It draws on spatial models of voting behavior in subnational elections to advance an innovative endogenous statistical model to forecast runoff elections for governors in Brazil. Additionally, it applies a new methodological approach based on alternative-specific conditional logistic regression models. In this perspective, the ideological models offer compelling evidence that ideology is the main level of electoral competition, which helps to settle the debate on the ideological differentiation of Brazilian political parties. Moreover, it also marginally confirms strategic voting theories (Cox 1997).

This dissertation also offers a major contribution to the understanding of clientelistic politics. It does so by building a completely new measurement of clientelism based on the geospatial characteristics of the distribution of votes among parties and how these parties devise strategies to garner these votes. It also incorporates interesting insights from field research interviews that corroborate the statistical models. A notable contribution relates to evidence suggesting that developed areas (public markets) may require even more resources to meet the demands of clientelistic-based voters.

Finally, the novel integration of both ideology and clientelism to explain partisan politics through electoral coalitions also offer an insightful approach to understand party development in modernizing environments. Since ideology appears to be the main dimension of political competition, parties may resort to other strategies, such as electoral coalitions, to gain access to electoral markets that ideology alone otherwise can not. More studies, however, are necessary to refine the combined utility theory developed in this dissertation to explain the two dimensions of political competition (ideology/clientelism).

### ***Future Research***

The models developed herein to understand patterns of political competition could be extended beyond Brazil to assess party competition in other multiparty developing democracies. In this sense, some improvements are suggested. For instance, future research could refine the deterministic model of spatial distribution of votes by testing the probabilistic alternatives in runoff systems. While the deterministic model applied in this study is simpler and more satisfying for runoffs

with two candidates, a probabilistic approach based on the spatial distribution of votes may improve the predictability of the outcomes of runoff elections.

The individual-level analysis using conditional logistic regression has broader application potential, as it is not constrained by the nature of the electoral rules but only by the availability of national surveys that include self-ideological placement and party choice plus external measures of party ideological placements. That is to say, researchers will find many opportunities to apply these analytic and methodological techniques for analyses of elections around the world.

The clientelistic models also seem to have a broader application potential as they are determined by the availability of electoral data that could link socio-demographic characteristics to votes. The validity of the measurements, in this case, would depend on the availability of data and the degree of socio-demographic homogeneity/heterogeneity of the electoral districts in which this data could be aggregated. For instance, if the state is relatively homogeneous socio-demographically and the data available is aggregated by state, then it should suffice. However, in relatively heterogeneous socio-demographic electoral districts, the level of aggregation should reflect this difference at the lowest level possible, either by municipality or electoral zones.

Electoral coalitions also inform the theory developed herein but should not limit its application. In fact, formal coalitions are easier to follow as they are recorded by the electoral commissions; but even when the system lacks a clear definition of electoral coalition, informal alliances, the previous governing coalition, or the ex-post-facto governing coalition could offer alternatives to formal electoral

coalitions. The biggest challenge with this would be to track informal alliances, since its mapping depends on the availability of written sources such as newspapers or party documents.

Looking further, researchers should also account for the dynamics of multiparty political party systems. In the case of Brazil, partisan politics have been polarized between two programmatic parties (the PT and the PSDB), but the electoral viability of third parties may displace any or both parties in national elections. In fact, all but the presidential election and re-election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso have been decided in runoffs since re-democratization in 1989, which suggests the viability of third parties. In the 2014 elections, for instance, Marina Silva (PSB) jumped to second place in the polls, ahead of the Aécio Neves (PSDB) and behind Dilma Rousseff (PT). Eventually the second round was disputed again between the PT and the PSDB, but the PT has lost critical political capital following Rousseff's inauguration into her second term amid an economic recession and corruption scandal involving members of her party. Regardless of the configuration of the main national electoral contenders, modernization suggests that ideology plays an increasingly important and definitive role in partisan politics in Brazil, with apparently ebbing clientelism. More study is necessary to determine how parties access the dimension of clientelistic linkages in modernizing polities.

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## Appendix A

### Codebook for Chapter 3

#### A.1 Aggregate-Level Models

##### A.1.1 Variables

**Ideological Proximity (pred\_won)** – results of the addition of votes according to the spatial distribution of the parties in the left-right ideological political spectrum using Power and Zucco's (2009) index of party ideology, which varies from one (left) to ten (right), to position each party in the political spectrum. Then, I redistribute the first round votes according to its ideological proximity, assuming that in the first round each party's voters occupy that party's ideal point and that in the second round the party chosen is the ideologically closest to the voter's single-peaked preference. After redistributing the votes, I generate a binary variable, which assumes the value one for the highest aggregation and zero otherwise.

**Incumbent Candidate (incumbentcandidate)** – incumbent candidate, regardless of the party. I.e. candidate may have switched party between elections.

**Incumbent Party (incumbentparty)** – party incumbency, regardless of the candidate.

**Incumbent Coalition (incumbentcoalition)** – incumbent is the party in the coalition, regardless of the candidate, I.e., the party elected the prior election belongs to the coalition but the party itself did not field a candidate.

**Incumbent Party\_Composite (incum\_canpar)** – includes incumbent party and candidate. I.e., incumbent candidate is running plus a different candidate who is running belongs to the incumbent party.

**Incumbent Coalition\_Composite (incum\_composite)** – includes incumbent party and candidate who belong to the coalition. I.e., the incumbent candidate is running and a different candidate who is running belongs to the incumbent party in the coalition.

**Left\_right** – position of the party on a left-right dimension. Parties with ideological score above 5.0 is right (=1) and parties with scores below 5.0 is left (=0)

**Left\_or\_right** – indicate runoff competition with parties either on the left or on the right of the political spectrum. So if there is a runoff between two parties on the left OR two parties on the right (=1) otherwise (=0). In other words, runoff of parties on same side of the political spectrum (=1) otherwise (=0). So to run models of runoff on the same side one should drop values < 1, then the new variable would show only values 1 (left\_or\_right = 1)

**Left\_AND\_right** – variable does not exist in the database but if the values > 0 of Left\_or\_right are dropped and it indicates runoff competition with parties on the left versus parties on the right of the political spectrum. So the new variable would show only zeros (left\_or\_right = 0)

**Verticalization** – dummy to test the effect of the verticalization of coalition in 2002 and 2006 in which electoral coalitions for the presidency had to be replicated in the states.

**Re-election (reelection)** – dummy to test the effect of the re-election instituted in 1998.

**Concurrent Coattail (presparty)** – dummy that indicates if the elected president in that same election was from the same party of the elected governor.



**Proximate Coattail (prepresparty)** – dummy that indicates if the elected governor belongs to the incumbent president's party.

### **A.1.2 Do File - Table 3.1**

#### **Model 1**

```
logit elected pred_won_old incumbentcandidate round1ord prepresparty
estimates store m1, title(Model 1)
```

#### **Model 2**

```
logit elected pred_won_old incumbentcandidate round1ord presparty
estimates store m2, title(Model 2)
```

#### **Model 3**

```
logit elected pred_won_old incumbentparty round1ord prepresparty
estimates store m3, title(Model 3)
```

#### **Model 4**

```
logit elected pred_won_old incumbentcandidate round1ord prepresparty if
left_or_right_old == 0
estimates store m4, title(Model 4)
```

#### **Model 5**

```
logit elected pred_won_old incumbentcandidate round1ord prepresparty if
left_or_right_old == 1
estimates store m5, title(Model 5)
```

```
estout m1 m2 m3 m4 m5, style(fixed) cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par fmt(2))) legend label
varlabels(_cons constant) stats(PseudoR2 LR N )
```

### **A.1.3 Do File – Figure 3.2**

#### **Install SPost**

```
Search spost, net
```

#### **Install praccum2**

```
capture program drop praccum2
program define praccum2
    version 6
    tempname newmat
    if "`e(cmd)'"=="cloglog" { local io = "typical binary" }
    if "`e(cmd)'"=="cnreg" { local io = "typical regress" }
    if "`e(cmd)'"=="fit" { local io = "typical regress" }
    if "`e(cmd)'"=="gologit" { local io = "typical mlogit" }
    if "`e(cmd)'"=="intreg" { local io = "typical regress" }
    if "`e(cmd)'"=="logistic" { local io = "typical none" }
    if "`e(cmd)'"=="logit" { local io = "typical binary" }
    if "`e(cmd)'"=="mlogit" { local io = "typical mlogit" }
    if "`e(cmd)'"=="nbreg" { local io = "typical count" }
    if "`e(cmd)'"=="ologit" { local io = "typical ordered" }
    if "`e(cmd)'"=="oprobit" { local io = "typical ordered" }
    if "`e(cmd)'"=="poisson" { local io = "typical count" }
    if "`e(cmd)'"=="probit" { local io = "typical binary" }
```

```

if "`e(cmd)'"=="regress" { local io = "typical regress" }
if "`e(cmd)'"=="slogit" { local io = "typical ordered" }
if "`e(cmd)'"=="tobit" { local io = "typical regress" }
if "`e(cmd)'"=="zinb" { local io = "twoeq count" }
if "`e(cmd)'"=="zip" { local io = "twoeq count" }
if "`e(cmd)'"=="ztp" { local io = "typical count" }
if "`e(cmd)'"=="ztnb" { local io = "typical count" }

if "`io'"==" " {
    di
    di in y "praccum" in r /*
    */ " does not work for the last type of model estimated."
    exit
}
local input : word 1 of `io' /* input routine to __pepred */
local output : word 2 of `io' /* output routine */

syntax [, Saving(string) Using(string) GENerate(string) XIS(string)]

if "`generate'" ~= "" {
    local gen = substr("`generate'",1,29)
    cap version 7
    if _rc != 0 { local gen = substr("`gen'",1,5) }
    version 6.0
}

if "`output'" == "ordered" | "`output'" == "mlogit" {
    tempname values
    mat `values' = r(values)
    local outcms = rowsof(r(probs))
    local count = 1
    while `count' <= `outcms' {
        local k`count' = `values'[`count',1]
        if `k`count' < -9 | `k`count' > 99 | int(`k`count') != `k`count' {
            di in red "category values must be integers between -9 and 99"
            exit 198
        }
        if `k`count' < 0 {
            local k`count' = abs(`k`count')
            local k`count' = "_`k`count'"
        }
        local count = `count' + 1
    }
}

