Speaking of Existence: a Previously Unmentioned Meta-Ontological Dispute Between Quinean Ontologists
Date of Award
May 2018
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Joshua Spencer
Committee Members
Michael Liston, Robert Schwartz
Keywords
meta-ontology, ontology, paraphrase
Abstract
In hopes of prompting a meta-ontological debate among eliminativist, Quinean ontologists, this paper shows that Trenton Merricks and Peter van Inwagen’s disagreement about the philosophy of language implies a meta-ontological disagreement. I first show that, according to van Inwagen’s philosophy of language, only artificial-language sentences assert positive existence propositions. I then use my analysis of van Inwagen’s philosophy of language to define the concept of apparent ontological commitment that he presents without a definition in his essay “Alston on ontological commitment.” I then present a previously unrecognized meta-ontological disagreement between Merricks and van Inwagen. I conclude with a discussion of the significance of this disagreement: multiple conceptions of being are equally legitimate interpretations of Quine’s meta-ontology, and so there is no settled, single Quinean meta-ontology.
Recommended Citation
Perkins, Charles Norwood Thorne, "Speaking of Existence: a Previously Unmentioned Meta-Ontological Dispute Between Quinean Ontologists" (2018). Theses and Dissertations. 1895.
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/1895