Date of Award
Doctor of Philosophy
Matthew Petering, Hamid Seifoddini, Jangsu Yoon, Yi Hu
Artificial Meat, Differential Game, Duopoly, Dynamic Subsidy Police, Monopoly
The global demand for meat has led to significant environmental and food crises. The diffusion of artificial meat has been proposed as a promising solution, but its success relies on the support of both individual firms and the government. To assist in boosting demand during the early stages of the product life cycle and enable producers to benefit from economies of scale and experience, strategic price subsidies by the government are necessary. The study highlights the importance of dynamic subsidy policies that consider the expected decrease in production costs due to technological advancements in the artificial meat market.Using real-time modeling, the study aims to determine the optimal operational practices for firms and government policies to maximize social outcomes under competitive conditions. The study develops three frameworks of artificial meat supply chains with a government subsidy, including a monopoly and two duopoly models. One duopoly model considers competition between artificial and conventional meat firms, while the other considers Cournot competition between two artificial meat firms. This study's contribution lies in its practical recommendations for both the meat industry and policymakers to effectively implement price, quantity, and subsidies in meat production. Furthermore, the study examines the interrelationship between various technological and environmental conditions with government and firm decision-making. The findings of this study provide valuable insights into the sustainable diffusion of the artificial meat, which could significantly impact the meat industry's crises.
Qu, Jie, "Differential Game Models for Optimizing Subsidy Policies in the Artificial Meat Industry" (2023). Theses and Dissertations. 3205.
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