```

```

if "`xis'"!="" {
    tempname results
    if "`output'" == "regress" {
        matrix `results' = ( `xis', r(xb), `r(xb_lo)', `r(xb_hi)' )
    }
    if "`output'" == "binary" {
        * grab output from binary model
        matrix `results' = ( `xis', r(p0), r(p1), `r(p1_lo)', `r(p1_hi)')
    }
    if "`output'" == "ordered" | "`output'" == "mlogit" {
        tempname probs newprob tmpmat
        local outcms = rowsof(r(pred))
        mat `probs' = r(pred)
        matrix `results' = `xis'
        local count = 1
        while `count' <= `outcms' {
            matrix `newprob' = `probs'[`count', 1..3]
            matrix `results' = `results', `newprob'
            local count = `count' + 1
        }
    }
    if "`output'" == "count" {
        tempname probs newprob values
        mat `values' = r(values)
        mat `probs' = r(pred)
        local outcms = rowsof(r(probs))
        local rmu = r(mu)
            local rmulo = r(mu_lo)
            local rmuhi = r(mu_hi)
        matrix `results' = `xis', `rmu', `rmulo', `rmuhi'
        local count = 1
        while `count' <= `outcms' {
            matrix `newprob' = `probs'[`count', 1..3]
            matrix `results' = `results', `newprob'
            local count = `count' + 1
        }
    }
    if "`input'" == "twoeq" & "`output'"=="count" {
        tempname az
        matrix `az' = r(always0)
        matrix `results' = `results', `az'
    }

    if "`saving'" ~= "" { mat `saving' = `results' }
    if "`using'" ~= "" {

```

```

    cap mat list `using'
    if _rc ~= 0 {
        mat `using' = `results'
    }
    else { mat `using' = (`using') \ (`results') }
}

}

if "`gen'" ~= "" {
    if "`output'" == "regress" {
        local columns = "gen'x gen'xb gen'xb_lo gen'xb_hi"
    }
    if "`output'" == "binary" {
        local columns = "gen'x gen'p0 gen'p1 gen'p1_lo gen'p1_hi"
    }
    if "`output'" == "ordered" | "`output'" == "mlogit" {
        local columns "gen'x"
        local outcms = rowsof(r(probs))
        local count = 1
        while `count' <= `outcms' {
            local columns "columns' gen'p`count' gen'p`count'_lo
`gen'p`count'_hi"
            local count = `count' + 1
        }
    }
    if "`output'" == "count" {
        local columns "gen'x gen'mu gen'mu_lo gen'mu_hi"
        local outcms = rowsof(r(probs))
        local count = 0
        while `count' <= (`outcms'-1) {
            local columns "columns' gen'p`count' gen'p`count'_lo gen'p`count'_hi"
            local count = `count' + 1
        }
    }
    if "`input'" == "twoeq" {
        local columns "columns' gen'inf"
    }
}

matrix colnames `using' = `columns'
svmat `using', names(col)

label variable `gen'x "value of x"
if "`output'" == "regress" {
    label variable `gen'xb "value of xb"
}
if "`output'" == "binary" {
    label variable `gen'p0 "Pr(0)"
}

```

```

    label variable `gen'p1 "Pr(1)"
  }
  if "`output'" == "ordered" {
    tempname values
    mat `values' = r(values)
    local outcms = rowsof(r(probs))
    local count = 1
    while `count' <= `outcms' {
      local count2 = `count'
      label variable `gen'p`k`count' "Pr(`k`count')"
      local count = `count' + 1
    }
  }
  if "`output'" == "mlogit" {
    tempname values
    mat `values' = r(values)
    local outcms = rowsof(r(probs))
    local count = 1
    while `count' <= `outcms' {
      local value = `values'[`count', 1]
      local count2 = `count'
      label variable `gen'p`k`count' "Pr(`k`count')"
      local count = `count' + 1
    }
  }
  if "`output'" == "count" {
    tempname values
    mat `values' = r(values)
    local outcms = rowsof(r(probs))
    local count = 1
    while `count' <= `outcms' {
      local value = `values'[`count', 1]
      label variable `gen'p`value' "Pr(`value')"
      local count = `count' + 1
    }
    if "`input'" == "twoeq" {
      label variable `gen'inf "Pr(always0)"
    }
  }
}

if "`output'" == "ordered" {
  local outcms = rowsof(r(probs))
  local count = 1
  while `count' <= `outcms' {
    qui egen `gen's`k`count' = rsum(`gen'p`k1' - `gen'p`k`count') if `gen'p`k1' ~= .
    local cumul = "`cumul`gen's`k`count' "
  }
}

```

```

        label variable `gen's`k`count' "Pr(<=`k`count')"
        local count = `count' + 1
    }
}
if "`output'" == "count" {
    local outcms = rowsof(r(probs))
    local count = 0
    while `count' <= (`outcms'-1) {
        qui egen `gen's`count' = rsum(`gen'p0-`gen'p`count') if `gen'p0~=
        local cumul = "`cumul`gen's`count' "
        label variable `gen's`count' "Pr(<=`count')"
        local count = `count' + 1
    }
}

di _n in g "New variables created by" in w " praccum" in y ":"
sum `columns' `cumul'
} /* generate */
end

```

### Generate Graphs

```

prvalue, x(pred_won_old 0) rest(mean)
praccum2, xis(0) saving(lrprob)
prvalue, x(pred_won_old 1) rest(mean)
praccum2, xis(1) using(lrprob) gen(lrprob)
prvalue, x(pred_won_old 0) rest(mean)
praccum2, xis(0) saving(lrprob)
prvalue, x(pred_won_old 1) rest(mean)
praccum2, xis(1) using(lrprob) gen(lrprob2)

```

```

twoway (line lrprobp1 lrprobp1_lo lrprobp1_hi lrprob2p1_lo lrprob2p1_hi lrprobx,
lcolor(black black black black black) lpattern(solid dash dash dot dot)), legend(order(1 4)
label(1 "Pr(Y=1|X)") label(4 "95% CI (Delta)") scheme(s1mono) xtitle("Ideology
Proximity"))

```

## A.1.4 Models not Shown – Aggregate-Level Models

### Model 6

logit elected pred\_won\_old incumbentcoalition round1ord prepresparty

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	156
	LR chi2(4)	=	56.88
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log likelihood = -79.692824	Pseudo R2	=	0.2630

-----

elected	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pred_won	1.464364	.3919522	3.74	0.000	.6961519	2.232576
incumbentc~n	-1.166609	.6682738	-1.75	0.081	-2.476402	.1431834
roundlord	1.925182	.4015759	4.79	0.000	1.138108	2.712257
prepresparty	1.309392	.5346036	2.45	0.014	.2615886	2.357196
_cons	-1.805418	.3624534	-4.98	0.000	-2.515813	-1.095022

### Model 7

logit elected pred\_won\_old incumbentcandidate roundlord prepresparty verticalizacao  
reelection northeast north centerwest southeast south

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	156
	LR chi2(11)	=	54.23
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log likelihood = -81.015773	Pseudo R2	=	0.2508

elected	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pred_won	1.446154	.3877375	3.73	0.000	.6862029	2.206106
incumbentc~e	.3213584	.5023754	0.64	0.522	-.6632792	1.305996
roundlord	1.818	.3958047	4.59	0.000	1.042237	2.593763
prepresparty	1.348889	.5406396	2.49	0.013	.2892545	2.408523
verticaliz~o	-.1170364	.7046569	-0.17	0.868	-1.498139	1.264066
reelection	.0521517	.6620122	0.08	0.937	-1.245368	1.349672
northeast	-.2059506	.9771634	-0.21	0.833	-2.121156	1.709254
north	-.3012902	.9835331	-0.31	0.759	-2.22898	1.626399
centerwest	-.3149163	1.043447	-0.30	0.763	-2.360035	1.730202
southeast	-.3372952	1.089105	-0.31	0.757	-2.471901	1.797311
south	-.2669803	1.058762	-0.25	0.801	-2.342116	1.808156
_cons	-1.654966	.9777298	-1.69	0.091	-3.571281	.2613492

### Model 8

logit elected pred\_won\_old incumbentcoalition roundlord prepresparty grand\_north  
grand\_south

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	156
	LR chi2(6)	=	57.23
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log likelihood = -79.518102	Pseudo R2	=	0.2646

elected	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pred_won	1.464856	.3922576	3.73	0.000	.6960451	2.233667
incumbentc~n	-1.236851	.6812441	-1.82	0.069	-2.572065	.098363
roundlord	1.939561	.4039884	4.80	0.000	1.147758	2.731364
prepresparty	1.35193	.545119	2.48	0.013	.2835166	2.420344
grand_north	-.3151837	.9406198	-0.34	0.738	-2.158765	1.528397
grand_south	-.5282865	1.008808	-0.52	0.601	-2.505514	1.448941
_cons	-1.462147	.9504919	-1.54	0.124	-3.325077	.4007825

## **A.2 Individual-Level Models**

### **A.2.1 Variables**

**Party Choice(asvote1)** – self-reported vote for governor in the first round of the 2006 election. Dummy coded 1 when the alternative specific variable and the self-reported vote equal 1, zero otherwise

**Distance (distance)** – measured by the modular difference between voter's self-placement in the political spectrum and the party placement according to Power and Zucco (2009) scale.

**Income** – categorical variable that indicate the income level of the respondent. The question is: "Qual é a sua renda mensal pessoal?" (What is your monthly personal income?). The levels are: 1-No income; 2-At R\$ 260,00; 3-From R\$ 260,01 to R\$ 520,00; 4-From R\$ 520,01 to R\$ 780,00; 5-From R\$ 780,01 to R\$ 1.300,00; 6-From R\$ 1.300,01 to R\$ 2.600,00; 7- From R\$ 2.600,01 to R\$ 5.200,00; 8- From R\$ 5.200,01 to R\$ 7.800,00

**Gender(Q1)** – ascribed gender. 1-Male; 2-Female

**Age(Q2)** – self-reported age. Question: "Quantos anos o(a) sr(a) tem?" (How old are you?)

**Bolsa Família (BF1A\_R)** – binary variable indicating if the respondent participated in the Bolsa Família program. The question is "O(a) sr(a) participa do programa Bolsa Família, do governo federal?" (Do you participate in the Bolsa Família program, from the federal government?). The answer "yes" is coded 1, zero otherwise.

