Date of Award
Master of Arts
Michael Liston, Robert Schwartz, Stephen Leeds
Anti-Realism, Kyle Stanford, pessimistic induction, philosophy of science, Pragmatism, Realism
In this paper, I characterize and criticize a recently articulated anti-realist defense, P. Kyle Stanford’s new induction over the history of science. I demonstrate that his position relies on a strong epistemological distinction between common sense knowledge and scientific knowledge. I argue that no such strong distinction exists and thus his anti-realism either collapses into realism or global skepticism. I also explore implications of this collapse for the belief/acceptance distinction and conclude that it is untenable only to accept our theories.
Schult, Jonathan Noble Bema, "What Science Doesn't Need to Know: Scientific Realism, Anti-Realism and the Continuum of Knowledge" (2016). Theses and Dissertations. 3345.