Date of Award

May 2024

Degree Type


Degree Name

Master of Arts



First Advisor

Joshua Spencer

Second Advisor

William Bristow

Committee Members

Joshua Spencer, William Bristow, William Penn


Finitude, Intelligibility, Metaphysics, Ontology, Pluralism


The ontological pluralist commits to a generic concept of being by claiming everything exists in one way or another. This generic concept of being includes all entities: entities existing in one way and entities existing in another. In this essay, I develop a generic concept of being using Kris McDaniel’s pluralism as a foundation. I argue that the generic concept of being is intimately linked to thought. I use my generic concept of being to respond to an objection concerning fundamentality and the principle of purity, which results in rejecting the latter. Second, I argue that McDaniel’s pluralism is inconsistent because differentiating the many ways of being relies on us. Thus, I conclude that being only appears to fragment because of us, and pluralism cannot hold for fundamental reality.

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