**Case (case)** – case specific variable - parties

**Alt (alt)** – alternative specific variable – long format of parties

### **A.2.2 Do File – Table 3.2**

#### **Model 1**

```
aslogit asvote1 dist if inest == 1, casevars(Income BF1A_R) case(case) alt(alt)
estimates store model1, title(Model 1)
```

#### **Model 2**

```
aslogit asvote1 dist if inest == 1, casevars(Income) case(case) alt(alt)
estimates store model2, title(Model 2)
```

#### **Model 3**

```
aslogit asvote1 dist if inest == 1, casevars(BF1A_R) case(case) alt(alt)
estimates store model3, title(Model 3)
```

```
estout model1 model2 model3, style(fixed) cells(b(star fmt(3))) se(par fmt(2))) legend
label varlabels(_cons constant) stats(N bic, fmt(%9.0f %9.3g)) labels(N "BIC"))
```

### **A.2.3 Do File – Figure 3.3**

#### **Install aspraccum**

```
capture program drop aspraccum
program define aspraccum
syntax [, Saving(string) Using(string) GENerate(string) XIS(string) first(string)]
tempname probs results saving
matrix `probs' = r(p)'
```



```

matrix `results' = `xis', `probs'
mat list `results'
    if "`first'" == "1" {
        tempname `using'
        mat `using' = `results'
    }
    else {
        mat `using' = (`using') \ (`results')
    }
if "`generate'" ~= "" {
    local columns "`generate'x"
    local outcms = rowsof(r(p))
    local count = 1
    while `count' <= `outcms' {
        local columns "`columns' `generate'p`count'"
        local count = `count' + 1
    }
    matrix colnames `using' = `columns'
    svmat `using', names(col)
    local count = 1
    while `count' <= `outcms' {
        local count2 = `count'
        label variable `generate'p`count' "Pr(`count')"
        local count = `count' + 1
    }
}
end

```

```

quietly clogit asvote1 dist *_612 alt612 *_613 alt613 *_615 alt615 *_625 alt625 *_640
alt640 *_645 alt645, group(case)

```

```

asprvalue, base(alt611) cat(alt612 alt613 alt615 alt625 alt640 alt645) x(Income_612 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 Income_613 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Income_615 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Income_625 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Income_640 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 Income_645 0 0 0 0 0 1 0) rest(asmean)
aspraccum, xis(1) using(mat) first(1)
asprvalue, base(alt611) cat(alt612 alt613 alt615 alt625 alt640 alt645) x(Income_612 2 0
0 0 0 0 0 Income_613 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 Income_615 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 Income_625 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Income_640 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 Income_645 0 0 0 0 0 2 0) rest(asmean)
aspraccum, xis(2) using(mat) first(0)
asprvalue, base(alt611) cat(alt612 alt613 alt615 alt625 alt640 alt645) x(Income_612 3 0
0 0 0 0 0 Income_613 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 Income_615 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 Income_625 0 0 0 3 0 0 0
Income_640 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 Income_645 0 0 0 0 0 3 0) rest(asmean)
aspraccum, xis(3) using(mat) first(0)
asprvalue, base(alt611) cat(alt612 alt613 alt615 alt625 alt640 alt645) x(Income_612 4 0
0 0 0 0 0 Income_613 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 Income_615 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 Income_625 0 0 0 4 0 0 0
Income_640 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 Income_645 0 0 0 0 0 4 0) rest(asmean)

```

```

aspraccum, xis(4) using(mat) first(0)
asprvalue, base(alt611) cat(alt612 alt613 alt615 alt625 alt640 alt645) x(Income_612 5 0
0 0 0 0 Income_613 0 5 0 0 0 0 Income_615 0 0 5 0 0 0 Income_625 0 0 0 5 0 0
Income_640 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 Income_645 0 0 0 0 0 5 0) rest(asmean)
aspraccum, xis(5) using(mat) first(0)
asprvalue, base(alt611) cat(alt612 alt613 alt615 alt625 alt640 alt645) x(Income_612 6 0
0 0 0 0 Income_613 0 6 0 0 0 0 Income_615 0 0 6 0 0 0 Income_625 0 0 0 6 0 0
Income_640 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 Income_645 0 0 0 0 0 6 0) rest(asmean)
aspraccum, xis(6) using(mat) first(0)
asprvalue, base(alt611) cat(alt612 alt613 alt615 alt625 alt640 alt645) x(Income_612 7 0
0 0 0 0 Income_613 0 7 0 0 0 0 Income_615 0 0 7 0 0 0 Income_625 0 0 0 7 0 0
Income_640 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 Income_645 0 0 0 0 0 7 0) rest(asmean)
aspraccum, xis(7) using(mat) first(0)
asprvalue, base(alt611) cat(alt612 alt613 alt615 alt625 alt640 alt645) x(Income_612 8 0
0 0 0 0 Income_613 0 8 0 0 0 0 Income_615 0 0 8 0 0 0 Income_625 0 0 0 8 0 0
Income_640 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 Income_645 0 0 0 0 0 8 0) rest(asmean)
aspraccum, xis(8) using(mat) first(0) gen(cl_inc)

twoway (line cl_incp1 cl_incp2 cl_incp3 cl_incp4 cl_incp5 cl_incp6 cl_incp7 cl_incx,
lpattern(solid dash dot)), xtitle("Income") ytitle("Pr(Vote for Party)") legend(order(7 1 2
3 4 5 6) label(1 "PDT") label(2 "PT") label(3 "PMDB")label(4 "PFL")label(5
"PSB")label(6 "PSDB") label(7 "PP")) scheme(s1mono)

```

## **A.2.4 Models not Shown**

### **Model 4**

```

estout model1 model2 model3 model4, style(fixed) cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par fmt(2)))
legend label varlabels(_cons constant) stats(N bic, fmt(%9.0f %9.3g)labels(N "BIC"))

```

	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se
alt				
dist	-0.020* (0.01)	-0.017 (0.01)	-0.023* (0.01)	-0.020* (0.01)
PDT				
Income	-0.105 (0.19)	-0.100 (0.18)		-0.097 (0.20)
Bolsa Família	-0.361 (1.47)		-0.147 (1.44)	-0.320 (1.47)
Gender				-0.196 (0.65)
Age				-0.011 (0.02)
constant	0.733 (0.72)	0.682 (0.70)	0.317 (0.30)	1.406 (1.48)
PT				
Income	-0.137 (0.15)	-0.148 (0.15)		-0.149 (0.16)
Bolsa Família	0.178 (1.12)		0.666 (1.08)	0.234 (1.12)
Gender				-0.287 (0.53)
Age				-0.005 (0.02)

constant	2.250*** (0.60)	2.306*** (0.58)	1.747*** (0.25)	2.900* (1.23)
PMDB				
Income	-0.136 (0.15)	-0.152 (0.15)		-0.173 (0.16)
Bolsa Família	0.548 (1.09)		0.859 (1.06)	0.630 (1.09)
Gender				-0.406 (0.52)
Age				0.002 (0.02)
constant	2.287*** (0.59)	2.377*** (0.57)	1.845*** (0.23)	2.921* (1.21)
DEM				
Income	-0.025 (0.17)	-0.063 (0.16)		-0.024 (0.18)
Bolsa Família	1.039 (1.14)		1.507 (1.09)	1.038 (1.14)
Gender				0.016 (0.58)
Age				0.001 (0.02)
constant	0.808 (0.67)	1.035 (0.63)	0.573* (0.27)	0.757 (1.36)
PSB				
Income	-0.349* (0.17)	-0.400* (0.17)		-0.433* (0.18)
Bolsa Família	1.339 (1.10)		2.055 (1.06)	1.441 (1.10)
Gender				-0.532 (0.57)
Age				0.020 (0.02)
constant	2.081** (0.64)	2.375*** (0.61)	1.004*** (0.27)	2.348 (1.32)
PSDB				
Income	0.004 (0.15)	-0.034 (0.14)		-0.000 (0.16)
Bolsa Família	0.914 (1.08)		1.091 (1.05)	0.893 (1.08)
Gender				0.341 (0.52)
Age				0.021 (0.02)
constant	2.010*** (0.59)	2.217*** (0.56)	2.014*** (0.23)	0.650 (1.22)
N	3535	3563	4200	3528
BIC	1878	1852	2156	1949

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

## Appendix B

### Codebook for Chapter 4

#### **B.1 Herfindahl Models**

##### **B.1.1 Variables**

**Herfindahl Index (herf)** – calculates the concentration and dispersion of the votes for each candidate in each municipality, which also take into account population size. Further, the results are integrated at the party level by taking the average of the candidates per party and for each state and election-year. Finally, the values of HI are normalized to account for the extreme high distribution of smaller parties. The HI varies from 0 to .8 where high indices of the variable would indicate that the party's votes are more concentrated, while low indices of the variable would indicate that votes obtained by the party are more dispersed.

**Ideology (ideology\_100)** – variable is based on the left-right measures of ideology as devised by Power and Zucco (2009), which comprises six waves of measurements based on interviews with congressional deputies and senators. The scale goes from one (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Re-scaled by dividing it by 100 in order to avoid coefficients that round to zero.

**Private Sector's Size (localtxyr)** – calculated by dividing local taxes revenues by current municipal income and averaged by state.

**Public Administration's Size (sizepub)** – calculated by dividing the GDP of the public administration by the municipality's overall GDP, and then averaged by the state.

**GDP per Capita (gdpcavg)** – captures the municipal GDP per capita, which includes all sectors and uses a national implicit deflator (the ratio of the current-currency value of a series to its corresponding chained-currency value, multiplied by 100) The GDP per capita is the average of all municipalities for each state for the four years preceding the election.

**Urbanization (urbanization)** – measures the ratio of urban to rural population in the state for each electoral cycle according to the most recent census conducted by Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistic (IBGE). The data was obtained in the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) website.

**Population (logpop)** – uses the log of the population of the states based on the most recent census prior to the electoral cycle.

