Date of Award

May 2022

Degree Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts

Department

Philosophy

First Advisor

William Bristow

Committee Members

Nataliya Palatnik, Julius Sensat

Keywords

Freedom, Hegel, Kant, Phenomenology of Spirit, Reason, Self-Consciousness

Abstract

The `Self-Consciousness' chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit has been interpreted in a variety of ways. Traditional readings, however, often do not emphasize Hegel's proclamation that the servile consciousness ``acquires a mind of its own'' and becomes ``thinking consciousness'' in the transition from `Self-Consciousness' A to B. Here, I show how to understand the end of part A and its transition to part B. In this transition, Hegel argues that the servant `comes to have a mind of their own' and becomes `thinking consciousness' or `stoic consciousness' in virtue of beginning to become rational. To this end, I argue that Hegel's argument in `Self-Consciousness' A provides realization conditions for rationality: (1) one must fear and submit to conditions of servitude; (2) one must devote one's practical activity to the service of another; and (3) one must come to understand one's practical activity (service) to have a particular form. Humans are always potentially rational, but they must realize this potentiality by fulfilling these conditions. The argument of `Self-Consciousness' A establishes both that these are the conditions and how they come about. Self-consciousness, as a result, becomes capable of judging propositions to be true or actions good.

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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