Date of Award
May 2016
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Michael Liston
Second Advisor
Robert Schwartz
Committee Members
Michael Liston, Robert Schwartz, Stephen Leeds
Keywords
Anti-Realism, Kyle Stanford, pessimistic induction, philosophy of science, Pragmatism, Realism
Abstract
In this paper, I characterize and criticize a recently articulated anti-realist defense, P. Kyle Stanford’s new induction over the history of science. I demonstrate that his position relies on a strong epistemological distinction between common sense knowledge and scientific knowledge. I argue that no such strong distinction exists and thus his anti-realism either collapses into realism or global skepticism. I also explore implications of this collapse for the belief/acceptance distinction and conclude that it is untenable only to accept our theories.
Recommended Citation
Schult, Jonathan Noble Bema, "What Science Doesn't Need to Know: Scientific Realism, Anti-Realism and the Continuum of Knowledge" (2016). Theses and Dissertations. 3345.
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/3345