**Region (northwest, north, center-west, south, and southeast)** – dummy variables for each of the five Brazilian geographic regions.

**Grandnorth (grandnorth)** – dummy for the northwest, north, center-west states.

**District Magnitude (magnitude)** – indicates the number of representatives elected in a single electoral district, which in Brazil coincides with the state boundaries. It varies from 8 to 70.

#### **1.2. Do File - Table 4.1**

##### **Model 1**

reg herf ideology\_100 localtxyr sizepub gdpcavg

estimates store m1, title(Model 1)

### **Model 2**

reg herf ideology\_100 localtxyr sizepub gdpavg urbanization logpop

estimates store m2, title(Model 2)

### **Model 3**

reg herf ideology\_100 localtxyr sizepub gdpavg urbanization logpop north northeast  
south centerwest magnitude

estimates store m3, title(Model 3)

### **Model 4**

reg herf ideology\_100 localtxyr sizepub gdpavg urbanization logpop north northeast  
south centerwest magnitude c.localtxyr#c.sizepub

estimates store m4, title(Model 4)

### **Model 5**

reg herf ideology\_100 localtxyr sizepub gdpavg urbanization logpop magnitude  
c.localtxyr#c.sizepub grandnorth

estimates store m5, title(Model 5)

estout m1 m2 m3 m4 m5, cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par fmt(2))) legend label varlabels(\_cons  
constant) stats(r2 df\_r bic, fmt(3 0 1) label(R-sqr dfres BIC))

### **B.1.3 Do File - Figure 4.1**

reg herf ideology c.localtxyr##c.sizepub urbanization logpop north northeast south  
centerwest magnitude

\* 5th, 50th and 95th percentile of sizepub = (.1475, .2992, .5076)

margins, at(localtxyr = (.009(.025).17) sizepub= (.1475 .2992 .5076))

marginsplot

### **B.1.4 Do File - Figure 4.2**

twoway (scatter sizepub localtxyr)

### **B.1.5 Do File - Figure 4.3**

reg herf ideology c.localtxyr##c.sizepub urbanization logpop north northeast south  
centerwest magnitude

\* 5th, 50th and 95th percentile of localtxyr = (.0126, .0410, .0907)

margins, at(sizepub = (.13(.05).57) localtxyr= (.0126 .0410 .0907))

marginsplot

## **B.2 Cluster Models**

### **B.2.1 Variables**

**Cluster Index (mean\_mprod)** – consists of first sorting the vote share for each candidate by municipality ranked according to its population size. Second, a new binary variable is coded one if the cumulative sum of the vote share per candidate by municipality is lower than .95 and zero otherwise. Third, a spatial clustering algorithm is run considering the new binary variable described above and then the number of clusters are iterated to find the best fit up to limit of 10. Fourth, after the optimum cluster solution is found, for each one of clusters it calculates the proportion of votes the candidate

received in that cluster (vp) and the proportion of the population in each cluster (pp). Finally, the dependent variable is obtained by calculating the sum of the product of the proportion of the votes received by each candidate and the proportion of the population [mean product =  $\sum(vp*pp)$ ].

**Ideology (ideology\_100)** – based on the left-right measures of ideology as devised by Power and Zucco (2009), which comprises six waves of measurements based on interviews with congressional deputies and senators. The scale goes from one (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Re-scaled by dividing it by 100 in order to avoid coefficients that round to zero.

**Private Sector's Size (localtxyr)** – calculated by dividing local taxes revenues by current municipal income and averaged by state.

**Public Administration's Size (sizepub)** – calculated by dividing the GDP of the public administration by the municipality's overall GDP, and then averaged by the state.

**GDP per Capita (gdpcavg)** – captures the municipal GDP per capita, which includes all sectors and uses a national implicit deflator (the ratio of the current-currency value of a series to its corresponding chained-currency value, multiplied by 100) The GDP per capita is the average of all municipalities for each state for the four years preceding the election.

**Urbanization (urbanization)** – measures the ratio of urban to rural population in the state for each electoral cycle according to the most recent census conducted by Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistic (IBGE). The data was obtained in the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) website.

**Population (logpop)** – uses the log of the population of the states based on the most recent census prior to the electoral cycle.

**Region (northwest, north, center-west, south, and southeast)** – dummy variables for each of the five Brazilian geographic regions.

**Grandnorth (grandnorth)** – dummy for the northwest, north, center-west states.

**District Magnitude (magnitude)** – indicates the number of representatives elected in a single electoral district, which in Brazil coincides with the state boundaries. It varies from 8 to 70.

### **B.2.2. Do File - Table 4.2**

#### **Model 1**

```
reg mean_mprod ideology_100 localtxyr sizepub gdpcavg
estimates store m1, title(Model 1)
```

#### **Model 2**

```
reg mean_mprod ideology_100 localtxyr sizepub gdpcavg urbanization logpop
estimates store m2, title(Model 2)
```

#### **Model 3**

```
reg mean_mprod ideology_100 localtxyr sizepub gdpcavg urbanization logpop north
northeast south centerwest magnitude
estimates store m3, title(Model 3)
```

#### **Model 4**

```
reg mean_mprod ideology_100 localtxyr sizepub gdpcavg urbanization logpop north
northeast south centerwest magnitude c.localtxyr#c.sizepub
estimates store m4, title(Model 4)
```

**Model 5**

```
reg mean_mprod ideology_100 localtxyr sizepub gdpavg urbanization logpop
magnitude c.localtxyr#c.sizepub grandnorth
estimates store m5, title(Model 5)
```

```
estout m1 m2 m3 m4 m5, cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par fmt(2))) legend label varlabels(_cons
constant) stats(r2 df_r bic, fmt(3 0 1) label(R-sqr dfres BIC))
```

**B.2.3 Do File - Figure 4.4**

```
reg mean_mprod ideology c.localtxyr##c.sizepub urbanization logpop north northeast
south centerwest magnitude
* 5th, 50th and 95th percentile of localtxyr = (.0126, .0410, .0907)
margins, at(sizepub = (.13(.05).57) localtxyr= (.0126 .0410 .0907))
marginsplot
```

**B.2.4 Do File - Figure 4.5**

```
reg mean_mprod ideology c.localtxyr##c.sizepub urbanization logpop north northeast
south centerwest magnitude
* 5th, 50th and 95th percentile of sizepub = (.1475, .2992, .5076)
margins, at(localtxyr = (.009(.025).17) sizepub= (.1475 .2992 .5076))
marginsplot
```

## Appendix C

### Codebook for Chapter 5

#### C.1 Variables

**Electoral Coalitions (incoal)** – consists of a group of variables that considers the electoral coalition for each party independently in any given electoral year. In this case, each party corresponds to a binary variable that is coded one for every time another given party forms a coalition with it and zero otherwise. For instance, the variable PP\_coalition is coded one when other parties forms coalition with the Progressive Party (PP) for the elections years between 1998 and 2010 and zero otherwise.

**Ideology (ideodiff)** – calculates the ideological distance, which is the absolute difference between a party's ideology and the ideology of all the other parties, which is a measure of dispersion, both to the left and to the right, of the coalition formed by any given party. The distance of the parties are based on Power and Zucco (2009) measure of ideological placement over time, which account for variations within parties across time. The parties are placed on a continuum that varies from one (most leftist) to 10 (far rightist).

**Clientelism (mproddiff)** – given by sorting the vote share for each candidate by municipality pondering its population size. Subsequently, a variable is coded one if the cumulative sum of the vote share per candidate per municipality is lower than .95 and zero otherwise. After that, a spatial clustering algorithm is run considering this dummy variable and then the number of clusters are iterated to find the best fit up to limit of 10. After the optimum cluster solution is found, it calculates, for each cluster, the proportion of votes the candidate received (vp) and the proportion of the population (pp). Further, the dependent variable is obtained by calculating the sum of the product of the proportion of the votes received by each candidate and the proportion of the population [mean product =  $\sum(vp*pp)$ ]. This measure indicates the increases in dispersion, which is consistent with clientelistic party behavior. Finally, like the ideology distance, I also calculate the clientelistic distance, which is the absolute difference between a party's measure of clientelism relative to all the other parties' measure of clientelism.

**Party Size (size\_seat and size\_vote)** – based on two measurements: party size seat, or the number of seats for each party in the House and the party size vote, or the number of votes each party receives in the election. In the case of party size vote, I calculate the distance, which is the absolute difference between a party's total of votes relative to all the other parties' total of votes.

**GDP per Capita (gdpcavg)** – captures the municipal GDP per capita, which includes all sectors and uses a national implicit deflator (the ratio of the current-currency value of a series to its corresponding chained-currency value, multiplied by 100) The GDP per capita is the average of all municipalities for each state for the four years preceding the election.

**Urbanization (urbanization)** – measures the ratio of urban to rural population in the state for each electoral cycle according to the most recent census.

**Population (logpop)** – uses the log of the population of the states based on the most recent census prior to the electoral cycle.



**Region** (northwest, north, center-west, south, and southeast) – dummy variables for each of the five Brazilian geographic regions.

**District Magnitude (magnitude)** – indicates the number of representatives elected in a single electoral district, which in Brazil coincides with the state boundaries. It varies from 8 to 70.

## **C.2 Do Files - Table 5.1**

### **Model 1 - 8**

```

set more off
capture drop ideodiff mproddiff totalvotediff10k
gen ideodiff = .
gen mproddiff = .
gen totalvotediff10k = .
local i = 1
foreach party in PT PSDB PMDB DEM PSB PTB PMN PRP {
    replace ideodiff = `party'_ideodiff
    replace mproddiff = `party'_mproddiff
    replace totalvotediff10k = `party'_totalvotediff10k
    logit incoal_`party' ideodiff mproddiff totalvotediff10k size_seat magnitude
    logpop gdpcavg urbanization verticalization north southeast south centerwest if
    CODIGO_CARGO == 6
    est store mod`i'
    local i = `i'+1
}
set more on
estout mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5 mod6 mod7 mod8, cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par
fmt(2))) legend label varlabels(_cons constant) stats(pr2 N bic, fmt(3 0 1)
label(Pseudo_R-sqr N BIC))

```

## **C.3 Do File - Table 5.2**

```

sum PT_mproddiff
sum PT_mproddiff if incoal_PT == 1
sum PT_mproddiff if incoal_PT == 1 & after_2002 == 1
sum PT_mproddiff if incoal_PT == 1 & after_2006 == 1
sum PSDB_mproddiff
sum PSDB_mproddiff if incoal_PSDB == 1
sum PSDB_mproddiff if incoal_PSDB == 1 & after_2002 == 1
sum PSDB_mproddiff if incoal_PSDB == 1 & after_2006 == 1

```

## **C.4. Do File - Table 5.3**

### **Model 1 - 6**

```

more off
capture drop ideodiff mproddiff totalvotediff10k
gen ideodiff = .
gen mproddiff = .
gen totalvotediff10k = .

