Date of Award

May 2023

Degree Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts

Department

Philosophy

First Advisor

Nataliya Palatnik

Committee Members

Joshua Spencer, Bill Bristow

Keywords

action, agency, Anscombe, mistake, practical knowledge

Abstract

A performative mistake is a mistake an agent makes when she fails to realize what she intends to bring about in the world. In this paper, I argue that performative mistakes create a puzzle for anyone who thinks that practical knowledge is required to act intentionally; it is not clear whether someone can continue an action she was doing after she commits a performative mistake. Against Adrian Haddock’s view of performative mistakes, I argue that such mistakes affect practical knowledge and therefore, cause an action process to cease. By emphasizing the deep relation between practical knowledge and practical reasoning, I show that an agent can continue an action after a performative mistake if she properly guides herself to the particular circumstances which make her previous practical reasoning applicable again.

Available for download on Monday, June 16, 2025

Included in

Philosophy Commons

Share

COinS