```

```

local i = 1
foreach party in PT PSDB{
    replace ideodiff = `party'_ideodiff
    replace mproddiff = `party'_mproddiff
    replace totalvotediff10k = `party'_totalvotediff10k
    logit incoalest store mod`i'
    local i = `i'+1
}
foreach party in PT PSDB{
    replace ideodiff = `party'_ideodiff
    replace mproddiff = `party'_mproddiff
    replace totalvotediff10k = `party'_totalvotediff10k
    logit incoalest store mod`i'
    local i = `i'+1
}
foreach party in PT PSDB{
    replace ideodiff = `party'_ideodiff
    replace mproddiff = `party'_mproddiff
    replace totalvotediff10k = `party'_totalvotediff10k
    logit incoalest store mod`i'
    local i = `i'+1
}

set more on
estout mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5 mod6, cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par fmt(2))) legend
label varlabels(_cons constant) stats(pr2 N bic, fmt(3 0 1) label(Pseudo_R-sqr N BIC))

```

#### **C.4.1 Do File for Models not Shown**

**Table 5.4 - Mprod\_first**

```

. set more off
capture drop ideodiff mproddiff totalvotediff10k
gen ideodiff = .
gen mproddiff = .
gen totalvotediff10k = .
local i = 1

```

```

foreach party in PT PSDB PMDB DEM PSB PTB PMN PRP{
    replace ideodiff = `party'_ideodiff
    replace mproddiff = `party'_mproddiff
    replace totalvotediff10k = `party'_totvotediff_10k
    logit incoale `party' ideodiff mproddiff totalvotediff10k size_seat magnitude
    logpop gdpavg urbanization verticalization north southeast south centerwest if
    CODIGO_CARGO == 6 & mprod_first == 1
    est store mod`i'
    local i = `i'+1
}
set more on
estout mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5 mod6 mod7 mod8, cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par
fmt(2))) legend label varlabels(_cons constant) stats(pr2 N bic, fmt(3 0 1)
label(Pseudo_R-sqr N BIC))

```

### Table 5.5 - Mprod\_second

```

. set more off
capture drop ideodiff mproddiff totalvotediff10k
gen ideodiff = .
gen mproddiff = .
gen totalvotediff10k = .
local i = 1
foreach party in PT PSDB PMDB DEM PSB PTB PMN PRP{
    replace ideodiff = `party'_ideodiff
    replace mproddiff = `party'_mproddiff
    replace totalvotediff10k = `party'_totvotediff_10k
    logit incoale `party' ideodiff mproddiff totalvotediff10k size_seat magnitude
    logpop gdpavg urbanization verticalization north southeast south centerwest if
    CODIGO_CARGO == 6 & mprod_second == 1
    est store mod`i'
    local i = `i'+1
}
set more on
estout mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5 mod6 mod7 mod8, cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par
fmt(2))) legend label varlabels(_cons constant) stats(pr2 N bic, fmt(3 0 1)
label(Pseudo_R-sqr N BIC))

```

### Table 5.6 - Mprod\_Third

```

. set more off
capture drop ideodiff mproddiff totalvotediff10k
gen ideodiff = .
gen mproddiff = .
gen totalvotediff10k = .
local i = 1
foreach party in PT PSDB PMDB DEM PSB PTB PMN PRP{

```

```

        replace ideodiff = `party'_ideodiff
        replace mproddiff = `party'_mproddiff
        replace totalvotediff10k = `party'_totvotediff_10k
        logit incoal_`party' ideodiff mproddiff totalvotediff10k size_seat magnitude
logpop gdpavg urbanization verticalization north southeast south centerwest if
CODIGO_CARGO == 6 & mprod_third == 1
        est store mod`i'
        local i = `i'+1
    }
set more on
estout mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5 mod6 mod7 mod8, cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par
fmt(2))) legend label varlabels(_cons constant) stats(pr2 N bic, fmt(3 0 1)
label(Pseudo_R-sqr N BIC))

```

### Table 5.7 - Mprod\_Fourth

```

. set more off
capture drop ideodiff mproddiff totalvotediff10k
gen ideodiff = .
gen mproddiff = .
gen totalvotediff10k = .
local i = 1
foreach party in PT PSDB PMDB DEM PSB PTB PMN PRP{
    replace ideodiff = `party'_ideodiff
    replace mproddiff = `party'_mproddiff
    replace totalvotediff10k = `party'_totvotediff_10k
    logit incoal_`party' ideodiff mproddiff totalvotediff10k size_seat magnitude
logpop gdpavg urbanization verticalization north southeast south centerwest if
CODIGO_CARGO == 6 & mprod_fourth == 1
        est store mod`i'
        local i = `i'+1
    }
set more on
estout mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5 mod6 mod7 mod8, cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par
fmt(2))) legend label varlabels(_cons constant) stats(pr2 N bic, fmt(3 0 1)
label(Pseudo_R-sqr N BIC))

```

### Table 5.8 - After\_2002 == 1

```

. set more off
capture drop ideodiff mproddiff totalvotediff10k
gen ideodiff = .
gen mproddiff = .
gen totalvotediff10k = .
local i = 1
foreach party in PT PSDB PMDB DEM PSB PTB PMN PRP{
    replace ideodiff = `party'_ideodiff

```

```

        replace mproddiff = `party'_mproddiff
        replace totalvotediff10k = `party'_totvotediff_10k
        logit incoale_`party' ideodiff mproddiff totalvotediff10k size_seat magnitude
logpop gdpavg urbanization verticalization north southeast south centerwest if
CODIGO_CARGO == 6 & after_2002 == 1
        est store mod`i'
        local i = `i'+1
    }
set more on
estout mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5 mod6 mod7 mod8, cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par
fmt(2))) legend label varlabels(_cons constant) stats(pr2 N bic, fmt(3 0 1)
label(Pseudo_R-sqr N BIC))

```

### Table 5.9 - After\_2006 == 1

```

. set more off
capture drop ideodiff mproddiff totalvotediff10k
gen ideodiff = .
gen mproddiff = .
gen totalvotediff10k = .
local i = 1
foreach party in PT PSDB PMDB DEM PSB PTB PMN PRP{
    replace ideodiff = `party'_ideodiff
    replace mproddiff = `party'_mproddiff
    replace totalvotediff10k = `party'_totvotediff_10k
    logit incoale_`party' ideodiff mproddiff totalvotediff10k size_seat magnitude
logpop gdpavg urbanization verticalization north southeast south centerwest if
CODIGO_CARGO == 6 & after_2006 == 1
        est store mod`i'
        local i = `i'+1
    }
set more on
estout mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5 mod6 mod7 mod8, cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par
fmt(2))) legend label varlabels(_cons constant) stats(pr2 N bic, fmt(3 0 1)
label(Pseudo_R-sqr N BIC))

```

### Table 5.10 - Interactions

```

. set more off
capture drop ideodiff mproddiff totalvotediff10k
gen ideodiff = .
gen mproddiff = .
gen totalvotediff10k = .
local i = 1
foreach party in PT PSDB PMDB DEM PSB PTB PMN PRP{
    replace ideodiff = `party'_ideodiff
    replace mproddiff = `party'_mproddiff

```

```

        replace totalvotediff10k = `party'_totvotediff_10k
        logit incoale`party' ideodiff mproddiff c.ideodiff#c.mproddiff totalvotediff10k
size_seat magnitude logpop gdpavg urbanization verticalization north southeast
south centerwest if CODIGO_CARGO == 6 & mprod_second == 1
        est store mod`i'
        local i = `i'+1
    }
set more on
estout mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4 mod5 mod6 mod7 mod8, cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par
fmt(2))) legend label varlabels(_cons constant) stats(pr2 N bic, fmt(3 0 1)
label(Pseudo_R-sqr N BIC))

```

## 1.6. Models not Shown

**Table 5.4**

	mod1 b/se	mod2 b/se	mod3 b/se	mod4 b/se	mod5 b/se	mod6 b/se	mod7 b/se	mod8 b/se
main								
ideodiff	-0.333*** (0.07)	-0.185 (0.11)	-0.259 (0.14)	-0.395*** (0.09)	-0.076 (0.08)	-0.291*** (0.08)	0.113 (0.06)	-0.230*** (0.07)
mproddiff	-2.188 (1.63)	1.703 (1.60)	-6.879** (2.13)	1.727 (2.44)	0.332 (1.34)	-3.518* (1.61)	4.272** (1.38)	2.840* (1.13)
totalvotediff10k	-0.010 (0.01)	0.009* (0.00)	-0.012* (0.01)	-0.006 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	-0.012** (0.00)	0.012** (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
size_seat	-0.003 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.01)	0.000 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)	0.011* (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)
magnitude	0.091 (0.06)	-0.192*** (0.06)	0.133 (0.08)	0.210*** (0.06)	-0.059 (0.05)	0.222*** (0.06)	-0.205*** (0.05)	-0.001 (0.05)
logpop	-0.826 (0.74)	0.973* (0.44)	-1.299 (0.77)	-2.181* (0.98)	-0.038 (0.56)	-1.250 (0.69)	0.810 (0.56)	0.091 (0.63)
gdpavg	0.351* (0.15)	-0.078 (0.17)	0.365 (0.21)	-0.845*** (0.25)	0.173 (0.15)	-0.255 (0.16)	-0.045 (0.18)	0.081 (0.18)
urbanization	0.322 (0.17)	0.113 (0.08)	0.250 (0.20)	-0.652 (0.34)	0.121 (0.07)	0.164 (0.09)	0.014 (0.08)	-0.265 (0.18)
verticalization	-1.011 (0.54)	1.400** (0.48)	0.400 (0.59)	-0.285 (0.53)	0.866 (0.47)	-0.275 (0.54)	1.625** (0.54)	1.097 (0.61)
north	-2.522*** (0.63)	0.801* (0.36)	-2.914*** (0.74)	-0.709 (0.92)	-1.343** (0.47)	-1.348* (0.68)	0.317 (0.39)	1.876*** (0.50)
o.southeast	0.000 (.)	-0.429 (0.99)	0.000 (.)	2.464 (1.69)	-1.613 (1.01)	-0.899 (1.12)	-0.870 (0.88)	-0.407 (1.38)
south	-2.767** (0.93)	-1.806 (1.03)	-4.159** (1.32)	5.055*** (1.53)	-1.893* (0.84)	0.960 (0.85)	-1.490 (0.96)	0.343 (0.95)
centerwest	-3.004*** (0.82)	-0.571 (0.72)	-2.313* (0.93)	4.748*** (1.42)	-0.934 (0.70)	1.052 (0.71)	-0.400 (0.76)	1.079 (0.86)
constant	11.814 (10.82)	-15.496* (6.49)	18.369 (11.26)	33.279* (14.53)	-1.128 (8.25)	17.471 (10.06)	-14.512 (8.23)	-3.213 (9.27)
Pseudo_R-sqr								
N	455	495	455	332	471	467	454	341
BIC	449.6	439.5	376.6	300.0	461.8	399.7	467.2	415.2

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

**Table 5.5**

	mod1 b/se	mod2 b/se	mod3 b/se	mod4 b/se	mod5 b/se	mod6 b/se	mod7 b/se	mod8 b/se
main								
ideodiff	-0.187*** (0.05)	-0.154 (0.08)	-0.137 (0.09)	-0.206** (0.07)	-0.057 (0.06)	-0.105 (0.06)	-0.033 (0.05)	-0.291*** (0.07)
mproddiff	3.268* (1.53)	0.339 (1.59)	-0.078 (1.69)	1.868 (2.18)	1.046 (1.42)	-0.629 (1.63)	1.551 (1.39)	-0.492 (1.30)
totalvotediff10k	0.000 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	-0.004 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.012** (0.00)
size_seat	-0.010* (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	0.007 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	-0.004 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
magnitude	-0.030 (0.04)	0.014 (0.04)	0.038 (0.05)	-0.017 (0.04)	0.057 (0.04)	-0.091* (0.05)	-0.005 (0.04)	0.069 (0.05)
logpop	0.614 (0.42)	-0.516 (0.40)	-0.902 (0.47)	-0.735 (0.59)	-0.197 (0.43)	0.583 (0.43)	0.209 (0.42)	1.398* (0.70)
gdpcavg	-0.070 (0.12)	0.170 (0.12)	0.370** (0.14)	-0.408* (0.20)	0.382** (0.12)	0.167 (0.12)	0.290* (0.13)	0.125 (0.15)
urbanization	0.043 (0.06)	0.002 (0.07)	0.037 (0.07)	-0.346 (0.24)	-0.025 (0.08)	0.014 (0.07)	0.004 (0.06)	-0.067 (0.08)
verticalization	0.211 (0.39)	-0.337 (0.39)	0.701 (0.39)	-0.158 (0.43)	0.550 (0.41)	0.470 (0.43)	0.584 (0.44)	-0.291 (0.55)
north	0.826** (0.31)	-0.734 (0.39)	-1.431** (0.50)	-0.338 (0.49)	-0.198 (0.37)	-0.294 (0.36)	0.170 (0.34)	0.357 (0.45)
southeast	-0.050 (0.75)	-0.032 (0.68)	-2.829*** (0.80)	1.096 (1.13)	-2.390** (0.79)	-0.507 (0.74)	-1.263 (0.73)	2.880* (1.31)
south	-0.213 (0.75)	-0.642 (0.72)	-2.641** (0.83)	1.480 (1.23)	-2.525** (0.77)	-2.220** (0.79)	-2.281** (0.79)	0.856 (0.87)
centerwest	0.386 (0.49)	-1.042* (0.52)	-1.879** (0.58)	1.568 (0.98)	-0.819 (0.55)	-0.855 (0.56)	-0.931 (0.55)	0.798 (0.59)
constant	-10.062 (6.11)	6.259 (5.75)	10.474 (6.77)	11.322 (8.70)	0.227 (6.24)	-9.855 (6.32)	-5.679 (6.09)	-21.475* (10.03)
Pseudo_R-sqr								
N	690	690	691	464	659	672	646	476
BIC	683.8	693.0	596.6	437.2	607.9	629.8	615.5	478.1

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001



Table 5.6

	mod1 b/se	mod2 b/se	mod3 b/se	mod4 b/se	mod5 b/se	mod6 b/se	mod7 b/se	mod8 b/se
main								
ideodiff	-0.249*** (0.05)	-0.248*** (0.07)	-0.152* (0.07)	-0.290*** (0.06)	-0.257*** (0.05)	-0.038 (0.05)	-0.025 (0.04)	-0.211*** (0.06)
mproddiff	-3.836** (1.19)	2.188 (1.17)	1.241 (1.23)	2.081 (1.45)	0.145 (1.04)	3.626*** (0.85)	-2.309* (1.05)	0.762 (1.17)
totalvotediff10k	0.005 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.010* (0.00)	-0.013** (0.00)
size_seat	-0.018*** (0.00)	0.008** (0.00)	0.008* (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	-0.005 (0.00)	0.015*** (0.00)	0.012*** (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)
magnitude	-0.033 (0.04)	-0.040 (0.03)	0.053 (0.04)	-0.014 (0.04)	-0.056 (0.04)	-0.068 (0.05)	0.129* (0.05)	0.181** (0.06)
logpop	-0.427 (0.24)	-0.339 (0.22)	-0.123 (0.22)	0.089 (0.28)	-0.014 (0.22)	0.390 (0.27)	-0.053 (0.34)	0.011 (0.31)
gdpcavg	0.104 (0.10)	-0.170 (0.10)	0.121 (0.10)	-0.143 (0.13)	-0.013 (0.09)	-0.237* (0.10)	0.286** (0.11)	-0.064 (0.13)
urbanization	-0.139*** (0.04)	0.037 (0.04)	-0.048 (0.03)	-0.009 (0.06)	-0.059 (0.04)	0.115* (0.05)	-0.048 (0.04)	0.132 (0.07)
verticalization	0.242 (0.30)	0.560 (0.29)	-0.024 (0.30)	-0.127 (0.35)	0.978*** (0.29)	0.072 (0.34)	-0.093 (0.32)	-0.591 (0.52)
north	-0.413 (0.31)	-0.030 (0.34)	-0.715* (0.35)	0.153 (0.45)	0.226 (0.32)	0.952** (0.32)	-0.581 (0.37)	0.481 (0.45)
southeast	-0.843 (0.53)	0.184 (0.57)	-0.812 (0.56)	0.624 (0.67)	0.171 (0.51)	0.198 (0.59)	-0.851 (0.55)	-1.965 (1.98)
south	-1.618* (0.77)	1.692* (0.72)	-0.974 (0.73)	1.347 (0.95)	-1.000 (0.78)	0.424 (0.91)	-4.544** (1.40)	-0.735 (1.36)
centerwest	-0.500 (0.41)	0.543 (0.36)	-0.223 (0.37)	0.789 (0.45)	0.331 (0.40)	0.568 (0.36)	-0.343 (0.42)	0.584 (0.49)
constant	6.429 (3.45)	4.063 (3.14)	-0.196 (3.17)	-1.763 (3.97)	-0.312 (3.14)	-7.028 (3.85)	-1.402 (4.70)	-2.083 (4.30)
Pseudo_R-sqr								
N	947	947	949	608	893	927	872	634
BIC	904.4	904.5	882.8	565.2	840.8	865.4	830.0	603.0

\* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Table 5.7

	mod1 b/se	mod2 b/se	mod3 b/se	mod4 b/se	mod5 b/se	mod6 b/se	mod7 b/se	mod8 b/se
main								
ideodiff	-0.109 (0.10)	-0.300 (0.15)	-0.336* (0.17)	-0.276* (0.12)	-0.013 (0.11)	-0.060 (0.08)	-0.025 (0.04)	-0.211*** (0.06)
mproddiff	4.117 (3.14)	2.140 (2.30)	8.119** (2.57)	0.072 (2.82)	1.319 (2.37)	0.959 (1.05)	-2.309* (1.05)	0.762 (1.17)
totalvotediff10k	-0.069** (0.03)	-0.002 (0.01)	0.021 (0.01)	-0.018 (0.01)	0.010 (0.02)	-0.026* (0.01)	-0.010* (0.00)	-0.013** (0.00)
size_seat	-0.014 (0.01)	0.014 (0.01)	0.022** (0.01)	0.015 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)	0.012*** (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)
magnitude	0.071 (0.60)	0.038 (0.19)	-0.180 (0.17)	0.316 (0.23)	-0.018 (0.21)	0.331 (0.20)	0.129* (0.05)	0.181** (0.06)
logpop	-1.250 (1.10)	-0.609 (0.82)	-1.762 (0.91)	-0.012 (0.85)	-2.281 (1.25)	1.547* (0.60)	-0.053 (0.34)	0.011 (0.31)
gdpcavg	-0.363 (0.22)	0.319 (0.23)	1.163*** (0.30)	0.927** (0.35)	0.456 (0.29)	-0.034 (0.19)	0.286** (0.11)	-0.064 (0.13)
urbanization	-0.094 (0.11)	0.042 (0.10)	-0.043 (0.10)	0.041 (0.12)	-0.227 (0.14)	0.165* (0.07)	-0.048 (0.04)	0.132 (0.07)
verticalization	-3.066** (0.95)	0.738 (0.61)	1.664** (0.64)	0.344 (0.65)	0.187 (0.78)	0.261 (0.52)	-0.093 (0.32)	-0.591 (0.52)
north	-5.932* (2.32)	-0.706 (1.15)	-2.827** (1.01)	-3.032* (1.46)	-4.146* (2.11)	1.248 (0.84)	-0.581 (0.37)	0.481 (0.45)
southeast	7.174** (2.20)				-1.117 (1.76)		-0.851 (0.55)	-1.965 (1.98)
o.south	0.000 (.)	-0.042 (2.35)	-6.903** (2.60)	-4.784 (2.54)	0.000 (.)	0.812 (2.09)	-4.544** (1.40)	-0.735 (1.36)
centerwest	0.492 (1.45)	0.784 (1.19)	-2.489* (1.25)		1.065 (1.50)	1.036 (1.14)	-0.343 (0.42)	0.584 (0.49)
o.southeast		0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)		0.000 (.)		
o.centerwest				0.000 (.)				
constant	24.395 (15.91)	4.886 (11.20)	18.255 (12.09)	-4.500 (11.73)	30.366 (17.11)	-25.214** (8.76)	-1.402 (4.70)	-2.083 (4.30)
Pseudo_R-sqr								
N	224	222	222	124	216	220	872	634
BIC	252.3	257.8	248.6	169.1	220.5	321.0	830.0	603.0

\* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Table 5.8

	mod1 b/se	mod2 b/se	mod3 b/se	mod4 b/se	mod5 b/se	mod6 b/se	mod7 b/se	mod8 b/se
main								
ideodiff	-0.166*** (0.03)	-0.276*** (0.05)	-0.171** (0.06)	-0.252*** (0.05)	-0.075 (0.04)	-0.049 (0.03)	0.033 (0.03)	-0.173*** (0.04)
mproddiff	-1.339* (0.64)	1.109 (0.67)	1.418* (0.66)	0.758 (0.86)	0.058 (0.63)	0.602 (0.51)	-0.559 (0.62)	1.905** (0.59)
totalvotediff10k	0.003 (0.00)	0.008** (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	-0.004 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	-0.008* (0.00)
size_seat	-0.011*** (0.00)	0.007** (0.00)	0.009** (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	-0.004 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	0.010*** (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
magnitude	-0.042 (0.03)	-0.130*** (0.04)	0.036 (0.04)	0.006 (0.02)	-0.043 (0.04)	0.042 (0.04)	-0.039 (0.04)	0.127* (0.05)
logpop	-0.205 (0.18)	-0.234 (0.17)	-0.248 (0.17)	-0.287 (0.20)	0.053 (0.20)	0.061 (0.18)	-0.438* (0.20)	0.077 (0.23)
gdpcavg	-0.015 (0.06)	-0.193** (0.07)	0.291*** (0.08)	-0.053 (0.10)	0.231*** (0.07)	0.039 (0.06)	0.153* (0.07)	0.010 (0.08)
urbanization	-0.058* (0.03)	0.007 (0.02)	-0.043 (0.03)	-0.054 (0.04)	-0.052* (0.03)	0.030 (0.02)	-0.030 (0.02)	-0.015 (0.03)
o.verticalization	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
north	-0.208 (0.19)	0.286 (0.21)	-1.260*** (0.25)	-0.303 (0.30)	-0.747*** (0.22)	0.187 (0.20)	0.114 (0.20)	1.199*** (0.23)
southeast	-0.448 (0.39)	0.852* (0.41)	-1.790*** (0.44)	0.037 (0.56)	-1.132** (0.42)	-0.630 (0.42)	-0.771 (0.41)	0.532 (0.77)
south	-0.822* (0.41)	0.882* (0.42)	-2.187*** (0.46)	-0.402 (0.63)	-2.080*** (0.48)	-1.028* (0.44)	-1.814*** (0.46)	0.947 (0.53)
centerwest	-0.131 (0.27)	0.678* (0.30)	-1.389*** (0.33)	0.193 (0.39)	-0.552 (0.31)	-0.048 (0.27)	-0.301 (0.29)	1.006*** (0.29)
constant	3.105 (2.64)	3.053 (2.54)	1.286 (2.58)	3.365 (2.87)	-2.289 (2.95)	-2.662 (2.67)	4.274 (2.93)	-3.273 (3.40)
Pseudo_R-sqr								
N	1925	1925	1925	1099	1847	1905	1801	1395
BIC	1884.7	1705.6	1550.9	947.7	1561.7	1767.2	1709.2	1360.2

\* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Table 5.9

	mod1 b/se	mod2 b/se	mod3 b/se	mod4 b/se	mod5 b/se	mod6 b/se	mod7 b/se	mod8 b/se
main								
ideodiff	-0.066 (0.04)	-0.246*** (0.06)	-0.097 (0.06)	-0.220*** (0.07)	-0.188*** (0.05)	-0.060 (0.04)	0.201*** (0.04)	-0.152*** (0.05)
mproddiff	-1.219 (0.72)	1.024 (0.75)	1.207 (0.71)	1.389 (1.13)	-0.296 (0.71)	0.447 (0.58)	-0.578 (0.73)	1.824** (0.65)
totalvotediff10k	-0.002 (0.00)	0.009** (0.00)	-0.006 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.009* (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.012* (0.01)
size_seat	-0.005 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)	0.006 (0.00)	0.008* (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)	0.008** (0.00)	0.007* (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
magnitude	-0.000 (0.04)	-0.166*** (0.05)	0.088 (0.05)	-0.012 (0.04)	-0.014 (0.05)	0.113* (0.06)	0.006 (0.06)	0.185* (0.07)
logpop	0.098 (0.24)	-0.313 (0.22)	-0.080 (0.19)	-0.576* (0.29)	-0.108 (0.24)	0.322 (0.24)	-0.281 (0.29)	0.139 (0.37)
gdpcavg	-0.125 (0.08)	-0.416*** (0.10)	0.189 (0.10)	0.132 (0.18)	0.128 (0.09)	-0.228* (0.09)	0.016 (0.09)	-0.229 (0.12)
urbanization	-0.063 (0.04)	0.028 (0.03)	-0.059 (0.03)	-0.109 (0.06)	-0.078* (0.04)	0.040 (0.02)	-0.020 (0.03)	0.030 (0.04)
o.verticalization	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
north	-0.136 (0.22)	0.664** (0.25)	-1.063*** (0.27)	-0.613 (0.46)	-0.702** (0.27)	0.690** (0.23)	0.408 (0.24)	1.515*** (0.26)
southeast	0.292 (0.55)	2.127*** (0.58)	-1.191* (0.55)	-1.049 (0.99)	-0.850 (0.57)	1.101* (0.56)	0.139 (0.57)	1.208 (1.05)
south	-0.246 (0.59)	2.516*** (0.62)	-1.490* (0.58)	-1.381 (1.15)	-1.315* (0.62)	0.309 (0.63)	-0.922 (0.65)	2.504** (0.83)
centerwest	0.154 (0.37)	1.477*** (0.40)	-0.851* (0.39)	-1.172 (0.79)	-0.143 (0.41)	0.963** (0.36)	0.401 (0.37)	1.657*** (0.43)
constant	-1.030 (3.40)	5.310 (3.32)	-0.808 (2.93)	6.773 (4.15)	0.631 (3.56)	-5.536 (3.54)	1.956 (4.31)	-3.453 (5.47)
Pseudo_R-sqr								
N	1388	1388	1388	562	1328	1368	1286	1071
BIC	1446.4	1345.3	1288.6	514.7	1237.8	1354.8	1276.2	1055.6

\* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Table 5.10

	mod1 b/se	mod2 b/se	mod3 b/se	mod4 b/se	mod5 b/se	mod6 b/se	mod7 b/se	mod8 b/se
main								
ideodiff	-0.192* (0.08)	-0.135 (0.11)	-0.012 (0.13)	-0.179 (0.10)	0.035 (0.09)	-0.203* (0.09)	-0.078 (0.07)	-0.252* (0.11)
mproddiff	3.118 (2.37)	0.788 (2.44)	2.393 (2.46)	2.595 (2.83)	3.570 (2.37)	-2.516 (2.18)	0.169 (2.26)	-0.186 (1.44)
c.ideodiff#c.mprod~f	0.060 (0.72)	-0.254 (1.05)	-1.480 (1.11)	-0.340 (0.86)	-1.115 (0.85)	0.940 (0.69)	0.426 (0.53)	-0.346 (0.72)
totalvotediff10k	0.000 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.012** (0.00)
size_seat	-0.010* (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	0.007 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)
magnitude	-0.029 (0.04)	0.014 (0.04)	0.037 (0.05)	-0.017 (0.04)	0.058 (0.04)	-0.090* (0.05)	-0.006 (0.04)	0.068 (0.05)
logpop	0.616 (0.42)	-0.512 (0.40)	-0.899 (0.47)	-0.730 (0.59)	-0.286 (0.44)	0.574 (0.43)	0.228 (0.42)	1.421* (0.70)
gdpcavg	-0.070 (0.12)	0.171 (0.12)	0.379** (0.14)	-0.410* (0.20)	0.377** (0.12)	0.171 (0.12)	0.290* (0.13)	0.132 (0.15)
urbanization	0.043 (0.06)	0.004 (0.07)	0.043 (0.07)	-0.347 (0.24)	-0.019 (0.08)	0.015 (0.07)	0.004 (0.06)	-0.070 (0.08)
verticalization	0.209 (0.40)	-0.328 (0.40)	0.708 (0.40)	-0.155 (0.43)	0.609 (0.42)	0.457 (0.43)	0.586 (0.44)	-0.307 (0.55)
north	0.827** (0.31)	-0.735 (0.39)	-1.463** (0.50)	-0.331 (0.49)	-0.225 (0.37)	-0.370 (0.36)	0.174 (0.34)	0.338 (0.45)
southeast	-0.047 (0.75)	-0.033 (0.68)	-2.846*** (0.81)	1.099 (1.13)	-2.425** (0.79)	-0.523 (0.74)	-1.255 (0.73)	2.911* (1.31)
south	-0.211 (0.75)	-0.656 (0.72)	-2.715** (0.83)	1.490 (1.23)	-2.503** (0.78)	-2.250** (0.79)	-2.268** (0.79)	0.840 (0.88)
centerwest	0.389 (0.49)	-1.056* (0.52)	-1.945*** (0.58)	1.579 (0.99)	-0.865 (0.55)	-0.907 (0.56)	-0.928 (0.55)	0.800 (0.59)
constant	-10.080 (6.11)	6.160 (5.77)	10.214 (6.80)	11.176 (8.71)	1.329 (6.33)	-9.540 (6.36)	-5.818 (6.08)	-21.844* (10.07)
Pseudo_R-sqr								
N	690	690	691	464	659	672	646	476
BIC	690.3	699.5	601.3	443.2	612.7	634.4	621.3	484.1

\* p&lt;0.05, \*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

## Appendix D

### List of Interviews

Interviewed	Position/Party	Place/Date	Note
Jorge Luis Magalhães Negrão	<i>Assitant to state deputy Pastor Coronel Isidório (PSB)/PT</i>	Salvador July 23, 2013	<i>Affiliated with PT, former BF state coordinator</i>
Paulo Falcão	Elected Mayor of Amélia Rodrigues, Bahia/PDT	Salvador, July 23, 2013	
Estadual Paulo Azi	<i>President of DEM-BA 1<sup>st</sup> Scretary of the State House of Representatives</i>	Salvador, July 23, 2013	<i>From Alagoinhas Region</i>
Alberto Rocha	Mayor of Pau Brasil, Bahia/ PDT	Salvador July 24, 2013	
Zé Neto	Majority Leader of the State House/ PT	Salvador, July 25, 2013	
Luiza Maia	State House Representative/PT	Salvador, July 25, 2013	<i>Feminist Caucasus</i>
Agnelo Alves	State House Representative/PDT	Natal, July 29, 2013	<i>Father of the then mayor of Natal Carlos Eduardo Alves (PDT)</i>
Jorge Cunha	Chief of Staff for Agnelo Alves/PDT	Natal, July 29, 2013	
Tiago Moura	Assistant to the State Deputy Giliosn Moura PV-RN	Natal, July 29, 2013	
George Soares	State House Representative/PR	Natal, July 30, 2013	
José Dias	State House Representative/ PSD	Natal, July 31, 2013	
Pinto Jr.	Journalist	Natal, July 31, 2013	

<b>Fabiano de Sousa</b>	<b>Mayor of Serrinha, RN/PMDB</b>	<b>Natal, July 31, 2013</b>	<b>President of the Association of Mayors of the Agreste Litoral</b>
<b>João Paulo Cabral</b>	<b>Mayor of Vera Cruz, RN/PMDB</b>	<b>Natal, July 31, 2013</b>	
<b>Robinson Faria</b>	<b>Vice-Governor of Rio Grande do Norte/PSD</b>	<b>Natal, August 1st, 2013</b>	
<b>Hermano Moraes</b>	<i>State House Representative/PMDB</i>	<b>Natal, August 5, 2013</b>	<i>President of the Municipal Chapter of PMDB</i>
<b>Daniel Almeida</b>	<b>House Representative/ PC do B-BA</b>	<b>Brasília-DF, August 8, 2013</b>	<i>Former PC do B House Leader</i>
<b>Marcos Braga</b>	<b>Chief of Staff of the PT Leadership/PT</b>	<b>Brasília, August 8, 2013</b>	
<b>Thales Coelho</b>	<b>Judicial Advisor Office of the Majority Leader (PT)</b>	<b>Brasília, August 8, 2013</b>	
<b>Alan Bueno</b>	<b>Assistant to PC do B House Leadership</b>	<b>Brasília, August 8, 2013</b>	
<b>Cândido Vacarezza</b>	<b>House Representative/ PT-SP</b>	<b>Brasília, August 13, 2013</b>	<b>Chair of the Political Reform Comission</b>
<b>Rui Falcão</b>	<b>President of PT</b>	<b>Brasília, August 13, 2013</b>	<b>Discoursed during party event to launch his candidacy for his re-election</b>
<b>Eduardo Suplicy</b>	<b>Senator PT-SP</b>	<b>Brasília, August 13, 2013</b>	
<b>Antonio Imbassahy</b>	<b>House Representative/PSDB-BA</b>	<b>Brasília, August 14, 2013</b>	

<b>Amir Lando</b>	<b>Former Senator and Minister of Social Security/PMDB</b>	<b>Brasília, August 15, 2013</b>	<b>In line to be seated as Congressman after Natan Donadon was arrested.</b>
<b>João Carlos</b>	<b>Advisor PDT Leadership at the House</b>	<b>Brasília, August 20, 2013</b>	
<b>Daniel de Sá</b>	<b>Advisor to House Representative Geovani Queiroz PDT-PA</b>	<b>Brasília, August 20, 2013</b>	
<b>Jorge Guimarães</b>	<b>Chief of Staff for PSol leader/PSol</b>	<b>Brasília, August 21, 2013</b>	
<b>Juthay Jr.</b>	<b>House Representative/ PSDB-BA</b>	<b>Brasília, August 21, 2013</b>	
<b>José Antônio Reguffe</b>	<b>House Representative/ PDT-DF</b>	<b>Brasília August 22, 2013.</b>	<b>The most voted congressman in Brazil, proportionally</b>
<b>30. Geraldo Simões</b>	<b>House Representative/ PT-BA</b>	<b>August 27, 2013</b>	
<b>Lúcio Vieira Lima</b>	<b>House Representative/ PMDB-BA</b>	<b>Brasília, DF, August 27, 2013</b>	
<b>Miro Teixeira</b>	<b>House Representative/ PDT-RJ</b>	<b>Brasília, DF, August 27, 2013</b>	
<b>Alfredo Sirkis</b>	<b>House Representative/ PV-RJ</b>	<b>Brasília, DF, August 28, 2013</b>	
<b>Chico Alencar</b>	<b>House Representative/ PSol-RJ</b>	<b>Brasília, DF, August 29, 2013</b>	



## **CURRICULUM VITAE**

**Cássio da Silva Muniz**

**Place of Birth:** Itabuna, Bahia, Brazil

### **Education**

2002 University of Brasília  
M.A. Department of Political Science

1999 University of Brasília  
B.A. Department of Political Science

**Dissertation:** Ideology versus Clientelism: Modernization and Electoral Competition in Brazil

### **Conference Presentations**

“Ideology and Clientelism: Geospatial Dominance and Clustering of Party Voting in Brazil.” 23<sup>rd</sup> International Political Science Association World Congress. Montreal, QC – Canada, July 19-24, 2014.

“Ideological Vote in Brazilian Gubernatorial Elections.” Midwest Political Science Association National Conference. Chicago, IL, USA, April 11 -14, 2013.

“When Voters Meet Parties: Runoff Gubernatorial Elections and Ideological Differentiation in Brazil.” Brazilian Studies Association Conference. Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA, September 6-8, 2012.

“Ideological Vote in Brazil: Inferences from Gubernatorial Run-off Elections.” Midwest Political Science Association National Conference. Chicago, IL, USA, April 12 -15, 2012.

“Gubernatorial Runoff Elections in Brazil: A Predictive Statistical Model.” Midwest Political Science Association National Conference. Chicago, IL, US, March 31-April 3, 2011.

“Brazil after Lula: Personal, Ideological, and Policy Determinants of Party Convergence.” Midwest Political Science Association National Conference. Chicago, IL, USA, April 22-25, 2010.

"Violence and Human Rights in the Federal District." Congress of Science of the University of Brasília. Brasília, Brazil, July 30-31, 1997.

### **Awards/Fellowships**

2013 UWM Department of Political Science  
Research Improvement Program for Dissertation Field Research in Brazil

2013 UWM Graduate School  
Travel Grant for Dissertation Field Research

2013 Wisconsin Association Extension 4-H Youth Development Professional  
Educational Tech Team Award - Organizer of WI State Fair Robotics  
Competition

2009, 2012, 2013  
Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies  
Research-Travel Award for Pre-dissertation Field Research

2009, 2011, 2013  
UWM Department of Political Science  
Summer Graduate Research Assistant for Data Management and Preliminary  
Data Analysis

2010 UWM Department of History  
Summer Graduate Research Assistant for Archive and Internet Research

2001 Ford Foundation  
Winter Quantitative Methods Course

1998 University of Brasília Research Center for Latin America and Caribbean  
Undergraduate Research Assistant

1997 Brazilian National Council of Scientific Development  
Undergraduate Research Assistant

### **Invited Talks**

"It all Started in Portugal: Third Wave Democratization and Demands on the  
Political System in Brazil." Presented at "Portugal and the World: On the

40<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Carnation Revolution." Department of Spanish & Portuguese,  
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI – USA, April 23, 2014.

"Innovative Social Policies in Brazil." Presented at "Summer Teacher Institute: The New Left in Latin America," Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI - USA, July 6-8, 2011.

"Political Reform in Brazil: Governability and Representation." Panel presentation at "Brazil Day," Department of Spanish and Portuguese, University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, Milwaukee, April 5, 2011.

"Roundtable on the Brazilian 2010 Presidential Election." 44<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference of the North Central Council of Latin Americanists, Rock Island, IL - USA, September 17-18, 2010.

### **Teaching Experience**

University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee

2013-2015 Graduate Instructor, Department of Political Science

Polsci 106 – Politics of the World's Nations

Polsci 320 – Politics of Developing Countries

2008-2013 Teaching Assistant in Political Science

Polsci 106 – Politics of the World's Nations

Polsci 175 – Introduction to International Relations

Polsci 359 – Problems in American Foreign Policy

Polsci 500 – Capstone Course in Political Science

Polsci 203 – Introduction to Research in Political Science

2004-2015 Lecturer, Department of Portuguese

Portugs 360 – History of Brazil – Political and Social Formation

Portugs 225 – Understanding Brazil: Race, Class, and Gender

Portugs 103 – Portuguese Languages Level I

Portugs 104 – Portuguese Languages Level II

Portugs 360 – Brazilian Literature

Portugs 229 – Immersion in Brazilian Language and Culture

2010-2015 Instructor, School of Continuing Education

Portuguese Language: Levels I, II, and III

Catholic University of Brasília

2001-2002 Lecturer, Department of International Relations

Introduction to Political Science

Modern and Contemporary Political Theory

University of Brasília

2001-2002 Graduate Instructor

Introduction to Political Science